About half of surveyed executives pointed to developments in peace and security as affecting their ability to conduct business. the Middle East63 and Europe – including high- profile attacks affecting large organizations across both the public and private sectors.64 “Grey-zone” activity and infrastructure disruptions across digital and energy infrastructure also intensified, especially in 2025. Europe experienced gas-pipeline sabotage and damage to sub-sea cables, while three major multi-cable outages occurred in the Red Sea and West Africa.65 The sharpest decline in this pillar was the deterioration in global multilateral actions, namely resolutions and peacekeeping missions, which have not kept pace with the growth of conflicts. The number of UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions fell from 50 in 2023 to 46 in 2024, and the ratio of multilateral peace operations to conflicts declined by about 11% YoY. This reflects heightened geopolitical tensions, which have made conditions difficult for UN intervention. Until the UNSC vote in November 2025 authorizing an international stabilization force for the Gaza Strip, the UNSC had not mandated a new peacekeeping operation since 2014.66 Furthermore, budget cuts have put pressure on existing missions – personnel deployed to multilateral peace operations fell by more than 40% between 2015 and 2024, and a budgetary crunch disrupted a mission’s function in 2024.67 In this context, the role of the UN’s engagement has evolved, leaning more on special political missions and special envoys, concurrent with a rise in regionally led frameworks.68 Given the pressures on peace and security, it is perhaps not surprising that perceptions of cooperation are pessimistic. About half of surveyed council members expected cooperation to deteriorate, and about half of surveyed executives pointed to developments in peace and security as affecting their ability to conduct business. This was the highest of any pillar after trade and capital (Figure 13). These tensions are also manifesting in how economies prepare for the future; many have responded by increasing defence spending, including China, India, the EU, Japan and Australia. In parallel, all 32 NATO member states met the defence spending target of 2% of GDP in 2025, whereas more than 10 fell short the year before.69 With NATO raising its spending target to 5% of GDP for 2035,70 national defence spending is set to rise further. Still, there are some sources of hope. Survey respondents noted that major powers have so far managed their rivalries with restraint, preventing competition from evolving into escalation.71 A panel of geopolitical experts interviewed for this report highlights the rise of “patchwork resilience”, where cooperation is succeeding in regional initiatives despite receding in global multilateral arrangements. Indeed, successful cooperation in this pillar has been achieved through smaller coalitions. Several regional bodies have stepped up to stabilize or manage crises (such as the African Union- led security transition in Somalia, and Southern African Development Community deployments in Mozambique and the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo). Beyond formal frameworks, minilateral diplomacy also contributed to de-escalation in 2025. Türkiye mediated talks between Ethiopia and Somalia under the Ankara Declaration, leading to a de-escalation of tensions.72 Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed on the text of a peace treaty and steps to keep third-country forces off their borders – with EU/US facilitation.73 These examples underscore how, even as large UN troop deployments recede, tailored coalitions can still reduce risks and open channels for political settlement. The Global Cooperation Barometer 2026 25