It may appear surprising that green financing and trade of green goods rose, given the pressures on multilateral mechanisms that traditionally support the flows of these components of climate action. One way to understand the growth of cooperation in clean technologies is as a convergence of global goals (such as emissions reductions) with domestic priorities. Many of these technologies have become more affordable, contributing to energy security by reducing dependence on foreign sources of energy and even expanding access to populations that previously lacked it. For example, the deployment of increasingly affordable EVs has contributed not only to emissions reductions, but has also displaced oil consumption in China and Europe – two regions that rely on oil imports. In Pakistan, imports of increasingly affordable solar panels have enabled local populations to increase access to energy.39 Financing for climate technologies, which includes international and domestic funding, was a key aspect of rising global cooperation. Mitigation finance continued its five-year run of growth, rising to approximately double its pre-pandemic value by 2024. Particularly important are funds flowing to emerging economies, which almost doubled from 2018 to 2023, and were further boosted in 2024 by multilateral development banks (MDBs).40,41 Adaptation finance is also estimated to have grown – and could be further propelled by a new deal struck at COP30 to triple adaptation finance by 2035.42 Yet the landscape of climate cooperation remains complex. Cooperation in mitigation finance grew by just 10% in 2024, the slowest since 2020. Cuts in ODA have multiplied, and international partnerships have fallen short of expectations. The Just Energy Transition Partnerships – an international financing mechanism that assists emerging economies’ transition towards low- emission energy sources – delivered only $7 billion by June 2025, against a $50 billion commitment. Trade in low-carbon goods was the other large growth engine of global cooperation. Global supply chains helped manufacturers reach scale and lowered prices. That in turn allowed their deployment in many emerging economies. For example, India – which added the second-most solar in 2025 after China – and Brazil gained access to affordable solar modules and stepped up installations.43 In 2025, solar, wind and EV sales in emerging economies outpaced those of the US and parts of Europe, where momentum declined. Nonetheless, there are concerns that the supply of these goods is overly concentrated in China, which accounts for the vast majority (up to 70% or even 80%) of the manufacturing of many clean technologies.44 Despite the growth in investment, trade and deployment, environmental outcomes continued to deteriorate. Research from the McKinsey Global Institute finds that deployment in the energy transition is progressing at half the speed needed to meet stated climate goals.45 Emissions continued to rise in 2024, as they have done steadily for most of the past few decades.46 There is one bright spot in the story: emissions intensity (measured as emissions/GDP) is dropping, signalling the world’s ability to continue delivering economic growth while making headway in managing emissions. The story for natural capital is equally sobering: after several years of steady progress, cooperation has lost momentum. Ocean health is declining. Growth in terrestrial and marine protected areas stalled during 2023–24, marking a reversal from the moderate growth experienced since 2020. Growth could renew soon, as projects such as the announced expansion of French Polynesia’s marine protected area take hold, and COP30 in Brazil saw the launch of a new vehicle to boost investment in terrestrial protected areas.47 In 2025, some indicators showed that the dynamics of previous years persisted. Investment in renewable energy and newly installed solar and wind capacity, and trade in low-carbon goods, continued to increase. Yet emissions from the energy system continue to grow, and there are signs that growth in climate finance is starting to weaken.48 The mixed state of climate cooperation is reflected in the two surveys presented in this report. Almost two-thirds of experts think cooperation in climate and natural capital was “much less cooperative” or “less cooperative” in 2025. A significantly smaller fraction of executives pointed to this area as one that harmed their ability to conduct business across borders. Importantly, though, many found reasons for optimism. Seventeen percent of surveyed council members expected 2025 would be “more cooperative” or “much more cooperative” – the highest number across the pillars. Achieving sustained progress on climate outcomes may require new forms of cooperation. Multilateral efforts still play a role, as recent advances such as the High Seas Treaty show. However, as seen in failed efforts to craft a Global Plastics Treaty in 2025 and delays in securing final adoption for net-zero international shipping emissions,49 the current environment remains challenging for turning aspirations into international agreements. Instead, states are advancing climate goals through smaller intra- and inter-regional coalitions. The EU and Central Asia forged a hydrogen partnership in September 2025 at the second Central Asian Regional Forum on Decarbonization Diplomacy in Astana.50 At the regional level, the European Commission put forward the Clean Industrial Deal plan in February 2025, aiming to make decarbonization efforts a driver of industrial growth across the continent. In ASEAN, the LTMS-PIP cross-border power-trading partnership among Laos, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore is an early step towards integrating renewable energy in the region. Emissions intensity is dropping, signalling the world’s ability to continue delivering economic growth while making headway in managing emissions. The Global Cooperation Barometer 2026 19