Global Risks Report 2026
Page 44 of 100 · WEF_Global_Risks_Report_2026.pdf
This could happen, for example, when more
members of the baby-boomer generation retire or
if there is a sharp upturn in unemployment if many
jobs are displaced by technology, leading to a
reduction in contributions to retirement funds and/or
to emergency withdrawals.
In an alternative scenario, investor sentiment could
turn against leading AI companies, if doubts take
hold over whether the huge investments in AI capital
expenditure (capex) will pay off. Total spending on
AI worldwide is estimated at $1.5 trillion in 2025
and is projected to rise to $2 trillion in 2026, with
the main segments being generative AI (genAI)
smartphones, AI-optimized servers, AI services, AI
application software, AI processing semiconductors
and AI infrastructure software.68 The data centre
capex of the top eight US hyperscalers (very large
cloud services providers) alone amounted to $258
billion in 2024 and is projected to more than double
to $525 billion in 2032.69
However, current and future revenues linked to
these AI capex investments are difficult to estimate;
there may ultimately be many losers alongside a
few winners. Some companies will be undercut by
providers of similar services at cheaper prices, while
others may find that some key technological inputs,
notably graphics processing units (GPUs), become
quickly outdated. The vulnerability of the companies
that are investing heavily today will depend not
only on the revenues that materialize, but also on
how they have financed their outlays. The largest
hyperscalers have until recently drawn heavily on
their own cash. But increasingly the AI buildout is
also being financed via relatively opaque special-
purpose vehicles and/or with debt.70
It is possible that the strategic decisions made
by today’s leading technology companies will pay
off, particularly with support from governments,
given AI’s strategic geopolitical value and the vast
opportunities across sectors. However, if investor
concerns about funding mechanisms and debt levels start to outweigh excitement about uncertain
future revenues, that could trigger an asset bubble
burst. Other possible triggers to watch for include
a societal backlash against the AI buildout; for
example, if concerns emerge around data centre
water usage,71 unemployment, or, more broadly,
inequality. Longer term, quantum technologies
could potentially upend entire data centre-based
business models.
Boomerang inflation
According to the IMF, inflation is projected to fall to
4.2% globally in 2025 and to 3.7% in 2026, albeit
with above-target inflation in the United States and
subdued inflation in most other countries.72 In the
immediate term, inflation is thus expected to remain
largely under control, although the figure masks
an acute cost-of-living crisis in many countries
following the significant global inflation spike in
2021–2022.
There are several risks that could worsen the
inflation outlook. Rising prices of natural resources
if geoeconomic confrontation intensifies are
of concern. Further, the inflationary pressures
associated with higher tariffs should not be
underestimated. Sustained, broad tariffs could lead
to widespread inflationary pressures, particularly
for the United States and closely linked economies
including Canada and Mexico.73 Uncertainty is
the defining feature of the outlook; specific policy
design and the level of sector-specific targeting of
tariffs are critical in determining inflationary impacts.
Another source of inflation risk may emerge from
disruptive paradigm changes in monetary policy.
As governments seek ways to stimulate growth
and manage growing debt servicing burdens, some
may also increase pressure on central banks to run
more accommodative monetary policies. Central-
bank independence could be further eroded in
Falco Negenman,
Unsplash
Global Risks Report 2026
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