Horowitz. Adam 11 24 2015

Horowitz. Adam 11 24 2015 For Educational Use Only U.S. v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (2013) 13 Cal. Daily Op. Sere. 2531, 2013 Daily Journal =. 3018 11 -I KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment Declined to Extend by United States v. Hassanshahi. December I. 2014 709 F.3d 952 United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff —Appellant, v. Howard Wesley COTTERMAN, Defendant —Appellee. No. 09-10139. I Argued and Submitted En Banc June 19, 2012. I Filed March 8, 2013. Synopsis Background: Defendant was charged with production of child pornography, transportation and shipping of child pornography, receipt of child pornography, possession of child pornography, importation of obscene material, transportation of obscene material, and unlawful flight to avoid prosecution. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona, 2009 WL 465028, Raner C. Collins, J., granted defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Government filed interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals, 637 F.3d 1068. reversed and remanded. The Court of Appeals granted rehearing en banc. 673 F.3d 1206. Holdings: The Court of Appeals, McKeown, Circuit Judge, held that: [1 ] extended border search doctrine did not apply to seizure and forensic examination of defendant's laptop computer; [2] forensic examination of defendant's computer that comprehensively analyzed its hard drive required showing of reasonable suspicion; and [3] border agents had reasonable suspicion to conduct initial search and subsequent forensic examination of defendant's computer that comprehensively analyzed hard drive. Reversed. Callahan, Circuit Judge, filed opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment, with whom Clifton, Circuit Judge, joined, and with whom M. Smith, Circuit Judge, joined in part. M. Smith, Circuit Judge, filed dissenting opinion, with whom Clifton and Callahan, Circuit Judges, joined in part. West Headnotes (27) [1] Customs Duties P- Searches and Seizures Searches and Seizures iis• Fourth Amendment and reasonableness in general Border searches constitute a historically recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment's general principle that a warrant be obtained, but reasonableness remains the touchstone for a warrantless search. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Cases that cite this headnote [2] Criminal Law Review De Novo The ultimate question of whether a warrantless search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is reviewed de novo. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Cases that cite this headnote [3] Criminal Law Specification of errors The Court of Appeals may consider an issue that has not been adequately raised on appeal if such a failure will not prejudice the opposing party. Cases that cite this headnote [4] Criminal Law P- Specification of errors WeStlaWNPS © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. EFTA00314991 Horowitz. Adam 11 24 2015 For Educational Use Only U.S. v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (2013) 13 Cal. Daily Op. Sent 2531, 2013 Daily Journal =. 3018 Government's failure to address issue on appeal of whether there was reasonable suspicion for border search, after addressing issue before district court, did not prejudice defendant, and thus Court of Appeals could consider issue, where Court of Appeals called for, and received, supplemental briefs by both parties. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 2 Cases that cite this headnote [5] Customs Duties 4' Searches and Seizures Searches and Seizures Necessity of and preference for warrant, and exceptions in general The broad contours of the scope of searches at international borders are rooted in the long- standing right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into the country; thus, border searches form a narrow exception to the Fourth Amendment prohibition against warrantless searches without probable cause. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 4 Cases that cite this headnote [6] Customs Duties P- Searches and Seizures Because the government's interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border, border searches are generally deemed reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 4 Cases that cite this headnote [7] Customs Duties P- Searches and Seizures Even at the border, individual privacy rights are not abandoned but balanced against the sovereign's interests; that balance is qualitatively different than in the interior and is struck much more favorably to the government. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Cases that cite this headnote [8] Searches and Seizures P- Scope, Conduct, and Duration of Warrantless Search The reasonableness of a search or seizure depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the scope and duration of the deprivation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 2 Cases that cite this headnote [9] Customs Duties p- Time and distance factors; checkpoints Extended border search doctrine, which encompassed any search away from border where entry was not apparent, but where dual requirements of reasonable certainty of recent border crossing and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity were satisfied, did not apply to seizure and forensic examination of defendant's laptop computer after defendant had been stopped and searched at border; although device had been transported and subjected to extended and extensive examination beyond border, computer never cleared customs and search would have been every bit as intrusive had it been conducted at border. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 10 Cases that cite this headnote [10] Customs Duties 4'- Time and distance factors; checkpoints The key feature of an extended border search is that an individual can be assumed to have cleared the border and thus regained an expectation of privacy in accompanying belongings. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 2 Cases that cite this headnote WeStlaWNPS © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 EFTA00314992 Horowitz. Adam 11 24 2015 For Educational Use Only U.S. v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (2013) 13 Cal. Daily Op. Sew. 2531, 2013 Daily Journal =. 3018 [11] Customs Duties 4— Time and distance factors; checkpoints Customs Duties Airports and airplanes The "functional equivalent" doctrine effectively extends the border search doctrine to all ports of entry, including airports; a routine customs search at the "functional equivalent" of the border is analyzed as a border search and requires neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 2 Cases that cite this headnote [12] Customs Duties Time and distance factors; checkpoints The extended border search doctrine, which encompasses any search away from border where entry was not apparent, but where dual requirements of reasonable certainty of recent border crossing and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity were satisfied, is best confined to cases in which, after an apparent border crossing or functional entry, an attenuation in the time or the location of conducting a search reflects that the subject has regained an expectation of privacy. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 3 Cases that cite this headnote [13] Customs Duties Time and distance factors; checkpoints Under the extended border search doctrine, which encompasses any search away from border where entry was not apparent, but where dual requirements of reasonable certainty of recent border crossing and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity were satisfied, time and distance become relevant to determining whether there is an adequate nexus to a recent border crossing only after the subject or items searched have entered. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Cases that cite this headnote [14] Customs Duties 46... Scope and Nature; Successive or Secondary , Searches Obscenity P- Computers; electronic transmission After seizure at border, forensic examination of defendant's computer that comprehensively analyzed its hard drive required showing of reasonable suspicion; although government had legitimate concerns about child pornography, such concerns did not justify unfettered crime-fighting searches or unregulated assault on citizens' private information. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Cases that cite this headnote [15] Searches and Seizures 6'- Persons, Places and Things Protected The Fourth Amendment's specific guarantee of the people's right to be secure in their "papers" encompasses financial records, confidential business documents, medical records, and private emails on personal electronic devices. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Cases that cite this headnote [16] Searches and Seizures fia Persons. Places and Things Protected The express listing of papers under the Fourth Amendment reflects the Founders' deep concern with safeguarding the privacy of thoughts and ideas, what might be called freedom of conscience, from invasion by the government; these records are expected to be kept private and this expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Cases that cite this headnote WeStlaWNPS © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 EFTA00314993 Horowitz. Adam 11 24 2015 For Educational Use Only U.S. v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (2013) 13 Cal. Daily Op. Sent 2531, 2013 Daily Journal =. 3018 [17] Searches and Seizures 4. Expectation of privacy The uniquely sensitive nature of data on electronic devices carries with it a significant expectation of privacy and thus renders an exhaustive exploratory search more intrusive than with other forms of property. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 4 Cases that cite this headnote [18] Customs Duties 4- Searches and Seizures The government's authority to protect the nation from contraband crossing its borders may be heightened by national crises, such as the smuggling of illicit narcotics, the threat of international terrorism, and future threats yet to take shape, but even in the face of heightened concerns, a court must account for the Fourth Amendments rights of travelers. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Cases that cite this headnote [19] Customs Duties Scope and Nature; Successive or Secondary Searches Reasonable suspicion to search personal electronic devices at the border requires that officers make a commonsense differentiation between a manual review of files on the electronic device and application of computer software to analyze a hard drive, and utilize the latter only when they possess a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 10 Cases that cite this headnote [20] Arrest 0. Reasonableness; reason or founded suspicion, etc "Reasonable suspicion" is defined as a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 9 Cases that cite this headnote [21] Arrest 0— Collective knowledge The assessment of reasonable suspicion is to be made in light of the totality of the circumstances; even when factors considered in isolation from each other are susceptible to an innocent explanation, they may collectively amount to a reasonable suspicion. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 5 Cases that cite this headnote [22] Criminal Law 4— Review De Novo Criminal Law Evidence wrongfully obtained The Court of Appeals reviews reasonable suspicion determinations de novo, reviewing findings of historical fact for clear error and giving due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 2 Cases that cite this headnote [23] Customs Duties Scope and Nature; Successive or Secondary , Searches Obscenity 0. Particular cases Border agents had reasonable suspicion to conduct initial search and subsequent forensic examination of defendant's computer that comprehensively analyzed hard drive after seizing it at border, where defendant had prior conviction for child molestation, he traveled frequently to country associated with sex tourism, and computer contained password- protected files; although defendant had offered to WestlawNexts © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 EFTA00314994 Horowitz. Adam 11 24 2015 For Educational Use Only U.S. v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (2013) 13 Cal. Daily Op. Sent 2531, 2013 Daily Journal =. 3018 open files, computer contained vacation photos, and initial examination did not turn up anything incriminating, agents appropriately were wary of offer of assistance due to concerns that defendant could tamper with computer and reasonable suspicion otherwise had not been eliminated. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 3 Cases that cite this headnote [24] Arrest 4- Reasonableness; reason or founded suspicion, etc Although a prior criminal history cannot alone establish reasonable suspicion, it is permissible to consider such a fact as part of the total calculus of information in that determination. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 4 Cases that cite this headnote [25] Customs Duties 4'- Particular Objects or Products Although password protection of files, in isolation, will not give rise to reasonable suspicion justifying border search, where there are other indicia of criminal activity, password protection of files may be considered in the totality of the circumstances; to contribute to reasonable suspicion, encryption or password protection of files must have some relationship to the suspected criminal activity. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Cases that cite this headnote [26] Customs Duties P- Particular Objects or Products Password protecting an entire device, as opposed to files within a device, cannot be a factor supporting a reasonable suspicion, such as would justify border search; using a password on a device is a basic means of ensuring that the device cannot be accessed by another in the event it is lost or stolen. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Cases that cite this headnote [27] Customs Duties 6*, Scope and Nature; Successive or Secondary Searches Obscenity 4- Scope of search Existence of password•protected files was relevant to assessing reasonableness of scope and duration of search of defendant's computer after its seizure at border; search necessarily had been protracted because of password protection that defendant had employed, and after defendant refused to provide agents with passwords to protected files and fled country, it took agent days to override computer security and open image files of child pornography. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Cases that cite this headnote Attorneys and Law Firms •956 Dennis K. Burke, Christina M. Cabanillas, Carmen F. Corbin, John S. Leonardo, John J. Tuchi, United States Attorney's Office for the District of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, for Appellant. William J. Kirchner, Law Office of Nash & Kirchner, M. Tucson, AZ, for Appellee. David M. Porter, Melia N. Brink, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Washington, Michael Price, Brennan Center for Justice, New York, NY; Hanni M. Fakhoury, Electronic Frontier Foundation, San Francisco, CA, for Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and Electronic Frontier Foundation. Christopher T. Handman, Mary Helen Wimberly, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Washington, M.; Sharon Bradford Franklin, The Constitution Project, Washington, ■., for Amicus Curiae The Constitution Project. WeStlaWNPA" © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5 EFTA00314995 Horowitz. Adam 11 24 2015 For Educational Use Only U.S. v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (2013) 13 Cal. Daily Op. Sent 2531, 2013 Daily Journal =. 3018 Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Raner C. Collins, District Judge, Presiding. M. No. 4:07-cr-01207-RCC-CRP-I. Before: ALEX KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, SIDNEY R. THOMAS, M. MARGARET McKEOWN, KIM McLANE WARDLAW, RAYMOND C. FISHER, RONALD M. GOULD, RICHARD R. CLIFTON, CONSUELO M. CALLAHAN, MILAN D. SMITH, JR., MARY H. MURGUIA, and MORGAN CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges. I 1 Judge Betty B. Fletcher was a member of the en bane panel but passed away after argument of the case. Judge Wardlaw was drawn as her replacement. Opinion by Judge McKEOWN; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge CALLAHAN; Dissent by Judge MILAN D. SMITH, JR. OPINION McKEOWN, Circuit Judge: Every day more than a million people cross American borders, from the physical borders with Mexico and Canada to functional borders at airports such as Los Angeles (LAX), Honolulu (HNL), New York (JFK, LGA), and Chicago (ORD, MDW). As denizens of a digital world, they carry with them laptop computers, iPhones, iPads, iPods. Kindles, Nooks, Surfaces, tablets, Blackberries, cell phones, digital cameras, and more. These devices often contain private and sensitive information ranging from personal, financial, and medical data to corporate trade secrets. And, in the case of Howard Cotterman, child pornography. Agents seized Cotterrnan's laptop at the U.S.-Mexico border in response to an alert based in part on a fifteen-year- old conviction for child molestation. The initial search at the border turned up no incriminating material. Only after Cotterman's laptop was shipped almost 170 miles away and subjected to a comprehensive forensic examination were images of child pornography discovered. This watershed case implicates both the scope of the narrow border search exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement and privacy rights in commonly used electronic devices. The question we confront "is what limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink •957 the realm of guaranteed privacy." Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001). More specifically, we consider the reasonableness of a computer search that began as a cursory review at the border but transformed into a forensic examination of Cotterman's hard drive. Computer forensic examination is a powerful tool capable of unlocking password -protected files, restoring deleted material, and retrieving images viewed on web sites. But while technology may have changed the expectation of privacy to some degree, it has not eviscerated it, and certainly not with respect to the gigabytes of data regularly maintained as private and confidential on digital devices. Our Founders were indeed prescient in specifically incorporating "papers" within the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of "[Otte right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The papers we create and maintain not only in physical but also in digital form reflect our most private thoughts and activities. [I] Although courts have long recognized that border searches constitute a "historically recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment's general principle that a warrant be obtained," United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 621, 97 S.Ct. 1972, 52 L.Ed.2d 617 (1977), reasonableness remains the touchstone for a warrantless search. Even at the border, we have rejected an "anything goes" approach. See United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993. 1000 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc). Mindful of the heavy burden on law enforcement to protect our borders juxtaposed with individual privacy interests in data on portable digital devices, we conclude that, under the circumstances here, reasonable suspicion was required for the forensic examination of Cotterman's laptop. Because border agents had such a reasonable suspicion, we reverse the district court's order granting Cotterman's motion to suppress the evidence of child pornography obtained from his laptop. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2 The facts related here are drawn from the record of the evidentiary hearing held before the magistrate judge. WeStlaWNeXt" © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6 EFTA00314996 Horowitz. Adam 11 24 2015 For Educational Use Only U.S. v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (2013) 13 Cal. Daily Op. Sew. 2531, 2013 Daily Journal =. 3018 Howard Cotterman and his wife were driving home to the United States from a vacation in Mexico on Friday morning. April 6, 2007, when they reached the Lukeville, Arizona, Port of Entry. During primary inspection by a border agent, the Treasury Enforcement Communication System ("TECS") 3 returned a hit for Cotterman. The TECS hit indicated that Cotterman was a sex offender—he had a 1992 conviction for two counts of use of a minor in sexual conduct, two counts of lewd and lascivious conduct upon a child, and three counts of child molestation —and that he was potentially involved in child sex tourism. Because of the hit, Cotterman and his wife were referred to secondary inspection, where they were instructed to exit their vehicle and leave all their belongings in the car. The border agents called the contact person listed in the TECS entry and, following that conversation, believed the hit to reflect Cotterman's involvement "in some type of child pornography." The agents searched the vehicle and retrieved two laptop computers and three digital cameras. Officer Antonio Alvarado inspected the electronic devices and found *953 what appeared to be family and other personal photos, along with several password -protected files. 3 The TECS is an investigative tool of the Department of Homeland Security that keeps track of individuals entering and exiting the country and of individuals involved in or suspected to be involved in crimes. Border agents contacted Group Supervisor Craig Brisbine at the Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE') office in Sells, Arizona, and informed him about Cotterman's entry and the fact that he was a sex offender potentially involved in child sex tourism. The Sells Duty Agent, Mina Riley, also spoke with Officer Alvarado and then contacted the ICE Pacific Field Intelligence Unit, the office listed on the TECS hit, to get more information. That unit informed Riley that the alert was part of Operation Angel Watch, which was aimed at combating child sex tourism by identifying registered sex offenders in California, particularly those who travel frequently outside the United States. She was advised to review any media equipment, such as computers, cameras, or other electronic devices, for potential evidence of child pornography. Riley then spoke again to Alvarado, who told her that he had been able to review some of the photographs on the Cottermans' computers but had encountered password - protected files that he was unable to access. Agents Brisbine and Riley departed Sells for Lukeville at about 1:30 and decided en route to detain the Cottermans' laptops for forensic examination. Upon their arrival, they gave Cotterman and his wife Miranda warnings and interviewed them separately. The interviews revealed nothing incriminating. During the interview, Cotterman offered to help the agents access his computer. The agents declined the offer out of concern that Cotterman might be able to delete files surreptitiously or that the laptop might be "booby trapped." The agents allowed the Cottermans to leave the border crossing around 6 E., but retained the Cottermans' laptops and a digital camera. 4 Agent Brisbine drove almost 170 miles from Lukeville to the ICE office in Tucson, Arizona, where he delivered both laptops and one of the three digital cameras to ICE Senior Special Agent & Computer Forensic Examiner John Owen. Agent Owen began his examination on Saturday, the following day. He used a forensic program to copy the hard drives of the electronic devices. He determined that the digital camera did not contain any contraband and released the camera that day to the Cottermans, who had traveled to Tucson from Lukeville and planned to stay there a few days. Agent Owen then used forensic software that often must run for several hours to examine copies of the laptop hard drives. He began his personal examination of the laptops on Sunday. That evening, Agent Owen found seventy-five images of child pornography within the unallocated space of Cotterman's laptop. 5 4 5 The other two cameras were returned to the Cottermans. "Unallocated space is space on a hard drive that contains deleted data, usually emptied from the operating system's trash or recycle bin folder, that cannot be seen or accessed by the user without the use of forensic software. Such space is available to be written over to store new information." United States v. Flyer. 633 F.3d 911. 918 (9th Cir.201 I). Agent Owen contacted the Cottermans on Sunday evening and told them he would need Howard Cotterrnan's assistance to access password -protected files he found on Cotterman's laptop. Cotterman agreed to provide the assistance the following day, but never showed up. When Agent Brisbine called again to request Cotterman's help in accessing the password -protected files, Cotterman responded that the WestlawNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 7 EFTA00314997 Horowitz. Adam 11 24 2015 For Educational Use Only U.S. v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (2013) 13 Cal. Daily Op. Sent 2531, 2013 Daily Journal =. 3018 computer had multiple users and that he would need to check with individuals at the *959 company from which he had retired in order to get the passwords. The agents had no further contact with Cotterman, who boarded a flight to Mexico from Tucson the next day, April 9, and then flew onward to Sydney, Australia. On April II, Agent Owen finally managed to open twenty-three password -protected files on Cotterman's laptop. The files revealed approximately 378 images of child pornography. The vast majority of the images were of the same girl, approximately 7-10 years of age, taken over a two-to three-year period. In many of the images, Cotterman was sexually molesting the child. Over the next few months, Agent Owen discovered hundreds more pornographic images, stories, and videos depicting children. A grand jury indicted Cotterman for a host of offenses related to child pornography. Cotterman moved to suppress the evidence gathered from his laptop and the fruits of that evidence. The magistrate judge filed a Report and Recommendation finding that the forensic examination was an "extended border search" that required reasonable suspicion. He found that the TECS hit and the existence of password -protected files on Cotterman's laptop were suspicious, but concluded that those facts did not suffice to give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The district judge adopted the Report and Recommendation and granted Cotterman's motion to suppress. In its interlocutory appeal of that order, the government characterized the issue as follows: "Whether the authority to search a laptop computer without reasonable suspicion at a border point of entry permits law enforcement to take it to another location to be forensically examined, when it has remained in the continuous custody of the government." A divided panel of this court answered that question in the affirmative and reversed. United States v. Cottertnan. 637 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir.20 I I ). The panel concluded that reasonable suspicion was not required for the search and that "[t]he district court erred in suppressing the evidence lawfully obtained under border search authority." Id. at 1084. In dissent, Judge Betty B. Fletcher wrote that "officers must have some level of particularized suspicion in order to conduct a seizure and search like the one at issue here." M. (B. Fletcher, J., dissenting). By a vote of a majority of nonrecused active judges, rehearing en banc was ordered. 673 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir.2012). Following en banc oral argument, we requested supplemental briefing on the issue of whether reasonable suspicion existed at the time of the search. H. WAIVER The government argued below that the forensic examination was part of a routine border search not requiring heightened suspicion and, alternatively, that reasonable suspicion justified the search. Before the district court, the government maintained "the facts of this case clearly establish that there was reasonable suspicion." However, having failed to obtain a favorable ruling on that ground, the government did not challenge on appeal the conclusion that there was no reasonable suspicion. Rather, it sought a broad ruling that no suspicion of any kind was required. Cotterman thus argued in his answering brief that the government had waived the issue —an assertion that the government did not address in its reply brief. Cotterman contends that the government has abandoned and conceded the issue of reasonable suspicion and that this court may not address that issue. We disagree. [21 [3] [4] We review de novo the ultimate question of whether a warrantless search *960 was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 905 (9th Cir.200 I ) (en banc). Our review necessarily encompasses a determination as to the applicable standard: no suspicion, reasonable suspicion or probable cause. That the government may hope for the lowest standard does not alter our de novo review, particularly when the issue was fully briefed and argued below. Further, we may consider an issue that has not been adequately raised on appeal if such a failure will not prejudice the opposing party. United States v. Ullah. 976 F.2d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 1992). Where, as here, we "called for and received supplemental briefs by both parties,"Alcaraz v. INS, 384 F.3d 1150, 1161 (9th Cir.2004), the government's failure to address the issue does not prejudice Cotterman. See also United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 103-04, 127 S.Ct. 782, 166 L.Ed.2d 591 (2007). III. THE BORDER SEARCH [5] [6] The broad contours of the scope of searches at our international borders are rooted in "the long-standing right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this countly." Ramsey. 431 U.S. at 616, 97 S.Ct. 1972. Thus, border searches form "a narrow exception to the Fourth Amendment prohibition WeStlaWNeff © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 8 EFTA00314998 Horowitz. Adam 11 24 2015 For Educational Use Only U.S. v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (2013) 13 Cal. Daily Op. Sent 2531, 2013 Daily Journal =. 3018 against warrantless searches without probable cause." Seljan, 547 F.3d at 999 (internal quotation marks and citation 6 omitted). Because "[t]he Government's interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border," United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004), border searches are generally deemed "reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border." Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616. 97 S.Ct. 1972. [71 [8] This does not mean, however, that at the border "anything goes." Seljan, 547 F.3d at 1000. Even at the border, individual privacy rights are not abandoned but "[b]alanced against the sovereign's interests." United States t'. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985). That balance "is qualitatively different ... than in the interior" and is "struck much more favorably to the Government." Id. at 538, 540, 105 S.Ct. 3304. Nonetheless, the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment analysis remains reasonableness. Id. at 538, 105 S.Ct. 3304. The reasonableness of a search or seizure depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the scope and duration of the deprivation. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984); see also United States v. Duncan, 693 F.2d 971, 977 (9th Cir.1982). In view of these principles, the legitimacy of the initial search of Cotterman's electronic devices at the border is not in doubt. Officer Alvarado turned on the devices and opened and viewed image files while the Cottermans waited to enter the country. It was, in principle, akin to the search in Seljan, where we concluded that a suspicionless cursory scan of a package in international transit was not unreasonable. 547 F.3d at 1004. Similarly, we have approved a quick look and unintrusive search of laptops. United States v. Arnold. 533 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir.2008) (holding border search reasonable where "CBP officers simply 'had [traveler] boot [the laptop] up, and looked at what [he] had inside.' ") (second alteration in original). 6 *961 Had the search of Cotterman's laptop ended with Officer Alvarado, we would be inclined to conclude it was reasonable even without particularized suspicion. See id. But the search here transformed into something far different. The difficult question we confront is the reasonableness, without a warrant, of the forensic examination that comprehensively analyzed the hard drive of the computer. Although the Arnold decision expressed its conclusion in broad terms, stating that. "reasonable suspicion is not needed for customs officials to search a laptop or other personal electronic storage devices at the border." Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008, the facts do not support such an unbounded holding. As an en bane court, we narrow Arnold to approve only the relatively simple search at issue in that case, not to countenance suspicionless forensic examinations. The dissent's extensive reliance on Arnold is misplaced in the en banc environment. A. The Forensic Examination Was Not An Extended Border Search [9] [10] Cotterman urges us to treat the examination as an extended border search that requires particularized suspicion. Although the semantic moniker "extended border search" may at first blush seem applicable here, our jurisprudence does not support such a claim. We have "define[d] an extended border search as any search away from the border where entry is not apparent, but where the dual requirements of reasonable certainty of a recent border crossing and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity am satisfied." United States v. Guzman-Padilla. 573 F.3d 865, 878-79 (9th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The key feature of an extended border search is that an individual can be assumed to have cleared the border and thus regained an expectation of privacy in accompanying belongings. See United States v. Abbouchi, 502 F.3d 850, 855 (9th Cir.2007) ("Because the delayed nature of an extended border search ... necessarily entails a greater level of intrusion on legitimate expectations of privacy than an ordinary border search, the government must justify an extended border search with reasonable suspicion that the search may uncover contraband or evidence of criminal activity.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Cotterman's case is different. Cotterman was stopped and searched at the border. Although he was allowed to depart the border inspection station after the initial search, some of his belongings, including his laptop, were not. The follow•on forensic examination was not an "extended border search." A border search of a computer is not transformed into an extended border search simply because the device is transported and examined beyond the border. WeStlaWNP5 © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. EFTA00314999 Horowitz. Adam 11 24 2015 For Educational Use Only U.S. v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (2013) 13 Cal. Daily Op. Sent 2531, 2013 Daily Journal =. 3018 [11] [12] To be sure, our case law has not always border crossing only after the subject or items searched articulated the "extended border search" doctrine with optimal clarity. But the confusion has come in distinguishing between facts describing a functional border search and those describing an extended border search, not in defining the standard for a search at the border. See, e.g., United States v. Cardona, 769 F.2d 625, 628 (9th Cir.1985) ("We have recently recognized the difficulty of making sharp distinctions between searches at the functional equivalent of the border and extended border searches."). The "functional equivalent" doctrine effectively extends the border search doctrine to all ports of entry, including airports. See Ahneida— Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973). A routine customs search at the "functional equivalent" of the border is "analyzed as a border search" and requires neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion. Seljan, 547 F.3d at 999. This case involves a search initiated at the actual border and does not encounter any of the difficulties *962 surrounding identification of a "functional" border. As to the extended border search doctrine, we believe it is best confined to races in which, after an apparent border crossing or functional entry, an attenuation in the time or the location of conducting a search reflects that the subject has regained an expectation of privacy.7 7 This characterization is consistent with how our circuit and others have articulated the doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Villasenor. 608 F.3d 467. 471-72 (9th Cir.2010); United Stales v. Yang, 286 F.3d 940.945-46 (7th Cir.2002); United States v. Hyde, 37 F.3d 116. 120 n. 2 (3d Cit 1994); United States v. Santiago, 837 F.2d 1545. 1548 (11th Cir.1988); United States V. Gaviria, 805 F.2d 1108, 1112 (2d Cir.1986); United States v. Niver, 689 F.2d 520, 526 (5th Cir.1982); United States V. Mr, 592 F.2d 735, 739-40 (4th Cir.1979). [13] In his dissent, Judge Smith advocates applying the extended border search doctrine because the forensic examination occurred 170 miles from the border and days after Cotterman's entry. Moving the laptop to a specialized lab at a distant location might highlight that the search undertaken there was an extensive one, but it is not the dispositive factor here. Because Cotterman never regained possession of his laptop, the fact that the forensic examination occurred away from the border, in Tucson, did not heighten the interference with his privacy. Time and distance become relevant to determining whether there is an adequate nexus to a recent have entered. See Villasenor, 608 F.3d at 471 (explaining that reasonableness of extended border search depends on "whether the totality of the surrounding circumstances, including the time and distance elapsed" establish that items to be searched have recently entered the country) (internal quotation marks omitted). Cotterman's computer never cleared customs so entry was never effected. In short, the extended border search doctrine does not fit the search here. B. Forensic Examination At The Border Requires Reasonable Suspicion [141 It is the comprehensive and intrusive nature of a forensic examination —not the location of the examination — that is the key factor triggering the requirement of reasonable suspicion here.8 See Cotterman, 637 F.3d at 1086-87 n. 6 (B. Fletcher, J., dissenting) (recognizing that "[al computer search in a forensic lab will always be equivalent to an identical search at the border. The duration of a computer search is not controlled by where the search is conducted. The duration of a computer search is controlled by what one is looking for and how one goes about searching for it.") (emphasis in original). The search would have been every bit as intrusive had Agent Owen traveled to the border with his forensic equipment. Indeed, Agent Owen had a laptop with forensic software that he could have used to conduct an examination at the port of entry itself, although he testified it would have been a more time consuming effort. To carry out the examination of Cotterman's laptop, Agent Owen used computer forensic software to copy the hard drive and then analyze it in its entirety, including data that ostensibly had been deleted. This painstaking analysis is akin to reading a diary line by line looking for mention *963 of criminal activity—plus looking at everything the writer may have erased. 9 8 9 The concurrence goes to great lengths to "refute any such notion" that location and duration contributed to our holding reasonable suspicion required here. Concurrence at 974-75. We see no reason for such an exegesis; our opinion is clear on the point that these factors are not at issue. Agent Owen used a software program called EnCase that exhibited the distinctive features of computer WeStlaWNeXt" © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 10 EFTA00315000 Horowitz. Adam 11 24 2015 For Educational Use Only U.S. v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (2013) 13 Cal. Daily Op. Sent 2531, 2013 Daily Journal =. 3018 forensic examination. The program copied. analyzed. and preserved the data stored on the hard drive and gave the examiner access to far more data. including password-protected. hidden or encrypted. and deleted files. than a manual user could access. Notwithstanding a traveler's diminished expectation of privacy at the border, the search is still measured against the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement, which considers the nature and scope of the search. Significantly, the Supreme Court has recognized that the "dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched" at the border will on occasion demand "some level of suspicion in the case of highly intrusive searches of the person." Flores- Montano, 541 U.S. at 152, 124 S.CI. 1582. Likewise, the Court has explained that "some searches of property are so destructive," "particularly offensive," or overly intrusive in the manner in which they are carried out as to require particularized suspicion. Id. at 152, 154 n. 2, 155-56, 124 S.Ct. 1582; Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541. 105 S.Ct. 3304. The Court has never defined the precise dimensions of a reasonable border search, instead pointing to the necessity of a case-by-case analysis. As we have emphasized, "[deasonableness, when used in the context of a border search, is incapable of comprehensive definition or of mechanical application." Duncan, 693 F.2d at 977 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Over the past 30-plus years, the Supreme Court has dealt with a handful of border cases in which it reaffirmed the border search exception while, at the same time, leaving open the question of when a "particularly offensive" search might fail the reasonableness test. The trail begins with United States v. Ramsey, where the Court reserved judgment on this question: "We do not decide whether, and under what circumstances, a border search might be deemed 'unreasonable' because of the particularly offensive manner in which it is carried out." 431 U.S. at 618 n. 13, 97 S.Ct. 1972. Of note, the Court cited two cases, albeit non-border cases, as examples: Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346. 347-48, 77 S.Ct. 828, 1 L.Ed.2d 876 (1957) (holding unconstitutional an exhaustive warrantless search of a cabin and seizure of its entire contents that were moved 200 miles away for examination) and Go- Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358. 51 S.Ct. 153, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931) (condemning as "lawless invasion of the premises and a general exploratory search" a warrantless "unlimited search, ransacking the desk, safe, filing cases and other parts of [an] office"). Less than ten years later, in 1985, the Court observed that it had "not previously decided what level of suspicion would justify a seizure of an incoming traveler for purposes other than a routine border search" and then went on to hold in the context of an alimentary canal search that reasonable suspicion was required for "the detention of a traveler at the border, beyond the scope of a routine customs search and inspection." Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540- 41. 105 S.Ct. 3304. The Court's reference to "routine border search" was parsed in a later case, Flores—Montano, where the Court explained that "the reasons that might support a requirement of some level of suspicion in the case of highly intrusive searches of the person—dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched—simply do not carry over to vehicles," and, more specifically, to the gas tank of a car. 541 U.S. at 152, 124 S.CI. 1582. Accordingly, the Court *964 rejected a privacy claim vis-a-vis an automobile gas tank. We are now presented with a case directly implicating substantial personal privacy interests. The private information individuals store on digital devices—their personal -papers" in the words of the Constitution —stands in stark contrast to the generic and impersonal contents of a gas tank. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 945, 957, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (expressing "doubt that people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year"). We rest our analysis on the reasonableness of this search, paying particular heed to the nature of the electronic devices and the attendant expectation of privacy. The amount of private information carried by international travelers was traditionally circumscribed by the size of the traveler's luggage or automobile. That is no longer the case. Electronic devices are capable of storing warehouses full of information. The average 400—gigabyte laptop hard drive can store over 200 million pages—the equivalent of five floors of a typical academic library. See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 Harv. L.Rev. 531, 542 (2005) (explaining that an 80 GB hard drive is equivalent to 40 million pages or one floor of an academic library); see also LexisNexis, How Many Pages in a Gigabyte?. http:/Avww.lexisnexis. corn/applieddiscovery/lawlibrary/ WeSflaWNPS © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 11 EFTA00315001 Horowitz. Adam 11 24 2015 For Educational Use Only U.S. v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (2013) 13 Cal. Daily Op. Sew. 2531, 2013 Daily Journal =. 3018 whitePapers/ADI_FS_PageslnAGigabyte.pdf. Even a car full of packed suitcases with sensitive documents cannot hold a candle to the sheer, and ever-increasing, capacity of digital storage. to 10 We are puzzled by the dissent's speculation about "how many gigabytes of storage [one must! buy to secure the guarantee that reasonable suspicion will be required before one's devices are searched." Dissent at 987. We discuss the typical storage capacity of electronic devices simply to highlight the features that generally distinguish them from traditional baggage. Indeed, we do not and need not determine whether Cotterman's laptop possessed unusually large or simply "average" capacity in order to resolve that the forensic examination of it required reasonable suspicion. [15] [16] The nature of the contents of electronic devices differs from that of luggage as well. Laptop computers, iPads and the like are simultaneously offices and personal diaries. They contain the most intimate details of our lives: financial records, confidential business documents, medical records and private emails. This type of material implicates the Fourth Amendment's specific guarantee of the people's right to be secure in their "papers." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The express listing of papers "reflects the Founders' deep concern with safeguarding the privacy of thoughts and ideas —what we might call freedom of conscience —from invasion by the government." Seljan, 547 F.3d at 1014 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting); see also New York v. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 873, 106 S.Ct. 1610, 89 L.Ed.2d 871 (1986). These records are expected to be kept private and this expectation is "one that society is prepared to recognize as `reasonable.' " Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). II 1I The dissent's discussion about Facebook and other platforms where the user voluntarily transmits personal data over the Internet. often oblivious to privacy issues. Dissent at 65-66. is a red herring. Of course. willful disclosure of electronic data. like disclosure of other material, undercuts an individual's expectation of privacy. But there was no such disclosure here. Nor does the border search implicate such an affirmative disclosure. •965 Electronic devices often retain sensitive and confidential information far beyond the perceived point of erasure, notably in the form of browsing histories and records of deleted files. This quality makes it impractical, if not impossible, for individuals to make meaningful decisions regarding what digital content to expose to the scrutiny that accompanies international travel. A person's digital life ought not be hijacked simply by crossing a border. When packing traditional luggage, one is accustomed to deciding what papers to take and what to leave behind. When carrying a laptop, tablet or other device, however, removing files unnecessary to an impending trip is an impractical solution given the volume and often intermingled nature of the files. It is also a time-consuming task that may not even effectively erase the files. The present case