Complaint — District of Columbia v. Athena Bitcoin, Inc. (D.C. Superior Court)
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Research, not advice. Part of the Bitcoin research archive (October 2026). Claims labelled unverified, contested or fringe are reported, not endorsed; statuses of bills and rules are as of the date checked. Government, court and patent records are public domain; the research notes are CC BY 4.0.
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Civil Division
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
a municipal corporation,
400 6th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001, Civil Action No.: __________________
Plaintiff,
COMPLAINT
v.
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
ATHENA BITCOIN, INC.
1 SE 3rd Avenue, STE 2740
Miami, Florida 33131
Defendant.
Plaintiff District of Columbia (“District”), by its Office of the Attorney General, brings this
action against Defendant Athena Bitcoin, Inc. (“Athena”) for failing to disclose excessive fees and
to protect consumers from scams in violation of the District’s Consumer Protection Procedures
Act (“CPPA”), D.C. Code §§ 28-3901, et seq. and Abuse, Neglect, and Financial Exploitation of
Vulnerable Adults and the Elderly Act (the “Financial Exploitation Act”), D.C. Code §§ 22-933.01
and 22-937. In support of its claims, the District states as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1. District seniors and other residents have been scammed out of life-altering amounts
of cash through Athena Bitcoin Automated Teller Machines (“BTMs”). Most deposits to Athena
BTMs in the District—93% during the first five months of operation—are the product of outright
fraud. Not only has Athena done little to nothing to prevent this fraud, but it has instead pocketed
hundreds of thousands of dollars in undisclosed fees on the backs of scam victims and adopted
policies to prevent these victims from recovering any of their losses.
2. Athena—one of the country’s largest BTM operators—has maintained seven
BTMs in the District. These BTMs ostensibly allow consumers to purchase cryptocurrencies, such
as Bitcoin, using cash. 1 But Athena’s machines are primarily used to facilitate fraudulent schemes
that exploit the elderly and result in huge sums of money being transferred directly to scammers.
(Athena BTM image via https://athenabitcoin.com/host-an-atm)
3. Bitcoin is digital “money” that is stored in a digital “wallet”—like a bank account
but without the oversight or security provided by a financial institution. Bitcoin wallets are
identified by long strings of letters and numbers called “addresses.” Each transaction with a Bitcoin
wallet is recorded on a public ledger called the “blockchain.”
4. In the typical BTM scam, foreign fraudsters contact victims posing as
representatives of trusted institutions—banks, law enforcement agencies, technology companies—
and falsely claim that the victim’s finances are at risk. Scammers tell victims to withdraw cash
from their bank or retirement accounts and deposit the funds into a BTM to protect their money or
to cooperate with an official investigation.
1
For simplicity, this Complaint generally uses the term “Bitcoin” to refer to the cryptocurrencies that users can
purchase using BTMs. That term should be understood to refer to any cryptocurrency that a user attempts to
purchase using a BTM.
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5. Upon receiving this directive, victims locate an Athena BTM, often in a gas station,
and insert their cash into the BTM. They direct the cash to a Bitcoin wallet—usually by scanning
a QR code provided by the fraudsters—where their converted cash is to be deposited as Bitcoin.
Athena then purchases the Bitcoin on an open exchange and, sometime later, transfers that Bitcoin
to the wallet address scanned by the user.
6. The scammer in control of the wallet may then transfer the money to another wallet
controlled by the scammer or convert the Bitcoin to cash via offshore Bitcoin exchanges, such as
Binance, Bybit, or KuCoin. Once the money has been deposited into the scammer’s wallet, the
transaction cannot be reversed.
7. Rather than take the steps necessary to prevent these fraudulent transactions from
overrunning its machines, Athena has intentionally profited from the fraud by imposing excessive,
undisclosed fees on BTM transactions—up to 26% of each transaction. Athena also has allowed
elderly consumers to deposit very large amounts of cash over short time periods into wallets that
Athena knew had already been used by other scam victims. Athena’s ineffective oversight
procedures have created an unchecked pipeline for illicit international fraud transactions.
8. Once the fraud is discovered, Athena has given consumers no recourse to recover
their funds. Athena has systematically told scam victims that all their money is unrecoverable even
while Athena has retained up to 26% of the scam as a fee, which could be easily returned.
Exacerbating these problems, Athena has misrepresented its refund policy in every direction—
imposing a no refunds policy in its Terms of Service while arbitrarily capping the fee refunds when
victims diligently force the issue.
9. An analysis of complaint and transaction data from Athena’s first five months of
operations within the District—from May 2024 to September 2024—revealed that at least 93% of
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all Athena BTM deposits were the product of fraud, as noted above. The data also revealed that
the median age of victims was 71 years, and the median loss per transaction was $8,000.
10. Athena violates the CPPA by engaging in unfair and deceptive trade practices,
including by failing to adequately disclose transaction fees, utilizing unconscionable contract
provisions, unfairly denying fraud victims the ability to recover stolen funds, operating without a
money transmission license, and failing to implement adequate consumer protection measures.
11. Athena’s conduct also violates the Financial Exploitation Act by facilitating the
financial exploitation of elderly and vulnerable District residents while actively deceiving them
regarding the existence and magnitude of the company’s excessive fee structure and its ability (or
inability) to refund those fees. Athena has permitted and profited from transactions in which
victims are coerced, misled, and manipulated into depositing their life savings into Athena’s
machines under fraudulent pretenses.
12. The District of Columbia brings this enforcement action to stop Athena’s predatory
business practices, protect vulnerable and elderly consumers, and obtain financial relief for
Athena’s victims. The District seeks injunctive relief, restitution, damages, civil penalties,
attorneys’ fees, and all other appropriate relief to ensure that Athena fully discloses its fee
structure, implements effective fraud prevention measures, and provides an adequate refund
process for victims of scams.
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PARTIES
13. Plaintiff District of Columbia is a municipal corporation empowered to sue and be
sued and is the local government for the territory constituting the permanent seat of the government
of the United States. The District is represented by and through its chief legal officer, the Attorney
General for the District of Columbia. The Attorney General has general charge and conduct of all
legal business of the District and all suits initiated by and against the District and is responsible
for upholding the public interest. See D.C. Code § 1-301.81(a)(1). The Attorney General is
specifically authorized to enforce the CPPA and the Financial Exploitation Act under D.C. Code
§§ 28-3909 and 22-937, respectively.
14. Defendant Athena Bitcoin, Inc. is a Delaware corporation formed on September 18,
2015. Athena maintains its headquarters at 1 SE 3rd Ave, Suite 2740, Miami, FL 33131. Athena
operates BTMs across the United States, including within the District and internationally, enabling
consumers to purchase Bitcoin using cash. Athena is registered to do business in the District but
does not have the required money transmission license. Athena trades over the counter (outside a
national exchange, but subject to SEC oversight) as Athena Bitcoin Global with a total market
capitalization of more than $200 million and yearly revenue of $192 million.
JURISDICTION
15. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in this Complaint through
D.C. Code § 11-921 and under the District’s Financial Exploitation Act, D.C. Code § 22-937(a),
and the CPPA, D.C. Code § 28-3909.
16. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendant under D.C. Code §§ 13-
422 and 13-423.
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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
I. BTMs Primarily Serve as a Scammer Payment Portal
17. BTMs have rapidly become a preferred tool for scammers worldwide—particularly
those targeting elderly and vulnerable consumers. The speed, anonymity, cross-border
functionality, and irreversibility of cash-to-crypto transactions make BTMs an ideal tool for
scammers.
18. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) have both documented the escalating role of BTMs in financial scams. According to the
FTC, reported fraud losses involving BTMs increased nearly tenfold from 2020 to 2023, reaching
$66 million in the first half of 2024 alone:
(BTM losses by year as reported by the FTC)
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19. The FBI’s data paints an even darker picture. Its 2023 Cryptocurrency Fraud Report
notes that the Internet Crime Complaint Center (“IC3”) received more than 5,500 fraud complaints
in 2023 involving BTMs with total reported losses exceeding $189 million.
20. The impact on elderly consumers is particularly severe. The FTC reports that in
2024, individuals over 60 were more than three times as likely as younger adults to report fraud
losses involving BTMs, accounting for about 71% of all reported losses at these machines.
Similarly, the FBI’s analysis of intakes from its Internet Crime Complaint Center from 2023 shows
that the overwhelming majority of both BTM complaints and losses were concentrated among the
elderly:
(2023 IC3 data as reported by the FBI)
21. This stands in stark contrast to nationwide cryptocurrency usage trends. According
to the FDIC’s National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, individuals 65 or older
are the least likely age cohort to use cryptocurrency:
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(2023 crypto usage data as reported by the FDIC)
22. Losses from scams utilizing BTMs far exceed those reported for most other types
of fraud, with the median reported loss per scam involving a BTM at $10,000 compared to $447
for fraud more generally. Criminals take advantage of the BTM industry’s lack of mandatory
transaction holds, minimal fraud screening, and weak internal consumer protections to convince
elderly victims to withdraw their entire life savings and deposit the cash into a BTM.
23. Scammers do not select these BTMs randomly. They direct victims to specific
operators, favoring those with lax security measures and weak fraud prevention protocols—
providing victims precise instructions on where to find BTMs in each city.
24. Athena plays a major part in this expanding crisis—operating 3,500 BTMs
worldwide, including having operated seven locations in DC. Transaction records show that
Athena’s kiosks in the District average $4,592 per transaction—far more cash than most people
would be comfortable carrying into a gas station. Athena takes an average of 20% per transaction:
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II. Athena’s Profits Are Derived From Undisclosed Fees
25. Through apps and exchanges, Bitcoin can be purchased online for fees ranging from
0.24% to 3%. But Athena BTMs charge District consumers exorbitant fees of up to 26%—without
ever disclosing those fees to the consumer. Athena’s markup is hidden within a fee-inclusive price
that Athena misleadingly displays as the “exchange rate.”
26. None of Athena’s online marketing efforts disclose the fact that Athena charges
transaction fees, much less their magnitude. Athena’s online advertisements direct consumers to
the nearest BTM for “freedom,” “security,” and “satisfaction.” Athena’s website, which is
available to consumers in the District, makes no mention of the existence of the fee:
(Sample of Athena’s online advertisements)
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27. Athena’s fees are also not clearly disclosed at the BTM. Consumers are not told
that they will receive significantly less in cryptocurrency than the cash they insert at any point
before or during the process and may only learn they have been charged a large fee after the
transaction—if at all.
28. Before June 2024, Athena’s BTMs made no mention of the steep transaction fees.
After June 2024, Athena amended its Terms of Service, which are presented to consumers in a text
box only the first time they use a machine. The Terms of Service do not use the word “fee” at all.
Instead, the Terms of Service speak of a “Transaction Service Margin,” which is buried deep
within a 700+ word wall of text that is only accessible by scrolling the BTMs’ digital interface.
Athena’s Terms of Service state that:
A margin (the difference between the market price and the actual selling
or buying price at the kiosk) will be assessed on your purchase or sale of
cryptocurrencies in an amount disclosed to you at the time you make the
offer to purchase or sell cryptocurrency.
29. The Terms of Service falsely claim that the magnitude of the Transaction Service
Margin will be disclosed at the time of purchase when, in fact, Athena never discloses the margin.
In order to determine the margin, a user must independently compare the spot price of Bitcoin to
the “exchange rate” charged at the machine or compare the Bitcoin received to the amount of cash
deposited into the BTM.
30. The Terms of Service present an example of the fee that obfuscates rather than
elucidates:
For example, in the context of a purchase transaction, if you tender a $100
bill and the Transaction Service Margin is $4, the Transaction Service
Margin will be assessed and deducted from the $100 and the remaining
$96 will be used to calculate the quantity of any cryptocurrencies
purchased by you at the quoted price.
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31. This hypothetical example confusingly misstates the process as a flat fee taken prior
to the purchase at the quoted price rather than a fee hidden within the quoted price. In addition,
this example is grossly misleading in the context of a 26% markup.
32. A real-world example provides a more accurate illustration of how the fee
functions. On August 21, 2024, a scam victim deposited $10,000 cash into an Athena BTM located
inside the Exxon station at 3535 Connecticut Ave NW. The price of Bitcoin at the time of the
transaction was $59,936 for one Bitcoin, but Athena marked up the Bitcoin price by 25.4% and
charged the victim an “exchange rate” of $80,315 per Bitcoin. So, of the $10,000 cash fed into the
BTM, Athena transferred just $7,463 worth of crypto (or 0.1245 of a Bitcoin) to the scammer’s
wallet identified by the victim. Athena retained the remaining $2,537 as a fee, which was not
disclosed to the victim.
33. In SEC filings, Athena describes the primary source of its revenue much more
plainly:
We charge a fee per crypto asset available through our Athena Bitcoin
ATM, equal to the prevailing price at U.S.-based exchanges plus a markup
that typically ranges between 13% and 26%. The prices shown to
customers on our Bitcoin ATM are inclusive of this price spread...The
markup varies by location. It is determined by a proprietary method that
is maintained as a trade secret.
Athena does not disclose the breakdown of the markup during the transaction. Instead, Athena
hides these fees in the price of the cryptocurrency displayed during the transaction. Athena’s fees
are excessive, inconsistent, undisclosed, and “maintained as a trade secret” to the detriment of
District consumers.
34. Part of the “secret” of Athena’s fee method is that the more Bitcoin a user buys,
the higher the fee percentage. In the District, small transactions are assessed a fee as low as 13%,
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and then steadily increase until maxing out at approximately a 26% fee for the largest
transactions.
35. Even after a transaction is complete, Athena still does not disclose the fee to the
consumer. After completing a transaction, a consumer receives a receipt from Athena that shows
the cash tendered and the Bitcoin received. Athena’s BTM receipts do not itemize transaction fees
and leave consumers with no clear idea of the exorbitant markup they were charged. The only way
for users to determine the amount of the fee is to compare the highly volatile market price of
Bitcoin at the exact moment of the transaction with the fee-inclusive “exchange rate” charged by
Athena, or by examining the amount of Bitcoin that ultimately appears in the user’s wallet (which
is likely controlled by a scammer).
36. The receipts below show an elderly District resident being charged three different
“exchange rates,” between $90,585 and $93,013 per Bitcoin, when depositing $21,200 into a
scammer’s wallet across three transactions over the course of an hour. The actual cost of Bitcoin
on the date of these transactions was less than $70,000.
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37. Athena’s failure to disclose these fees in a clear and transparent manner prevents
consumers from making informed financial decisions and results in unsuspecting users paying
excessive hidden charges. The company’s deceptive pricing structure is particularly harmful to
elderly consumers, who are often unfamiliar with cryptocurrency transactions and are unlikely to
recognize that they are paying an exorbitant markup.
38. For scam victims, the lack of fee disclosures eliminates a critical opportunity to
recognize that their money is, in fact, not being “protected” before completing the transaction.
Many victims are tricked into believing they must deposit cash into a BTM to “protect” their
money from hackers or fraudsters or other assorted pretextual villains. But if Athena clearly
disclosed its 26% fee before the transaction, some victims may consider the potential loss of a
quarter of their savings and realize that their money is not being protected before it is too late.
III. Athena’s Refund Policy is Misleading and Unfair
39. Athena enforces an opaque refund policy that either denies refunds to scam victims
altogether or caps them arbitrarily, even though, at a minimum, Athena could easily return the
hidden transaction fees that it charges and retains.
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40. Athena’s Terms of Service tell a story of zero refunds, except in what Athena
suggests are limited circumstances required by state law.
Your transaction will be final once you have inserted cash into a kiosk...
All Transaction Service Margins are fully earned when assessed. Unless
required by applicable law, no Transaction Service Margins or any
amounts paid for cryptocurrencies will be refunded for any reason. In the
event that a refund needs to be issued, Athena will refer to the legal
requirements established in each state and adhere to its respective refund
policies. (emphasis added)
41. In practice, Athena actively avoids issuing refunds to victims who have clearly
been defrauded. Athena’s logs of complaints from District customers show that Athena customer
service representatives misrepresent to caller after caller that no refunds are available and instead
point victims to disclaimers, terms and conditions, and law enforcement agencies. As reflected in
Athena’s contemporaneous logs:
• On June 1, 2024, an Athena representative informed a relative of District elder S.K. that:
“Then I confirmed to him that the transaction was already completed and explained why
it cannot be reversal or refunded, then I suggested that he should submit a report to the
local police or the FBI.”
• On July 16, 2024, an Athena representative informed District elder C.S. that: “I told her
how this Bitcoin transaction works, and I explained all the terms and conditions of the
service, and told her that report the case with the police…”
• On July 25, 2024, an Athena representative informed District elder S.H. that: “I told her
how this bitcoins transaction works and explained the terms and conditions and
recommended submit a report with the local police or FBI…”
• On August 17, 2024, an Athena representative informed District elder M.H. that: “i
confirmed to him that the transaction was already completed and explained why it cannot
be reversal or refunded, then i suggested that he should submit a report to the local police
or the FBI.” [errors original]
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42. Athena does not disclose to elderly (and other) fraud victims at any point during or
after the transaction, including when they report fraud and request a refund, that Athena retains a
significant percentage of a victim’s losses as a transaction fee.
43. For example, on July 15, 2024, a 78-year-old District resident was scammed into
cashing out $18,500 worth of her retirement savings and feeding it into an Athena BTM. Later that
same evening, after discussing the matter with some friends, she realized that she had been
scammed. The following day, less than 24 hours after the transaction, the elderly victim called
Athena to report the fraud. Athena informed her that the transaction was final and said there was
nothing to be done but file a report with the police. Athena did not reveal, and the elderly victim
never discovered, that Athena had retained $4,694 of the fraudulent proceeds—funds that Athena
could have immediately refunded.
44. Even when Athena provides refunds after consumers repeatedly follow-up and
involve law enforcement, Athena arbitrarily caps them. According to Sam Nazzaro, Athena’s
Chief Compliance Officer and Regulatory Counsel, Athena’s “Board of Directors has instituted a
limited fee refund policy even though there is no legal or statutory obligation to do so...” and that
policy “caps the potential gross profit refunds at $7500” because “gross profit reflected on any
purchase does not take into account the various costs with running this business.”
45. Under this policy, a District resident who was scammed into feeding $98,000 into
an Athena BTM while paying almost $26,000 in undisclosed fees along the way received a capped
fee refund of $7,500—just 30% of the fee paid and less than 10% of the total losses.
46. As a condition of receiving the arbitrarily capped fee refund, Athena requires a
fraud victim to sign a confidential release, “under penalty of perjury in accordance with 28 USC
sec. 1746,” that frees the company from “any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes
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of action or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever.” The release requires the victim to agree that
they:
…accepted the Terms of Service and attested to our Pledge of Ownership
of the digital wallet... However, it is now alleged, after presenting a
complaint to a law enforcement agency, that the acceptance to the Terms
of Service and the Pledge of Ownership were made in apparent deceit from
a third party despite the warnings provided by the kiosk.
47. The release attempts to free Athena of all future liability while requiring the victim
to blame themselves “under penalty of perjury” for not sufficiently heeding the onscreen warnings.
IV. Athena Knows Its Fraud Warnings Are Ineffective
48. Athena’s BTMs contain warning screens featuring stock photos of people receiving
bad news over the phone. The warnings specifically allude to tech support, bank, and government
imposter scams, and offer a hollow directive: “REACT BEFORE YOU TRANSACT.”
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49. The warnings make clear that Athena knows its BTMs are used in scams where
victims are directed to a BTM by someone else, tricked into “protecting” their money from a
supposed account compromise, threatened with fake arrest, or convinced that they are assisting
with an important government investigation.
50. But scammers don’t let victims think about warnings. As depicted in the photos
below, they keep victims on the phone and off balance throughout the entire scam—talking victims
through the visit to their bank, the trip to the BTM, clicking through its many screens, and that
terrifying moment when a lifetime’s worth of cash is inserted one bill at a time.
(Athena security camera photos of District scam victims.)
51. Scammers tell victims to do as they’re told and not talk to anyone until the deposit
is complete. Scammers explicitly warn victims not to read the on-screen warnings or tell them that
the warnings don’t apply to their situation.
52. The rapid prompts, wordy warnings, and long, complicated legal disclaimers that
Athena uses at its BTMs exacerbate the confusion and pressure that scammers create for their
victims.
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53. Athena knows that its scam warnings are ineffective because most of the money
deposited into Athena’s District BTMs—and 93% of dollars deposited in the first five months of
Athena’s operation in the District—comes from people who are the victims of just these sorts of
scams.
54. Athena is aware its BTMs are commonly used for scams because victims frequently
self-report the scams to Athena. Victims repeatedly describe the same pattern in their complaints
to Athena:
• “someone who pretended to be from Wells Fargo”
• “the scammer impersonated a bank and made me deposit USD 98,120”
• “someone was pretending to be an agent from the Bank of America and said to her bank
account was hacked”
• the scammer said “she was accused in Texas for 3 different counts related to drugs
trafficking, money laundering and identity theft”
• “someone who pretended to be from [a] software company that provide antivirus
software contacted him”
• “someone was impersonating US Government and said to him that he needed to protect
his money”
• “she said that someone who pretended to be from Chase Bank and Apple contacted her”
• “she said that an inspector officer from the US Marshall told her that she was related with
drug traffic” [errors original]
55. Despite clear data showing that its warnings do nothing to stop the imposter scams
driving most of its revenue, Athena has continued operating unchanged—attempting to insulate
itself behind ineffectual warnings and allowing its network of machines to grow into a pipeline for
large-scale elder financial exploitation.
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56. There are obvious measures Athena knows it could take to protect users from
scams. For instance, Athena could adopt reasonable transaction limits to prevent users—especially
first-time users—from being duped into giving away substantial savings all at once. Recognizing
the dangers of unregulated BTMs, certain jurisdictions, including the State of California, where
Athena operates, have enacted such protections. See Cal. Fin. Code §§ 3902, 3905 (imposing fee
disclosure requirements and a $1,000 daily transaction limit). However, Athena, has failed to
implement any such protections on a national level and continued to operate in the District in a
manner that exposed consumers to predictable and preventable financial harm.
57. For example, on July 10, 2024, a 75-year-old District resident lost $27,600 in a
single BTM transaction; on July 15, 2024, a 79-year-old District resident lost $18,500 in single
BTM transaction; and on August 30, 2024, a 73-year-old District resident lost $24,500 in a single
BTM transaction. Athena could have—and should have—prevented each of these scams. Instead,
the company allowed the transactions to proceed and pocketed a combined total of $17,913 in
undisclosed fees on the backs of three District elders who lost more than $70,000 combined.
V. Athena Requires Users to Complete Wallet Attestations That It Knows Are
Ineffective and Processes Clearly Fraudulent Transactions That Are Linked to a
Single Scam Wallet
58. Like its ineffectual “warning” screens, Athena further attempts to shield itself from
liability by requiring its BTM users to tick a series of boxes confirming that the Bitcoin wallet
address was “generated by myself”—a process that the company terms a “Pledge of Ownership”
after a transaction is completed.
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(Athena wallet confirmation before June 2024) (After June 2024)
59. The on-screen prompts (shown above) instruct a user to tick boxes stating, “I
declare that the crypto address shown above was generated by myself” and that the address or QR
Code was not “given to me by a friend, family member, government or bank agent, employer, or
any other third party.” The user completes the screen by clicking a button that states “This is my
personal Bitcoin wallet.”
60. But elderly scam victims standing terror-stricken in gas stations, pockets stuffed
with uncomfortable amounts of cash, do not understand what it means to “generate” a
cryptocurrency wallet or have their own “personal Bitcoin wallet.” In reality, scam victims are
provided a QR code by the scammer that they use to identify the (scammer’s) wallet that should
receive the Bitcoin deposit. Scam victims are unlikely to be familiar with the technical details of
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Bitcoin wallet creation and generation, are unaware that they don’t own or control that wallet, and
are unaware that they are, in fact, transferring money directly to the scammer.
61. Given this Pledge of Ownership, Athena knows or should know when a wallet has
been claimed by a consumer; however, Athena processed transactions when a user requested
money be deposited into a Bitcoin wallet that has already been used by someone else. Athena could
have prevented many of the scams by implementing an obvious fraud prevention measure: it could
have declined to process these transactions. In these instances, Athena knew for a fact that the
wallet was not “generated” by the person depositing the funds and that the wallet is not that
individual’s “personal Bitcoin wallet.” But Athena failed to implement these protections, enabling
it to continue to collect thousands of dollars in transaction fees on the back of fraud victims.
62. An example is illustrative: For the five days starting May 28, 2024, across 56
different transactions, scammers manipulated multiple victims into depositing an aggregate of
$297,143 into a single Bitcoin wallet the scammers controlled. More than 20 of the transactions
originated through Athena BTMs, helping the fraudsters direct $184,871 of the total losses into
that wallet. Two of the victims were elderly District residents, who Athena permitted to deposit
huge sums of cash into the same wallet.
63. By June 1, 2024, the wallet had been completely emptied through KuCoin—a
Seychelles-based crypto exchange that recently agreed to exit the U.S. market after pleading guilty
in the Southern District of New York to charges related to violating U.S. anti-money laundering
laws.
64. This was not an isolated incident. On August 14, 2024, scammers convinced a 74-
year-old District resident that her money was at risk due to a malicious hack on her bank accounts.
At the scammers’ direction, she brought $6,000 cash to an Athena BTM inside the Exxon at 420
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Rhode Island Ave NW (pictured below) to deposit her cash into a crypto wallet using a QR code
as instructed. But the wallet belonged to the scammers, and after Athena took its 25% cut of the
scam, $4,446 worth of Bitcoin was transferred directly into the scammers’ wallet.
(ExxonMobil station at 420 Rhode Island)
65. In the five days leading up to this fraudulent transaction, Athena had already
transferred more than $90,000, across at least seven different transactions, into the same scam
wallet. Multiple victims had already clicked through Athena’s pledge of ownership screen and
confusedly claimed to own that same wallet. Despite having knowledge that the elderly District
resident could not actually own this wallet that had been previously claimed by other victims,
Athena processed and profited from her transaction. By September 11, 2024, the scam wallet had
been completely emptied, and all the money was gone.
66. Athena continued to process transactions even after multiple victims have pledged
ownership of the very same wallet—ignoring an obvious indicator of fraud.
67. Athena has forced victims to pledge wallet ownership to protect itself—to deflect
from the fact that it does not know, or care, who owns the wallets, or where the money is going,
as long they get to keep their undisclosed cut.
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CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT ONE
Deceptive Trade Practices in Violation of the
Consumer Protection Procedures Act, D.C. Code § 28-3904
68. The District re-alleges the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set
forth herein.
69. The CPPA is a remedial statute that is to be broadly construed. It establishes an
enforceable right to truthful information from merchants regarding consumer goods and services
that are or would be purchased, leased, or received in the District of Columbia.
70. Athena’s cryptocurrency transaction services through its BTMs are for personal,
household, or family purposes and, therefore, are consumer goods and services.
71. Athena, in the ordinary course of business, offers to sell or supply, either directly
or indirectly, consumer goods and services and is therefore a merchant as defined by the CPPA.
72. Users of Athena machines purchase consumer goods and services from Athena
through its BTMs and are therefore consumers as defined by the CPPA.
73. The deceptive trade practices that the CPPA prohibits in connection with the sale
of consumer goods and services include:
a. Representing that goods or services have a source, sponsorship, approval,
certification, accessories, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or
quantities that they do not have, D.C. Code § 28-3904(a);
b. Misrepresenting as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead,
D.C. Code § 28-3904(e); and
c. Failing to state a material fact if such failure tends to mislead, D.C. Code
§ 28-3904(f).
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74. Athena has violated the CPPA, including one or more of the foregoing CPPA
provisions, by:
a. Failing to disclose its excessive transaction fees before consumers insert
cash. Consumers are not informed that they will be charged a fee of up to
26%, nor are they provided with a clear explanation of how the fee is
calculated. Instead, Athena buries the fee within a misleading “exchange
rate,” which prevents consumers from understanding the true cost of their
transaction.
b. Misleading scam victims who call to report fraud by failing to disclose that
the company has retained a significant portion of their losses as a transaction
fee. Instead of informing victims that Athena collected up to 26% of the
transaction in fees, Athena implies or directly states that nothing can be
refunded because cryptocurrency transactions are irreversible. This
misleading representation creates the false impression that Athena has no
ability to provide restitution, when in reality it has retained a substantial
portion of the victim’s money.
c. Failing to disclose to consumers when they are depositing funds into a
wallet that has already been associated with one or more previous
transactions with other consumers. Transaction records show that Athena
allows multiple consumers to pledge ownership of the same wallet and send
repeated payments to fraudsters using that wallet. Athena does not warn
consumers when a wallet has already been associated with another
transaction.
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d. Impliedly representing to consumers that it has a money transmission
license to operate in the District when in fact it does not. District consumers
insert money into Athena BTMs for transmission, and Athena transmits
money on their behalf. Athena is thus a money transmitter and is required
to possess a money transmission license under D.C. Code § 26-1002. It does
not have one. Nevertheless, by doing business in the District, it implicitly
holds itself out to consumers as having one.
75. Each of these deceptive acts or practices constitutes a separate violation of the
CPPA.
COUNT TWO
Unfair Trade Practices in Violation of the
Consumer Protection Procedures Act, D.C. Code § 28-3904
76. The District re-alleges the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set
forth herein.
77. The CPPA requires merchants to treat consumers fairly in connection with the sale,
lease, or transfer of consumer goods and services.
78. Athena has violated the CPPA by engaging in the unfair acts and practices alleged
herein. Those unfair acts or practices cause District consumers substantial injury that those
consumers cannot reasonably avoid and that is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to those
consumers or to competition.
79. Athena engages in an unfair trade practice, prohibited by D.C. Code § 28-3904, by
including in its Terms of Service and enforcing an unconscionable provision that states no refunds
will be given under any circumstances, even when a consumer is the victim of fraud. This provision
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unfairly shifts all risk to the consumer while shielding Athena from accountability, despite the
company’s ability to refund its excessive transaction fees.
80. Athena engages in an unfair trade practice, prohibited by D.C. Code § 28-3904, by
systematically preventing scam victims from recovering their stolen funds. When fraud victims
contact Athena shortly after a scam transaction, the company refuses to refund any portion of the
transaction, instead directing victims to law enforcement while retaining a substantial portion of
the stolen funds as fees.
81. Athena engages in an unfair trade practice, prohibited by D.C. Code § 28-3904,
by arbitrarily capping any refunds it provides at $7,500. This arbitrary cap on fee refunds is
unfair because it prevents District consumers from fully recovering funds lost to Athena’s
undisclosed fee collection process.
82. Athena engages in an unfair trade practice, prohibited by D.C. Code § 28-3904, by
failing to implement adequate fraud prevention measures to protect consumers from scams.
Despite knowing that its BTMs are routinely used in fraud schemes and that its warnings are
ineffective, Athena does not take reasonable steps to prevent financial exploitation. It fails to
implement effective consumer warnings and permits large cash deposits from elderly consumers
without intervention.
83. Athena has engaged in unlawful and unfair practices affecting District consumers,
in violation of D.C. Code § 28-3904, by engaging in trade practices that violate the District’s
money transmitter laws, including by operating without the money transmitter license required by
D.C. Code § 26-1002.
84. The substantial injury that Athena’s BTMs inflict on consumers from its unfair acts
and practices includes significant loss of funds through both scams and Athena’s undisclosed fees.
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85. As a direct result of the unfair practices described above, Athena obtained
income, profits, and other benefits that it would not otherwise have obtained.
86. Athena continues to cash in on undisclosed BTM fees despite knowing the harm
its BTMs cause to the District and District residents.
87. Each instance in which Athena engaged in an unfair act or practice as alleged in
this Count constitutes a separate violation of the CPPA.
88. Athena’s violations present a continuing harm, and the unlawful acts and practices
complained of here affect the public interest.
COUNT THREE
Violations of the Abuse, Neglect, and Financial Exploitation
of Vulnerable Adults and the Elderly Act, D.C. Code § 22-931 et seq.
89. The District re-alleges the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set
forth herein.
90. The Financial Exploitation Act, D.C. Code § 22-933.01, prohibits the financial
exploitation of vulnerable adults and the elderly, including “[using] deception . . . to obtain the
property, including money, of a vulnerable adult or elderly person, with the intent to deprive the
vulnerable adult or elderly person of the property or use it for the advantage of anyone other than
the vulnerable adult or elderly person.”
91. Athena violates D.C. Code § 22-933.01 by systematically withholding material
information about its exorbitant transaction fees, preventing consumers—especially elderly users
unfamiliar with cryptocurrency—from understanding how much money they are losing in each
transaction. By failing to disclose its fees clearly and instead embedding them in a misleading
exchange rate, Athena deceives elders into overpaying, extracting substantial sums from
individuals who are already being defrauded.
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92. Athena also violates D.C. Code § 22-933.01 by knowingly benefiting from
fraudulent transactions in which scammers coerce elderly consumers into depositing their money
into Athena’s BTMs. Athena receives numerous complaints from scam victims and is aware of the
prevalence of scam victims utilizing its machines based on its ineffective warnings. In addition,
Athena routinely allows consumers to deposit money into wallets previously used by a different
Athena consumer, which increases the likelihood of scams. Despite these flags, Athena continues
processing these transactions and retaining the fees generated from them.
93. Athena also violates D.C. Code § 22-933.01 by falsely claiming that nothing can
be refunded because “cryptocurrency transactions are final” when elderly scam victims contact the
company to report fraud. In reality, Athena retains a substantial portion of scam victims’ funds in
the form of excessive fees but either refuses to return these funds or sets an arbitrary cap on any
refund.
94. Through its actions, Athena intentionally and knowingly has obtained the money
or property of elderly and vulnerable adults by deception with the intent to use the funds for the
benefit of someone other than those vulnerable and elderly adults (i.e., Athena), in violation of
D.C. Code § 22-933.01(a)(1).
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff the District of Columbia respectfully requests that the Court:
a. Declare that Athena’s conduct violates the CPPA and Financial Exploitation Act, as
described herein.
b. Permanently enjoin Athena, pursuant to D.C. Code § 28-3909(a), from violating the
CPPA, including requiring the company to:
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i. Remove unconscionable contract terms, including its no-refunds policy, its cap on
refunds, and its liability limitation clauses;
ii. Fully disclose all transaction fees, including the actual percentage markup above
the market rate, at the point of sale before consumers insert cash;
iii. Institute and implement adequate fraud prevention measures, including
appropriate daily and monthly transaction limits and effective fraud detection
protocols.
c. Permanently enjoin Athena, pursuant to D.C. Code § 22-937(a)(1), from violating the
Financial Exploitation Act;
d. Enjoin Athena from engaging in money transmissions in the District of Columbia until
Athena has the licenses required by D.C. Code § 26-1002(a);
e. Order Athena to pay damages and restitution pursuant to D.C. Code §§ 28-3909(a), 28-
3909(b)(3), and 22-937(a)(2), for the entire transaction amounts it collected in connection
with fraudulent transactions conducted within the District of Columbia in violation of the
CPPA and Financial Exploitation Act, in an amount to be proven at trial;
f. Order Athena to pay damages and restitution, pursuant to D.C. Code §§ 28-3909(a), 28-
3909(b)(3) and 22-937(a)(2), for all undisclosed fees it collected within the District of
Columbia in violation of the CPPA and Financial Exploitation Act, in an amount to be
proven at trial;
g. Award civil penalties of $10,000 for each violation of the Financial Exploitation Act
pursuant to D.C. Code § 22-937(a)(5), in a total amount to be proven at trial;
h. Award civil penalties of $5,000 for each violation of the CPPA pursuant to D.C. Code
§ 28-3909(b), in a total amount to be proven at trial;
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i. Award the District the costs of this action and reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to D.C.
Code §§ 28-3909(b) and 22-937(a)(3); and
j. Grant such further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
JURY DEMAND
The District of Columbia hereby demands a trial by jury.
Date: September XX, 2025 Respectfully submitted,
BRIAN L. SCHWALB
Attorney General for the District of Columbia
COTY MONTAG
Deputy Attorney General
Public Advocacy Division
WILLIAM F. STEPHENS
BETH MELLEN
Assistant Deputy Attorneys General
Public Advocacy Division
/s/ Alicia M. Lendon
ALICIA M. LENDON [1765057]
Chief, Civil Rights & Elder Justice Section
Public Advocacy Division
/s/ Anabel M. Butler
ANABEL M. BUTLER [90006593]
JASON JONES [90003354]
Assistant Attorneys General
400 6th Street, NW, Suite 10100
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 841-6061
[email protected]
Attorneys for the District of Columbia
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