The Global Risks Report 2024

In addition, long lead times for developing appropriate infrastructure may challenge readiness for regional or local changes that manifest abruptly. For example, the collapse of coral reef systems – which absorb more than 90% of wave energy – could leave coastal communities vulnerable to storm surges, potentially doubling annual flood damage on a global scale. 27 Extreme weather, a parallel phenomenon occurring alongside planetary changes, is mutually reinforcing: the former can push a planetary system into an alternative state (for example a heatwave collapsing coral systems), while many of the climate tipping points are anticipated to shift weather patterns and increase extreme weather in turn, creating positive feedback loops of greenhouse gas emissions. 28 Together, these environmental and planetary changes could radically impact economic growth and insurability over the next decade, 29 driving food, water and health insecurity. Immediate impacts could reduce agricultural productivity and potentially cause simultaneous harvest failures in key regions. For example, some studies suggest that the loss of significant ice mass from the Greenland Ice Sheet could lead to droughts and agricultural loss in the Sahel region, in northern Africa, at the same time as it reduces marine primary productivity in the North Atlantic. 30 Although specific geographic impacts are highly complex due to the influence of multiple planetary systems, food and water insecurity are a key source of exposure – or leverage – for several global and regional powers. China, South Korea, Japan, Russia and Saudi Arabia are among the largest net importers of food and agricultural products, whereas Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, New Zealand, Thailand and the United States comprise some of the largest exporters. 31 At a domestic level, intensifying competition for resources could spark disputes over dwindling freshwater sources, arable land and habitable areas. On the international stage, changes to agricultural productivity and water availability could alter global trade patterns and alliances, or even become a bargaining chip in the contentious management of migration flows between host countries, adding an additional layer of complexity to shifting geostrategic dynamics. There are also clear limits to adaptation, and tipping points will induce changes that, although longer-term in nature, are likely to overwhelm even well-implemented adaptation solutions and make relocation and migration more likely. 32 For example, the Thwaites Glacier, which plays a key role in stabilizing the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, may have already passed an irreversible tipping point. 33 Although research is evolving and impact time frames are highly uncertain, this could cause a sea level rise of more than half a metre, or, through the destabilization of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, up to 3.2 metres over longer timescales according to some estimates, 34 dramatically altering coastlines and submerging some island states (Figure 2.9).35 Modelled costs of adaptationUS$125 billion/year this decadeThe adaptation finance gap is estimated atUS$194 to US$366billion/year (based on 2021adaptation finance flows) Adaptation financing needsUS$387 billion/year up to 2030 International public finance flowsUS$21 billion in 2021 200300400 100 0US$ billion/year for developing countriesAdaptation finance gap FIGURE 2.8 Source UN Adaptation Gap Report , 2023. Global Risks Report 2024 46