# Profoundd archive — Epstein Files # Bates number: EFTA01756049 # Title: From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen < # Dataset: 10 # Pages: 20 # Images: 20 detected # Tags: epstein, doj, dataset-10, image-described # Source PDF: https://profoundd.com/epstein-docs/EFTA01756049/download # Doc viewer: https://profoundd.com/epstein-docs/EFTA01756049 # # Text below is what Profoundd has extracted from the source PDF. # 'ocr-enriched' tag means OCR was applied to scan-only pages. # Image descriptions are AI-generated factual captions (llava:13b). #---------------------------------------------------------------------- === SUMMARY === From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen < Sent: Tuesday, November 5, 2013 11:23 AM Subject: November S update 5 November, 2013 Article 1. =he National Interest Diplomacy Redux: Kerry's Opportunity, Obama's Test Lincoln P. Bloomfield Jr. =a href="#b">Article 2. =loomberg Israel Pushed Iran to the Table, Says Hagel =effrey Goldberg Article 3. =YT Mr. Kerry Fumbles in Egypt The Editor=al Board =a href="#b">Article 2. =loomberg Israel Pushed Iran to the Table, Says Hagel =effrey Goldberg Article 3. =YT Mr. Kerry Fumbles in Egypt The Editor=al Board =a href="#d">Article 4. =he Washington Post Saudi Arabia's Prince Turki: 'American policy has been wrong' =ally Weymouth Article 5. =all Street Journal Making the Most of the U.S. Energy Boom =eorge P. Shultz and Frederick W. Smith &n=sp; EFTA_R1_00057206 EFTA01756049 Arti=le 1. The National Intere=t Diplomacy Red=x: Kerry's Opportunity, Obama's Test Linc=ln P. Bloomfield Jr. chttplinationalinterest.org/profile/linco=n-p-bloomfield-jr> November 5, 2013 --=Since he succeeded Hillary Clinton last February as the country's sixty-=ighth secretary of state, John Kerry has quickly built on relationships fo=ged with foreign leaders during his Senate years to position diplomacy as the principal tool in addressing some of th= most consequential international security challenges currently facing the=United States. It is a big change.=While Mrs. Clinton earned plaudits for her tireless travels, the sixty-sev=nth secretary will be remembered more for talking about diplomacy's impo=tance than for actually using it to great effect. By contrast Mr. Kerry's legacy as Secretary of State is already =ure to be defined by the success or failure of major U.S. diplomatic initi=tives to secure compromises from parties to the Middle East's most deep-=ooted conflicts. Three simultaneous =egotiations now offer the prospect of achieving strategically important ob=ectives: one to produce an Israeli-Palestinian two-state solution; another=to rid Syria of its chemical-weapons arsenal; and the third to achieve an accord with Iran under which Tehran w=uld forego developing nuclear weapons. If Diplomacy Succee=s The opportunity is =ard to overstate. Officially ending sixty-five years of Palestinian grieva=ce while according Israel universally -recognized borders—issues which, w=atever one's views, have soured Arab attitudes toward the US and complicated US-Israel relations for generation= —would fulfill the declared but unmet policy aspiration of every America= president since Truman. Eliminating a large chemical-weapons arsenal that=has been used repeatedly despite international prohibitions would restore the crucial deterrent effect of t=e Chemical Weapons Convention, undermined by the Syrian regime's lethal ch=mical munitions attacks on its own civilian neighborhoods. Above all, reliably=halting Iran's nuclear weapons quest without resort to military force world not only make good on the 'reddest' of President Obama's much-rem=rked 'red lines,' it would forestall a Persian-Arab nuclear arms race astride the oil-rich Persian Gulf, a scenario made all t=e more combustible by Sunni-Shia sectarian strife and Israel's unpredict=ble response to proliferating nuclear threats in its midst. President Obama has=much riding on the outcome of these negotiations. Not only has he staked t=e credibility of his office on redressing the nuclear and chemical weapons=threats posed by Iran and Syria, respectively, but he has courted increased strategic risk in precipitously withdrawing f=rces from Iraq and (soon) Afghanistan and exhibiting only perfunctory conc=rn over large defense sector cutbacks imposed by sequestration. Achieving =ignificant security benefits through negotiation, while not necessarily compensating for these risks, would enh=nce U.S. influence at a time when m=ny in the world are questioning Ameri=a's political and economic vitality and its appetite for continued global leadership. One could envision =he President, with Middle East successes in hand, making high diplomacy a =ore meaningful dimension of the Asia "pivot," seeking to defuse escala=ing tensions between China and its neighbors by mediating 2 EFTA_R1_00057207 EFTA01756050 conflicting territorial claims—as Secretary Kerry proposed =n his recent Asia travels—and probing North Korea's Kim Jong-Un for mo=e reliable undertakings than his father and grandfather ever produced. Recognition is wide=pread that the U.S. has over-relied on 'hard power' in recent years, a=d civilian policy tools—not having demonstrated comparable potency since=perhaps the 1995 Dayton Agreement that ended hostilities in Bosnia— have lost stature and credibility compared to the =ilitary. Congressional funding has reflected the belief that DoD, alone am=ng cabinet departments, has the wherewithal to generate game-changing impa=t on security challenges overseas. A demonstration that geopolitical dealmaking is not a lost art in Washingt=n would be salutary on many levels. Is the US Up to the=Challenge? To say that success=could bring great benefits is not to predict it. Two impediments that Secr=tary Kerry has—justifiably, in the author's view—chosen to disregard=are, first, the perennial penchant of White House advisors to shield the President from political exposure to high-pro=ile endeavors carrying the risk of failure, and second, the potential that=congressional partisanship —ignoring the old 'water's edge' boundar=—could impede US negotiators' ability to deliver on a major agreement. The stakes in all t=ree of these arenas justify taking political risk, but as in military ende=vors, clarity about the long-term stakes for all concerned parties, and th= breadth of planning in support of negotiations, directly affect the prospects for success or failure. Here i= where doubts arise about the Administration's readiness to deliver on t=e promise of the diplomatic tracks it has so vigorously embraced.c/=> While each of these=negotiations is underway without undue controversy, questions are already =rising in the Syria and Iran tracks as to whether the US may be aiming too=low, preemptively limiting its objectives to what it believes could be agreed upon most easily, quickly and with the=least resistance from interested parties, including Congress. The benefits of nar=owly crafted agreements resulting in the dismantling of Syria's chemical=weapons and a monitored pullback of Iran's nuclear enrichment activities=would be deemed by many in the US as preferable to no agreement with a corresponding increased likelihood of resort to mil=tary force. For Syria, Russia and Iran, modest concessions would represent=a price worth paying if this meant the US would refrain from challenging t=eir larger, more strategic and longer-term objectives in the region. US negotiators, the=efore, could encounter surprisingly little pushback from Syria and Iran, r=spectively, and have Moscow's support, if the goals pursued are tightly =rawn and do not entail much if any political discomfiture for those parties. The one mystery emerging from this diploma=ic blitz is the Administration's own view of long-term US national inter=sts in the Middle East, and whether the current negotiations are aligned w=th a coherent strategy to pursue them. Israeli-Palestinian=Talks on Course, but what about the spoiler? Start with the trac= that is best-positioned: the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. US negotia=or Martin Indyk brings the expertise and the diplomatic and bureaucratic c=edentials necessary to hold his own in a negotiation where required compromises can be brokered only by mainta=ning the complete trust of the parties. Ambassador Indyk has assembled a q=ality team and kept a low media profile—all steps consistent with a prod=ctive negotiating approach. Unfortunately, neit=er party to the talks—Israeli or Palestinian Authority representatives=97has the capacity to address what has in recent years become the greatest=(if not the sole) source of insecurity in their midst, namely heavily armed nonstate actors equipped and funded by I=an. The range, accuracy and quantity of rocket and missile threats against=population centers in Israel from Hizballah across the Lebanese border and=Hamas in Gaza have steadily increased. Any confusion about=Israel's overriding security preoccupation should have been dispelled by=Prime Minister Netanyahu's October 1 address to the UN General Assembly.=While pledging his readiness to make "an historic 3 EFTA_R1_00057208 EFTA01756051 compromise with our Palestinian neighbors," Mr. Netanyahu spent=the majority of his speech articulating a detailed warning about the dange=s posed by Iran's fundamentalist regime. Notwithstanding Ambassador Indy.'s wide policy mandate, it very likely does not extend to US policy on Iran. Syria—Understanda=le Reluctance but Troubling Missteps The Syria crisis—=dmittedly a dauntingly violent and complicated conflict where American int=rests are less than obvious to the public—has revealed the Administratio= to have a penchant for reacting to rather than shaping events. Much has been said about the sudden lurches in the Pr=sident's approach. He postured to use force and then paused, belatedly s=bmitting the issue for congressional authorization, only to pull back in t=e face of insufficient support. Secretary Kerry's=seemingly spontaneous response to a London press query about conditions un=er which the US might refrain from attacking Syria prompted a stunningly q=ick Russian initiative to negotiate the removal of Syria's chemical weapons, challenging Washington to take 'y=s' for an answer—which it did. While officials tout President Obama'= effective threat of force in compelling Syria to forfeit its chemical wea=ons, the UN Security Council resolution adopted with US support would require a second resolution before punitive action u=der Chapter VII is authorized —a precedent the George W. Bush administrat=on famously resisted on Iraq. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Secr=tary Kerry so readily welcomed Russia's offer of a negotiated dismantlement of Syria's chemical arsenal precisel= because of Mr. Obama's unreadiness to authorize military action.=/p> Even assuming that =he Syria chemical weapons disarmament process fully succeeds, major questi=ns remain. Yes, Mr. Obama will have recouped a measure of presidential cre=ibility by backing up his declared 'red line' on Syria's use of chemical weapons, albeit months after t=eir use had been confirmed by intelligence. But what of the President's =ther Syria 'marker —his August 18, 2011 declaration that "the time=has come for President Assad to step aside"? That declaration, although repeated as recently as October 14 by Secretary Kerry, shows no sign of being pursued, much less fulfilled= notwithstanding administration pronouncements that the eleven-country "=eneva process" will effect a governmental transition in Damascus.=/p> The Atlantic Counci='s Fred Hof has posed a question that many Syrians=are surely asking as well: has the US made Bashar al-Assad "an irreplaceable party to a long-term contract" to fu=fill its chemical weapons agreement? President Obama appears as indifferen= about whether his demand to rid Syria of its homicidal dictatorship will =ver be carried out as he is ardent about having his red line restored on chemical weapons. Having gained this =eprieve, President Assad can be forgiven for doubting that the threat of U= military force remains a realistic danger to his regime's survival, or =o his armed forces' freedom of action against the domestic opposition. It is Mr. Assad's good fortune that, wi=h the military strikes options pulled back from the brink, the Obama natio=al-security team left itself with no other levers of influence at hand to =ontain the spreading Syria crisis. When President Obam= initially solicited options to exert leverage on Syria in this crisis, hi= national-security staff turned straight to the Pentagon, which dutifully =enerated kinetic strike packages and target sets. Nowhere did that process reflect the Administration's forward-looking doctrinal approa=h to international -security challenges ying success to the integration of "all of the tools of American powe=" in a whole-of-government operation. The President also ignored the =ounsel of his top military advisor, General Martin Dempsey, who had public=y cautioned that in Syria "you need a strategy to tie military options with other instruments of power." 4 EFTA_R1_00057209 EFTA01756052 It is a rare specta=le to find the Arab League Foreign Ministers formallycal=ing for war crimes prosecutions against a fellow Arab leader and his inner cir=le, yet even more striking that US government —which sports a full Office=of Global Criminal Justice led by an Ambassador -at-Large, solely for this =urpose—apparently has not seen fit to lead on this issue or even consider the threat of war crimes prosecutio= as a potential tool of leverage on Mr. Assad's regime. While Hezbollah and=lran's Revolutionary Guards have invested heavily in television and othe= media outlets as a means of shaping public opinion to their advantage, th= administration apparently sees no opportunity in the Arab world's information domain to expose the cynical and illegit=mate misdeeds of those directly responsible for this crisis. And while Pre=ident Obama's June decision to arm and train the Syrian opposition has t=anslated into what the Washington Post describes chttp://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-10-02/world/4=616148_1_u-s- intelligence-analysts-training-program-rebel> as a "minuscule" clandestine program, Moscow and Tehran continue a robust flow of heavy arms, fighters =nd funds into Syria to sustain the Assad regime. In sum, Washington =howl no evidence of mustering either military or nonmilitary tools of infl=ence that would offer a credible prospect of rescuing what remains of Syri='s largely defenseless population from the ravages of Bashar al- Assad's conventional forces. With well over 110=000 killed and an estimated seven million displaced, one third of them ove=flowing refugee camps in neighboring countries, one finds no inclination w=thin the Administration to invoke—as it had in Libya—the humanitarian intervention doctrine known as Responsi=ility to Protect. Indeed, the US-Russia-Syria chemical weapons disarmament=project has become, pace the Nobel Committee, the ethical antithesis of Re=ponsibility to Protect, veritably a License to Ignore. These policy foible= obscure the larger strategic landscape at play in Syria's conflict. Rus=ia's opportunism in seizing upon Secretary Kerry's press remark to off=r full partnership in eliminating Syrian chemical weapons was clearly motivated less by the fear of civilian casual=ies from "one stiff breeze" of toxic vapors than by its interest in ke=ping the Assad regime in power. Having no other major clients for its arms=export industry since the fall of Muammar Qadhafi, no other port of access for its navy in the Levant, and an affini=y for a secular regime—however brutal—that bills itself as a bulwark a=ainst Sunni Arab religious extremism, Russia has deftly kept America from =etting in the way of its core interests in the region. If the Administrati=n sees advantage in giving Moscow a pass over its weapons being used by th= Syrian military to lay waste to populated cities and towns, its passivity=toward Iran's regional activities demands explanation. Iran and its proxy force Hezbollah have massively supported t=e Assad regime, revealing an historically rare condition of vulnerability =o prospective regime change in Damascus. Hezbollah, which ha= the blood of US Marines on its hands and has become so heavily armed that=it sustained hostilities with Israel for several days in 2006, is now poli=ically exposed back home in Lebanon and throughout the Arab world for fighting and killing fellow Muslims in a=neighboring Arab country on behalf of a secular dictatorship. Its operatio=s, today as thirty years ago, are wholly dependent on continued support fr=m Tehran. The Iranian cleric =eading an organization charged with countering the "soft war" against =he fundamentalist regime in Tehran, Hojjat al-Islam Mehdi Taeb, explained reiterated the official US view that "We're not go=ng to allow Iran to create a nuclear weapon." The carefully engin=ered June election of Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran, and this regime=stalwart's genial pursuit of détente with the US and normalized foreig= relations with others, have challenged Washington to respond with comparable tactical skill and strategic purpose= Some observers —press photographers, at the very least—were disappoint=d when President Obama's opportunity to greet President Rouhani personal=y at the UN in September did not materialize. Mr. Obama's telephone call to Mr. Rouhani as the latter headed for the a=rport to return to Iran was a hospitable gesture regardless of one's pol=cy view of Iran, a privilege US presidents can exercise as a consequence o= hosting the United Nations on American soil. Yet the ensuing pre=s statements by White House aides promoted the disturbing theme that, just=as Secretary Kerry had met with Iranian foreign minister Zarif in New York= President Obama had made a connection with his own "counterpart," talking 'president to president' with =assan Rouhani. President Obama would have been well advised to initiate a =all the next morning to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Not only would that h=ve tested the sincerity of Tehran's apparent warming to the United States, it would have dispelled the damaging misimpr=ssion that an unelected religious autocrat holds a superior protocol rank =o the president of the United States. That Mr. Obama, in =is September 24 speech to the UN General Assembly and subsequently, cited = fatwa by the Supreme Leader without irony or caveat, as though this carri=d some recognized legal effect, only underscored the uncertainty about the new Iranian President's own author=ty to set national policy on the very matter to be negotiated. US and European dip=omats emerged from the initial mid-October nuclear talks in Geneva remarki=g on the change in Iran's posture from previous negotiations. Foreign Mi=ister Zarif reportedly engaged in detailed, substantive discussions about the nuclear program, and told the press afte=ward that "serious give-and-take has taken place." It is a welcome cha=ge, and administration officials are now seized with two entirely predicta=le tasks: eliciting from the Iranian side a set of commitments that the US and allies persuasively believe will=prevent a future nuclear weapons "breakout;" and offering Iran in retu=n a commitment to deliver an agreed level of sanctions relief. Lead US negotiator =endy Sherman, in congressional hearings before the initial Geneva session,=assured legislators that the President is pursuing a comprehensive agreeme=t, not interim steps wherein a partial lifting of sanctions could deflate international solidarity to pressure Ir=n economically before a satisfactory nuclear deal is reached. It is the co=rect approach. Yet the Administration now, predictably, finds itself caugh= in a two-front negotiation, needing to overcome deep skepticism and a backdrop of troubled relations not only =ith Tehran but with Capitol Hill. 6 EFTA_R1_00057211 EFTA01756054 As Congress plays i=s customary 'bad cop' role in support of a satisfactory nuclear deal b= proposing still tighter sanctions—the one factor Washington experts seem to agree =as prompted Tehran's conciliatory turn—it is unclear how the US negoti=tors can elicit from Mr. Zarif and his masters a sufficient Iranian compro=ise that will not look to all the world like a capitulation. And if the US side cannot bring to the table assuranc=s of sanctions relief sufficient to seal an acceptable deal, its predicame=t may induce paralyzing caution on other policy fronts deemed important to=Tehran, lest the collaborative spirit at the nuclear talks be spoiled. All three negotiati=ns underway, regarding Israel-Palestine, Syria, and Iran's nuclear progr=m, are inescapably attached to larger region-wide dynamics that will frust=ate American objectives if not addressed by US foreign policy. President Obama needs a strategy. American Interests,=American Principles, American Influence—an American Strategy Policy veterans in =ashington cannot point to any prior case where economic sanctions have "=icked in" strongly enough to produce the desired result—until now. San=tions against the regimes led by Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam Hussein and Bashar al-Assad produced scarcity and hardsh=p for the poorest of their citizens but enriched the leadership circle, wh= exacted higher rents on the basic commodities they alone could smuggle in= Kudos to the US Tre=sury Department for locating and constricting the key transactional nodes =hrough which Iran's economy connects to the world. Yet the tool of econo=ic sanctions against Iran, while more potent than any previous instance, should be troubling to US policymakers.=With the exception of the clerical regime, Iran's 79 million people ough= to be the target of American goodwill, not collective punishment for the =cts of their dictators. Sustaining the US economy as the world's strongest depends on free trade; a latter-=ay 'blockade' of any country by the United States should be a rare exc=ption, for policy and moral reasons. One consequence of =he Iran sanctions that mirrors past cases, as Fareed Zakaria has pointed out=/span> , is that Iran's Revolutionary Guards "profit from the sanctions because=their businesses have become the only path for trade and smuggling." For these reasons, =resident Obama should strengthen his negotiating hand with Iran by collaborating with Congress to make clear, not just what further economic pain and=isolation will result from Tehran's refusal to accept a verifiable end to its nuclear weapons program, but the=relief and rewards that a comprehensive nuclear concession by Iran's lea=ers will produce. Every citizen of Iran should become aware that the US is=offering an end to those sanctions that were created for the purpose of pressuring Iran on the nuclear issue=97whether via executive order or legislation. The Congress could also indi=ate its readiness in principle to support the lifting of UN Security Counc=l sanctions relating to the nuclear issue. This step would pla=e the onus for compromise back on the Iranian side of the negotiating tabl=, forcing the regime to explain to its people why it would not accept a de=I codifying what it has already said is its policy, namely that it does not seek to build nuclear weapons that =t wants sanctions relief in order to secure an immediate upsurge in the en=ire country's standard of living. Assuming Iran can say yes to comprehen=ive nuclear restraints for comprehensive sanctions relief, the Revolutionary Guards' lucrative smuggling business=would be over. More importantly, the terrible choice between war with Iran=or a regional nuclear arms race would be averted. Reciprocating Presi=ent Rouhani's expressed desire for improved relations, the Congress and =dministration should even consider fattening Iran's 'prize' for an a=ceptable nuclear deal with a package of increased student visas, cultural and 7 EFTA_R1_00057212 EFTA01756055 sporting exchanges and the like. Steps to empo=er Iranian civil society economically, counter internal censorship and pro=aganda, and spread goodwill between the two countries' populations are a=l consistent with US security interests once the nuclear weapons threat is reliably controlled. What President Obam= should avoid, however, is encumbering the nuclear negotiation with other =ssues complicating US-Iran relations. "We are not seeking regime change,=94 Mr. Obama declared at the UN in September. This statement cleverly spoke to two audiences —the clerics in Tehran who=e singular priority is remaining in power; and the president's domestic =olitical allies who associate 'regime change' with neoconservative att=tudes favored in the previous administration. A more appropriate =ormulation in the President's speech would have made clear that if his A=ministration does not seek regime change, it carries no particular brief t= maintain this regime in power either. The principle of popular sovereignty should be at the heart of US policy, =nd given the storied history of US meddling in Iranian politics, Iranian l=aders would be hard-pressed to complain if an American president said that=the Iranian people should have the ultimate say in how they are governed. The fact is that Ha=san Rouhani and the Iranian Foreign Ministry do not represent the Islamic =epublic on some major issues relevant to negotiations in the Middle East. =he commander of the elite Qods Force atop the Revolutionary Guards organization, Qassem Suleimani, is leading t=e effort in Syria to train and resupply Lebanese Hezbollah fighters in def=nse of the Assad regime—a vital interest to the Tehran regime, as noted.=Suleimani also appears to run the "Iraq" account for Tehran, coordinating with Prime Minister Maliki in =upport of extralegal killings of defenseless Iranian dissidents inside Ira= by a special unit of Iraqi forces attached to the Prime Minister's offi=e. The paramilitary ca=paigns supported by Iran's Revolutionary Guards in Syria and Iraq are no= unconnected to American interests. In Iraq, five armed attacks since mid-=009 by Iraqi military units, or by Iranian-supplied militias passing through their lines, against more than 3,000 unarmed Iran=an dissidents place the United States in breach of its obligations under t=e Fourth Geneva Convention. A promise of protection, formally given by the=US to every one of these individuals in 2004, remains an American duty today because the Iraqi government has r=peatedly violated its 2009 commitment to provide protection for these peop=e, engaging instead in lethal attacks against them in coordination with Te=ran. The US understandab=y wants a robust and lasting security assistance relationship with Iraq'= armed forces after so much sacrifice by American forces in Iraq. Yet it i= compromised by its failure to live up to not only international humanitarian law, but Section 3 of the Arms Expo=t Control Act prohibiting arms transfers to militaries that misuse them, a=d the so-called Leahy Human Rights laws prohibiting training for any milit=ry units implicated in gross human rights violations. The latest assault,=the September 1 execution of 52 defenseless Iranian exiles by Iraqi specia= forces using handcuffs and silencers, and the abduction of seven others w=o are still missing, occurred five days after Qassem Suleimani met with Prime Minister Maliki and his aides t= plan the operation, according to the exiled group, the MEK. The massacre =ent largely unreported in the American media, the story overshadowed by th= September 2 announcement in Tehran of President Rouhani's plans to travel to the United States. America's policy =apses in both Syria and Iraq, the portfolio directly overseen by Qassim Su=eimani on Iran's behalf, come as well at the expense of Iran's regiona= strategic rival: the Sunni Arab world and Saudi Arabia in particular. Writes veter=n international correspondent Arnaud de Borchgrave chttp://www.upi.com/Top_Newshnalysiside- Borchgrave/2013/10/15/Commentary-Geopolitical-amnesia/UPI-68501=81836239/> , "The longer t=e fighting in Syria, the more the situation in Iraq deteriorates and the c=oser Iran's military Imullahocracy' comes to dominating the entire r=gion." 8 EFTA_R1_00057213 EFTA01756056 The Administration=92s recent move restricting Egypt's military assistance pipeline—a cor=erstone of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty that has kept Israel's southern=flank quiet for 34 years—only adds to the insecurity felt by America's longstanding Arab allies as well as Israel. President Obama mus= separate these wider complications of US-Iran relations from the nuclear =egotiations, but without disregarding them. Although Mr. Obama expressed t=e hope at the UN that a nuclear agreement with Iran can "help serve as a foundation for a broader peace," it sho=ld be clear that Tehran's Revolutionary Guards have every intention to c=ntinue prosecuting their campaigns, working through extremist non-state ac=ors, to destabilize rival societies to the west. Until the day comes=when no more Iranian arms, money, explosives and training are flowing to c=ient militias, Ambassador Indyk is going to need to point to a regional Am=rican security posture that Israelis and Palestinians can believe in should they be otherwise prepared to bring=forth an historic final-status settlement. If at the same time Egypt's m=litary is casting about for alternative strategic partnerships, Mr. Indyk=92s task will be that much more daunting. The US has every ri=ht, and every interest, in pursuing its own interests throughout the Middl= East. If success in effecting a transition in Syria to a more acceptable =uccessor government is taken as a setback in Tehran, that should not deter Washington. Nor should the US hesitate an= longer to impose a principled, legally correct line with Iraqi Prime Mini=ter Maliki in order that US-Iraq military relations will not be further ta=nted by dishonor or moral compromise. Should the Obama team see fit to reaffirm its commitment to the security o= Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab states, and to Egypt's military, this re=uilding of confidence with the Sunni Arab world should neither surprise Ir=n nor perturb the nuclear negotiations. 'Peace through strength' has always entailed much more than combat pow=r alone. Conclusion—Discre=e Deal with Iran, Invest in Syria's Outcome, Restore Regional Confidence= Enable Israeli-Palestinian Settlement With congressional =upport, the president should seize the initiative and give his negotiators=the requisite leverage to secure, as soon as practicable, a comprehensive =ut discrete nuclear-for-sanctions agreement with Iran. Isolating that issue will guard against policy paralysis in oth=r areas deemed to be sensitive for Iran, and empower the Administration to=go to work repairing its frayed standing in the Arab world. The dismantlement o= Syria's chemical arsenal will be of little benefit if, thanks to US ina=tion, Hezbollah emerges strengthened and emboldened, Syria's Kurds break=away, and the Sunni majority embraces the only 'help' currently on offer—from radical Sunni religious extremis=s drawn to the sectarian fight from all over the region. What began as an =dealistic 'Arab spring' moment is deteriorating into another potential=Afghanistan, placing enormous new security and economic burdens on Jordan, Lebanon 1151, Turkey, Iraq and, by extension, Israel. Rather than letting 1161 extremists maintain the initiative, the President should challenge his national-security team =o devise a whole-of-government strategy worthy of the name for Syria [=7), one that does not place US forces on Syrian territory or pilots in Syr=an airspace. These regional circ=mstances will inevitably affect Ambassador Indyk's prospects of success =s well. Israel's leaders will be less likely to trust in a settlement wi=h the Palestinians if the surrounding Arab countries are engulfed in crisis. Israeli citizens will find it harder to =erceive a peace benefit if they remain in the crosshairs of not only nucle=r threats but also ever more deadly mortars, rockets and missiles smuggled=to local extremists by Iran's Revolutionary Guards. With so much invest=d and so much at stake in the Middle East, it is never too late to step up=efforts to advance American interests. The credibility of presidential red=lines matters, but only by exercising leadership in taming the dangers clouding the region's future will the U= preserve its influence and reputation, which are foundations of American =ower. 9 EFTA_R1_00057214 EFTA01756057 Secretary Kerry's=big bet on Middle East diplomacy can pay big dividends if backed by a forc=ful presidential commitment, a coherent strategic vision, integrated lines=of policy, and an active array of interagency tools of influence. The keys to success or failure now rest largely in Pre=ident Obama's hands. Ambassador Bloom=ield is a former US Special Envoy, Assistant Secretary of State for Politi=al Military Affairs and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affair=. He is Chairman of the Stimson Center. =1span> Arti=le 2. Bloomberg Israel Pushed=lran to the Table, Says Hagel Jeffrey Goldberg Nov 4, 2013 -- Last=week, Secretary of State John Kerry, the Obama administration's most fer=ent supporter of nuclear negotiations with Iran, by the conservative wing of the pro-Israel camp as a danger to the Jewish state, portrayed as someone who is soft on =ran and naive about the Palestinians and their intentions. These accusations a=e now mainly forgotten. Hagel has worked assiduously to ensure that Israel=maintains its so-called qualitative military edge over its foes; he has de=eloped close working ties with Israel's defense minister and its top generals; and Jewish groups, once wary, have =mbraced him. Last week, he spoke to a national meeting of the Anti- Defamat=on League, and publicly confirmed that the Pentagon has fast-tracked the d=livery of six V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor airplanes to Israel. "They're going to the head of the line," he sai=. These are aircraft that could be used to stealthily insert commandos int= such hostile and distant locales as ... Iran. Still, Israel isn't getti=g all it wants from the U.S. -- specifically, the sort of munitions that could blast through the reinforced roofs of Ira=ian nuclear facilities. "I suspect the Is=aelis would like an inventory of everything, but certain things we do keep=as proprietary, and they know that," Hagel said. "On the standoff weap=ns piece, that's right on track -- the Israelis are signed off on that," he said, referring to weapons that can be fired=at targets from far distances. In a 75-minute conv=rsation, Hagel gave me his version of the Middle East crisis tour. Talking=with him, I found, was not like talking to Donald Rumsfeld. Interviewing R=msfeld at this table was like interviewing a razor blade; one wrong move and you'd get cut. Hagel, on the other han=, is tranquil, conversational, and very, very discursive. I found it diffi=ult, at certain moments in the conversation, to make out any obvious theme= in the Obama administration's approach to the region. This might not be Hagel's fault, of course. The administr=tion's current approach is, to borrow from Churchill, a kind of themeles= pudding. Circumstances have =onspired to curse Hagel with a challenging diplomatic portfolio, even as h= is forced to spend much of his time wrestling the Pentagon budget to the =round. It is well known that he is the main point of American contact for General Abdelfatah al-Seesi, the le=der of the Egyptian military junta; the two men have spoken more than 25 t=mes since the July couplike event that deposed the elected president, the =uslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Mursi. But Hagel 10 EFTA_R1_00057215 EFTA01756058 has also been holding the hands of other Arab leaders of the (re=atively speaking) moderate camp, who are uniformly worried that the U.S. i= withdrawing from the Middle East. These figures include Mohammed bin Zaye= Al Nahyan, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, and the most important defense figure in the United Arab Emirat=s. MBZ, as he is known, is one of the many Arab leaders who fear (as Israe=ls leaders do) that any vacuum created by the departure of the U.S. from=the Middle East will be filled by Iran. In my next post, 1=9211 discuss Hagel's argument that, despite the creation of a "new wor=d order" in which power is rapidly diffusing, there is no plausible subs=itute for the U.S., and also why, despite his obvious pro-Israel record as defense secretary, he is still married to a s=t of ideas about Middle East peace that may no longer be operative. Jeffrey Goldberg=is a Bloomberg View columnist. =/span> Arti=le 3. NYT Mr. Kerry Fum=les in Egypt The Editorial Board chttp://www.nytimes.com/interactive/opinio=/editorialboard.html> November 4, 2013 --=Secretary of State John Kerry's trip to Egypt chttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/04/world/middleeast/kerry-=gypt-visit.html?ref=middleeast> for murder in a politically motivated case (now postponed until Jan. 8) that had the whole country on =dge. Mr. Morsi has been held incommunicado and charged, along with other d=fendants allied with the Muslim Brotherhood, with inciting violence in the=deaths of about a dozen people in clashes last December outside the presidential palace after he took nea=- dictatorial powers. Whatever validity t=e charges contain, there is little doubt that the case is part of an attem=t by the military to crush the Muslim Brotherhood and other opponents. It =s also hypocritical, since crackdowns engineered by the generals themselves have killed hundreds of people and l=d to the arrests and imprisonment of thousands more. Mr. Kerry also misf=red on the tone and content of his talks with Gen. Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi, t=e country's strongman and ringleader of the coup. The Morsi trial never =ame up. And they undercut whatever cautionary message President Obama had hoped to send last month when he suspended the=delivery of major weapons systems to Egypt and withheld $260 million in ai=. "It is not a punishment," Mr. Kerry said. He appeared to acce=t the notion that the generals and the civilian government they installed =re on a path to real democracy. "The road map is being carried out to th= best of our perception," he said cryptically, referring to plans for a referendum on an amended Constitution and promise= to hold parliamentary and presidential elections by next spring. But the Constitutio= is still a work in progress, and the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood =oes not bode well for an inclusive political system. Moreover, General Sis= made no pledge to lift the hated state of emergency when it expires later this month. 11 EFTA_R1_00057216 EFTA01756059 The United States a=d Egypt share many important interests, including peace with Israel, secur=ty in Sinai, the free flow of traffic through the Suez Canal and cooperati=n against terrorism. It is important for both nations to keep trying to work together. But they also need to be=clear about their differences, especially on what the word democracy means= Mr. Kerry has muddied the waters. =/span> Arti=le 4. The Washington Post= Saudi Arabia=92s Prince Turki: 'American policy has been wrong' Lally Weymouth Nov. 4, 2013 -- The=Post's Lally Weymouth spoke this week with Saudi Arabia's Prince Turki= former chief of intelligence and brother of the foreign minister. Excerpt=: Q. Who made the =ecision to turn down the U.N. Security Council seat? A. It is always in =he end the king [King Abdullahj who makes the decision. But it wasn't a =himsical decision. Nor was it, as some newspapers here have described it, =one in a fit of pique. It was a studied and considered decision. The kingdom cond=cted a very high-level campaign for the seat, and many people were surpris=d by the decision to turn it down. Some governments ta=e decisions that not everybody knows about it. My understanding is that [t=e decision was based on] the situation in the Security Council chttp://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2013/1418/why- did-saudi-arabia-reject-a-un-security-council-seatk , particularly on the Syrian issue, but not just on that. You had also the i=sue of nuclear non-proliferation ... and then you have the i=sue of Palestine, which has been with us since 1947. These three issues cu=minated in the decision where the kingdom felt that, by not taking the seat, it would make the point to the Security Coun=il that there is a need to fix it. Do you think the=decision was building for a long time? Were President Obama's decision n=t to act on Syria and the United Nations Security Council's decision to =ass a weak resolution on Syria the last straws? It was based on U.N= Security Council decisions, especially the one on the issue of [Syrian] chemical weapons removal The fact that it=had no enforcement powers? Not only that — t=e fact that even if it had enforcement powers, it would only remove the ch=mical weapons. But [Syrian President] Bashar al-Assad can continue to kill=his people using aircraft, artillery, Scud missiles and other lethal means. This also followed the Chinese and R=ssian veto of the resolution that would have put in place an interim 12 EFTA_R1_00057217 EFTA01756060 gover=ment composed of all the factions in Syria — that was put in front of th= Security Council a year and a half ago by the Arab League. What do you and =our country think is the best outcome in Syria? The best outcome is=to stop the killing. How?<=pan style="font-size:18.0pt"> We had a proposal, =ut forth by our foreign minister, that you have to level the playing field= And that means Bashar's military superiority has to be checked by givin= the opposition the means to defend themselves = You're not talking about sending troops on the ground. Over the p=st 2% years, if anti-tank, anti-aircraft defensive weapons had been dis=ributed to the opposition — and not all the opposition, [but] the opposi=ion that is for an inclusive Syria — then they would have been able to c=eckmate the military superiority of Bashar al-Assad and force him to come to the negotiating table. Unfortunately, th=t did not happen. Europe and America continued to deny the opposition the =eans to defend against Bashar's lethal weapons, the Russians and the Iranians continued to supply Bashar with whatever he needed. So it's up to =he U.S. and the Europeans to arm the opposition? Absolutely. The Europeans put an embargo on arms to Syria Every day there are=more than 50 to 100 people killed in Syria. And the world sits back and wa=ches. Do you feel Pres=dent Obama just doesn't get it? I don't know if h= gets it or not. But I think the world community is definitely at fault he=e. The Russians because they are supporting Bashar and allowing him to do =he killing. The Chinese because they have vetoed any measures in the United Nations to prevent him doing that. =he Europeans for not supplying the opposition with weapons. The United Sta=es for continually not supplying the opposition with what they need. It'= a worldwide apathy — a criminally negligent attitude toward the Syrian people. So what do you t=ink will happen in Syria? They are going to c=ntinue the killing. And Assad will s=ay in power as things stand now? 13 EFTA_R1_00057218 EFTA01756061 As things stand now= Bashar al-Assad is under the protection of the Security Council because o= the chemical weapons resolution. And [U.S.] Secretary [of State John] Ker=y is saying that Bashar al-Assad has to stay in power until the chemical weapons are removed and everybody is s=ying these weapons aren't going to be removed until next year. So you ca= imagine the public opinion throughout the Muslim world, seeing this trage=y happening and nobody willing to come forward. How do you see t=e situation in Iran? When President [Has=an] =span style="font-size:18.0pt; color:windowtext; text-decoration:none">Ro=hani was elected chttp://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/06/17/5-t=ings-to-know-about-irans-new-president- hassan-rouhanik , King Abdullah sent him a note of congratulations and expressed the wish fo= a fruitful relationship with Iran, and Rouhani responded in kind. Since t=en, he has made several statements about how he would like to see improved=relations with Saudi Arabia. Under [former Iranian president Mahmoudj Ahmadinejad, there was a very strained =elationship. The king during those years publicly called on Iran not to in=erfere in Arab affairs. As you can see from Lebanon to Syria, to Iraq to B=hrain, there is a chain of actions taken by Iran to interfere in Arab affairs.... The other aspect is=the issue of nuclear nonproliferation. Saudi Arabia has always been consistently supportive