Advances in digitization continued to underpin growth in global connectivity, through rising data flows and IT trade, a 25% YoY increase in international bandwidth (which is now four times larger than in 2019), and continued investments in digital infrastructure – often driven by national agendas and the quest to secure advantages in the AI digital race. In parallel, IT services continued to show growth – an uninterrupted run since before the pandemic – and IT goods trade reverted to growth after contracting in 2023. In doing so, IT goods bucked the larger trend in goods trade, consistent with countries channelling investment into AI capabilities, as cooperation incentives align with furthering technological progress. In 2025, the AI race led to even more increases in cross-border activity. Greenfield FDI announcements in data centres30 reached record highs, estimated at about $370 billion globally in 2025,31 up from about $190 billion in 2024. These new projects may drive corresponding increases in cross-border flows of IT goods – chips, electronic components, communications equipment and IT services over the near to medium term (Figure 7). These developments also have the potential to boost productivity, after many years of the barometer showing total factor productivity stuck in neutral. For example, recent McKinsey Global Institute estimates suggest generative AI could increase global productivity growth by 0.1 to 0.6 percentage points annually until 2040.32 Still, growing barriers and restrictions create uncertainty about the future. Although the flow of international students grew more than any other metric in this pillar in 2024, rising by 8% and surpassing pre-pandemic levels, this momentum may soon moderate as restrictions on talent mobility increase. Early indicators point to a contraction in 2025: new US F-1 and M-1 student visas declined by 11% in Q1 2025, and similar declines occurred in other countries, including Australia33 and Canada.34 Perhaps no barrier has been more salient than expanded controls on frontier technologies and resources, especially but not limited to those deployed by the US and China.35 Elsewhere, however, collaboration in critical technologies such as AI data centres, semiconductor fabrication and 5G infrastructure persists among small groups of countries, including new partnerships between the US and partners in Europe, the Gulf and India; and China’s new partnerships with the Middle East, South-East Asia and Africa.36 These headwinds are perhaps why surveyed council members expressed considerable pessimism regarding the future of cooperation in this pillar. Eighty-seven percent of the surveyed experts felt that 2025 would be “less cooperative” or “much less cooperative” when it comes to innovation and technology, making survey responses for innovation and technology the most pessimistic among the five pillars. Ultimately, even in a more fragmented landscape, pragmatic cooperation will continue wherever shared incentives are clear, such as in standards bodies, cloud and data arrangements and applied AI deployments, even as controls tighten. Leaders can keep innovation moving by separating sensitive intellectual property (IP) from scalable interfaces, investing in cross-certification and benchmarking and using regional agreements to deploy at speed where rules and incentives already line up. Ultimately, even in a more fragmented landscape, pragmatic cooperation will continue wherever shared incentives are clear. The Global Cooperation Barometer 2026 16