Open but Secure Europe%E2%80%99s Path to Strategic Interdependence 2025

“War is the continuation of policy with other means”, wrote the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz. That clean contrast between diplomatic measures and military ones — the latter kicking in when the former fail — has long been particularly stark in the peaceful, secure European Union. But in a “lose- lose”7 world of mounting crisis and insecurity, it is breaking down. Survey the map. The most obvious priority for Europeans, Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine, tightly intertwines foreign policy and defence. Diplomatic manoeuvring, military supplies to Kyiv and the EU’s own conventional and hybrid defence all condition each other. In Europe’s wider neighbourhood, too, the divide between foreign policy and military matters is blurred, as wars and other violent crises encroach. Globally, the fragmentation of the post-Cold War system of multilateral governance intersects with mounting hard-power rivalries; and high geopolitics is increasingly difficult to separate from broader themes such as technology, climate and trade. The second Donald Trump presidency in the US is not likely to lessen any of these trends and in many cases will accelerate them.8 Such circumstances make it tempting for Europeans to pull up the drawbridge; to seek autonomy and insulation from the wider world by withdrawing diplomatically and reinforcing their defences unilaterally. That would be a mistake. Interdependence is a reality; particularly for a bloc with a fragile periphery, on the doorsteps of both Asia and Africa, and deeply integrated into global systems of commerce and cooperation. The only sensible choice is to make a virtue of it; taking strength from those connections by deepening and diversifying them. What would a European Union strategically interdependent in foreign policy and defence look like? Survey that map again. On the European continent itself, it would be deeply unstrategic to pursue or accept any sort of peace in Ukraine that is not fair and sustainable. That means continuing to arm and otherwise support Kyiv to give it the best possible hand in any negotiations. A commitment by each EU member state to spend 0.3% of GDP on this goal should become a new yardstick. Further priorities include a long-term plan to ramp up ammunition production, reinforce Ukrainian air and missile defence and supply the support and spare parts needed to maintain European military equipment already in Ukrainian hands.9 It also means being ready for the new Trump administration’s push for peace talks. The more the union establishes a strong common position, the less likely those talks will take place over European heads. It would also be unstrategic to allow Ukraine, as well as Moldova and the Western Balkans, to stagnate or descend into greater instability on the union’s margins, rather than offering them a clear path to EU accession, even within the timeframe of the next multiannual financial framework.10 Equally, it would be unstrategic to overlook hybrid threats on European soil, such as GPS jamming or interference in energy and telecommunications infrastructure. That demands a whole-of-society approach to security challenges, taking in such “civilian” realms as logistics, telecommunications and healthcare. Most of all, it would be unstrategic either to give up NATO or to take it for granted. The US may be pivoting towards Asia, but Europe will continue to depend on its nuclear deterrent, intelligence and continent-wide command and control abilities well into the foreseeable future. In that respect, “total autonomy” would spell insecurity. A stronger European role in the alliance is the strategically interdependent way forward; with the EU and close allies like the United Kingdom and Norway as sovereign partners to America, not free- riders or clients. That means improving the union’s ability to deal with more of its own problems — through structures like the European Defence Agency, the European Defence Fund and Permanent Structured Cooperation — while investing in domestic defence industries that can pull their weight in NATO and reduce over-reliance on the US. Those two goals are not at odds. There is a natural complementarity between NATO as a military alliance and the EU as a security alliance with a more muscular capacity for defence. That capacity should be channelled to areas complementing NATO’s responsibilities: resilience and cyber defence, military mobility, research and development (R&D), and capability development and delivery.11 Looking farther afield, in the Middle East, a strategically interdependent Europe is one with a more unified position on the Israel-Palestine question. Historically the EU (or before 1993, the European Economic Community) has played an important role in the conflict, for example in the Venice Declaration of 1980.12 But today it is a non-force in the quest for peace and stability in the region — a dismal record for one of the world’s leading economies, in its own neighbourhood. In Asia, a strategically interdependent Europe would continue to seek broad free-trade agreements with states like India, including building an alliance with the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a regional grouping of 12 states (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United Kingdom and Viet Nam) that was created in 2018 following America’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership.13 Europe should tread a canny line with China: standing up to Beijing on cases that undermine Europe’s security (such as Chinese support for Russia’s aggression in Ukraine) while pursuing continued cooperation on shared interests like climate action. There is value in recognizing that China will remain a leading world power for the foreseeable future. Interdependence is a reality for a bloc with a fragile periphery, on the doorsteps of both Asia and Africa, and deeply integrated into global systems of commerce and cooperation. A commitment by each EU member state to spend 0.3% of GDP on continuing to arm and support Kyiv should become a new yardstick. A stronger European role in NATO is the strategically interdependent way forward; with the EU and close allies like the United Kingdom and Norway as sovereign partners to America, not free-riders or clients. Open but Secure: Europe’s Path to Strategic Interdependence 8