From Minerals to Megawatts 2025

Growing regionalization and policy actions are re-routing flows and reinforcing concentration: China introduced export controls on gallium and germanium in 202330 and later restricted rare-earth technologies and material exports;31 Indonesia’s nickel-ore export ban increased and concentrated nickel-processing capacity within the country;32 and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) imposed cobalt export restrictions,33 further tightening global supply chains. Even without shocks, output from the current asset base erodes as reserves deplete and ore grades decline.34 In copper, for example, maintaining flat supply requires ongoing investment – new and sustaining projects must first replace lost volumes before adding net new capacity. At the same time, new Western projects are advancing. Keliber’s lithium hydroxide project in Finland was designated a “Strategic Project” under the European Union’s Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), a status intended to accelerate permitting and enable access to finance.35 Thacker Pass secured a $2.26 billion US Department of Energy loan,36 and the US is channelling cross-border support to allied Canadian projects under the Canada-US Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals Collaboration to strengthen global supply-chain resilience. The next decade remains a window to prepare before steeper demand tests capacity. Looking to 2035, forecast tightness stems not only from demand growth but from how much of 2035 supply still needs to be developed. Figure 9 projects that for several minerals, today’s operating base covers only half (or less) of expected 2035 demand, with the balance dependent on projects that must still be permitted, financed or even identified. For example, today’s supply of lithium and graphite covers approximately 35-45% of forecasted 2035 demand; even if announced projects deliver, material shortfalls are expected to persist – implying a near-doubling of output needed within a decade. Recycling helps but cannot close these gaps alone. Its contributions are meaningful for copper and aluminium – the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates an average recycled-input share of about 35% for aluminium and approximately 17% for copper (excluding direct-use scrap) over the last decade.37 However, recycling of lithium and rare earths remains nascent due to low end-of-life volumes and insufficient collection and mechanical- separation capacity. Projected global supply-demand balance for select minerals (2035e)1 FIGURE 9 Li Cu EVs Data centres Electricity infrastructureREEs Ni Zn C2Sn AI Co PO3FeDemand (100%) Existing 2024 supply Supply additions by 2035 Forecast deficit Forecast surplus35%32%34% 63%10%27% 58%24%18% 68%18%14% 81%7%12% 45%46%9% 7% 14%16% 79% 81%76%24% 100% 100%3%1% 9% Notes: Balances are indicative and synthesized from multiple sources based on available information; figures may vary by source and assumptions (e.g. demand trajectories, project start-up/ramp, recycling rates). 1 Percentage shortfall/surplus = (forecast refined supply − forecast refined end-demand) ÷ forecast demand (2035e). 2 C: Graphite 3 PO: Phosphates Sources: IEA, Shanghai Metals Market, CRU (Commodities Research Unit), Association for Iron & Steel Technology, International Lead and Zinc Study Group, USGS, Silver Institute, Research and Markets, International Tin Association, International Aluminium Institute, S&P Global, Wood Mackenzie and Kearney analysis From Minerals to Megawatts: Building Resilience for EVs, Data Centres and Power Grids 21