Breaking Down Democracy:

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June 2017 Breaking Down Democracy: Goals, Strategies, and Methods of Modern Authoritarians 0 Freedom I House by Arch Pudthngtun EFTA00804723 CONTENTS Executive Summary Introduction: Modern Authoritarians: Origins, Anatomy, Outlook Chapters 1. Validating Autocracy through the Ballot 10 2. Propaganda at Home and Abroad 15 3. The Enemy Within: Civil Society at Bay 22 4. The Ministry of Truth in Peace and War 29 5. The Rise of 'Illiberal Democracy 35 6. Flacks and Friends 41 7. Bullying the Neighbors: Frozen Conflicts, the Near Abroad. and Other Innovations 47 8. Back to the Future 52 Conclusion:Authoritarianism Comes Calling 57 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This report emerged from a presentation on the state of global freedom conducted by the author and David J. Kramer, former president of Freedom House. The major source of data and analysis is Freedom in the World, the report on political rights and civil liberties published annually by Freedom House. The author wishes to thank the Freedom House analysis staff and the many scholars who have participated in Freedom House assessments of global democracy. The author also extends special thanks to Elen Aghekyan, Tyler Roylance, Alexandra Cain. Danielle Recanati, Amy Slipowitz, Alan Williams. Christopher Walker, Bret Nelson. Michael Johnson, Rebeka Foley. Zselyke Csaky. Sarah Repucci, Vanessa Tucker. Robert Ruby, and Daniel Calingaert. THE AUTHOR Arch Puddington is Distinguished Scholar for Democracy Studies at Freedom House and a co-editor of Freedom in the World. ON THE COVER Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing. 2016. Lintao Zhang/Getty Images EFTA00804724 Freedom House Executive Summary Breaking Down Democracy: Goals, Strategies, and Methods of Modern Authoritarians by Arch Puddington The 21st century has been marked by a resurgence of authoritarian rule that has proved resilient despite economic fragility and occasional popular resistance. Modern authoritarianism has succeeded, where previous totalitarian systems failed, due to refined and nuanced strategies of repression, the exploitation of open societies, and the spread of illiberal policies in democratic countries themselves. The leaders of today's authoritarian systems devote full- time attention to the challenge of crippling the opposition without annihilating it, and flouting the rule of law while maintaining a plausible veneer of order, legitimacy, and prosperity. Central to the modem authoritarian strategy is the capture of institutions that undergird political plural- ism. The goal is to dominate not only the executive and legislative branches, but also the media, the judiciary, civil society, the commanding heights of the economy, and the security forces. With these institu- tions under the effective if not absolute control of an incumbent leader, changes in government through fair and honest elections become all but impossible. Unlike Soviet-style communism, modern authoritari- anism is not animated by an overarching ideology or the messianic notion of an ideal future society. Nor do today's autocrats seek totalitarian control over people's everyday lives, movements, or thoughts. The media are more diverse and entertaining under modern authoritarianism, civil society can enjoy an independent existence (as long as it does not pursue political change), citizens can travel around the coun- try or abroad with only occasional interference, and private enterprise can flourish (albeit with rampant corruption and cronyism). This study explains how modern authoritarianism de- fends and propagates itself, as regimes from different regions and with diverse socioeconomic foundations copy and borrow techniques of political control. Among its major findings: • Russia, under President Vladimir Putin, has played an outsized role in the development of modern authoritarian systems. This is particu- larly true in the areas of media control, propa- ganda, the smothering of civil society, and the www.freedomhouse.org 1 EFTA00804725 BREAKING DOWN DEMOCRACY: Goals, Strategies, and Methods of Modern Authoritarians MAJOR DECLINES FOR INFLUENTIAL COUNTRIES OVER THE PAST 10 YEARS 0 1 -5 I I -20 1 -25 -30 -28 C C -25 -21 -17 -17 -16 -12 -12 -12 -10 weakening of political pluralism. Russia has also moved aggressively against neighboring states where democratic institutions have emerged or where democratic movements have succeeded in ousting corrupt authoritarian leaders. • The rewriting of history for political purposes is common among modern authoritarians. Again, Russia has taken the lead, with the state's asser- tion of authority over history textbooks and the process, encouraged by Putin, of reassessing the historical role of Joseph Stalin. • The hiring of political consultants and lobbyists from democratic countries to represent the interests of autocracies is a growing phenome- non. China is clearly in the vanguard, with multi- ple representatives working for the state and for large economic entities closely tied to the state. But there are also K Street representatives for Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Ethiopia, and practically all of the authoritarian states in the Middle East The toxic combination of unfair elections and crude majoritarianism is spreading from modern authoritarian regimes to illiberal leaders in what are still partly democratic countries. Increasing- ly, populist politicians —once in office—claim the right to suppress the media, civil society, and other democratic institutions by citing support from a majority of voters. The resulting changes make it more difficult for the opposi- tion to compete in future elections and can pave the way for a new authoritarian regime. An expanding cadre of politicians in democ- racies are eager to emulate or cooperate with authoritarian rulers. European parties of the nationalistic right and anticapitalist left have expressed admiration for Putin and aligned their policy goals with his. Others have praised 2 EFTA00804726 Freedom House EVERY INDICATOR HAS DECLINED OVER THE PAST 10 YEARS 0.0 Electoral Process' Pluralism and Functioning of Expression and Association and Participation Government* Belief Assembly' -0.1- I -0.5 - -0.6 - -0.7—Personal and Rule of Law Individual Rights 'Denotes indicators scored on a 12-point scale. All others are scored on a 16-point scale. illiberal governments in countries like Hungary for their rejection of international democratic standards in favor of perceived national inter- ests. Even when there is no direct collaboration, such behavior benefits authoritarian powers by breaking down the unity and solidarity of the democratic world. There has been a rise in authoritarian inter- nationalism. Authoritarian powers form loose but effective alliances to block criticism at the United Nations and regional organizations like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Organization of American States, and to defend embattled allies like Syria's 8ashar al-Assad. There is also growing replica- tion of what might be called authoritarian best practices, vividly on display in the new Chinese law on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and efforts by Russia and others to learn from China's experience in internet censorship. Modern authoritarians are working to revalidate the concept of the leader-for-life. One of the seeming gains of the postcommunist era was the understanding that some form of term limits should be imposed to prevent incumbents from consolidating power into a dictatorship. In re- cent years, however, a number of countries have adjusted their constitutions to ease, eliminate, or circumvent executive term limits. The result has been a resurgence of potential leaders-for- life from Latin America to Eurasia. While more subtle and calibrated methods of re- pression are the defining feature of modern au- thoritarianism, the past few years have featured a reemergence of older tactics that undermine the illusions of pluralism and openness as well as integration with the global economy. Thus Moscow has pursued its military intervention in Ukraine despite economic sanctions and over- seen the assassination of opposition figures; www.freedomhouse.org 3 EFTA00804727 BREAKING DOWN DEMOCRACY: Goals, Strategies, and Methods of Modern Authoritarians Beijing has revived the practice of coerced pub- lic "confessions" and escalated its surveillance of the Tibetan and Uighur minorities to totalitar- ian levels; and Azerbaijan has made the Aliyev family's monopoly on political power painfully obvious with the appointment of the president's wife as "first vice president." Modern authoritarian systems are employing these blunter methods in a context of increased economic fragility. Venezuela is already in the process of political and economic disintegra- tion. Other states that rely on energy exports have also experienced setbacks due to low oil and gas prices, and China faces rising debt and slower growth after years of misallocated invest- ment and other structural problems. But these regimes also face less international pressure to observe democratic norms, raising their chanc- es of either surviving the current crises or—if they break down—giving way to something even worse. In subsequent sections, this report will examine the methods employed by authoritarian powers to neu- tralize precisely those institutions that were thought to be the most potent weapons against a revitalized authoritarianism. The success of the Russian and Chinese regimes in bringing to heel and even har- nessing the forces produced by globalization —digital media, civil society, free markets—may be their most impressive and troubling achievement Modem authoritarianism is particularly insidious in its exploitation of open societies. Russia and China have both taken advantage of democracies commitment to freedom of expression and delivered infusions of pro- paganda and disinformation. Moscow has effectively prevented foreign broadcasting stations from reach- ing Russian audiences even as it steadily expands the reach of its own mouthpieces, the television channel RT and the news service Sputnik. China blocks the websites of mainstream foreign media while en- couraging its corporations to purchase influence in popular culture abroad through control of Hollywood studios. Similar combinations of obstruction at home and interference abroad can be seen in sectors in- cluding civil society, academia, and party politics. The report draws on examples from a broad group of authoritarian states and illiberal democracies, but the focus remains on the two leading authoritarian powers, China and Russia. Much of the report, in fact, deals with Russia, since that country, more than any other, has incubated and refined the ideas and institutions at the foundation of 21st-century author- itarianism. Finally, a basic assumption behind the report is that modem authoritarianism will be a lasting feature of geopolitics. Since 2012, both Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping have doubled down on existing efforts to stamp out internal dissent, and both have grown more aggressive on the world stage. All despotic regimes have inherent weaknesses that leave them vulnerable to sudden shocks and individually prone to collapse. However, the past quarter-century has shown that dictatorship in general will not disappear on its own. Authoritarian systems will seek not just to survive, but to weaken and defeat democracy around the world. 4 EFTA00804728 Freedom House Introduction Modern Authoritarianism: Origins, Anatomy, Outlook As the world's democracies confront a dangerous internal challenge from populist and nationalist political forces, it is imperative that they recognize the simultaneous external threat presented by modern authoritarian regimes. These 21' century authori- tarians developed an arsenal of new tactics to use against their domestic opponents, and gone on the offensive in an effort to subvert and replace the liberal international order. But modern authoritarian systems are not simply adversaries of free societies. They also represent an alternative model—a grim future for beleaguered democracies that have already fallen under the sway of illiberal leaders and have suffered an erosion of freedom. Democracy under siege Global democracy is currently facing the repercus- sions of what has been called the decade of decline." The phrase describes a 10-year-plus period, from 2006 to 2016, during which the state of freedom experi- enced more reversals than gains as measured by Free- dom in the World, the annual report on political rights and civil liberties published by Freedom House.' According to Freedom in the World, the crucial indicators of democracy experienced setbacks in each of the 10 years in question. In all, 105 countries suffered net declines, while 61 showed some mea- sure of improvement. The decade marked the longest democratic slump of its kind in more than 40 years of Freedom House analysis.' The decade of decline has been principally character- ized by a steady erosion of political institutions in es- tablished authoritarian countries, or in countries that were clearly headed in that direction. In other words, repressive countries became even more repressive — the bad became even worse.' However, a parallel pattern of institutional erosion has affected some more democratic states, pushing them into the category of "illiberal democracies." In these so- cieties, elections are regularly conducted, sometimes under conditions that are reasonably fair. But the state, usually under the control of a strong party or leader, applies much of its energy to the systematic weaken- ing of political pluralism and the creation of a skewed electoral playing field. Opposition parties are often impotent, freedom of the press is circumscribed, and the judiciary tends to be dominated by the ruling party. Countries that fit this description include Hungary, Bolivia, Ecuador, and, if recent trends continue, Poland. There are many reasons for the global decline in dem- ocratic indicators, but the statistical evidence from Freedom in the World suggests that modern author- itarian regimes have found a way to survive without resorting to democratic reforms, and that a number of democracies —as part of the general loss of liberal consensus —are engaging in their own antidemocratic experiments. Modem authoritarianism The traditional authoritarian state sought monopolis- tic control over political life, a one-party system orga- nized around a strongman or military junta, and direct rule by the executive, sometimes through martial law, with little or no role for the parliament Traditional dictatorships and totalitarian regimes were often defined by closed, command, or autarkic econo- mies, a state media monopoly with formal censorship, and "civil society" organizations that were structured as appendages of the ruling party or state. Especially in military dictatorships, the use of force—including military tribunals, curfews, arbitrary arrests, political detentions, and summary executions —was pervasive. Often facing international isolation, traditional dictator- ships and totalitarian regimes forged alliances based on www.freedomhouse.org S EFTA00804729 BREAKING DOWN DEMOCRACY: Goals, Strategies, and Methods of Modern Authoritarians common ideologies, whether faith in Marxist revolution or ultraconservative, anticommunist reaction. As the 20th century drew to a close, the weaknesses of both communist systems and traditional dictator- ships became increasingly apparent. Front and center was the growing economic gap between countries that had opted for market economies and regimes that were committed to statist economies. The political and economic barriers that had long shel- tered the old dictatorships were soon swept away, and those that survived or recovered did so by making a series of strategic concessions to the new global order. Modern authoritarianism has a different set of defin- ing features: • An illusion of pluralism that masks state control over key political institutions, with co-opted or otherwise defanged opposition parties allowed to participate in regular elections • State or oligarchic control over key elements of the national economy, which is otherwise open to the global economy and private investment to ensure loyalty to the regime and bolster regime claims of legitimacy based on economic prosperity • State or oligarchic control over information on certain political subjects and key sectors of the media, which are otherwise pluralistic, with high production values and entertaining content; in- dependent outlets survive with small audiences and little influence • Suppression of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that are focused on human rights or political reform, but state tolerance or support for progovernment or apolitical groups that work on public health, education, and other develop- ment issues • Legalized political repression, with targets pun- ished through vaguely worded laws and political- ly obedient courts • Limited, selective, and typically hidden use of extralegal force or violence, with a concentration on political dissidents, critical joumalists, and officials who have fallen from favor • Opportunistic, non-ideological cooperation with fellow authoritarian states against pressure for democratic reform or leadership changes, international human rights norms and mech- anisms, and international security or justice interventions • Knowledge -sharing with or emulation of fellow authoritarian states regarding tactics and legis- lation to enhance domestic control China and Russia The two major modern authoritarian powers are China and Russia. Until fairly recently, the conventional wisdom was that China's one-party authoritarian system would gradual- ly relax as the middle class expanded and the country became fully integrated into the global economic and diplomatic systems. The leadership did expand citizens freedom to travel, make money, and access information and entertainment that did not touch on sensitive subjects. But it has resolutely refused to give up control over the political sphere. In fact, the state has become increasingly aggressive in its suppression of political dissent and information that might challenge the Communist Party narrative. The regime's rhetoric and policies have become more hostile to democracy and *Western'. values. Its propa- ganda asserts the superior efficiency of the one-party system and sneers at the messiness of democracy. And the focus of its repressive apparatus has steadily expanded from a relatively narrow segment of political opposition figures to encompass a broad collection of target groups, including human rights lawyers, ethnic minorities, Christians, women's rights advocates, liber- al academics, and independent journalists. Russia is much smaller than China in terms of pop- ulation and economic might, but it has emerged as a leader of modern authoritarian innovation. Under Vladimir Putin, the Russian regime pioneered the capture of the media through state enterprises and oligarchic cronies, the adoption of laws designed to dismember civil society, the use of the judiciary as an instrument of political harassment, and, perhaps most importantly of all, the development of modern propaganda and disinformation. Russia has also been in the vanguard of a relentless campaign against liberal values, and has moved relentlessly to export authoritarian ideas and tech- niques to other societies, both in neighboring 6 EFTA00804730 Freedom House Eurasian countries and elsewhere in the world. While today there is nothing that resembles the Comintern of Soviet times, authoritarian countries have devel- oped an ad hoc network of cooperation that has proven effective at the United Nations and in regional bodies like the Organization of American States. Adapting to survive Modern authoritarianism matured as regimes sought to defend themselves against the sorts of civil society movements that triggered "color revolutions" in Georgia, Ukraine, and elsewhere in the early 2000s. On their own, formal opposition parties were relatively easy to marginalize or co-opt, and traditional mass media could be brought to heel through pressure on private owners, among other techniques. But civil society organizations presented a formidable chal- lenge in some settings, as they were able to mobilize the public—especially students and young people— around nonpartisan reformist goals and use relatively open online media to spread their messages. It is now a major objective of modern authoritarian states to suppress civil society before it becomes strong enough to challenge the incumbent political leadership. Yet whereas dissidents were dispatched to the gulag or explicitly exiled by the Soviets, or jailed and murdered by traditional dictatorships like Augus- to Pinochet's Chile, today's activists are checked by NGO regulations that control registration and foreign funding, laws that allow arbitrary restrictions on public protest, and trumped-up criminal charges for key organizers that serve to intimidate others. Modern authoritarianism has also devised special methods to bring the internet under political control without shutting it down entirely. While old-style dic- tatorships like Cuba long prevented the widespread use of the internet out of fear that online communi- cations would pose a threat to the state's monopoly on information, modern authoritarians understood that a high rate of Internet penetration is essential to participation in the global economy. However, once online media emerged as a real alternative to tradi- tional news sources and a crucial tool for civic and political mobilization, these regimes began to step up their interference. The Chinese government has developed the world's most sophisticated system of intemet controls. Its so- called Great Firewall, a censorship and filtering appa- ratus designed to prevent the circulation of informa- tion that the authorities deem politically dangerous without affecting nonsensitive information, requires tremendous financial, human, and technological re- sources to maintain. Other regimes have not attempt- ed anything approaching the scale of China's system, but some have constructed more limited versions or simply relied on inexpensive offline techniques like arrests of critical bloggers, direct pressure on the owners of major online platforms, and new laws that force internet sites to self-censor. Alternative values While modern authoritarians initially mobilized for defensive purposes, to thwart color revolutions or the liberal opposition, they have become increasingly aggressive in challenging the democratic norms that prevailed in the wake of the Cold War, and in setting forth a rough set of political values as an alternative to the liberal model. Examples of this phenomenon include: 1. Majoritariankun: A signal idea of many author- itarians is the proposition that elections are winner-take-all affairs in which the victor has an absolute mandate, with little or no interference from institutional checks and balances. Putin, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the Venezuelan chavista leadership all behave as if there are no valid controls on their authority, the opposition has no rights, and the system is theirs to dismantle and remake from top to bottom. Disturbingly, the leaders of some dem- ocratic societies have begun to embrace the majoritarian idea The Hungarian prime minister, Viktor °Man, has instituted a thorough overhaul of the country's constitution and national leg- islation with an eye toward measures that will insulate his party from future defeat 2. Sovereignty: A number of governments have invoked the doctrine of absolute sovereignty to rebuff international criticism of restrictions on the press, the smothering of civil society, the persecution of the political opposition, and the repression of minority groups. They claim that the enforcement of universal human rights standards or judgments from transnational legal bodies represent undue interference in their domestic affairs and a violation of national pre rogatives. 3. Dictatorship of Int Initially articulated by Vlad- imir Putin, this phrase has come to signify the adoption of laws that are so vaguely written as to VANivireedomhoustorg 7 EFTA00804731 BREAKING DOWN DEMOCRACY: Goals, Strategies, and Methods of Modern Authoritarians give the authorities wide discretion in applying them to regime opponents. Such measures are typically paired with a court system that uses law merely to justify political instructions from the ex- ecutive branch, making a mockery of due process and international conceptions of the rule of law. 4. History revised: A number of countries have un- dertaken a refashioning of history to buttress the legitimacy and aims of the current government Historians and journalists are forbidden to cross certain redlines set by the authorities. In China, the state has prevented the publication of full, accurate, or critical accounts of the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, or the Mao Ze- dong era in general. In Russia, Joseph Stalin has been rehabilitated. He is now officially portrayed as a strong if mildly flawed leader rather than as the man responsible for the deaths of millions of his own people. In Turkey Erdogan has decreed that high school students should study the de- funct Ottoman language, challenging a nearly century-old reform linked to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, modern Turkey's founder.' 5. Democracy redefined: It is a testament to the power of the democratic idea that authoritarian leaders around the globe have claimed the man- tle of democracy for forms of government that amount to legalized repression. Even as they heap disdain on the liberal order, they have often insisted on the validity of their own systems as types of democratic rule. They even devise terms to describe their special variant, such as "sovereign democracy," "revolutionary democra- cy," or illiberal democracy." 6. Return of the leader for life: Among the changes invariably instituted by modern authoritarians is the de facto or de jure removal of constitution- al limits on presidential terms. Preventing the concentration of power in a single leader is a fundamental goal of democratic governance, but authoritarian propaganda has presented term limits as artificial constraints, associated them with foreign origins, and claimed that they do not suit every country's unique historical, cultur- al, or security conditions. While these ideas may not amount to a coherent or complete ideology, they do form the basis for an impressive degree of collaboration and alliance-build- ing that has brought together modem authoritarian regimes with significantly different economic systems, official creeds, and sources of political legitimacy. A loose-knit league of authoritarians works to protect mutual interests at the United Nations and other inter- national forums, subverting global human rights stan- dards and blocking precedent -setting actions against fellow✓ despots. With the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Russia, China, and a number of Central Asian governments have come together to discuss common regime-security strategies s More disturbingly, modern authoritarians collaborate to prop up some of the world's most reprehensible regimes, apparently reasoning that the toppling of one dictator thins the herd, inspires imitation, and endangers them all. This is most visible in Syria, where Russia, China, Iran, and Venezuela at various times have offered diplomatic support, loans, fuel, or direct military aid to the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Dashed hopes Democracy recorded unprecedented gains during the 20th century's last decades. In 1975, Freedom House found that just 25 percent of the world's sovereign states qualified for the Free category; by 2000, the share of countries rated as Free had reached 45 percents The numbers told an optimistic story, and a series of accelerating social trends suggested that the recent improvements would hold firm and expand as the new millennium dawned. There was, to begin with, a strong identification of free societies with free markets. The degree of economic freedom varied from one society to the next, and corruption was a problem in practically all of the new democracies. But there was no longer a major bloc of countries that rejected capitalism, and practically ev- ery country sought to deepen their participation in the global economic system, as witnessed by the number of governments seeking admission to the World Trade Organization. Authorities in the United States and elsewhere predicted that as countries came to accept the rules of the game set down by the WTO, they would also be more amenable to accepting the norms of liberal democracy, including fair elections, freedom of expression, minority rights, and the rule of law. A second development was the introduction of the In- ternet and other digital media. In the wake of the col- lapse of the Soviet Union, communist governments in 8 EFTA00804732 Freedom House Eastern Europe, and military dictatorships elsewhere, there was an explosion of newspapers, radio and television stations, and other independent media with diverse editorial policies. But the internet in particular was seen as an irresistible force that could render censorship of any kind impossible. In 2000, President Bill Clinton compared China's efforts to control inter- net content to "trying to nail Jell-O to the wall." Third, a growing number of experts began to identify a new instigator of democratic change in global civil society. Unlike the -people's movements" of earlier decades, in which well-known leaders mobilized mass demonstrations and often insurrectionary violence with the goal of overthrowing despotic regimes, the phenomenon that was labeled civil society consisted of organizations that were often committed to a single cause or a few causes united by a particular theme. Most activists were young, with little prior involvement in politics, and many regarded themselves as part of a global effort to advance goals like reducing carbon emissions, empowering women, or fighting corruption. In a prescient 1997 article, Jessica T. Mathews predict- ed that in the future global civil society would be the triggering force behind liberal changes She suggested that in many cases civil society organizations would play a more important role than governments. Her words seemed prescient in light of later events in Serbia, where student activists organized a campaign that eventually brought about the downfall of President Slobodan Milotevio in 2000, and in Ukraine, where young reformers played a pivotal role in ensuring that the 2004 elections were not stolen through fraud. In declaring that dictatorships or even authoritarian methods were destined to succumb to this triad of new social forces, commentators were also express- ing optimism about the universal appeal of liberal values. The decade after the end of the Cold War was a heyday for democratic ideas and norms. It was increasingly expected that countries would not only hold elections, but that their elections would meet international standards and be judged -free and fair.' There was also an expectation that political parties would be able to compete on a reasonably level playing field, that opposition leaders would not be harassed or arrested, and that minorities would be able to pursue their agendas through normal political channels and not find it necessary to wage perpetual protest campaigns. However, there were nagging questions. It remained unclear whether most societies would have access to multiple sources of political ideas, multiple interpreta- tions of the news, and open scholarly inquiries about the past Would there be honest judicial proceedings, especially in cases with political implications? Would property rights be secure? Beyond these primarily domestic issues, there was another series of questions related to individual governments' relations with their neighbors and the rest of the world. The end of the Cold War had brought a peace dividend, both financial and psychological, for all sides. At the time, most assumed that peace would prove durable. But would the general decline in military budgets hold? Would the new national boundaries that divided the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia be sustainable? As modern authoritarianism has taken root and ex- panded its influence, the answers to these questions are increasingly negative. L Freedom in the World 2016 (New York: Freedom House, 2016), htfrpoullfrearInmhrumn.nrginwent/francInm-worldfirea- dom-world-2016. L Ibid. 3. Ibid. & Ceylan Yeginsu, 'Turks Feud Over Change in Education,' New York Times, December 8, 2014, worlrUntinr/arrIngan-nitchnc-nttnman•lanspinp-rlaccnn-As-oart-nfAngitinnal.tiorkkh•valsts html S. Eleanor Albert, 'The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:Council on Foreign Relations, October 14, 2015, httplAvww.c(r.org/ rNina/shanghai•rnrywratinn•nptanisatinn/o1nMR?, 6. 'Freedom in the World at 41; in Freedom in the World 2014 (New York: Freedom House, 2014), httos://freedomhouse.ondsitesi cf./Wit/files/Fr_ 7. 'China's Internet A Giant Cage; Economist, April 6, 2013, was•expected-help-democratisechina-insteada-has-enabled. & Jessica T. Mathews, 'Power Shift; Foreign Affairs (January/February 1997), paaer•shift. wwwireedomhouse.org 9 EFTA00804733 BREAKING DOWN DEMOCRACY: Goals, Strategies, and Methods of Modern Authoritarians Chapter 1 Validating Autocracy through the Ballot A major difference between modern authoritarian systems and traditional dictatorships lies in the role of elections for parliament and head of state. Twentieth-century dictatorships often dispensed with elections entirely or conducted them under blatantly fraudulent conditions. In the Soviet bloc, elections were a pointless ritual in which citizens were pres- sured to go to a polling place and cast ballots for the Communist Party candidate, the only one permitted to compete. Military and postcolonial dictatorships often canceled elections on spurious "national emergency" grounds, or rigged the outcome through crude bal- lot-stuffing and open intimidation. At a certain point in the 1980s, however, the strong- men, juntas, and revolutionary councils of the era realized that reasonably fair elections could no longer be avoided. Sometimes a ruling group understood that this would likely lead to an opposition victory. But usually, the incumbent leaders—and often foreign journalists and diplomats —presumed that voters in repressive settings preferred stability to uncertainty and would opt for the reassuring faces of authority. These calculations proved wildly misplaced. Opposi- tion parties swept to victory in country after coun- try—in Uruguay, Argentina, Nicaragua, South Korea, the Philippines, Poland. The word "stunning" made a frequent appearance in news accounts, as in the stunning rejection of the ruling party in Poland, or the stunning setback suffered by Chile's Augusto Pinochet in a referendum on the continuation of his dicta- torship. Or, perhaps most astonishing, the stunning defeat of Communist Party stalwarts in a number of Soviet cities in 1990 local elections.' Elections became a key force behind the wave of de- mocratization that engulfed much of the world during that decade. Today, the obligation to hold some form of multiparty balloting is felt by nearly all governments. The illusion of pluralism Yet just as with other democratic institutions, modern authoritarians have mastered the techniques of con- trol over the electoral process, maintaining political dominance behind a screen of false diversity. They have adapted in many ways to the age of the inter-"We're not perfect. But we do have democracy." —Hugo Chavez "Yes, we falsified the last election.... In fact, 93.5 percent [of ballots were] for President Lukashenka. People say this is not a European result, so we changed it to 86 percent." —Alyaksandr Lukashenka net and the expectations of a better-informed public. In the most sophisticated authoritarian states, profes- sional political operatives —in Russia they are called "political technologists" —work just as hard as their counterparts in the United States. Their goal, however, is not to defeat opposition candidates in a competitive setting, but rather to organize a system that creates the illusion of competition while squelching it in reality. In most countries, elections are largely 'free and fair,' meaning the playing field is reasonably level, there is an honest tabulation of the ballots, vote buying and ballot stuffing do not change the outcome, and independent election observers are allowed to monitor the proceed- ings. For 2015, Freedom in the World placed the num- ber of electoral democracies at 125, around 64 percent of the world's sovereign states.' By historical standards, this is an impressive figure. Still, there are 70 countries that do not qualify as electoral democracies. In all but a few of these settings, elections are indeed held, but they are either badly flawed or patently dishonest. Yet even in systems where elections are tainted or fixed outright, authoritarian leaders often claim legitimacy from the ballot box. Of the countries assessed in this study, only China rejects elections as part of the leader- ship's strategy for political control. In Russia, Turkey, Ven- ezuela, and elsewhere, the leadership invokes victory at the polls as a mandate for government, including the adoption of policies that are in fact deeply unpopular. In some authoritarian states, elections are neither free nor fair, with heavy manipulation that directly ensures 10 EFTA00804734 Freedom House the ruling party's dominance. But in other settings, elec- tions are held under conditions that are relatively free but effectively unfair. That is, the electoral playing field is tilted to favor the incumbents, though the balloting itself is not fixed and remains somewhat unpredictable. In illiberal environments like Hungary and Turkey over the past five years, prospects for an opposition victory are remote, but not out of the question. Even in a qua- si-dictatorship like Venezuela, the opposition can score impressive victories in parliamentary elections and mo- bilize competitive campaigns for the presidency. A display of supremacy In December 2011, members of the Russian opposition obtained video evidence of ballot stuffing committed by operatives from Vladimir Putin's United Russia party in that month's parliamentary elections. A series of unusu- ally large protests ensued. Putin weathered the furor and went on to win a presidential poll the following year. But for a brief period, Putin lost control of Russia's political narrative and was placed on the defensive. He seemed angry and rattled, and subsequently blamed the turmoil on the United States, claiming that statements by then secretary of state Hillary Clinton were meant as a signal to the opposition to launch a color revolution in Russia. (The theme of Clinton as the puppet master behind a plot aimed at regime change in Russia was revived during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, when the Russian media displayed a clear preference for Republi- can candidate Donald Trump and disdain for Clinton.3) For Putin, the events of late 2011 and early 2012 were evidence of weakness and political incompetence. A ruling partywhose triumph requires that party mem- bers be ferried by bus from one voting district to anoth- er to cast multiple ballots is, by today's authoritarian standards, a party that has grown careless and lazy. Authoritarian rulers today seek to fix outcomes well before election day through laws and policies that em- bed unfairness at every level. These leaders take a measure of pride in election victo- ries, even if the results were secured through dishonest methods. They are held up as demonstrations of politi- cal mastery rather than neutral measurements of pub- lic preference. Putin's victories at the polls enable him to reject comparisons with Leonid Brezhnev and other doddering defensive Soviet-era leaders. Likewise, Hugo Chavez boasted that unlike the colonels and generals who ruled over South American dictatorships during the 20th century, his tenure as president of Venezuela was sanctified by no fewer than 17 elections, including a number of referendums. Chavez won all but one.' There are, of course, examples of elections whose out- come resembles the obviously rigged results in total- itarian or junta-like settings. Eurasian presidents such as Azerbaijan's Ilham Aliyev and Belarus's Alyaksandr Lukashenka have repeatedly won elections with over 80 percent of the vote, and others have easily broken the 90 percent barrier. The ruling Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) won every seat in the most recent parliamentary polling.5 However, more sophisticated autocracies try to manage elections so as to maintain a pluralist façade and hide evidence of systematic fraud or intimidation. In Russia, nominal opposition parties usually garner a significant share of parliamentary seats. But all defer to Putin as the country's unchallenged leader and typically vote according to his wishes on key issues!. Genuine opposition forces that seek to win political power are not tolerated, particularly if they champi- on liberal values. Putin has long sought to prevent the rise of a democratic opposition that could raise embarrassing questions about systemic corruption, foreign interventions, or economic stagnation. State media and state resources Predetermining ballot results depends both on the rules and regulations that govern the administration of elections and on the regime's control of other as- sets that can influence the outcome. Control of the media is crucial. The methods of mod- ern censorship are examined in more detail in another section of this report. But when a would-be authori- tarian leader assumes power, one of the first goals is to secure domination over whichever sector of the media has the greatest impact on public opinion and therefore on voting behavior. The first clear indicator of Putin's authoritarian bent was his aggressive move to eliminate independent owner- ship of Russia's major television stations. Through vari- ous forms of intimidation, the new president persuaded private media moguls to surrender ownership to the state, state-owned corporations, or political cronies. Television thus became a propaganda vehicle for Putin and a potent weapon against his critics, who have since been mocked, vilified, or ignored on the nation's most important medium. All this occurred within a few years after his election as president in 2000. In Venezuela, Chavez used his authority over media licensing to destroy Radio Caracas Television (RCTV), a popular broadcast station that was aligned with the woiw.freedomhoustorg 11 EFTA00804735 BREAKING DOWN DEMOCRACY: Goals, Strategies, and Methods of Modern Authoritarians opposition. Other critical voices in television and print media later faced legal suits, regulatory harassment, and withdrawal of advertising revenue until the own- ers agreed to sell their holdings to business interests that were on more friendly terms with the regime.? A prominent theme that runs through authoritarian media is the imperfect nature of electoral processes in the leading democracies, especially the United States. The goal is less to portray elections in Russia, Venezuela, or Iran as paragons of democratic practice than to muddy the waters—to make the case that countries like the United States have no right to lec- ture others on democracy, and that perhaps all elec- tions are equally flawed. The Kremlin's chief propagan- dist described the 2016 U.S. election as "so horribly noxious that it only engenders disgust towards what is still inexplicably called a 'democracy." A second important instrument in authoritarians election toolbox is the state itself. During his period as Venezuela's president, Chavez became a master at using state money and manpower to ensure voter loyalty. In the 2012 election, the last before his death, Chavez is estimated to have invested billions of dol- lars in state resources, including giveaways of house- hold goods to ordinary citizens, in a rather unsubtle vote-buying campaign. That election vividly illustrated the powerful interplay of state media and state resources in undemocratic settings, and it is worth examining in greater detail. Su- perficially, it seemed reasonably consistent with dem- ocratic standards. The voting itself took place without serious violence or major complaints of irregularities. But to a substantial degree, the results were shaped by the regime's actions well before the ballots were cast Chavez had by that time secured an iron grip on the me- dia. Through the state or political allies, he controlled six of the eight national television stations and about half of the country's radio stations. In some regions, he com- manded a virtual information monopoly. The opposition was effectively shut out of the Chavez-aligned outlets, earning mention only as cartoonish villains. The incumbent benefited especially from a practice whereby all radio and television stations are obliged to preempt normal programming to accommodate the president's speeches to the nation. During 2012, Chavez took advantage of this tool to fill 100 hours of broadcast- ing 47 of them in the 90 days prior to the election. Aure- lio Concheso, an analyst with Transparency Venezuela, placed the value of this free airtime at $1.8 billion. Anoth- er government mandate required radio and television stations to broadcast 10 state messages of 30 seconds each on a daily basis: the messages, not surprisingly, dovetailed with the arguments of the Chavez campaign. Concheso estimated the value of this free airtime at $292 million. In addition, the govemment spent an es- timated $200 million on advertising with private radio and television stations. By contrast, the opposition had access to five minutes of airtime a day, at a cost of $102 million. The opposition was thus limited to an incredible 4 percent of the airtime enjoyed by Chavez. Meanwhile, according to Concheso, the state oil com- pany spent some $20 billion on gifts of home durable goods, apartments, and outright cash subsidies to purchase the allegiance of Venezuelan voters and underscore the message that without Chavez, this largesse would dry up. Finally, a measure of fear was introduced through a campaign suggesting that although the balloting was secret, the government had ways of ascertaining a voter's choice. The threat had a special effect given public memories of an episode in 2004, in which those who signed a petition for a referendum to remove Chavez from office were blacklisted and excluded from government jobs, benefits, and contracts. Favored tactics The following are among the other tactics deployed by modem authoritarians to ensure success at the polls: 1. Intimidating the opposition: Opposition leaders are only occasionally targeted for assassination. But they can face a variety of other cruel fates. Wealthy businessman and opposition supporter Mikhail Khodorkovsky was dispatched to a Rus- sian prison for 10 years for daring to challenge Putin. In 2017, anticorruption campaigner Andrei Navalny, widely regarded as the most serious challenger to Putin, was effectively eliminated from the 2018 presidential contest after being convicted in a trumped-up embezzlement case.9 In Malaysia, opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim has twice been convicted and jailed on sodomy charges. Prominent political figures have also been jailed in Belarus, Venezuela, Iran, Ethiopia, Turkey, and Egypt, among many others. Human rights activists and bloggers are also subject to harassment and persecution. They are frequent- ly jailed on trumped-up charges of defamation, tax fraud, or drug trafficking, among others. 12 EFTA00804736 Freedom House 2. Marginalizing the opposition: As noted above, authoritarian leaders use their media power to paint critics as knaves or buffoons. Especially through television coverage, opposition figures are presented as clownish, effeminate, shady, elitist or enslaved by foreign interests. The mes- sage is pounded home day after day, until the image of the opposition as small and unfit to rule is fixed in the public's mind. 3. Tolerating the pseudo-opposition: Having jailed, exiled, or silenced potentially competitive oppo- sition figures, authoritarians tolerate nominal op- position parties that are effectively controlled by the regime. These groups have accepted the su- premacy of the incumbent leadership and settled into their roles in a stage-managed democracy. 4. Criminalizing protest: The crippling of formal opposition parties leads many voters to chan- nel their dissent into loosely organized civic activism, often