by countries seeking to attract know-how and capital from overseas to boost their own domestic capabilities. Cross-border capital flows have increased continually since 2022, with growth in metrics that track foreign portfolio flows and direct investment stock. In the case of FDI, newly announced greenfield projects have surged in future-shaping industries and the resources that power them – semiconductors, data centres/AI, electric vehicle (EV) batteries, and critical minerals – as nations work with their close partners to build capacity in strategically sensitive areas. Compared to trade, the geopolitical distance of greenfield FDI has fallen about twice as fast.18 Much of this pipeline is heading to advanced economies – particularly the US – as they invest more in one another and reduce FDI announcements into China, whose share fell from 9% of total announced FDI inflows in 2015–19 to only 3% in 2022–25.19 These trends further intensified in 2025. Services trade also ratcheted higher, continuing its five-year run of growth since the low point of 2020. Gains were mostly driven by digitally delivered services (such as IT services), travel and other business services (professional, technical, R&D/engineering).20 In 2025, WTO estimates point to moderating but still positive growth in services trade, with digitally delivered services remaining firm as travel and transport normalize under lingering policy uncertainty.21 As in most pillars, metrics closely associated with global multilateral cooperation fell the most. Official development assistance (ODA) had the largest decline in this pillar, 10.8% in 2024, marked by lower aid to Ukraine, reduced humanitarian aid and weakened refugee spending. Only four countries exceeded the UN target of 0.7% GNI (gross national income), as countries adjusted their priorities amid a more fragmented global landscape. For 2025, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimated another 9–17% fall in ODA, reflecting multi-year reductions across several top donors.22 Finally, after growing uninterruptedly since 2020, international labour migration may be approaching an inflection point. The global stock of labour migrants grew in 2024, but signs of a slowdown emerged; for example, new migration flows to OECD countries weakened by 4% in 2024.23 In 2025, a sharp contraction played out. Net migration inflows into the US and Germany fell by an estimated 65% and 39% compared to 2024, respectively (Figure 5).24 While 2025 certainly introduced new tensions, the direction of travel was often consistent with previous years. The goods trade share of the global economy declined slightly, capital flows increased and labour migration restrictions intensified. In this landscape, about 85% of the council members surveyed perceived cooperation to be broadly declining. Forty percent of surveyed executives pointed to growing barriers in trade, talent and cross-border capital flows as hampering their ability to do business. Notably, though, the remaining 60% said the effects were not substantially negative, at least to date. This may illustrate the fact that many organizations have found ways to readjust their strategies to navigate increased turbulence in the world of trade.25 Looking ahead, there are many fast-moving currents under the surface – such as opportunities to rearrange trade between new partners, and participate in fast-growing corridors such as those between emerging economies.26,27 Recent examples of increased cooperation – from major players and coalitions of smaller economies – include the September 2025 launch of the Future of Investment and Trade (FIT) Partnership that is bringing together 14 small and medium-sized economies in trade; the graduation of the EU– Mercosur accord into the adoption phase; the conclusion of the EU–Indonesia deal after a decade; the conclusion of a Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) among ASEAN nations; and the US striking bilateral deals for critical minerals with close partners (e.g. Australia in October 202528). Of course, the idea of smaller trade coalitions is not new – more than 370 regional trade agreements have been signed since 1995.29 The challenge moving forward will be for companies and countries to navigate a spectrum of preferences and market access arrangements – and what this will eventually mean for global commercial flows. The challenge will be for companies and countries to navigate a spectrum of preferences and market access arrangements – and what this will eventually mean for global commercial flows. The Global Cooperation Barometer 2026 13