Clear Orbit Secure Future 2026

the entire lifespan of a satellite and no universal mandate for operators to carry insurance covering debris removal. Lastly, government assets, which comprise the majority of debris objects, are often self-insured or uninsured. Despite these limitations, insurance could play a targeted role in incentivizing future commercial responsibility. For example, regulators could require new insurance products that cover end-of-life disposal, theoretically creating a funding pool for remediation missions if a satellite fails. While this would require a mechanism for translating payouts into debris remediation, it could create market- based incentives to adopt new technologies, such as ADR-compatible docking plates, in exchange for lower premiums. Such a system may include models such as a tiered insurance approach, offering lower rates for operators who follow all guidelines, or a captive mutual model where third-party liability coverage is shared among operators, contingent on all parties meeting strict sustainability standards. While not a complete solution, a reimagined framework could serve as an economic lever to align commercial incentives with long-term orbital safety. 2 Performance or surety bonds: A similar market-based mechanism, performance bonds would require an operator to set aside funds that are only returned upon successful completion of their end-of-life disposal plan. This creates a direct financial incentive for compliance and provides a source of funding for remediation if obligations are not met.10 3 Economic instruments: Other mechanisms – such as taxes, corrective mechanisms, credits and subsidies – could be used in combination to influence actor behaviour. These instruments typically require a mature regulatory structure and a high degree of international alignment to prevent the creation of competitive disadvantages for any single nation’s industry and due to the physical nature of space where the actions of one actor can potentially impact all other space assets. 4 Public–private funding models: A public– private partnership (PPP) could be seen as a more inclusive way to direct financial resources in dealing not only with specific debris linked to a given actor but also with the broader debris population, including pieces that exist today and are not attributable. Powerful precedents for this type of hybrid governance exist in the maritime and climate sectors. For example, the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, established under the International Maritime Organization, provide a liability and compensation regime for oil tanker spills. This system is funded through mandatory contributions from companies that receive oil by sea, based on a “polluter pays” principle. This approach successfully internalizes the negative externalities of the industry and ensures that a mechanism is in place for compensation and clean-up, offering a proven pathway for how the space sector might manage debris. While complex, such an approach could be considered an alternative to previous types of instruments and a preferred method by the private sector. All these economic solutions require regulatory advances to implement. As technology solutions mature and the cost of inaction becomes more widely understood, opposition to such financial frameworks may diminish. As technology solutions mature and the cost of inaction becomes more widely understood, opposition to such financial frameworks may diminish. 20 Clear Orbit, Secure Future: A Call to Action on Space Debris