Open but Secure Europe%E2%80%99s Path to Strategic Interdependence 2025
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When it comes to technology, the European
Union is a long way off achieving strategic
interdependence. Its industry lags behind the
US and China and depends heavily on its global
competitors. Nearly 80% of suppliers to European
semiconductor firms are headquartered outside the
bloc,32 while its global competitor China produces
80% of the EU’s solar panels and just under half of
its critical raw materials.33,34 Meanwhile, the seven
largest US tech companies are 20 times bigger than
the EU’s, generating 10 times the revenue.35
The EU’s technology sector cannot afford to be
playing catch-up. The bloc desperately needs a
secure and stable supply of critical technologies to
realize its digital and green transitions. Being heavily
dependent on the US and China reduces Europe’s
ability to act autonomously when those countries
do not align with the EU’s interests or values.
However, to achieve a more robust and resilient
technology sector, Europeans have so far asked
themselves the wrong question. Rather than trying
to emulate US successes – for example with a
European cloud or satellite constellation – they
should be asking how to create an environment
where European innovation and industry can play to
its own strengths.
Building strategic interdependence should
therefore begin with a frank assessment of where
the EU’s dependencies and vulnerabilities lie,
where it has strong like-minded partnerships
and where it can develop its leading edge in
technologies of the future. The EU cannot create
champions without the raw ingredients: the
right regulatory space, financing, infrastructure
and trade partnerships are needed to unleash
Europe’s technological potential and safeguard its
competitiveness and economic security.
Greasing the gears
To begin with, the EU needs to rethink its
regulatory approach. The bloc has pitched
itself as a regulatory powerhouse, setting
important standards to guide the development of
technologies. In the 2019-2024 EU institutional
term, 93 digital and technology regulations were
adopted, including the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), the Digital Services Act (DSA),
the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Chips Act, the
AI Act and the Data Act.36
But the “Brussels effect” – where other regulatory
jurisdictions seek to align with the EU’s regulations
– is losing its potency as emerging technologies
like advanced AI become more hotly contested
geopolitically. The rise of technology sectors in
other countries, especially new great and middle
powers, dilutes the imperative to follow the EU’s
digital rules. Big technology firms, meanwhile, have
consistently argued that overregulation has stifled
innovation in Europe.European policy-makers should not see it as a
simple choice between regulation and innovation.
Rather, a broader set of legal and institutional
reforms are necessary for technology companies
to innovate and for digital economies and societies
to thrive in the global ecosystem.37 To kick-start
European industry and innovation, the EU should
conduct a comprehensive review of its regulations
and withdraw any unnecessary regulatory and
administrative barriers. As part of this EU-wide
review, it should consider creating one-stop shops
in member states that could help companies
navigate the complexity of digital regulations. This
should be accompanied by a less fragmented
approach to initial public offerings (IPOs) to start-
ups and small and medium enterprises, as well as
a more unified and straightforward legal framework
for businesses.
Innovation also requires investment. European
start-ups currently face challenges in accessing
capital, as bank loans have become harder to
secure and venture capital in the EU remains much
lower than in the US, as Agathe Demarais details
in the following chapter. With support from the
European Commission, the European Innovation
Council could tap into pension and insurance
funds to fuel home-grown start-ups and high-tech
companies. To entice more private sector funding,
the EU could minimize investor risk by introducing
robust de-risking tools, such as loan and guarantee
programmes backed by EU institutions. The
European Fund for Strategic Investments and the
European Guarantee Fund can serve as valuable
models for these initiatives.
To get the most value for money, the EU should
make use of the tools already at hand, such as
the scale provided by the single market. The
completion of the single market should therefore
focus on removing barriers in services, energy,
defence, finance, electronic communications and
digital technologies to make doing business and
innovation across member states easier.38 The
EU could then develop schemes to coordinate
investments across the bloc and help European
companies scale-up into global players. This
approach could benefit from tax incentives, such
as stock options with deferred taxes to make it
easier for innovators to work across Europe, as
well as from accelerating permitting and improving
guidance and support for implementing regulations.
However, developing a more resilient and
competitive technological industry cannot rest on
the private sector alone. The EU must play its part
by increasing investment in its own infrastructure
– especially water supply, hydrogen pipelines,
charging points, renewable energy technologies
and 5G networks. Securing critical infrastructure is
an important priority, particularly Europe’s subsea
cable network, on which Ireland, Cyprus and Malta
rely for digital connectivity.
Beyond foundational infrastructure, the EU could
aim higher by expanding its supercomputing 80% of suppliers
to European
semiconductor
firms are
headquartered
outside the EU.
China produces
80% of the EU’s
solar panels and
nearly 50% of
its critical raw
materials. The
US’s 7 largest
tech companies
generate 10x more
revenue than the
EU’s.
To kick-start
European industry
and innovation, the
EU should conduct
a comprehensive
review of its
regulation and
withdraw any
unnecessary
regulatory and
administrative
barriers.
Open but Secure: Europe’s Path to Strategic Interdependence
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