Document text
FM 31-20-5
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface iv
CHAPTER 1. Overview 1-1
The Environment 1-1
The Nature of Special Reconnaissance 1-2
Special Operations Imperatives 1-8
Special Reconnaissance Fundamentals 1-10
Battlefield Operating Systems 1-12
Relationship to Other Missions 1-14
Employment 1-16
SR and Air-Land Operations 1-16
Historical Perspective 1-18
CHAPTER 2. Premission Activities 2-1
Section I. Mission Analysis 2-1
Procedures 2-1
Products 2-4
Staff Activities 2-5
Subordinate Operational Elements 2-8
Section II. Mission Planning 2-9
Mission Planning Process 2-9
Feasibility Assessment 2-10
Post-FA Activities 2-12
Plan of Execution Development 2-12
Section III. Mission Preparation 2-19
Training 2-20
Intelligence 2-21
Personnel 2-22
Logistics 2-22
Communications 2-22
Periodic Update 2-22
Section IV. Preemployment Preparation 2-23
Deliberate Planning 2-23
11
I FM 31-20-5
SOURCES USED
REFERENCES
These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.
Joint and Multiservice Publications
Joint Publication 1-02. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,
15 April 1988.
Joint Pub 3-05.5. Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Pro-
cedures (Final Draft), August 1990.
STANAG 2174. Military Routes and Route/Road Networb, 10 September 1978.
Army Publications
AR 381-10. U.S. Army Intelligence Activities, 1 July 1984.
FM 3-18. Special NBC Reconnaissance (LB Team), 3 June 1992.
FM 5-34. Engineer Field Data, 14 September 1987.
FM 5-103. Survivability, 10 June 1985.
FM 7-93. Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations,'^ June 1987.
FM 21-76. SwmH 5 June 1992.
FM 31-20. Doctrine for Special Forces Operations, 20 April 1990.
FM 31-26. (SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Special Forces Advanced Opera-
tions Techniques (U) (To Be Pubhshed).
FM 31-71. Northern Operations, 21 June 1971.
FM 33-1. Psychological Operations, 31 July 1987.
FM 34-36. Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Op-
erations, 1 July 1990.
FM 90-3. Desert Operations, 19 August 1977.
FM 90-5. jungle Operations, 16 August 1982.
FM 90-6. Mountain Operations, 30 June 1980.
FM 90-10 (HTF). Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) (How to
Fight), 15 August 1979.
References-1
FM 31-20-5 1
DOCUMENTS NEEDED
FM 100-25. Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, October 1990.
FM 101-5. Operations, 5 May 1986.
FM 101-5-1. Operational Terms and Symbols, 21 October 1985.
STP 31-18C34-SM-TG. Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide for MOS 18C,
Skill Levels 3 and 4, 5 October 1990.
STP 31-18F4-SM-TG. Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide for MOS 18F, Sfa'//
Lew/ 4, 10 June 1991.
TC 31-19. Special Forces Military Free-Fall Operations, 9 September 1988.
TC 31-24. Special Forces Air Operations, 9 September 1988.
TC 31-25. Special Forces Waterhorne Operations, 3 October 1988.
TC 31-29. Special Forces Operational Techniques, 9 September 1988.
TC 57-1. The jumpmaster, 28 September 1979.
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
DA Form 5517-R. Standard Range Cards (LRA), February 1986.
READINGS RECOMMENDED
These readings contain relevant supplemental information.
FM 25-101. Battle Focused Training, 30 September 1990.
FM 34-60A. Counterintelligence Operations (SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL),
6 June 1989.
FM 41-10. Civil Affairs Operations, 11 January 1993.
Department of Army Information Security Program, 25 February 1988.
References-2
FM 31-20-5
PREFACE
Special reconnaissance (SR) is defined as reconnaissance and surveillance ac-
tions conducted by Special Forces (SF) to obtain or verify, by visual observa-
tion or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities,
intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data con-
cerning the meteorologic, hydrographic, geographic, or demographic charac-
teristics of a particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessment, and
poststrike reconnaissance.
Field manual (FM) 31-20-5 provides the doctrinal basis for the conduct of SR
missions across the operational continuum. It is a continuation of the doctrinal
education process that begins with Joint Publication 3-05.5 and FMs 100-25
and 31-20. This manual provides information and guidance to SF commanders,
staffs, and operational personnel at battalion and lower echelons (Special
Forces operational detacnments [SFODs] C, B, and A) in their conduct of SR.
It is a general guide and does not eliminate the requirement for well-written,
practiced, and mission-essential task list (METL)-driven standing operating
procedures (SOPs).
It is designed to expand on and be supported by FM 31-20-1, Special Forces Tac-
tics, Techniques, and Procedures (to be published). It was written under the as-
sumption that the user understands these basic fundamentals. However, it
expands on this basic information by providing a number of historical examples
to nighlight key points throughout the text as well as advanced tactics, tech-
niques, procedures, and references to support future SF operations. Users of this
FM should adapt its contents to meet the situation and knowledge and skill levels
of the SFOD to be employed through the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and
time available (METT-T) analysis system.
The chapters provide general SR mission procedures and information. This in-
formation is ordered chrono logically fr om receipt of the unit mission letter
through postmission activities. [Figure P-l| shows the applicability of each chapter
to the differing unit levels. Examples of specific SR techniques and procedures
are provided in the appendixes, the order of the appendixes follows the order
they appear in the text. This organization permits the user of this FM to review
the basics of SR mission performance from beginning to end without becoming
embroiled in a mass of detail with which the user may be thoroughly familiar.
For those users only interested in the details of specific techniques, the appen-
dixes provide reference material keyed to the generic activities in the text.
Commanders and trainers should use this and other related manuals in conjunc-
tion with command guidance, the Army Training and Evaluation Program
IV
FM 31-20-5
(ARTEP), and the Mission Training Program to plan and conduct mission-
specific training. Planning SR-relatea training prior to being employed with a
specific SR mission is the key to assuring success.
The provisions of this publication are the subject of the international agreements
listed in the references in the back of this book. There are numerous acronyms,
abbreviations, and terms found within this manual. Users should refer to the
Glossary section at the back of the manual for their meanings or definitions.
The proponent of this publication is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Spe-
cial Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), Fort Bragg, NC. Reviewers and
users of this manual should submit comments and recommended changes on DA
Form 2028 to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-DT-DM, Fort Bragg,
NC 28307-5000.
Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men and
women are included.
Applicability
Chapter 1
Ovwvlew
Chapter 2
Pramisslon
Employment
Chapters
Employment
Chapter 4
Postmlssion
AcUvllies
Appendixes
SF Group
;
SFODC
, si
SFODB
;:
SFODA
^
-
-
Figure P-1. User applicability guide.
FM 31-20-5
INDEX
A
advanced operational base (AOB) 2-4, 2-6, 2-8, 2-11, 4-1, G-2
advanced special operations training (ASOT) 2-3
advanced trauma life support (ATLS) 1-7
airdefense 1-13
air-land operations 1-17
area assessment (AA) 1-4, 1-14, 1-17, 3-1, C-13
area of operations (AO) 3-1
area of responsibility (AOR) 2-1
area orientation 1-7
area reconnaissance B-1, B-5
area specialist team (AST) 2-13
area studies 2-21
assessment team (see a/so pilot team and survey team) M, 1-14
augmentation 3-22
B
battle drills (BDs) 1-12
battlefield operating systems (BOS) 1-12 tfirougti 1-14
beach survey format 0-51
"BLUES" application A-1, A-14
bridge report (BRIDGEREP) 3-8, D-18
briefback 2-18and2-19
C
camouflage and concealment C-21 and C-22
CARVER 3-13
analysis 3-8
assessment 3-15
Index-1
FM 31-20-5
matrix 1-7, 3-15
reconnaissance report checklist 3-15
chemical reconnaissance team "LB" E-1
civil affairs (CA) 1-14, 1-16, 2-7
civil-military operations 2-15
close air support (CAS) 1-13
collateral activities 1-16
combat patrolling 2-24
combat service support (CSS) 1-13
command and control (C^ 1-13
command, control, communications, and intelligence (C^l) 1-11
commander in chief (CINC) 1-18
communications site A-16
comparlmentation 2-13
contingency operation 1-17
counterdrug (CD) 1-16
counterinsurgency (COIN) C-16
counterintelligence (CI) 4-2
counterterrorism (CT) 1-15
countertracking C-23
courses of action (COAs) 2-3, E-1
criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability effect,
recognizability (CARVER) 1-4
CS gas (see tear gas)
D
damage
collateral 3-11
immediate 3-11
debriefing
collective intelligence 4-2
format D-54and D-55
general collective 4-3
individual 4-3
decision-making process 2-5
deliberate planning 2-23
Desert Storm (see also Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm) 1-17
direct action 1-14
Index-2-
FM 31-20-5
E
electronic countermeasures (ECM) A-3
electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) A-3
electronic filmless camera system (EFCS) 2-7, C-1 1
electronic information retrieval 4-4
emerging missions 2-23
employment 1-16, 3-1
escape and evasion (E&E) 1-15
plan 1-1 3, C-5
estimates 2-3 and 2-4, 2-16
Executive Order 12333 F-3
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 3-22, 1-1
detachment E-3
F
F-470 Zodiac inflatable twat C-3
feasibility assessment (FA) 2-10
field standing operating prxedures (FSOPs) 1-12
foreign internal defense (FID) 1-14
fonward operational base (FOB) 2-4, 2-6, 2-8, 2-13, 4-1 , G-2
G
Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War F-5
grenades 1-4
group chemical detachment E-1
H
high altitude high opening (HAHO) operations
(see a/so military free-fall [MFF] operations) C-2
high altitude low opening (HALO) operations
(see also military free-fall [Uff] operations) 2-6, 2-1 7, C-2
host nation (HN) 1-14
host nation law F-2
human intelligence (HUMINT) 1-8, 1-18
hydrographic survey format D-52 and D-53
I
"ICE Packs" (see individual chemical equipment [ICE] resupply procedures)
imagery intelligence (IMINT) 1-8, C-9, C-11
Index-3
FM 31-20-5 1
immediate action drills (IADs) 1-12
incidental infomiation collection 1-5, 3-23
indicators 3-21 , 3-23
individual chemical equipment (ICE) resupply procedures E-3
initial area assessment (lAA) 3-I
intelligence and electronic warfare (lEW) 3-23
intelligence preparation of tfie battlefield (IPB) 1-8, 3-1
intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) 2-6
intermediate staging bases (ISB) C-1
internal defense and development (IDAD) I-14
isolation facility (ISOFAC) 4-1
J
joint force commander (JFC) 1-11
joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) G-1
joint force special operations air component commander (JSOACC) G-1
Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) 2-7
joint special operations areas (JSOAs) 1-5
joint special operations task force (JSOTF) 1-11,0-1
joint strategic capabilities plans (JSCPs) 2-2
joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) G-2
K
Klepper Arius 2 military canoe C-3 and C-4
KS-99 series camera system C-11
L
land mines 1-2
laws of war F-1
LB team (see also chemical detachment team "LB") 1 -4, 3-1 9 and 3-20, 3-22
lines of communication (LOC) 1-15, B-1
LOC surveillance 3-21
long-range surveillance unit (LRSU) 2-24
M
message pickup (MRU) operations C-6
military free-fall (MFF) operations C-2
military intelligence (Ml) 1-12
Index-4
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ FM 31-20-5
military intelligence detachments (MID) 2-8, 3-22
mission concept (MICON) 2-13, 2-16
mission, enemy, ten'ain, troops, and time
available (MEH-T) 1-16, 3-4, A-9, C-12
analysis system iv
factors 3-21, A-1, A-8, A-15
mission-essential task list (METL) 1-3, 2-20, 2-23
mission-essential equipment 2-18, H-1
mission letter 2-2
mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) E-3
mission planning 2-9
mission planning agent (MPA) 2-19
mission-specific equipment 2-10, H-1
mission support sites (MSSs) 1-13
mission support package (MSP) 2-19
mission tasking package (MTP) 2-9
mobile training team (MTT) 3-23
modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE) 2-4
N
National Command Authorities (NCA) F-5
near-real-time (NRT) 1-3
information 1-11
intelligence 1-14, 1-17
night observation C-18
night vision devices (NVDs) 2-18, C-20
night vision goggles (NVGs) 2-18
observation and surveillance sites
construction A-2, A-4, A-6, A-7, A-9
techniques A-12 through A-15
in nonpermissive environments A-2
in northern areas A-7
in permissive and semipermissive environment A-2
in the desert a-5
in the forest A-6
in the jungle and swamp A-7
in the nwuntains A-3
Index-5
FM 31-20-51
occupation A-1
selection a-2 through A-4. A-8
types of A-1 through A-12
observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment,
obstacles, key ten-ain, and avenues of approach (OCOKA) C-7, C-9, C-13
observation log C-8
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm 1-17 and 1-18
operational continuum i-2
operations and intelligence (O&l) 2-4
operations security (OPSEC) 1-12
overt collection 1^
P
peacetime campaign plans (PCPs) 2-2
pilot team (see a/so survey team and assessment team) 1-4,1-15,2-3,2-8
plan of execution (POE) 1-13, 2-12
principal area assessment (PAA) 3-1
PROJECT DELTA 1-19
psychological operations (PSYOP) 1-5, 1-13 and 1-14, 1-16, 2-7
PSYOPthemes 3-19
Q
quick reaction force (QRF) 4-1 , C-5
R
radio direction finding (DF) A-15
reconnaissance
hydrographic, meteorotogical, and geographic 1-4
poststrike 1-4. 3-10, 1-6
nuclear, biological, and chenxal (NBC) 1-4
reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) 1-5, 3-11
report
after-action i-5, 4-5
CARVER reconnaissance 3-14
formats D-1 through D-55
historical 4-5
of enemy sighting (SPOTREP) D-1
of lessons learned 4-5
requests for intelligence information (Rlls) 2-6
Index-6
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ FM 31-20-5
requests for information (RFIs) 2-6,2-14
river/estuary report (DELTREP) 3-8, D-16
"rolled over" (see also "rollover! 1-14
"rollover 1-15, 3-21
routes and roads report (ROUTEREP) 3-8, D-7
rules of engagement (ROE) 1-2
S
satellite 3-11
security assistance (SA) 1-16
sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF) 3-22
SFOD SOPs 1-12
signal center (SIGCEN) 4-2
signals intelligence (SIGINT) 1-8
size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) C-7
small boat operations C-2 and C-3
SO legal considerations 2-4, F-1 tfirougfi F-5
SOMPF shell 2-12
Special Air Service (SAS) 1-18
Special Forces operational base (SFOB) G-2
special operations command (SOC) 1-11, G-1
special operations command and control
element (SOCCE) 24, 2-7, 2-13, G-2 and G-3
Special Operations Command Research Analysis and
Threat Evaluation System (SOCRATES) 2-21, 4-2, 4-4
special operations coordination element (SOCOORD) G-2
Special Operations Debriefing and Retrieval System (SODARS) 4-2, 4-4
special operations imperatives 1-8 through 1-10
special operations mission planning folder (SOMPF) 2-6, 2-12, 2-19
Special Operations Target Interdiction Course (SOTIC) 2-4
special reconnaissance (SR) iv, 1-2 and 1-3, 1-6, 1-10
specific data collection (SDC) 3-21
SR relationship to other missions 1-14
staff judge advocate (SJA) F-1
staff weather officer (SWO) 4-2
support of GP forces 1-16
support operations teams A (SOTs A) 2-3,2-8
surf report (SURFREP) 3-2, D-14 and D-15
survey team {see also pilot team and assessment team) 1-4
Index-7
FM 31-20-51
T
tactical beach report (TACBEREP) 3-4, D-10
target acquisition 1-3
target analysis (TA) 1-4, 3-13
target areas of interest (TAIs) 1-10
target intelligence packages (TIPs) (see a/so SOMPF shell) 1-10, 2-21
target reconnaissance report CTGTRECONREP) D-3 through D-6
target survey checklist 3-14
teargas F-5
technical intelligence exploitation plan and
category requirements format D-21 through D-44
ten'orist F-4
theater special operations support command (TASOSC) G-2
threat order of battle 1-12
Title 10 of the U.S. Code 2-20
tracking C-23
types of photography C-10
U
unconventional warfare (UW) 1-15
United States Commander in Chief,
Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) 2-20
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 3-11
use of force F-3
V
validation and certification 2-20
W, X, Y, Z
zone reconnaissance techniques B-1 frirough B-4
Index-8
I FM 31-20-5
GLOSSARY
PART I- ACRONYMS
AA
area assessment
ADA
air defense artillery
AO
area of operations
AOB
advanced operational base
AOE
area of effect
AOR
area of responsibility
APC
armored personnel carrier
ARSOTF
Army special operations task force
ARTEP
Army Training and Evaluation Program
ASA
American Standard Association
ASOT
advanced special operations training
ASP
ammunition supply point
AST
area specialty team
ATLS
advanced trauma life support
BD
battle drill
BDU
battle-dress uniform
BLS
beach landing site
BOB
back of beach
BOS
battlefield operating systems
BRIDGEREP
bridge report
C^
command and control
CI
command, control, communications, and intelligence
CA
civil affairs
Glossary-1
FM 31-20-5
Glossary-2
CARVER
criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, recognizability
CAS
close air support
CCTV
closed-circuit television
CD
counterdrug
CI
counterintelligence
CINC
commander in chief
COA
course of action
COIN
counterinsurgency
CONOPS
concept of operations
CONPLAN
concept plan
CONUS
continental United States
CP
command post
CSM
command sergeant major
CSS
combat service support
CT
counterterrorism
DA
direct action. Department of the Army
DCSINT
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
DELTREP
river/estuary report
DP
direction finding
DOD
Department of Defense
DODIC
Department of Defense Identification Code
DP
datum point
DTG
date-time group
DZ
drop zone
E&E
evasion and escape
ECCM
electronic counter-countermeasures
ECM
electronic countermeasures
EFCS
electronic filmless camera system
EMR
electro-magnetic radiation
EOD
explosive ordnance disposal
FA
feasibility assessment
FCB
•
forward control base
FM 31-20-5
FID
foreign internal defense
FM
field manual
FOB
forward operational base
FSOP
field standing operating procedure
GP
general purpose
HAHO
high altitude high opening
HALO
high altitude low opening
HE
high explosive
HEAT
high explosive anti-tank
HF
high frequency
HLZ
helicopter landing zone
HN
host nation
HNS
host nation support
rlUMINT
human intelligence
lAA
initial area assessment
IAD
immediate action drill
ICE
individual chemical equipment
IDAD
internal defense and development
lEW
intelligence and electronic warfare
IFV
infantry fighting vehicle
MINT
imagery intelligence
INTSUM
intelligence summary
IPB
intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IR
information requirements
ISB
intermediate staging base
ISOFAC
isolation facility
IV
intravenous
JFC
joint force commander
JFSOCC
joint force special operations component commander
JIC
joint information center
JRTC
Joint Readiness Training Center
JSCP
joint strategic capabilities plan
Glossary-3
FM 31-20-5
Glossary-4
JSOA
joint special operations area
JSOACC
joint force special operations air component commander
JSOTF
joint special operations task force
JTCB
joint targeting coordination board
KIA
killed in action
LBE
load-bearing equipment
LNO
liaison office
LOC
lines of communication
LRRP
long-range reconnaissance patrol
LRSU
long-range surveillance unit
LTD
laser target designation
LZ
landing zone
METL
mission-essential task list
METT-T
mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available
MFF
military free-fall
MHW
mean high water
MI
military intelligence
MICON
mission concept
MID
military intelligence detachment
MLW
mean low water
MOPP
mission-oriented protective posture
MOS
military occupational specialty
MPA
mission planning agent
MPU
message pickup
MRE
meal, ready-to-eat
MSC
major subordinate command
MSD
minimum safe distance
MSP
mission support package
MSS
mission support site
MSU
major subordinate unit
MTOE
modification table of organization and equipment
MTP
1
mission tasking package
I FM 31-20-5
MTT
mobile training team
NAI
named area of interest
NATO
North American Treaty Organization
NBC
nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA
National Command Authorities
NCO
noncommissioned officer
NM
nautical miles
NRT
near-real-time
NVD
night vision device
NVG
night vision goggles
O&I
operations and intelligence
OB
order of battle
OCOKA
observation and fields of fire, cover i
and avenues of approach
OP
observation post
OPCEN
operations center
OPLAN
operation plan
OPSEC
operations security
ORP
objective rally point
PAA
principal area assessment
PCP
peacetime campaign plans
PDM
pursuit deterrent mines
PIR
priority intelligence requirements
POC
point of contact
POE
plan of execution
POI
point of impact
POL
petroleum, oils, and lubricants
PSYOP
psychological operations
PW
prisoner of war
PWP
plasticized white phosphorous
QRF
quick reaction force
R&S
reconnaissance and surveillance
Glossary-5
FM 31-20-5 ^H
RFI
request for information
RII
request for intelligence information
ROE
rules of engagement
ROUTEREP
routes and roads report
RP
rally point
RPG
rocket propelled grenade
RSP
render-safe procedures
SI
personnel officer
S2
intelligence officer
S3
operations officer
S4
logistics officer
SA
security assistance
SALUTE
size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment
SAS
Special Air Service
SATCOM
satellite communications
SCIF
sensitive compartmented information facility
SDC
specific data collection
SF
Special Forces
SFOB
Special Forces operational base
SFOD
Special Forces operational detachment
SIGCEN
signal center
SIGINT
signals intelligence
SIO
senior intelligence officer
SIR
specific information requirements
SJA
staff judge advocate
SL
static-line
SLR
single-lens reflex
SO
special operations
SOC
special operations command
SOCCE
special operations command and control element
SOCOORD
special operations coordination element
dneean^-fi _
SOCRATES
Special Operations Command Research Analysis and Threat Evaluation System
FM 31-20-5
SODARS
SOF
SOMPF
SOP
SOT A
SOTIC
SPETSNAZ
SPOTREP
SPTCEN
SR
SUPCEN
SURFREP
SWO
TACBEREP
TACCTA
TA
TAI
TASOSC
TE
TGTRECONREP
TIP
TOC
UAV
USAJFKSWCS
USASOC
USCINCSOC
USMC
USSOCOM
UW
WIA
WLTS
WP
Special Operations Debriefing and Retrieval System
special operations forces
special operations mission planning folder
standing operating procedure
support operation team A
Special Operations Target Interdiction Course
Soviet Special Purpose Forces
report of enemy sighting
support center
special reconnaissance
support center
surf report
staff weather officer
tactical beach report
tactical commander's terrain analysis
target analysis
target area of interest
theater Army special operations support command
technical evaluation
target reconnaissance report
target intelligence package
tactical operations center
unmanned-aerial vehicle
United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
United States Army Special Operations Command
United States Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command
United States Marine Corps
United States Special Operations Command
unconventional warfare
wounded in action
water line at the time of sounding
white phosphorous
Glossary-7
FM 31-20-5 1
PART II - DEFINTIONS
area assessment
asset (intelligence)
compartmentation
deconflict
direct action
direct action operations
evasion and escape
evasion and escape net
executive order
exfiltration
foreign intelligence
In unconventional warfare, the collection of specific information prescribed by
the commander to commence immediately after infiltration. It is a continuous
operation, and it confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds to intelligence acquired from
area studies and other sources prior to infiltration.
(DOD, lADB) Any resource-person, group, relationship, instrument, installa-
tion, or supply— at the disposition of an intelligence organization for use in an
operational or support role. Often used with a qualifying term such as agent asset
or propaganda asset. (JCS Pub 1-02)
(DOD) 1. Establishment and management of an intelligence organization so that
information about the personnel, organization, or activities of one component is
made available to any other component only to the extent required for the perfor-
mance of assigned duties. (JCS rub 1-02) 2. In unconventional warfare, the divi-
sion of an organization or activity into functional segments or cells to restrict
communication between them and prevent knowledge of the identity or activities
of other segments except on a need-to-know basis. 3. Restricting the use of spe-
cific cryptovariables to specific users for the purpose of limiting access to the
information protected by these cryptovariables and limiting the adverse impact
of a compromise of these variables. (AR 310-25)
To reconcile or resolve a conflict in interests as in targeting.
In special operations, a specified act involving operations of an overt, clandes-
tine, or low visibility nature conducted primarily oy special operations forces in
hostile or denied areas. (JCS Pub 1-02)
Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by special opera-
tions forces to seize, destroy, or inflict damage on a specified target; or to de-
stroy, capture, or recover designated personnel or material. In the conduct of
these operations, special operations forces may employ raid, ambush, or direct
assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by
fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for preci-
sion guided munitions; and conduct independent sabotage. (USCINCSOC)
(DOD, I, NATO, lADB) The procedures and operations whereby military per-
sonnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held
or hostile area to areas under friendly control. (JCS Pub 1-02)
(DOD, lADB) The organization within enemy-held or hostile areas that operates
to receive, move, and exfiltrate military personnel or selected individuals to
friendly control. (JCS Pub 1-02)
Order issued by the President by virtue of the authority vested in him by the
Constitution or by an act of Congress. It has the force of law. (AR 310-25)
(DOD) The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control.
(JCS Pub 1-02)
Information relating to the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign pow-
ers, organizations, or persons, but not including counterintelligence, except for
information on international terrorist activities. (DOD Directive 5240.1)
Glossary-8.
FM 31-20-5
infiltration
intelligence reporting
joint doctrine
joint operations
joint special operations area
low intensity conflict
low visibility operations
observation post (OP)
observation site
operational command
(DOD, NATO, lADB) 1. The movement through or into an area or territory occu-
pied by either friendly or enemy troops or organizations. The movement is made
either by small groups or by individuals at extended or irregular intervals. When
used in connechon with the enemy, it infers that contact is avoided. 2. In intelli-
gence usage, placing an agent or other person in a target area in hostile territory.
Usually involves crossing a frontier or other guarded line. Methods of infiltration
are black (clandestine), grey (through legal crossing point but under false docu-
mentation), white (legal). 3. A technique and process in which a force moves as
individuals or small groups over, through, or around enemy positions without
detection. (JCS Pub 1-02)
(DOD, lADB) The preparation and conveyance of information by any means.
More commonly, the term is restricted to reports as they are prepared by the
collector and as they are transmitted by him to his headquarters and by this
component of the intelligence structure to one or more intelligence-producing
components. Thus, even m this limited sense, reporting embraces both collection
and dissemination. The term is applied to normal and specialist intelligence
reports. (JCS Pub 1-02)
(DOD) Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or
more Services of the same nation in coordinated action toward a common objec-
tive. It is ratified by all four Services and may be promulgated by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. (JCS Pub 1-02)
Operations carried on by two or more of the Armed Forces of the United States
(Army, Navy, Air Force). (AR 310-25)
That area of land, sea, and airspace assigned to a joint special operations com-
mand to conduct SO activities.
(DOD) A limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic,
or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic,
economic, and psychosocial pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low
intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is often
characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence
Also called Lie. (JCS Pub 1-02)
(DOD) Sensitive operations wherein the political/ military restrictions inherent in
covert and clandestine operations are either not necessary or not feasible; actions
are taken as required to limit exposure of those involved and/or their activities.
(JCS Pub 1-02)
An OP is a valuable part of most defensive postures. OPs are normally temporary
or one-time-use positions occupied overnight. They are used to ensure early
warning for the defensive perimeter.
An observation site is a preplanned structure that is designed to be occupied for ex-
tended periods. Construction techniques should be practiced in areas where the
conditions and/or terrain are similar to those found in the target area. The size of the
site must be large enough to accommodate both the observers and their equipment.
(DOD, lADB) Those functions of command involving the composition of subor-
dinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the au-
thoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational command
should be exercised by the use of the assigned normal organizational units
through their responsible commanders or through the commanders of subordi-
Glossary-9
FM 31-20-5
overt operation
proactive
special operations
special reconnaissance
strategic intelligence
nate forces established by the commander exercising operational command. It
does not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization,
and unit training, except when a subordinate commander requests assistance.
(JCS Pub 1-02) The term is synonymous with "operational control" and is
uniquely applied to the operational control exercised by the commanders of
unified and specified commands over assigned forces in accordance with the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947, as amended and revised (10 United States Code
124). (JCS Pub 1-02)
(DOD, lADB) The collection of intelligence openly, without concealment.
(JCS Pub 1-02)
Acting in anticipation of future problems or needs.
Actions conducted by specially organized, trained and equipped military and
paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological ob-
jectives by nonconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sen-
sitive areas. They are conducted in peace, conflict, and war, independently or in
coordination with operations of conventional forces. Politico-military considera-
tions frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low
visibility techniques, and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ
from conventional operations in degree of risk, operational techniques, mode of
employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed
operational intelligence and indigenous assets. (USCINCSOC)
SR operations arc reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by special
operations forces to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection
methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an
actual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydro-
graphic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. It includes target ac-
quisition, area assessment, and poststrike reconnaissance. (USCINCSOC)
(DOD) Intelligence that is required for the formation of policy and military plans
at national and international levels. Strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence
differ primarily in level of application but may also vary in terms of scope and
detail. (JCS Pub 1-02)
Glossary-10
FM 31-20-5
SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE
TACTICS, TECHNIQUES,
AND PROCEDURES
FOR SPECIAL FORCES
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION;
Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only to protect technical or
operational information from automatic dissemination under the International
Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was made on 7 March 1990.
Other requests for this document will be referred to Commander, U.S. Army John F.
Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: A0JK-DT-6M, Fort Bragg, NC
28307-5000
DESTRUCTION NOTICE;
Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of
the document.
Headquarters, Department of the Army
MISSION DEBRIEFING
^ FM 31-20-5
CHAPTER
POSTMISSION
ACTIVITIES
Information gathering is the goal of all SR operations. Gathering additional
information accomplishes two goals. Erst, the information prevents the STOD
from having to go hack into the same area to perform another reconnaissance
to gain more information. Second, if needed, a quick reaction force (QRF) or
other reinforcements can he given guidance for the best route through the area
to adjacent STODs or units. After completing SR mission tasks, the SFOD
quickly exfiltrates to an isolation facility (ISOFAC) or other secure area for
debriefing, preparation of after-action and lessons learned reports, reconstitu-
tion, recovery, stand down, or regeneration as required. ST units have SOPs
for postmission SFOD debriefing to ensure all needed information is obtained.
Deoriefings must he timely and address PIR, IR, other mission-specific re-
quirements, and other information. Command emphasis is essential to the suc-
cess of these postmission activities.
Immediately after the SFOD's arrival at the ISOFAC, the staff of the recoverir\g
operatior\al base begins the debriefing process. The purpose of this quick and
systematic debriefing is to capture as much accurate mformation as is available
from the SFOD in the shortest time possible. For example, PIR may be mission-
specific information on the operational capability of an enemy unit. However, if
the SFOD noticed large movements of noncombatants during certain hours, re-
porting this information may help to identify enemy population control opera-
tions being undertaken. This extra information could play a key role in the timing
of future infiltrations. The returning SFOD is also questioned about map correc-
tions during all debriefing sessions. This key information aids in both planned
and emergency exfiltrations or reinforcement operations.
Debriefing Staff
The AOB and/or FOB debriefing staff conducts debriefings. [Appendix D| con-
tains information on debriefing formats. Priority in debriefing the SFOD goes to
the SIO and his staff. Debriefings are tape recorded and or videotaped, and the
SIO maintains these tapes on file for long-term use. The debriefing staff is made
up of the following:
• OPCEN director or base deputy commander (committee chairperson).
• OPCEN operations officer (S3).
• SIO (S2).
4-1
FM 31-20-5
AST for the recovered SFOD.
SPTCEN persoi^r^el officer (SI).
SPTCEN logistics officer (S4).
CA staff officer.
PSYOP staff officer.
Signal center (SIGCEN) director or senior signal officer.
Medical operations officer.
Judge advocate.
Staff weather officer (SWO).
Chaplain.
Unit historian.
Others as directed by the OPCEN director.
Procedures
As soon as the SFOD is recovered, and before its members are allowed to attend
to personal hygiene and other personal matters, members undergo a rapid de-
briefing as a group. The debriefing procedures described below address the basic
steps to be followed as part of the debriefing process.
Collective Intelligence Debriefing. The intelligence staff conducts this debriefing,
but other staff elements may also be present. The purpose of this debriefing is to
answer PIR and/or SIR, elicit indications, and provide warning.
Format. This debriefing is quick and to the point. The format and line of (|uestion-
ing varies from mission to mission but is determined by the OPCEN director in
accordance with the unit SOP. See FMs 34-36 and 31-20 for examples of the
types of information for which the SFOD can be queried. For use of specific
debriefing guides from the United States Special Operations Command's
(USSOCOM's) concept of operations (CONOFS), and Special Operations De-
briefing and Retrieval System (SODARS), refer to USSO COM's SOCRATES.
The Battalion S2 has access to this system. Appendix D has an example of a
debriefing guide. The intelligence staff immediate y exploits time-sensitive
information critical to decision making by the commander or higher headquar-
ters. For example, a priority maybe the location of insurgent safe nouses that are
targets for DA teams.
Technii^ue. Normally, the principal debriefer uses a technique known as "map-
tracking." The primary deoriefing aid used is a map of the SFOD's AO. The de-
briefer starts at the point of infiltration or embarkation and follows the route
travelled by the unit. He proctors the flow of information to ensure all events,
sightines, and activities conducted to the point of exfiltration or debarkation are
coverea. After getting the initial information, the debriefer then segments return
route information. He asks specific questions with emphasis on operating sys-
tems (intelligence, communications, engineering, weaponry, and medical as-
pects) that affected the SFOD's mission. Tnroughout the debriefing, the debriefer
maintains a relaxed and nonhostile atmosphere in which the unit recounts its ac-
tivities. A qualfied debriefer such as a member of the battalion counterintelli-
gence (CI) team, an interrogator, or an order of battle technician conducts the
4-2
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^— FM 31-20-5
debriefing. If such a person is not available, a detached but knowledgeable proc-
tor and prompter collect and record the information concerning the SFOD s ob-
servations during its mission.
Review of SFOD Documents and Other Materiel.After the collective intelligence de-
briefing, the intelligence staff gathers all maps, notebooks, papers, exposed film,
video tapes, photographs, recovered equipment, and other materiel. It then re-
leases the SFOD to attend to personal hygiene, rest, and recuperate. If necessary,
all rucksacks, map cases, and uniform pockets are inventoried to ensure all items
of intelligence interest are collected. The intelligence staff thoroughly reviews all
of the collected items for data and formulates more detailed questions for the
next stage of debriefing.
Individual Debriefing. As soon as the intelligence staff is ready, and in any case not
later than three hours after the SFOD has recovered to the operational base, the
intelligence staff calls SFOD members in individually for detailed debriefing. At
this stage in debriefing, the intelligence staff focuses first on the commander's
FIR and SIR and then on IR. The mtelligence staff also collects information on
the adequacy of preinfiltration intelligence support. As an individual is released
by the intelligence staff, other staff elements may conduct similar individual de-
briefings. However, no other staff element should talk with an SFOD member
until the intelligence staff has had its turn.
General Collective Debriefing and After-Action Review. After individual debriefings,
and not later than 6 hours after the SFOD has recovered to the operational base,
the base debriefing staff assembles the SFOD and the staff as a group for a general
collective debriefing and after-action review. The base commander may also be
present. At this debriefing, the SFOD leader gives a quick summary of the opera-
tion, focusing on the SFOD's stated and implied missions. He also briefs unantici-
pated SFOD s or members' activities (for example, to exploit a high-value source
of information). After the SFOD leader dves his summary, each staff section, in
turn, questions the SFOD members ana augmenters. At the conclusion of this
stage of the debriefing, the commander or OPCEN director provides any necessary
further guidance. The SFOD is then released to prepare its after-action review and
report of lessons learned. Odinarily, this debriefing includes—
• Name, rank, and position of each SFOD member.
• Mission.
• Time, location, and insertion and extraction methods.
• Routes.
• Terrain (vegetation, height of canopy if in forest, trails, water sources and
direction of flow, LZs and BLZs), local population, including distance and
direction to the nearest terrain feature, and natural and man-made obstacles
to movement in the area.
• SFOD's uniforms and equipment.
• Hostile forces (strength, activity, location, uniform, time, equipment, weap-
ons, and morale).
• Results of hostile contact (friendly and enemy killed in action [KIA] and
wounded in action [WIA], disposition of KIA, PWs, descriptions and se-
rial numbers of captured weapons, and descriptions of captured docu-
ments and equipment).
4-3
FM 31-20-5
FOLLOW-ON MISSIONS
• Weapons, demolitions, and ammunition used and results.
• Map corrections.
• Communications equipment used and results.
• Friendly contacts, including descriptions, locations, circumstances, and results.
• Miscellaneous information such as incorporation of surveillance plan, secu-
rity procedures, surveillance techniques used, and surveillance site type,
construction, and occupation.
• Condition of the SFOD, including time needed to prepare for the next mission.
• Conclusions and recommendations.
Electronic Information Retrieval. Upon completion of a debriefing, the battalion S2
places the information into the most appropriate format in accordance with
USSOCOM's CONOPS and SODARS to ensure it can be retrieved and
cross-referenced within the chain of command and the SOCRATES. The
battalion S2 has access to these formats and systems. He forwards debriefing
reports via secure STU III data modem or by mail or courier on 5.25-inch floppy
disks through operational channels to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
(DCSINT), United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), for
final review and electronic submission via SOCRATES to USSOCOM.
Security Manager Duties. Once a debriefing is completed, the unit security
manager reviews all resulting reports to ensure they are properly classified. He
further reviews each report for any unclassified but sensitive information. He
ensures that each report is marked with the appropriate classification markings.
WRITTEN REPORTS
As stated in FM 31-20, follow-on missions may be conducted; however, such
missions must be performed by exception and not by rule. SFODs may perform
these missions under the following conditions:
• The follow-on mission becomes a new, separate mission.
• The new mission allows for additional planning time.
• The new mission does net compromise the main mission.
• The follow-on mission does not go beyond the SFOD's capability or its
task organization.
• The SFOD A trained for the mission and has the mission-specific equipment.
• The SFOD going into isolation understands that this is a "he prepared to"
follow-on mission at the time the mission letter and/or briefing is issued.
After the debriefing, the SFOD leader, assisted by other members of the SFOD
and attachments, prepares several written reports. The unit historian prepares the
unit's historical report.
4-4
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^— FM 31-20-5
After-Action Report
The after-action report states the who, what, when, why, where, and how of the
operation. It is a permanent record of the SFOD's major activities from isolation
to debriefing. As such, it is an extremely important template on which past mis-
sions may be compared and future missions planned. The battalion S3 will sub-
mit the SFOD's after-action report through command channels to the group
commander not later than 48 hours after the SFOD A has been debriefed. The
intelligence and operations officers at each echelon maintain copies of SFOD's
after-action report. The unit historian reviews this report and prepares a draft
historical report.
Report of Lessons Learned
Shortly after completing the after-action report, or simultaneously with its sub-
mission, the SFOD leader submits a report of lessons learned. This report is the
SFOD leader's reflection on the operation and his recommendation for the fu-
ture. This report organizes lessons learned according to the seven BOS (see
Chapter 1| . It addresses what worked and did not work on the operation, why it
did or did not work, and what changes are needed in existing tactics, techniques,
and procedures in the unit.
Unit Historical Report
The unit historian reviews the report of lessons learned and then finalizes the
draft unit historical report and submits it for the commander's approval. He is-
sues the official historical report of the operation, in classified and unclassified
versions as appropriate, within 90 days after the completion of the operation.
Technical Intelligence Report
SFODs may encounter first seen, odd, or modified U.S. or foreign equipment.
These items should be reported using a technical intelligence report (shown in
Appendix D|| . New, modified, or enhanced equipment is not normally considered
classified, but enemy-modified U.S. equipment is. For example, a discovery of a
U.S. projectile modified by the enemy to accept non-U.S. fuzes would be classi-
fied. Common sense and AR 380-5 will dictate classification.
4-5
AREA ASSESSMENTS
FM 31-20-5
CHAPTER
EMPLOYMENT
There are no "generic" SR missions on today's hattlefieUs or during peace.
Each mission has challenges that must he overcome through comprehensive
planning. The goal of the planners must he to identify those tasks that must he
accomplished to execute the OPLAN. Some of the tasks that will support the
OPIAN during the conduct of SR are area assessment, target acquisition, hy-
drographic reconnaissance, poststrike reconnaissance, technical evaluation,
NBC reconnaissance, specific data collection, and other related tasks.
An AA is defined and discussed in FM 31-20 as part of the situation
development process. AAs are not independent SR missions. The AA is often
associated with infiltration, but in fact, is a continuous process. As shown in
[Figure 3-l| (page 3-3), the AA starts at infiltration and ends after exfiltration. AA
is linked with the IPB process and is directly related to on-going and /or future
operations. The A A serves as the basis for the commander's estimate of the
situation in the area of operations (AO). He uses it to modify plans made during
isolation. For this reason, the information must be updated as the mission
permits. The A A process can be divided into two distinct stages— initial and
principal area assessments.
Initial Area Assessment
An initial area assessment (lAA) is done by the SFOD immediately upon infiltra-
tion. An example of information reported in the lAA is unexpected ground
conditions that will prevent the SFOD from arriving at the target during the
planned time. The lAA is reported to the rear in a timely manner. \i is routmely
included in the initial entry report as a one-line entry in the other information
section. The exact time requirement for these reports must be part of the
OPLAN. The lAA ends after it has been transmitted and received through the
chain of command. The principal area assessment (PAA) then begins.
Principal Area Assessment
The primary goal of the PAA is to continually "confirm, correct, refute, or add to
previous intelligence gained before infiltration." The PAA should expand the
lAA to include all aspects of the operational area. Some of the aspects are the
threat, resistance movements, civil government, populace, targets, weather, ter-
rain, and the logistical capabiHties of the area.
3-1
FM 31-20-5
TARGET ACQUISITION
SF conducts target acquisition for two reasons. The primary goal is to "fix" the
target. An example of fixing the target is to verify th e emplacement of mobile
weapons systems at prepared launch sites ( [Figure '3-2] ). The second goal is to u|
date information on Known or suspected targets. To gain this information, PI.
and IR must address the SIR of the follow-on DA element or of persnnel de-
ploying weapons systems against the target. During target acquisition, the
SFODs continue with the AA process and report changes that could hinder the
following operations. Some of the planning considerations are—
• The rules of engagement.
• Coordinated linkup operations with the follow-on forces.
• Coordinated no-fire and restrictive-fire zone for weapons systems operators.
• Political considerations.
• Effect and reaction of the local populace.
HYDROGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE
Hydrographlc reconnaissance is the reconnaissance of operationally or strategi-
cally significant bodies of water and marginal land areas. It is conducted to deter-
mine water depths, beach gradients, the nature of the bottom, location of
obstacles and barriers, speed of currents, thickness of ice, defensive preparations,
and other military and nonmilitary characteristics of a target. SFODs perform
hydrographlc reconnaissance of point, diffuse, and linear targets that lie above
and below the water line. Hydrographlc reconnaissance missions conducted by
SF are described below. For a detailed discussion of SF waterborne operations,
see TC 31-25.
Beach Surveys
A bea ch survey i s the collection of data describing the characteristics of a specific
beach. |Figure>^ , page 3-4 is a typical beach profile. The survey is used to deter-
mine if the beach is suitable for military operations. A beach surve y may be con
ducted openly or clandestinely using the beach survey format atlAppendixIl
SFODs normally conduct beach surveys to validate preexisting data. Often, these
surveys are in support of other SOF. SFODs may also prepare tactical beach re-
~ ' "lEREPs) and surf reports (SURFREPs) using the message formats at
[Appendix d . When reconnoi termg beach es, SFODs can perform basic beach re-
connaissance as depicted in "'
Figure 3-4 and as described below.
Beach Characteristics. A beach is a strip of sand, pebbles, or other material ex-
tending inland from the line of extreme low water to the coastline. Its length is
the distance along the beach at the water's edge during high and low tides be-
tween the ends of the beach. The shape of a beach is classified as straight, con-
cave, or convex. The coastline is marked by the limit of normal wave action and
is classified as cliff, dune, or plain.
3-2
■FM 31-20-5
Start
Area
A$sessment
Stop
Debriefing and
Written Area Assessment
Figure 3-1. Area assessment.
snrE2
Mission: Determine which ADA
site is occupied.
Figure 3-2. Target acquisition exampie.
3-3
FM 31-20-5-
Beach width is the average distance from the low-waterline to the coastline. The
dahim plane is used to determine the shoreline and the low-water line.
The foreshore is part of the shore or beach that lies between the extreme low-
water line and the upper limit of normal waves. The composition of the foreshore
may be silt, mud, gravel, boulders, rock, coral, or any combination. The gradient
(or percentage or slope) of the foreshore is expressed as a r atio of waterj ppth to
horizontal distance. See the TACBEREP message format at Appendix V
The Backshore width is measured from the upper limit of normal wave action
inland to the extreme limit of storm wave action. Backshore gradient and com-
position of the backshore are identified in the same manner as those of the fore-
shore. Vegetation is often found growing here since it is normally dry and acted
upon only by storm waves.
The hinterland is the area extending five miles inland. It begins at the coastline
(the first line of permanent vegetation).
Beach Survey Procedures.Beach survey procedures will vary according to
METT-T and the permissiveness of the environment. During the reconnaissance,
each swimmer records obstacles, wave height, surf conditions, and other perti-
nent information. Time and azimuth are used to record distances and locations,
which will be approximate even under optimal water and light conditions. The
procedures desaraLMow characterize a relatively simple tactical beach recon-
naissance see
Figure 3-4 page 3-5),
OFFSHORE
NEARSHORE
BACK-
FORESHORE SHORE
HINTERLAND
HIGH WATER MARK
(THE MOST LANDWARD
LINE OF DEBRIS)
FIRST LINE OF
PERMANENT
VEGETATION
SANDBAR TROUGH
Figure 3-3. Typical beach proflie.
3-4
FM 31-20-5
Two-man swim teams are dropped off by aircraft or watercraft parallel to the
beach and outside the surf zone. One man m each team carries a leadline for mea-
suring depths. The other man in the team is the recorder. There are normally two
swimmers for every 25 meters of beach to be reconnoitered. The team leader and
assistant team leader are paired in the center of the formation and act as a guide
and reference point for the other teams in the line.
Upon signal from the guide team, the swimmers move toward the beach. The
guide team may use a compass to help in swimming a predetermined course to
and from the beach, or it may guide on a designated object on the beach.
Teams remain at 25-meter intervals and swim parallel to each other as they slowly
move toward the beach. With a current in excess of 2 knots, the SFOD will tend to
drift in the direction of current.
Just outside the surf zone, each team halts and examines the beach and as far into
thebackshoreascanbeseen.
When the leadline man in each team estimates the depth is 6.5 meters (usually
the depth at which recordings are first made), he lowers his line.
CURRENT
RECOVERY CRAFT
DROP OFF CRAFT
SWtM ®
PAIRS
w
GUIDE
PAIR
"W
w
©
500-1000 METERS
(APPROXIMATELY)
SURF
ZONE
LOW WATER MARK
HIGH WATER MARK
BACKSHORE
12.5M' 12.5M
25M
1 . Swim pairs are dropped off parallel to beach.
2. MemlDets romain outside the surf zone ar)d swim parallel as they move toward the beach.
3. Each team member records everything with a grease pencH/waterproof martter on a slate or piece of TM plexiglass.
4. Team members move to the high water Urie, then swim tacit out the way they came and form a recovery line.
5. Team members are recovered.
Figure 3-4. Tactical beach survey procedures.
3-5
FM 31-20-5
When the leadline touches the bottom, the leadline man notifies his buddy (the
recorder) who signals the guide team to stop. The recorder records the depth on
his slate.
The guide team estimates the distance to the high watermark and signals all
teams to take a sounding.
From this point on, soundings are recorded every meter towards the target area
until a 1.8-meter depth is reached and then at 0.3-meter increments up to me wa-
ter's edge. Whenever a swim team reaches a 5.5-, 3.6-, or 1.8-meter sounding, it
also takes a bottom sample. On the seaward lane the process is reversed.
At the high waterline (or at the water's edge if the team leader has determined
that is the safe limit for the team), all teams shift left 12.5 meters with each team
recording the beach gradient and any other significant foreshore, backshore, or
hinterland features in its area. A technique for measuring the beach gradient is
illustrated in Figure 3-5. Each swim team also covers its assigned sector of fire to
protect the team from surprise attack from its front or flanks.
When the shift left has been completed, all teams swim back out to sea, taking
soundings as before, following the guide pair. Once the mission is complete, the
swim teams will then be extracted. Extraction may be at a prearranged time or
after a prearranged signal from the pickup craft.
Key Points. Several key points need to be kept in mind as the SFOD conducts a
tactical beach survey.
One team of swimmers should be designated beforehand to observe the surf for
a SURFREP rather than take soundings during the reconnaissance.
WATERUNE
8EACH GRADIENT - 1.6 METERS DIVIDED BY 7.9 METERS - 20%
Figure 3-5. Measuring beach gradient
3-6
FM 31-20-5
If the recconnaissance is to be accurate, the swim teams must maintain the proper
interval and all pairs must follow the guide throughout the reconnaissance. An-
other technique to add accuracy is to have a third swimmer with a 25-meter line
accompany the guide pair, he can swim ahead to where the next sounding should
be taken. This procedure can also help verify the guide's initial distance estimate.
When making a dive during a tactical survey, swimmers must ensure noise and/or
light discipline for security purposes. Swimmers should be careful to avoid
detection from the beach. They should avoid allowing the sun to reflect off the
face mask, holding the line or slate above water when sounding or recording,
proceeding into shallow water, or raising the body out of the water when close to
the beach.
During ea ch beach survey, thorough photographic coverage is essential. See Ap-
pendix C[ The areas to be covered are-
• Offshore to hinterland panoramas.
• Backshore and hinterland panoramas.
• Beach exits.
• Hinterlands.
• Miscellaneous.
From both the left and right flanks of the beach, standing at the water's edge, the
photographer takes overlapping panoramic views beginning offshore and sweep-
mg inshore. If light conditions permit, a videocamera is used. The frames show
the approaches, reefs, waterlines, full length of the beach, full width of the beach,
and beach gradient.
From the scarp at the center of the beach, the photographer takes a panorama of
the backshore and hinterland, ridges, escarpments, vegetation, and obstacles.
The photographer obtains medium views and close-ups emphasizing location,
surrounding features, and trafficability. He takes views from ti\e beach facing in-
land and from the high ground inland facing seaward.
The frames of the hinterland show vegetation, soil and reck types, trafficability
indications such as wheel tracks and swamp areas, obstacles, habitation, roads,
and defenses or defendable positions.
The photographer takes pictures that show conditions or obstacles that will help
identify the material composition and trafficability of the beach. He should take
complete coverage (includine close-ups) of any features encroaching on or limit-
ing tne usefulness of the lanaing areas, such as hazards to approach and barriers
to egress. He includes personal or familiar objects in photographs to help the in-
ter preter in det ermining measurements. All photographs are logged as described
in [AppendixC
Hydrographic Surveys
A hydrographic survey is the collection and assessment of data about specific
bodies of water and marginal land areas and their effects on operations. A hydro-
graphic survey and beach survey overlap in that they both involve the collection
of data relative to the foreshore area. The survey may be conducted openly or
3-7
FM 31-20-5
clandestinely. SFODs normally do hydrographic surveys to confirm or verify in-
formation on a particular body of water and marginal land areas. The hydrographic
survey report is written in message format, depending on mission req uirements.
The written report may be accompanied by sketches (see [Figure 3-6f , overlays,
photographs, and exposed film, bottom samples from the foresnore and nearshore
approaches are also attached to amplify information contained in the report. The
sketch that accompanies the report is to scale. It shows the shoreline; tne 1-, 2-,
and 3-fathom curves; the foreshore; obstacles cultural features; beach flanks; and
beach interruptions as seen from above. The sketch depicts the nearshore and fore-
shore gradients by showing three cross-sections taken at the beach center and in
the middle of the left and right sections of the beach. The vertical scale of the
cress-sections is usually larger than the horizontal scale of the cross-sections. All
soundings by the survey party are shown on the sketch. The intelligence NCO,
under the supervision of tne SFOD tec hnician, prepa res the hydrographic survey
report in accordance with the format at Appendix D, In the course of doing a hy-
drographic survey, the survey team may prepare bURFREPs and river/estuary
reports (DELTREPs).
Ports Reconnaissance
A port is a town or city having a harbor for ships taking on or discharging cargo.
Because of the high density of man-made structures and their relevance to SO,
the SR of ports combines the techniques of hydrographic survey; AA; technical
evaluation ari d CARVER analysis; and mapping, sketching ana photographing
( Appendix C I. SFODs can conduct port reconnaissance overtly or clandestmely.
he emphasis in port reconnaissance is the identification, location, and assess-
ment of critical infrastructure and the accessibility and vulnerability of that infra-
structure. At a minimum, port surveys address—
• Access routes, capacities, and conditions of cargo, refueling, and repair
berths and other facilities.
• Bulk energy production, storage, transmission, and distribution (petroleum,
oils, and lubricants [POL], electric power).
• Telecommunications (radio, television, telephone).
• Transportation, LOC, and associated facilities (railroads, highways, bridges,
and airfields).
• Bulk water supply.
• Bulk storage of dry goods.
• Health services.
• Government administration and services.
• Fire and security services.
• Local military forces.
Wateway Reconnaissance
Waterways include trafficable estuaries, rivers, canals, locks, and other associ-
ated structures such as bridges and dams. SFODs perform waterway surveys in
much the same way as they do coastal hydrog raphic surveys. The basic message
format used is the DELTREP | Appendix D| . In inland surveys of integrated
transportation, the SFOD maps out the transportation network infrastructure, fo-
cusing on critical nodes and choke points witnin this network. The basic message
formats used in the reconnaissance of land routes are the routes and roads report
(ROUTEREP) and bridge report (BRIDGEREP).
3-8
FM 31-20-5
SINGLE LANE
AUTO TRAIL
JOSYWK BEACH, FASKEN ISLAND SHEET 1 OF 1
' BERU SCARP^
3 FATHOM
A'-^
,5.5 4.5 4 3.5
9 8 7.6 7
MEDIUM SAND
14.5 14 14 13 12J«11.5 11 10 9.5 9
12"'12--11 10
16.5 16 16 15.5 14.5
•■• MEDIUM SAND
18.5 18. 17.5 17 17
— -.
19.5 19.5 19 19 18.5
20.5 20.5 20 20 19.5
21 21 21 20.5 20.5
3 3
¥ • • • • # ,^ MEDIUM
SAND
14
16
18.
15 15 15.5 14
17
18 17 17
"• •- — ,^
19.5 19 19 19 19
20.5 20 20 20 19.5
6.5 '?*""6
8 6.5 5
••••••• GRAVEL
13 12.5 12—12 J, 11 9 8 BAR
14 13 12
15 15 14
18.5 17.5 17
•••
19.5 19 19
SECTION A -A'
HORIZ. SCALE: 1"= 25 M
VERT. SCALE: 1"= 2 M
HW
MLLW
'-M'^ m' ^' ^' ^' .'^ ^' m' .'.'.'.' .'
SECTION B-B'
HORIZ. SCALE: 1-= 25 M
VERT. SCALE: 1"= 25 M
HW
MLLW
SECTION C - C
HORIZ. SCALE: 1"= 25 M
VERT SCALE: 1"= 25 M
25 50 75 100 M
HydrographIc Sketch of
Joswyk Beach, Fasken Island
Map Used
AMS Fasken Island: 1:25,000
Jazway's Sheet 3752 NE
Beach Center
LAT: 32»16'04"S
LONG:173°30'27'W
Ret. Point
Seaward End of Pier. Right
Flank Coord 72849627
Date o( Survey
27 June 1992
Surveyed By
Type of Survey
Night Swimmer
Accuracy
Fair
Scale
r = 2SM
All soundings in
feet corrected lo mean low water.
Figure 3-6. HydrographIc survey sketch.
3-9
FM 31-20-5 ■
METEOROLOGICAL RECONNAISSANCE
Sudden changes in weather conditions often play a major role in the execution or
development of military plans. Meteorology for a specific area plays a major role
in determining mission requirements. The two areas most affected by the weather
are transportation and supply activities. Commanders need to have a clear and
current understanding of all aspects of the JSOA. SF units conducting meteoro-
logical reconnaissance can provide information that will help commanders deter-
mine where they can maneuver their units to best exploit their strengths against
the threat's weaknesses. Learning the true amount of illumination passing
through dense foliage or the fordabUity of a rain swollen river or the trafticability
of a region all fall under this area of SR. As mentioned before, SFODs should
cross reference information available from other national assets such as satellites
or sources currently in the JSOA.
GEOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE
Like meteorological reconnaissance, geographic reconnaissance may be required
to support developing or existing plans. Specific questions about planned routes
can help commanders determine what vehicle or unit will best be able to execute
the mission at hand.
POSTSTRIKE RECONNAISSANCE
Poststrike reconnaissance is the visual, photographic, and/or electronic survey to
measure results of a specific point or area of operational, tactical, or strategic
significance that has been subjected to a strike. Effects measured by an SFOD
may be of a military or nonmilitary nature, addressing material, informational,
economic, psychological, or cultural impacts of the strike. A poststrike recon-
naissance by SFODs may be a short-term survey to determine immediate and
collateral material damage.
Information Requirements
If the reconnaissance is of a strike by friendly forces, SFOD preparation for post-
strike reconnaissance begins with the question "What was the type and extent of
the damage intended, as stated by the commander ordering the strike?" If the re-
connaissance is of a strike by threat forces, the starting point is the assumed in-
tent of the threat commander. The SFOD organizes its efforts to gather indicators
and other information that will aid the senior intelligence officer (SIC) in the
FOB in answering the following SIR:
• What was the weapon used?
• What did the strike actually hit (stated in terms of actual point[s] of impact,
immediate damage, and collateral damage)?
• Was the intended type and extent of damage or effect achieved?
• To what degree was effect achieved (stated as intended point or points of
impact, distance and azimuth from the intended point[s[ of impact, and a
percentage of damage)?
3-10.
FM 31-20-5
• What part of the target was hit or missed?
• Was the prestrike target analysis accurate and adequate? If not, what were
the deficiencies?
• What is the target activity as a result of the strike?
• Are forces on or near the target employing any special or unique recovery
equipment, techniques, or procedures?
Employment of SFODs
SFODs should be committed to poststrike reconnaissance only where the data to
be collected is of the utmost strategic importance and cannot be collected by
other means, for example, aerial reconnaissance, satellite, unmanned aerial ve-
hicle (UAV), developed human sources. SFODs should not be sent to confirm if
every mission hit the target because the indiscriminate employment of SFODs
may establish a pattern, alerting threat forces, increasing risk of detection and
compromise, and degrading the probabihty of mission success. Threat forces
quickly become aware of a pattern of sending in reconnaissance teams on post-
strike assessments and actively seek to interdict and destroy them.
Techniques and Procedures
During the poststrike mission certain locations must be determined. To collect
the needed information on these locations, SFODs use a variety of standard and
nonstandard techniques and procedures in poststrike reconnaissance.
Receonnaisance and Surveillance. To collect the needed information, SFODs nor-
mally conduct patrolling and/or set up observation and surveillance sites. The
emphasis is on offset methods in most cases as opposed to actually entering or
traversing the target.
The intended point of impact (POl) is that specific point on the ground where the
ordnance was to impact. The SFOD may be given only a general idea of its loca-
tion in relation to its target. In most cases, the POl will be identifiable as a crater
or a scorched area.
Damage in the area of effect (AOE) maybe classified as immediate or collateral.
Immediate damage is that damage directly inflicted by the ordnance at the mo-
ment of its impact and/or detonation. Collateral damage is the secondary effects
of the ordnance. Fires, structural weakening and/or collapse, abandonment or re-
inforcement of the target are all secondary effects. Taken together, the areas of
immediate and collateral damage constitute the AOE.
When planning a poststrike mission, the SFOD must consider the minimum safe
distance (MSD) and what will happen if the target has not sustained the desired
effect? Will another mission be fired or flown? If so, what will be fired or
dropped? This information will be important when planning the safe distances
required for the placement of the observation and surveillance sites, mission sup-
port sites, or other fixed locations. Planning should also include establishing an
exclusionary zone from which all patrols must depart before ordnance is deliv-
ered. This procedure aids commanders in ensuring tha t friendly fi re casualties are
■" ■"■ :3-7 "'" ■
avoided. Safe distances can be calculated by using [Figure
example o f a poststrike overlay depicting the POl, AOE, and IV
, page 3-12. An
^ , . X ^ , , SD IS shown in
Figure 3-g| , page 3-12. Other specific ordnance safety considerations used when
moving aro und an area where different types of munitions have been used are
addressed in Appendix \
3-11
FM 31-20-5 ■
EXPLOSIVE WEIGHT
SAFE DISTANCES FOR
PERSONNEL IN THE OPEN
KQ
LB
METERS
FEET
.46 to 12.3
1to27
300
900
45.4
100
465
1,390
113.8
250
630
1,890
226.8
500
800
2,400
453.6
1,000
1,600
4,800
907.2
2,000
3.200
9,600
Weights not found In this chart can tw calculated using the following formula;
SAFE DISTANCE IN FEET - 100 X (EXPLOSIVE WEIGHT X .33)
NOTE: All dittmncm an cahulatmd for aoldlan In optn flat tanaln.
Figure 3-7. Safe distances for standard bomb sizes.
Figure 3-8. Poststrike overlay.
3-12
TARGET ANALYSIS
FM 31-20-5
Records. Complete records must be maintained during the conduct of the post-
strike mission. These records should include maps, sketches, photographs,
notes, an d other recor ds of the SFOD's observations. Record keeping is dis-
cussed in | Appendix C
TA is the assessment of a specific, technically complex target in the context of
PIR, IR, and/or SIR grouped into the categories of criticality, accessibility, recu-
perability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability. An SFOD may, for example,
conduct a TA of an industrial establishment or other technically sophisticated
complexes for follow-on DA or UW attack. The same sort of analysis can allow
an HN government to defend such a complex in a FID environment. The
CARVER target analysis matrix and the feasibility assessments are the founda-
tion of the TA process. The FA is an evaluation of the risks of a mission, and it
answers questions of whether the attacking force can complete the mission and
survive. TA is a cooperative effort between the SFOD performing the SR mission
and the intelligence functions at battalion and company level. This analysis seeks
to answer FIR/ IR and SIR in the CARVER target analysis matrix categories. Tar-
get analysis is the responsibility of the battalion S2, but the SFOD can often be
used to answer SIR that can be satisfied by no other means. Preparation for TA
requires review and understanding of the steps in the process described below.
TA Steps
TA can be overt or clandestine. It can be conducted as part of a larger AA, or it
can be a distinct mission activity. It can take place during peacetime competition,
conflict, or war. It is often more than a tradihonal reconnaissance and less than a
full-scale analysis. It comprises the cyclic steps outlined below.
Step One. The first step is a joint S2 and SFOD review of the commander's guid-
ance and stated requirements, which set out what is to be accomplished regarding
the target. In a FID environment, this step includes an evaluation of the threat to
the target.
Step Two. The second step is the gathering, organizing, and evaluating of all
available information about the target and the identification of gaps in the data.
The S2 provides maps, photographs, flow charts, blueprints, diagrams, and other
data for review. With the help of the S2, the eniployed SFOD examines the in-
formation to answer as much of the mission PIR and/or IR before infiltration.
The S2 begins preparing a CARVER report and "target folder" that highlights the
gaps in available information at this step and uses them to develop a detailed
collection plan.
Step Three. After infiltration, the SFOD surveys the target. In a nonpermissive en-
vironment, the SFOD ordinarily tries to penetrate the target area and set up fixed
sites to survey the target and/or run small patrols into the target (particularly if it is
a complex spread over a wide area). The SFOD gathers information that—
• Validates data gathered and conclusions drawn up to this step.
• Satisfies PIR and IR.
• Gives the supported targeting analyst and/or the SFOD a "feel" for the target.
3-13
FM 31-20-5 ■
If the survey is overt and with the cooperation of personnel working at the site,
the SFOD follows the rules in the target survey checklist shown in figure 3-9.
Step Four. The fourth step is the completi on of the CA RVER reconnaissance re
port and its transmittal to the battalion S2. [Figure 3-10 is a checklist showing the
minimum recommended data requirements tor a LAKVER reconnaissance report
prepared by an SEOD.
Q Note layout, construction, location and composition of key components, security, aiuj communications.
Q Find out what the key components of the site are lively to be by previsit research, and check this infarmatlon
against what you see or are told on the site.
Q Determine who the key personnel at the sHe are and what they do.
Q Get permission to take photographs prior to taking any.
□ Look for those things that woukl be important if the site had to be attacked in the future.
Q Dress neatly but not conspcuously and in a manner that blends with the environment (for example, no "Death From
Above" T-shirts).
Q Note manufacturers and model numt>ers of key components. Find out which, If any, of these components are made
by cast methods or are othenwise extremely difficult to replace.
Q Be conscious of where you are on site at all times in relation to key components and notk^ what type of machinery
or equipment is in your immediate vk;tnity.
Q Try to discern how the site is similar to other sites in its class; note any significant differences.
Q Take brief but good notes. Ensure that notes do not comment on security or access and/or egress points.
Q Be polite and attentive when someone from the site is speaking. Direct questions one at a time to your host.
Q Do not badger guides with persistent questions atxiut subjects they are unsure about or do not want to dscuss.
Q Avoid making comments about perceived lax security.
□ Do not wander away from the tour group or into restricted areas: such conduct will offend your host.
Q Do not smoke where there is even a remote fire hazard or without the per missran of your host
Q Be especially alert for flow charts and layout diagrams.
Q Get the name, job title, and telephone number (or mailing address) of persons at the site who act as your host, for
example, by asking for a business card. Send the person a thank-you note after the tour.
Q Do not volunteer any more information about yourself or your purpose than is necessary to accomplish
your mission.
Q Log the direction and locatton of each picture.
Q Ask for informational handouts, such as illustrated puUk; relations literature, that provide technical informatton
about the site.
Figure 3-9. Target survey checklist
3-14
FM 31-20-5
CARVER Matrix
The SFOD can reproduce the results of its TA mphicallv in a matrix through
ine bf uu can reproduce tne results or its lA ^rapnicaiiv in a matrix tnrougti
which target variables are reduced to numbers figure 3-111 page 3-16). This ma-
trix is a tool for ratine the relative desirability of potential targets and for allocat
desirability of potential targets and for allocat-
ing resources for sub"sequent DA. Normally, the bFOD, company, and battalion
intelligence NCOs jointly prepare the CARVER matrix. A Iff-pomt scale is used
to measure each of the CARvER variables.
Criticality. A target is critical when its damage or destruction will have a signifi-
cant influence on military, political, or economic operations. SFODs consider
each target in relation to other elements of the particular target system or target
complex nominated or designated for attack. The criticality or the target changes
with the situation. For example, when one has few locomotives, railroad bridges
may be less critical as targets; however, safeguarding bridges may be critical to
maneuvering GP forces who use such bridges. T he standard of assigning crit-
icality values on CARVER matrbces is shown in [Figure 3-I4 page 3-16. Criti-
cality depends on several factors:
• Tine: How rapidly will the impact of the target attack affect operations?
• Qualify; What percentage of output, production, or service will be curtailed
by target damage?
Surrogates: What will be the effect on the output, production, and service?
vhat are their positions, how is their
t affected in tne system or complex?
. Relativity: How many targets are there, what are their positions, how is their
relative value determined, and what will be affected in tn(
Q Site/syetem/complex layout diagram with north arrow andscate.
Q CARVER assessment. (Focus on acoeesibiltty, vulnerability, and recognlzability.)
Q Map coverage of 1 :2S0,000 out to 50 nautical miles (MM), 1:50.000 out to 10 NM, and 1:26,000 out to 5 NM from
the target with significant installations and activities noted. (Do not overlook unusual and nonstandard map cover-
age. Examples inciude foreign military or civilian maps {with no grid lines, strange scales and ttie like], street plans,
water line plans, and power grid maps.)
□ High-angle overhead, oblique overhead, and ground photography of the target with annotatwns of installations,
activities, and differences observed.
□ Site communications and electronics data (for example, gathered by an attached SOT A).
Q Locations of the nearest fixed-wing capable airstrip and fixed-wing capable instrumented airstrip, ground distances
from each of the above airstrips to the target, and the nearest drop zones (DZs), landing zones (LZs), and beach
landng sites (BLSs).
Q Summary of local human and material resources available to support special operations.
Q List of sources used.
Figure 3-10. CARVER reconnaissance report checklist
3-15
FM 31-20-5 ■
FOSSIL-FUEL BULK POWER PLANT
TARGET COMPONENT
C
A
R
V
E
R
TOTAL
FUEL TANKS
8
9
3
8
5
6
39
FUEL PUMPS
8
6
2
10
2
3
31
BOILERS
6
2
10
4
7
4
33
TURBINES
8
6
10
7
9
9
49
GENERATORS
4
6
10
7
9
9
45
CONDENSERS
8
8
6
2
9
4
38
FEED PUMPS
3
8
5
8
4
6
34
CIRCULATING PUMPS
3
8
5
8
6
4
34
STEP-UP
TRANSFORMER
10
10
10
9
10
9
58
LOW-1
AVERAGE - 5
HIGH - 10
Figure 3-11. CARVER matrix.
CRITERIA
SCALE
Immediate halt in output, production, or services target cannot function wittwut.
9-10
Halt within 1 day or 66% curtailment in operations.
7-8
Halt within 1 week or 33% curtailment in operations.
5-6
Hall within 10 days or 10% curtailment in opnrations.
3-4
No signilicant ellect on operations.
1-2
Figure 3-12. Assignment of critlcality values.
3-16
FM 31-20-5
Accessibility. A target is accessible when an operational element (including
knowledgeable insioers) can infiltrate the target with sufficient personnel ana
equipment to accomplisn its mission, Assessing accessibility entails identifying
and studying critical path(s) that the operationaf element must take to achieve its
objective(s) and measuring those things that aid or impede access. The standard
for assiming accessibility values on CARVER matrbces is shown in Figure 3-13.
Accessioility may be broken down into three parts:
• Infiltration from the staging base to the target area.
• Movement from the LZ, DZ, BLS, or other entry points to the proximity of
the target.
• Movement into the target and onto the critical element(s).
In most cases, assessing the critical path(s) an SFOD performing a DA mission
must take to exfiltrate the target area is desirable. Factors to consider when
evaluating accessibility include man-made and other barriers and obstacles, ac-
tive and passive early warning systems, swimmer detection devices, air defense
capabilihes in the target area, road and rail transportation assets, land use, cover
and concealment, ana population density. The analysis alongeacn critical path to
the target should measure the time it would take for the SFOD to bypass, neutral-
ize, or penetrate barriers and obstacles along the way. Accessibility is measured
in terms of relative ease or difficulty of movement for the SFOD and the likeli-
hood of detection. Analysts should always consider the use of standoff weapons
such as mortars or antitank type weapons in such evaluations.
Recuperability. A target's recuperability is measured in time, that is, the time it
will take to replace, repair, or bypass destruction of or damage to a target. Recu-
perability varies with the sources and type of targeted components in the target
complex. Recuperability should factor m such items as stockpiles, backup sys-
tems, repair facilities, and spare parts. Th e standard fo r assigning recuperability
values on CARVER matrbces is shown in Figure 3-14 page 3-18.
CRITERIA
Easily accessible, standoff weapons can be employed.
SCALE
9-10
Inside a perimeter fence but not inside the building.
Inside a building but on the ground floor.
7-8
5-8
Inside a building but on the second floor or in the basement;
climbing or lowering required.
Not accessible or accessible with extreme difficulty.
3-4
1-2
Figure 3-13. Accessibility value standards.
3-17
FM 31-20-5-
Vulnerability. A target is vulnerable if the SFOD has the means and expertise to
successfully attack the target. When determining the vulnerability of a target, the
SFOD A compares the critical component wim the capability of the attacking
element to destroy or damag.e it. In general, the attackmg element may tend to
choose special components, qo permanent damage, prevent or inhibit cannibal-
ization, maximize effects throug.h use of on-site materials, and/or cause the target
to self-destruct. Vuherability depends on the nature and construction of the far-
get, amount of damage required, and the assets available. Examples include per-
sonnel,^ expertise, motivation, weapons^ explosives, and equipment. The standard
for assignmg vulnerability values on CARVER matrixes is shown in Figure 3-15.
CRITERIA
SCALE
Replacement repair, or substitution requires 1 month or more.
9-10
Replacement, repair, or substitLition requires 1 week to 1 month.
7-8
Replacement, repair, or substitution requires 72 hours to 1 week.
5-6
Replacement, repair, or sobetitution requires 24-72 hours.
3-4
Same day replacement, repair, or substitution.
1-2
Figure 3-14. Recuperability value standards.
CRITERIA
SCALE
Vulnerabln to long-range laser target designation, small arms fire, or
charges of 2.2 kilograms (kg) or less.
9-10
Vulnerable to light antiarmor weapons lire or charges ol between 2.2 and 4.5 kgs.
7-8
Vulnerable to medium antiarmor weapons Are, bulk charges of between 4.5 and
13.6 kgs, or very careful placement of smaller charges.
5-6
Vulnerable to heavy antiarmor (Ire, bulk charges of between 1 3.6 and 22.6 kgs, or
special weapons.
3-4
Invulnerable to all but the most extreme targeting measures.
1-2
Figure 3-15. Vuinerability value standards.
3-18
FM 31-20-5
Effect. The effect of a target attack is a measure of possible military, political,
ecor^omic, psychological, and sociological impacts at the target and beyond.
Closely related to the measure of target criticality is the type and magnitude of
given effects desired that will help planners select targets and target components
for attack. Effect in this sense, however, addresses all significant effects, whether
desired or not, that will likely result once the selected target component is
attacked. Traditionally, this element has addressed the effect on the local popu-
lace, but now broader considerations are addressed as well. For example, the pri-
mary effect of the destruction of two adjacent long-range radar sites in an early
warning system may be to open in the system a hole of sufficient size to cause
enough down time to permit the attacker to launch a successful airmobile or
missile strike against the defender. Effects can also include the triggering of
countermeasures, support or negation of PSYOP thennes, unemploynnent,
reprisals against the civilian populace, collateral damage to other targets, and the
like effects. Possible effects can be speculative (and should be labelled as such),
and effects of the same attack maybe quite different at the tactical and the opera-
tional and /or strategic levels. An example of speculative effects is the destruction
of a substation that does not affect local power supply but cuts off all power to an
adjacent reg ion. The sta ndard for assigning effect values on CARVER matrixes
is shown in [Figure 3-1^ , page 3-20
Recognizability. A target's recognizability is the degree to which it can be recog-
nized by an operational element and /or intelligence collection and reconnais-
sance assets under varying conditions of distance, weather, light, and season
without confusion with other targets or components. Factors that influence rec-
ognizability include the size and complexity of the target, the existence of dis-
tinctive target signatures, the presence of masking or camouflage, and the
technical sophistication and training of the attackers. The standard fo r assigning
recognizability values on CARVER matrixes is shown in figure 3-17 page 3-20.
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL RECONNAISSANCE
NBC reconnaissance can be in a wide range of forms. For example, overflights
can be used to look for dead vegetation and wildlife. However, if a possible NBC
area is encountered, commanders will have many questions such as—
• When and where did the NBC strike occur?
• Will the threat continue using NBC weapons?
• Were the weapons effective?
Given the effectiveness of modern weapons, questions concerning NBC use will
have a high priority on the PIR and IR lists. One of the first questions should be
whether or not anything happened at all. For example, industrial accidents or at-
tacks on industrial facilities often produce effects similar to NBC strikes. If, on
the other hand, NBC use can be confirmed, the battlefield commander is then
permitted to request a response in kind. The theater commander would task the
SF group through the SOC to obtain samples and information that confirm or
deny NBC use. SFODs supported by group chemical assets, such as the LB team,
can perform this type of mission.
3-19
FM 31-20-5-
The primary problem with using SF soldiers to conduct NBC reconnaissance is
that extensive training and equipment are required. Such NBC training and
equipment are not normally afforded to SFODs. This void was identified and
fined by LB teams, who have been assigned to SF groups. The LB team has the
special skills and equipment to conduct mis hazardous mission when augmented
to SFODs. For a further expl anation of th e role of SF and non-SF units during
chemical operations, refer to |Appendb( E and FM 3-18.
CRITERIA
SCALE
Oveiwhelmingly positive effects; no significant nngaUve effects.
9-10
Moderately positive effects; few significant negative effects.
7-8
No significant effects; neutral.
5-6
Moderately negative effects; few significant positive effects.
3-4
Ovenwfielmingly negative effects; no significant positive effects.
1-2
Figure 3-16. Effect value standards.
CRITERIA
SCALE
The target is clearly recognizable under all conditions and from a distance
and requires little or no training lor recognition.
9-10
Ttie target is easily recognizat>le at small-arms range and requires a small amount
of training lor recognition.
7-8
The target is difficult to recognize at night or In tjad weatfier or might be confused
with other targets or target components and requires some training for recognition.
5-6
The target is difficult to recognize al night or in bad weather. Even within small-arms
range, it is easily confused with other targets or components and requires extensive
training lor recognition.
3-4
The target cannot be recognized under any conditions, except by experts.
1-2
Figure 3-17. Recognizability value standards.
3-20
FM 31-20-5
SPECIFIC INFORMATION AND OTHER COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Specific data collection (SDC) is the most common task associated with SR. The
SFOD conducts SDC mission to collect a specified piece or type of information.
Normally, an SFOD conducts SDC as the collateral requirements of SR, that is,
the requirement to infiltrate, to operate, and to exfiltrate undetected. The most
common types of SDC include but are not limited to LOC surveillances, point
target surveillance, information collection, and signal intercept.
LOC Surveillance
In this type of operation, the SFOD infiltrates a JSOA and establishes surveil-
lance along the specified LOC. The LOC could be a major highway, a rail line, or
even a canal, along which significant traffic passes or is expected to pass. The
SFOD then collects and reports information concerning activity along the LOC
based upon predetermined or specified significant indicators. These indicators
are normally pieces of equipment, types ofunits, or even certain types of activi-
ties. The indicators may themselves be innocuous, but their presence or absence
along the LOC may provide significant operational or strategic intelligence. Ex-
amples of significant indicators are NBC delivery means, chemical decontamina-
tion equipment, air defense artillery (ADA) system radars, special purpose
troops, large or unusual troop or equipment convoys, refugee movements, spe-
cialized unit equipment, security force activities, or heavy construction activities.
LOC surveillance units provide the CINC or JTF commander "eyes on"
HUMINT of threat operational or strategic intent. SFODs receive this tasking
because it is beyond the capability of other means or because the tasking au-
thority needs the flexibility tnat human operators provide.
The success of SFODs conducting this type of surveillance often depends on their
ability to avoid compromise. Operational security requirements drive many of the
considerations that determine infiltration and/or exfiltration means as well as the
surveillance and observation technique and equipment selected to perform the mis-
sion. Almost exclusively, these missions will require static observation techniques.
Movement equates to compromise! The SFOD must consider METT-T when se-
lecting LOC observation sites. Site selection drives the SFOD's ability to place
constant observation on the LOC. Use of visual observation aids (binoculars,
scopes, cameras) and thermal or infrared devices increase the SFOD's stand-off
distance and lessens the risk of compromise. Poor weather or heavy vegetation
may require the SFOD to use multiple sites to achieve constant observation.
Specific Target Surveillance
Specific target surveillance is much like LOC surveillance. For example, an
SFOD assigned this mission infiltrates and observes a specific target, location, or
activity such as threat strength or activity at a suspected supply base, prisoner-of-
war (PW) compound, air base, or missile launch site. Unlike LOC surveillance,
the SFOD does not have the same options in selecting its observation site(s).
Vantage points may be limited or restricted in terms of now they maybe used to
accomplish the mission. SFODs consider all METT-T factors when selecting
proposed sites.
SFODs conduct specific target surveillance missions to collect, confirm, or refute
intelligence about a target(s). This information, once processed, is used to plan
3-21
FM 31-20-5
interdiction missions or to suppcrt DA missions against the target(s) in question.
The SFOD tasked with the surveillance mission does not routinely "rollover" and
conduct the DA against the target. That mission normally will oe tasked to an-
other SFOD that will specifically plan DA against the target using the informa-
tion provided by the SR element.
JR for these missions are normally worded very precisely. If vaguely presented,
the SFOD ensures clarification early in the mission planning cycle. Often, the IR
or their associated reporting requirements determine observation site selection or
the surveillance technique selected to effect the mission. For example, a large
compound can require the use of multiple sites to ensure sufficient coverage.
These large targets present command ana control problems and heighten the risk
of compromise. Multiple sites pose special problems for the SFOD communica-
tions capabilities, especially in the numbers and types of radios required. Multi-
ple surveillance sites also require the SFOD to determine its internal
communications needs whether the element acts independently or in coordina-
tion with other elements. The SFOD always balances security considerations
against execution techniques.
A key to mission success during SR is the ability to infiltrate the target area, gain
all available information, then exfiltrate while the threat remains unaware of the
SFOD's presence.
Information Collection
This term generically addresses those SR missions to obtain information previously
unknown or to refute or confirm specific information about a target that does not
neatly fall under the category of surveillance. Examples of this type of SR include
NBC agent confirmation; soil, water, or air survey and/or sampling; mute reconnais-
sance DZ and/or LZ surveys; or any other specific data requirements. Such a mis-
sion is almost always limited to the specific data or indicators required.
Often, these missions require the SFOD to conduct mission-specific skill training
or to accept augmentation by non-SF subject matter experts. Augmentation may
entail an LB team, topographic or civil engineers, explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) soldiers, or scientific specialists such as toxicologists or meteorologists.
When augmenters conduct a mission, special premission training is required for
both the SFOD and the augmenters. Regardless of the rank of the augmentee, the
SFOD is responsible for safe infiltration, security, and exfiltration as well as
reaction to contingencies. Specialists focus on their specialty, while the SFOD
supports them.
Once the SFOD collects the information, it forwards that information to the FOB.
The SFOD must know when there is enough information to warrant a report.
Signal Intercept
An SFOD tasked to conduct signal intercept operations requires extensive lan-
guage and equipment training. For this reason, a SOT A, found in the battalion
military intelligence detachments (MIDs), is attached to an SFOD to conduct sig-
nal intercept operations. Signal intercept missions, both voice and code, are
closely controlled by the theater intelligence center. The SOT A collects informa-
tion that may have tactical, operational, or strategic value. This information al-
most always passes from the SOT A and terminates at the SFOB's or FOB's
sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF).
3-22
FM 31-20-5
When a SOT A performs this type of SR in a nonpermissive environment, it nor-
really is attached to an SFOD. This augmentation occurs because the MOS train-
ing of the SOT A covers only general soldier skills and its signal collection
training. The SFOD conducts joint mission planning and premission training to
ensure all participants understand their responsibilities. FM 34-36 provides a de-
finitive explanation of SOT A and SOF intelligence and electronic warfare
(lEW) operations.
INCIDENTAL INFORMATION COLLECTION
Incidental information collection is not a separate mission. It is, as the name im-
plies, conducted "incidentally" to another mission. Incidental information collec-
tion, which is passive and overt, does not provide a reason for active information
collection. Missions cannot be planned to ODtain incidental information.
Incidental information collection is not conducted in response to taskings or
requirements. Taskings and requirements imply that SFODs are authorized to
actively collect data and that they are expected to fulfill those requirements. Inci-
dental information collection objectives imply no such charter, and the SFOD is
not held responsible for meeting them. Obtaining the data specified in incidental
information collection objectives is merely an additional benefit of other activi-
ties. To specify incidental information collection objectives, the SIO reviews his
existing data bases for missing or incomplete information. Additionally, he main-
tains active coordination with other elements that may have identified intelli-
gence deficiencies. He should maintain these intelligence shortfalls as a standing
list of IR. The SIO reviews this list when preparing a mission brief for an SFOD.
Those items that do not directly relate to the tasked mission but with which the
SFOD may reasonably be expected to observe become incidental information
collection objectives.
After the SFOD receives the mission briefing, it reviews the incidental informa-
tion collection objectives. After the SFOD A completes the POE, the intelligence
sergeant analyzes it to identify likely times when locations or activities listed in
the objectives may be observed. No alteration of the plan is made to increase
likelihood of observing the desired data. Where the objective data itself may not
be directly observable, the intelligence sergeant develops a list of indicators for
SFOD members. All members are "sensitized" (made aware of) to the objectives
and indicators.
The prefemed means of reporting incidental information collection objectives is
by including the data in routine encrypted reports at the earliest possible time.
The SFOD must be sensitive to the fact that any appearance of active espionage
may damage the primary mission or even jeopardize relations with the host na-
tion. Therefore, the SFOD should limit and carefully safeguard written records.
Each returning SFOD should include any incidental information in their area
assessment or after action review within 24 to 48 hours after being debriefed.
For clarity, the foUowins is an example of an SFOD involved in incidental in-
formation collection while acting as a mobile training team (MIT) tasked to con-
duct training in nation X at the 33d Battalion. The SFOD provides small unit
patrolling training to a select border reconnaissance company. One of the SFOD's
incidental information collection objectives is to note indicators of external support
3-23
FM 31-20-5-
to dissidents in the 33d Battalion's area of responsibility. Such indicators may in-
clude the presence of foreign weapons and munitions, propaganda products be-
yond local reproduction capability, or the presence of foreign personnel in unlikely
locations or numbers.
During the training, a squad leader in the border reconnaissance company pro-
duces a specific type of antitank weapon of recent manufacture that is foreign to
the HN and United States. He indicates that it was recovered during a recent raid
on a suspected dissident safehouse. As part of the training, he is interested in
knowing the purpose of the weapon and safe handling procedures for this and
similar artifacts captured in the future.
Since the SFOD clearly identified the weapon as coming from an external source
and allegedly being in the possession of known dissidents, the SFOD would re-
port the data through the battalion SIO to the interested agency. The data was
obtained in the course of routine activity and was not the result of active collec-
tion attempts. Similarly, the SFOD, while eating in a local restaurant, may see
high-quality anti-U.S. propaganda posters echoing certain themes. This informa-
tion may be an important indicator obtained in the course of normal activities.
3-24.
^ FM 31-20-5
CHAPTER
PREMISSION
ACTIVITIES
Development of a special operations mission planning folder (SOMPF) and
supporting POE is the^oal of memission training. The nature ofSR requires
a higher degree of mission analysis, plannning, and mission specitic trainning
than that associated with combat patrolling. This chapter is broken down into
four sections. The first section describes mission analysis and command and
staff responsibilities upon receipt of a mission tasking in a garrison posture.
The second section describes the mission analysis and home station planning
in support of a specific operation plan (OPLAN). The third section describes
specific SR mission preparation and training done before becoming opera-
tional. The last section discusses the final prep artion for planned missions
and adaptive planning for emerging missions in an operational configuration.
SECTION I. MISSION ANALYSIS
Mission analysis views all sources of mission taskings and sets priorities for re-
sources and efforts through a clear statement of the battalion commander's intent
and concept of operations. It provides the basis for the battalion preparation of
mission letters to the SFOD A and support platoon and/or detachment level.
PROCEDURES
Home station mission analysis follows the procedures outlined in FM 101-5. The
specific application of this decision-making process to SR is described below. This
process assumes the SF battalion has more than one OPLAN it may be required to
execute. It is designed to allocate resources and set priorities of effort. Draft
METLs are developed and refined based on specific mission planning. The bulk of
the work on area studies is completed prior to beginn ing specific mission planning.
Sources, processes, and products are summarized in Figure 2-1 (page 2-2)
An SF battalion is seldom activated from scratch; therefore, planning does not
begin with a total absence of previous guidance or planning, the process is nor-
mally modified and enhanced by prior work done by the battalion. Complete re-
views of the nature described above should be done—
• As soon as a new mission letter is received.
• When supported OPLANs are significantly changed.
• When the situation in the area of responsibility (AOR) changes dramatically
(as in Europe in the recent past) or as the commander prescribes (normally
once every 18 months to 2 years).
2-1
FM 31-20-5-
Step 1 - Mission Receipt
The mission analysis process at battalion level and below begins with receipt of
the mission letter from the SF group (refer to FM 31-20, Appendix F). This level
is the lowest level at which a mission letter will identify the requirement to con-
duct SR. The battalion staffs must analyze the mission letter in conjunction with
a number of other documents. Among mem are specific OFLANs the battalion is
tasked to support. Peacetime campaign plans (PCPs) outline major operations
such as the overall counterdrug efforts for an area or region. Joint strategic capa-
bilities plans (JSCPs) are the mans used to allocate appropriate resources and
manpower. The PCPs and JSCPs developed at the JCS and unified command lev-
els are basic outlines of the "big picture" for regional U.S. efforts. The battalion
must also review other documents, such as developed war plans (OFLANs and/
or concept plans JCONPLANsJ) containing or implying mission requirements. In
addition to extend documents specifying potenhal missions, the battalion com-
mander may deduce missions based on nis evaluation of the assigned AOR. The
battalion commander must direct priority of effort first to externally directed
missions and second to deduced missions. The battalion staff should forward de-
duced mission requirements to the SF group for validation and inclusion in task-
ing documents. SFOD A commanders must have a clear understanding of the
intent of all the commanders involved whether or not the mission is externally or
internally developed. If any staff member notes a conflict or lacks overall under-
standing of the intent, he should resolve these problems at the highest level be-
fore mission analysis proceeds.
OPLANs
DEDUCED
REQUIREMENTS
SOURCE \
Mission Letter From Group
w Mission Analysis ,
/
PROCESS
\ Key Analysis Performed /
\ at Battalion Level /
PRODUCTS
Commander's intent and concept, draft battalion METL,
SFOO B mission letters, guidance to SFOD C, area
studies, SFOD A mission letters, draft SFOD B METL.
Figure 2-1. Mission analysis.
2-2
FM 31-20-5
Step 2 - Information Exchange
During this step, staff representatives and commanders exchange information
critical to initial mission analysis. The battalion staff is the focal point for passing
information. Therefore, it must ensure that all requests and responses are quickly
and fully disseminated.
Step 3 - Initial Mission Analysis
Using BOS, the commander, selected staff representatives, and certain key sup-
port element leaders review the documents received in step 1 and list the speci-
fied and implied tasks. They must consider the relationship of SR to other
missions, as well as its status as a mission. For example, a UW or FID mission
may imply an SR requirement in the form of a pilot team. At this point, they do
not direct mission analysis against a specific target for execution by a specific
SFOD A. Rather, they direct analysis at allocating resources against projected
requirements to best achieve the SF group commander's intent. The final prod-
ucts are the basis for routine personnel and administrative activities during garri-
son operations. They are also used to develop specific battalion- and lower-level
POEs. The result of this analysis is the battalion commander's restated mission
and operational planning guiaance. The restated mission must clearly identify the
requirement to conduct SR, contain specific courses of action (COAs), and pro-
vide general guidelines.
Step 4 - Staff Estimate Preparation
The staff may present staff estimates orally or in writing. The volume of material
may require estimates to be briefed to the commander orally with emphasis on
the staff sections' conclusions and recommendations. The following paragraphs
discuss, by staff section, considerations concerning the overall SR requirement.
SI Personnel Estimate. In considering the battalion's overall SR requirement, the
51 must evaluate battalion personnel strengths in terms of its capability to
accomplish the mission. The SI presents the battalion commander with projected
shortfalls in specific military occupational specialties (MOSs), individual qualifi-
cations, distribution of personnel, or projected losses, gains, and absences
affecting readiness.
52 Intelligence Estimate. The key to developing the intelligence estimate is a thor-
ough review of the available systems and information and the identification of
required intelligence support. The S2 section identifies intelligence estimate re-
quirements as soon as possible to ensure mission success. While the S2 and other
staff members are reviewing available data, such as area studies, after-action re-
ports, and area assets, they must consider alternate means of gathering the re-
quired information. These means may include requesting overflights and satellite
photography or exploiting sources in the target area. S2 personnel review all
available information related to the PIR and IR reports passed by deployed
SFODs to gain current information and adjust established POEs. They should
also review information gathered by other group and battalion assets such as the
MI detachment and its support operations teams A (SOTs A).
53 Operations Estimate. The S3 section prepares the operations estimate, which
contains a recommendation of the number of subordinate units required to meet
SR requirements. The operations estimate must identify general requirements for
SR-related schooling (advanced special operations training [ASOT], operations
2-3
FM 31-20-5
PRODUCTS
and intelligence [O&I], Special Operations Target Interdiction Course [SOTIC],
language training) and training along with an evaluation of the SFOD's current
status and/or capability. Typical considerations for SR include the—
• Number of SFODs A and SFODs B dedicated to preparing for SR as a pri-
mary mission. (FM 31-20 states that an SFOD A can be tasked to prepare
for two of the five primary SF missions.)
• Feasibility of functionally aligning SFODs A within the companies with all
SR-tasked teams in one company or having them decentralized.
• Requirements to deploy a forward operational base (FOB), advanced opera-
tional base(s) (AOB[s]), and/or special operations command and control
element(s) (SOCCE[s]) and, if so, the num ber required. For detailed in-
formation on the SOCCE, see [Appendix G| .
S4 Logistics Estimate. The logistics section analyzes the logistics needs to sup-
port the required type and number of SR missions. This estimate may drive ac-
quisition of certain types of items or modification table of organization and
equipment (MTOE) revision. Samples of losistical considerations for SR in-
clude the quantity and type of observation devices, photographic equipment,
vehicles, and specialized field gear required and available. This estimate drives
budgeting for batteries (with the communications section), expendable, and air
items to support SR.
Other Staff Estimates. Special staff sections (signal, medical, and legal) may be
required to provide estimates. They must, as a minimum, prepare communica-
tions, medical, and legal estimates for SR-tasked teams. They must—
• Evaluate the adequacy of the type and density of communications systems
available versus mission requirements.
• Identify special medical requirements to support the types and numbers of
SR missions to be performed in a given AOR.
• Evaluate the legality of the general type of SR missions prop osed, particula rly
that of battalion-generated functional SR requirements. See |AppendixF| for
detailed information concerning SO legal considerations.
Once the staff sections prepare the estimates, they present or brief them to the
commander. Based on the information contained in the estimates, the commander,
with the assistance of the battalion executive officer, command sergeant major
(CSM), and S3, prepares the commander's estimate. This estimate evaluates SR
requirements, sets priorities, and factors in other SR missions and non-SR require-
ments. The commander then formulates a clear statement of intent and/or concept
of operations, which establishes his priorities relative to SR. He further translates
his concept of operations into a written mission letter to the companies. These
products drive a number of activities on the part of the battalion staff and subordi-
nate units. Although these actions begin during product development, they will not
be finalized until after comple tion of pre mission activities and mission planning.
This process is summarized in Figure 2-2 ,
2-4
FM 31-20-5
STAFF ACTION
mm
1
(
COMMANDER'S AC1
wfm
■
1
Mission Received
lOra
1
1
D
Information to
Commandef
^^ 1 nfonnatio n to Staff
■
^1
■
n
i«
^1
1
1
1
staff Estimates
1
M
^ Mission Analysis,
Restated Mission,
and Commander's
Planning Guidance
n ' ' — ■
^
Preparation of
PlansADrdeis
1
g
.^
Commander's Estimate
and Decision
Commander's Concept
Issuance of
Plans/Orders
1
-^
WW
— -^^ Approval of
1
^J"
-^ Plans/Orders
1
FEEDBACK
FEEDBACK
1
n i
1
Q
Mission
Acxx>mpllshment
Figure 2-2. Decision-making process.
STAFF ACTIVITIES
As a result of the commander's statement of intent, mission letters, and guidance
to battalion staff sections, a variety of actions begin. The goal of these actions is
to aid the preparation, conduct, and support of SR operations. These actions nor-
mally parallel actions taken in support or other missions. However, there are SR-
specific considerations that each staff element fulfills.
SI (Personnel)
Based on the general guidance contained in the commander's statement of intent
and guidance to the battalion, the SI conducts a comprehensive review of per-
sonnel resources, assignments, and procedures. Working closely with the S3,
battalion CSM, company commanders, and sergeants major, the SI determines
the adequacy of assigned personnel to meet the specific SR mission require-
ments. If shortfalls in MOSs or specific qualifications are identified, the Si for-
wards personnel requests to the SF group. If authorizations under the current
MTOE do not support requirements, the SI works with the S3 in submitting
2-5
FM 31-20-5-
MTOE changes. Where shortfalls in training are identified such as the lack of
high altitude low opening (HALO)- or SOTIC-qualified personnel, the S3 cor-
rects the shortcomings in the MTOE or obtains schooling as required. The SI
maps the location of personnel with SR mission-essential skills, experience, and
abilities. For example, certain missions may call for a native speaker, a member
of a given ethnic group, 20/20 vision, or an individual with in-country experi-
ence. Although identifying requirements is not the Si's responsibility, identify-
ing and locatmg the assets is. Based on requirements identified by the SFODs A
and B, S3, commanders, and sergeants major, the S 1 matches available personnel
who have SR-related skills with existing mission profiles. Working with the SF
group SI and the battalion CSM, the battalion SI requests appropriate personnel
and advises the commander on the most appropriate assignment of incoming per-
sonnel. After mission-specific planning is completed, the battalion SI and com-
pany staffs monitor the profiles for individual positions to assign incoming
personnel accordingly. For example, the ideal candidate required by an SFOD A
to perform a specific mission is required to have certain skills. These skills may
include experience in rock climbing, an extensive background in foreign equip-
ment, or expertise in an SF-specific method of infiltration/exfiltration. Personnel
who meet the ideal requirements may not be available, but these profiles should
serve as a baseline for assignments.
52 (Intelligence)
During all stages of the mission, the S2 section, more than any other staff section,
must be proactive. Given the commander's intent, the S2 anticipates the IR and
generates the appropriate requests for intelligence information (RIIs) and re-
quests for information (RFIs). As soon as a target or mission is identified, the S2
section begins—
• Collecting all available information on the target area.
• Deploying organic assets to collect current information.
• Sending RFIs to all available sources and agencies to gain current material
and information about the target and target area.
• Reviewing on-hand information. A detailed review of the target SOMPF
along with intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) reflecting information about
the target and target area is required.
• Reviewing map coverage requirements for the target area.
53 (Operations)
The S3 reviews specific skill qualifications and requests required school quotas.
Working with subordinate element commanders and sergeants major, he sets
priorities for allocations to SR-related schools. The S3 drafts and presents the
battalion METL. This draft must consider requirements for the FOB or AOB
and/or SOCCE(s). He synchronizes specific mission planning with other ele-
ments participating in the supported OPLAN. When missions are to be per-
formed in support of or in proximity to GP elements, he requests direct liaison
authority during plan development. Based on the draft METL and commander's
concept of the operation, he drafts the battalion commander's training guidance
and begins worlc on the battalion's long-range training plan. He matches am-
munition and other resource forecasts to SR-specific requirements. He must also
2-6
FM 31-20-5
be alert to training opportunities that are relevant to METL requirements. Exam-
ples of this long-range planning include examining mission profiles at Joint
Readiness Trainmg Center (JRTC) and programming appropriate subordinate
elements against specific rotations. (For example, an SFOD A without SR as one
of its two primary missions would not be scheduled to perform such a mission at
JRTC. Units programmed for SR duties would receive that opportunity.)
S4 (Logistics)
The S4, like the S2, must anticipate SFOD requirements. The S4 section orders,
purchases, or identifies specialized equipment. Where the curren t MTOE does
not support the requirements, the S4 submits MTOE changes. See lAppendix H
for a discussion of mission-specific clothing and equipment that support
SR missions.
S5 (Civil-Military Operations)
The S5 plans section must ensure all plans relevant to SR operations are made
readily available. This section coordinates with supporting rSYOP elements to
determine possible (positive and negative) psychological impacts of the mission
on noncombatants and enemy forces. It then relays information to the tasked
SFODs. The S5 coordinates with CA elements to generate data on the local
populace and possible sources of supply and to estimate effects of military
operations on the local populace. In an SR context, examples of this support
include but are not limited to—
• Predicting the local populace's reaction to inadvertent compromise of
the SFODs.
• Determining availability of equipment in the local economy.
• Identifying sources of potable water.
Additionally, the S5 plans section oversees and synchronizes the area study effort
within the battalion to minimize duplication of effort.
Signal Section
The signal section analyzes the requirements for SR-unique communications
capabilities and evaluates the battalion's ability to support the mission with or-
ganic assets. Considerations for SR communications are generally the same as
mose for other missions. Certain SR-specific aspects, however, require special
consideration. Many SR missions require NRT transmission of data not common
to other missions such as FID and UW. The frequent use of the split team concept
during SR often requires additional communications equipment. In those
instances, the signal section immediately submits MTOE changes. Differing mis-
sion environments will dictate special equipment needs. Desert environments
limit the SFOD's capability to construct antennas (no trees), and standard com-
munications gear may not be appropriate for urban operations. For other SR mis-
sions, data transmission capabilities may be essential (FAX, filmless camera).
Planning for SR communications requirements is vital to mission success. If the
SFOD cannot successfully transmit data in a timely manner, the mission is a fail-
ure. Redundancy and reliability of communications become imperative. Unfortu-
nately, the nature of SR limits bulk and weight that can be transported. The signal
section must actively seek the best compromise between weight and capabilities
that supports the mission.
2-7
FM 31-20-5 .
SUBORDINATE OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS
The transmission of mission letters to the SF companies begins their direct in-
volvement in the mission analysis process. The SF battalion support company
also receives a mission letter.
The SF Company
The SF company begins mission analysis upon receipt of its mission letter. Based
on the mission letter, the company determines the SR-related SFOD B missions,
which may—
• Include area assessment (pilot team).
• Establish an AOB in support of an SR mission(s).
• Function as a SOCCE with a supported and/or supporting headquarters.
• Augment the FOB.
It sets priorities for probable missions, both in support of SR and other missions.
Then, based upon the mission letter, the company commander designates primary
missions for each SFOD A. He provides each SFOD A with a mission letter
clearly stating his intent and setting priorities for SFOD A missions.
The company commander and his staff analyze the capabilities of each SFOD A
ensuring that SR missions go to the best qualified SFOD A.
The SF Battalion Support Company
To best support the battalion's SFODs, the SF battalion support company must
have a clear picture of mission requirements. The first source of these require-
ments is the mission letter. Working with other primary and special staff sections,
the S3 section prepares this letter, which is issued by the battalion commander.
The letter contains general guidance as to the types and quantities of support the
company will be required to provide. With respect to SR, the mission letter must
include guidance for the SOTs A of the MI detachment. The letter must alert the
signal section to unusual requirements and include other SR-specific taskings.
This letter serves the SF battalion support company commander as a basis for
METL development. The second means of identifying support requirements are
the briefbacks conducted by the employed SFODs. Representation of all con-
cerned staff sections at this mostly oral presentation enhances mission success
more than almost any other briefmg. The briefback is normally the last chance
for the S3 and S4 representatives to brief the SFOD and commanders present on
last minute updates to outstanding requests.
Upon completion of specific mission planning, the support company commander
revises the draft METL. Working witn the appropriate staff section, the support
company commander issues guidance to each of his subordinate elements in a
mission letter, which includes a statement of intent and concept of operations.
This letter provides a start point for developing battalion METL. Specific and
related tasks are drafted from this general analysis.
2-8
■ FM 31-20-5
SECTION 11. MISSION PLANNING
The joint speckd operations targeting process develops and refines SR mission
taskings. The targeting process determines which mission concepts become SR
and results in SOl ana/or |SOTF taskings to the SF group and/or SFOB to plan
and execute. Mission taskines take the form of the mission tasking pacRaee
(MTP) and the TIP. ^ ^^ ^
MISSION PLANNING PROCESS
The mission planning process begins with receipt of the MTP and TIP. The pro-
cess will ultimately result in a completed SOMrF. Each MTP contains the §0C
and group commanders' operational intent. It also contains a specification of pre-
mission constraints and considerations that will hamper the assessment and plan-
ning process. The group commander and staff review the MTP and TIP to
determine the general shortcomings and requirements inherent in the mission
tasking. They then assign a battahon to assess the mission's feasibility and to
begin planning the mission. Although the group passes the action to thekttalion
for more detaned analysis, group sraff elements must continue their own analysis
and begin to coordinate known shortfalls. Figure 2-3 depicts mission plannmg.
SOURCE
PROCESS
Specific OPLAN and Other
Directed SR Missions
Specific Mission Analysis
Key Analysis Performed
at SFOD A Level
PRODUCTS FeaslWllty AssMstnent, P0E8, Support Requirements, SOMPF, Finalized METL
(SFOD A. B & C)
Figure 2-3. Mission planning.
2-9
FM 31-20-5
FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT
Upon receipt of the MTF, the SF battalion begins the feasibility assessment (FA)
process. This assessment determines the ability of the SFOD A to perform the
mission and the abilities of the battalion or SFOD B to support the mission. The
BOS and SO imperatives are the best guides for conducting an FA. The FA pro-
cess requires direct involvement of the battalion and/or FOB staff, the SFOD B
staff, and the SFOD A. Each has specific degrees of concern and areas of respon-
sibility that, when addressed, will accurately reflect mission feasibility. This pro-
cess must address TAIs, NAIs, and other known aspects of the target area. The
review of these items ensures unity of effort of all units in the area of the SR
target and ensures deconfliction between friendly units. When determining mis-
sion feasibility for a preconflict mission assignment at home station, planners
must forward to the isolated SFOB detailed mission shortfalls in training or re-
source requirements that are beyond the battalion's capability to fix, such as
school quotas and mission-specific equipment. Once completed, the FA must
clearly indicate whether or not mission feasibility is conditional upon the resolu-
tion of identified shortfalls. The battalion commander translates training defi-
ciencies into additions to the SFOD METL for training. He then tasks his staff to
resolve or coordinate the resolution of materiel or personnel shortfalls.
Battalion FA Activities
The battalion commander and his staff consider the specific mission require-
ments in the context of overall group and battalion plans. They must assess the
battalion and/or FOB staff's ability to prepare, support, sustain, and command
and control SR elements once they are committed to an operation. The SF battal-
ion has two principal roles in the FA process. The first is to guide and support the
SFOD's efforts. The second is to determine its own capability to support the
SFODs. In the deliberate, home station planning process, where time is not a
critical factor, the battalion will not determine a mission infeasible without al-
lowing the tasked SFOD to conduct its assessment. If the SFOD's and the battal-
ion staff's assessments conflict, the battalion commander makes the final
determination. The battalion operations staff serves as the focal point for coordi-
nating infiltration and exfiltration feasibilities. SFODs and battalion staffs must
consider all methods of infiltration and exfiltration during FA. Infeasible or inap-
propriate methods of infiltration or exfiltration are excluded from future consid-
eration. A mission becomes infeasible when all potential infiltration and/or
exfiltration methods are infeasible. If you can't get there, the mission is infeasi-
ble! The battalion and/or FOB staff forwards to the tasked SFOD A and B known
constraints, available information, and the commander's intent, which become
their basis for assessment.
Company FA Activities
A battalion tasks missions directly to each of the operational detachments,
3 SFODs B and 18 SFODs A. This tasking does not imply, however, that the
company headquarters does not participate in the process of tasking its organic
SFODs A. Unless there are overriding security reasons for compartmentalizing
the mission (in SR, these reasons would include having the SFOD B in the JSOA
in an operational role simultaneously with the SFOD A on unrelated missions),
the company receives the MTP from the battalion commander and staff. It then
2-10
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ FM 31-20-5
tasks one of its SFODs A and supervises its assessment activities. The SF
battalion commander has three reasons why he would pass the MTP through the
company commander. First, the SF company manages the day-today activities
of the SFOD A, specifically training. Second, operational experience of the SF
company headquarters normally exceeds that in the SFOD A. The company staff
provides capable mentorship for the SFOD A. Third, after deployment the two
most common missions for an SFOD B will be as an AOB or as a SOCCE in
support of the employed SFODs A. As an AOB, its personnel must know the C
and support requirements of elements performing SR within its AOR. For SR,
the company's feasibility assessment concerns include—
• Communications means and schedules.
• Emergency exfiltration requirements.
• Emergency resupply considerations.
• Medivac availability.
Operational Detachments' FA Activities
The SFOD A or B performing FAs for specific missions does and develop com-
plete plans at this time. For SR, it—
• Considers all appropriate means of infiltration and exfiltration required.
• Assesses its ability to fix the target, avoid compromise, recognize and/or de-
tect the indicators, communicate the data acquired in a timely manner, and
exfiltrate the area.
The SFOD A and/or B determines the nature of the SR task and examines appli-
cable SR tactics. It identifies interagency coordination, required resources, train-
ing beyond its organic capability, or augmentation needs. It must include such
requirements as conditions in the final FA. FAs are—
• Affirmative (we can do it as trained, equipped, and routinely supported).
• Conditional (we can do it, but the following conditions exist).
• Negative (we cannot accomplish this mission because of a clearly stated reason).
FA Conducted by Supporting Agencies
Aviation assets conduct the following FAs:
• Aircraft availability.
• Aircraft compatibility with mission guidelines.
• Routes for infiltration and exfiltration.
Technical auementers conduct FAs to ensure compatibility with the mission.
This FA should include:
• Capability to execute the selected means of infiltration.
• Transportation requirements for technical equipment.
• Mission specific skills required for the mission.
2-11
FM 31-20-5
POST-FA ACTIVITIES
Once a mission is determined feasible or conditionally feasible, the FOB staff
and/or SFOD anticipates actual mission tasking. The battalion and/or FOB staff
immediately identifies requirements for schooling, training, and equipment.
Modifying MTOEs to meet mission requirements is one example of long-term
fixes that must begin upon FA. The battalion staff and the SFOD retain all
documentation and working papers from the FA since they form the basis for
subsequent FOE development.
PLAN OF EXECUTION DEVELOPMENT
The POE is the final element of the SOMPF. It represents how the SFOD intends
to carry out the assigned mission. Specific mission preparation begins when the
battalion receives the tasking to prepare a SOMPF to accomplish a tasked mis-
sion (see Joint Pub 3-05.5).
SOMPF Shell
This tasking takes the form of a SOMPF "shell" containing all elements devel-
oped to that point (see Joint Pub 3-05.5 for SOMPF contents). Ideally, the
SOMPF contains a completed TIP, which requires constant update until mission
execution. This update process requires the supporting intelligence agencies to
anticipate mission-specific requirements and to react to the developing situations
particular to SR missions. The TIP, however, is critical to operational planning.
Options for conducting specific mission planning include—
• Activating the FOB for training and isolating SEODs so they may accom-
plish their detailed planning.
• Conducting planning as part of the routine training day.
Battalion Activities
The battalion commander and staff plan for support of the overall operation. Addi-
tionally, the battalion has activities that support SFOD POE development. Building
upon the analysis conducted durine the FA, the battalion staff uses a standard
decision-making process as describea in FM 101-5. For non-time-critical planning,
the staff prepares formal written estimates. These estimates identify anticipated SR
mission-specific requirements of the SEODs. They also address planning options
available to the tasked SFOD. For example, the signal section addresses available
communications capabilities and procedures for transmitting data without undue
risk of compromise. At the battalion level, the battalion commander directs the
decision process toward—
• Selecting the specific SFOD(s) to conduct the missions.
• Developing estimates to be used in preparation of the battalion order and
SFOD planning guidance.
• Developing the commander's intent into a feasible concept of operations.
• Planning for FOB activities required to support the employed SEODs.
The battalion planning process produces the battalion order. The battalion order
encompasses all missions that the battalion's SFOD will accomplish as well as
2-12
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ FM 31-20-5
SR. The operations annex to the order contains the specific mission-target task-
ings, usually a target list appendix. Compartmentation requirements normally
keep the target list restricted to battalion and /or FOB and SFOB staff use. SF
company commanders normally only receive target list extracts for their SFODs
B and applicable SFODs A. SFODs only receive target information pertaining to
their target or JSOA.
Once completed, the coordinated battalion plan or order becomes a supporting
plan to the group and/or SFOB OPLAN. Revised or new missions normally re-
quire the staff to review previous analysis and coordination. Unless the changes
entail extensive modifications, only the target list appendix requires revision.
The order must clearly state the commander's intent. For SR missions, the battal-
ion commander's general statement of intent for the overall operation is insuffi-
cient. He must include a separate statement of intent for eacn specific mission
tasking. The intent directs mission concept (MICON) development at the SFOD
level. The order must contain sufficient detail to guide the SFOD commander's
mission analysis and decision-making process without unduly limiting the
SFOD's planning options.
The battalion commander issues a mission letter to each company and, through
the company mission letter, the SFOD A receives its SR taskmgs. The company
commander also provides the battalion OPLAN and SOMPF to the SFOD. The
SFOD A needs time to review this information before it receives the mission
briefing from the battalion commander and staff. The mission briefing consists of
battalion staff officers and/or NCOs summarizing their specific areas and elabo-
rating on specific data or changes in the OPLAN that have particular impact on
the SFOD's SR mission. The SFOD does not leave the briefing until it under-
stands the commander's intent and has asked all the questions generated by its
review of the battalion OPLAN and SOMPF. The battalion staff answers all
questions concerning, for example, infiltration platforms, support equipment
availability, and rehearsal areas available to the SFOD. The SFOD includes them
in the area specialist team's (AST's) mission file.
An SFOB or FOB may employ multiple SFODs on the same SR mission. For
example, several SFODs may be employed against a linear target such as a rail
line. These SFODs may operate in an integrated manner or separately. Multiple
SFODs provide information of greater accuracy in less time than independent
SFODs One disadvantage of using multiple SFODs is mission complexity. Also,
saturation of a target area increases the chances of mission compromise and
makes such missions more dangerous for the deployed SFODs. Regardless,
whenever multiple SFODs are employed, they must operate far enough apart to
preclude interfering with each other.
Company Activities
This discussion presumes that the SFOD B is not compartmentalized from the
SFOD A receiving the mission. The SF company commander and staff receive
the mission briefing with the SFOD A. This practice ensures the SFOD B—
• Is available to the SFOD A during the planning process.
• Understands the training and resource requirements related to the mission,
• If tasked to act as an AOB, SOCCE, or as FOB augmentation, understands
the missions it is supporting or controlling.
2-13
FM 31-20-5 .
If the SFOD B is tasked to act as a SOCCE to support an SR mission, it acts as
the liaison between the supported unit and the SF oattalion and SFOD A through-
out the planning process. Additionally, it must ensure resolution of operational
conflicts between the GP force and the SFOD. For more information on the
SOCCE, see Appendix G
The SOCCE reviews the completed battalion OPLAN (especially those portions
relating to the specific SR mission [s] that support a GP force commander). The
review ensures the POE meets the supported unit's requirements and does not
conflict with that unit's operations. When available, the SOCCE attends the mis-
sion briefing to answer questions concerning the operations of the supported unit.
The battalion staff coordinates this liaison through the SFOB operations center.
SFOD Activities
FM 31-20 and FM 31-20-1 outline SFOD A mission planning procedures. The
events described in the deliberate and adaptive planning cycles apply for home
station POE development. Time is not a factor at this point. Likewise, mission-
specific training does not have to take place during the planning cycle. It can be
accomplished as part of the unit's normal training plan.
Step 1 - Receive the Mission. The SFOD receives the battalion staff's planning
guidance. This guidance may come in a mission letter during normal peacetime
operations, or it may come in the form of an OPLAN and SOMPF during hostili-
ties. The company passes command guidance to the SFOD A. The SFOD com-
mander reviews this planning guidance and activates the staff sections within the
SFOD A. Unit SOPs designate SFOD A members for each staff section accord-
ing to their MOSs and assigned staff responsibihties. Each SFOD member re-
views his portion of the OPLAN. When review of the OPLAN is complete, the
SFOD discusses the battalion commander's intent. Each member voices his con-
cerns and develops questions to be answered in the mission briefing to the team.
The SFOD develops and puts into writing RFIs. These RFIs address unanswered
questions and unclear points in the commander's intent. These RFIs are for-
warded to the battalion staff and a mission briefing is scheduled. The battalion
staff presents the mission briefing, during which it answers as many RFIs as pos-
sible and provides a working status on the others. The SFOD questions each staff
member as required. The SFOD commander ensures that the SFOD's perception
of the commander's intent is correct through face-to-face discussion with the
battalion commander. For SR, specific considerations include—
• Communications requirements (particularly in terms of timeliness and inter-
face with non-SF systems).
• Political and legal constraints to consider in planning.
• Availability of infiltration and exfiltration means.
• Clarification of the specific intelligence requirements and why indicators
were selected.
• The indicators or combinations of indicators that are critical to determining
the PIR and/or IR.
• What the indicators mean in terms of PIR and/or IR (allowing the team to
develop additional or alternative indicators).
• Availability of specialized equipment.
• Success criteria.
2-14
FM 31-20-5
Step 2 - Exchange Information. After the mission briefing is complete and all ques-
tions have been answered or noted for further research and/or coordination, the
SFOD commander conducts an abbreviated mission analysis session with the
SFOD. This session is held to ensure SFOD members understand FIR, indicators,
legal and political constraints, and timeliness requirements. In this session, the
SFOD reviews all available information to ensure that all SFOD members agree
on what has been presented. SFOD members with specialized skills and/or expe-
rience (either in the mission or in the JSOA) provide information on their unique
perspectives or requirements. If confusion over factual information or interpreta-
tions of information exists, the SFOD develops and forwards additional RFIs to
the battalion for clarification.
Step 3 - Restate The Mission and Produce Planning Guidance. After exchanging in-
formation, the SFOD commander, SFOD operations sergeant, and SFOD SO
technician (or SGM and S3 officer if an SFOD B) meet to develop a restated
mission and produce planning guidance. In this step, the SFOD leadership—
• Reviews the mission tasks from the operations order.
• Reviews the battalion mission statement and commander's intent.
• Considers the information received to date.
• Reviews the feasible infiltration and/or exfiltration means.
Based on this information, the SFOD leadership develops a comprehensive list of
specified and implied tasks and the commander develops a restated mission.
There is no need to rearrange the wording of the task in the operations order. The
restated mission specifically identifies the SR task as the ' what" of the who,
what, when, where, and why. For example, it identifies the operation as target
acquisition, area assessment, and so forth. In the case of "other collection tasks,"
a description of the activity is substituted. Based on the SFOD leadership's
knowledge of the skills, capabilities, current and achievable standards of trainmg
of the SFOD, and available resources, it develops COAs for consideration. For
SR, these COAs must include—
• SR tactics (R&S, overt collection).
• Infiltration and/or exfiltration means.
• Required task organization.
• Guidance on specific techniques to be employed such as static surveillance
or mobile reconnaissance.
Planning responsibilities different from, or not covered by, unit SOPs are also
clearly stated. When the SFOD leadership has completed its analysis, it passes
the findings out to the entire SFOD. Normally information is disseminated ver-
bally; however, written guidance or the use of training aids (for example, flip
charts) is preferable where guidance is complicated. As a minimum, the SFOD
leadership must present COAs in writing.
Step 4 - Prepare Staff Estimates. Based on the planning guidance and unit SOPs,
the SFOD members prepare estimates for their areas of responsibility. These
estimates are not limited to those of the traditional staff areas of responsibility.
For SR, specific skills and mission requirements may create a need for a "spe-
cial staff" type estimate. Formats for staff estimates are in FM 101-5. PSYOP
and civil-military operations (CMO) estimates will always be prepared for SF
2-15
FM 31-20-5-
operations. For home statioi^ planning (where time is not a factor), SFODs pre-
pare written estimates. Written estimates provide continuity for replacements
when SFOD members rotate. Staff estimates must identify requirements for
support for each CO A. Once completed, the staff estimates are briefed to the
SFOD. The briefing serves the purpose of exchanging information between
SFOD members.
Step 5 - Prepare Commander's Estimate and Decision. After the staff estimate brief-
ings, the SFOD commander reassembles the SFOD leadership and with their as-
sist ante prepares the commander's estimate. A critical portion of this step is
determining and weighing the factors against which the CO As will be evaluated.
The SFOD leadership selects the specific factors for the mission based on the
commander's intent and the specified and implied tasks. For SR, these factors
should account for timely transmission of data, OPSEC, and the quantity and
quality of indicators the COAs should produce. The commander's estimate must
include specific factors for each of the functional areas in the BOS. The SO
imperatives should also be translated into specific factors related to the mission.
Whatever set of factors is used, the SFOD commander must state why he se-
lected those factors. The commander's estimate is also prepared in written form.
Based on his estimate, the commander decides which COA the SFOD will plan
to execute. The product of this step is a statement of the SFOD commander's
intent and a concept of the operation. The SFOD commander briefs them to the
entire SFOD. This briefing serves to answer any questions the SFOD may have
and serves as the SFOD ' murder board" for the concept. After the briefing, the
commander schedules a MICON briefing for the battalion commander.
Step 6 - Present MICON Briefing. The MICON briefing is an informal briefing pre-
sented to the battalion commander to receive his approval of the SFOD's concept
of the operation prior to expending time in detailed planning. MICON briefings
have no format. For SR missions, the MICON briefing normally includes the—
• COAs considered.
• Factors used to evaluate the COAs.
• Commander's decision.
• Specific SR tasks derived.
• SR tactic selected.
• Task organization (to include requests for required attachments).
• Infiltration and exfiltration means.
• Identification of external support required (such as interagency approval of
certain activities, specialized equipment).
• General statement of the commander's concept of operations.
• Mission essential personnel and equipment.
Visual aids should be restricted to those already being used by the SFOD for mis-
sion planning. The MICON briefing should not be so formal the "event" hinders
the SFOD's planning activities. The battalion com mander either approves the
concept, modifies it, or directs the SFOD to return tc step 3j providing additional
guidance to clarify his intent. Key battalion staff members should accompany the
battalion commander to the MICON briefing. If they do not, they must familiar-
ize themselves with the approved concept.
2-16
FM 31-20-5
Based on the approved concept, the battalion staff anticipates the SFOD's sup-
port requirements. For example, if the mission concept calls for HALO infiltra-
tion of a 12-man element, the S4 does not wait for a support request for HALO
air items for the infiltration. The selected concept drives intelligence require-
ments. Because of the generally repetitious IR, intelligence personnel are able to
anticipate many of these requirements. The SFOD is not relieved of the responsi-
bility to plan all details of the operation.
Approval of the MICON ends the concept development phase for this planning
session. Responsibility for the concept now rests with the battalion commander
and the SFOD concentrates on detailed planning.
Step 7. Prepare Operation Plan. Upon approval of the MICON, the SFOD leader-
ship produces the body of the OPLAN. The written OPLAN specifies taskings to
subordinate elements and individual members of the SFOD. Annexes are not in-
cluded at this point. They are produced during the detailed planning phase. The
plan must be m keeping with the battalion commander's guidance and under-
stock by all members of the SFOD. If this criteria is satisfied, the battalion com-
mander approves the plan after the briefback.
Step 8. Conduct Detailed Planning. The SFOD organizes for planning the same as
it would for mission execution. When the mission does not require the entire
SFOD, nonessential members help subelements in the mission planning process.
Compartmentalization within the SFOD is generally counterproductive. For ex-
ample, multiple surveillance teams working a single TAI must synchronize their
activities to avoid compromising one another. Each SFOD member or element
completes a detailed plan for the execu tion of assign ed tasks. SFODs must focus
on the selected tactics and techniques | Appendix C"| to be used during employ-
ment and the SIR during the development ot the SK FOE. The FOE must address
the following questions:
• How do we get to the NAI and/or TAI?
• How do we collect the data (SR techniques used)?
• How do we report the data?
• How do we exfiltrate the area?
As discussed in Chapter '. , there is no set way to conduct an SR mission. There
are, however, numerous techniques that can be applied as the situation warrants.
These techniques and their adva ntages, disad vantages, and applicability to the
various SR tasks are described in [Appendix C[ As specific detailed plans are de-
veloped for SR missions, they must be wargamed to ensure they are complete
and viable. Members of the SFOD brief their respective areas, while other mem-
bers provide appropriate critique. The battalion staff should be available to pro-
vide the same service with the added advantage of greater objectivity.
In SR, certain aspects of the mission may be beyond the actual experience of any
of the planners. In these circumstances, rehearsals are excellent mission planning
tools. New or unfamiliar employment techniques may be tested by realistic re-
hearsals of portions of the plan during its development. Often, walking through
an action will revest the need for modifications to the plan. In any case, before an
SFOD briefs an SR POE to its battalion commander, it should physically verify
the viability of the plan under the most realistic circumstances possible. This
verification requires the S2 to identify the best available sites and facilities to
duplicate the intended mission site. The S3 makes provisions to use those sites
2-17
FM 31-20-5
and facilities. SFODs A and the S3 maintain rehearsal information for future ref-
erence. Examples of such information include time factors for surveillance site
construction or movement rates with specified weights over specific terrain
types. When such data has general applicability and does not compromise opera-
tional security, commanders should forward it to the USAJFKSWCS to be in-
cluded in the appropriate appendix in the next iteration of this FM. Refer to FM
31-20 for a flow chart on POE development. The format for a POE is in Appen-
dixes G and H of Joint Publication 3-05.5. Formats for specific subelements of
the detailed plan that support the POE vary with the mission. Some portions of
the POE may require annexes, while others only requite mention in a larger sec-
tion. The selected format should chronologically track the conduct of each ac-
tivity (for example, surveillance site construction) from beginning to end. It
should relate the activity performed in terms of how it contributes to collecting
and reporting requirements or how it enhances the survivability of the SFOD.
The POE lists all mission-essential equipment and accounts for the disposition of
that equipment in SFOD packing and resupply plans. The SFOD leadership en-
sures tnat all supporting subplans are consistent and mutually supportive. They
also must ensure that specialized equipment used for one activity can also be
used for another. For example, if night vision equipment is necessary for move-
ment and for observation, the same piece of equipment should be used for both
activities, which may entail some compromise. A tripod or rifle mounted night
vision devices (NVDs) may be best for observation, but night vision goggles
(NVGs) may be required for movement. For SR it is usually impractical to nave
both. Upon completion of all supporting subplans, the SFOD leadership super-
vises the preparation of the formal POE. It includes all the annexes, notes, narra-
tives, or graphics essential to conduct the mission.
Step 9 - Conduct BriefbackJhe briefback serves a distinct purpose. Where the
POE details what an SFOD intends to accomplish, the briefback explains to the
battalion commander how the SFOD will execute the assigned tasks. For SR mis-
sions, once the SFOD infiltrates, the battalion commander effectively loses his
ability to supervise the performance of tasks. He cannot supervise surveillance
site selection, routes, or movement techniques. His last effective influence on
these activities is through guidance given at the briefback.
The briefback format is driven by the plan, not the reverse. There are several
available mission briefback formats that provide general guidance. There is no
"best" format or checklist for SR. The content of a briefback for an area assess-
ment to determine FID requirements may vary widely from that of an SR mission
for target acquisition in support of a GP maneuver force. The format chosen for
briefing the information must be adapted to meet the mission requirements rather
than to fit a prescribed format. The latter procedure leads to including irrelevant
information and deleting critical factors, the SFOD prepares the briefback using
the completed detailed plan. The plan is not written to a briefback format. Exist-
ing formats are useful as a means to organize the presentation (in general terms)
and as a checklist to look for obvious areas that were overlooked during plan-
ning. Briefback preparation often meals gaps in planning. In adapting the for-
mat, the following principles apply:
• The format must provide a detailed description of the activities of each
SFOD member throughout the execution of the mission (it provides a men-
tal picture of the operation for the commander receiving the briefing).
• The briefing employs visual aids only if they clarify the briefing.
2-18
FM 31-20-5
• Briefers must avoid coi^stai^t reference to the commander's folder as it de-
nies the staff access to necessary information (use charts instead).
• The briefing must flow in such an order that the recipients can apply in-
formation from one section to the next.
• The briefing must provide the commander with adequate information to
judge the efficacy of the plan.
SFODs present their briefback in the facility where the planning was conducted.
This practice enhances OPSEC and minimizes administrative requirements for
the SFOD. Although rehearsal and professional presentation are required, the
goal is clarity, not display. Each SFOD member briefs his own responsibilities.
The battalion commander is interested in how the surveillance element intends to
conduct surveillance, not in how the security element or command element
thinks the surveillance element intends to conduct surveillance. The staff focuses
questions on areas where they did not hear adequate information to judge the
completeness or viability of the plan. However, all staff elements shoula have
thoroughly coordinated their input during the mission planning phase. The
traditional habit of quizzing SFOD members' memory of details and
cross-training is not appropriate for this briefback since mission preparation and
training will continue. The sole purpose of this bnefback is to judge tne adequacy
of the plan. For example, if the battalion communications representative hears
reference to a communications system that he cannot personally vouch for as
available, he quizzes the SFOD on the availability of that system. If he hears
discussion on the use of an antenna that appears inappropriate, he questions that
selection. This briefback is intended to disclose any weaknesses in the plan while
they can be corrected. If the SFOD cannot justify any action, no matter how
minute, the action needs to be reconsidered. SR, like other SO, can fail due to
minor oversights. The battalion S4 must address outstanding support requests
and any other shortfalls.
Once the battalion commander is confident the plan is workable, he approves the
POE. If further work is required, he gives specific guidance and returns the
SFOD to the planning phase. The commander determines the extent of revision
and whether or not another full briefback is required. As a minimum, he should
require the appropriate staff officer to personally brief him on any changes. Once
the plan is approved, the SFOD commander is responsible only for the prepara-
tion of the SFOD and execution of the mission. The battalion commander as-
sumes responsibility for the viability of the plan. The commander should
withhold final approvtd of plans until all support requests are confirmed and the
mission tasking authority approves the POE,.
Step 10 - Obtain POE Approval. Once the POE is completed and approved by the
battalion commander, the S3 forwards it through the SF group to the tasking
agency. The tasking agency then compiles the SOMPF by obtaining the TIP, mis-
sion support package (MSP), and otner supporting documents. The S2/S3 se-
cures the basic folder and returns a copy to tne mission planning agent (MP A).
This procedure constitutes POE approval.
SECTION III. MISSION PREPARATION
Mission preparation must predate isolation and the deliberate planning process.
During mission preparation, specific mission employment is not required. How-
ever, SFODs tasked to conduct a specific type of mission or use a specific
2-19
FM 31-20-5
TRAINING
means of infiltration, continue to support their METL list through scheduled
training. Best accomplished at the unit's home station, mission preparation in-
cludes unit training, individual, and mission-specific training.
Mission preparation and training provide the tools for coping with the ambiguous
nature of SR. By developing specific METL based on theater-specific
requirements, the techniques in the appendixes of this FM, those taught at the
USAJFKSWCS, and those contained in related publications (for example,
FM 31-26, FM 31-20-1), can be applied to a wide variety of SR requirements.
Special equipment and organization, coupled with the METL-driven training,
produce uniquely capable, area-oriented forces, prepared to conduct SR in a
specific environment.
Mission-Essential Task List
Once the battalion completes its OPORDs and/or OPLANs and tasked detach-
ments complete their detailed planning, all levels of command must revise and
refine the draft METLs. The battalion S3 addresses the specified and implied
tasks for each mission and at each level in the appropriate METL. METLs should
be mutually supporting between levels of command.
Unit Training Plans
The battalion S3 orients unit training plans toward the METL derived from the
mission analysis. Each level of command should analyze each task on the METL
to determine its supporting, collective, and individual tasks. The MTP is an ex-
cellent source for developing such an analysis as are the appropriate soldiers
manuals. Care must be talcen not to overlook a task because it is not listed in a
reference. For SR, many tasks are mission specific (such as operating a nonstan-
dard piece of communications equipment) and are developed as tasks, condi-
tions, and standards for training.
Evaluations
Evaluations of units (both internal and external) must measure the unit's capa-
bility to meet its mission obligations as defined in its METL. Commanders
should not evaluate skills and performance for generic tasks not related to the
METL until all METL tasks are completely trained.
Validation and Certification
Title 10 of the U.S. Code specifically requires that United States Commander in
Chief, Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) validate readiness and cer-
tify to supported ClNCs that SOF based in the continental United States
(CONUS) are prepared to complete their assigned missions. The USCINCSOC
conducts this program through his components. Certification and validation pro-
grams are delineated in unit training regulations, policies, and SOPs. To be effec-
tive, these programs must focus on unit METL derived from the supported
CINCs' mission requirements. Units must coordinate their METL with tne com-
mand element directing and conducting such certification and validation pro-
grams. Unit METL must be validated by the supported headquarters just as POEs
2-20-
INTELLIGENCE
FM 31-20-5
are approved by the supported headquarters. For SF performing SR, this head-
quarters will normally be a theater SOC. The battalion commander must coordi-
nate training requirements that detract from readiness to perform tasked SR with
the supported CINC as they impact on the certification of mission readiness.
Schools
School support for required skills is a shared responsibility of the SFOD, com-
pany, and battalion. The SFOD submits requirements for schooling identified
durmg mission planning. The S3 at battalion coordinates quotas. The company
operations officer maintains requirements, allocated quotas, and unit fill for the
company commander. The battalion, company, and SFOD commanders ensure
that mission requirements are met or ensure that shortfalls are reported in terms
of mission readiness.
Operational Environment
For all forms of SR, the SFOD must know the operational environment. For this
reason, the SFOD often seeks opportunities to deploy to the actual operational
area, even when the activities in the potential JSOA are not directly related to the
SR mission tasks. The opportunity to survey the climatological, geographical,
cultural, and other environmental factors must not be lost. Where it is impossible
to deploy to the actual area and to conduct offset training, the S3 coordinates
with the battalion S2 to identify accessible locations for training that replicate
each SFOD's operational area. SFODs are programmed to exercise their mission
plans as realishcally as possible while carefully maintaining OPSEC.
The battalion S2 is the primary point of contact for all intelligence-related mat-
ters. Due to the nature of SR, the battalion S2 will play a key role in mission
success. All mission planners must understand IR and goals.
Target Intelligence Packages
Intelligence is perishable over time. The battalion S2 has primary responsibility
for maintaining the intelligence data base current. The S2 section conveys
changes to the situation and to TIPs that affect mission accomplishment to the
appropriate SFOD. This section must provide the SFODs current situation up-
dates, INTSUMs, and answer intelligence-related questions and requests.
Area Studies
At the company and SFOD level, the area study is the primary tool for tracking
intelligence over time. The SFOD continuously updates tne area study. The battal-
ion S2 provides the data base for updating the study using all available sources to
include the Special Operations Command Research Analysis and Threat Evalua-
tion System (SOCRATES) (see Chapter 4 for more information on SOCRATES)
Validity
The S2 must ensure the PIR and IR on which the mission is based have not been
nor can be satisfied by other sources. If the S2 identifies other mission-capable
2-21
FM 31-20-5 ■
PERSONNEL
sources, he informs the battalion commander through the S3. The battalion
commander then has the option to request relief from the mission tasking. For
example, during initial planning of the mission, external sources were not avail-
able to obtain the required PIR and IR. This planning may^ have taken place years
in the past. However, after the S2 reviews the assets available, a new satellite is
identified that can provide required information. This new satellite coverage over
the target eliminates the need to isolate and deploy an SFOD A to a target not
requiring on-site human analysis. The SFOD A is saved for targets that meet the
SR mission profile.
LOGISTICS
The battalion SI and CSM assign personnel according to the specific require-
ments for individual skills identified during mission analysis and planning. In
addition to careful monitoring of the assignment of incoming personnel, some
crossleveling of skills within the battalion may be advantageous. The SI and
CSM must weigh the relative contribution of^the additional SR-related skill
against the advantages that unit cohesion and continuity of personnel bring to SR
missions. Personnel turbulence triggers mandatory POE reviews. A good refe-
rence for review is the changing of any two of the SFOD leaders or when any four
SFOD members who developed the POE rotate out of the SFOD.
COMMUNICATIONS
All levels of command review SR-specific requirements for logistics. The S4
must redistribute the available supplies and equipment within the battalion and
make inventory adjustments.
PERIODIC UPDATE
SR communications requirements are usually unique. The signal section must re-
view density and type of equipment to ensure that all requirements can be met.
Battery inventory is particularly critical. The annual budget must include projec-
tions tor training requirements. Where nonstandard equipment is used, the signal
officer and his staff must identify reliable sources for repair parts and batteries.
The S3 must periodically review and update SR mission SOMPFs. This review
and update should take place whenever—
• There is a significant change in the situation (intelligence).
• The supported plan or basic tasking changes.
• Personnel turbulence affects mission readiness.
2-22
■FM 31-20-5
SECTION IV. PREEMPLOYMENT PREPARATION
This section deals with execution of an SR mission after the battalion has been
alerted and has activated the FOB. Normally, the FOB will operate from a for-
ward secure area, but it may also operate from home station. The deliberate plan-
ning cycle and isolation procedures described in FM 31-20 do not change for SR.
DELIBERATE PLANNING
The deliberate planning cycle discussed in this paragraph continues the planning
sequence begun witLreceipl of the mission letter and continued with receipt of
the MTP and TIP (Sections 1 andlljof this chapter). Deliberate planning of^this
nature presumes that the SFOD has completed an SOMPF for the mission and
conducted its mission preparation at home station. Tasks like reviewing the cur-
rent INTSUM for changes and the confirmation of infiltration and exfiltration
means are critical activities. The nature of SR, however, often fails to provide the
standard 5-day period from the order to execute. For SR, an alternative to shorten
the time from execute order to employment is to alert an SFOD to be prepared to
execute a specific SR mission in 5 days. This procedure permits the team to com-
plete the isolation procedures in FM 31-20 and standby for an actual execute or-
der. The actual time required from the execute order to infiltration is
considerably shortened and is generally limited by infiltration requirements.
There arc, however, disadvantages to this approach. First, it commits the SFOD
to a specific mission. Shifting to another mission (even one that has a completed
SOMPF prepared by that SFOD) is a mentally and emotionally difficult shift that
requires, as a minimum, that the SFOD pass through the 5-day cycle again. Sec-
ond, the stress of being consistently ready to execute SR missions without a spe-
cific time or date of execution will eventually wear on the SFOD, and the SFOD
will lose its edge. Failure to allow the SFOD to complete the activities of the SF
planning cycle significantly increases the probability of mission failure.
EMERGING MISSIONS
Emerging missions are those missions for which a requirement was not anticipated
and no SOMPF has been prepared. The planning process for such missions in-
volves a 7-day cycle. The first two days are used by the FOB to prepare orders; the
last five days arc dedicated to the deliberate planning process during SFOD isola-
tion. FM 31-20 has a complete discussion of this process. As with any such proce-
dural guide, the time frames are approximate and are adjusted as required (for
example, the MICON brief may occur late on the first day or early on the third day
of isolation, rather than on the second day). The 7-day time frame obviously does
not permit the type of meticulous, METL-driven mission preparation described in
the previous sections of this chapter. If, however, the battalion has done a reason-
ably thorough job of mission analysis for its assigned AOR, the general conditions
of the emerging mission will parallel other missions for which it has prepared its
SFODs The JSOA will be similar (if not the same) as will the threat and various
other factors of the operational environment. The battalion and company com-
manders must make every effort to assign the mission to the SFOD that has most
closely prepared for the mission. During time-sensitive planning, staffs must
2-23
FM 31-20-5
COMBAT PATROLLING
anticipate mission requirements and staff to staff coordination. Planners must con-
sider the transportation and information needs commonly requested for the type
target being considered. Some specific areas that are particularly critical to time-
sensitive planning are communications, map coverage, intent, infiltration and ex-
filtration, and logistics.
The battalion communications section must provide the SFOD with viable
communications. Communications means must be adequately responsive to SR
mission requirements.
No significant planning can begin in the absence of map coverage. The FOB S2
must supply adequate maps to the SFOD. Overhead imagery significantly en-
hances the probability of mission success.
The commander's intent and the precise nature of the SIR, FIR, and IR must be
clearly stated and understood. There will be no time for clarification later. A
clear understanding of the intent and requirement permits maximum flexibility to
the deployed SFOD.
Detailed planning for infiltration and exfiltration is critical. Compromise of the
SFOD on infiltration usually means the SR mission will be a failure. Since in-
filtration and exfiltration involve external assets, coordination is more difficult in
a short period. Face-to-face coordination between the SFOD and the supporting
asset (for example, pilot, boat operator and/or ship captain) is crucial.
Supplies found in the FOB support center (SPTPCEN) are, in all probability, the
only logistical support available. This situation highlights the need for the battal-
ion S4 to plan to deploy with a wide range of equipment and supplies rather than
just those required for preplanned missions.
SF assets are not optimally employed in a conventional, non-SO role. Circum-
stances, however, may drive the JFC to employ them in this manner. He may
direct reconnaissance of an emerging target without the minimum 5 days re-
quired for the deliberate planning process. In such a situation, the FOB opera-
tions center (OPCEN) functions as a tactical operations center (TOC), and the
SFO D operates us ing standard infantry and/or ranger troop leading procedures.
(See |AppendixB[ ) Although the SFOD can be reasonably expected to perform
beyond the capabilities of a GP reconnaissance element (long-range surveillance
unit [LRSU] or squad patrol), the employing headquarters must not harbor un-
realistic expectations. During combat patrolling, the SFOD is not performing SR.
Combat patrolling is likely to overlook numerous aspects of the mission that
would have been accounted for during the deliberate planning process. The ad-
vantage of SFODs conducting a light infantry reconnaissance patrol is their ex-
perience and high degree of training. These advantages will aid the probability of
a mission success; however, the risk of compromise is significantly higher. A
mission such as this is a misuse of a limited asset, justifiable only if the tasking is
the product of a deliberate analysis of the risk versus potential gain.
2-24
I FM 31-20-5
CHAPTER
OVERVIEW
The preface to this manual defines special reconnaissance and hrieHy de-
scribes the types of activities conducted under the umbrella ofSR. This de-
scription is not intended to limit an SR mission to specific activities. This
chapter explains the nature of^ SR and describes the environment in which it is
conducted. It provides the criteria for determining the difference between SR
performed by U.S. Army Special Forces and other types of reconnaissance.
THE ENVIRONMENT
Historically, U.S. security strategy, national military strategy, and military force
development have stressed deterrence to war through the preparation for it. Al-
though the United States has successfully deterred war, conflicts short of war
have Decome pervasive. The contemporary strategic environment dictates that
U.S. armed forces think in terms of an operational continuum made up of three
conditions: peace, conflict, and war (Figure 1-1).
PROACTIVE INDIRECT AND DIRECT
ACTION "NONCOMBATANT" FORCES
(ESSENTIALLY NONVIOLENT)
DIRECT AND INDIRECT ACTION
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
(MINIMUM VIOLENCE/
MAXIMUM INTELLIGENCE)
REACTIVE/DIRECT ACTION
GENERAL PURPOSE HEAVY/LIGHT
FORCES (MAXIMUM VIOLENCE/
MINIMUM INTELLIGENCE)
l»EACe
CONFLICT
WAR
CONFLICT
F>eAce
PREHOSTILITIES
HOSTILITIES
POSTHOSTILITIES
Figure 1-1. The operational continuum.
1-1
FM 31-20-5 ■
The Operational Continuum
The states of the operational continuum are dynamic but not distinct with well
defined boundaries. Although the states are useful in generally defining the op-
erational environment and predicting probable types of mission tasking, there is
little or no value in trying to define a clear point at which an operation ceases to
be set in peace as opposed to conflict, or conflict as opposed to war. At that de-
gree of resolution, specific rules of engagement (ROE) are much more important.
Due to the dynamic nature of the continuum, what occurs at one point of a given
state can decisively shape other points in other states and determine the outcome
of the overall struggle. There is, for example, a direct correlation between the
largely nonviolent, indirect, and proactive operations performed during peace
and the violent and direct, combined arms battles of war. The success of opera-
tions during peace and conflict may directly influence the success of operations
in war, if not preclude the necessity for war altogether.
The Light/Heavy/SOF Mix
The role of the Army is to project land power through combined arms operations.
SF units play an integral part in this role. Because SF units are often employed
prior to hostilities, they may already be deployed in an operational area. Because
of their area orientation, area expertise, and peacetime employment, SF can pro-
vide timely and accurate intelligence before the supported commander's other
assets can respond. The depth at which SF can operate extends beyond normal
assets available to maneuver commanders. Finally, the opportunity to deploy hu-
mans who use their judgement and technical expertise and who have an intimate
knowledge of the operational area provides a dimension not present in other in-
telligence and reconnaissance mechanisms.
Role of Special Operations Forces
Recently, the Army has devoted increased resources to special operations forces
(SOF). In part, this increase in resources is in recognition of the importance of SF
in the light/heavy/SOF force mix during combined arms combat operations. The
Army has also become more aware of the need to emphasize operations in con-
flict and peace. A part of the Army's aim in developing SOF has been to identify
and defeat threats to national interests before they can escalate to war. Techno-
logical advances and the increased involvement of a sophisticated society have
expanded the notion of "war." Conflicts have become very complex and now in-
clude direct and indirect political, military, economic, psychological, or social
struggles. They are waged oy foreign or domestic adversaries at any point along
the operational continuum. SOF and SF in particular are well suited to operate in
these environments. These environments, and the operations SOF conduct in
them, generate unique information requirements (IR) that SF, performing SR, is
uniquely qualified to fulfill.
THE NATURE OF SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE
SR operations normally have a defined scope and preplanned duration and exfil-
tration. They are designed to answer specific, well defined, and often time-
sensitive priority intelligence requirements (PIR), IR, and specific information
requirements (SIR) of strategic, tactical, or operational signficance. The unique
nature of SR encompasses tasks often not clearly defined or even identified.
1-2
I FM 31-20-5
Units must conduct a thorough mission analysis that defines the SR tasks thev
are likely to perform, They must then apply an appropriate mix of the basic skills
and techniques in which they have been trained to accomplish a specific mission
(Figure 1-2). SR training, therefore, depends heavily on me unit METL derived
from theater-specific requirements and may vary widely among units,
Special Reconnaissance Tasks
Success in peace, conflict, and war often depends on the availability of detailed,
near-real-time (NRT), and all-source intelligence at all levels of execution. Be-
cause of their unique capabilities, area orientation, and location on the battlefield
or in the operational area, SFODs can provide some of the most detailed informa-
tion available for operational and strategic planners. This information can be
used to reduce uncertainties and risks to acceptable levels, Unless hostile contact
is part of fh e n iission, SFODs pp/formirig SR normally strive to avoid detection,
of this FM contain detailed information
'discussed below.
Chapter 31 and
on the execution
Target Acquisition. SR target acquisition is the detection, identification, and loca-
tion of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective engagement of the target
by appropriate lethal or nonlethal means. The purpose of SR target acquisition is
to obtain information on target type, location, movement, development, strength,
and vulnerability. Simultaneously, the SFOD collects information on the weatner,
climate, and geography of the target area.
SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE MISSION
TASKS
\ Target Acquisition
Area Assessment
NBC Reconnaissance /
\ Po8tstr1i<e
\ Reconnaissance
Target Analysis
Inlotmation /
Collection /
\ Hydrographic,
\ Geographic,
\ Meterological,
\ l^econnaissance
"'^V
TASKS
Other Collection Tasks
SR EXECUTION
Figure 1-2. SR tasks.
1-3
FM 31-20-5 1
Area Assesement (AA). A A is inherent to all SF missions. It is the continuous and
generalized or specific collection and evaluation of information about a specific
country, region, or other defined area of interest. It is used to confirm, correct,
refute, or add to other intelligence and the area study. Pilot, survey, or assessment
teams are generally employed to conduct AAs prior to conducting foreign inter-
nal defense (FID) or unconventional warfare (UW) missions. SFODs conduct
these AAs to gather enough data to conduct effective mission planning. They are
then continued by the operational element after deployment. Such AAs are par-
ticularly critical when relatively little current information is available. SFODs
are normally employed in remote areas to provide otherwise unavailable real-
time data and generate an extremely valuable data base for subsequent opera-
tions. In some situations, SFODs perform specialized AAs to support crisis
response and emergency evacuation at theater level. Through AAs, SF provides
otherwise unavailable NRT data and generates an extremely valuable data base
for subsequent operations.
Hydrographic, Meteorological, and Geographic Reconnaissance. Mission planners
often encounter unknown variables. These variables may be hydrographic, mete-
orological, and geographic in nature. SF teams can be taskea to resolve traffic-
ability or fordability, or locate obstacles or barriers. Plarmers can review
defensive preparations and other military and nonmilitary characteristics of a
named area of inter est (NAI) up to the time that general purpose (GP) forces link
up with the SFOD. Appendix D contains examples of report formats commonly
associated with reconnaissance
Poststrike Reconnaissance.Poststrike reconnaissance is the distant or close visual,
photographic, and /or electronic surveillance of a specific point or area of opera-
tional or strategic signficance that has been subjected to attack (lethal or nonle-
thal). Its purpose is to measure results of such activity. SFODs are committed to
poststrike reconnaissance only by exception. In this context, poststrike recon-
naissance does not indicate the use of special weapons of mass destruction.
Target Analysis (TA). The combination of the conventional engineer reconnais-
sance and SF area assessment techniques results in what is known as TA. The
criticahty, accessibility, recuperabihty, vulnerabihty, effect, recognizability
(CARVER) formula plays an important role in this process. TA examines techni-
cally complex targets in the context of PIR, IR, and SIR. It may be used to evalu-
ate potential targets for follow-on SOP direct action (DA) or UW operations. It
may also be used to evaluate friendly installations or facilities as a basis for
defensive activities.
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Reconnaissance. NBC reconnaissance by
SFODs is the collection and evaluation of specific information about the pres-
ence (or abse nce) of radiological, biological, and /or chemical contamination (see
Appendix E| . The information that is collected is used to determine the extent of
contammahon on specific terrain, buildings, equipment, and/or airspace in se-
lected areas of strategic or operational significance. SFODs can, with appropriate
premission training, conduct NBC reconnaissance unilaterally. They may also
conduct such reconnaissance with augmentation from the SF group's NBC as-
sets, particularly from the detachment's LB team. In permissive environments,
the LB team may also do NBC reconnaissance independently.
Specific Data Collection. This task is similar to target acquisition but results in data
for uses other than targeting. As an example, GP forces planning a contingency
1-4
FM 31-20-5
operation may require specific ii^formatior^ or^ the trafficability of a givers area or
tne disposition or intentions of threat forces in an operational area. An SFOD
may infiltrate deep into a threat area prior to hostilities to obtain the required
data. This task is different from AA in that specific data is collected to support a
maneuver commander. Under no circumstances should an SFOD be committed
under the guise of "AA" to generate data of general interest for a supported ma-
neuver commander. Specific PIR of an operationally or strategically significant
nature is required to justify committing SF assets to such a mission.
Other Collection Tasks. In addition to the foregoing, SFODs can be tasked for
other collection activities. These tasks are defined as activities conducted in
support of national policy objectives, planned and executed so that the role of the
U.s! Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly. Some collection
tasks support such activities; however, they are not intended to influence U.S.
political processes, public opinion, policies, or media. They do not include
diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence or related
support functions.
Incidental Information Collection. In addition to conducting SR as an assigned mis-
sion, SF soldiers are expected to collect facts incidental to all other activities.
Incidental information collection is an inherent responsibility as opposed to a
tasking. As a result of extensive travels to areas of actual or potential interest to
the U.S. Government, SF soldiers often have unique, direct or indirect access
(and often the only U.S. military access) to critical military, political, and eco-
nomic infrastructure and potential joint special operations areas (JSOAs). SF sol-
diers are obligated to note and promptly report all such unique or unusual
information that comes to their attention, hcidental information collection is
passive and overt in that access is with consent. An example of incidental in-
formation collection is an after-action report or trip report that notes new phone
numbers or new personnel who are key to operations.
SR Tactics and Techniques
SR tactics are grouped into reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) and overt
collection ( [Figure I-3| page 1-6). R&S is normally conducted in battle dress
within a zone of armed conflict or war. This activity may, however, be
clandestine or covert. Overt collection may be conducted in or out of battle dress
in an environment such as FID. All SR activities are tied to a predetermined
potential action. Examples include a missile strike, ground force raid,
psychological operations (PSYOP) program, or FID or UW mission. SR is not
conducted in the absence of such potential action. However, this rule of thumb
does not imply that SR is only conducted after the decision to commit forces is
made. On the contrary, SR may be conducted to determine the need for, or
viability of, contemplated operations.
Reconnaissance and Surveillance. R&S is the survey of activity in a particular area
of operations. SFODs perform this activity in one or more carefully selected NAI
to provide an accurate picture of the battlefield or operational area. It is con-
ducted to provide timely information on weather, threat, terrain, economy, and
population and accurately locate dangerous, high value, relevant targets for the-
ater weapons systems.
Overt Collection. Overt collection is the observation with consent of selected
activities in a particular area of interest or operations. It may be a primary
activity, or it may be incidental to other mission activities.
1-5
FM 31-20-5 1
Criteria
One of the most commonly asked and difficult to answer questions is this: When
is a mission "special" reconnaissance rather than just reconnaissance? SR miss-
ions are normally beyond the organic capabilities of Army corps commanders,
intelligence resources of other services, and national intelligence assets. SFODs
may be tasked to conduct SR when constraints on other systems prevent the gath-
ering of required data in sufficient detail and accuracy. GP forces may be pre-
vented from executing the mission because of—
Physical distances.
Political considerations.
Lack of required special skills and expertise.
Threat capabilities.
Follow-on SF missions, for example, FID and UW.
SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE
Raeonnalsuno* and Survvlllanc*
Overt Inlormation Collection
Active In Nature
Passive In Nature
1
Unique Infiltralicn
and Exflltration Means
^^
Invited by Host to
Travel as Part of
a Group
^^-^^^
SF Skills
Requires Stealth
--"^^
Requires Technical
Experience
'
Reconnaissance
Surveillance
Mission Typ«
Advance Parties
I
\
■
Patrolling
Special Oteervation
Devices
V
Simple Note Pads
and Cameras
\
'
V
Tactics and Techniques
Mobile
Static Around
Facility
'
\
Covert
Contidential
Produces Detailed
Intormatlon
Figure 1-3. Special reconnaissance tactics and tecliniques.
1-6
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ FM 31-20-5
Some types of support that are required by employed units may be beyor\d the
capabilities of the corps commai^der to provide. Examples include—
• Infiltration and exfiltration means.
• Medical support and evacuation.
• Fire support.
• Resupply.
• Communications.
• Intelligence.
• Unique equipment, weapons, and resources.
• Augmentation.
Because of their training, organization, and capabilities, SF units generally do
not have the constraints of GP forces. The following paragraphs describe now
SFODs employ their training, organization, and capabilities in the conduct of SR.
Threat forces are using a neutral country's territory as logistical and staging
bases. These bases, which form a complex, are supported by rail systems,
waterways, and bulk power facilities. Mission planners have determined that the
use of U.S. GP forces crossing the baler into the neutral country is politically
infeasible unless specific detailed information on threat activities is available.
The physical distances involved are beyond the range of the corps commander's
systems. National intelligence sources have confirmed that the threat force is in
the area, but its exact location is not known and its activities are difficult to
distinguish from routine economic activity. All efforts to "fix" threat bases
have been exhausted.
This mission meets the criteria of SR and warrants targeting by SF. SFODs could
cross into the target area by air, land, or sea using clandestine techniques routinely
practiced at their home station. Their prior trainmg reduces the time required for
final mission preparation activities.
Limitations such as the routine medical support and communications augmenta-
tion required by GP units are overcome due to the capabilities of the independent
health care practitioners and communications noncommissioned officers (NCOs)
found in each SFOD A. When medical evacuation is not available or would com-
promise the mission, SF medical NCOs, because of their unique training and ex-
perience, can overcome these limitations. The medical NCO has extensive
training in such areas as advanced trauma life support (ATLS) and minor surgery.
The communications NCO has the ability to employ standard organic equipment
or nontechnical means of communicating over extended distances. The special
communications techniques include high-frequency (HF) burst transmission sat-
ellite communications and alternate secure means of passing messages.
SFODs also have the expertise to identify crucial subcomponents of the target
complex and, with a high degree of probability, determine if these components
are operational. Using the CARVER matrix, they report the information obtained
to the tasking headquarters.
Area orientation and language qualification are other special skills associated
with SFODs. For example, the deploying SFODs may have been previously as-
signed to the target area. As a result, they know what the region looks like, how
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FM 31-20-5'
the local population may react, or what other subtle factors may exist. At a mini-
mum, they are trained in the led customs and taboos and can talk, listen, and
read in the language of the populace. The SFOD knows its logistical needs and
the resources availaole in the target area to support its mission.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS IMPERATIVES
FM 31-20 explains the general application of the special operations (SO) impera-
tives to SF operations. The following paragraphs address their application to SR.
SF commanders tasked to conduct SR must incorporate these imperatives into
their plannin and execution if they are to effectively employ their forces.
Understand the Operational Environment
In SR, SF soldiers must have a firm grasp of the political, economic, sociologi-
cal, geographical, psychological, and military aspects of their operational envi-
ronment. They must understand their circumstances and be ready to respond to
rapid changes in a manner that assures survival and mission accomplishment.
They must Know—
• What they are looking for.
• The purpose for which the information is required.
• What they are working against.
• How to adjust their tactics, techniques, and procedures for optimal success.
• How to exploit perishable opportunities.
Commanders and their staffs must determine their charter. They must also deter-
mine the ROE and chain of command of the organization or agency in charge of
the operations.
Recognize Political Implications
The role of SF is frequently a supporting one that creates the conditions for deci-
sive nonmilitary or military activities to cccur. When conducting independent SR
operations during peace, conflict, or war, commanders must focus primarily on
the political effects of their military activities. Even when their activities support
conventional military operations during contingency operations or open hostili-
ties, the political implications often remain significant. They must clearly under-
stand tne potential implications of exceeding the mission charter or of
compromising a clandestine or covert activity.
Facilitate Interagency Activities
As part of the multiagency intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), SR
missions must accommodate the SIR, PIR, IR, and other information requests
generated by other agencies. Planners must synchronize the collection efforts,
ensuring they are complementary and mutually supporting. SFODs may conduct
SR using intelligence collection disciplines such as human intelligence
(HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), or imagery intelligence (MINT).
These actions will present commanders with an expanded picture of the opera-
tional area in question.
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ FM 31-20-5
Engage the Threat Discriminately
SF is a limited resource that cannot be rapidly reconstituted. This fact, combined
with the often sensitive political implications of SR, requires commanders to
carefully assess the SR requirements against loss of this valuable asset. Planners
must also consider collateral damage to civilian property or compromise of the
SFOD by noncombatants.
Consider Long-Term Effects
SF commanders must take a long-term approach to the issues. They must place
each individual event in broader political, military, and psychological context to
avoid strategic failure while achieving tactical or short-term success. SFODs
should not be used for short-term transitory gain such as road watching along
secondary roads or trails. They should, however, be used for surveillance of
threat first strike and special weapons systems to aid in identification of a threat's
operational and/or strategic military capabilities.
Ensure Legitimacy and Credibility of SO
Without legitimacy and credibility, SR will not get the needed support of indige-
nous elements, the U.S. populahon, other government agencies, or the interna-
tional community. Commanders must insist that their legal advi
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