The Global Cooperation Barometer 2026
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150.600.650.700.750.800.850.900.951.001.051.10
2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024
-15 -5 0 5 -10 10Compound annual growth rate (CAGR), %
Trade and capital index
Foreign portfolio investment (FPI)
Remittances
Services trade
Labour migration
Developing countries share of manufacturing exports*
FDI stock
Trade concentration1*
Developing countries share of FDI*
Goods trade
Official development assistance (ODA)
2012–20 2020–23 2023–24Trade and capital held steady in 2024, capital and services increased,
while goods trade and official development assistance (ODA) decreased FIGURE 4
Goods trade, the historical core of this pillar, grew
slightly slower than overall GDP (gross domestic
product), leading to a slight decline in this metric.
More notable than the overall value of trade is its
composition. As the global multilateral system sees
pressures, a large reconfiguration in trading partners
is playing out: McKinsey Global Institute research
finds goods trade is falling between countries that are
geopolitically distant (less aligned), and instead shifting
towards more geopolitically proximate partners. The
average geopolitical distance of global goods trade
has fallen by about 7% between 2017 and 2024.12
Developing countries and China have gained a
larger share of manufacturing exports: in 2024,
their exports rose by $276 billion, or 5 percentage
points, of which China represented more than half
the total growth. Overall trade relationships slightly
diversified, as the trade concentration metric fell by about 1%.13 Taken together, these shifts suggest
that global trade is redistributing within aligned
networks while diversifying across partners.
Undeniably, a series of US tariff announcements
in 2025 raised questions about the future of trade.
Early indicators suggest that rather than leading to
a contraction, these announcements have fuelled
a reconfiguration. Trade volumes are estimated to
have grown in 2025 (by about 2.4%), though slightly
below the pace of real GDP growth (3.2%).14,15
However, reconfiguration intensified – US imports
from China fell by about 20% in the first seven
months of 2025, compared to the same period
in 2024, while imports from geopolitically closer
partners in Europe and Asia increased.16
Flows of capital and services, on the other hand,
trended upward.17 This was often motivated 1. Metrics were inverted given negative connotation;
*outcome metrics.
Sources: World Bank; UN Trade and Development
(UNCTAD); UN Comtrade; International Monetary Fund
(IMF); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD); International Labour Organization
(ILO); McKinsey & Company analysis.
The Global Cooperation Barometer 2026
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