Open but Secure Europe%E2%80%99s Path to Strategic Interdependence 2025

They ought to remember that the EU still makes up about 15% of global GDP and is the world’s second-biggest military spender.6 Through concerted, united action, European cooperation and integration has the potential to be an extraordinary force multiplier, not only for its member states but also for its wider neighbourhood and as a contributor to global order. Achieving this vision requires both a clear strategy for engaging with the world and the political will to do so. It demands nothing less than an intellectual, political and institutional awakening. Neither autarchy nor dependency The concept of “strategic interdependence” presented across the following chapters offers a path forward. Instead of attempting to insulate themselves from the world, Europeans must accept the benefits of interdependence while working out how to structure and maintain it. The best hedge against dependence and insecurity is to foster more options and build more relationships. Paradoxically, greater interdependence — when strategically managed — can offer a defence against coercion and blackmail, just as a divorcing couple might find shared ground and stability as co-parents of their shared children. At the same time, Europe must be realistic about the vulnerabilities inherent in interdependence and take steps to protect itself against them. It is here that strategic thinking is most essential: Europe must organize its relationships in a way that avoids imbalances that could be turned against it. This means de-risking those relationships that are most unequal, to protect against coercion and blackmail from the outside. On foreign policy and defence, the future of the conflict initiated by Russia will be the single most important factor in the years ahead. The EU must be ready to live up to its rhetoric of supporting Ukraine, even in a situation where support from the US starts to weaken. This means bolstering its role as a security provider and pledging 0.3% of GDP in support for Ukraine, while preparing for the eventuality of a complete drop-off in US assistance in the short term and ensuring that Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans remain on the path to EU membership in the long term. Europe also needs to embrace greater and more diverse engagement with the wider world: a more balanced transatlantic relationship with deeper European responsibility for NATO; a stronger voice on the Middle East; new trade deals in Asia; closer partnerships in Latin America; and a humble but ambitious approach to a rising Africa. This new engagement must be built on a realistic European approach to reforming the United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions and, most of all, on a new drive to reinforce the EU’s defence in cooperation with crucial partners such as the United Kingdom. On climate, European policy-makers should focus on expanding the union’s green technological capacity. Rather than trying to reclaim leadership in sectors such as solar power, where China’s dominance was decided a decade ago, the EU should prioritize emerging green technologies that are still in contention, like battery production. In addition, it must create a framework to manage unavoidable dependencies; for example, by establishing a critical raw materials (CRM) reserve as a buffer against supply disruptions. The best hedge against dependence and insecurity is to foster more options and build more relationships. Greater interdependence, when strategically managed, can offer a defence against coercion and blackmail. Open but Secure: Europe’s Path to Strategic Interdependence 5