Open but Secure Europe%E2%80%99s Path to Strategic Interdependence 2025

A similar but distinct approach applies in Latin America. There are obvious areas of overlap with Europe on topics including the green transition, multilateralism and technological innovation; but unlike Asia, the region is often overlooked on the world stage. Europe can make itself a natural partner, especially through its strategic relationship with Brazil14 and the conclusion of the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement. Most important for Europeans, in the long-term, is Africa. Europe is highly exposed to events, good and bad, on the continent. By 2050, two in every five children born on Earth will be Africans.15 That demands of Europe both humility and ambition towards Africa: the humility to acknowledge the failings of its Sahel strategy16 and its neglect of the humanitarian nightmare in Sudan;17 and the ambition to deepen cooperation with promising partners such as Ghana, Kenya, Côte D’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania. Bilateral and mini- lateral formats may prove more fruitful than the endless circuit of “Africa conferences”, which can seem patronizing. De-risking interdependence European Union leaders and governments must be pro-active about creating the tools and conditions needed for all this engagement. At home, that means revising its “strategic compass” roadmap agreed in early 2022, which is already ripe for revision and to do so before decisions are taken on the union’s next seven-year budget — unlocking the additional resources needed for any realistic policy of strategic interdependence. The role of EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs could be bolstered with support not only from special representatives but also by groups of member- state foreign ministers. In addition, the EU should establish an informal security council, comprising the main representatives of the European Council and the European Commission, to coordinate external policies. Globally, Europe’s leaders will need to stand up for international law and multilateral cooperation — recognizing that this will at times put it at odds with the US administration. Much of the global governance system is deadlocked, but not all of it: Europeans can make pragmatic arguments for reforming United Nations agencies, the Bretton Woods institutions18 and the arbitration and conflict- resolution system of the World Trade Organization. The EU is much more dependent than the US and China on external trade, so it is particularly in its own interests to uphold and where possible deepen open trading arrangements.19 This is one of many areas where, even if a global or Western consensus is lacking, Europeans can help form smaller plurilateral groupings and coalitions of the willing. Another area of interdependence is technological cooperation, where the EU should seek a digital alliance with the US — notably in the development and promotion of 5G and 6G technologies where Europe is still in a leading global position. To do this, the EU will need to address its own digital weaknesses and lagging competitiveness (as Eva Maydell and Agathe Demarais explain later in this report) and seek to be more active in discussions about regulating artificial intelligence globally rather than merely doing so at home. Space is a related realm of technological competition, where Europe will have to manage its exposure to the risks of slipping behind the US and China. Scale matters, In the Middle East, a strategically interdependent Europe is one with a more unified position on the Israel-Palestine question. Most important for Europeans, in the long-term, is Africa. Bilateral and mini-lateral formats may prove more fruitful than the endless circuit of “Africa conferences”. Open but Secure: Europe’s Path to Strategic Interdependence 9