The Global Risks Report 2024

Crime wave 2.6 Severity score: Illicit economic activity FIGURE 2.24 Source World Economic Forum Global RisksPerception Survey 2023-2024. 10-year rank: 31stGlobal proliferation of organized crime or the illicit activities of businesses that undermine economic advancement and growth.Includes, but is not limited to: illicit financial flows (e.g. tax evasion, sanctions evasion, money laundering) and illicit trade andtrafficking (e.g. counterfeiting, human trafficking, wildlife trade, weapons). 10-year average: 4.0 NoteSeverity was assessed on a 1-7 Likert scale[1 – Low severity, 7 – High severity]. The percentages in the graph may not add up to 100% because figures havebeen rounded up/down.2 years 10 years3% 8% 12% 17% 26% 20% 13% Proportion of respondents7% 13% 26% 26% 19% 6% 5% 7 High Low 6 5 4 3 2 1Severity – State fragility, fueled by climate change, conflict and economic har dship, will create or widen a governance gap in which transnational organized crime can flourish. – T echnological advances will open new markets and allow crime networks to spread, and the human and economic cost of crime may rise in tandem. – As the ease and attractiveness of these parallel economies gr ows, the lines between criminals and the state likely will blur. Organized crime may continue to globalize in terms of both targets and operations, and in doing so, could become a powerful and destabilizing presence in a wider set of countries. The latest data suggests that activity has already started to rise across all criminal markets and actors (Figure 2.25). 103 Notwithstanding a drop in homicide rates, organized crime remains a significant contributor to lethal violence: between 2000 and 2019, it resulted in roughly the same number of killings as all armed conflicts across the world combined, at a rate of approximately 65,000 deaths per year. 104 Illicit economic activity is an under-the-radar risk – it ranks comparatively low in terms of perceived severity over both the two- and 10-year time horizons, at #28 and #31 respectively (Figure 2.24). While narrower than the definition adopted by the GRPS, this section will focus specifically on organized crime in light of these recent data trends to explore whether emerging geostrategic, environmental, demographic and technological forces could turn the already-chronic risk of organized crime into a pressing crisis over the next decade. Indeed, many of the perceived drivers to Illicit economic activity are among the most severe perceived risks over the short- and longer-term horizon. It is among the top 10 most connected risks in the network, seen to be driven by Economic downturn, Lack of economic opportunity, Cyber insecurity and Involuntary migration, together with Unemployment, Intrastate violence and Geoeconomic confrontation, among others (Figure 2.26). There are three concurrent trends that will fuel crime syndicates and related illicit markets over the next decade. First, societal fragility, arising from geopolitical, socioeconomic and environmental vulnerabilities, may drive an expansion in illicit markets. In parallel, advances in technology will break down barriers to entry – borders, languages, skill sets – opening alternate revenue streams, particularly in the cyber domain, and allowing transnational criminal networks to spread. Finally, the erosion of legitimate governance may create a vacuum of power for criminal organizations to flourish, contesting fragile regimes for territorial control, or capitalizing on lucrative partnerships with state actors. Global Risks Report 2024 68