range of sectors, such as solar panels or electric vehicles. While Chinese exports slowed from 2022- 2023,18 their growth has remained strong over a five-year timeframe. If Chinese access to the US market is constrained by new tariffs, Chinese exports will be likely to flow to EU and other markets. But the EU has already started pushing back in selected areas of trade with China, for example imposing tariffs on electric vehicles imports from China for a period of five years in October 2024.19 If faced with a potential influx of Chinese imports redirected from the United States, the EU might impose new tariffs on Chinese imports. Other regions such as Latin America could take similar approaches in the face of diverted imports as they aim to defend local industries. Over the next two years, this could lead to a pattern of rolling, progressive protectionism spreading worldwide, at different speeds in different sectors, going well- beyond bilateral tit-for-tat tariffs. Some governments would move more aggressively than others, and once the first countries impose across-the-board tariffs on their trading partners, more countries could quickly follow.Escalation beyond tariffs Research published in November 2024 assessed the vulnerability of 173 countries to restrictive US trade measures. The research considers key concerns of US policy-makers, including those countries’ bilateral trade surpluses with the United States, restrictions on market access for US exports, and existing tariffs, among other criteria.20 Weighing the countries according to these criteria, South Korea is found to be the most at risk for being targeted with restrictive US trade measures, followed by China, Japan, Canada and India, at the next level of risk. However, other countries and blocs are found to be at risk, too: Brazil, the EU, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico and Thailand are the next group of economies.21 This assessment chimes with the results of the EOS, which show that geoeconomic confrontation (sanctions, tariffs, investment screening, etc.) is a prominent concern in Eastern Asia, in particular (Figure 1.18). In Taiwan, China and Hong Kong SAR, China, this risk is the third- most significant concern in their two-year outlooks. Moreover, 12 other economies, including Japan and South Korea, rank geoeconomic confrontation among their top 10 risks. While Eastern Asia may National risk perceptions: Geoeconomic confrontation FIGURE 1.18 Source World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey 2024.Executive Opinion Survey rank of national risks from the question “Which ﬁve risks are the most likely to pose the biggest threat to your country in the next two years?” Rank 1st10th20th30th34th Global Risks Report 2025 29