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# Title:        Office of Terje Rod-Larsen •L i> April 16 update
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=== SUMMARY ===
Office of Terje Rod-Larsen •L i> April 16 update 16 April, 2012 B B Article 1. The Washington Post Events do not wait as Obama plays a delay defense Jackson Diehl Article 2. Project Syndicate A Post-Arab Spring Strategy Volker Perthes Article 3. NYT Europebs Economic Suicide Paul Krugman EFTA_R1_00167746 EFTA01809349 Article 4. Today's Zaman Israeli-American relations after AIPAC Summit: Opportunities in 2013 and Iran Emrah Usta Article 5. National Defense University Press The Evolution of Saudi


=== EXTRACTED TEXT ===
Office of Terje Rod-Larsen •L i> April 16 update 
16 April, 2012 
B 
B 
Article 1. 
The Washington Post 
Events do not wait as Obama plays a delay defense 
Jackson Diehl 
Article 2. 
Project Syndicate 
A Post-Arab Spring Strategy 
Volker Perthes 
Article 3. 
NYT 
Europebs Economic Suicide 
Paul 
Krugman 
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Article 4. 
Today's Zaman 
Israeli-American relations after AIPAC Summit: Opportunities in 2013 and Iran 
Emrah Usta 
Article 5. 
National Defense University Press 
The Evolution of Saudi Security and Enforcement Policies on Communication 
Naef Bin Ahmed Al-Saud 
B 
Article 1. 
The Washington Post 
Events do not wait as Obama plays a delay defense 
Jackson Diehl 
B 
AprilB16 Barack Obamabs foreign policy strategy in this election year might be best 
summed up by William F. Buckleybs famous promise: to b stand 
athwart history , yelling stop.bushing Israel to the edge. The race between the 
Republicans and Democrats in the US is being influenced 
by lobbying groups. In response to AIPAC, which asks for a more hawkish stance from 
the US, the J Street movement (a pro-Israel group that supports a two state solution) 
offers an alternative discourse. The Obama administration, on the eve of the upcoming 
presidential elections, may take action to ensure that this movement becomes more 
influential. The J Street Group which favors more peaceful policies in the Palestinian -
Israeli issue is one of the groups that the Obama administration could rely on to 
advance 
diplomatic solutions in respect to the Iranian issue. It is not possible for the Obama 
administration to be successful in the upcoming elections if it wavers between the two 
groups. It is also likely that relations between the US and Israel will become more 
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tense after 2013. 
In 2013, the US, which is reluctant to take action for a military operation against Iran in 
2012, will have to address the stronger Israeli stance and policies. It is certain that 
Israel, which sees the nuclear 
capacity of Iran as a threat to its security and national integrity is not satisfied that 
Washingtonbs policies see diplomatic negotiations as a necessity. 
Israelbs basic concern at this point is that lranbs existing nuclear policy could advance. 
For Iran, which will likely become successful in its nuclear program, the Israeli weapons 
and missile systems will 
not be harmful to its nuclear arsenal. In addition to the probable repercussions of the 
Arab Spring, the Israeli predicament is further affected by the democratization efforts 
and demands in the region. This is one of the reasons why Israel, after losing its 
allies and friends in the region after the Arab Spring, views Iran as the only enemy. 
A probable Israeli-Iran conflict in 2013 can become a turning point for the current 
policies of the US vis-C-vis Israel. This could dramatically affect Israeli-American 
relations in the aftermath of 2013. 
However, the probable attitude of Turkey as a rising star that assumes lead roles in 
NATO, in a potential Israeli-Iranian conflict is not reviewed or evaluated in the 2013 
American policies. Turkeybs growing role is shown by the fact that a possible Israeli 
attack against Iran in 2013 is as tied to the NATO Anti-missile Sheild System in 
KC<recik as it is to American elections. 
B 
Emrah Usta is a US foreign policy analyst and a fellow at the Center for American 
Studies at SC<Ieyman Sah University in DOstanbul. 
B 
B 
B 
Article 5. 
National Defense University Press 
The Evolution of Saudi Security and Enforcement Policies on Communication 
Naef Bin Ahmed Al-Saud 
B 
April 2012 -- Communication, including social media, is vital to Saudi policy concemse. rsuant to both national and internal security. The evolution of Saudi security policy on communication and social media 
is being derived to a significant extent from recent external precedents. particularly government actions in the United States and Great Bream, as 
well as India, Israel, and other countries. The consensus among such countnes appears to be that anbterronsm 
and other ant:crime objecbves, including public safely. civil order. and governmental alleviation of economic hardship, take precedence over 
political notions such as democracy. 
Despite broadly analogous restrictions under American. British, Indian. and Israel, laws and government actions. some an the West seem to 
romanticize social media as a tool for protest in Saudi Arabia. It 
is therefore ironic that by md•2011, social media in Arnenca. Europe. and Israel expedited the organization of large illegal protests by citizens 
against their own governments, as a function of economic deprivation that could not be adequately resolved by 
political activates associated with democracy. In recent years. Saudi government policies have focused on economic development intended in 
part to address the concerns of its citizens. which has so far tangentially preempted widespread social mediaborgaria0 
unrest that other countries have begun to experience. 
This article argues that Saudi Arabia and many Other nations have found that Communication access. isethcularly including social media and the 
Internet Qenenov may be:h and co-opt enbOthremment 
WOWS and aimingl acts including terrorism. Moreover. and analogous to Wage brother governments such as those Of the United States and 
Israel, communication infrastructure may be deployed by the Saudi oovemment t0 track and arrest criminals includinq 
Potential terronsts. In feat relevant Saudi laws may be deemed analogous to U.S. national and Internal security policies upheld by Supreme 
Court decisions. Saudi laws may also be broadly analocious to restrictive Indian Internet laws in the woddbe law% 
democracy. Next, the article argues that the Kinadombs experience with Internet technologies is that they OrOvide effective cormnunicaton 
methods toward rehabilitation  of (*boasts and other cnminals. The analysis concludes by obsenana that America and 
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other counties may wish to learn from the Saudi experience in antiterrorism and other criminal rehabilitation through social media. However. 
social mediaborganized  protests by Israelis due to economic hardship may possibly lead to greater Israel, compassion 
for Palestinian economic hardship under occupation. 
Lessons from Israel and Great Britain 
By mid-2011. the Israeli government faced public protests. which were brought about by widespread economic deprivation. Some estimate over 
a quarter million Israelis participated in protests at some pointbsimilarty 
organized by cell phone and social media, particularly Facebook.1 An editorial in 
Londonbs Financial Times stated, "a perception that too many people cannot make 
ends meet, or even live in outright poverty, motivates Israelis as it did Tunisians and 
Egyptians 
in January and February. . [I]t is evident that public spending on education and 
healthcare is low partly because the [Israeli] governmentbs military budget is so high. 
Nothing better illustrates how a peace deal with the Palestinians would benefit Israeli 
society as a whole. "2 Among the poorest are lsraelbs Arab citizens and orthodox 
Jews.3 Another commentator in the Financial Times points out that Israeli discontent is 
also caused to a significant extent by a widespread resentment that the country may be 
under 
the inf luence of powerful, small interest groups including Israeli settlers in the 
occupied territories: the "settlers ... enjoy cheap, subsidized housing and benefit from 
public services that are far superior to those available to Israelis living inside 
the Green Line."4 
Such mounting evidence of resentment driven by social mediab4 Israelis inside Israel against Israeli 
settlers in the occupied territhtlesb rnay have a powerful, positive impact on the direction of Middle 
East 
peace. Palestinians living under far worse economic conditions due to Israeli 
occupation in the West Bank and Gaza are presumably observing the large Israeli 
protests and contemplating their own moves. Of course, one concern for peaceful 
protest is whether 
a government indiscriminately kills nonviolent civilians in significant numbers. For 
example, in August 2011, after many months of Syrian military actions against civilian 
protesters, Saudi Arabia, followed by Bahrain and Kuwait, withdrew their ambassadors, 
while King Abdullah requested that the Syrian "killing machine" be stopped.5 
Thus, the Kingdombs leadership has been observing developments in Israel as a test 
of social mediabs effectiveness in organizing nonviolent protest to create significant 
shifts in security and economic policy. 
Since Palestinian welfare and fair treatment are among Saudi Arabiabs vital interests, 
there are two social media questions that matter to the national security interests of both 
Israel and Saudi Arabia: 
Will orthodox Jews, Israeli Palestinians, and Palestinians in the occupied territories 
seize the historic opportunity to organize together via social media to create meaningful 
nonviolent protests against 
Israelbs pro-settler funding policies that are a root cause of economic deprivation for 
Israelbs majority of civilians living outside of settlements and those living inside the 
occupied territories? 
Would Israel be motivated to change its policies as a result of widespread Palestinian 
social mediaborganized protests against economic deprivation of Palestinians in Israel 
and the occupied territories? 
In any case, such protests have not been limited to Israel and the Arab world. In early 
August 2011, more reverberations from riots in Tunisia and Egypt appeared across 
London and other locations in the United 
Kingdom, turning several areas into "quasiwar zones." These events were organized by 
social media including Twitter and Facebook, as well as BlackBerry Messenger6 The 
police called the unrest the worst in memory, and the streets of London were flooded 
with 
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16,000 police officers.7 
At the height of the 2011 London riots, which seem to be known as Britainbs "intifada of 
the underclass," one of Prime Minister David Cameronbs former advisors pointed out 
that the rioting youth "have nothing 
to lose and nothing to gain. "8 British rioters believed that their lives were going 
nowhere because they were "further than ever from the sort of wealth that makes them 
adults. A career, a home of your ownbike Minas that can be ruined by notsbare out of 
sight "9 One woman who carried a television out of a store justified her action by 
stating. "Ibm taking my taxes back "10 
According to an editorial in the Financial Times in early August 2011, the government 
"lost control of En9landbs streets. (The unrest] has exploded into an orgy of arson, 
looting and feral violence which has 
spread through the capital and to other English cities. . . The government must now 
do what is necessary to regain control of the nationbs streets."11 Cameron tackled the 
threat of social media, stating during an emergency parliamentary session: "Everyone 
watching these horrific actions will be struck by how they were organized via social 
media." noting the govemmentbs need to "stop people communicating via these Web 
sites and services when we know they are plotting violence, disorder and criminality. . . 
. Free f low of information can be used for good. But it can also be used for ill. And 
when people are using social media for violence, we need to stop them. "12 According 
to Cameron, the British government would not be deterred by "phoney human rights 
concerns. "13 
Beyond such declarations, one mainstream British publication observed that the 
London rioters were able to "terrorize" their own countrymen, and that the government 
considered deploying the British army into the streets.14 
Thus. Saudi Arabiabs security policy on communication including the Internet and 
social media may need to evolve in this direction as well, with contingency plans for 
Saudi military deployment to protect the 
people and in support of the Kingdombs other security and law enforcement 
institutions. At the same time. it is crucial to note that in early 2011, before the protests 
broke out in Israel and Great Britain. the Kingdom announced $35 billion in government 
spending 
for unemployment benefits, housing subsidies, and other social programs. With these 
developments in mind, Saudi policies continue to address economic securityr dbv*malextension social media at a function of national and interne secunlvbwhich would
appear to be roughly analogous to conclusions reached by Israel and Great Britain. 
Ultimately. Western leaders do not want to see "social media" sources organize large 
protests erupting in Riyadh or downtown Beijing. The serious risk is that Western oil 
traders and other Western financiers 
could get nervous due to miscalculations of risktrus"*°°"`"*s ky*cke.band Western 
economies could finally collapse. According to a report, curiously entitled "America 
Fears the Great Brawl of China." there are an "estimated 18.000 riots, strikes 
and protests that break out in China" each year.15 Consider the global economic 
destruction if such unrest were to become much more organized through social media 
or other Internet facilities.16 According to one Western media dispatch on China. "Since 
the 
nationwide student-led protests of 1989. the educated urban elite has mostly been 
politically Quiescent But the party fears them far more than it does unruly farmers or 
migrants. Beijingbs center was flooded with police earlier this year when calls for an 
Arab-style b iasmine revolutionb circulated on the internet "17 
A postscript on developments in Libya makes clear that economic deprivation is at the 
root of instability and may not necessarily alter circumstances by simply changing 
regimes. According to Anthony Cordesman, 
"We need to recognize that Libyabr,ke as only other States that have become increasingly unstable since Of* 20110is
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not going to suddenly emerge with stable politics, effective governance, security and 
human rights for its people, or an economy that offers 
lobs, development, and a fair share of the nationbs income."18 The risk is that when 
established governments fall, violence and instability may grow over the long term, 
rather than Western notions of democracy or peace.19 
Social Media Impacts on Saudi Security Laws 
In 2009, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested a social worker for using 
Twitter by spreading information to protesters about American police movements at the 
Group of 20 summit of global leaders 
in the United States. It turned out that while protesters were using social media to try to 
help other protesters escape arrest, the police were also monitoring the social media 
site to keep informed about protesters. The protester who was arrested claimed 
that the FBI wanted to crush "dissent."20 
Protesters and pundits in other countries may also make false claims about crushing 
dissent when, as in the United States, Great Britain, and other countries, the 
government imperative is to protect civilians 
from protesters who may turn violent. This extends to the Saudi governmentbs 
objective to monitor and defeat the use of social media in any potential terror-related or 
illegal means, which broadly parallels U.S. security policies upheld by Supreme Court 
decisions. 
A 2010 Supreme Court decision, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,21 made clear 
that almost all types of support for groups labeled as terrorists are banned,22 
apparently even if the support may turn out to 
be advice favoring nonviolence. In 2008, the U.S. Government started an investigation 
leading to that court case when activists began planning to hold lame demonstrations 
against war.23 
Analogous to the U.S. Supreme Courtbs decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project, the Kingdom restricts those who might try to provide any type of support for 
terrorists, including communication, whether 
by social media or other means. Also analogous to FBI investigations, the Saudi 
government has been known to monitor groups in the Kingdom, or communications 
about the Kingdom focused on various types of innocent-sounding "rights," particularly 
when such rights 
may turn out to involve any type of communication or support whatsoever with respect 
to terrorism. 
Consider the following. In mid-June 2011, the Washington Post published a report on 
FBI raids of homes belonging to labor organizers and peace activists.24 The American 
activists appear to have publicly criticizedbffis via 'I meth" American foreign policy toward South America and the Middle East. They 
claimed that the U.S. Government was using antiterrorism policies as a pretext to target 
them for their political opinions.25 The FBI was looking toward the possibility 
that these citizens may have provided "material support"b  which the atuens demedbfor
Palestinians and Colombians on U.S. Government terror suspect lists.26 Most of the 
Americans raided were non-Muslim and, according to one of their lawyers, were "public 
non-violent activists with long, distinguished careers in public service, including 
teachers, union organizers and antiwar and community leaders."27 Thus, Saudi 
Arabiabs national security and internal security approaches do not appear to be more 
restrictive 
than the U.S. Governmentbs deployment of FBI raids on American activists and 
organizers who have used social media to spread political opinions criticizing U.S. 
foreign policy and possibly implicating "material support" for terror suspects. 
Even apart from terrorism, public safety is a paramount concern for government 
entities that may need to take action by monitoring communication, whether through 
social media or analogously by cell phone. 
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For example, in mid-August 2011, San Francisco transportation officials turned off cell 
phone underground service for several hours in order to maintain public safety by 
stopping a planned protest discovered on the Web site of a protest organizer.28 
Some in the United States compared the San Francisco transportation agency strategy 
of temporarily cutting off cell phone use to former President Hosni Mubarakbs strategy 
of cutting off Internet and cell phone 
services in order to quell protests by the Egyptian people.29 Other research indicates 
that Mubarak may have made a mistake in doing so. When Egyptian cell phone and 
Internet services were disrupted on January 28, 2011, unrest apparently increased 
instead 
of decreased. The cutoff caused more civilians to become aware and interested, while 
more people became involved in communicating face-to-face with greater street 
presence, and communication became more decentralized and harder to control than 
simply large 
gatherings in Tahrir Square.30 (In contrast to the situation in Egypt involving 
communication cutoff, the Libyan uprising may have been relentless largely due to 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization support for the rebels including strategic bombing, 
access 
to drones and other intelligence, and other assistance.) 
San Franciscobs local government determined that it had a legal right to turn off cell 
phone service on its property under a 1969 ruling by the Supreme Court in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio.31 In this case, the Supreme 
Court decided that a government may stop speech that could incite activity considered 
unlawful (beyond merely advocating violence).32 In 2011, mass violence apparently did 
not occur within San Franciscobs transportation system, but the local government 
believed 
that violence might possibly occur imminently if it did not cut off communication. Thus, 
even in America, as in Saudi Arabia, it is legal for a government institution to cut off 
communication in the interests of public safety and security if there is a chance 
that it could prevent protests that might possibly lead to violencebff“nstsre" be 
1"'"nthwhether or not violence later occurs. 
Analogous to the Supreme Court ruling in Brandenburg, other nations including Saudi 
Arabia and India place restrictions on speech that may possibly be communicated to 
incite unlawful activitYret herbYs'xialmedia or other means In mrd•20 11. for example, India issued Internet rules to strengthen secunty and place limits on information, including 
content that might be considered "insuSing' or "blasphemous' or 'harmful' to any country.33 Indian cyber cafC)s, Web 
sites, and search engines may be liable to the  goyemment for any offending Internet content, including social media. According to the Indian 
government, its rules weigh security end freedom, deriving inspiration from laws in other democratic countries 34 
According   to the deputy minister responsible for information technology and commumcabon, Sachin Pilot "We must draw a distinction between 
freedom of expression and freedom of expression with intent to harm or defame sompone."35 
Analogous to both Indian law and Me Supreme Counts holding in Brandenburg, under Saudi law, mainstream media (including the print media) 
and Internet sites (including blogs) are restricted from "damaging 
the countrybs public affairs or delivering insults to senior clerics, or -incrbno divisions between &fixers,' among other violations. 36 Also 
analogous to Indian law and the Supreme Counts holding in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Protect Saudi proposed laws 
pending in the Shuns Council would punish anyone who may be supporting terrorism by any means such as "harming the interests of the state" or 
'endangering national unity."37 
In Saudi Arabia, activism online hos thus far not created significant challenges to the Royal family or the rest of the government For example, a "day 
of rage Organized via social media, including Facebook 
fizzled out 3$ In any case King Abdullah has ensured that newspapers and by Implication social media have considerable freedom to Question 
religious clones, discuss the rights of women, report on police abuse, and so forth Thus, for example, religious. 
clerks may be criticized or questioned in public media or forums, but net personally attacked 39 
When foreigners aim to influence events under a particular nabonbs confrOt, whether by sou., media or Otherwise. that nation may take it upon 
itself to erne' Or repel such foreigners By further extrapolation 
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in 2011 those 
faced by Israel from self-proclaimed Westerners aiming to visit Palestinian lands under occupation and use social media to spread international 
awareness. 
Saudi Social Media Strategies 
While the Western approach toward violence caused by social media substantially concentrates on punishment 40 0 separate example of the 
Saudi govemmentbs social media approach to counterterrorism is the Sakina 
program, which has achieved considerable success in persuading radically inclined youth toward moderation.41 The program is run by a 
nongovernmental organization supported by the Interior Ministry Educator Ministry and Islamic Affairs Ministry. Salunabs 
religious experts deploy social media to hold online discussions in chat moms with people who initially seem to support extremist views. The 
experts aim to ask online extremist sympathizers why they seem to believe in religious violence and then the experts 
point out how those views contradict the peaceful teachings of Islam. 
Such dialogues via social media have had a multiplier effect against violence due to their perpetual availability online where others can read and 
share them. Violence in the Kingdom has been drastically reduced 
since authorities started becoming involved in such social media. Saudi advice has been sought by numerous other Arab countries wishing to 
structure similar antiviolence social media programs.* 
One analyst in the West observed that the Sakina program has "international appear as it draws audiences and interaction throughout the 
Middle East as well as the West and particularly the United States.43 
It thus stands to reason that it asked, Saudi Arabia would be willing to advise Western institutions on structuring effective social media programs 
to rehabilitate a broad spectrum of violent criminals typically indigenous to and rampant in the Westbnot merely 
limited to terrorists. 
Coincidentally, by late June/early July 2011, several mainstream Western media (not 
just social media) reports appeared concerning Googlebs self-proclaimed "idea" to try 
using social media against extremists. 
Curiously. Saudi Arabiabs preexisting Sakina program was not emphasized. But at 
least one of the leaders of the new Google project was formerly with the U.S. 
Department of State. Is it possible that State Department personnel who now work with 
social media 
against extremism may not be aware of highly successful preexisting Saudi social 
media programs against extremism? It would appear that top individuals in the Kingdom 
may need to be more high profile in deploying mainstream media to proclaim the 
success of 
particular Saudi policies, especially pertaining to broad social media access and 
effective nonviolence programs. 
As one mainstream European media source pointed out about the new Google social 
media antiextremist program. "to solve the problems of violent extremism, clever 
technology and algorithms are only a sideshow. "44 
The Saudi approach to antiviolence programs does not rely on social media programs 
alone, but further deploys highly qualified experts, along with available rehabilitation 
programs and incentives for success. 
Tangentially. given the importance of Palestinian welfare to Saudi national security, the 
Kingdombs policies may develop in the direction of supporting social media to provide 
similar success in encouraging 
Israelis. Palestinians. and other Arabs to get to know each other at least initially over 
the Internet while discussing sports, photography, and other common interestsbi nauchn° 70000 MOW% 45 These den physical intrachons between Palestinians and 
Israelis tend to be constricted to army checkp0ints 4$ Al least one Faceted( site appears to encourage peaceful coexistence  as Israeli President 
Shirnon Penn and the President of the Palestinian Authonly both posted welcome messages 47 Behold the future 
of Middle East Peace 
Conclusion 
It is worth noting that social media are increasingly being used by Arabs and Israelis to promote communication toward peaceful coexistent.* h 
eff0rtS deserve SOpp0il as an ev01vin0 part Of Saudi security 
Policy On social media, Pailiculany if Some Of the many Israelis new Protesting their gavernmentbS economic deprivation 4130 use social mad,a to a nation may request assistance from another in such security mattersb as Bahrain had to ask for Saudi assistance due to concerns about the disruptive influence of foreigners that would appear to heve been greeter national security threats than 
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help Palestinians under occupation travel to Tel Aviv to protest economic deprivation without access to meaningful 
careers. decent housing. *odd-class health care. or education. Ultimately, further development toward welttargeted Saudi-supported social 
media policies could catalyze profound achievements toward Middle East peace. 
B 
B 
His Royal Highness Brigadier General Naef Bin Ahmed Al-Saud of the Royal Saudi Army holds a doctorate from Cambridge University. His 
professional focus includes military special operations and international 
diplomacy. 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
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=== IMAGE DESCRIPTIONS ===
[Image 1] The image shows a document with text, which appears to be a letter or a report. The text is in English and discusses various topics, including economic policy, social issues, and the role of government. The document is a scan, and the text is black on a white background. There are no visible names, dates, places, or logos that can be discerned from this image. The text is dense and covers multiple

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