The next global shock? BOX 2.11 State criminal In a more extreme scenario, the state itself may become the criminal. Cybercrime could create lucrative illicit funding streams that are difficult to attribute to any particular state and that can be used for government services, illegal political activities (such as assassinations or disinformation campaigns) or even political campaigns. For example, North Korea stole $200 million in cryptocurrencies over an eight-month period last year, allegedly to fund their nuclear weapons programme. 130 Autocratic governments, fragile regimes and “ungoverned states” are more susceptible to such capture. Acting today To effectively prevent the spread of illicit activity across both geographic and economic markets, three key areas could be tackled: the capability to launder illicit profits; communications that enable extensive criminal networks; and corruption. 131 For example, while the counter-risk of surveillance needs to be handled carefully, the dismantling of encrypted communications could be a radical tool to disrupt transnational crime networks. The takedown of EncroChat, for instance, led to 6,558 arrests and close to EUR900 million in criminal funds seized or frozen. 132 All three pillars can be tackled at multiple layers of governance; however, GRPS respondents feel that National and local regulations have the most potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness with respect to Illicit economic activity (Figure 2.30).With constraints to international cooperation, there may be a shift towards unilateral, bilateral and regional agreements on crime, although these may prove less effective at addressing transnational criminal networks that transcend political alliances and country borders. GRPS respondents recognize the continued need for Global treaties and agreements to boost local efforts. While it was considered comparatively less important in the context of Cyber insecurity, the development of a UN treaty on cybercrime is seen by some to be an encouraging step, notwithstanding that it is accompanied by deep concerns around related government repression of human rights. 133 If adopted, it would be the first framework for international cooperation on a cyber issue, addressing the prevention, investigation and prosecution of cybercrime. 134 Alongside these efforts, a focus on socioeconomic drivers will also be essential to reduce entry pathways into, and demand for, criminal activities. Risk governance: Crime wave FIGURE 2.30 Source World Economic Forum Global RisksPerception Survey 2023-2024.“Which approach(es) do you expect to have the most potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness over the next 10 years? Select up to three for each risk.” Risk categories Economic Environmental Geopolitical Societal Technologicala b c d e fghia b c d e fghi Cyber insecurity Illicit economic activity 15%48% 12% 31% 9% 33%55%48%42% 28%61% 23% 40%20%25%17%38%35% Share of respondentsApproach a. Financial instruments b. National and local regulationsc. Minilateral treaties and agreements d. Global treaties and agreements e. Development assistancef. Corporate strategiesg. Research & developmenth. Public awareness and education i. Multi-stakeholder engagement Global Risks Report 2024 75

The Global Risks Report 2024