The Global Cooperation Barometer 2026

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150.600.650.700.750.800.850.900.951.001.051.10 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 -15 -5 0 5 -10 10Compound annual growth rate (CAGR), % Trade and capital index Foreign portfolio investment (FPI) Remittances Services trade Labour migration Developing countries share of manufacturing exports* FDI stock Trade concentration1* Developing countries share of FDI* Goods trade Official development assistance (ODA) 2012–20 2020–23 2023–24Trade and capital held steady in 2024, capital and services increased, while goods trade and official development assistance (ODA) decreased FIGURE 4 Goods trade, the historical core of this pillar, grew slightly slower than overall GDP (gross domestic product), leading to a slight decline in this metric. More notable than the overall value of trade is its composition. As the global multilateral system sees pressures, a large reconfiguration in trading partners is playing out: McKinsey Global Institute research finds goods trade is falling between countries that are geopolitically distant (less aligned), and instead shifting towards more geopolitically proximate partners. The average geopolitical distance of global goods trade has fallen by about 7% between 2017 and 2024.12 Developing countries and China have gained a larger share of manufacturing exports: in 2024, their exports rose by $276 billion, or 5 percentage points, of which China represented more than half the total growth. Overall trade relationships slightly diversified, as the trade concentration metric fell by about 1%.13 Taken together, these shifts suggest that global trade is redistributing within aligned networks while diversifying across partners. Undeniably, a series of US tariff announcements in 2025 raised questions about the future of trade. Early indicators suggest that rather than leading to a contraction, these announcements have fuelled a reconfiguration. Trade volumes are estimated to have grown in 2025 (by about 2.4%), though slightly below the pace of real GDP growth (3.2%).14,15 However, reconfiguration intensified – US imports from China fell by about 20% in the first seven months of 2025, compared to the same period in 2024, while imports from geopolitically closer partners in Europe and Asia increased.16 Flows of capital and services, on the other hand, trended upward.17 This was often motivated 1. Metrics were inverted given negative connotation; *outcome metrics. Sources: World Bank; UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD); UN Comtrade; International Monetary Fund (IMF); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); International Labour Organization (ILO); McKinsey & Company analysis. The Global Cooperation Barometer 2026 12
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