Document text
r- - - e I V
1;> ' _ F . K AL/L. ironwrrrom CONTAINED7 HEP IS UNCLASSIFIED
DA
U I A-i1~ U
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
. Date of transcription O1 Z 31 O04
ALI HASAN ALMAJID~ ALIIKRIII, aka "Chemical .A1'i"
Blacklist #5! date of birthiJuly I, I941, place of birth Tikrit,
hd d 1 Iraq was interviewed at the Bag' a Internationa :'~¢- * : :'
Baghdad, Iraq. Also fpresent at the interview wasUS Army Representative» [::::;;:::::::::%;:] FBI L- -u-i- Y- " I
provided Arabic/English trans ation. A ter being advised that the
interviewing Agents were members of the United States Government
from Washington, DC, MAJID provided the following information:
MAJID is from the Abu Nasir tribe or clan located in and
around Tikrit, Iraq. Fourteen different tribes/families lived in
this area. MAJID's grandfather was the Governor of Tikrit. His
father was a well-known, highly respected individual in Tikrit who
had "no problems with anyone." There were no major problems *
between the families of the area. Issues were normally solved
without approaching the government for a solution.
. Tribal thoughts and customs pervade the entire social
structure in Iraq including Baghdad. As an example, MAJID
described how the tribe deals with an incident such as a car
accident involving a fatality. After the accident, an agreement
between the families of the involved parties normally takes place
regarding the punishment of the person deemed at fault. -This
agreement is then presented to a court and sentencing occurs based
on the recommendation from the two families.
MAJID's tribe has two primary rules, one which prohibits
"fighting" within the tribe and the other which prohibits a man
from "flirting" with a single woman. For violation of either rule
an offender would be killed.' . ~ '
The oldest male.member of the tribe is generally the
"sheikh" or leader and tends to be the one who is most respected
and fair. Sometimes, however, the oldest male may not be able to
fulfill this function due to mental or physical difficulties.
MAJID became "sheikh" of his tribe after the death of the third
person in line. 'Saddam Hussein, MAJID's cousin and former
hwmwmnml, 01/31/2004 M Baghdad, Iraq ' _ .
File # 315E-HQ-14485 I Date-dictated 0113112004 .°§_Georqe h. Pir ' b Mg] ' . . WA *7 , ,
This docu_ment contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. Itis the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to he digtributed outside your agency. . _pD_302 Rev_10_6_95! _ . 5-ll-ZUUQ BY 60324 ~UC' BAH/5&3/L$C
be
'b7C
_b6
b7c
4i ____ ' ,
5 2%" 7 i _
. I _ 92 *" ' Q 929'
FD 302a Rev iows!
315E-HQ-1448534
Conunuatmn ofFD-302 of . Al i Hasan A1 -Maj id Al -__Tikriti , On _O 1 /,3_l,/2 D O4 , Page 2
President of Iraq, later declared that he was "sheikh" of MAJID"s
tribe. . V ,
Concerning the Iraqi Ba'ath Party Ba'ath!, MAJID advised
that from its inception the Party embraced a "democratic and
humanitarian vision." MAJID still believes in these principles.
The party does not believe in war, killing, mass killings, one
person taking charge, oppression, or "bad behaviors." MAJID added
Islam,does not believe in violence or oppression.
The acts of,some members of the Ba'ath, including
Hussein, "brought shame to the Party." This included "bad
behaviérs" that were individual acts of Ba'ath members. MAJID
agreed that there was a contradiction between the original tenets
of the Ba'ath and the way it was practiced under Hussein's regime.
This change occurred from the beginning and continued throughout
Hussein's Presidency. 1
MAJID described a meeting which took place in July, 1979
shortly after Hussein assumed leadership of Iraq. Hussein invited
all Ba'ath members to a meeting in Baghdad. MAJID was the Director
of a "branch" of the Baath at the time, At the meeting, Hussein
provided details of~a coup attempt in the Party. Over sixty
members were identified and taken by security forces from the
meeting hall. The investigation into this matter was headed by
Barzan Ibrahim Hasan Al-Tikriti, Hussein's brother. MAJID does not
know the details of the investigation and did not look at the
files. Until the moment the "plot"_was announced, MAJID had heard
no information regarding this matter. It appeared that many people
had been "marked," meaning they had been previously identified,
rightly or wrongly, as being involved in_a plot against Hussein.
If some were wrongly accused, it was by Barzan and not Hussein.
MAJID thought this "plot" might have been a continuation of one
uncovered in previous years involving Abdul Khaliq Al-Samarra'i and
Nathim Ghezar. In 1979, MAJID said, "If Samarra'i lives, coups
will continue." MAJID was in a "sad mood" at the time of this
meeting. However, he felt all persons identified were guilty.
MAJID described his views regarding Hussein. During the»
period twenty years ago and more, MAJID considered Hussein to be
the closest person to him. They grew apart from-then until a_
period of time about ten years ago. At'that time, MAJID came to a
"crossroads" in life and was thinking about leaving the Ba'ath.
Hussein convinced him to remain. Without Hussein's approval, q
MAJID's resignation would "shame" his tribe. Thus, MAJID continued
" ' 31 Q .~
FD-302a Rev 10-6 95!
315EHQ~l4.48534
Conhnuat1onofFD-3020f W Ali Hasan Al-Majid AlTikriti .011 Q1/31/_2004 Jase 3
in government service-during the past ten years, though not as a ~
volunteer. 1 . . I
MAJID stated that during this time he was appointed to
three different Ministerial posts without first being asked or
notified. He learned of these appointments from radio and
television announcements. Concerning his most recent appointment
as Minister of Interior, MAJID heard that Hussein was reluctant to
ask MAJID to serve in this capacity for fear that MAJID would
refuse and thereby embarrass Hussein.
Before the 2001 Ba'ath Conference, MAJID asked Hussein
whether he would continue as a Party member. MAJID simply wanted
out of the Baath. Hussein denied this request. In more recent
times, Hussein told MAJID that he could terminate his membership in
the Party at the 2004 Conference. MAJID described the day he heard
this news as "the happiest day of my life."
During the last seven to eight years, Hussein refused to
accept advice or criticism from his closest advisors even if he was
wrong. VAfter Hussein Khamil, Hussein's sonin-law, fled Iraq to
Jordan in 1995, Hussein did not trust anyone and appeared to change
for the worse. He seemed particularly wary of individuals who were'respected in the Party. "
MAJID described his feelings and those of others
regarding issues leading the latest war with the United States.
MAJID wanted the United Nations Special Commission UNSCOM!
inspectors to visit Iraq in 2003, as did the majority of the Ba'ath
leadership. They felt the boycott would not be ended without
certification of the termination of Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction WMD! program. Hussein, however, did not agree that
the inspectors should be allowed to enter Iraq. Thus, MAJID and
the other leaders had to support Hussein. If not, they would have
been viewed as traitors and on the side of the United States.
During this period, Hussein, Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri, Taha
Ramadan, Tariq Aziz, and MAJID held a discussion regarding WMD.
The four men "pressed" Hussein to.tell UNSCOM and the world that
Iraq has no WM. Hussein did not agree stating that Israel would
strike Iraq if they felt Iraq had no WMD. At this meeting, MAJID
asked Hussein, "Do we have " Hussein asked, "Don't; you know?"
MAJID stated "no" to which Hussein replied "no."
, 92' ' . I 1 I . m
ED-302a Rev.10-6-95! ' 92 "
Q
3l5EHQ1448534
ContinuationofFD-3020f Ali..Hasan A1-Maj id AlTikriti ! " ,,0n 01/31/2004 ,Pas<> A 4
Prior to the 2003 war, MAJID attended a meeting of the
Iraqi leadership, including Hussein, where MAJID stated that "Iraq
will lose the war." However, Hussein was convinced that Iraq would
win. ~MAJID considered this unbelievable as Iraq had undertaken no
preparations or special precautions in anticipation of the war.
Additionally, no plans were made for the post-war period,
especially regarding the potential needs for adjustments or changes
in the leadership of Iraq. As before, MAJID wanted to resign. "He
did not want to take responsibility for the actions of one
individual, Hussein. MAJID added, "I'm fair. Saddam is not."
Hussein was a "dictatorship of one man." Hussein is "cruel in
dealing with everyone including relatives."
MAJID does not believe he has a chance to "clear his ~
name" while imprisoned. He would like to see all the former Iraqi
leaders, including those currently in jail, tell the truth and
"criticize" Hussein. If MAJID were to do this by himself, he
believes he would be viewed as a spy. MAJID stated it would be
more appropriate for him to first solicit the opinions and supportof other Iraqi leaders. *
At this point, interviewers asked how one could get
Hussein to take responsibility for his actions. MAJID replied that
Hussein would take responsibility-if "faced with the facts"~such as
the previously discussed issue regarding UNSCOM weapons inspectors.
Interviewers later asked whether MAJID and other Iraqi leaders
would be willing to compile a list of advice offered to Hussein on
major issues which Hussein ignored or rejected. MAJID responded
that he would first need to talk to these former Iraqi leaders.
Later, however, MAJID stated that this could best be accomplished
if he were released from custody and had the opportunity to form
his own political party.
Interviewers asked whether MAJID considered Hussein
"evil." MAJID replied "there are two faces of Saddam." One face
revealed a man who freely shared his wealth with those in need.
MAJID once saw Hussein crying while reading the Koran. The other
face of Hussein was one of "evil." He was "so cruel you could not
imagine," ,
Hussein had no friends, either inside or outside his
family. Hussein did not even trust his own sons. His personality
was not stable and he was "lonesome.". When presented with a
problem, Hussein often made quick decisions without all the facts.
His worst decision was the most recent war with the United States,
1
.1 92
~v an302a Rev 10-6-95!
315E-HQ-1448534
Contmuatxon ofFD-302 of Al i Hasan Al Maj id A1 ~Tikriti , on O1 /3 1 /,2 04 W388. 92
the world's greatest superpower, coming after-a lengthy and
unsuccessful war with Iraq and thirteen years of an economic
boycott.
* MAJID acknowledged the Pshame" Hussein had brought upon
his tribe and the Iraqi people; MAJID appeared to agree that he
had a responsibility to reclaim honor for his tribe as a result of
Husseinls actions while serving as leader of Iraq.
X.
F ~ ' 92 ~ l { 1 -
r ' 92 ' . ~
i ' ~ I PILL ULTIUH CUNTAINED ' n HERE:Ex UNCLASSIFIED
FD3°2 R°" 1°'6-95> . mm: 05-11-zoosrnr 60324 uc BAWISABJLSC
_ _1_
' FEDERAL BUREAU OF HWESTIGATION
1 Date of transcription 02 [04 [2004
I ALI HASAN ALMAJID AL¢'IIKRITI, aka"Chemical Ali
Blacklist #5! date of birth July 1, 1941, place of birth Tikrit,
Iraq was interviewed at the Baghdad International Ai ort BIAP
Baghdad, Iraq Also present at the interview wasUS Army Representative. | FBI L b7c
provided Arabic/English trans ation. A ter being advised that the
interviewing Agents were members of the United States Government
from Washington, DC, MAJID provided the following information:
MAJID described his role in Kuwait from August, 1990-
January, 1991. ' .
MAJID first provided background information leading to
his appointment to duties in Kuwait. MAJID was summoned to an
Iraqi leadership meeting on August 7, 1990. In attendance were
Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leaders. Hussein told MAJID that he
MAJID! needed to go to Kuwait.' MAJID told Hussein "the leadership
is here," and there should be someone among them who is qualified
for the job. .He reminded Hussein that he had previously sent the
Intelligence Director on such a mission and "me going will do no
good." Hussein replied, "OK. We'll see." Upon conclusion of the
meeting, Hussein announced to everyone that MAJID would be going.to
'Kuwait. At the time of this.announcement, MAJID remembers Hussein
was placing his handgun on his person. MAJID responded, "By your
order, I go." At the time, Sabawi Hasan Ibrahim, Hussein's *brother, was already in Kuwait. J 7
Z , I Hussein's declaration to the Iraqi leadership authorized
MAJID and Sabawi the responsibility of "managing" Kuwait. Aziz
Saleh AlNoman was appointed Governor of Kuwait and "included" inthe security plans. * i
The work in Kuwait was-divided into two parts, with
Sabawi serving as Director of Intelligence in charge of security of
Kuwait and MAJIDLcharged with the responsibility ofmaintaining
"organigation" among-the various Ministries. Sabawi was in charge
of the Security Committee of Kuwait with members from various
government components including intelligence, special security, the
Invesngaon on 02/04/2004 at Baghdad, Iraq . . 92 .
1=11=# 3l5EHQ144853 ~10 - lvaredictawr 0210412004 . b6 'George L. Piroég H_* s b7c
' ~ . .J W I
Thxs doc92iment_contains'neither recommendations nor cpngilusions of the FBI; It is the property of the F131 and is, loaned to your égency;I 1t and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
-92 r ' . . . ~ . Q
~ FD-302_a Rev. 10-6-95! $
Q. Q
315E-HQl448534
C6ntinuationofFD-3020f i ALI HASAN AL-MAJID ALTIKRITI .011 02/ 6.4/2004 mag, 2
4
police, the military, and the militia. MAJID stated both he and
Sabawi had equal overall responsibility with respect to Kuwait.
In Kuwait, MAJID interacted with various ministers
including the Minister of High Education, the Minister of Trade,
the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Transportation, the
Minister of Interior, the Minister of Industry, and the Minister of
Local Government.
_ Part of MAJID's duties and one which he was "happiest" to
perform was the protection of the "belongings and finances" of the
people of Kuwait. MAJID stated, "I was severe_inkperforming my
job" and "committed crimes." These "crimes" were actions directed
at Iraqi military personnel who broke the law. MAJID described the
details of three events or "crimes."
In one instance, a captain in the Iraqi forces told
soldiers under his command to burglarize an electronics store in
Kuwait. The soldiers complied, broke into the store, and took
various electronic devices including televisions. When MAJID heard
of this incident, he ordered the arrest of the captain. The matter
was then referred to a committee for investigation. Upon
conclusion, the captain was sentenced to death. NormallY, the
arrest of a military officer requires approval by Hussein or the
Minister of Defense. In this instance,'MAJID called one of
Hussein's bodyguards for "approval" to carry out the-sentence after
the conclusion of the investigation and trial. Thereafter,
Presidential Secretary Hamid Hamadi informed MAJID-of the approval.
The execution was carried out in Kuwait in front of a government
building in the county of Al-Kathima.
In another incident, a woman in Kuwait, possibly .
Lebanese, was sexually assaulted by an Iraqi soldier. MAJID
-contacted the head of the military unit of the accused soldier and
a committee was formed.to investigate the attack. The soldier was
found guilty and sentenced to death. With the permission of the
woman, the.soldier was executed at the same location the assault
occurred.
The third incident involved three Iraqi military
personnel who raped a Kuwaiti woman and stole items from her house.
Again, an investigation took place and the three men were sentenced
to death; With the permission of the woman, the men were_executed
in front of.her house.
1 I
if ""I 3 _i Inn 1111, _ ' C l
92 v f 7 92 ' -i 92 EFD-302a Rev. 104-95! 92
/<5! <9
315E~HQ1-448534
Cont1nuat1onofFD-3026f M ALI HASAN AL-MAJID ALTIKRITI ,on 02/04/2004 ,Page 3
MAJID only attended executions of military personnel. Henever attended executions of civilians»
MAJID denied personal knowledge of any atrocitiescommitted in Kuwait by Iraqi military members or Iraqi citizens
prior to or during the reported.occurrences during the occupationof_Kuwait. MAJID is aware of media reports regarding these eventswhich came after the occupation. MAJID is not aware of the results
of an international and not Kuwaiti! investigation detailing the
crimes committed. He has no knowledge of the findings of the
investigation which details the atrocities including torture sites
located at police stations or sports facilities, punishment
including amputations of limbs, ears, noses, tongues, genitalia,and eyes, and torture via use of electric shock. Furthermore,
MAJID is not aware of 500 Iraqis identified as war criminals and
1082 Kuwaiti civilian deaths, including 57 mentally handicappedindividuals, which occurred as a direct result of Iraqi misconduct.
MAJID denied knowledge of punishment, including execution, of
individuals who failed to display pictures of Hussein, displayedpictures of the Kuwaiti royal family, or wrote anti-Iraqi graffiti.
MAJID stated "If I had heard of these atrocities you detailed, I
would have asked to be released from duty." He does not doubt they
occurred but reiterated that he never heard such information, did
,not witness such events, and had no knowledge of these events at 7
that time. If committed, these atrocities would have been carriedout by the Iraqi Intelligence Service under the direction of Sabawi
who reported directly to Hussein.
MAJID is aware of the destruction/sabotage of the Burgan
and AlRumaila oil fields by the Iraqi military. This "operation"was not the responsibility or under control of MAJID but fell under
the direction of the Iraqi military.
MAJID denied personal knowledge of any persecution,including executions and imprisonment, of Shia Muslims living in
southern Iraq in 1991. He denied personal knowledge of the
destruction of Shia villages during this or any other time.
MAJID denied personal knowledge of any persecution,
including executions and imprisonment, of Kurdish individuals
living in northern Iraq during the Anfal Campaign in the late
1980s. He denied personal knowledge of the destruction of Kurdishvillages during this or any other time. " - ' "
92
. - _ .. _, _ . _ .. .
1 II 92
92<
315EHQel448534
Cmmmwmwwébfy ALI HASQN ALMAJlDWAL-TIKRITI t ,d102/04/2004 ,m@- 4
~ MAJID denied personal knowledge or responsibility _
regarding Iraqi use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War,
against the Kurds, or at any other time. He stated, "I never used
or saw anything about chemicals." ,
. MAJID avoided interfering with "things that had nothing
to do" with him. He felt as if Hussein was "watching" him. At one
point, Hussein took some property from MAJID.
- When asked whether he feared Hussein in the past, MAJID
replied, "Yes. I was afraid that if I_disobeyed him, he would tell
our tribe that I was a coward." When asked whether he feared
Hussein now, MAJID replied, "No- If given a month to talk to our
tribe, I would'be able to convince them and Saddam would lose to
me." "
MAJID wishes Hussein was dead. MAJID wishes Hussein had
"martyred or killed" himself instead of being captured. Hussein's
sons Qusay and Uday! died "honorably," even though Uday was a bad
person. In contrast, Husseinls ending capture! was "lousy,"
displayed his cowardice, and brought shame to the tribe. Martyrdom
of Hussein would have brought honor to the tribe. After Husseins
capture, MAJID offered to kill him for the Us military. MAJID
believes history will be the judge of Iraq and Hussein as its ruler
for the past twenty-four years; 1
MAJID does not consider himself a failure, except that he
"stayed with Hussein." MAJID feels he had no choice butto carry
out Hussein's orders. * d :
Though Hussein is no longer head of their tribe, MAJID
stated that he could.not testify against him because it would
shame the tribe." If giyen the opportunity to first talk to the
tribe, MAJID.feels he could explain the situation. Then, he might
be able to provide information in public regarding Hussein.
921 I y 0/ I
, 92~
' FD-302a Rev. 10-6-95!92
} Imwtwmon 03/20/2004 'M Baghdad, Iraq , I ' . .A ' b6
File # - - - 317 Date dictated _ Z a * _ 03/21/2004 1>7c
by eorge L: ' I , _- _, ALL INEDRIIATIQN CONTAINEDJWQR - h HEREIN IS umcnnsszrrzn= ° 1 *9 DATE uses?-2009 BY 60324 uc bawjseb/n
no
FEDEMULBUNMHIOEINVESHGATHMY__ 5;, . . _,,___W L ___,=;__ WT
1
' D=1l=°.fm5¢p!iqn 03/21/2004
On 03/21/2004, Ali Hasan AlMajid Black List #5! was
interviewed at a military detention facility at Baghdad
International Airport BIAP!, Baghdad, Iraq. AlrMajid was advised
the interviewing agents were representatives of the United States
Government. The interview was monitored by a representative of the
military Joint Interro ation D inee Cell JIDC!. FBI LanguageSpecialist LS!E;;;::;;i::::;;:;Eiprovided Arabic/Englishtranslation. A aji provi ee he following information:
~During the years 1987 through 1989, AlMajid served as
Secretary General of the Ba'ath Party's Northern Bureau Command
with responsibility over northern'Iraq including Kurdish territory.
Iraq was divided into the Northern, Central, Euphrates, and
Southern Sectors. Al+Majid replaced Mohammad Hamza Zubaydi Black
List #9!, former Secretary General. Saddam Hussein appointed
AlMajid to this position during a meeting of the Revolutionary
Command Council RCC!. At the meeting, Hussein informed AlMajid
of his new responsibilities*while simultaneously appointing Zubaydi
as Iraqi Minister of Transportation. AlMajid's appointment was
made personally-by Hussein, as he was clearly in charge, and no
vote was taken by the RCC; Prior to this appointment, Al-Majid was
the Deputy Commander of the Ba'ath Party"s Military Organization.
AlMajid was shown and read a copy of a document written
in Arabic, described as RCC decree number 160, dated March 29,
1987, signed by Saddam Hussein, which sets forth details regarding
AlMajid's appointment as.the representative of the Ba'ath Party
for the northern region of Iraq, including the Autonomous Region of
Kurdistan. AlMajid acknowledged that this decree was issued and
that it spelled out his authority over all civilian, military-and
security agencies in the region. He stated a decree is issued at
the conclusion of an RCC meeting which details issues addressed by
the RCC. AlMajid denied, however, having authority over the *
military forces or security services in the region, as the security
services are never subordinate to anyone in the government except
Hussein. The security services, Fedayeen Saddam, and Saddam's Cubs
answered to Hussein only and took their instructions only from _
Hussein. AlMajid received a copy of decree number 160 in writing
at a later time. Immediately after issuance of the decree, he also
mmmwmmmmmmmmmmmwmmmmiRwmmwwwmhmwwmmmmwm
it and.its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
I Ib6
b7C
~ - q_ my . _ F._ I
i
315ErHQ~1448534302
. ~
Conunu£md6fFD-3020f Ali Ha's'Z'=i~ri Alf-Maj id " " ';OniO_3/_20/20011 g,1=a,-';= --2_ 02'
.received additional instructions in writing from the Presidential a
Diwan which further defined his authority.' , e
As specified to him in the additional instructions,
AlMajid only used the authorities in the decree for the
"collectivization" of the villages in the.northern region located
within five kilometers km! of provinces, and areas classified as
cities, zones, or suburbs. This "collectivization" consisted of
moving villagers from.their homes to Iraqi government housing
complexes; Per the additional instructions given to AlMajid,
iareas outside of five km fell within the control of the military
including cities near the border between Iraq and Iran. AlMajid
noted that the Anfal Campaign in Kurdish territory in 1988 was .
conducted by the military under the command of Sultan Hashim Ahmad
AlTai Black List #27!. The instructions that followed decree
number 160 set the aforementioned five km parameters and restricted
AlMajid's authority. AlMajid acknowledged that he did delegate
orders to the security.services as it pertained to the areas under
his span of control, but the services acted independentlyeverywhere else to include their technical work. .
g Al=Majid claimed to have once excused himself from a
meeting where a discussion was to take place regarding the
collectivization of villages outside the five km boundary. In
AlMajid's opinion at that time, such actions would have required a
large budget, engineers, planners and other professionals which he~
did not have at his disposal. AlMajid concluded that such tasking
should have been controlled by the Minister of Housing. The
Ministry of Housing had the responsibility for the construction of
housing complexes for the villagers affected by the
collectivization. AlMajids role was to inform the governors of
the various provinces of the completion of the complexes to
initiate the transfer of the villagers.
AlMajid claimed each province had a security committee
composed of representatives from the various security services.
These committees were not, however, under his control- If AlMajid
required assistance, he would seek it from the Army Chief of-Staff.
The military had two major bases, one in Suleimaniyeh and the other
in Kirkuk, where the 1st Army Corps headquarters was located..
AlMajid does not hate the Kurds as they are Iraqis and
his people. Just as the Arabs,.the Kurds have good and bad people.
AlMajid claimed to have personal relations with many_Kurds.
AlrMajid had a good relationship with Jalal Talabani and claimed[ ' I » 92
FD 302a Rev 10-6-95!
1_ .
' FD-302a Rev. -1o+9s! >
9 ea
315EHQl448534302 i '
ContinuaonofFD-3020f w AliAHasan AlMajid 92 ,0 03120/2094 ,1»... 3
they had eaten at each other's homes. AlMajid disliked Talabani
but did not hate him. He affectionately referred to him as the
sheikh of the saboteurs. Al~Majid stated "saboteurs" was the
term the Iraqis used in official documents to describe Kurds who
resisted Iraqi government rule. AlMajid had only heard that the
"saboteurs" had relationships with other governments such as Iran
and Turkey, and eventually with the United States and other western
countries. Iran entered into a relationship with the Kurds,
whereby Iran not only benefitted from the relationship but also
destroyed the Kurds Iraqi reputation; In 1987, Iran declared that
year would be the last one of the Iran~Iraq War and sent its agents
into Kurdish territories inside Iraq. Iran attempted to establish
its presence in certain areas such as Halabja and others.
According to AlMajid, these actions necessitated military action
by Iraq. AlMajid agreed that it was difficult for the Iraqr
government to distinguish Kurds from Iranians or good individuals
from bad ones. ' I
Al<Majid's powers in the northern region lasted
approximately two years until April, 1989, but he does not recall
whether an RCC decree was issued repealing his powers. Hassan Ali
AlAmiri replaced AlMajid as the Secretary General of theNorthern
Bureau Command. In June, 1989, AlMajid was appointed Minister of
Local Government.
AlMajid denied having any knowledge of executions of
Kurds in Northern.Iraq. Al~Majid stated his duties included the
collectivization of villages within the specified five km boundary
into government housing complexes. Those villages outside of the
five km boundary fell under the control of Nazar Khazraji, Iraqi
Army Chief of Staff. As part of the process, AlMajid ordered
Kurds within the BaKath Party to explain the need for
collectivization to the effected Kurdish population. Additionally,
AlMajid declared that no one, not even one person, would be moved
until the land was prepared and electricity was established. As
part of their relocation, the affected Kurds were given 3,000 Iraqi
Dinars approximately $10,000! to build new homes within the
authorized zones. Alternatively, the Kurds were allowed to choose
new living quarters within the government housing complexes.
Al1Majid also coordinated the travel of those living in distant
villages t6-théir'new homes by communicating with the governors of
the provinces. These tasks required considerable effort from allthe government services. * * ,
.
i I
92 v92 ' T
- F1>sv=a<R=v,1o-é~9s>- * _ ~
315E-HQ-1448534-302
Cont_inuationofFD-3020f Ali Hasan Al- Majid _ V ,on 03/20/2004 wage 4
After the deportation or collectivization process began,
AlMajid believed that the Kurds and Iranians felt threatened. The
Iranian insurgents previously would have had to walk only
approximately five km in mountainous terrain to bordering villages
where refuge or assistance was provided. However, because of the
deportation process, this distance was increased and it became more
difficult for insurgents to cross mountainous terrain without safe
havens.
Al~Majid agreed that most-Kurds did not want to move or
leave their homes. Those that did were seeking improvements such
as electricity, refrigerators, and school teachers. If Kurds
refused to be relocated, they were forced into vehicles and taken
with their belongings to government housing complexes. Once the -
villagers were deported, the villages were leveled so as not to *
become safe havens for saboteurs. 'Al~Majid stated these were not
his personal orders but those of the Iraqi government as it cost
millions of dinars and required the efforts of all of thegovernment's ministries. 7
Interviewers played a portion of an audiotape of A17
-Majid's voice in Arabic. This tape is described in a Human Rights
Watch HRW! report titled "Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign
-Against the Kurds," dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-
Majid Tapes, as a recording of a Northern Bureau meeting to review
gthe campaigns Of 1987 and 1988._ According to HRW, the tape is
undated but is in a batch dated January 21 and 22, 1989.! In the
tape, Al~Majid discusses the previous decision to collectivize and
destroy villages. AlMajid acknowledged that the tape contains his
words and his voice. He acknowledged that he ordered the
=destruction of homes within the prohibited zones after the
residents were removed. Al~Majid acknowledged that he held a
separate meeting wherein he instructed-those under his command that
no house was to remain standing within the prohibited zones. Al-
Majid also acknowledged that he informed his subordinates that he
would tour the prohibited zones and if his orders were not carried
out completely, he would hold the section commander responsible,
'During a portion of the same tape, AlMajid stated that
.he.,dis.cuss.e.Q1 W.ith.l§TaZ§lI-.'.Kl1§1ZIai5.-, Jraqi Army Qhie ¢f_§ta??f,. thefailure of Tali Al>Duri,"5th Army Corps Commander, to carry out
his orders. AlMajid claimed that this portion of the tape
demonstrates that he did not have authority over the military, as
Al-Majid could only complain about military officers that failed to
~carry out their orders. AlMajid claimed that if he did have
i
_ g
~ FD-30211 Rev. 10-6195! _ .
IQ Q
315EHQ<l448534302
ContinuationbfFD-3020f Ali Hasan AlMajid ,onyo3/E20/2004 ,1=ag° 5 _
_ ¢
authority over the military, he wouldihave removed Al-Duri.
However, AlDuri was allowed to finish his assignment and continued
to other posts.
_ Al~Majid was shown and read a copy or a handwritten
letter in Arabic, described as number 3324, dated May 14, 1987,
from the Director of Security, Halabja Security Directorate to the
Suleimaniyeh Security Directorate. The letter details an order by
the Commander of the First Army Corps, as requested by AlMajid, to
execute wounded civilians, to use bulldozers to level
neighborhoods, to impose a curfew, and to destroy with tanks and
bulldozers any house which opens fire. 'AlMajid denied knowledge
of this order from the Iraqi military or any such request from him
and suspects the document is a forgery. AlMajid stated he would
not have issued an92prder to a Corps Commander. In AlMajids *
opinion, the letter did not follow the normal chain of command.
AlMajid denied that civilians were executed after interrogations.
He added that interrogations were the responsibility of the
security services. ~
AlMajid was shown and read a copy of a document written
in Arabic, described as number 28/3650, dated June 3, 1987, signed
by AlMajid, marked "Top Secret and Personal" directed to various
military, political and security commands. It orders, in part, _
that the armed forces kill any human being or animal present within
the prohibited areas. AlMajid admitted to issuing such an order,
and that it was.sent to the referenced agencies including the _
military. Al-Majid acknowledged the authenticity of the copy-of
this document and confirmed the authenticity of his signature on
the last page. ~
AlMajid was shown and read a copy of a dbcument written_
in Arabic, described as Directive 4008, dated June 20, 1987, signed
by AlMajid, addressed to various military commands. The subject
of the directive is "Dealing With The Villages That Are Prohibited
For Security Reasons." It lists certain actions to be effective as
of June 22, 1987. Paragraph two states, "The presence of human
beings and animals is completely prohibited in these areas, and
these shall be regarded as operational zones in which the troops
can open fire at will, without any restrictions, unless otherwise
instructed by our'headquarters;"- Paragraph four statesn in part,
"The Corps Commands shall carry out random special bombardments l»
using artillery, helicopters and aircraft at all times of the day
or night in order to kill the largest number of persons present in
those prohibited areas." Paragraph five states, in part, "All
. in ._* Ii I I" I I. !.
~ FD-302a. Rev.10-6-95! _ »
. 92
3l5E~HQl448534302
Continui1tionofFD-3020f H Ali Hasan AlMajid V ,On 03/20/2004 ,Pas*=~ -6-
1
persons captured in those villages shall be detained because of
their presence there, and they shall be interrogated by the
security services.and those between the ages of 15 and 70 are to be
executed after any useful information has been obtained from them."
AlMajid admitted issuing the order in paragraph two. According to
Al-Majid, everyone, whether civilian or military, knew that no one
was allowed in those areas as it was a theater of operations.
Anyone caught in those areas, including women and children, was to
be killed. Al~Majid denied issuing the orders in paragraphs four
and five. AlMajid acknowledged the authenticity of the copy of
this document and confirmed the authenticity of his signature on
the last page. . .
'AleMajid was shown andread a copy of a document written
in Arabic, dated November 22, 1988, from the Deputy Brigadier
General of Security, Director of Security of Erbil Province to the
Section Security Chiefs. This document reiterates paragraph five
of Directive 4008, dated June 20, 1987, and states that this -
portion of the directive "is to be applied to anyone present in the
prohibited areas." AlMajid questioned the authenticity of this
document stating that such an order. Directive 4008! was already in
effect and did not need to be repeated. y
A1Majid stated that while he_was authorized to issue
orders to the military, he did not have the authority to take -
action against military members if they did not carry out his
orders. . h
Copies of the documents referenced in this report are
contained in the 1A section of the file.*.a ~:____ _ w_H -f-__l ____" _ r_~_ i;=§:#>~~:=::1z>- »i 1, 92.
_ I
i ]
i
92
i
t
i
|
t
i~ W
' AIL IN_E_§RHATION c0n'r.u1n:092»£"FD.3 !g R¢v_92§ !_5.95!. . IERE s UNCLASSIFIED ~ 2
R» DATE 01-2009 Br: 60324 uqgbaw/_sab/rs1
"1? .
FEDERAL BUREAU on JNVESTIGATION
Date oftranscription O392[27[2004
On 03/27/2004, Ali Hasan Al-Majid Black List #5!_was
interviewed at a military detention facility at}Baghdad ,
International Airport BIAP!, Baghdad, Iraq. The interview was .
monitored by a representative of the military Joint Interro ationDetainee Cell JIDC!. FBI Language Specialist LS![;;:::::fg[::::::]provided Arabic/English translation. AlMa3i provi ed the
following information: ~ ,
Al~Majid claimed he does not consider himself a leader.
He stated he is a.prisoner of the United States government and does
not consider himself as being senior over any of the other
prisoners. When the former Iraqi regime fell, Al-Majid believes he
lost his position as a leader. Al-Majid again denied that the
other prisoners within the military detention facility viewed himas a leader. ~ " ' ,
. Al-Majid acknowledged that in a-previous interview, on ~
01/31/2004, he stated that if he were released from custody he
would like to form his own political party_for the betterment of 4
Iraq. The interviewer asked Al-Majid whether he told other
prisoners about a deal he was developing with the United States ,
government regarding his own political party, Al~Majid denied he
told others about a deal, but acknowledged that he told some of his
fellow prisoners that he had presented recommendations to theUS
government. Al-Majid stated he should not hold any Iraqi
government position. Before the recent war, Saddam Hussein told
Al-Majid that he would be allowed to leave the leadership in 2004.
_ Al-Majid acknowledged that in a previous interview he
expressed his wish to talk to his tribe about Saddam Hussein.
Al-Majid stated he still wished for the opportunity. When
questioned whether he still had a desire to lead, Al-Majid stated
he had deceived himself about his_own aspirations while in custody.
He added, "You meaning the United States! are in charge of the
country." Al-Majid stated alltdiscussions should concern ways for
Iraq to better co-exist with the United States. -
mvesgaonon .03/27/2004 at Baghdad, Iraor
Fi1:=# 315E-HQ-1448534c{5]%/vi _ Datedictated 0342712004 156L - /mi _ , t we
by 1 eor e -
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of - the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. .106
137C
F I i= b FD 3023 Rev. i0-6-95! 92 - .; , , '* {
92 92, o I 1
-¢
¢
315E-HQ-1448534-302
Cohnahon QEFD-302 of ' AI i A-1 -:Maj id , On 2 7 / 2 O O4 , Page 2
_AlMajid stated he intended to be completely cooperative
with the interviewers as it is.his belief that such cooperation is
necessary to help bring an end to Iraqi bloodshed. . .
AlMajid acknowledged that during a previous interview on
02/04/2004, he told interviewers that he had offered to-kill Saddam
Hussein after his capture. AlMajid repeated this offer to the
interviewers. He claimed that prior to the United States invasion
and the fall of the Iraqi regime, there was little opportunity to
kill Hussein. In addition, it would have been impossible to try to
eliminate him from the tribe or even to speak about wanting to do
so without first consulting other tribal leaders. This would have
resulted in the tribe killing AlMajid or his sons.~ AlMajid
denied that his negative statements regarding Hussein or his
expressed desire to kill him were made to please the interviewers.
He emphasized that his derogatory comments about Hussein represent
his true feelings.
I .
At a 2001 Ba'ath Party meeting, AlMajid told Hussein he
did not want a nomination to the Iraqi leadership. Minutes before
the meeting, Hussein told AlMajid that he would be nominated
again. Al-Majidinoted that itlwould have been disgraceful toobject. p - " I
* Al~Majid reiterated his wish to kill Hussein. *He;also
reiterated his wish to have an opportunity to speak with his tribe.
AlMajid stated that if given the opportunity to speak to
Hussein, he would tell Hussein that he Hussein! loved-himself more
than the people of Iraq.
Al~Majid blames Hussein for the war and the present
condition of Iraq. He added that Hussein never listened. AlMajid
claimed he spoke out against the war and supported the return of
United Nations inspectors. According to Al#Majid, Hussein forced
Iraq into war because he did not believe the United States would be
able to enter Baghdad, AlMajid believes92God blinded Hussein from
realizing the force of the United States. He stated Hussein did
not care about the nation of Iraq, the people of Iraq or his own
family, including his sons. *
. >Al-Majid acknowledged that he was a member of the Iraqi
Revolutionary Command Council RCC! and the Ba'ath Party National
Command, He added that he was Hussein's closest relative holding a
position within these institutions until Qusay Hussein was _
92
/J ". _ _ _
. . _ Q1 . PFD-302a Rev.'I0-6-95! » , _. L
92-
'3l5E-.'HQ"'l448534-302
cenunua<>i92'qfF15l§b26f ' Ali Hasan A1-Maj id A ~,On__O_3_[27/2004 ,Pagc 3
<.
appointed to the RCC. Al-Majid denied that he was one of the four
individuals comprising the Council of Ministers, reportedly
including Taha Yasin Ramadan, Tariq Aziz, Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri,
and AlMajid. However, Al-Majid stated that he was "one of the
four important people."
~Z When asked if there was anyone in history to whom Hussein
could be compared, Al-Majid answered, "There is no equal."
Al~Majid was surprised, if not disgusted, when he first heard about.
Hussein's actions when captured. He had always considered Hussein
to be courageous. 'According to Al-Majid, his peaceful surrender
shattered that image. Al-Majid believes it would have been more
honorable if Hussein had died as a martyr. He now wishes Hussein
would commit suicide. Although AlMajid suspects that other
prisoners in the camp share his negative views about Hussein, he
claims not to have spoken to them about this matter.-
According to Al~Majid, Hussein prepared and approved all
decrees for the RCC. However, between 1991-2003, the RCC met on
only two or three occasions and these were merely to nominate
Hussein to be the President of Iraq. In retrospect, Al-Majid
considers this to be a mistake of the Iraqi leadership. He further
admitted that the Iraqi leadership bears the blame for granting
Hussein authority to make immediate decisions without the RCC's.
approval. Al-Majid acknowledged that the Iraqi leadership has to
answer for remaining silent about their true sentiments for Hussein
and added that "we are now paying for it." -
Al-Majid considers his curret'detention to be partial
payment for his crimes., He believes that any future payment for
his actions will be decided in a court of law. Al=Maiid stated
that if he is released, he would not enter an Iraqi city but
instead isolate himself. Although he wants to see his family
again, AlMajid stated he does92not consider himself fit to take
care of them.
* Al-Majid was asked.to describe Hussein as a father. He
responded by stating that Hussein was a failure as a father, a
failure as a leader, a failure as a President and "a failure of
everything." Al~Majid emphasized that these characterizations
reflected his true feelings, and he denied making them to please or
ingratiate himself with the interviewers. a
Al-Majid claimed Hussein's only good quality was his
charity to individuals. For example, when Hussein would see a poor
é
. 1
921 9292 * _.1g . ' lb ' 1FD6mhGw2@&!$ _¢" ! _ ~
K
315E.-HQ-l4_48534302
ContinuationoiF'1§-§02of A1-Maj _-,Oh, -0372'-7/2004- _,Page
uor needy individual, he would give the person assistance and 1
sometimes cry for them. Al-Majid-acknowledged, however, that this
behavior contrasted sharply with Hussein's exgesses such as his *
continued construction of opulent palaces while large segments of
the Iraqi people suffered in poverty. A1Majid stated that this
paradox was due to Hussein's pride and personality; '
xi .
Al-Majid stated he was afraid that Hussein would distort
his AlMajidPs! history. During the last three to four years,
Al-Majid intentionally isolated himself from Hussein. He was
fearful that his prominence in the military might cause Hussein to
feel threatened, and he wanted to alleviate any mis-perception
Hussein may have had about him wanting to become President._ The
interviewer reminded Al-Majid that during an interview O1/31/2004,
Al-Majid expressed a desire to create his own party and lead the
people of Iraq. Al-Majid acknowledged making this remark but
explained that he made it during a period of mental fatigue and 1
that he no longer had this ambition.
Al-Majid claimed that all of the instructions given to .
him by Hussein had to be implemented and he "had no choice" but to
follow orders. Although he feared Hussein, Al-Majid claimed that
this fear did'not cause him to do things he would normally not have
done and that all of his actions were his decisions. Al-Majid
recalled an incident which occurred on August 7, 1990 in the course
of a meeting of the leadership called by Hussein. During this
meeting, Hussein turned toxAlMajid and stated that Kuwait was
worrisome to him. He recommended that Al-Majid "go calm things
down." Al+Majid suggested to Hussein that these duties could be
accomplished by the Minister of Interior or others. However, as
the meeting ended, Hussein ordered AlMajid to "guard" Kuwait. Al-
Majid stated he had no desire~for this duty but had to follow
orders
Al-Majid acknowledged.the differences between the .
treatment of prisoners in an Iraqi prison and in an American'
detention center. ~He ascribed this difference to the fact that the
United States is an advanced country with human rights, while Iraq,
is a third world country; Al¢Majid commented that the former
regime must have done something good to have been able to be in the
custody of.the United States. If a coup had taken place in Iraq
before the war, Al~Majid stated.he would have been executed long
ago. Now, he is alive and hopes to see his family.
; ,. _ 1 ,.* F0-aoza Rev.10-6-95! /, _ - i
92
315E-HQl4=48534-302
C}ontinua{i<.>n' of FD-T302; of -Al i__Hasan Al id - V _ _ ;'On O3 /2 7/ Q 04 - -:P8° -I 5 .
AlMajid was confronted with the fact that his
. cooperation with the interviewers is less than desirable and that
he seems only willing to discuss matters when all the facts are
laid in front of him. AlMajid denied doing this and reiterated he
is cooperating; He added that he has not participated in the
killing of any persons and that he has no information,about weapons
of mass destruction. 'AlMajid stated that the United States does
not need to place mental pressure on him-in order to receive
information. p _ _
AlMajid advised that before he was captured by Coalition
Forces, he had wanted to surrender. He claimed he~did not do so, £
_ however, because he could not find anyone to whom to surrender.
AlMajid expressed the opinion that those who have not'surrendered
are "losers and have a bitter life." AleMajid stated that he is
~grateful that while in U.S. custody, his human rights are
~guaranteed. He is awaiting God's decision as to whether he will go
to court, be executed or released. -
92 -
1
i lg ,. ALL INFOR1-[ATIDH CONTAINED 1 I It - U HERE 7 IS UNCLASSIFIED _
_,- FD_302 Rev_1o;6~_~95! - DA 0'?_2009 BY 5.0324 uc bawfsabitrs
V .-
-1-
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Date oftranscription . O4[O5[2004
On April 4, 2004, Ali Hasan AlMajid Black Listi#5! was
interviewed at a military detention facility at Baghdad
International Airport BIAP!, Baghdad, Iraq. The interview was
monitored by a representative of the military Joint I terro ation
Detainee Cell JIDC! FBI Language Specialist LS! b6[:;:;;:::]provided Arabic/English translation. 'A1-Mali? provided the b7C* o owing information:
AlMajid was questioned regarding a letter issued by the
Iraqi Ba'ath Party Northern Bufeau Command, dated April 6, 1987,
signed by him. AlrMajid was nbt shown a copy of the document as
none was possessed by the interviewer. This document is described
as letter S Sh/18/2396 in the Human Rights Watch Report HRW!
report titled "Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the
.Kurds," dated July, 1993. It is referenced on page 13 and in .
footnote 41 of the Prelude to Anfal section of the report.!
According to the HRW report and as read to AlMajid by the
interviewer, the letter states the following, "By the authority
vested in us by the Revolutionary Command Council's decree number
160 of March 29, 1987, we have decided to authorize the chairmen of
the security committees in the northern governates to confiscate
the real and personal property of the saboteurs, provided that
their properties are liquidated within one month of the date of the
issuance of the confiscation decree."
AlMajid acknowledged giving such authority to the
security committees, but does not remember the details- The
confiscation discussed applied to money as well as real property.
However, AlMajid stated the authority for this order was not based,
on Revolutionary Command Council RCC! decree number 160. It was
based on a separate RCC decree which authorized the confiscation of
funds and property of individuals who worked against the Iraqi
government as saboteurs; AlMajid stated in a previous interview
that saboteurs was a term used by the Iraqi government'to describe
Kurdish rebels.! This decree also authorized the confiscation of
the funds and property of individuals in the Da'wa Party. These
twotcategories~of individuals were considered to be hostile or
antiIraqi government political forces.- AlMajid does not remember
the number or date of the other RCC decree. *
ihwwumwon 04/04/2004 Baghdad, IraG
Fi1»=# 315E-HQ-11448534 '55. . na:=<1im:=¢ 04/05/2004b6 ' . W u
'Ihis_dccumcnt contains neither recommendations nor eonclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
U921
92 ' 0-FD-302a Rev. 10-s-as! '
I
315E"HQ1448534
¢mwra1i<1=1<>fF1>-:+.v2'<=r Alli Hasan A1-Majid .011 b4/04/éqo4 ,1»... 2
»AlMajid's directive regarding the confiscation and
liquidation of property and money was issued to the chairmen of the
security committees of each province in Northern Iraq. The
liquidation of property was accomplished through auctions. *
AlMajid emphasized that money and property were taken only from
saboteurs who had been proven to have participated in sabotage
activities against the Iraqi government. AlMajid noted the
confiscation was not limited solely to Kurds, but also applied
Yezidis and Arabs as well.
AleMajid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a
document written in Arabic, described as letter number 1/2713 of
the Northern Bureau Command, dated April 10, 1987, issued by Radhi
Hassan Salman, Deputy Secretary General of the Northern Bureau
Command. This letter wasidistributed to all the Directorates and
the Security of Chamchamal via.a cover letter signed by the Deputy
Director of the Security Directorate of Suleimaniyeh Governate-
The document states, in part, "His Excellency has ordered that'.
[legal] cases of people from the villages prohibited for security
reasons, or cases of the saboteurs, regardless of their nature, not
be heard and to freeze the cases that have already been heard."
The copy of this document was obtained from the HRW report titled.
"Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi Government in Its Own
Words," dated'February, 1994. It appears on pages 35-36 of the
report.! ~ ' . ,
g AlMajid stated, "I do not remember this." He added that
all Northern Bureau Command orders were issued by him and not by
his deputy. AlMajid acknowledged that Salman was the Deputy
Secretary General of the Northern Bureau Command. He asserted that
he would not have tasked Salman with issuing such an order and that
Salman did not issue it in Al~Majid's absence. He stated that all
[legal] cases are matters for courts of law and are not matters for
the security committees. AlMajid.acknowledged that he did issue
similar instructions to the courts in approximately June, 1987. He
directed the courts not to hear cases and/or to postpone cases
regarding individuals from the prohibited zones. In these zones,
villages were cleared of people, their residences were demolished,
and the residents were relocated to government housing complexes. _
AlMajid reiterated that such an order would have been issued only
by him and would have been logically directed to the courts and not
to the security committees. He added that the security services
were not in charge of the courts. When questioned about the
authenticity of the document and whether he thought it was a
forgery, AlMajid stated, "I do not know. Maybe.", »
L._.._____.______ - _ A
K
K-_-ti-- ., Q} ' ,FD302a Rev.1_0-6->95! 1 ~ ' , - .
315E+HQ1448534
Contmuahon of I-VD-302' of A_lj_.___Ha san__ AlMaj id , On Q4 / U 4 / O O 4 Q Page v 3
AlMajid was questioned regarding an order issued by him
to the Security Directorates-of the Northern Bureau directing the
execution of all "firstedegree relatives of criminals." AlMajid
was not shown a copy of two documents referencing this order as
neither was possessed by the interviewer. The two documents are
described as-a handwritten note, dated November 20; 1989, from the
Security Chief, Interrogating Officer, Amn Office in Suleimaniyeh
to an Iraqi citizen and letter number 106309, dated May 1, 1987,
from the Security Directorate of the Autonomous Region. Theset
documents are referenced in the previously described HRW report
dated July, 1993, Prelude to Anfal section, pages 13-14.!
According to the HRW report and as noted to A1Majid by the
interviewer, the handwritten note provides a response to an Iraqi
citizen's request for information regarding his missing parents and
brother. The note.states that the brother was executed July.12,
1987 as "a member of the group of Iranian saboteurs." Ihe note. -
further explains that the parents-were executed May 19,"1987 "in
compliance with the order from the Struggling Comrade Ali Hasan
AlMajid, member of the Regional Command [of the Ba'ath Party],
that was relayed to us by letter number 106309 of the Security
Directorate of the Autonomous Region, dated May 1, 1987, regarding
the liquidation of firstedegree relatives of criminals."
A1Majid stated that he did not issue an order to execute
the firstdegree relatives of saboteurs. In July/August,.1987, he~
did, however,~order the "deportation" of the firstedegree relatives
of saboteurs to the prohibited areas, AlMajid issued this order
to ensure the security of the cities. He was responsible for the
security of the cities and areas within five kilometers of the_
cities. Firstdegree relatives included only the fathers of the
saboteurs. .It did not include the female relatives such as anindividual's mother, sister,-or daughter. . *
As previously described, prohibited areas were those .
regions where the Iraqi government had already removed the citizens
and relocated them to government housing complexes. The order
regarding deportation of firstdegree relatives was intended to
force fathers to control the actions of their sons. After the
"gathering of people" into Iraqi government housing complexes, Al-
Majid stated any acts of sabotage against the government would
result in implementation of this order. AlMajid wanted the sons
who were sabpteurs, and the consequences of their actions, to be'a
"pressuring factor" on the fathers. AlMajid ordered firstdegree
relatives only to be deported to prohibited areas so that the
security committees did not expand the order to include other_ _ I
.' I-D-302a Rev. 10-s95! '
Q
315E-HQ-1448534 _
ContinuationofFD-3020f Ali Hasan .AlMaj id ,QI1 04/O4/ZQD4 ,P8° 4
relatives. He acknowledged that other relatives including mothers,
sisters, and daughters could have elected to join their relatives
who had been ordered "deported" to the prohibited areas. .
AlMajid further acknowledged that Directive 4008 issued
by him effective June 22, 1987 was still in effect at the time of
his issuance of the order regarding*first-degree relatives. As
previously stated by AlMajid and reiterated in this interview,
anyone caught in the prohibited areas after June 22, 1987,
including women and children, was to be killed. He added that
Directive 4008 was modified in September, 1987 to allow farming in
certain areas. When questioned whether the deportation of first
degree relatives to prohibited areas was tantamount to sentencing
them to death because of Directive 4008, AlMajid stated, "Why
would we deport them to a prohibited area [so that they would be *
killed] when we could kill them?" When the interviewer suggested
that perhaps this procedure was meant to minimize the "blood on the
hands" of AlMajid and others, AlMajid offered no reply.
AlMajid noted that saboteurs and firstdegree relatives
were given one month to decide whether they wanted to stay or
leave. .If they decided to remain in government housing complexes,
they were required to pledge not to commit acts of sabotage against
the Iraqi government. . ..
AlMajid denied chairing a,meeting on or around_September
6, 1987 of senior Ba'ath Party officials to discuss the national
census of October 1T, 1987. This meeting and the national census
are referenced in the previously described HRW report dated July,
1993, Prelude to Anfal section, pages 17-20.! . '
p AlMajid stated that he was not involved with the
national census as this was a "scientific and technical matter"
beyond the scope of his duties. He did, however, facilitate the
work of the census takers by means of seminars and meetings which
explained the census process to residents of the northern region.
In the north, a Kurdish individual named Dr. Samal Majid Faraj,
Iraqi Minister of Planning, was in charge of the census. According
to AlMajid, a census takes place every ten years92in Iraq.
Z AlMajid denied that October 17, 1987 was viewed or.
treated by the Iraqi government as_a "cutoff date" for the
saboteurs in the north. He stated that neither a discussion took
place at any meeting nor was a decision made to allow "subversives
to repent" and "return to the fold" up to the day of the census.
' 92
__. FDl302a Rev.10,~6-95!
U .
315E¬HQ1448534
' 'C6ntii1{iaon 6fFD'-302' of ' Al HasanAlMajid" ,0m04/04/2004 ;Ha '5
AlMajid denied that
. saboteurs" living in
their "saboteur kin"he ordered family members of "unrepentant
government-controlled areas be forced to join
in the prohibited areas after the date of the
census. As previousIy.stated, he did issue an order to deport *
firstdegree relatives of-saboteurs prior to the census. .However;
AlMajid'stated there was no connection between that order and the
national census. Al-Majid stated there were no parameters placed
on the ages of the "saboteur kin" or on the ages'of the males
ordered deported, including the age ranges between 12 and 50, 17
and 50, or 15 and 70. _ _
AlMajid characterized northern Iraq as "backward." For
the census process, many translators were needed. 1Most residents
of northern Iraq received information about the census and
understood the instructions. According to AlMajid, census takers
did not travel into prohibited areas, which were under_control of
the Iraqi Army,-and conducted their work only in cities and
villages. Individuals were required to make-themselves availableto census takers in order_to be counted. If an individual failed
to participate in the census, AlMajid stated,_"He would be the
loser." Without being counted, such an individual would have nocitizenship.and would not be allowed to send his children to .
school. However, other services, such as electricity and food-from
the government, were unaffected.
AlMajid stated that an'individual_could register for the
census according to their ethnicity and religion, whether Arab,
Kurd, Yezidi, Christian, Jew, etc. In northern Iraq, a person was
not required to register only as an Arab or as a Kurd, and.no other
ethnicity. .
According to AlrMajid, an individual was not deemed an
army deserter simply because of failing to register for-the census.
He noted that most Kurds neglected their military service. _
According to an RCC decree dated 1984/85, a Kurdish individual was
required to serve only three months versus the normal three.years
of military service. As a result, some individuals registered
themselves as Kurds during the census. AlMajid recalled that four
or five families in-Mosul, whom he described as Jarjaris and as
Arabs, registered as Kurds. This "error" was caught, however, and
the individuals were directed to-register their true ethnicity.
AlMajid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a
document written in Arabic, described as RCC decree number 10,_
dated January 3, 1988, signed by Saddam Hussein, which amended RCC
92 '-v
EBMMmJM$
Er
315E-HQ1448534
Continuation of1='D-362'. of '_"Ali Hasan A1Majid, ;mm04/04/2004 Jww .6
decree number 677, dated August 26, 1987. The document states, in
part, "The Party organization shall carefully examine the situation
of military deserters and draft dodgers who are captured. The
death sentence shall be carried out by the Party organization,
after that examination, on every deserter or draft dodger who is
captured if the duration of his desertion or draft evasion exceeds
lone year or if he has committed the crime of desertion more than
once. The provisions of this Decree shall apply to all persons92who
evaded military service prior to its date of promulgation and who
do not follow up with-their recruiting departments within 30 days
from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette." The
copy of this document was obtained from the previously described
HRW report dated February, 1994. It appears on pages 89-91 of the
report.!
decree,
details
between
further
failingAl¢Majid acknowledged that he had "heard about" this
but stated he does not remember actually seeing it or the
contained within it. He denied that there was a connection
RCC decree number 10 and the national census. AlMajid
denied there was a connection between registering or
to register for the census and military service. AlMajid
reiterated that an individual was not deemed a deserter or draft
dodger simply because he failed to register for the census. He
added that RCC decree number 10 and its order to execute deserters
and draft dodgers did not come into effect because an individual
'failed to register for the census. Al-Majid reiterated that those
who failed to participate in the census lost their citizenship
documents. p » o
The interviewer played a portion.of a copy of an
audiotape of AlMajid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is -
from approximately 9:55 to 16:06 of the tape. u- op o th'
audiota e was obtained b the interviewer fromls b6.
p y .,1»v¢
'United Kingdom Liaison on Transitional Justice, §_lC¬ 0 'uman
Rights & Transitional Justice Coalition Provisional Authority,Baghdad, Irag._ Per FBI LS[::t;:;:] the copy of this audiotape
closely approximates the trans a ion provided in the previously
described HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan
AlMajid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording _
documents a meeting Al*Majid held with members of the Northern
.Bureau and governors of the Autonomous Region of Iraqi Kurdistan on
April 15, 1988._ From context, however, it appears this recording
took place in 1987.! ,
92 <. FD-302a Rev. 104-9s! ' .
v
315E-HQ1448534
Continuationof!-3020i" ' Al-i[_.Hasan in-Maj id Lon 04704/2004 .1>a"ge' 7 -
¢
AlMajid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a
recording of his voice and his words. He added that,he believes
this meeting took place in April, 1987 rather than in 1988.
AlMajid stated that those present included the governors and
Ba'ath Party secretary generals of each province of the Autonomous
Region of Iraqi Kurdistan. These provinces included Irbil, Dohuk,
Suleimaniyeh, Kirkuk, and Mosul. "
y AlMajid stated that in the audiotape he is speaking
about the "gathering of villages" in the northern Kurdish region of
Iraq. In the audiotape, he explains the difficulty with movingsafely between cities in the north and the numbers of "martyrs" _
suffered at the hands of saboteurs. AlMajid is encouraging those
present to "speed up the process" of gathering or collectivizing
the villages in the north.
The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an
audiotape of Al~Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is
from approximately 3:28 to 4:25 of the tape and states the
following, "If you remember, when I was placed in charge of the
Northern Bureau, I was also tasked with additional responsibilities
[including] administration, the relevant Special Services, theSecurity and Intelligence ones, and the Army, and the civilian wing
of the Party, and the military wing of the Party. These were my
responsibilities, that's all. So, I was to work as I wished.
Therefore, we started making our own decisions and in someinsta ' ' l't' f th L d h' ' ' t t n B t _nces, even in vio a ion o e ea ers lp s ins ruc 10 s. u
Comrades, this was three months ago." co of this audiotape
was obtained by the interviewer from previouslydescribed. Per FBI LS[:;;::::;] the copy of this au iotape appears
to be»a portion of a mee ing vetailed in the previously described
HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan AlMajid
Tapes. According to the HRW report,_a recording documents a bqcNorthern Bureau meeting to review the campaigns of 1987 and 1988.
Also according to the report, the audiotape is undated but is in a
batch dated January 21 and 22, 1989. Per LS[:::::::] the HRW
translation of the audiotape of this meeting appears to begin at
approximately 6:15. The recording referenced here appears to be
from the same meeting and precedes the HRW translation.!
AlMajid.acknowledged that the audiotape played is a
recording of his voice and his words. "He added that this audiotape
recorded a meeting held by AlMajid with Nazar Khazraji, Iraqi Army
Chief of Staff, Kamil Sajid, the Army First Corps Commander, Sultan
Hashem, the Commander of the Anfal Operation, Tali*a AlDuri,
1*~. -. FD-302a _Rev.10-6-95! ' l _ .i
2
3i5E¥HQ-1448534
C6tTnuaodEFD-302ot" t . ' Ali Hasan AlMaj~id >- -1,on_O4~/04"/2004 ,Pas= ' ,3
outgoing Army Fifth Corps Commander, Yunis Zareb, incoming Army
Fifth Corps Commander, and the Secretary Generals of the Ba'ath
Party Sections. Al-Majid believes this meeting took place in late
1988 or early 1989. ~
AlMajid stated that despite the impressions which may be
given to the listener of this audiotape regarding the official in
charge of the meeting and the person in charge of the military, he
was only.responsible for the cities and "what was in between the
cities." Specifically, AlMajid stated he was in charge of the
"security of the cities" and the "security committees of the ~
cities" during the period he served as Secretary General of the
Northern Bureau Command. He added that he "had nothing to do with
Iranian intelligence.u. AlMajid reiterated that he was only in
charge of the cities and roads connecting cities in northern Iraq.
The Iraqi military was in charge of all other territory within that
portion of the country. Within cities, AlMajid commanded military
forces, intelligence services, security services, and all other
government agencies. _AlMajid stated he was in charge of the
cities of Suleimaniyeh, Bazyan, Chamchamal, Koysanjaq, AlRabie,
Kirkuk,Alton Kopri, Erbil, Shaqlawa, Hareer, Zakho, and Khabat.
He added that he was in charge of the provinces of Dokan, Mosul
except Aqra!, and Kirkuk except_Qader Karam!.
92 _ . The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an _
audiotape of AlMajid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is
from approximately 8 25 to 9 28 of the tape - v 2 Z . u 0. 0 |audiotape was obtained by the int ' ~ . - from"previously described. Per FBI LS the copy o t is
audiotape closely approximates the rans ation provided in the HRW
report July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan AlMajid Tapes. .
According to the HRW report, this recording documents a Northern
Bureau meeting to review the campaigns of 1987 and 1988. Also
according to the report, the audiotape is undated but is in a batch
dated January 21 and 22, 1989. The recording referenced here
appears to be from the same meeting discussed in the previous three
paragraphs.! ' *
AlMajid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a
recording of his voice and his words. He added that this audiotape
recorded the same meeting which_was just previously discussed.
AlMajid stated that he met with Khazraji because "he had work" and
"I had work." AlMajid remembers complaining to Khazraji during
this meeting about the delay of the military in leveling villages
where residents had already been removed. According to Al*Majid,b6
'b7C
l t. .L I 92
b .-FD.~302g Rev. 10-6-95! _ ; '
315E5HQl448534
Cdnt'ii1uaono.f-FD-30'i1§f Ali__Hé_sari Al-Maj"-id ' ,0n'O4/-OH_4_/_2OO4 -;Page--- 9~
the village buildings needed to be removed as they often served as
sanctuaries.for saboteurs. He added that after removal or _
"deportation" of villagers, the army had the responsibility to
remove "what was left." ' -
During this meeting asacknowledged by Al*Majid, he
criticized Tali'a Al¢Duri, Army'Fifth Corps Commander; because of
his failure to execute his duties regarding the destruction of
villages ina timely fashion. This complaint by AlMajid placed
the responsibility for handling this matter upon Khazraji. Al-
Majid stated this audiotape shows that he was not in charge of
1 military forces in northern Iraq during this period. If he had
been in charge, Al-Majid would have removed AlDuri and not justcomplained to Khazraji. ' » '*
- Copies of the documents referenced in this report are
contained in the 1A section of the file.
I
I
1 F 1
_ V, ' _f ALL INFORMATION conmiimn
.=* 6 - HEREIN UNCLASSIFIED'FD'3°2' R°"' 1° 95! _ nrrz 0.;-2009 BY 60324 uc haw/ssh/rs
. -1-' x
FEDERAL BUREAU QF INVESTIGATION
Date of transcription I O [2 0 O4
On April 9, 2004, Ali Hasan AlMajid Black List #5! was
interviewed at a military detention facility at Baghdad
International Airport BIAP! , Baghdad, Iraq. The interview was
monitored by a representative of the military Joint Interro ation
Detainee Cell JIDC!.. FBI Language Specialist LS!provided Ara_bic/ English translation. AlMaj 1; proviged the0 owing information: "
The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an
raudiotape of AlMaj'id's voice in Arabic, The segment played is
from approximately 11:20 to 12:19 of the tape. The co ' of this .
. audiotape was obtained by the interviewer froUnited ' ' ' ' ' 'Kingdom Li_aison on Transitional Justice, ice o uman
Rights & Transitional Justice Coalition Provisional Authority,Baghdad, Iraq. Per FBI | a translation of this audiotape
closelyapproximates the trans a_ ion provided in the Human Rights
, Watch Report HRW! report titled "Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal
Campaign Against the Kurds, " dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali .
Hasan AlMaj id Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording
documents a meeting AlMaj id held with members of the Northern
Bureau and directors of the Ba'ath Party headquarters in the
northern governates. Also according to the HRW report, the tape is
dated May ~26, 1988, but from context appears to be 1987.!:
1 »
AlMaj id, acknowledged that the audiotape played is a
recording of his voice and his words. He'added that he believes
this tape recorded a meeting which occurred some time during the
first half of 1988. Attendees included officials of the Northern
Bureau-who were the -Secretary Generals of_ the Sections of the
northern provinces. They were sometimes called the Directors of
they provinces. These individuals included Nazarr Yunis of Mosul,
Tariq Kafi of Dohuk, .Sou_bhi Ali-Al-Khalaf of. Erbil, *Khid1'_1ir
Abdelaziz of Kirkuk, and Sayyed Aswad Ali of Suleimaniyeh.
q .Al_-Majid acknowledged that he is discussing the; success
of the. d_e_po_;rtatio_n campaign in northern Iraq during this taped
session. He stated that the "gathering" of the people in the north
brought them physically closer to the Iraqi government authorities,
..p92 _
mvesgaonon .04/09/2004 ai Baghdad, Iraq , . .
File# 315E-HQl44'8534 *5? be vazedicwedt 0411012004 I
by] A W/L Ib7C H
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions o_f the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;-
it and its contents are not to bedistributed outside your agency. .b6
b7C
H
5
r
H '
FD302a Rev10-6-95! ' - " .1 _
~
3l5EqHQ~144853-11
separated the saboteurs from the Iranians, and ended sabotage
operations. @
The interviewer played a segment of the same audiotape
from approximately 14:49 to 16:16. * t
Al=Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a
recording of his voice and his words. He added that this tape may
have been recorded at the same meeting which was just previously I
discussed or from a meeting with Nazar Khazraji, Iraqi Army Chief
of Staff, and yunis Zareb, Fifth Corps Commander, among others,
discussed during a previous interview. ¢
During this meeting, Al-Majid is reviewing the positive
results of the "gathering" of the villages. A1-Majid notes to the
attendees that previous orders and decrees existed directing action
against the.saboteurs. However, there was "no enthusiasm regarding
or execution of"»these directives. In fact, some individuals, such
as Army Commander Talifa AlDuri, did not "follow up on their work"
and destroy buildings as had been directed. _
- AlMajid.stated that some villages had already been
declared as prohibited before he was assigned as Secretary General
of the Northern Bureau. These prohibited areas were specified on
maps.
Regarding the statement "I know how rotten the Army is,
I_am its son, and its commander, ".AlMajid stated that he was a
civilian who was given military rank in 1991. He added that he was
not the Army's "son." AlMajid noted that he was a member of the
ndlitary wing of the Party from 1968-91. ,Al-Majid further stated
that when he said "I am its son, and its commander, " he did not
mean that he was, technically, a military commander. He was
referring to the time during which served in the military wing ofthe Party. l * ' I
In 1991, Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri, Muhammad AlZubaidi,
Mizban Hadi, and Al-Majid were all given military ranks» At the
time, Al¢Majid was serving as Minister of Interior. Al-Duri was
given the rank of General, AlZubaidi and Hadi were given the ranks
of Major General, and A1-Majid was made a Lieutenant General,
AlMajid reiterated that he had served as a'commander in the
Party's military wing, not in the professional Iraqi Army.Conunuauonofl-TD-3020f a i1'1i'Hasan Al-Majid ,On 04/09/2004 ,Page ...2 Z
92 1 _FD 302a Rev 10-6-95! _
3l5EHQI44B534 .
¢<>nhn"mnbfFD-3020f - Ali Hasan Al .-Maj id ,0n_04/_09./.2_o.o4 .Ps= 3
The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an
audiotape of A1-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is
from approximately 9:35 to 10:47 of the tape. of this
audiota e wa b ' ' ' I p s o tained tervewer from[:f:;:¬?flpreviouslydescribed. Pe » ' ' r FBI LS a translation o lS au iotape
closely approximates the translation provided in the previously
described HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix A} The Ali Hasan
AlMajid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording
documents a meeting AlMajid held with members of the Northern
Bureau to review the campaigns of 1987 and 1988. Also according to
the HW report, the tape is undated, but is in a batch dated
January 21 and 22, 1989.! -
- ' AlrMajid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a
recording of his voice and his words. He added that this is
probably the same meeting with Khazraji and Zareb, among others,
discussed during.a previous interview. .
In the tape, AlMajid stated that he is discussing
"caring for the families of saboteurs" and is not discussing
executing them. When questioned about his statement "I put his
message to my head" and his seeming disregard of a message from
Saddam Hussein to care for the saboteurs, AlMajid asked, "I filed
it in the back of my mind? I didn't listen to?" AlMajid noted
that if his intention had been to kill the people of the north,
then why would he have "gathered" them and brought them closer to
him. He stated that he would have sent the individuals to
prohibited areas and the Army would have killed them. AlMajid
denied that a hypothetical act such as this is similar or identical
to the actual order given by AlMajid to "deport" the firstdegree
relatives of saboteurs to the prohibited zones, as discussed in a,
previous interview. '
92. ' _ _
AlMajid stated that he had no intention to kill the
families of the saboteurs. He pointed out that there were three
levels or stages of the process within the five kilometer zones
around cities, the only areas for which he had responsibility.
First, the gathering, then the declaration of forbidden zones, and
finally, the establishment of a "certain level of trust between us
and them." AlMajid noted there was "not much trust-" Neither the
Army nor the administration was allowed to go into the prohibited
areas. Once trust was established, however, the residents of the
northern region were_allowed to farm in the prohibited areas.I
1:6
b'7C
v
FD-302a Rev. 104-95! , , I _
315E-HQl448534
-- CwmwmmDBMoT . Ali asan Al-Majid ,Q104/O9/2004 ne 4
Al-Majid stated that the goal of the campaign in the
north was not to kill families, rather it was to end sabotage.
From the five kilometer zones around the cities AlMajid's
responsibility!, he noted that no one was deported back to the
prohibited areas. Al-Majid added that no one was found in a
prohibited area within the five kilometer zones.
Al-Majid stated that citizens of the horth who desired to
move to other provinces were allowed to do so. Those moving to a
different province in-the Kurdish Autonomous Region were provided
assistance in the form of funds from the government. _
The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an
audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is
from approximately 3:30 to 5:00 of the tape. The co of thisaudiotape was obtained b the interviewer fromt;::;::?fj previouslydescribed. Per FBI LS[:ft:::::]a translation o t 1S audiotape
closely approximates the translation provided in the previously
described HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix.A, The Ali Hasan
Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording
documents a meeting held by A1~Majid on April 15, 1989 to welcome
Hassan Ali AlAmiri as his successor as Secretary General of the
Northern Bureau.!
Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a '
recording of his voice and his words. This recording took place at
a meeting in April, 1989 where Al~Majid is welcoming Hassan
AlAmiri as his successor. The attendees included officials of the
Northern Bureau and possibly the governors of the northern
provinces. Al-Majid is describing the situation at that time as
"stable" and says that AlAmiri is "the right person to take over."
Al-Majid further states that it is not suitable for him Al-Majid!
to continue in this position. He does, however, offer to serve as
an advisor if needed. , -
The interviewer played a segment of the same audiotapefrom approximately 6:56 to 7:35. '
AlMajid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a
recording of his voice and his words, The interviewer asked
Al-Majid about the statement, "It will no longer be allowed for a
member of the leadership to have power over the Army."_ Al-Majid
stated that the extraordinary situation had ended in the north and
these powers were no longer necessary. Once the transition had
occurred, Jalal Talabani broadcast that AlAmiri would not have the_1o6
137C
_.92FD-302a Rev. 1045-95! .
K3_15E_~H_Q-1448534
same powers as A17Majid because he was not a relative of Saddam r
Hussein. In the tape, AlMajid is not referring to his power over
the Army in the entire northern region, but his power over the Army
in the regions within five kilometers of the cities. As noted in a
previous interview, Al-Majid stated that specific written
instructions followed Revolutionary Command Council RCC! decree
number 160 delineating the responsibilities and territories of
Al-Majid and the Army. These instructions were issued.in writing
from the office of the Presidential Diwan, signed by Ahmad Hussein
on behalf of Saddam Hussein. AlMajid received a copy of these
instructions. Khazraji and A1Majid met to determine how to best
implement the orders. They discussed each others responsibilities,
including Al-Majids duties regarding areas within five kilometers
of cities and the Army's responsibilities for all other territory
in the northern region. - _
The interviewer played a segment of the same audiotape
from approximately 8:00 to 10:l0.
Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a
recording of his voice and his words. In this recording, Al-Majid
is referring to his first meeting with the'Army corps commanders,
police, security services, and Party officials regarding the
situation in northern Iraq., A1Majid stated that while it is true
he assembled all of these individuals for this meeting, "I was not
in charge of the Anfal Operation." He stated thae his
responsibilities did not include the "gathering" of all the
villages of the north; He reiterated his area of responsibility
only included the cities and areas within five kilometers of the
cites. Al-Majid opined that a "regular citizen" bearing witness to
events during this time period might not have known the difference
between the responsibilities of Khazraji and Al-Majid.
Regarding the statement in the tape asserting "directives
which are still in force and.will remain in force, " AlMajid
stated that he is referring the early stages of the campaign in the
north, He denied that this statement refers to Directive.400B and
added that this directive ended in September, 1987 when the Iraqi
government granted permission for northern residents-to farm.
AlMajid reiterated~that all of his statements concern his area of
responsibility at that time, cities and zones within five
kilometers of the cities. ~
The interviewer played a segment of the same audiotape
from approximately 12:00 to 13:30; - V
1Continuation ofFD-302 of Ali Hagan A1-Maj id _ , On O4 / O!-1/2 O01; ,Page
. - _ ~
I-D 302a Rev 1o.4~9:~J! ,
315E-HQl448534
Cotinuauon o£Fl'!:302 of . _ Ali _l-Iagan A1-Maj id _ {On O4 / 09'/20 O4 ,Pgge 6
Al-Majid acknowledged_that the audiotape played is a
recording of his voice and his~words. 'Al-Majid stated that his
comments about an Army commander refer to Tali'a AlDuri, Fifth _
Corps Commander. According to AlMajid3 Al-Duri asked that the
campaign in the north be postponed for one month. Al-Majid refused
this request and described AlDuri as "reluctant" despite having
been provided everything needed by Al-Majid. Al-Majid added that
he was in charge of all things owned by the provinces, including
bulldozers and other equipment. Such items were provided to
AlDuri to complete his assignment, which included destruction of -
the villages that had been evacuated. Again, Al-Majid stated his
comments refer only to areas within five kilometers of the cities.
The interviewer replayed a portion of an audiotape
discussed previously during the interview. The segment replayed
was from approximately 10:11 to 10:47 and included the statement,
"No, I will bury them with bulldozers." This recording is the one
previously described as_being in a batch dated January 21 and 22,
1989.!
AlMajid denied that the audiotape played is*a recording
of his voice and his words. He stated, "Those are not my words."
AlMajid added, "I would neither bury them nor kill them. They are
Iraqis." He stated that he,did not bury people or order people to
be.buried. Al-Majid added that he has never heard or seen others
doing such things. He stated, "If I had done such a thing, I would
tell you I was carrying out an order." ~ ~
AlMajid acknowledged previous statements made by him
during interview on February 4, 2004 including "I never used or saw
anything about chemicals." Al-Majid again denied personal
knowledge or responsibility regarding the Iraqi government's use of
chemical weapons during the Iranrlraq War, against the Kurds, or at
any other time. He added, "I have never had any involvement with
chemical weapons in my life." .
Al-Majid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a
handwritten document in Arabic, described as letter number.
ShSh/4947, dated June 11, 1987, from the Security Directorate of
Erbil Governate to the Security-Directorate of Shaqlawa, issued by
the Director of General Security of Erbil Governate. The document
states, in part, "On 5/27/1987, our aircraft attacked the villages
of Malakan, Talinan, Kandor, Bileh Aliya, and Bileh Sufla in
Khalifan subsdistrict, which harbor some saboteurs...A number of
saboteurs were killed and about 0! people lost their eyesight as
X .
FD 302a Rev.10-6-95!_ 92 .
Iv ' ' -
0
315E-HQ-1448534 ,
_ ¬v,» 1
Cont1n92§ationofF'D-30'26f . 1' Ali Hasan AlMajid _ Z '_.b:§_l= /OQLZOO4 ,PaE=' ~ 7'
. - 1 J v -
a result of the bombing, including the family of Kamal Haji Khidr-Agha, the commander of the 12th [PUK] Division. . ." The copy ofthis document was obtained from the HRW report titled "Bureaucracyof Repression: The Iraqi Government in Its Own» Words," datedFebruary; 1994. It appears on pages 62-63 of the report.!
_ All-Majid denied knowledge of this document or the events,described in it. He stated, "I have no idea about this.-" AlMajidadded that he does not think this document is genuine. He notedthat security directors would not normally write about militarymatters such as those discussed in this 'doc,ument. AlMajid furthernoted that Shaqlawa was subordinate to Erbil. In his opinion, itwould have been more logical for a subordinate unit such asShaqlawa to be communicating this information to a higher- one suchas Erbil. However, the opposite direction of communication isshown in this document. AlMaj id noted other discrepancies heperceived in this letter including the lack of use of stateletterhead, the lack of a Top Secret _classification on informationthis important, and the discussion of a matter in paragraph two ..which does not fall. within the scope of the duties of the Directorof General Security of Erbil. According to Al-Maj id, this '_is amilitary intelligence matter. Finally, he stated that the authordid not ask for any action. The last section, paragraph four, isblank and would normally include the action requested or anyinstructions. Al-Maj id stated that he does not remember the nameof the Director of General Security of Erbil. ' '
The interviewer told AlMaj id that one of the common sideeffects of a chemical weapons attack is loss- of vision. Theinterviewer further noted that the individual named as a victim. inthe document, Agha, was contacted by independent investigators.Agha confirmed that he and his family had been temporarily blindedin, a chemical attack on May 27, 1987. AlMajid stated, "~I have notheard of this attack, only one in the city of Halabja." . -
AlMaj id was shown and read a portion of a copy of ahandwritten document in Arabic appearing on official letterhead,described as a letter, dated May 10, 1988, regarding the fourth 3Anfal operation from the Third Shoba branch! to the Director ofthe Fifth Subdirectorate of Military Iritelligenceg. Ihedocumentmakes recommendations for the use of "special ammunition" against _the areas "Alsamaqolyat-Balisan and the villages existing in theseparate border zone between Corps 24 and Corps 23. " The documentalso notes that on May 9, 1988- " .a direction was issued to ~
_,v
~
I--h-I-I-_-E_-IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII-II--III-I-I-_--_-_~ 'W
_ _,_ ,.. ,. > -...»-...,,......-. ....._.. ,.- . ... .- » .¢ ..~
' FD-302a Rev. 10-6-95! Q; _
-5
3l5EHQ.-14485-3492 92
ContinuationofF'D-3020f .' VA1-Ii: Hasan Al-,1YIaj,i_d 92 ~,On4~O4/O9/2_DO4 ,Page:__ 8
. _ A , 4.
Special Ammunition Committee to study the issue..=" The copy'of_
this document was obtained from the US Army Criminal InvestigativeDivision.! ~ Z l 1
AlMajid denied knowledge of this document or the events
-described in it. He stated, in general, he did not know what took
place between the Minister of Defense and military intelligence.
According to Al-Majid, military intelligence reports directly to
the President and only informs the Minister of Defense. He added
that neither "special" nor regular ammunition was the .
responsibility of military intelligence. AlMajid stated that the
term "special" refers to chemical weapons, Any order to use
chemical weapons-would have come from Saddam Hussein or the Army
Chief.of Staff, AlMajid believes such weapons would have been
used only against Iran if, and only if, Iraq was in "a difficult
situationx" He stated that he does not believe it is the .
responsibility of military intelligence to search for saboteurs and
direct strikes against them. By 1988, Al-Majid asserted that the
saboteurs had "reached the end" and the use of chemical weapons was
not necessary, Control of the villages in northern Iraq did not
require chemical weapons and the Anfal Operation did not require
chemical weapons. AlMajid suspects that this document is a"forgery, but can not say for certain. . '
~ Al+Majidwas shown and read a portion of a copy of a
document in Arabic, described as cover-letter number
M5/Sh3/Q2/9879, dated May 18, 1988, and an attached;report from the
,Director, General Directorate of Military Intelligence, to the
Subdirectorate of-Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector. The cover
letter states, in part, "Enclosed is our special report about the.
Northern Region for the month of April, 1988._ Please be informed."
On page four, paragraph c, the attached report states, "After the
special strikes against the villages where the headquarters and
bases of the agents,were, their organization distributed a quantity
of medical supplies against chemical strikes injections and pills!
among the inhabitants of those villages as well as neighboring
villages." Paragraph ! of the same page states, "The intensity
of the artillery bombardments by our forces and the use of the
special ammunition! led to heavy losses among them." _ The copy of
this document was obtained from the previously described HRW report
dated February, 1994.* It appears on pages 57-61 of the report.!
AlMajid denied knowledge of this document or the events
described in it; As used in this report, henreiterated that the
term "special" refers to chemical weapons. AlMajid doubts the
K
idF1;-aoza Rev. 104-95! .if
- ' ' 1
92
-v ,
315EHQl%48534.
cmmwmmmnmsmut "- Ali Hasan.A1=Majid __,&iO4/OS/2004 ,H¢ 9 '1
92
~
authenticity of'this document. He stated that if chemical weapons
had been used in Iraq, particularly in the northern region during
this time, "We would have heard. No such thing can be hidden."
- AlMajid was shown and read a portion-of a copy of a
document in Arabic, described as cover letter number Q3/Qadissiyat
Saddam/404, dated June 26, 1988, and an attached report-from
' Captain Kifah Ali Hassan, Director of the Intelligence Center of
Kalar to the Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence, Eastern
Sector Sh3!. The cover letter states, in part, "Enclosed is the
_guarter1y report about the saboteurs movements within our sector
during the first half of 1988. Please be informed." On page six,
' paragraph b, the attached report states, "During the month of
March, I988, our aircraft bombed the headquarters of the sabotage
- bands in the villages of Saywan 596! and Balakajar 294! in a
chemical strike. This resulted in the death of 50 saboteurs and
the'wounding of 20 other saboteurs." The copy of this document
was obtained from the previously described HRW report dated
February, 1994.~ It appears on pages 49-52 of the report.
According to the HRW report, the numbers appearing in parenthesis
in paragraph b are coordinates given to the villages by the
military.!
AlMajid denied knowledge of this document or the events
described in it. He stated that this report should have been
forwarded to the Northern Sector, AlMajid's assigned location,
AlMajid doubts the authenticity of this document. He added, "I am
certain chemical weapons were not used in the northern or southern
sectors of Iraq, only in Halabja." According to AlMajid, the '
Iraqi government's use of chemical weapons in Halabja was directed
against,Iranians.* He emphasized, "If I.used them, I would admit."
_ AlMajid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a
document in Arabic, described as cover letter number
Sh3/Q1/Qadissiyat Saddam/16093, dated December 13, 1988, and an
attached report from the Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence,
Eastern Sector, to the General Directorate of Military Intelligence
Sh3!. The cover letter states, in part, "The following is the
information that we received from source number 202 about the
sabotage movements:" Page five, paragraph 10a, states, "After the »
.expulsion of the saboteurs of the First Section of.the Barzani band
in the Badinan Sector by-our forces during the Final Anfal ,
operation, six British journalists arrived in the trieborder region ,
of Iran, Iraq and Turkey to see the saboteurs who had come from the
above sector via Turkish territory and interview them about the '1
u ~_ Q5315E-HQ-1448534'FD-302a Rev. 106-95! A ' W
- Continuation ofFD-302 of _ n Ali Hasan Al Maj id _ .011 O4 /O9/2 O04 388° 1-Q
chemical strike undertaken by our forces." The copy of this
document was obtained from the.previously described HRW report
dated February, 1994. It appears on pages 5356 of the report.!
Al-Majid denied knowledge of this document or the~events
described in it. He noted that if this document is genuine, it
proves that he was not in charge. A1Majid was never informed of
this matter. If he had been in charge, he would have been notified
of this information. He added that he is unable judge the
authenticity of this document. According to Al-Majid, the Iraqi
government would not have had to use chemical weapons at that stage
of the campaign in the north. The saboteurs were not stronger than
the Iraqi military. Once the saboteurs were isolated from the
cities, they "were weakened" due to lack of food, fuel, and other
supplies. By this point in the operation, all the villages that .
could have provided assistance to the saboteurs had been removed.
Thus, the Iraqi Army's advance into this area was not difficult so
as to require the use of chemical weapons. Z
The.interviewer played a portion of a copy of an
audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is
from approximately 21:59 to 26:44 of the tape and includes the
statements "That evening, I went to Suleimaniyeh and hit them with
the special ammunition," "I will attack it with chemical weapons,
~and "I will kill them all with chemical weapons." The co ofthis audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from[::::::i?E:]
previously described. Per FBI LS|:|.a translation of this
audiotape closely approximates the translation provided in the HRW
report dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes.
According to the HRW report, this recording_documents a meeting
AlMajid held with members of the Northern Bureau and directors of
the Ba'ath Party headquarters in the northern governates. Also
according to the HRW report, the tape is dated May 26, 1988, but
from context appears to be 1987.! .
AlMajid stated that this audiotape was "assembled" from
tapes of two different meetings. One meeting, in the first half of
1988, was discussed at the onset of this interview, while the other
took place in Mosul on March 30, 1991. '
When the cities of Suleimaniyeh, Dohuk, Erbil, and Kirkuk
fell out of Iraqi government control in 1991, AlMajid was tasked
with "liberating" Dohuk. He invited Abd Jawad Thannoon, Governor
of Dohuk, Nasir Said, Fifth Corps Commander, and all state and
Party officials to a "reception" at the Mosul Hotel in Mosul..b6
107C
s .
, ' 92 9 _. . Q3FD-302a Rev. 10-6-95! " 1 .
I»
I
3l5EHQ-1448534
Cmmmwnfm-Bozor A1i"Hasan Al'=Maj id .o'n' 04/99/2004." maze 11
There, Al-Majid gave a speech declaring "Whoever has a friend in
Dohuk, I will attack with chemical weapons tomorrow." Said
attempted to interrupt AlMajid because he did not want the timing
of the operation to be revealed. Al-Maiid directed him to
communicate this information to-Dohuk. He wanted "the illusion" of
a chemical weapons attack to be imprinted in the minds of those i
controlling Dohuk. Al-Majid stated that the Iraqi government was
weak in 1991. Thus, the chemical weapons "threat" was used as a
"scare tactic" against the saboteurs in Dohuk.
. . _
Al-Majid directed the military to procure bags of flour
or cement and attach them to helicopters. These aircraft were then
used the following morning to spread the material over Dohuk and
give the further "illusion" of a chemical weapons attack. AlMajid
used this "scare tactic" to reduce losses on "our side and their
side." Al-Majid walked into Dohuk at 9:30 am the same morning.
Some Iraqi military members would not enter the city, however,
thinking that a chemical weapons attack had actually occurred.
- AdMajid stated, "This tape has been altered»" He added
that the story he related about Dohuk is the real reason he is
known as "Chemical Ali" and not because of Halabja. According to
Al-Majid, Khazraji once told Abbas Mahmoud or Rasool Mahmoud that
Al=Majid ordered the chemical weapons attack on Halabja. This is
not true, however. 7 ~ .
A portion-of this tape states, "Jalal Talabani asked me
to open a special channel of communication with him That evening,
I went to Suleimaniyeh and hit them with the special ammunition.
That was my answer." AlMajid stated I inspected Suleimaniyeh and
it was not hit. He added that he has never heard of such an
attack, particularly with chemical weapons. He stated he did not
order a chemical weapons attack on Talabani and his headquarters in
the Jafati Valley near Suleimaniyeh. AlsMajid stated, "This tape
is not correct." He claimed that he actually went to Suleimaniyeh
to meet with Talabani and.that the words "and hit them with the
special ammunition".have been inserted into this tape. The
remainder of the tape is a threat or scare tactic used by AlMajid
against the saboteurs in Dohuk,
_ The interviewer played a portion ofla copy of an
audiotape of Al=Majid{s voice in Arabic. The segment played is 1
from approximately 1:54 to 4:17 of the tape and includes the
.statements "...we will surround them in a small pocket and attack
them with chemical weapons. I will not attack them with chemicalsL.
s
_ I
X 4 FD¬Ma@mnw¬&$ !!92 i _
92 92 L
3l5E~HQ~1448534
, W
ContinuationofFD-3020f Ali Hasan AlMajid 4 .05 04/09/2004 ,Pag= 12
92.
just one day, but I will continue to attack them with chemicals for
fifteen days." The co of this audiotape was obtained by the
interviewer from previously described. Per.FBI LS
E::::::] a translation of this audiotape closely approkimates the _
translation provided in the HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix
* A, The Ali Hasan Al¢Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this
recording documents a meeting AlMajid held with members of the
Northern Bureau and directors of the Ba'ath Party headquarters in
- the northern governates. Also according to the HRW report, the
tape is dated May 26, I988, but from context a ears to be 1987.The copy of this audiotape obtained frmm[::::i?%:] though appearing
to be from the same meeting, was provided to the FBI as a separate
, recording.! " ; y -
*,Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is'a
recording of his voice and his words. He stated that this is the
same meeting with Ba'ath Party Section officials and Governors of
the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan on April 15, 1987 discussed in a
previous interview. -
l AlMajid commented that these statements are attempts at
"psychological warfare" against the enemy in the beginning of the
campaign against the saboteurs in the northern region; His words
were used as a scare tactic, similar to what was previously
described in this interview and would later be used in Dohuk» In
Al-Majidks opinion, the saboteurs would be "weakened by words."
Logistically, they would later be weakened by their forced
separation from the cities.
The interviewer questioned AlMajid about the meaning of
the sentences "I will not let the government get involved. I will
say it is from here [the Northern Bureau." AlMajid stated he was
simply projecting the power of the Northern Bureau and that he had
not exceeded his authority. ' _
- The interviewer questioned AlMajid about the statement
"I told the expert comrades that I need guerrilla groups in Europe
to kill whomever they see from them [the saboteursl." Al+Majid
admitted to making this statement but asserted that it was.simply
part of the "psychological operations" against the saboteurs. He
added that he had neither knowledge of nor authority over Iraqi
government operations or operatives in Europe. However, AlMajid
believed that such_a statement would become known to Talabani and
would possibly diminish the strength of the saboteursrb6
b7C
1 ci 'FD-302a Rev.10-6-95! '
I
. . 315EHQl4485.34 .
Continuation ofFD-302,of Ali Hasa K A1 -Maj id_ O
,OnO4/O9/2004 ,i>as¢ 13
Copies of the document-s referenced in this report are
contained in the 1A section of the file. 1
IJ
r
9
$1 i~ A
I -.2 1- _ALL INFORI{A'lION CONTAINED' HEREIN UNCLASSIFIED -FD-302 R¢v-10-6-95! ~ DATE 6-2009 BY 0324 uc haw/sab./rs
._ _
-FEDERAL BUREAU or INVESTIGATION
_ - mormmpnm 0615 2004 _
'Sabir Abd Al Aziz Husayn Al Duri, Black List #205!, d
of birth May 19, 1949, was interviewed at a detention facility
located at the Baghdad International Airport BIAP!, Baghdad, Ir
Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of
United States Government from Washington, DC. FBI Language
S ecialist rovided Arabic/En'lish translation.P » p. . 9 ASabir-provi e the 'ollowing information:
- In 1987, Sabir was the Director of Military Intelligen
Istikhbarat!. The Istikhbarat was responsible for collectingate
aq.
the
C8
intelligence from all available sources, The collection effort was
done through spies, technical resources involving specialized
equipment, human sources, interrogations of arrestees, and aeria
reconnaissance. During Sabir's tenure as the Director, the_ 1
Istikhbarat was divided into the following five sections: Sectil
on
I - responsible for.gathering intelligence on all countries except
Iran.' Section II'~ responsible for gathering intelligence only
Iran. Section III - responsible for general security and_the
military. Section III was divided during the Anfal Campaign and
was moved from Section I to Section II. The individual in chargon
6
of Section III during the Anfal Campaign was General Walid.Khalid
phonetic!. Section IV technical resources section- Section V r
administrative section.
"Sabir provided a historical account of the events that
eventually led up to the Anfal Campaign. The IraqwIran War was
_ ongoing, and a four month battle just concluded in Basra in which
the Iraqi military_was victorious. After the battle, the Iranian
military continued to shell the city of Basra. This caused the
Iraqi military to draw forces from other battle fronts to assist in
defending the city. Iran discovered a lack of Iraqi troops in the
Northern Region of Iraq, particularly in the area of Sulayminiyah.
Iran took advantage of the lack of Iraqi troops in the Northern
-Region and conspired with the Kurdish.opposition groups led by
Barzani and,Talabani, The balance of the war shifted toward Iran
which prompted the Iraqi government officials to develop a new
~ strategy. According to Sabir, President Hussein, Ali Hasan Al
Majid, the Minister of Defense Adnan Khairallah phonetic!, an d
the Army Chief of Staff =;Nizar Al Khazraji phonetic!, developed
the strategy for the Northern Region. Sabir advised his role as
the Director of the Istikhbarat was to gather intelligence, and
mwmmmon O6/11/2004 m Baghdad, Iraq - -
mug 315EHQ1448534"gv , nnemaaq» O6/15/2004,
SSA Geor e L. P
by SSA ' _, /Cmi 4 g .
This document contains neither recommendations not conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contentsan not to be disnibuted outside you; agency. '
- 5/-r8:/1_jo?_.Tn;,O6-IIZ1»~ibé
b7C1:6
Ib7C
1
! 92 r
Foamamwnosm! ,l
3l5E*HQ-1448534_
cm-mormozor ___$;;_1!;>_:Lr_Abd, A1 Aziz Hn$ayx1_Al nuns. -0106/ll/2004 is 2
disseminate that intelligence to the high level Iraqi Government
officials which consisted of President Hussein, the Minister of
Defense, Army Chief of Staff, and the Presidential Secretary. The
intelligence was studied, and a recommendation for a plan of action
was discussed and subsequently implemented,
The deployment of Chemical Weapons CW! during the Anfal
Campaign was at the sole direction of President Hussein. The chain
of communications to utilize CW during the Anfal Campaign would
flowifrom President Hussein to the Presidential Secretary, and then
to the Army Chief of Staff or Minister of Defense depending on the
delivery method for the CW. If the CW were to be deployed via the
Air Force, the orders would have*been passed through the Minister
of Defense. If the CW were to be deployed via artillery or other
conventional means, the orders would have been passed through the
Army Chief of Staff to the Corps Commander. Sabir advised there
was a special division within the Iraqi Army, known as the Chemical
Disbursement Division, who were responsible for manufacturing,
housing, and distributing the CW. The Army Chief of Staff, or the
Deputy Chief of Staff were responsible for the Chemical
Disbursement Division which was located at the Al Bakr Base. Sabir
advised a CW advisor was attached to the I Corps of the Iraqi Army
during the Anfal Campaign.
Sabir described the events that eventually led to the CW
attack on Halabja. Sabir remembers that Halabja fell under Iranian
control, and the city of Sulayminiyahwas being threatened. Sabir
and his Deputy, Wafiq Al Samarai phonetic!, were traveling to the
Sulayminiyah area to check on their military positions, when an
intelligence officer advised them
Once he learned of the CW attack,
Kirkuk and met with Army Chief of
this meeting, Khazraji told Sabir
of Defense phonetic!, who was inof the CW attack on Halabja.
Sabir traveled to the city of
Staff, Nizar Al Khazraji. During
that Adnan Khairallah Minister
Kirkuk with Khazraji, had just
received orders from President Hussein to launch a~CW attack on
Halabja. Once Khairallah received the orders from President .
Hussein he telephdnically contacted the Commander of the Air Force,
Hameed Sha'abin Al Tikriti phonetic!, and ordered him to launch
the CW attack on Halabja. Sabir advised the Air Force planes that
conducted the CW attack on Halabja were from the Al Bakr Base.
Recently, Sabir has learned from other detainees at Camp Cropper
that detainee, Hamid Raja Shalah Al Tikriti phonetic! Black List
'#l7!, was the Air Force Squadron Commander stationed at the Al Bakr
Base, who led the Air Force planes that conducted the CW attack on
Halabja.
~ 92Foamammtwaas il, 92 l,
3153-no-1448534
Omwmovdwof Sabir Abd Al Aziz,usayn Al Quri, .@yQ§]1lLZQQ4 .&§ e 3
Z Sabir was under the impression that Halabja was under
Iranian control, and was not aware ofa number of Iraqi citizens
that were still residing within the city during the CW attack.
Sabir claims the decision to utilize CW on Halabja came quickly,
and the Istikhbarat was not consulted.
It was Sabirs understanding the Anfal Campaign had an
announced purpose and a hiddenfpurpose. The announced purpose was
to relocate the Kurds from the Northern Region of Iraq, provide p
them adequate-housing, and improve their quality of life. The
hidden purpose of the Anfal Campaign was to relocate the Kurds
toward the interior of Iraq, away from the border of Iran, and
clear the Northern Region of the opposition groups that were led by
Barzani and Talabanii There was concern the Kurds were going to
_ conspire with these_opposition groups, and this was the reason why
1 the Kurdish villages were razed; The Iraqi Government believed '
that the destruction of the Kurdish villages would deter and e
prevent the Kurds from returning'to the area.
Sabir concluded the interview by stating Saddam Hussein
doesn't care about anybody, and would have done anything to stay in
power. In addition; Sabir advised Hussein destroyed Iraq, and does
not want Hussein put to death, but wants himgto suffers I
s
7
~
; .1 7 .' _ _: - ',
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED!a
Fn.30z R¢v_10.5.95! ' HEREIN I UNCLASSIFIED
varDATE ' -2009 BY 60324 uc hawfsab/rs
. J
FEDERA1-BUREAJTOFINVESTHQHTHMN
, - q Date oftranscription . O6[O11 42004
, Sabir Abd Al Aziz Husayn Al Duri, Black List #205!, date
of birth May 19, 1949, was interviewed at'a detention facility
located at the Baghdad International Airport BIAP!, Baghdad, Iraq.
Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the
United States Government from Washington, DC. Department ofDefense DOD! representatives! , KLNU! were
also present, and observed the first thirt minutes of theinterview. FBI. Language Special-istprovided
Arabic/English translation. Sabir provided the followinginformation: I
Sabir was the former Director of the Istikhbarat
Directorate of Military Intelligence! and former Director of the
Iraqi Intelligence Services IIS! Mukhabarat!. In 1987, during
the IraqIran war, the primary role of the Istikhbarat in the
Northern region of Iraq was to gather intelligence on Iranian
forces. The secondary role of the Istikhbarat was to gather
intelligence on the activities of the Kurds and determine their
relationship with the Iranians. During this time frame, Sabir was
a member of the Northern Affairs Committee and advised the Chairman
of the committee, was Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri Black List #6!, Deputy
Secretary General of the Revolutionary Command Council RCC!.
Other Directors of the Iraqi security services were members of the
Northern Affairs Committee. a .
1 ' _ The Iraqi government utilized tribal Sheikhs to recruit,
Kurdish fighters Jahsh! in the war against Iran, and during the
Anfal Campaign. The tribal Sheikhs would get paid by the
Government of Iraq GOI! by the number of Kurdish fighters they
recruited. The Sheikhs who recruited the Kurdish fighters on
behalf of the Iraqi government were known as Mustasharsr .
' Sabir believes the planning stages for the Anfal Campaign
occurred between approximately 1985 and 1987. Three Corps of the
Iraqi Army were positioned in the Northern Region of Iraq-at this
time. The I Corps was located in Kirkuk, the II Corps was located
in Diyala, and the V Corps was located in Mosul» The Corps of the
Iraqi Army concentrated on the war with Iran, while the Jahsh
Battalions were responsible for defending the Kurdish territory.
Each Corps had an Istikhbarat officer assigned to it who was
responsible for-gathering"intelligence. The Istikhbarat officer
__ ' ~ , -
gatron on 05/03/2004 Baghdad, Iraq
4' - - __
315E-HQ1448534 - Dmemmd U6/Q4/2004Investi ' 7 at v ' n
,;e_- - . - ,~. _
-nm#~ - " _ J
b7C SSA Geor e L. Pir n
by SS tmi ,
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusion; of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
. it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. _ y
9 /- I SAf3»r92..3a2=¢~. at»: =¢=>~/b6
'b7C
, I
92
FD-302a Rev 10-6~95! ' l. f *
315EHQl448534
Cmmmmmowbamof Sabir Abd Al Aziz Rusayn1Al Duri ,ml06/Q3/2004 Jg * 2
¢
reported directly to Sabir. Sabir formed two units of theII
Istikhbarat in the-Northern region, the first unit was located in
Kirkuk, and the second unit was located in Mosul. Both units
reported to Sabir. General Farhan Jaaburi phonetic! was in charge
of the Northern Region Military Directorate of Intelligence and
reported to the Northern Region Section located in Baghdad. The
Northern Region Section in Baghdad would report to Deputy Wafiq Al
Samaarai phonetic!, who was in charge of Section/Department III,
which had responsibility over the Northern region of Iraq. The
Iraqi Intelligence and Security Services reported to the Security.
Committee, who in turn, would report to the Presidential Secretary.
Copies of the operational intelligence and information reports
would get disseminated to the Presidential Secretary, Minister of
Defense, Chief of Staff, and Military Committee.
During this time frame, Ali Hasan Majid Blacklist #5!
was stationed in Kirkuk and was responsible for the Ba'ath Party
and the Northern Region. Sabir was unsure of the exact dates, but
believes it was approximately 1987 that Ali Hasan Majid was given
the authority by the RCC to become the Commander of the Northern 7
Region of Iraq. Sabir initially advised the control of the
Istikhbarat did not fall under Majid's authority, and later advised
that Majid had complete'authority over the military and the Ba'ath
Party According to Sabir, Majid did not have the authority to
meet with the Directors of the Intelligence Services, however,
Majid would exert his power over them. 92
~
y Interviewers refreshed Sabir s memory and told him that
Majid was given the authority as Commander of the entire Northern
region of Iraq as referenced in RCC decree #160 dated March 29,
1987. Sabir viewed a copy of this decree, which formally appointed
command of the Northern Region of Iraq, to include the autonomous
region of Kurdistan, to Ali Hasan Majid. RCC decree #160 gave
Majid authority over the Foreign Intelligence Apparatus, the
Internal Security Force, the Military Intelligence, the Popular
Army, and the Military. A copy of RCC decree #160 which Sabir
viewed in Arabic along with the accompanying English translation
will be maintained in~a FD340/1 A! envelope and marked as Document
#'s 1 & 2!.
During the Anfal Campaigh, the military was responsible'
for fighting on the front lines and clearing the areas of
resistance. The Istikhbarat was responsible for gathering
intelligence from within each of the Corps. Sabir did not.have
knowledge of Majid's specific defined areas of responsibility, and
I I . v
_ FD-302a Rev. 10495! * l 'I . . i|
315E-HQ_l448534. 4
I Conmonofmaozog A Saqbir Ahd Al Aziz Husayn A1 huri mos/03/.2004 Jag: 3
advised areas outside of MajidPs responsibilities would have been
given to the military; The military was also responsible for
removing the Kurdish population in the Northern Region, and the
Governors in each of those areas were responsible for relocating
the displaced Kurds. .Each Governor was responsible for reporting
directly to Majid.
Sabir viewed twentyfive pages of documents in Arabic
I awhich centered around the time frame of 1987 involving preAnfal
and Anfal Campaign activities. The copies.of documents describe
-correspondence between different entities within the Iraqi
» Government involving the use of "Special Ammunition" in the
Northern Region of Iraq., Sabir acknowledged that Special
Ammunition was a term used by the Iraqi government to represent
Chemical Weapons CW!.
Sabir doesnft remember each and every document, however,
did verify his signature on the bottom of several of the documents
and thus concluded they were authentic. A copy of the twentyfive
pages of documents viewed by Sabir, and the accompanying English
translation will be maintained in a ED34O/1 A! envelope and marked
as Document #'s 3-& 4!. 92-A
While viewing the copies of documents, and upon verifying
his signature, interviewing agents observed the following physical
changes in Sabir. Sabir-started to profusely perspire, his facial
characteristics dramatically changed, and his lower lip began to
uncontrollably quiver. Additionally, after explaining the April
16,.1987 chemical weapons attack on the villages of Balisan and
isheikh Wasan, Sabir's eyes began to tear, Sabir stated that
decisions made by President Saddam Hussein to utilize CW directly
*led to the deaths of the men, women, and children in those
villages. P
The original plan to use CW was formulated in 1986 when
it was perceived that Iraq was losing the war, which was due in
part to the loss of the Faw Peninsula to Iranian forces. Sabir
believes the general consensus was that the Iraqi forces needed a
small'victory to boost their confidence and continue fighting the
war with Iran. The idea to utilize CW against Iran during the war
was originally brought up by his subordinates within the -
Istikhbarat. The Istikhbarat's primary mission was to defeat and
expel the Iranian forces, and not utilize the CW against innocent
civilian populations which included women and children. Sabir
advised the Istikhbarat was responsible for collecting information
. .1, . ev
' . - -
. _I I _ '* FD-30Za Rev.1_0-6-95! ts '~. .
cmmmwmmmémpf Sabir hbd Al Aziz Husayn Al Duri ;mL06/Q30O4,P%e :4
n r It3l5EHQ~l448534
for target identification and providing that information to the
Iraqi military in 1987.
' Sabir viewed another document which was dated June 23,
l987, drafted by Ali Hasan Majid of the Northern Bureau Command, to
the Commander's of the I, II, and V Corps. This memo set policy on
dealing with the Kurds by turning the prohibited areas in the
Northern Region of Iraq into free fire zones, and ordered the V
arrest, interrogation and summary execution of all those aged 15~70
who were found in the prohibited areas. In addition, it gave
permission to the pro=government.Kurdish militias Jahsh!, to keep
everything they might seize in those prohibited areas, not only
light weapons but also personal belongings. Sabir acknowledged
this memo and reiterated that Majid had the authority to act on his
own, and had the support of President Saddam Hussein and the RCC.
A copy of the document viewed by Sabir in Arabic, and the
accompanying English translation will be maintained in a FD
340/l A! envelope and marked as Document #"s 5 & 6!. Z
0
92f
I/
:0
I
T" ALL INFDRHATIDN cnnrnxmrn -
* nnnrxn Is uncnnssrrxrni FD-302 Rev.10~6-95! ' DATE 05-13-2009 BY 60324 UC BAWISAB/LSD
l 92 -FEDERA1iBUREA1lOFINVESTHEXIHHW
mmfwn 0612512004
SABIR ABD AL AZIZ HUSAXN AL DURI, Black List #205!, date
of birth May 19, 1949, was interviewed at a detention facility
located at the Baghdad International Airport BIAP!, Baghdad, IraqtI t .1 . A t .d . . d 92 . . .n erviewing gen s 1 entifie themselves as.representatives of the
United Sta om Washington, DC. FBI Language
Specialist provided Arabic/English translation.SABIR » '* - »provi e e o owing information.
During the time frame of 1997+1988, NAZAR KHAZRAJl
phonetic! was the Army Chief of Staff, and ADNAN KHAIRALLAH_
phonetic! was the Minister of Defense. In early 1997, HUSAXN
RASHID Black List #131! was the Commander of the Republican Guard
in the Sulaminiyah area, and then was named the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations; According to SABIR, the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations was responsible for carrying out and executing
all Army operations. ' _ . -
There were<two main Directorates under the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Operations, which were the Directorate of Planning and
the Directorate of Military Movements. The Directorate of Planning
was responsible for studying and planning operations for the
military. The Directorate of Military Movements was responsible
for executing the operational plans. During this time frame the
Director of Military Movements was AXAD FUTAYYIH KHALIEA AL RAWI 1
Black List #30!. AYAD then became the Commander of the Republican
Guard when HUSAXN RASHID became the Deputy Chief of Staff. When
this occurred NAJEM ABDULLAH phonetic! took AYAD's-position as the
Director of Military Movements. MUHAMAD ADBUL KAD$R phonetic!
was the Director of Planning then became the Director of Tourism.
YUNIS ALTHARAB phonetic! then replaced KADIR as the Director of
Planning. qg
During the Iran-Iraq War, the Directorate of Military
Intelligence DMI! Istikhbarat! would_gather intelligence on the
enemy, Iran, and would disseminate the intelligence to the Minister
of Defense and Army Chief of Staff. The intelligence would then be
passed to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. Because Iraq
was still at war with Iran, the intelligence flowed quickly throughthe various levels of command. - 0
n l
Investigation on 06/2'37/72004 W :55 'Bf:1Qhd8d, Iraq V _ _
92 r" 92FiIc# 31sEHQ-144853440 1 s n.@¢:.m=¢- 06/25/2004SSA *0 1* _,1_»$;l" 7 0 . _ b6
i This document contains neithpr gccomnicndations nor conclusions; of the FBI. Iris the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
92. it and its contents are not to be distributed outsidc your agency. .
E92 z , . 31> 17.7%./. 51;!; z_o1>"I
0'b6
b'7C
"-' . _1 ,
;i;FD6mhQm106Q
ContinuaonofFD-3020f SABIR Abd Al Aziz Husayn Al Duri >,0n.06]23/20,04. ,Pas<= *2 ~."
315EHQ"l448534
Z phonetic!.
dated April 3,
document.
Section, Staff
identified his
identified the
portion of the
4
SABIR viewed several copies of documents in the Arabic
language and was asked if he could identify individualssignatures/initials on these documents, and in certain instances '
provided additional details regarding the document. All of the
documents viewed by SABIR along_with the English translation will
be marked appropriately and maintained in a FD340/1 A! envelope.
Document 1/Page 1 - Subject: Using the Special
Ammunition. In addition to his own signature, SABIR identified the
Director of SH3, WALID KHALID phonetic!, and advised this was the
individual who authored the document. SABIR also identified the
signature of the Deputy of the Istikhbarat, WAFIQ AL SAMARA'I
. Document 1/Page 5 Document from the Istikhbarat dated
~March 31, 1987. SABIR identified the initials of WAFIQ AL SAMARAI
in the lower portion of the document.
~ Document 1/Page 7 Subject: The Use of Special Weapons,
1987. In the lower right portion of the document,
VSABIR identified WALID KHALID's signature. In the lower left
portion of the document he identified the signature of WAFIQ AL
SAMARA'I. SABIR also identified his own_signature at the bottom
center portion of the document.
' Document 1/Page 8, Subject: The Use of Special .
Ammunition, dated Marchl29, 1987. SABIR identified the signature
of SALEH FAYAD {phonetic!, who was the Secretary to the Director of
the Istikhbarat in the lower left portion of the document. In the
lower right portion of the document, SABIR identified his own
signature, and identified the signature of WAFIQ AL SAMARA'I[
Deputy of the,Istikhbarat, in bottom center portion of the
Document 1/Pages 9, 10, 11 Subject: The Use of the
Special Ammunition, dated March 3, 1987. After reviewing thisdocument, SABIR advised the letter/memo was from the Third Branch
Second Section, and the initials on page number eleven represented
the author of the document, who was the Director of the Second
Colonel SALEH Last Name Unknown LNU!. He _
own signature at the bottom of page eleven, and also
signature of WAFIQ AL SAMARA'I in the_lower left
document. .
r I$im§Ma@wJ&&%!V -
92 ... V
.315E~HQ-1448534
Continuaon0£FD-3020f SABIR Ab_d__Al~Aziz. Husayn A1 Duri . ,0n 06/.23_/2004 ,,Pag=- 3
Document 1/Page 12' Signed June 5;'l987. SABIR believedthe signature at the bottom of the document was WALID KHALID's, but
was not positive.
Document 1/Rage 13 Subject: The Use of Special
Ammunition, dated March 13, 1987. After reviewing-the document,~-
SABIR advised the "committee" referred to within the document
regarding the special ammunition comprised a representative fromthe Directorate of Planning and a representative from the 92
Directorate of Military'Movements; A representative from the
Istikhbarat and~other representatives from,different services were
also on this committee. The committee would meet approximately
every two weeks, and the highest ranking'member would chair this
particular committee. The committee provided recommendationsregarding operations and the use of chemical weapons CW! to the
Army Chief of Staff. The recommendations were then presented to
the Minister of Defense or Armed Forces Comittee.
The Armed Forces Committee comprised the following
individuals: Minister of Defense, Director of the Istikhbarat,
Commander of the Navy, Commander of the Air Force, Commander of
Army Aviation, Army Chief of Staff, the four ! Deputy Army Chiefs
of Staff, Director.of Planning, Director of Military Movements, and
the Minister of Military Affairs- President SADDAM HUSSEIN chaired
the Armed Forces92Committee which would meet twice a week. The
Secretary of the Armed Forces Committee was ALA DIN KATHEM ALJANABI. Any plans for military operations were discussed in this
committee. SABIR does not recall CW being discussed within thiscommittee because all secret matters were routed directly to the
President's office. President HUSSEIN would issue the decisions to
-use the CW and the Presidential Secretary would then issue the
orders to the Minister of Defense of Army Chief of Staff. SABIR
advised that in the past, President HUSSEIN had ordered the
imediate deployment of CW based on reports from the Istikhbarat.
_ _ Document 1/Page 14 ~ Subject; The Use of Special
,Ammunition, dated March 19, 1987./'SABIR identified the signatureof Director SINAN ABDUL JABAAR ABU GHAI-IL. He advised this
document was from the First'Directorate/Division who were
responsible for the Iranian Branch, Northern Branch, and externalmatters.
,Document 1/Page 15 ~ Subject: Information, dated March
12, 1987. SABIR could not identify the signatures on this
document. .
VI M . _ .-i ,
, e .
'nsmamwJoa&9
F
315E-HQ--1448534 1
Continua1ionofFD-3020f _ K SABIR Abd.Al}.Aziz Husayn,A1 Duri .01: Q6/23/2004 .P*1a<= 4 _
Document 1/Page 16 Subject: Information, dated March
11, 1987. SABIR identified WAFIQ AL SAMARA'I's signature located
* on the bottom center of this document.
Document 1/Page 17 - Subject: Information, dated March
11, 1987. SABIR could not identify the signatures on this
document. e - *
~ Document 1/Page 25 ~ Signed March 13, 1987. SABIR could
not identify the signature on this documentl
' Document #15 After viewing these documents, SABIR '
advised Project #858 was the responsibility of the Special Security
Organization SSO!, and was headed by AHMED MURTADA phonetic!.
MURTADA's last position within the Iraqi Government prior to his
capture by Coalition forces was Minister of Transportation. The
mission of Project #858 was to gather intelligence through the use
of listening posts on the Iraqi borders. SABIR advised that
'HUSSEIN KAMEL would receive the intelligence through the intercepts
and would send the information to the Presidential Secretary. The
information would then be disseminated to the Istikhbarat who would
confirm the information collected on the intercept. -
' SABIR was the Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Servicel
' IIS! Mukhabarat! from 1991 until his retirement in 1994. He
assumed this position from SABAWI IBRAHIM HASAN AL TIKRITI,
President HUSSEIN's half brother. l
I
I
|
i
j-[ii I r '