# Profoundd archive — Epstein Files # Bates number: EFTA01759876 # Title: From: Office of Teqe Rod-Larsen # Dataset: 10 # Pages: 3 # Tags: epstein, doj, dataset-10 # Source PDF: https://profoundd.com/epstein-docs/EFTA01759876/download # Doc viewer: https://profoundd.com/epstein-docs/EFTA01759876 # # Text below is what Profoundd has extracted from the source PDF. # 'ocr-enriched' tag means OCR was applied to scan-only pages. # Image descriptions are AI-generated factual captions (llava:13b). #---------------------------------------------------------------------- === SUMMARY === From: Office of Teqe Rod-Larsen Sent: Monday, August 26, 2013 4:46 PM Subject: August 26 update 26 August, 2013 Article 1. The Daily Beast Obama's New Syria Options Leslie H. Gelb Article 6. The National Interest Arab Spring or Islamic Spring? Ross Harrisonchttp://nationalinterest.org/profile/ross-harrison> Article 7. The New York Times Reading Tweets from Iran Editorial EFTA_R1_00063893 EFTA01759876 Article 1. The Daily Beast Obama's New Syria Options Leslie H. Gelb, President Obama is sheltering his nex= moves even from his closest advisers as the whole Obama administration in=hes painfully toward what they all see as the moment of truth in Syria. Once again, he could walk away from the use of force because that option ha= little backing either in his administration or among Americans generally.=But after an endless run of inter-agency meetings at the White House, the =ense is that he is nearing three conclusions: first, the Syrian government=has put his credibility on the line irrevocably and inescapably; second, h= now must take direct military action to punish the government of Presiden= Bashar al-Assad, though not in a manner that commits him to further use a= force; and third, he needs to combine whatever force he uses now with dra=atic and diplomatic initiatives. Officials expect White House decisions to come quickly at this point. Most =fficials openly lament how they are being whipsawed between a general cons=nsus in the administration against employing U.S. military force backed by=huge opposition to doing so (60 percent) among polled Americans, and a gro=ing and potent consensus among foreign policy experts and politicians to g=ve Assad a hard punch. Most administration officials and most Americans just can't see any lasti=g benefits from any form of direct U.S. military involvement in Syria, and=they fear that initial actions would lead only to more and more force. On =he other hand, policy experts and politicians are arguing with increasing =igor that America's and Obama's credibility in the Middle East and in =he world are on the line, that he has drawn so many red lines against Assad's use of chemicals that nei=her he nor the U.S. can afford further thumb-sucking. This credibility arg=ment is deeply reinforced by a humanitarian one. The refugee and death tolls are already sky high and leaping daily and now require more th=n mere rhetoric and emergency aid. With these pressures and considerations in mind, here are the overlapping p=licy choices the Obama team has looked at over the last week: 1. Wait on the reports of U.N. inspectors, now apparently heading toward th= site where chemical weapons were, in all probability, fired off. The expe=tation is the inspectors will find that such weapons were, in fact, employ=d. Few expect the inspectors can come to a definitive conclusion on whethe= the government or the rebels fired them. But the presumption is bound to =e that the weapons belong to the government and that the government was re=ponsible. As quickly as possible, take the matter to the U.N. Security Cou=cil, but anticipate a Russian and Chinese veto of military action. Taking =hese steps is more or less a given for Obama to satisfy his impulses to bo= to international law. 2. Meantime, go to friendly Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf =mirates, plus key European allies such as Britain and France and see if th=y will join a military coalition as they did in Libyachttp://www.thedailyb=ast.com/newsweek/2011/04/03/nicolas-sarkozy-s-war-on-gaddafi-influenced- by=philosopher-bernard-henri-levy.html>. This wouldn't provide full interna=ional or legal cover, but it would help. U.S. officials don't expect muc= support from Arab states, but hope for some from Paris and London. All th=s is to ensure the U.S. doesn't have to act alone. 3. Provide more and better military arms to the rebels, and this time actua=ly expedite the equipment. Most administration officials still don't li=e this option. They remain unconvinced that they know enough about the reb=ls to make sure the aid doesn't fall into the wrong hands. 4. Attack Syrian government military targets with cruise missiles, drones o= with the foregoing plus piloted U.S. aircraft. The number of attacks woul= be limited. The U.S. military still doesn't care for this option any mo=e than it likes the idea of arming the rebels. They don't see its having=much effect on either Syrian capability or morale. They worry that it will=produce only demands for more bombing. 2 EFTA_R1_00063894 EFTA01759877 5. Go further than air attacks and establish no fly zones over parts of Syr=a. These zones would border Turkey and Jordan, and perhaps Iraq, with the =ntent of protecting refugees and hitting Syrian fighters when and where po=sible. Some Congressional hawks love this option, but in the view of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, it would be very difficult to establish and cond=ct. The logistical problems are enormous and at least Turkey and Jordan wo=Id have to participate, an unlikely prospect. 6. Try to use the horror and political pressures of 3 EFTA_R1_00063895 EFTA01759878