Document text
REDACTION KEY
A. CLASSIFIED FBI INFORMATION RE-REVIEWED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE
ORDER 14040.
C-1. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT
THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT
PENDING ONGOING CONSULTATION.
C-2 INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT
THAT GOVERNMENT’’S DIRECTION FOLLOWING CONSULTATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040.
D. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE IS
REQUIRED. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION IS OBTAINED WILL BE RELEASED.
F. ADMINISTRATIVELY DESIGNATED FBI FILE AND/OR SERIAL NUMBERS OR
HANDLING INFORMATION.
G. SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION WITHHELD PURSUANT TO THE
LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIVILEGE.
J-1. SECTION 102A(i)(1) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED BY
THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TE RRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004, 50
U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1).
J-2. INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM DI SCLOSURE BY THE BANK SECRECY ACT
(BSA) AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE BSA. SEE 31 C.F.R. § 5311 ET SEQ; 31 C.F.R. CHAPTER X.
J-3 INFORMATION DETERMINED BY ANOTHER DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY TO BE
PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f).
O-1. INFORMATION WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT
AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT.
P. INFORMATION RESTRICTED FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE PRIVACY ACT
OF 1974. SUCH INFORMATION WILL BE PRODUCED IN MDL 03-1570 (S.D.N.Y.)
PURSUANT TO THE PRIVACY ACT PROTECTIVE ORDER ENTERED IN THAT
CASE.
P-1. INFORMATION SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, DATES OF BIRTH, AND
OTHER SENSITIVE PERSONAL INFORMATION.
S. NAMES AND OTHER PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL.
NOTE: Classification markings (classification banners and portion markings) are redacted
without a code throughout the release.
As for the trip to Los
Angeles, al-Bayoumi asked Bin Don either one or two days
before the two of them actually traveled to Los Angeles i f Bin Don would accompany al-
Bayoumi to the Saudi Arabian (Saudi) Consulate. Mr. Bin Don told the present
interviewers that al -Bayoumi specifically asked for assistance with his (al -Bayoumi’s) “I -
94.”
The I-94 is Immigration and Naturalization form that specifies the type of visa
and length of time the holder (al- Bayoumi) is allowed to remain in the United States. Mr.
Bin Don said that the trip to Los Angeles occurred on a “regular workday” and was not
on Friday or the weekend. At this time, Bin Don had known al-Bayoumi about one
month..
Mr. Bin Don said that al-Bayoumi drove his (al-Bayoumi’s) automobile to the
consulate in Los Angeles. Before arriving at the consulate, al -Bayoumi stopped at a
photographic shop on Sepulveda Boulevard, in Los Angeles to get photographs of him
suitable for a passport. Mr. Bin Don recalls that al -Bayoumi pulled his vehicle up to a
gated entrance to a parking garage that was under the Saudi Consulate. Al -Bayoumi
spoke in Arabic on the intercom microphone at the gate and t he gate was opened and al -
Bayoumi drove into the garage and parked. They parked in a normal parking place and walked towards a reception area. Both Bin Don and al- Bayoumi were dressed in Islamic
clothing, i.e. a “thobe.” The reception area was accessibl e from the garage. As they
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approached this area, three men dressed in western business suits, walked out of the
reception area and greeted al -Bayoumi. The conversation was in Arabic and only lasted
for a brief period of time. Mr. Bin Don stated that he considered this a happenstance meeting and that the three men fr om the consulate were only being polite to another
“brother.” Mr. Bin Don and al-Bayoumi then entered the reception area. There was no receptionist present and al-Bayoumi used a telephone in the reception area to announce
his presence. Mr. Bin Don described the reception area as plain, with a few seats, an
airport type metal detector and an airport type X -ray machine.
Mr. Bin Don said that shortly after the call was placed by al -Bayoumi a m id-
eastern male, dressed in a western business suit, with a full beard, “two fists length” came out to the reception room and greeted al-Bayoumi in English. Al-Bayoumi introduced the
consular employee to Bin Don, but Mr. Bin Don no longer recalls the emplo yee’s name.
Al-Bayoumi and the employee spoke briefly about al- Bayoumi’s interest in obtaining
religious materials, including Korans from the consulate. Also mentioned in Mr. Bin
Don’s presence was the fact that al -Bayoumi had not been at the consulate for at least
three months. On the drive up to Los Angeles, al-Bayoumi told Mr. Bin Don that he, that is al-Bayoumi routinely traveled to the consulate to obtain Islamic religious materials.
Mr. Bin Don then stated that he “ran in to” the consular employee at a shopping
mall in Anaheim, CA within the last six months.
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thirty minutes al- Hazmi and al -Mihdhar left the restaurant. Mr. Bin Don said that they
did not have a motor vehicle. He does not recall the direction that they walked after
leaving the Mediterranean Café. Mr. Bin Don stated emphatically, that he had no
information from al-Bayoumi in advance that they would meet al- Hazmi and al -Mihdhar
at the Mediterranean Café. He further said that the meeting was “purely a coincidence”
and that al -Bayoumi’s friendly nature was the reason that al -Bayoumi showed an inte rest
in the situation of al- Hazmi and al -Mihdhar. Mr. Bin Don and al- Bayoumi then left the
restaurant and returned to the King Fahad Mosque for the sunset prayer. Al-Bayoumi did
not offer to take al- Hazmi and al -Mihdhar to the mosque, nor did Bin Don see them at
the mosque for the sunset prayer. Bin Don and al-Bayoumi left Los Angeles before the evening prayer.
The next
contact with al -Hazmi and al -Mihdhar was at the party that al-Bayoumi
organized. The party was held in the apartment occupied by al- Hazmi and al -Mihdhar.
Mr. Bin Don described the attendees at the party as, “many people from the community.” Mr. Bin Don described the behavior of al- Hazmi and al -Mihdhar as normal and that they
both appeared to be at ease. Mr. Bin Don videotaped the party at the request of al-Bayoumi, using al-Bayoumi’s video camera. Some of the guests at the party did not want
to be videotaped and Bin Don assumed that this was for religious reasons. Mr. Bin Don
said that for most of the party, he remained in the kitchen area. During the party, based
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on what little conversation Bin Don could understand, al- Hazmi and al -Mihdhar told the
others that they were students. Mr. Bin Don said that every one at the party was a
“brother” that he recognized from attending prayer services at the ICSD.
Mr. Bin D
on’s statement to the 9-11 Commission and the Commissioners which
has been paraphrased in part is as follows:
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an individual who, similarly to Mohdar Abdullah, facilitated
the day-to-day life of 9/11 hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar during their time in San Diego, has been identified
by FBI San Diego as living in Canada. s reported to be very concerned about his presence on U.S.
no-fly lists , in conjunction with the San Diego office, will address seeking an interview of
In June, 2012, NYO investigators, along with AUSA and HQ analysts, traveled to
London, UK, to exploit evidence seized in 2001 in New Scotland Yard’s searches of Omar al Bayoumi’s
residences and offices. Working directly with SO15 section of Scotland Yard, the document exploitation
team reviewed materials and New Scotland Yard’s procedures for searches/evidence collection, discussed
the potential for use in trial, and returned to the United States with copies of hundreds of pages of
documentation with potential probative value. is undertaking the translation of these documents, to
determine relevancy. To date, documents detailing the visits of Mutaib al Sudairy and
Adel al Sadhan as well as directions indicating that Bayoumi was very familiar with
trips from the Saudi Consulate in L.A. to the King Fahad Mosque, have been uncovered. Both documents
provide evidence contradicting direct claims Bayoumi has previously made to FBI investigators,
particularly about his actions on the day he allegedly randomly met the 9/11 hijackers, and highlight gaps
in Bayoumi’s story that undermine his claims of innocence.
Details on Mohdar Abdullah and his connection to Operation ENCORE:
The FBI is seeking to indict Mohdar Abdullah (Mohdar) in the Southern District of
New York (SDNY) for providing material support to 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid
al-Mihdhar, pursuant to USC 18 section 2339B. Mohdar is the subject of San Diego’s full field
investigation, and currently resides in Sweden. The immediate goal of
Operation ENCORE is to
Mohdar played
a key role facilitating the daily lives and assisting future Flight 77
hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. Shortly after February 4 , 2000, al-Bayoumi
tasked Mohdar to assist al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. Mohdar was also a family friend and
associate of Anwar Aulaqi and they may spent time together with the hijackers. After September
11, 2001 Mohdar was investigated by the FBI for assisting the hijackers. On September 19,
2001 he was arrested by FBI San Diego on charges of immigration fraud for his claim of being a
Somali asylee (Mohdar is Yemeni). Mohdar pled guilty to the immigration charges and was
deported to Yemen in 2004.
While Mohdar was detained in an immigration facility he bragged to two fellow
inmates that he assisted the hijackers. The FBI and the SDNY have debriefed these individuals.
Both are cooperative, but there is some prosecutorial concern about their value as witnesses.
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Telephone numbers assigned to the Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE) in
Washington, D.C., where Musaed al-Jarrah was the director of the Islamic Affairs Department,
had significant telephonic contact with al-Thumairy and al-Bayoumi while the hijackers were in
the Los Angeles and San Diego areas. There is evidence that al-Jarrah had possible links to al
Qaeda and tasked al-Thumairy and al-Bayoumi with assisting the hijackers.
EO14040-000227-UPDATED
Omar Ahmed al-Bayoumi, and Musaed al-Jarrah. These subjects provided (or directed others to
provide) the hijackers with assistance in daily activities, including procuring living quarters,
financial assistance, and assistance in obtaining flight lessons and driver’s licenses. Operation
ENCORE seeks to prove these subjects provided such assistance with the knowledge that al-
Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were here to commit an act of terrorism.
Fahad al-Thumairy was the Imam at the King Fahad Mosque near Los Angeles,
California when a
l-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar first arrived in the United States. Al-Thumairy
immediately assigned an individual to take care of them during their time in the Los Angeles
area.
Omar al- Bayoumi was living in San Diego on a student visa, despite not
attending classes, and receiving a salary from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for job duties he
never performed. Shortly after arriving in Los Angeles, the two hijackers had an allegedly
accidental meeting with al-Bayoumi, who claims to have been in Los Angeles on personal
business. At this meeting, al-Bayoumi advised the hijackers to relocate to San Diego, which they
did. Once in San Diego, al-Bayoumi assisted the hijackers with a place to live, opening a bank
account, and also assigned two individuals to care for them, one of whom was Mohdar Abdullah.
Telephone numbers assigned to the Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE) in
Washington, D.C., where Musaed al-Jarrah was the director of the Islamic Affairs Department,
had significant telephonic contact with al-Thumairy and al-Bayoumi while the hijackers were in
the Los Angeles and San Diego areas. There is evidence that al-Jarrah had possible links to al
Qaeda and tasked al-Thumairy and al-Bayoumi with assisting the hijackers.
EO14040-000276-UPDATED
6 radical, i.e., advocating toppling various governments, including
Saudi Arabia. KHADIB was an AIAI leader, then was kicked out of the group for being too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues KAHDIB formed a radical Muslim splinter group whose name is unknown
The following information is known regarding Omar
Abdi Mohamed:
Name: Omar Abdi Mohamed, aka Omar Khadib Sex: Male Date of Birth: 1960 Place of Birth: Somalia SSN: CADLN INS A#: Height: 5'11" Weight: 180lbs.
Hair: Black
Eyes: Black Residence: La Mesa, CA 91941
Occupation: Director, Western Somali Relief
Agency 4979 University Avenue., #C
San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282-6013
(619) 563-9443 President, Somali and East African Youth Center 4979 University Avenue, #D, San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282- 0711
Objectives: The objectives of this investigation are
to: (1) develop additional facts demonstrating that Omar Mohamed continues to be a leader of the AIAI or a splinter terrorist group in the United States, (2) determine if Mohamed is a member of AL-QAEDA, (3) identify other AIAI and AL-QAEDA members and associates of Mohamed and neutralize their support of terrorist activities.
EO14040-000366-UPDATED
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(Rev. 01-31-2003)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 01/24/2005 To: Counterterrorism Attn:
From: San Contact: Approved By: Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title: Omar Abdi Mohamed,
aka Omar AlKhatib, Omar Khadib, Cumar Khadhiib, abu Hafsa;
Synopsis: Submission of LHM
Full Field Investigation Instituted:
Administrative: Enclosed for for dissemination is LHM ref. investigation of captioned subject. Details: Previous Investigation
:
INS advised that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED was born on
in Somalia. MOHAMED was a resident of Canada from 1990 to
1995. His last known address in Canada was
Ontario. His telephone number at that address was MOHAMED was allowed entry into the United States on July
8, 1995. His status at that time was SR-1 (Lawful Alien Permanent Resident - Religious Worker). That status was granted as the result
of being offered employment by Masjidul Taqwa (Islamic Institution), 2575 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, CA 92101, telephone (619) 239-6738. The offer was made by Imam On April 11, 2000, MOHAMED
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To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego Re: 01/24/2005
their respective communities who have converted to Islam.
Especially on such figures like well known Christian ministers and clerics, government ministers, ambassadors, businessmen, doctors, engineers, laureates and intellectuals, and university instructors, individuals who play an influential role in their communities and are highly regarded." The Ministry attached a form with the mentioned letter that was to be filled with the converts full name prior to conversion to Islam, full name after conversion to Islam, and date of conversion to Islam, occupation prior to conversion, occupation after conversion, social activities prior to conversion, social activities after conversion, impact that his conversion to Islam had on others, current address, and other information. The letter was signed by Director of Dawa Office in America, Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.
wrote Saudi Arabia a handwritten request for funding a school they wanted to start in San Diego, California. The Ministry was contacting Mohamed so he could provide further information on the people and the circumstances surrounding the starting of the new school. According to the handwritten letter the five men were forced to flee their native lands because of the "infidels" and they wanted to start an Islamic school because "This land is the land of the infidels, and you are aware of that."
The Ministry also sent out notices of personnel
changes within the Saudi Dawa Office in America. One letter dated January 17, 1998, was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California." San Diego notes that AlThumairi is the subject of According to LA LHM dated 1/24/2004,
the investigation of AL-THUMAIRY was predicated on FBI investigation determined that AL-THUMAIRY had substantial contact with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. ALBAYOUMI had significant contact with two September 11th hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar who lived in San Diego, California, in 2000.
To date, investigation of Mohamed has not determined
the extent, if any, that he reported on the Muslim community and Muslim converts. However, San Diego opines that if Mohamed had not complied with Saudi directives with regards to requests for information and Islamic outreach, he would not have continued to receive his monthly payments from the Ministry. Also unknown is the extent, if any, that Saudi Arabia reimbursed Mohamed for his
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To: C unt From: San Diego
Re: , 01/24/2005
LEAD(s): Set Lead 1: (Action)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGONT, D.C.
disseminate enclosed LHM as
appropriate. ♦♦
EO14040-000381-UPDATED
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To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego Re: , 01/25/2007
As Mohamed was arrested, a search warrant was served
on his residence. In this search several Arabic language documents
on Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, IFTA Office, letterhead with address 601 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Washington DC 20037, Telephone (202) 342-3700, were seized by investigating agents.
These documents were subsequently translated by a
San Diego Division Arabic language specialist. Of interest, these documents contain written directions from the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance to Omar Abdi Mohamed to collect information on Muslim converts and the Islamic publications produced by local mosques and the Somali community. The seized documents include mention of a contractual relationship between Mohamed and the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance; a Saudi Ministry checklist of Muslim convert reporting criteria; a request for reports on the Arab and Somali communities in Canada and San Diego; and a note of leadership personnel changes within the American Dawa Office.
Mohamed received, by his own admission, over $100,000
from the Saudi Ministry. Mohamed apparently began receiving this money in the mid 1990's, and was recently receiving $1,750.00 a month up and until he was arrested. After his arrest, it appears that the Ministry payments into Mohamed's bank account were discontinued.
With specific regards to captioned subject, the Saudi
Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance sent Mohamed a letter dated February 14, 1996, requesting Mohamed to "provide us with information about well known personalities in their respective communities who have converted to Islam. Especially on such figures like well known Christian ministers and clerics, government ministers, ambassadors, businessmen, doctors, engineers, laureates and intellectuals, and university instructors, individuals who play an influential role in their communities and are highly regarded." The Ministry attached a form with the mentioned letter that was to be filled with the converts full name prior to conversion to Islam, full name after conversion to Islam, and date of conversion to Islam, occupation prior to conversion, occupation after conversion, social activities prior to conversion, social activities after conversion, impact that his conversion to Islam had on others, current address, and other information. The letter was signed by Director of Dawa Office in America, Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.
In a letter dated May 28, 1998,
wrote Saudi Arabia a handwritten request for funding a school they wanted to start in San Diego, California. The Ministry was
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To: Count From: San Diego
Re: , 01/25/2007
contacting Mohamed so he could provide further information on the
people and the circumstances surrounding the starting of the new school. According to the handwritten letter the five men were forced to flee their native lands because of the "infidels" and they wanted to start an Islamic school because "This land is the land of the infidels, and you are aware of that."
The Ministry also sent out notices of personnel
changes within the Saudi Dawa Office in America. One letter dated January 17, 1998, was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California." San Diego notes that AlThumairi is the subject of According to LA LHM dated 1/24/2004,
the investigation of AL-THUMAIRY was predicated on FBI investigation determined that AL-THUMAIRY had substantial contact with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. ALBAYOUMI had significant contact with two September 11th hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar who lived in San Diego, California, in 2000.
To date, investigation of Mohamed has not determined
the extent, if any, that he reported on the Muslim community and Muslim converts. However, San Diego opines that if Mohamed had not complied with Saudi directives with regards to requests for information and Islamic outreach, he would not have continued to receive his monthly payments from the Ministry. Also unknown is the extent, if any, that Saudi Arabia reimbursed Mohamed for his frequent domestic and international travel. Investigation at San Diego is ongoing.
Also found were two Arabic language certificate style
documents. One of these documents, as translated by San Diego, was issued to Omar Abdo Mohammad al-Khatib by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Islamic Affairs Endowments, Dawa and Guidance, Deputyship of Islamic Affairs Forum Program. The document was noted to be an "Attendance Certificate" for the "first forum for training Propagators in America that was organized by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 27/08/1998 to 04/09/1998". According to the document the attendees received training in Science of the Koran, Science of the Hadith, Islamic Dogma, the Jurisprudence of Islamic Law, Principles of the jurisprudence of Islamic Law, and Propagation." The document was signed by Mohamad bin Abed AlMuhsen AlTurki.
A second similar Arabic certificate was found from
the "Islamic African Center in Khartoum, the Dawa Branch, for a training course for Imams and Propagators held in coordination with the Saudi Fatwa body, the World Muslim League, and Imam Mohamed bin Saud Islamic University" from 06/08/1988 to 31/08/1988. This document also certified that Omar Abdi Mohamad attended the training
EO14040-000387-UPDATED
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To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego Re: 01/25/2007
LEAD(s): Set Lead 1: (Action)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, D.C.
disseminate enclosed LHM as
appropriate. ♦♦
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To: San Diego From: San Diego Re: , 05/17/2007
various governments, including Saudi Arabia. KHADIB was an AIAI
leader, then was kicked out of the group for being too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues. KHADIB formed a radical Muslim splinter group whose name is unknown Current Investigation:
On January 22, 2004, Omar Mohamed was arrested on
immigration charges of lying on his naturalization application and is currently in federal custody awaiting trial.
Mohamed's wife , born
in , California drivers license number
SSAN , telephone number was interviewed upon
Mohamed's arrest. stated they were married in 1986 and have
six children. Four of the children are Canadian citizens by birth and two are US citizens by birth.
Mohamed was employed by the San Diego City Schools
at a school on 54th and University (NFI). and Mohamed have no other business or employment. and Mohamed have no business interests or employment outside the US.
In July or August 1998, Mohamed and their two
oldest children traveled to Kenya. recalled they flew from San Diego to New York to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
recalled that her relationship with Mohamed
changed in 2000. In late 2000, Mohamed traveled to Australia. is not sure of his purpose of travel, but believed that Mohamed was traveling related to his relationship with an Australian woman.
According to Mohamed has relatives in Sydney,
Australia. Mohamed's fathers cousin lives in Sydney, and he also has relatives in Kenya. recalled that Mohamed had returned one time each year since 2000. did not know Mohamed's travel plans, but according to Mohamed he went to Australia. Mohamed's last travel was from September 2003 to December 25, 2003, believed that the trip took Mohamed to Australia.
Investigation further determined that
Fardan of the Masjid Taqwa in San Diego, California, sponsored Omar Abdi Mohamed's religious worker entry into the US. was approached by a blue eyed Somali who represented the San Diego Somali
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Muslim community. The blue eyed Somali, not
encouraged to sponsor Mohamed.
As Mohamed was arrested, a search warrant was served
on his residence. In this search several Arabic language documents on Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, IFTA Office, letterhead with address 601 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Washington DC 20037, Telephone (202) 342-3700, were seized by investigating agents.
These documents were subsequently translated by a
San Diego Division Arabic language specialist. Of interest, these documents contain written directions from the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance to Omar Abdi Mohamed to collect information on Muslim converts and the Islamic publications produced by local mosques and the Somali community. The seized documents include mention of a contractual relationship between Mohamed and the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance; a Saudi Ministry checklist of Muslim
convert reporting criteria; a request for reports on the Arab and Somali communities in Canada and San Diego; and a note of leadership personnel changes within the American Dawa Office.
Mohamed received, by his own admission, over $100,000
from the Saudi Ministry. Mohamed apparently began receiving this money in the mid 1990's, and was recently receiving $1,750.00 a month up and until he was arrested. After his arrest, it appears that the Ministry payments into Mohamed's bank account were discontinued.
With specific regards to captioned subject, the Saudi
Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance sent Mohamed a letter dated February 14, 1996, requesting Mohamed to "provide us with information about well known personalities in their respective communities who have converted to Islam. Especially on such figures like well known Christian ministers and clerics, government ministers, ambassadors, businessmen, doctors, engineers, laureates and intellectuals, and university instructors, individuals who play an influential role in their communities and are highly regarded." The Ministry attached a form with the mentioned letter that was to be filled with the converts full name prior to conversion to Islam, full name after conversion to Islam, and date of conversion to Islam, occupation prior to conversion, occupation after conversion, social activities prior to conversion, social activities after conversion, impact that his conversion to Islam had on others, current address, and other information. The letter was signed by Director of Dawa Office in America, Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.
In a letter dated May 28, 1998,
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To: San Diego From: San Diego Re: , 05/17/2007
wrote Saudi Arabia a handwritten request for funding a school they
wanted to start in San Diego, California. The Ministry was contacting Mohamed so he could provide further information on the people and the circumstances surrounding the starting of the new school. According to the handwritten letter the five men were forced to flee their native lands because of the "infidels" and they wanted to start an Islamic school because "This land is the land of the infidels, and you are aware of that."
The Ministry also sent out notices of personnel
changes within the Saudi Dawa Office in America. One letter dated January 17, 1998, was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California." San Diego notes that AlThumairi is the subject of According to LA LHM dated 1/24/2004,
the investigation of AL-THUMAIRY was predicated on FBI investigation determined that AL-THUMAIRY had substantial contact with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. ALBAYOUMI had significant contact with two September 11th hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar who lived in San Diego, California, in 2000.
To date, investigation of Mohamed has not determined
the extent, if any, that he reported on the Muslim community and Muslim converts. However, San Diego opines that if Mohamed had not complied with Saudi directives with regards to requests for information and Islamic outreach, he would not have continued to receive his monthly payments from the Ministry. Also unknown is the extent, if any, that Saudi Arabia reimbursed Mohamed for his frequent domestic and international travel. Investigation at San Diego is ongoing.
Also found were two Arabic language certificate style
documents. One of these documents, as translated by San Diego, was issued to Omar Abdo Mohammad al-Khatib by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Islamic Affairs Endowments, Dawa and Guidance, Deputyship of Islamic Affairs Forum Program. The document was noted to be an "Attendance Certificate" for the "first forum for training Propagators in America that was organized by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 27/08/1998 to 04/09/1998". According to the document the attendees received training in Science of the Koran, Science of the Hadith, Islamic Dogma, the Jurisprudence of Islamic Law, Principles of the jurisprudence of Islamic Law, and Propagation." The document
was signed by Mohamad bin Abed AlMuhsen AlTurki.
A second similar Arabic certificate was found from
the "Islamic African Center in Khartoum, the Dawa Branch, for a training course for Imams and Propagators held in coordination with the Saudi Fatwa body, the World Muslim League, and Imam Mohamed bin
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not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY or AL BAYOUMI as a potential "tazkia" contacts for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community appears to have been unknown at such time.
OMAR AHMED MUSTAFA AL-BAYOUMI, date of birth
1957, place
of birth Alhajra, Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabian passport
social security account number first came to the
attention of the FBI in 1998 when a complainant telephonically contacted FBI San Diego on 08/31/1998 to report information regarding AL-BAYOUMI and his wife MANAL BAGADER (reference
The complainant advised that AL-BAYOUMI had received a
suspicious package from the Middle East on 03/03/1998. In addition, the complainant advised that there had been large gatherings of males in the apartment of AL-BAYOUMI. As a result of these reports, a preliminary inquiry was initiated on AL-BAYOUMI on 09/08/1998.
The preliminary inquiry did not uncover any
information regarding AL-BAYOUMI to justify conversion into a full investigation. When interviewed, the local Postal Inspector advised that the package was listed as "suspicious" because it arrived without postage or paperwork. Therefore, upon completion of the preliminary inquiry, the investigation of AL-BAYOUMI was closed on 06/07/1999 (reference ).
Subsequent to the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001,
investigation determined that two of the hijackers aboard AA77, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR, had resided at Parkwood Apartments,
, 6401 Mount Ada Road (also listed as 6333 Mount Ada Road), San
Diego, California, between 02/2000 and 05/2000. Rental records obtained from Parkwood Apartments revealed that AL-BAYOUMI had co-signed the apartment lease agreement for AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR.
Upon receipt of this information, efforts commenced to fully
identify and locate AL-BAYOUMI. AL-BAYOUMI was located in Birmingham, England, where he was residing with his family and attending Aston University.
AL-BAYOUMI was detained by New Scotland Yard (NSY)
on 09/20/2001 under United Kingdom (UK) Terrorism Act 2000, Prevention of Terrorism. From 09/22/2001 to 09/28/2001, AL-BAYOUMIwas interviewed by NSY. On 09/28/2001, AL-BAYOUMI was released from custody without charges, as NSY could not allege any criminal activity on his part that would substantiate a continuation of his detention beyond the period authorized.
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AL-BAYOUMI moved from England to Saudi Arabia in
08/2002 and was interviewed by the Saudi Mabahith in approximately 10/2002. In 08/2003, AL-BAYOUMI was interviewed in Saudi Arabia by members of the PENTTBOM Investigative Team (reference
. AL-BAYOUMI was also interviewed
in Saudi Arabia by representatives of theNational Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "9/11 Commission"), in the presence of the FBI, in 10/2003.
FBI
investigation has determined that OMAR AL-BAYOUMI
possibly assisted NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR (hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77 on 09/11/2001) upon their arrival in the San Diego, California, area in early 02/2000. In response to interviews conducted and intelligence gathering, and to provide a comprehensive summary of the investigation to date, the following details of the investigation of AL-BAYOUMI are provided. These details include information garnered from the interviews of AL-BAYOUMI conducted by the FBI, the Saudi Mabahith, and New Scotland Yard (NSY), as well as independent investigation into the associations and activities of AL-BAYOUMI while residing in the United States.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
AL-BAYOUMI first traveled to the United States on
08/01/1993 using Saudi Arabian passport # On 06/06/1995,
AL-BAYOUMI returned to the United States at Los Angeles, California.
AL-BAYOUMI entered at that time on a using Saudi
Arabian passport # with an intended address of Beadnell
Way, Apartment
, San Diego, California (reference
. AL-BAYOUMI and his family resided
at this address until relocating to Beadnell Way, Apartment
San Diego, California, in 02/1996. In the summer of 1999,
AL-BAYOUMI and his family moved to Parkwood Apartments,
Mount Ada Road, San Diego, California.
AL-BAYOUMI returned to Saudi Arabia from 03/21/2000
to 05/31/2000. AL-BAYOUMI then resided with his family in San Diego until the fall of 2000, at which time he relocated to England and enrolled at Aston University in Birmingham. AL-BAYOUMI's wife and children remained in San Diego until 06/2001 when they moved to join AL-BAYOUMI in England. AL-BAYOUMI again traveled to Saudi Arabia from 06/26/2001 to 07/16/2001, then returned to Birmingham, England,
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and remained at this level until the allowance payments ceased in 08/2001 [Note: the time frame of increased payments to AL-BAYOUMIdoes not correspond to the dates that hijackers NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR resided in San Diego]. Review of employment records obtained from the PCA indicates that AL-BAYOUMI received a promotion in 04/2000, and his contract status also was changed from "single" to "married" at that time. As a result, his salary and allowance were both increased.
When applying for school in the United States,
AL-BAYOUMI had provided a letter from stating that AL-BAYOUMI was being supported while in the United States. was also listed as "sponsor" on AL-BAYOUMI'sImmigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Form I-20. When interviewed, , owner of , advised that had
been a
subcontractor of Dallah Avco and the PCA and that he was asked
to provide the letter of support concerning AL-BAYOUMI. Review of employment records during the time that AL-BAYOUMI was in the United States indicated that AL-BAYOUMI continued to receive his salary and allowance through Dallah Avco.
In addition to attending school in San Diego,
AL-BAYOUMI acted as the manager/facilities supervisor of the Al Medina Al-Munarawah Mosque, also known as the Kurdish Islamic Center, 511 South Magnolia, El Cajon, California. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he had been contacted by SAAD AL-HABIBregarding the local mosque used by the Kurdish population. AL-HABIB,a Saudi Arabian who had attended school in San Diego, informed AL-BAYOUMI that he was interested infunding a new mosque for the Kurdish community because the mosquewas located in a small building without a parking lot. AL-HABIBasked AL-BAYOUMI to assist in acquiring a larger building to house the mosque, to which AL-BAYOUMI agreed. AL-BAYOUMI subsequently looked for and obtained a building in El Cajon, California, that included a parking lot. Al-HABIB provided all of the money to AL-BAYOUMI to purchase the building, to include the USD 10,000 for which AL-BAYOUMI then wrote a check for the initial down payment.
As manager/facilities supervisor, AL-BAYOUMI kept an office at the
mosque. AL-BAYOUMI advised that the position was on a volunteer basis and that he was not paid for his work at the mosque.
VISIT TO THE SAUDI ARABIAN CONSULATE, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
On approximately 02/01/2000, AL-BAYOUMI traveled by
car from San Diego to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles in order
to renew his passport. AL-BAYOUMI was accompanied on this trip by KAYSAN BIN DON, an associate from San Diego.
BIN DON,
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During an interview of KAYSAN BIN DON by the writer
on
8/2/2007 he advised that he and AL-BAYOUMI did the first prayer
of the day at the ICSD and then around 10am or so they left for Los Angeles. BIN DON stated that he is sure they didn't get to Los Angeles until after 12 because he remembers discussing with AL-BAYOUMI a special allowance for traveling Muslims, which allows them to combine the second prayer (which takes place after the apex of the sun, i.e. around noon) and third prayer (which takes place a few hours after that during the winter months) of the day. BIN DON stated that they assumed they would have to do this since they were still on the road when they should have performed their second prayer.
BIN DON stated that when they arrived in the Los
Angeles metropolitan area, AL-BAYOUMI first drove around Santa Monica looking for a halal restaurant AL-BAYOUMI had eaten at before with his son. After failing to locate it, AL-BAYOUMI drove to the Saudi Consulate. At the consulate AL-BAYOUMI met with a male individual unknown to BIN DON and spoke with him in Arabic. BIN DON described this individual as being in his 40s or 50s, bald, a Tunisian citizen, and at that time was giving lectures at the KFM. BIN DON stated this unknown individual and AL-BAYOUMI embraced and then went into a room and closed the door. After approximately twenty minutes, AL-BAYOUMI emerged from the room and he and BIN DON subsequently left. BIN DON did not recall seeing Al-BAYOUMI's passport at such time but assumes he had it as that was the stated purpose of their trip to Los Angeles.
Writers queried BIN DON to give an honest assessment
of his Arabic language skills at the time. BIN DON in response held up his hand in the shape of a "zero." BIN DON added that he had basically no understanding besides being able to exchange "hello's" and "good bye's."
After visiting the consulate, AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON
proceeded to the KFM. BIN DON advised that they did not attend an organized prayer session but merely prayed alone for five or ten minutes. Writers queried if AL-BAYOUMI showed BIN DON around the KFM, as that was ostensibly the reason BIN DON came to Los Angeles.
BIN DON commented that they were in "hurry" because it had taken
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so long to drive up to Los Angeles, so there wasn't time.
Writers
queried if BIN DON or AL-BAYOUMI was in "hurry," to which BIN DON replied, "I guess AL-BAYOUMI." BIN DON could not fully explain why they were in a hurry since they had already taken care of the visa issue, but offered that they had not eaten yet so they needed to hurry. Before leaving the KFM, AL-BAYOUMI spoke with an unknown individual. AL-BAYOUMI translated for BIN DON, stating that AL-BAYOUMI was asking for a suggestion of where to eat. AL-BAYOUMItranslated that AL-BAYOUMI had been told there was a restaurant on"Venice Boulevard right around here."
BIN DON and AL-BAYOUMI left the KFM and parked off
of Venice Boulevard, just to the east of the two restaurants they entered. The first restaurant they entered was named, "something like 'Mediterranean Deli.'" Upon entering, AL-BAYOUMI spoke to the proprietor of the establishment in Arabic, which AL-BAYOUMItranslated for BIN DON as "he said they 'don't serve sit down meals.'"
AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON then walked a "couple of store fronts" to
another restaurant that BIN DON believed was "in the same building" as the first restaurant. This restaurant was named "Mediterranean Restaurant," according to BIN DON. AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON entered, went up to the counter, ordered and then sat at a table next to the front window while they waited for their food to be prepared.
After approximately five to ten minutes, two men,
BIN DON now knows to be AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR entered the restaurant and proceeded to the front counter. BIN DON described the front counter as being about "30 to 40 feet" away from the table at which he and AL-BAYOUMI were sitting. BIN DON advised that neither he nor AL-BAYOUMI could hear AL-HAZMI or AL-MIHDHAR talking from where they were sitting. BIN DON indicated that AL-BAYOUMI was staring at them from the time they entered the restaurant. BIN DON stated that he believed that this was because AL-BAYOUMI could not tell if the two men were Arab or Hispanic. Writers queried whether AL-BAYOUMI ever stated this or gave any information to indicate that this is why he was staring. BIN DON stated that AL-BAYOUMI did not give any such indication but added that "that must have been why he was staring."
BIN DON stated that AL-BAYOUMI then went up to the
counter and began talking with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. The three of them then proceeded to the front table near the window and sat down with BIN DON. BIN DON indicated that the entire conversation was in Arabic and so he was dependent on AL-BAYOUMI for any information as to topics being discussed. The three talked for thirty minutes to an hour and then exchanged telephone numbers. AL-BAYOUMItranslated for BIN DON that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were currently
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living in an apartment nearby but that he had invited them to come to San Diego since AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR did not like Los Angeles.
BIN DON added that he believed that AL-BAYOUMI gave his cell phone
number and AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR
gave a land-line number. These
assumptions are based on the fact that "most Muslim men only give their cell numbers out," because they don't want to risk someone calling their home and their wife answering and the fact that BIN DON did not believe AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR had time to get a cell phone as they had been in the U.S. "only a couple of days."
After exchanging phone numbers, the four separated
with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR walking off together and AL-BAYOUMIand BIN DON returning to their car. BIN DON stated that he did not see where or which direction AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR went. However, before returning to the car, AL-BAYOUMI wanted to stop at a small grocery store that was about fifty yards from the car. They walked around inside for a few minutes and then without buying anything, returned to the car.
AL-BAYOUMI then drove back to the KFM, where he and
BIN DON prayed for five to ten minutes. Again, this prayer was not part of an organized prayer session at the KFM. AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON prayed alone and then left the KFM to return to San Diego. BIN DON guessed that it would have been after five o'clock and probably closer to six, as it was "fully dark" outside when they began the trip back to San Diego.
These events are significant because it shows
inconsistencies with AL-BAYOUMI'S account of the meeting between himself and the two hijackers. the most important of these is that during AL-BAYOUMI interview with the PENTTBOM team in Saudi Arabia, he states that he didn't know where the King Fahad Mosque was, and had never been there. The time of the meeting is in question also.
ARRIVAL OF AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR IN SAN DIEGO
AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR arrived in San Diego a few
days after meeting AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON in the restaurant. When
interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI
advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR arrived
at the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD), 7050 Eckstrom Avenue, San Diego, California, and asked for him. AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHARinformed AL-BAYOUMI that they were looking to obtain an apartment in the area. AL-BAYOUMI then directed them to the nearby Parkwood Apartment complex at which he resided with his family.
Investigation has determined that AL-MIHDHAR and
AL-HAZMI initially attempted to obtain an apartment at Parkwood
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Apartments on their own with cash, but could not because they did not have a credit history and because the leasing company did not accept cash payments. On 02/04/2000, AL-BAYOUMI signed as a guarantor and obtained a cashier's check drawn on his Bank of America checking account in the
amount of USD 1,558 for their security deposit
and first month's rent of Apartment #150. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR immediately provided him with the same amount of cash as the bank check and he then deposited the cash into his account. Financial records indicate that a cash deposit of the same amount as the cashier's check (USD 1,558) was made into AL-BAYOUMI's bank account on the same day, indicating the contemporaneous reimbursement from AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. While at the Bank of America, AL-MIHDHAR also opened bank account #09000-05839 with an initial deposit of USD 9,900. These three transactions - the cashier's check for USD 1,558, the cash deposit of USD 1,558, and the opening of AL-MIHDHAR’s account - were all posted within a time period of seven minutes on 02/04/2000. When interviewed, the bank teller who assisted with these transactions was able to corroborate the same information as obtained from the financial records (reference
A review of rental records from Parkwood Apartments
indicated that in addition to AL-BAYOUMI's signature as guarantor, both AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR listed AL-BAYOUMI's residence (Apartment ) as their last address; In addition, the review of rental records as well as bank records indicate that all rental payments (subsequent to the initial security deposit and first month's rent paid by cashier's check from AL-BAYOUMI's bank account.
INSTRUCTION RECEIVED BY AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR
Information received from KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED
(KSM) indicates that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were complying with
the directions given to them prior to
departing for the United States.
According to KSM, AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were instructed to make
contacts at the local mosques and to request assistance from members of the Muslim community after their arrival in the United States.
KSM advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were given such guidance
because, unlike some of the other hijackers who spoke English andhad spent time in western cultures, neither AL-HAZMI nor AL-MIHDHARhad such language skill and experience (reference ).
DINNER PARTY HELD AT PARKWOOD APARTMENT #150
A few days after arriving in San Diego, AL-BAYOUMI
had a "welcoming party," as described by BIN DON, for AL-HAZMI and
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12/27 23:36
Islamic Affairs of SAE 12/28 11:43
12/28 13:5712/28 22:24
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI 12/28 23:02
ANWAR AULAQI 12/28
23:05
12/28 23:07
Islamic Affairs of SAE 12/29 00:20
12/29 00:3512/29 00:39
Unknown 12/29 12:54
12/29 13:06
Ar-Ribat Mosque 12/29 13:07
ANWAR AULAQI 12/29 13:07
Unknown 12/29 13:48
Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999,
AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact with had just two months prior to this contact
moved from Ottawa, Canada to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a Somali/Yemeni student living in San Diego would receive eight calls over a three-day period from a Saudi Imam located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.
became a subject of interest, due
to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998.KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.
Subsequent investigation determined that
this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, investigation determined that telephone number which
was subscribed to by AL-HAZMI while living at the Parkwood Apartments with AL-MIHDHAR, had also had contact with the telephone number 967-1-200578. However, the contact between telephone
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number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.
According to TA, AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY's
first telephonic contact is on 12/16/1998. After which, for almost a year, there is no recorded telephonic contact until 11/15/1999.
Then, beginning on 12/06/1999 and ending on 12/29/1999 there are
twelve phone
calls (thirteen if a call from AL-THUMARY to the Ar-Ribat
Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included, however also see paragraph below) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring in the second half of December. In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003,AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMAIRY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMAIRY also worked at the Consulate ( ).
ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat
Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the Ar-Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of their relationship is still unknown. According to TA, the first telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and AULAQI was on 12/18/1999, after which there were calls on 12/28/99, 12/29/99 (possibly two calls on this day depending on to whom ALTHUMARY was talking at the Ar-Ribat Mosque) 1/12/00 and 4/25/00. During a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-THUMARY (
The three telephone numbers which are
attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM . In an interview
conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE ( .
In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."
The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700
and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE
The same serial states that MUSAED
AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his
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documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice
of
a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California"
.
Moreover, AL-THUMAIRY and AL-BAYOUMI contact with
AL-JARRAH did not end after the reported contact above. AL-THUMARY'sland line of had five additional telephonic contacts
with the cell phone of AL-JARRAH. AL-THUMAIRY's cell
phone had 48 additional telephonic contacts AL-JARRAH's
cell phone from 07/22/2001 to 02/03/2003.
However, even with such extensive contact with
AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the soledistributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. interviewed on , reported that "AlBayoumi
fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to"AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)"
The significance of this three-day long
heightened contact remains unclear. However, a few items seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulates that distributed funds and support to extremists, and, it appears in some case, terrorist organizations; 2) there were inexplicable, at least currently, telephonic connections between Al-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-basedindividuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMIparticular OMAR AL-BAYOUMI ; 3) these same San Diego-basedindividuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.
Recruitment: Although, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, may
not have arrived in southern California with an active support network, it seems that once they were vouched into the local community they may have begun to vet individuals for those individual'swillingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.
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and certain radical elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.
Known Identifiers
Descriptive Data:
Main Subject
Name -
Last: AL-BAYOUMI
First: OMARMiddle: AHMED
Race: WSex: MDOB: 1957
POB: Saudi Arabia
SOC:Alias(es) -
Last: AL-BAYOUMI
First: O
Middle: A
Current Location: Riyadh, Saudi ArabiaMiscellaneous: Subject is a non-USPER.
LEAD(s):
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FEDERAL BUREA
U OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 02/19/2009
To: Counterterrorism Attn:
International Operations Attn:
Riyadh Attn:
San Diego Attn:
New York Attn:
From: New York
Contact:
Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title: FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY
OPERATION ENCORE
Synopsis: Initiate a Full Investigation (FI)on FAHAD AL
-
THUMAIRY
Enclosure(s): 1 - Opening LHM
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Full Investigation Initiated: 02/12/2009
Reference: -OPERATION ENCORE,
Details: Administrative Note: New York is opening the
captioned FI based on information developed during interviews and
investigation conducted under the auspices of the referenced
investigation. Due to logistical constraints related to
uploading to any PENTTBOM file and the evolved nature of the
instant investigation, all future documentation related to such
referenced investigation should be uploaded to the captioned
case.
Background: On 08/28/2007, writers opened the
OPERATION ENCORE investigation that contained information
garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets,
which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM
investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both
a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation
into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained
individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11
hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional
intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM
investigation, OPERATION ENCORE was opened. Writers opined that
certain Al Qa'ida (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.
Specifically, writers were interested in gaining a
greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL- MIHDHAR and
NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the
local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an
understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with
which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain
support and safe harbor.
Results : Over the past two years, writers
have interviewed multiple individuals including some of those
detailed in the referenced serial and additional confidential
human sources (CHS) related to the PENTTBOM investigation, who
were also knowledgeable of events and individuals in Los Angeles
and San Diego in late 1999 and early 2000. The results of such
interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has
provided significant insight into i) how AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI
may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what
other objectives AL- MIHDHAR and AL -HAZMI may have had in addition
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to preparation for the 9/11 plot, and iii) additional individuals
associated with AL- MIHDHAR and AL -HAZMI during late 1999 and
early 2000.
Exploitation of Muslim Community: Multiple
and other individuals associated with AL-
MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California
believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia"
prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally
defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the
context. , AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI
would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a
certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have
been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival.
Such individual would then, because of this individual's
relationship with the tazkia- providing individual, have provided
any and all assistance that AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI would need
during their time in the United States
). At this time, it is unknown who
would have been the tazkia- providing individual or to whom the
tazkia would have directed AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI to visit.
believed that it likely would have involved
someone or multiple persons who had access to the Saudi Consulate
in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver
City, California, as support from both communities would have
been necessary for success (see serial
). It is important to note that the individual to whom the
tazkia directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, would not have
necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL- MIHDHAR and AL-
HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact,
, the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a
carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving
assistance.
One individual meeting such description who is
also reported to have had contact with AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI is
FAHAD AL-THUMARY, main subject in closed case# .
AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver
City, California and was described in U.S. State Department
documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California
(Consulate) Additional
documentation from
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( . AL-THUMARY was
previously the subject of an FI out of the Los Angeles Division
based on his association with OMAR AL- BAYOUMI through phone calls
and AL-THUMARY's potential association with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-
HAZMI . According to the closing EC
and supplemental closing EC
the FI was closed due to: i) AL- THUMARY's relocation
to Saudi Arabia, ii) an exhaustion of "all reasonable and
practical intelligence collection methods". However, a review of
AL-THUMARY's case file does not appear to reveal any
investigation into AL- THUMARY as a potential "tazkia" contact for
AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was
investigated as the existence of such a protocol as well as the
fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a
protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community appears to
have been unknown at such time.
If AL- THUMARY played any part in providing
assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from
another unknown individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-
MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance
from another unknown individual(s) there may have been telephonic
contact between Al- THUMARY and such unknown individual(s). A
review of AL-THUMARY known telephone records for the time period
immediately prior to AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI arriving in the U.S.
is particularly instructive.
During a three- day period at the end of
December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the
arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of
phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact,
including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been
duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below
documents this pattern:
TO PHONE # DATE TIME
Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE) 12/27 12:40
SAE 12/27 12:42
12/27 14:26
SAE 12/27 14:41
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI 12/27 18:27
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI 12/27 23:36
12/27 23:36
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Islamic Affairs of SAE 12/28 11:43
12/28 13:57
12/28 22:24
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI 12/28 23:02
ANWAR AULAQI 12/28 23:05
12/28 23:07
Islamic Affairs of SAE 12/29 00:20
12/29 00:35
12/29 00:39
Unknown 12/29 12:54
12/29 13:06
Ar-Ribat Mosque 12/29 13:07
ANWAR AULAQI 12/29 13:07
Unknown 12/29 13:48
Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999,
AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic
contact with had just two months prior to
this contact moved from Ottawa, Canada to San Diego, California.
It is still unclear why a Somali/Yemeni student living in San
Diego would receive eight calls over a three- day period from a
Saudi Imam located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two
would have been first introduced.
became a subject of interest, due
to contact with telephone number 967-1 -200578 on 03/02/2000,
which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first
came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the
U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on
08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two
suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this
number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL- OWHALI was later
captured in Kenya and identified this number during his
confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this
number both before and after the attack.
( ) Subsequent investigation determined that
this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by
AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the
PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on
09/11/2001, investigation determined that telephone number
which was subscribed to by AL-HAZMI while living at
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the Parkwood Apartments with AL- MIHDHAR, had also had contact
with the telephone number 967- 1-200578. However, the contact
between telephone number and this Yemeni number was the
first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in
southern California.
According to TA, AL- BAYOUMI and AL-
THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on 12/16/1998. After
which, for almost a year, there is no recorded telephonic contact
until 11/15/1999. Then, beginning on 12/06/1999 and ending on
12/29/1999 there are twelve phone calls (thirteen if a call from
AL-THUMARY to the Ar- Ribat Mosque, at which AL- BAYOUMI performed
administrative duties, is included, however also see paragraph
below) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of
such calls occurring in the second half of December. In an
interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he
knew AL-THUMARY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMARY also
worked at the Consulate ( ).
ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar- Ribat
Mosque during the time AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI were living in San
Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the Ar-
Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of
their relationship is still unknown. According to TA, the first
telephonic contact between AL- THUMARY and AULAQI was on
12/18/1999, after which there were calls on 12/28/99, 12/29/99
(possibly two calls on this day depending on to whom ALTHUMARY
was talking at the Ar-Ribat Mosque) 1/12/00 and 4/25/00. During
a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-
THUMARY .
The three telephone numbers which are
attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be
linked. Telephone number 202- 494-2777 is subscribed to by the
SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal
phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is
attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM ( ).
In an interview conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described
himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE (
). In the same interview, ASSWAILEM
details the personal relationship that he had with AL- BAYOUMI,
which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship
funds."
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AL-HAZMI; 3) these same San Diego- based individuals provided some
of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL- MIHDHAR and AL-
HAZMI.
Recruitment: Although, AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI,
may not have arrived in southern California with an active
support network, it seems that once they were vouched into the
local community they may have begun to vet individuals for those
individual's willingness to assist AL- MIHDHAR and AL -HAZMI.
Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like
they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential
willingness to assist AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI (
. Additionally AL -MIHDHAR and AL-
HAZMI were reported to have been associating with a group of
similarly-aged and similarly-situated (i.e., students, single)
individuals in Southern California. Of all the nineteen 9/11
hijackers, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI came to the United States
earliest and stayed the longest. During such time, AL-MIHDHAR
and AL-HAZMI may have been recruiting individuals for potential
future operations.
Predication for the Investigation
As stated above, the prior intelligence gathering
project established a possible modus
operandi of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI's for integrating into and
receiving assistance from the local Muslim communities, i.e.
tazkia. This methodology could possible be exploited in the
future to help integrate and guarantee assistance to future AQ
terrorists. The recent review of phone records and financial
records coupled with source reporting on the above- described
individuals may indicate the existence of a group of like- minded
individuals who provided assistance, financial and otherwise, to
AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, during their time in the U.S. AL-
MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been able to "plug into," what
appears to be a extremist Saudi- based financial support group
through the use of tazkia. This information provides specific
and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to
national security may exist, as the group or organization that
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these above-described individuals compose i) is or may be a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may
be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities
constituting a threat to the national security (or related
preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign
power.
Possible Nexus to a Foreign Power
At this point in the investigation, there are
number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved
could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic
Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were
able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ
operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs
and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the
resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical
element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with
AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical
elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually
beneficial goals.
Known Identifiers
Descriptive Data:
Main Subject
Name -
Last: AL-THUMARY
First: FAHAD
Middle: I. A.
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: 1971
POB: Saudi Arabia
PNO: Official)
SOC:
Alias(es) -
Last: AL-THUMAIRY
First: FN
Middle: MN
Phone #:
Current Location: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
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Miscellaneous: Subject is a non- USPER.
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Action)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
is requested to provide
notice of the initiation of this investigation to the DOJ Office
of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and DOJ's Criminal
Division.
Set Lead 2: (Action)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
Coordinate as
required based on information in the Details section above.
Set Lead 3: (Action)
COUNTERTERRORISM
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 10/27/2009
To: Counterterrorism Attn:
Attn:
Attn:
Attn:
Attn:
Intelligence Directorate Attn:
Attn:
From: New York
Contact:
Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title: MUSAED AL-JARRAH
Synopsis: To open captioned Full Investigation, document
transmission of and request a
Enclosure(s): (1
)the electronic
Full Investigation Initiated: 10/27/2009
Details: New York Office opened captioned Full
Investigation based on information that MUSAED AL- JARRAH, former
director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the Saudi Arabian
Embassy, is or was part of a group that may have provided support
to two (2) of the 9/11 hijackers. Through NYO Operation Encore
investigation, more information has surfaced indicating AL-
JARRAH's connection to international terrorism.
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By way of background, over the past two years
under Operation Encore, NYO sought to gain a greater
understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL- MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-
HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e.
southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding
would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL -
MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and
safe harbor.
As a result, NYO Agents interviewed multiple
individuals related to the PENTTBOM investigation. The results
of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation
has provided significant insight into i) how AL- MIHDHAR and AL-
HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii)
what other objectives AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI may have had in
addition to preparation for the 9/11 plot, and iii) additional
individuals associated with AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI during late
1999 and early 2000.
other
individuals associated with AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI during their
time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must
have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States.
Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher"
depending on the context. AL-MIHDHAR
and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to
present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may
simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon
their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this
individual's relationship with the tazkia- provider, ha ve provided
any and all assistance that AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI would need
during their time in the United States (see
At this time, it is unknown who would have
been the tazkia-provider or to whom the tazkia-provider would
have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit.
believed that it was likely a person or multiple persons who had
access to both the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and
the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from
both communities would have been necessary for success (see
. It is important to note that
the individual to whom AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI were directed,
would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-
MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact,
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, the nature of tazkia, in general, is to
function as a carte blanche, no- questions- asked method for
receiving assistance.
One individual reported to have had contact
with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, main subject in
closed case # . Above captioned subject, AL-
JARRAH, has multiple telephonic contacts, with AL- THUMARY. AL-
THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City,
California and was described in U.S. State Department
documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California
(Consulate) ( ). Additional
documentation from the
( ). AL-THUMARY was
previously a main subject of an FI based on his association with
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI (through phone connectivity) and his (AL-
THUMARY's) potential association with AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI
( ).
According to the closing EC for AL- THUMARY
( ) and supplemental closing EC
the FI was closed due to: i) AL-THUMARY's
relocation to Saudi Arabia, ii) an exhaustion of "all reasonable
and practical intelligence collection methods" and iii) the U.S.
Attorney's Office conclusion that there was insufficient evidence
to prosecute AL-THUMARY at such time. However, a review of AL-
THUMARY's case file does not appear to reveal any investigation
into AL-THUMARY as a potential "tazkia" contact for AL-MIHDHAR
and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the
existence of such a protocol, as well as the fact that AL- MIHDHAR
and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the
local Muslim community, appears to have been unknown at such
time.
If AL- THUMARY played any part in providing
assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from
another individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL- MIHDHAR
and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from
another individual(s), there may have been telephonic contact
between Al-THUMARY and such individual(s). A review of AL-
THUMARY's known telephone records for the time period immediately
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prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is
particularly instructive.
During a three- day period at the end of
December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the
arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of
phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact,
including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been
duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below
documents this pattern:
TO PHONE # DATE TIME
Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE) 12/27 12:40
SAE 12/27 12:42
12/27 14:26
SAE 12/27 14:41
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI 12/27 18:27
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI 12/27 23:36
12/27 23:36
Islamic Affairs of SAE 12/28 11:43
12/28 13:57
12/28 22:24
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI 12/28 23:02
ANWAR AULAQI 12/28 23:05
12/28 23:07
Islamic Affairs of SAE 12/29 00:20
12/29 00:35
12/29 00:39
Unknown 12/29 12:54
12/29 13:06
Ar-Ribat Mosque 12/29 13:07
ANWAR AULAQI 12/29 13:07
Unknown 12/29 13:48
Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999,
AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic
contact with (main subject of ).
had just two months prior to this contact moved from
Ottawa, Canada to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why
a Somali/Yemeni student living in San Diego would receive eight
calls over a three- day period from a Saudi Imam located in Los
Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first
introduced.
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became a subject of interest, due
to contact with telephone number 967-1 -200578 on 03/02/2000,
which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first
came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the
U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on
08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two
suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this
number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL- OWHALI was later
captured in Kenya and identified this number during his
confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this
number both before and after the attack.
Subsequent investigation determined that
this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by
AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the
main PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on
09/11/2001, investigation determined that telephone number
which was subscribed to by AL- HAZMI while he lived
at the Parkwood Apartments with AL- MIHDHAR, had also had contact
with telephone number 967- 1-200578. However, the contact between
telephone number and this Yemeni number was the first
recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern
California.
According to Telephone Applications (TA),
AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on
12/16/1998. After which, for almost a year, there is no recorded
telephonic contact until 11/15/1999. Then, beginning on
12/06/1999 and ending on 12/29/1999, there are twelve phone calls
(thirteen if a call from AL- THUMARY to the Ar- Ribat Mosque, at
which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included)
between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such
calls occurring in the second half of December. In an interview
of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-
THUMARY from the KFM but was unaware that AL- THUMARY also worked
at the Consulate ( .
ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar- Ribat
Mosque during the time AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI were living in San
Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the Ar-
Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of
their relationship is still unknown. According to TA, the first
telephonic contact between AL- THUMARY and AULAQI was on
12/18/1999, after which there were calls on 12/28/99, 12/29/99
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Arabia and distributing those funds to a few recipients"
The distribution functioned as follows,
"[e]ach time a large wire was received, checks were written and
cash withdrawals were made from the account until the account's
balance was depleted...[a]t that time, the next large wire
transfer was received and the cycle was repeated"
During the period that this account was
examined, 06/10/1999 to 11/15/2002,
and the owned by
received from AL- THUMARY. also the
president of had previously been
associated with members of the Somali- based terrorist
organization, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI). At the time of
MOHDAR ABDULLAH's arrest in 2001, ABDULLAH
possessed business card with the phone number
on his person.
indicated that
MOHAMED, a Somali extremist who immigrated from Toronto, Canada
to San Diego, California in 1995 (case # also
received a portion of the Saudi largesse for his activities.
MOHAMED was selected as the AIAI leader in the U.S. in the
beginning of 2000 . NOTE: AIAI is
a Somali-based terrorist organization which rose to power in the
early 1990s (according to DHS's Terrorist Reference Guide from
2004) and is designated a terrorist group on the FBI's
MOHAMMED
received a stipend of approximately
per month from
the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs
Based on some of the above
it seems likely this stipend was administered by AL-
THUMARY or AL-JARRAH.
However, even with such extensive contact with AL-
JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole
distributor of funds in California, AL- THUMARY may have been
competing for such funds with AL- BAYOUMI.
interviewed on reported that
"AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be
the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques."
According to "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like
each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of
the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of
the Saudi Government did not say which part of the Saudi
Government AlBayoumi represented)"
EO14040-000576-UPDATED
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(F)
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(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(P)
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(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
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(P)
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To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: 10/27/2009
The significance of this three- day long heightened
contact remains unclear. However, a few things seem apparent: 1)
AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi- based network operating out of the
Embassy and Consulate(s); 2) this network is reported to have had
the purpose of distributing funds and support to sunni salafist
extremists; 3) there were inexplicable telephonic connections
between Al-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals
prior to the arrival of AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI; and 4) these
same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most
obvious and tangible assistance to AL- MIHDHAR and AL -HAZMI.
AL-MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI do not appear to have
arrived in southern California with an active local support
network. However, it appears that once AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI
were vouched for, via tazkia, they may have begun to assess
individual's suitability for recruitment. Multiple individuals
stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or
"assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL- MIHDHAR
and AL-HAZMI ( ).
Predication for the Investigation
The above information provides specific and
articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to
national security may exist, as the group or organization that
these above-described individuals, including AL-JARRAH, compose
i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power
and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in
activities constituting a threat to the national security (or
related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a
foreign power.
Suspected Foreign Power
At this point in the investigation, there are a
number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved
could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic
Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL -HAZMI were
able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ
operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs
and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the
resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical
element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with
AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical
EO14040-000577-UPDATED
(F)
(F)
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: 10/27/2009
elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually
beneficial goals.
Pertinent Sensitive Investigative Matters :
Not Applicable
Number of Subjects: 1
Code:
Descriptive Data:
Main Subject
Name -
Last: AL-JARRAH
First: MUSAED
Middle: A.
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: 1960
POB: Saudi Arabia
Phone #: Previous -
202-342-3700, 202 -944-3192,
EO14040-000578-UPDATED
(G)
(P-1)
(G)
(G)
(P)
(F)
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: 10/27/2009
Current -
Current Location: Malaysia
Miscellaneous - Subject is a non- USPER.
E-mail Addresses:
Additional Information/ Intelligence :
Not Applicable
EO14040-000579-UPDATED
(F)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(G)
(F)
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: 10/27/2009
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Info)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, D.C.
To notify of the initiation
of captioned FI.
Set Lead 2: (Action)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
Coordinate as
required based on information in the Details above.
Set Lead 3: (Info)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
Read and clear.
Set Lead 4: (Info)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
Read and clear.
Set Lead 5: (Info)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
Read and clear.
Set Lead 6: (Action)
EO14040-000580-UPDATED
(G)
(F)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(Rev. 08-28-2000)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF I NVESTIGATION
Precedence: PRIORITY Date: 11/26/2001
To: Counterterrorism Attn:
From:
San
Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #: Title:
OMAR ABDI MOHAME
OMAR KHADIB;
: San Diego requests
Experian for financial and credit records regarding captioned
subject.
Full Field Investigation Instituted:
Details: Request Of Bureau:
Bureau is requested
Experian for financial and credit records regarding captioned
subject.
On 2000, , advised that Omar Mohamed
of San Diego as selected as the Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI) leader in the United States approximately six months ago. stated that members of the AIAI are very secretive. that AIAI raises large amounts of money in the United States and transfers it to Somalia using .
EO14040-000643-UPDATED
(S)
(S)
(S)
(G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (J-1), (G)
(G)
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(S)
(A), (J-1), (G)
To: nt : San Diego
Re: , 11/26/2001
25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to
which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.
On 09/17/2001, OMAR KHADIB, who was one of many Muslim
community ders interviewed regarding the 09/11/2001 hijackings,
insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.
San Diego appreciates FBIHQ’s assistance in this matter.
Set Lead 1:
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC.
EO14040-000645-UPDATED
(P)
(P)
(F)
To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: , 11/26/2001
FBIHQ is requested Experian for credit
informa aining to Omar Abdi Mohame ib, date of
birth, 1960, SSAN , La Mesa, CA.
91941
♦♦
EO14040-000646-UPDATED
(P-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(F)
To: C unterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: 11/16/2001
insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that
the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.
San Diego appreciates FBIHQ’s assistance in this
matter.
♦♦
EO14040-000650-UPDATED
(F)
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of
Investigation
In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI
and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. San Diego, California 92123
February 10, 2004
OMAR ABDI MOHAMED,
Investigative Summary:
, advised that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, also known as Omar Abdi
Mohamed AlKhadib, was born on , in Mogadishu, Somalia.
MOHAMED was a resident is last known
address in Canada was Ontario. His
telephone number at that address was MOHAMED was
allowed entry into the United States on July 8, 1995. His status at that time was SR-1 (Lawful Alien Permanent Resident - Religious Worker). That status was granted as the result of being offered employment by Masjidul Taqwa (Islamic Institution), 2575 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, CA 92101, telephone (619) 239-6738. The offer was made by . On April 11, 2000, MOHAMED submitted
his
Application for
Naturalization to Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS).
advised that OMAR
MOHAMED of San Diego, was selected as the Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI) leader in the United States in early 2000. stated that members of the AIAI are very secretive. A close friend of advised that AIAI raises large amounts of money in the United States and transfers it to Somalia
AIAI is an international terrorist
organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). AIAI is a faction of a foreign nation and a political organization that is engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof, which is not substantially composed of United States citizens.
AIAI was previously identified by
FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. A terrorist threat summary received from members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) suggested that the AIAI is developing cells of supporters in the U.S. primarily responsible for fund-raising and at a future date, possible attacks directed at U.S. targets. One of the goals of the AIAI is to seize the Ogaden region of Ethiopia by force and form an Islamic state composed of Ogaden and Somalia. , has reported that
EO14040-000651-UPDATED
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(A), (G), (J-1)
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(P-1)
(P)
To: General Counsel From: San Diego
Re: 01/17/2002
Arrangements should be made with Experian to provide
the records personally to a representative of your office. Experian
should neither send the records through the mail nor utilize the
name of the subject in any telephone calls to your office. Experian should not contact FBIHQ directly in any manner.
Consumer reports received from a consumer reporting
agency must be clearly identified when reported in any Bureau communication. Subsequent dissemination of such information is prohibited, except to other Federal agencies or military investigative entities as may be necessary for the approval or conduct of a foreign counterintelligence investigation.
Any questions regarding the above can be directed
to San Diego Division, Attention: .
EO14040-000668-UPDATED
(F)
(S)
(Rev. 01-31-2003)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 10/23/2007
To: Counterterrorism Attn:
Attn:
Attn:
Riyadh Attn:
Sanaa Attn:
EO14040-000699-UPDATED
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(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
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(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
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(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(Rev. 01-31-2003)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Ottawa Attn:
San Diego Attn:
Los Angeles Attn:
Washington Field Attn:
New York Attn:
From: New
ct:
Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title: OPERATION ENCORE
Synopsis: Initiate a Full Investigation (FI) on the
below-described group.
Enclosure(s): 1 - Opening LHM
1 - submitted under separate cover
EO14040-000700-UPDATED
(G)
(G)
(G)
(S)
(S)
(G)
(S)
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(G)
(A),(G),(J-1)
To: Counterterrorism From: New York Re: ( 10/23/2007
Full Investigation Initiated: 10/23/2007
Reference:
Details: Administrative Note: New York is opening the
captioned FI based on information developed during interviews and investigation conducted under the auspices of the referenced investigation. Due to logistical constraints related to uploading to any PENTTBOM file and the evolved nature of the instant investigation, all future documentation related to such referenced investigation should be uploaded to the captioned case file.
Background: On 06/28/2007, New York opened a subfile
under the PENTTBOM investigation to contain information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, New York believed that certain Al Qa'ida (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.
Specifically, New York sought to gain a greater
understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.
Results: Over the past two months, writers
interviewed multiple individuals related to the PENTTBOM investigation. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition to preparation for the 9/11 plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.
Exploitation of Muslim Community: Multiple San
Diego sources and other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. According to such sources,
EO14040-000701-UPDATED
(F)
(F)
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: 10/23/2007
may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim
community, appears to have been unknown at such time.
If AL-THUMARY played any part in providing
assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another individual(s), there may have been telephonic contact between Al-THUMARY and such individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY's known telephone records for the time period immediately prior to AL-MIHDHAR
and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.
During a three-day period at the end of December
1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact, including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below documents this pattern:
TO PHONE # DATE TIME
Saudi Arabian Embassy (SAE) 12/27 12:40
SAE 12/27 12:42
12/27 14:26
SAE 12/27 14:41
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI 12/27 18:27
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI 12/27 23:36
12/27 23:36
s of SAE 12/28 11:43 12/28 13:57
12/28 22:24
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI 12/28 23:02
ANWAR AULAQI 12/28 23:05 12/28 23:07
Islamic Affairs of SAE 12/29 00:20 12/29 00:35
12/29 00:39
Unknown 12/29 12:54
12/29 13:06
Ar-Ribat Mosque 12/29 13:07
ANWAR AULAQI 12/29 13:07
Unknown 12/29 13:48
Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999,
AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact
EO14040-000703-UPDATED
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(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P), (P-1)
To: Counterterrorism From: New York Re: 10/23/2007
with (main subject of had
just two months prior to this contact moved from to
San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a
student living in San Diego would receive eight calls over a three-day period from a Saudi Imam located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.
became a subject of interest, due
to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.
Subsequent investigation determined that
this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the main PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, investigation determined that telephone number
, which was subscribed to by AL-HAZMI while he lived
at the Parkwood Apartments with AL-MIHDHAR, had also had contact
ephone number 967-1-200578. However, the contact between
telephone number and this Yemeni number was the first
recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.
According to Telephone Applications (TA),
AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on 12/16/1998. After which, for almost a year, there is no recorded telephonic contact until 11/15/1999. Then, beginning on 12/06/1999 and ending on 12/29/1999, there are twelve phone calls (thirteen if a call from AL-THUMARY to the Ar-Ribat Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring in the second half of December. In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMARY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMARY also worked at the Consulate ( .
ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat
Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the
EO14040-000704-UPDATED
(F)
(P)
(P)
(F)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(F)
(P)
To: Counterterrorism From: New York Re: 10/23/2007
At this point in the investigation, there are a number
of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could
be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-
MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit
and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.
Pertinent Sensitive National Security Matters
A sensitive national security matter exists as a number
of individuals identified herein were or may currently hold diplomatic status in the Saudi Arabian government, including FAHAD AL-THUMARY, MOHAMMED AL-MUHANNA and MUSAED A. AL-JARRAH.
Known Identifiers
Descriptive Data:
Main Subject
Name -
Last: AL-THUMARY
First: FAHAD
Middle: I. A.
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: 1971
POB: PNO: SOC: Alias(es) -
Last: AL-THUMAIRY
First: FN
Middle:
Phone #: Current Location: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Main Subject
Name -
EO14040-000710-UPDATED
(P)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(A)(G)(J-1)
(A)(G)(J-1)
(F)
To: Counterterrorism From: New York Re: 10/23/2007
Miscellaneous - Subject is a non-USPER and
UHANNA
Main Subject
Name -
Last: AULAQI
First: ANWAR
Middle: NASSER
Current Case #
Main Subject
Name -
Last:
First: Middle:
Race: B/W
Sex: M
DOB: 1975
POB: Mogadishu, Somalia
ARN: PNO:
SOC: Address(es) -
House #: Street Name: City: State: Postal Code: Country: Canada
Phone #:
Miscellaneous - Subject is an USPER.
Main Subject
Name -
Last: AL-JARRAH
First: MUSAED
Middle: A.
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: 1960
EO14040-000712-UPDATED
(P-1)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(P)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(P)
(A)(G)(J-1)
(A)(G)(J-1)
(F)
(F)
To: Counterterrorism From: New York Re: 10/23/2007
POB:
Phone #:
Miscellaneous - Subject is a non-USPER.
EO14040-000713-UPDATED
(P-1)
(P)
(A)(G)(J-1)
(A)(G)(J-1)
(F)
To: Counterterrorism From: New York Re: 10/23/2007
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Action)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
is requested to provide notice
of the initiation of this investigation to the DOJ Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and DOJ's Criminal Division. Set Lead 2: (Action)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
Coordinate as
required based on information in the Details section above. Set Lead 3: (Action)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
The is
requested to process the which is being submitted via email to the mailbox at case to the
and appropriate supported systems. ♦♦
EO14040-000714-UPDATED
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(F)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(Rev. 08 -28-2000)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: PRIORITY Date: 10/22/2001
To: Counterterrorism Attn:
Investigative Services
Los Angeles
New York
From: San Diego
Contact: ,
Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title: PENTTBOMB;
MAJOR CASE 182;
ACTS OF TERRORISM
Synopsis: Lead for Los Angeles to conduct interview of
Reference FBI control number .
Enclosure(s): Enclosed for Los Angeles are the following:
(1) One copy of FD -302 from interview of on
October 16, 2001.
(2) One copy of FD -302 from interview of on October
16, 2001.
(3) One copy of i nsert regarding and records
checks.
(4) One copy of 28 photographs; including 19 known hijackers
and 9 San Diego associates.
EO14040-001516-UPDATED
(G)
(S)
(S)
(F)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(G)
(S)
(F)
(G)
(P)
(P)
(S)
To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: , 10/22/2001
in
and Sana -Bell company is related to .
Los Angeles is requested to determine
knowledge in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, illegal activities
at the ICSD, Omar Al -Bayoumi and Soliman Elay.
EO14040-001519-UPDATED
(F)
(F)
(F)
(P)
(G)
To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: , 10/22/2001
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Adm)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
For information, read and clear.
Set Lead 2: (Adm)
INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES
AT WASHINGTON, DC
To make aware of San Diego investigation and resulting
leads set forth for other divisions.
Set Lead 3:
LOS ANGELES
AT HAWTHORNE, CALIFORNIA
Los Angeles will interview
apartment Hawthorne, California, telephone date of
birth Social Security Account Number , regarding
her knowledge of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Islamic
Center of San Diego, Omar Al -Bayoumi and Soliman Elay.
Set Lead 4: (Adm)
NEW YORK
AT NEW YORK
For information, read and clear.
EO14040-001520-UPDATED
(F)
(G)
(P)
(P-1)
(P)
(P)
(P-1)
(Rev. 08 -28-2000)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: PRIORITY Date: 10/22/2001
To: Counterterrorism Attn:
Investigative Services
New York
San Diego
From:
Contact: SSA
Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title: PENTTBOMB
MAJOR CASE #182
Synopsis: To report results of investigation in obtaining subscriber
information at Legat,
Reference: San Diego EC dated 10/04/2001 captioned as above.
Details: Referenced San Diego EC requested obtain subscriber
information for the following numbers, in conjunction with the San Diego
investigation of Omar Al -Bayoumi. By letter dated 10/17/2001, the
Philippine National Police, provided the
following subscriber i nformation:
1.
This number is subscribed to by International Synthetic
Industry, 389 Quirino Hiway, Brgy. Baesa, Quezon City, Philippines.
2.
This number is subscribed to by the Commission on Audit, 2/F
COA Building, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, Philippines.
3.
This number is subscribed to by Fiber Development Authority,
Asiatrust Annex Building, 1424 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Philippines.
4.
EO14040-002322-UPDATED
(G)
(G)
(G)
(F)
(S)
(S)
(G), (S)
(P-1)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(C-2)
To: Counterterrorism From:
Re: 10/22/2001
2
This number is subscribed to by Baynatel Telephone Booth, on
Roosevelt Street, Quezon City, Philippines.
EO14040-002323-UPDATED
(G)
(F)
To: Counterterrorism From:
Re: 10/22/2001
3
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:
ALL RECEIVING OFFICES
Read and Clear.
EO14040-002324-UPDATED
(G)
(F)
To: Counterterrorism From:
Re: , 01/25/2002
2 requests any security related
information regarding IYAD MAHMOUD MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA AL -RABABAH.
It should be noted that although query provided
negative results regarding IYAD MAHMOUD MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA AL -RABABAH,
AL-RABABAH’s name was also queried spelling his first name as Eyad.
Inasmuch as no further information is available through
liaison contacts or Legat considers covered.
EO14040-002485-UPDATED
(F)
(F)
(G)
(G)
(A),(G),(J-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(Rev. 08 -28-2000)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: IMMEDIATE Date: 10/10/2001
To: Counterterrorism Attn:
Investigative Services
National Security
From: San Diego
Contact:
Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title: PENTTBOMB
MAJOR CASE #182
Synopsis: Request to pass
information to foreign and domestic intelligence and criminal sources.
Administrative: Re telcalls from Special Agent
San Diego Division, to Assistant General Counsel (AGC)
National Security Law Unit (NSLU), FBIHQ, dated October 4, 2001 and October
5, 2001.
Details: As a result of the investigation being conducted at San
Diego it has been deter mined that Omar Ahmed Al -Bayoumi played an important
role in helping terrorists, Nawaf Al -Hazmi and Khalid Al -Mihdhar assimilate
into San Diego. Al -Bayoumi allowed them to stay at his apartment at the
Parkwood Apartment Complex, prior to obtaining their a partment at the
same complex approximately two weeks after they entered into the United
States through Los Angeles, California. Since the terrorists did not
have credit history or bank accounts Al -Bayoumi was listed as the guarantor
and co-signer on their apartment, and on at least one occasion paid for
their rent. Additionally, he helped set up a bank account for Al -Mihdhar.
EO14040-002563-UPDATED
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To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: 10/10/2001
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
For information. Read and clear.
Set Lead 2:
INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES
AT WASHINGTON, DC
For information. Read and clear.
Set Lead 3:
NATIONAL SECURITY
AT WASHINGTON, DC
to be able to pass specific information regarding links between
Dallah/Avco Trans Arabia Company and UBL to New Scotland Yard and utilize
same for the FBI prosecution of Al -Bayoumi.
EO14040-002567-UPDATED
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(Rev. 08 -28-2000)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: PRIORITY Date: 10/05/2001
To: Counterterrorism Attn:
Investigative Services
New York
From: San Diego
Contact:
Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title: PENTTBOMB
MAJOR CASE #182
Synopsis: Information regarding , aka
, currently residing in , Saudi Arabia. Request Legat
interview . Coverage of San Diego investigation
set forth .
Enclosure(s): Enclosed for receiving offices is: 1) A two (2)
page dated 10/04/2001 of . 2) query hist ory
for DOB 3) Eleven (11) page photo spread
numbered 1 through 28.
Details: Suspected hijacker Khalid Al -Mihdhar (listed as subject
#15) and Nawaf Al -Hazmi (listed as subject #19) were passengers on Flight
#77, which was used in the attack on the Pentagon. Additional description
information regarding Al -Mihdhar (subject #15) and Al -Hazmi (subject
#19) can be obtained from EC dated 09/27/2001 to all field offices from
Counterterrorism, captioned as above, wh ich provides extensive
information regarding all nineteen hijackers.
Al-Mihdhar and Al -Hazmi resided at the Parkwood
Apartments located at , San Diego,
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To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: , 10/05/2001
can be reached at . mother could
provide no further address for in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, exce pt
that he is enrolled in a religious university and the program is called
the .
advised that her son,
has returned to the United States approximately three or four times since
relocating to Sa udi Arabia in September 1996. A inquiry confirms
that has returned to the United States four times since 1997.
The date of arrivals are 06/27/1997, 08/13/1998, 01/03/1999, and
06/25/2000 (copy attached). When returned to the Unite d States
in June 2000, he spent about three or four weeks in the San Diego area.
During this time, San Diego hijackers Khalid Al -Midhar (subject #15)
and Nawaf Al -Hazmi (subject #19) prayed at the ICSD in San Diego,
California. confirmed that met with
Al-Bayoumi and that it is possible met the hijackers.
EO14040-002573-UPDATED
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To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: , 10/05/2001
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Adm)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
For information only. Read and clear.
Set Lead 2: (Adm)
INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES
AT WASHINGTON, DC
For information only. Read and clear.
Set Lead 3:
AT
1) Locate and interview
telephone 2) Display enclosed eleven (11)
page photo spread which includes the nineteen (19) hijackers and nine
(9) San Diego associates. 3) Determine if recalls hijacker
Al-Mihdhar (subject #15) and Al -Hamzi (subject #19) and the hijacker's
association wi th Al-Bayoumi (subject #20).
EO14040-002574-UPDATED
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(Rev. 08 -28-2000)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: IMMEDIATE Date: 09/22/2001
To: All Field Offices Attn: Personal Attention SACs
All Legats Personal Attention LEGATs
From: Counterterrorism
Contact:
Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title: PENTTBOMB
MAJOR CASE - 182
OO: NY
Synopsis: SUMMARY 11: This communication provides recipients
with the current daily summary of information gleaned from the PENTTBOMB
investigation.
Administrative: ALL OFFICES SHOULD MAINTAIN EVIDENCE, TO
INCLUDE ORIGINAL NOTES, AT THEIR RESPECTIVE FIELD OFFICES/LEGATS
UNLESS SPECIFICALL Y DIRECTED OTHERWISE. THE ONLY EXCEPTIONS ARE
ITEMS WHICH REQUIRE LABORATORY PROCESSING.
Details: The following provides recipients with information
obtained, to date, from the PENTTBOMB investigation. Recipients are
advised that this communication contains information previously provided,
EO14040-002984-UPDATED
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To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: , 09/22/2001
as well as information recently obtained, in the course of this
investigation.
Headquarters Related Information
Former Special Agent in Charge (SAC) John P. O’Neill
has been positively identified among the victims found at the World Trade
Center site. There has been no new developments pertai ning to Special
Agent Bomb Technician Leonard W. Hatton.
now has a mechanism to review credit cards. If
there is a "hit" on the credit card, will notify the affected field
office where the credit card has been utilized.
All field offices are requested to review parking lot
and surveillance camera records for 9/10/2001. Some of the subjects
or associates may have been at the airport on the day before the incidents.
Field Office Related Information
Atlanta
Investigative Efforts:
As of 4:00 pm on 9/21/2001, the toll -free hotline
has received 12,723 calls.
Baltimore
Investigative Efforts:
AHMED EL -KHEIR
an Egyptian with has been identified as
an individual who abandoned his luggage at a College Park, MD, motel
on 9/11/2001 and who had reportedly been seen in the company of ZIAD
JARRAH (UA Flt. #93). On 9/18/2001, EL -KHEIR was arrested by Prince
George's County PD fo r trespassing. During the initial interview with
FBI Baltimore (FBI BA), EL -KHEIR denied knowing or ever having seen ZIAD
JARRAH or any of the hijackers displayed to him in a photo array. On
9/20/2001, EL -KHEIR was re -interviewed and identified a photogr aph of
ZIAD JARRAH as a Pakistani who had assisted him in the past. On 9/21/2001,
FBI BA administered EL -KHEIR a polygraph examination. In response to
being asked whether he played any part in the planning or execution of
the events of 9/11/2001, EL -KHEIR showed strong deception. EL -KHEIR
is currently incarcerated in the Prince George's County Jail for
trespassing. EL -KHEIR has telephonically contacted the Egyptian
Embassy, where he alleges his cousin is the Embassy's Third Secretary.
EO14040-002985-UPDATED
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To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: , 09/22/2001
FBI BA expects th at EL-KHEIR's cousin will arrive on 9/22/2001 to post
bail for EL -KHEIR. FBI BA will interview the cousin if he appears.
In the event that EL -KHEIR is released from jail on bond, the INS detainer
is still in effect. Investigation continuing.
FBI BA consensually recorded a conversation between
a Cooperating Witness and the Ayay Islamic Prayer
Center in Laurel, MD, a location where it is known that KHALID ALMIHDHAR
(AA Flt. #77) dropped off his personal belongings. and the CW
had a conversation regarding , and the recent
terrorist attacks. Computer hard drives provided by had been
erased on or before 9/11/2001. Future consensually monitored calls will
be attempted. Investigati on continuing.
FBI BA has determined that may be
traveling in the near future (NFI).
FBI BA reported three incidents wherein males of
Middle Eastern descent were in possession of, or attempting to gain
possession of, vehicles bearing Department of Defense parking stickers.
FBI BA will attempt to identify these individuals. Results will be
provided to SIOC and appropriate field offices.
Previous FBI BA investigation identified a female
who was allegedly observed dining on two occasions with MOHAMMAD ATTA
(AA Flt. #11) at the Olive Garden restaurant in Laurel, MD. Based on
photo identification, FBI BA tentatively identified this female as
(DOB , , Silver
Spring, MD, employed at the .
was further identified by employees at Caton Auto Body Shop in Laurel,
MD, as the woman who accompanied several Middle Eastern males when they
brought a 2001 Honda in for repairs. translated for the males
and furnished the shop a telephone number for contact purposes.
was also positively identified by a former employee of the
ezStorage facility in Jessup, MD. That employee said that on or about
8/27/2001, appeared at the ezStorage location with three Middle
Eastern males, and the employee identified one of the men as ZIAD JARRAH
(UA Flt. #93). Investigation by Legat determined that, according
to Israeli records, is a U. S. citizen who visited Israel
from 5/15/2001 - 5/25/2001. FBI BA currently has under
physical surveillance and will attempt to interview her on 9/22/2001
to determ ine any nexus to this investigation.
FBI BA has placed under
surveillance. On 9/21/2001, traveled to the Crystal City area in
Northern Virginia and visited a Kinko’s copy store there for two hours
and 20 minutes. sp ent most of that time duplicating blank pages
EO14040-002986-UPDATED
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To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: , 09/22/2001
of a day planner book. also met with several Middle Eastern
individuals in the morning. On 9/21/2001 was observed at a Dennys
restaurant depositing a keyless remote vehicle entry device, which was
wrapped in two plastic bags inside of a third bag, into a trash receptacle
and then remaining in the vicinity of the receptacle for several hours.
The device was eventually recovered and transported to
for analysis. is currently wanted f or felony vehicle theft (local
warrant) for the taking of a vehicle from Dar Cars, Rockville, MD, in
January 2001. Previous investigation determined that resided in
various Laurel/College Park, MD, motels since June 2001, as well as being
tentatively identified by a motel manager as a possible associate of
HANI HANJOUR (AA Flt. #77). Due to the fact that has been exhibiting
unusual behavior (visiting Kinkos, performing ATM transactions, moving
from motel to motel in the Laurel/College Park area, e tc.) is remaining
under surveillance until thorough financial, cellular telephone and other
records checks are completed. He will then be arrested and interviewed.
Investigation continuing.
On 9/21/2001, FBI BA was advised of suspicious
activity in the vicinity of the Newcastle County (Delaware) Airport.
Investigation was conducted that resulted in arrests by local law
enforcement of four Middle Eastern males, identified as MUSTAFA CAMCI
( DPOB in Turkey. out of st atus. counterfeit passport
purported to be of exceptional quality. employed as painter. jumped
ship in Houston, TX on 4/23/2000); SADULLAH SAKA (DPOB in Turkey.
out of status. arrived on at New York City in 11/1996.
Employed as painter); SEYKAN KEMAL (DPOB in Turkey. out of
status arrived in 9/2000 through New York City. employed
as pizza delivery man.); and ALI TUNC (DPOB in Turkey. out
of status. arrived . These individua ls have been
interviewed by FBI BA. Their stories appear to be legitimate and their
employment has been corroborated by their employers. All four
are currently under detention by INS Philadelphia for being out of status.
Investigation continuin g.
Boston
Investigative Efforts:
On 09/22/2001, INS Detroit advised that a Northwest
Airlines Flight #345 en route to Logan International Airport (LIA) in
Boston was deplaned because the cockpit door strike plate was missing.
Initial investig ation determined that the strike plate was in place
prior to landing in Detroit. One theory is that the plane was prepared
for a terrorist takeover at some point on 9/22/2001 in Boston. That
plane was scheduled on 9/22/2001 to fly to San Francisco via De troit.
FBI Boston (FBI BS) is obtaining the manifest of the flight to review
EO14040-002987-UPDATED
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To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: , 09/22/2001
it Results of investigation
will be provided to and appropriate field offices.
Investigation by FBI BS has determined that a
photograph obtained from the vehicle of NAWAF ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77) appears
to be identical with Flight 175 subject AHMED ALGHAMDI (UA Flt. #175).
The photograph, which was obtained by FBI WFO, was superimposed over
a known photograph of ALGHAMDI a nd it appears to be a positive match.
Investigation continuing.
A maid at the Park Inn Hotel in Newton, MA, advised
FBI BS that an Arabic male answered the door of the room at approximately
11:00 a.m. on the morning of 9/11/2001. The male aske d her to come back
later to clean because someone in the room was sleeping. This hotel
is where WALEED ALSHEHRI (AA Flt. #11) and WAIL ALSHEHRI (AA Flt. #11)
stayed the night before the attack. FBI BS has initiated logical
investigation to identify the u nknown Arab male. Results will be provided
to and appropriate field offices.
FBI BS tentatively identified the Charles Hotel as
the place where AHMED ALGHAMDI (UA Flt. #175) and HAMZA ALGHAMDI (UA
Flt. #175) stayed while in Boston. This p reliminary determination is
based upon telephone records, ATM records, and a taxi driver who reportedly
drove them from the Charles Hotel to the Days Inn Hotel. FBI BS is
currently reviewing hotel records to confirm that these subjects stayed
at this hote l. Results will be provided. Investigation continuing.
FBI BS has identified a credit card for MUSTAFA
AHMED, who is believed to have been the person who received the Western
Union wire transfers from the subjects in the week pri or to 9/11/2001.
This information was passed to the financial analysis team.
On 9/21/2001, at approximately 6:00 pm,
, a travel agent from Providence, RI, reported that a customer
named purchased a ticket on a Virgi n Atlantic flight to
Johannesburg via London. Following his purchase, he made several
pro-terrorist statements. Since the initial purchase, has changed
his flight two times. The flight now leaves from JFK on 9/24/2001.
FBI NYO has been made aware of the potential threat and will interview
prior to takeoff. Investigation continuing.
On 9/21/2001, FBI BS received information that Delta
Flight #1479 will be hijacked on 9/22/2001. Information was originally
provided by US Customs Serv ice from a 9/17 interview of a walk -in source.
This source was on Delta Flight #1479 on 9/6/2001 and claims to have
observed Arab passengers allegedly conducting ‘‘pre-operational
surveillance. ’’ FBI BS obtained a manifest for this flight. A review
EO14040-002988-UPDATED
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during this tour. AL -SHEHHI was seated in First Class and is believed
to have been traveling with another party. An analysis of the flight
manifest suggests that AL -SHEHHI ma y have been flying under the name
of MATTHEW COHEN. Investigation continuing.
Detroit
Investigative Efforts:
As previously reported, ,
, and were arrested in apartmen t
on 9/18/2001 for identity fraud and fraudulent use of a visa. On
9/21/2001, these three individuals were ordered detained during a hearing
before a United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of
Michigan. The judge has subsequently received threatening telephone
calls and is receiving protection from the U.S. Marshals. On 09/20/2001,
a ‘‘JOHN DOE" (aka ) arrest warrant was issued as
possibly being the fourth occupant of apartment. This
warrant charges identit y fraud, fraud and misuse of visas, and misuse
of social security card. Investigation continuing.
Federal Protective Service Officer (FPSO)
while providing security at the U.S. Courthouse, Detroit,
was shot and killed on 9/21/200 1 by ( ).
was providing security at the U.S. Courthouse in Detroit, MI.
while waiting to pass through the metal -detector, was determined
by FPSO , to possess a bag containing a nickel -plated revolver.
Before could be disarmed, he shot and killed FPSO
was shot and wounded by other officers present. He is currently
in a hospital bed under guard by FBI Detroit (FBI DE). Based upon
information and physical evidence found in his c ar, appears to
be a mentally -deranged person who was under the influence of drugs at
the time of the shooting. The shooting does not appear to be related
to the investigation. When able, will be interviewed by FBI DE
to determine if there is any nexus to the PENTTBOM investigation.
FBIHQ received a
# from the FBI Internet Tip Line. The report advised as follows:
"I believe I have information on an attack on the Golden Gate Bridge
on the 22nd of this month, which is tomorrow. Please have an official
call me so that I can give this entire message to a person who can choose
weather to act upon it or not,,,,.Thankyou Mrs " The
report was furnished from Mrs. on 9/21/01 at 2:43:49 p.m. from
e-mail ‘ . The tipster was identified as
( , MI 48881, telephone number ).
A copy of the was provided to FBI DE, who will interview
EO14040-002990-UPDATED
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To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: , 09/22/2001
Investigation has determined that a number of the
hijackers attempted to obtain USAID identifications in the Summer of
2001. FBI MM interviewed , the of USAID
in Miami Beach, FL. conducted record queries and determin ed that
the majority of these applications had been forwarded through
at APPOLLO INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL in Patterson, NJ. was able to
determine that the following hijackers attempted to acquire USAID
identifications: SALEM ALHAZMI (AA Flt . #77) (on/about 7/7/2001); KHALID
ALMIHDAR (AA Flt. #77) (on/about 7/7/2001); ABDULAZIZ ALOMARI (AA Flt.
#11) (on/about 7/7/2001); MOHAMED ATTA (AA Flt. #11) (on/about 7/4/2001);
NAWAF ALHAMZI (AA Flt. #77) (on/about 07/10/2001); MAJED MOQED (AA Flt.
#77) (date unknown); and AHMAD ALHAZNAWI (UA Flt. #93) (date unknown).
USAID card applications and color photocopies of the identifications
are being disseminated to appropriate offices. Investigation being
coordinated with FBI MM, FBI NK, and FBI WFO. Resu lts will be forwarded
to and all appropriate offices.
Previous FBI MM investigation determined that, on
5/2/2001, MOHAMED ATTA (AA Flt. #11) and ZIAD SAMIR JARRAH (UA Flt. #93)
obtained Florida drivers licenses at the same south Florida loc ation.
DMV queries revealed that five Arab individuals, including
also obtained Florida drivers licenses on that date. FBI MM
located and interviewed . identified a photograph of
(DOB ) as the individua l who assisted in obtaining
his driver’s license. was polygraphed on 9/18/2001 and determined
to be inconclusive. He will be re -polygraphed on 9/21/2001.
has been identified through INS records as a naturalized United States
Citizen who was born in Haiti. Efforts by FBI MM are underway to fully
identify and to determine his role, if any, in assisting ATTA,
JARRAH, and others in obtaining fraudulent Florida driver's licenses.
Results of investigation will be forwarded to and appropriate
offices. Investigation continuing.
On 08/27/2001, six purported Pakistani nationals
arrived in Miami from
This
information was uncorroborated not only by the review of
audio tapes by FBI Language Specialists, but also by a negative physical
search from the hotel rooms of the individuals On
09/20/2001, three of the s ix individuals were polygraphed. Two subjects
passed the polygraph, and one was found to be inconclusive. One requested
an attorney and will not be polygraphed. The remaining two polygraphs
are being conducted on 09/21/2001. Investigative results will be
provided to and appropriate offices.
EO14040-002992-UPDATED
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Re: , 09/22/2001
recovered was a wallet from SALEM ALHAZMI. This wallet contained
contained a couple of addresses, including one for LNU (last
name was illegible) with an address of ??? Wayne,
New Jersey, phone number . FBI WFO coordinating
investigation with FBI NK and results will be provided to SIOC.
Investigation continuing.
Investigative Efforts:
FBI Washington Field Office (FBI WFO) reported on
a situation involving a Saudi Arabian pilot aboard a United Airlines
flight from Dulles to Heathrow. Prior to take -off, the flight crew became
suspicious of one passenger. This passenger claimed to be a Sa udi Arabian
pilot, and asked to ride in the jump seat. The crew asked the FBI to
interview him, and two other Middle Eastern travelers. These
individuals were interviewed by the FBI, US Customs Service (USCS) and
INS. They were cleared to fly, but the pilot refused to fly with them
on board. No further investigation.
was interviewed by FBI WFO
concerning his assistance to AHMED ALGHAMDI (UA Flt. #175) in obtaining
a Virginia ID card. described himself as a ‘‘Professional
ID Provider. ’’ He identified three of the hijackers and is being detained
by INS on immigration charges. According to HANI HANJOUR
(AA Flt. #77), NAWAF ALHAZMI (AA Flt. #77) and AHMED ALGHAMDI followed
and another ID broker to lawyer ’S office.
secretary provided DMV forms presigned by Investigation
continuing.
FBI WFO investigation identified EYAD M. ALRABABAH
and (DOB ) as possible
associates of the hijackers. These identifications were made through
FBI WFO's analysis of Virginia Driver's Licenses with addresses provided
by (supra). ALRABABAH and are currently
located in FBI NK's territory. FBI WFO is coordinating with FBI NK to
arrest both subjects on INS charges. The association of ALRABABAH and
has been further strengthened by purchase of ALRABABAH's
vehicle, and their arrival in the WFO area within the year 2000.
Investigation continuing and being coordinated with FBI NK.
A continuing review of Dulles security camera videos
indicates that two of the hijackers may have visited Dulles on 9/10/2001.
It appears that they passed through the security checkpoints and baggage
claim areas. Review of security cameras on -going.
American Airlines reports that only five victim
families have not contacted AA concerning victims on Flight #77, and
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are those of the suspected hijackers. This lends credence to ot her
information that there appears to be only five hijackers on Flight #77,
and not six as previously considered.
Investigation by FBI WFO of associates and employers
of have discerned no ties to any of the hijackers.
No links have been developed from the address book of 75 phone numbers
seized as part of a consensual search of his residence. However, he
will be arrested on 9/23/2001 on forgery charges that were uncovered
incidental to this investigation. This warrant is be ing pursued out
of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia (USAO
EDVA).
On 9/21/2001, FBI WFO arrested
on Title 18, Section 1028 (False Identity
Documentation) on 9/21/01. A co nsensual search was conducted of his
residence ( , Washington, D.C.) with negative
results. was identified as assisting ABDULAZIZ ALOMARI (AA
Flt. #11) obtain a VA Identification card. Investigation continuing.
On 9/20/2001, (DOB
), , was contacted
by FBI WFO and agreed to be interviewed. was subsequently
arrested by the INS had reportedly
been scheduled to return to Saudi Arabia by air on 09/20/01.
Investigation continuing.
On 9/21/2001, the U.S. Coast Guard National Response
Center advised that they had received a threat of an impending release
of anthrax on Washington D.C., on 9/22/2001. Although FBI WFO does not
consider this a credible threat, appropriate notifications have been
made.
EO14040-002999-UPDATED
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Re: , 09/22/2001
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:
ALL RECEIVING OFFICES
Receiving offices are requested to continue
to conduct all logical investigations. Relay any pertinent information
back to FBIHQ, SIOC, FBI NY CP, FBI WFO, and other relevant field offices.
LEGATs are requested to share new information .
EO14040-003000-UPDATED
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(Rev. 08 -28-2000)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: PRIORITY Date: 06/03/2002
To: Counterterrorism Attn:
New York Attn:
Minneapolis Attn:
Washington Field Attn:
Phoenix Attn:
San Diego
From: Newark
Contact: SA
SA
SA
Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title: PENTTBOM;
MAJOR CASE 182
GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(e)
Synopsis: To provide investigative summary information and set
leads.
Reference:
EO14040-003050-UPDATED
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Enclosure(s): Enclosed for the Minneapolis Division is a copy
of the toll records for the cellular telephone,
. Enclosed for the Washington Field Office is a copy of
the toll records for the cellular telephone used by FAYEZ ABUTALEB,
subscriber name
Details: Previous investigation has revealed that EYAD MAHMOUD
MOHAMMED MOUSTAFA ALRABABAH, also known as EYAD ALRABABAH, and his former
roommate, , also known as were
associated with known hijackers, MOJED MOQED, HANI HANJOUR, NAWAF ALHAZMI,
and AHMED ALGHAMDI. ALRABABAH and lived at ,
Apartment Falls Church, Virginia from approximately 03/2001 to
06/2001. The aforementioned hijackers visited ALRABABAH and
at this apartment during 04/2001 -05/2001.
and ALRABABAH rented this apartment from a woman
by the name of and the lease was in her name. The telephone
number for , Apartment was and
was listed to . Investigation has revealed that and
ALRABABAH both utilized telephone number during their stay
in Virginia.
EO14040-003051-UPDATED
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To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: , 06/03/2002
On 05/07/2001, ALRABABAH drove the four hijackers from
Falls Church, Virginia to the FAIRFIELD INN, Fa irfield, Connecticut.
On 05/09/2001, ALRABABAH drove the four hijackers to Paterson, New Jersey.
Prior to living in the aforementioned apartment in Falls
Church, Virginia, resided at , Paterson,
New Jersey, telephone n umber . While resided in
Paterson, he met ALRABABAH and eventually left New Jersey to in
Falls Church, Virginia, with ALRABABAH. met the four hijackers
in Virginia while he resided there. was evicted from the
apartment in 06/2001 and returned to reside at
Paterson, New Jersey.
Upon his return to , lived
with two men named , date of birth , and FAYEZ
IBRAHIM ALI ABUT ALEB, also known as FAYEZ ABU -TALEB, date of birth
. maintained contact with ALRABABAH who was working
and residing in Connecticut.
The past activities of and FAYEZ IBRAHIM
ALI ABUTALEB have raised questions as to wh ether they were associated
with the known hijackers, as well as FBI Phoenix had conducted
an investigation into the automatic teller transactions of known hijacker
HANI HANJOUR and the investigation revealed the following:
On 06/19/2001, a t 23:03:29 hours, HANI HANJOUR conducted
an automatic teller machine (ATM) transaction at the PNC Bank, 1152 Main
Street, Paterson, New Jersey. A review conducted by the Phoenix Division
of all transactions conducted 30 minutes before and after HANJOUR'S
transaction revealed four individuals who made transactions at the same
ATM just prior to HANJOUR. Two of the four individuals identified were
FAYEZ I.A. ABUTALEB, date of birth and date
of birth At present, it has not been determined if ABUTALEB
and knew HANJOUR or made some financial transaction for him,
but the aforementioned transaction illustrates the possibility.
Additionally, had two telephones in his name;
a VOICESTREAM cel lular telephone, , and the main hardline
number for his residence at , Paterson, New Jersey,
. Investigation by the Newark Division revealed that
ABUTALEB was in possession of the aforementioned VOICESTREAM cellul ar
telephone, .
The Newark Division has reviewed the toll records for
these two telephone numbers. The review produced the following:
EO14040-003052-UPDATED
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To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: , 06/03/2002
On 08/17/2001, the cellular telephone
contacted the telephone number 973 -256-7033 once. The telephone number
973-256-7033 is listed to the GREAT NO TCH EXXON, 1299 Route 46 East,
Little Falls, NJ. The GREAT NOTCH EXXON was previously owned by
and . provided information about
the prior ownership of the GREAT NOTCH EXXON during his interview with
the FBI on 05/21/2002. ( , Serial The GREAT
NOTCH EXXON was also a location where a number of the hijackers were
observed in the past. ( Serial
The cellular telephone also contacted
the telephone number 201 -567-7276 on 08/17/2001. The telephone number
201-567-7276 is listed to GETTY, Route 4 East, Englewood, New Jersey.
is also part owner in the aforementioned GETTY gas station
with and . ( , Serial
On 08/18/2001, the cellular telephone
contacted the MIDTOWN EXXON, 973 -483-2464, twice. The
cellular telephone also contacted the telephone number
twice. The telephone number is the number of
cellular telephone. During 09/2001 was interviewed by the
Minneapolis Division and he advised the interviewing agents that his
VOICESTREAM cellular telephone number was .
Serial
On 08/18/2001, the cellular telephone
also contacted the telephone number once.
listed as his home telephone number on his VOICESTREAM
subscriber paperwork. ( Serial
On 08/19/2001, the cellular telephone
contacted the telephone number once and the telephone number
once. In the aforementioned interview of ,
had advised the intervie wing agents that his home telephone number
was and his cellular telephone number was .
The aforementioned call to home number, , was
approximately 25 minutes in duration. It should be noted that
resided in Minnesota when was arrested and that the
aforementioned attempts to reach him were in the time period of 08/16/2001
to 08/19/2001.
was the Newark Division, in
the past, for
EO14040-003054-UPDATED
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To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: , 06/03/2002
friend and former roommate, ,
currently lives with his wife in a house located at , Clifton,
New Jersey. has been interv iewed by the Washington Field Office
and advised that he splits his time between Clifton, New Jersey and Langley
Park, Maryland, where he stays with a friend. advised the
interviewing agents that he met ALRABABAH in the Paterson, New Jersey
area and that he never saw ALRABABAH in Virginia or Maryland.
Serial
Due to the fact that ALRABABAH and knew each other
from the Paterson area and lived in addresses that were next door to
each other in Falls Church, Virgini a, it is possible that has not
been truthful with the FBI when he discussed his knowledge of ALRABABAH.
It should be noted that ALRABABAH, and several of the known
hijackers have all been in, Falls Church, Virginia, and Paterson, New
Jersey, at one time or another. ALRABABAH, and several of
the known hijackers were in Falls Church, Virginia basically during the
time period of 03/2001 to 07/2001.
resided at , Paterson, New
Jersey, before and afte r he resided at , apt.
Falls Church, Virginia. ALRABABAH visited at the
Avenue address. ( Serial ) Previous
investigation has placed the hijackers in Paterson, New Jersey at variou s
times during 2001, such as the confirmed sighting of 7 of the hijackers
at APOLLO INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL, 1009 Main Street,2nd floor, Paterson,
New Jersey in 07/2001. ( Serial
Serial The Newark Division has not ascertained whether has
come into contact with any of the known hijackers.
The Newark Division has not ascertained why is
utilizing a VOICESTREAM cellular telephone subscribed to the name
However, there are calls f rom to ,
which is the home telephone number listed by on the VOICESTREAM
paperwork. A check revealed a ,
SSN , current address of , Apartment Clinton,
New Jersey, and a past address of , Paterson, New
Jersey. An Internet search on the telephone number revealed
a listing of , Paterson, New Jersey.
The telephone facility assigned the number 3 will hereafter
be referred to as the cellular telephone. Additional analysis
of the toll records of the cellular telephone, ,
revealed the following:
The cellular phone contacted home
telephone, , numerous times, but it should be noted that
contacted number on and on .
EO14040-003059-UPDATED
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To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: , 06/03/2002
The Newark Division has not ascertained the significance of the contact
between and .
The cellular telephone contacted 7 and
8. The telephone number is the cellular
telephone number utilized by , who is the of the
, N.W., Washington, D.C. The
telephone number is the main telephone number of the
. ( Serial
As documented in Serial
came to the attention of t he FBI due to his purchase of the
Washington, D.C.
Apparently, the former owner, , was offered a large sum of
money to get him to sell the . The FAYEZ ABUTALEB cel l phone
has also contacted the , .
A check on the name
revealed a , date of birth , Social Security
Number (SSN) , Washington, D.C. The
address Washington, D.C. is also listed as the
address of an gas station. The employer of was listed
as Arlington, Virginia.
listed Annandale, Virginia,
as the of and
as the .
appears to be the same person as
of the aforementioned , due to the fact
that contacts the , on his cellular
telephone, . ( Serial The
, is also contacted by the FAYEZ ABUTALEB cellular
telephone and, as i ndicated previously, the cellular
telephone. (review of the toll records of ABUTALEB and cellular
telephones)
As documented in the , and
appear to be of a number of
located in the Virginia and Washington, D.C. area. The following gas
stations appear to be associated with and/or
Arlington, Virginia
EO14040-003060-UPDATED
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To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: , 06/03/2002
Arlington, Virginia
contacted by: (secure case);
and (payphone); all three of these numbers were in contact
with hijacker phone , believed to have been used by k nown
hijackers HANI HANJOUR, NAWAF ALHAMZI, and SALEM ALHAMZI.
Washington, D.C.
contacted by: FAYEZ ABUTALEB and .
Falls Church, Virginia
contacted by: and (secure case).
Fairfax, Virginia
Washington, D.C.
Washington, D.C.
contacted by: (secure case); this number contacted hijacker
cellular telephone believed to have been used by known
hijackers HANI HANJOUR, NAWAF ALHAMZI, and SALEM ALHA MZI.
( Serial
came to the attention of the FBI in
captioned case concerning involvement with his nephew,
, the known hijackers, and the HOLIDAY INN, Route
46 West, Totowa, New Jersey. Known hijacker KHALID M. AL -MIDHAR was
positively identified by a hotel housekeeper who worked for the
aforementioned HOLIDAY INN. ( Serial
AL-MIDHAR was registered under nephew's name,
Apt. Fairfax,
EO14040-003061-UPDATED
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To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: , 06/03/2002
Virginia, during the first week of 09/2001. A number of the known
hijackers were in Totowa, New Jersey at this time. (
Serial Serial
On 10/11/2001, , date of birth,
was interviewed by the Washington Field Office concerning
his stay at the aforementioned HOLIDAY INN. advised the
interviewing agents that drove him to New Jersey to visit
his wife, , and he had stayed at the HOLIDAY INN during the
first week of 09/2001. made two calls from the HOLIDAY
INN to cellular telephon e, .
denied seeing or knowing any of the known hijackers. (
Serial
It should be noted that the hijackers were in Totowa,
New Jersey, at the same time as . There is contact between
and FAYEZ ABUTALEB, , and telephones
that were in contact with the known hijackers. is employed at
the which is in FALLS CHURCH, Virginia, where known
hijackers resided for a period of time.
Along with the aforementioned telephonic contact, the
cellular telephone and the ABUTALEB cellular telephone both
contacted telephone number . (review of toll records of
and ABUTALEB cellular telephones) The subscriber f or the telephone
number is , date of birth ,
, Heightsville, Maryland. The telephone facility assigned
number will hereafter be referred to as the cellular
telephone.
There are significant contacts in the toll records
pertaining to . A preliminary review of the cellular
telephone toll records revealed the following:
The cellular telephone contacted
on 09/11/2001, at approximately 11:44pm, for a 4 minute time period.
The telephone number has also been in contact with the
telephone number 972 -680-0761, which is subscribed to the HLFRD, 525
International Parkway, Richardson, Texas.
The cellular telephone contacted the telephone
number . The telephone number is the main
number of Jamaica Queens, New
York. (referenced in Serial Serial
EO14040-003062-UPDATED
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To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: , 06/03/2002
The writer recommends that EYAD ALRABAB AH,
FAYEZ ABUTALEB,
, and be interviewed
concerning the aforementioned information. The interviews should
involve the following topics:
Interviewees should be questioned about their association
with or knowledge of HAMAS, HLFRD, ICPC, DAR AL -HIJRA MOSQUE,
ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, and RAMZI BINALSHIBH.
ALRABABAH, and should be questioned
at length abo ut their knowledge of each other, the known hijackers, the
DAR AL-HIJRA MOSQUE, the , overseas travel, e -mail
addresses, and HAMAS.
ALRABABAH and should be questioned about the
and the and who the y have been in contact
with at these locations.
ZAKARIA, , and should be questioned about
any knowledge of the known hijackers when they resided in Falls Church
or overseas, the aforementioned ABUTALEB , and
possible contact with the known hijackers in Totowa, New Jersey.
should be questioned at length on his
knowledge and/or involvement with HAMAS, HLFRD, AL -ALMAL SCHOOL,
GREAT NOTCH EXXON, any of
the aforementioned family members, and the MIDTOWN EXXON.
EO14040-003064-UPDATED
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To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: , 06/03/2002
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
Read and clear.
Set Lead 2:
NEW YORK
AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK
Provide copies of this communication to SA
and SA . Newark Division requests that New York
Division review the content of this communication and facilitate logical
investigation as appropriate .
Set Lead 3:
MINNEAPOLIS
AT BROOKLYN PARK, MINNESOTA
Locate and re -interview
Brooklyn Park, Minnesota. telephone number , cell
phone number , concerning his knowledge of ,
,
HAMAS, and the rest of the information provided in this communication.
Set Lead 4:
WASHINGTON FIELD
AT ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA
Locate and re -interview
Arlington, Virginia, telephone , concerning his
knowledge of , FAYEZ ABUTALEB, DAR AL -HIJRA MOSQUE, the known
hijackers and his previous residence, ALRABABAH, and the rest
of the information provided in this communication.
Set Lead 5:
NEWARK
EO14040-003065-UPDATED
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To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: , 06/03/2002
AT NEWARK, NEW JERSEY
Locate and interview
FAYEZ ABUTALEB, and the family members mentioned in this
communication.
EO14040-003066-UPDATED
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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Precedence: PRIORITY Date: 11/05/2001
To: Counterterrorism Attn:
Investigative Services
New York
San Diego
Legat
From: San Diego
Contact:
Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title: PENTTBOMB
MC 182
Synopsis: Details of a liaison meeting of New Scotland Yard detectives
and FBI special agents in S an Diego, October 21 through October 28, 2001,
concerning OMAR AHMED AL -BAYOUMI. Lead set to Legat for
dissemination of enclosed FD -302s to New Scotland Yard.
Reference:
Administrative: Information concern ing OMAR AHMED AL -BAYOUMI is
carried by Legat as . This communication is referenced
to .
Enclosure(s): For New York, copies of FD -302s prepared by San Diego
concerning the investigation of OMAR AHMED AL -BAYOUMI for review by
SA for Legat a duplicate set of FD -302s
for dissemination to New Scotland Yard.
EO14040-003333-UPDATED
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To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: , 11/05/2001
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Details: Referenced serial was a lead set to by San Diego to
locate and interview OMAR AHMED AL -BAYOUMI. The subject was located
and interviewed on September 21, 2001, by the Metropolitan Police Service
(MPS,) also known as New Scotland Yard in Lo ndon. Legat provided
liaison service between the FBI and the MPS, arranging for Special Agents
from New York and San Diego to travel to while Omar Al -Bayoumi
was in the custody of NSY.
Subsequent to this, NSY detectives familiar with the ca ptioned
investigation traveled to San Diego with New York SA
on October 21, 2001. The purpose of the travel was to provide FBI special
agents with evidence obtained in the course of the New Scotland Yard
(NSY) interview and attendant i nvestigation of OMAR AHMED AL -BAYOUMI.
The following is a summary of the detention and interview
of OMAR AHMED AL -BAYOUMI in
The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) detained OM AR AHMED
AL-BAYOUMI under the United Kingdom Prevention of Terrorism Act on Friday,
09/21/2001. AL -BAYOUMI's residence, automobile and office were searched
incident to his detention. On 09/24/2001, Legat , with the
assistance of SA (New York Division, TDY to Legat
and SA (San Diego Field Office, TDY to
Legat ) provided the MPS with background information to aid in
an interview of AL -BAYOUMI. SA and SA were assigned
TDY to Legat from 09/23/2001 to 09/30/2001. The purpose of the
travel was to provide the MPS with information concerning what was known
about the relationship between OMAR AHMAD AL -BAYOUMI and KHALID M.
AL-MIHDHAR, NAWAF AL -HAMZI and other subjects of this i nvestigation.
The MPS did not allege any criminal activity on the part of OMAR AHMED
AL-BAYOUMI carried out in the U.K. that would substantiate a continuation
of his detention beyond the period authorized. For these reasons,
AL-BAYOUMI was released from custody without charges on Friday, September
28, 2001.
Search results of AL -BAYOUMI's home and office were
previously furnished to San Diego and the receiving offices. Original
documents and electronic data files are maintained by FBI New York.
The following is a summary of evidence items seized during
the search of OMAR AL-BAYOUMI's home, office and vehicle in London
by the MPS:
· A number of banking documents and evidence of travel between
the United States, United Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia. A
business card was found linking him to the Al -Medina mosque
located in El Cajon, California.
EO14040-003334-UPDATED
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To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: , 11/05/2001
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· Several videos were recovered from the sea rch of AL-BAYOUMI's
residence. One video revealed the party at the hijackers'
apartment.
· Computers and diskettes were recovered from his residence.
The following is a summary of investigative steps taken
during the visit by MPS detectives to San Die go FBI, October 21, 2001
to October 28, 2001:
· Between 10/19/2001 and 10/28/2001, the MPS officers attended
various briefings of aspects of the Omar Al -Bayoumi
investigation. The briefings were overseen by San Diego SA
Individual briefings were given by SA
financi al matters; SA ,
telephone records; SA , Isamu
Dyson; SA computer evidence; SA ,
Al-Bayoumi's affiliation with various university enrollment
and alleged employment.
· and disseminated information and
evidence that had been collected as a result of the arrest
of Omar Al -Bayoumi and the subsequent searches conducted in
England.
· and participated in investigative strategy
meetings conduc ted by SA and attended by SA
and other San Diego agents involved in the
investigation. These strategy meetings proved valuable for
both the FBI and the Anti -Terrorist Branch of NSY.
· As a result of the meetings, d evelopments have been made in
the following areas:
Financial
New Scotland Yard was made aware of financial dealings that
Omar Al-Bayoumi had with the Al -Medina Mosque, El Cajon, California,
and Al-Bayoumi's association with Soliman Elay and Elay's
EO14040-003335-UPDATED
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To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: , 11/05/2001
4 association with Sana Bell and BMI Real Estate companies.
The FBI is now examining
documentation relating to this Mosque that was seized from
Al-Bayoumi's Birmingham address and from Bayoumi's office in the
Mosque. Additionally, an arrest warrant has been issued for
Al-Bayoumi for visa fraud in connection with financial false
statements made on documents relating to his education status and
his alleged employment by ERCAN Engineering, Newport Beach,
California. An interview with
, revealed that Al -Bayoumi coerced him into writing a
letter indicating his company would be supporting Al -Bayoumi
financially.
The FBI has been made aware of Al -Bayoumi's stated employer
in Saudi Arabia, Dallah/Avco. New Scotland Yard was made aware
that in most financial documents in the U.S., Al -Bayoumi did not
divulge any employment with Dallah/Avco. This is significant
because Dallah/Avco is suspected of having links with UBL. FBI
is currently trying to verify these alleged links. The
investigation has revealed that Al -Bayoumi routinely failed to list
Dallah/Avco or the CAA as a source of income or financial support.
NSY has reported that during their interview of Al -Bayoumi,
Al-Bayoumi stated that he was receiving $4,000.00 per month from
Dallah/Avco while in the U.S.
FBI provided NSY with schedules of U.S. financial accounts
of Al-Bayoumi, Manal Bagader, Soliman Elay an d
Additionally, link charts of significant financial activity that
has occurred were provided to NSY.
Computer/Telephone
New Scotland Yard provided FBI with e -mail addresses recovered
from Al-Bayoumi's computer. This lead to t he FBI resulted in a
link with Osama Bassnan in September 2001 being produced. The link
chart of significant e -mail activity has been provided to NSY.
FBI has linked Bassnan via telephone analysis with Al -Bayoumi and
Bayoumi's wife, Manal Bagader, on at least 200 occasions while living
in the U.S. FBI has provided NSY with link charts of telephone toll
records for related individuals. The significance of Bassnan is
that he hosted a party for Sheik Omar Rahman, who was later convicted
for masterminding th e first World Trade Center bombing in 1993.
Bassnan is also a known supporter of UBL and he is opposed to the
Israeli/Palestinian peace efforts. FBI is currently conducting
further investigation into the links between Al -Bayoumi and Bassnan.
Interview -Isamu Dyson
As a result of Al -Bayoumi's interview, Bayoumi had stated that
he had a chance meeting with Nawaf Al -Hazmi and Khalid Al -Mihdhar
EO14040-003336-UPDATED
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(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
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(P)
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To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: , 11/05/2001
5 while in the company of a Caucasian Muslim named Ossma LNU. The
meeting took place in Los Angeles, California .
Investigative efforts on the part of San Diego FBI resulted
in locating and correctly identifying Ossma LNU as Isamu Dyson
who was now living in . Dyson was interviewed by
SA . That interview is covered under a sepa rate
FD-302. Dyson provided a statement confirming his association with
Al-Bayoumi. As a result of a meeting between , the
interviewer of Al -Bayoumi in London, and SA it became
apparent that inconsistencies existed between Al -Bayoumi's and
Dyson's account of the chance meeting with the hijackers.
The inconsistencies in the statements of and Al -Bayoumi
are of importance to the investigation. For that reason, the FBI
arranged for Dyson
to retrace the events of the February 01,
2000, which is the presumed date that Al -Bayoumi and Dyson had the
alleged chance meeting with the hijackers.
Dyson was
interviewed regarding his knowledge of other meetings/social
functions hosted by Al -Bayoumi in which the hijackers may have been
present as there are several witnesses that have placed Al -Bayoumi
with the hijackers. NSY advised that Al -Bayoumi did not disclose
additional meetings with the hijackers during their interview.
· NSY requeste d copies of all FD -302's related to the investigation
of Omar Al -Bayoumi. NSY agreed to provide San Diego FBI with a
copy of a particular video tape which was obtained in their search
of Omar Al -Bayoumi's property in London. NSY maintained a copy of
that tape which was made an item of evidence at FBI New York. The
copy will be sent to San Diego FBI by NSY for review. The video,
as described by NSY, has images of Omar Al -Bayoumi at a party he
hosted in San Diego. San Diego will review this tape when it i s
made available. It is anticipated that a review of the tape will
help investigating agents develop other leads to be carried out
in San Diego.
· On October 28, 2001, and SA
left the San Diego Division.
On November 03, 2001, SA copied San Diego's FD -302 reports
known to concern the investigation of OMAR EMHED AL -BAYOUMI. Two sets
of copies were produced. One set was sent to Legat under the
cover of this electronic communication for dissemi nation to NSY. The
EO14040-003337-UPDATED
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(S)
(P)
To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: , 11/05/2001
6 second copy was sent under this communication to New York FBI for review
by SA .
San Diego's investigation of OMAR AHMED AL -BAYOUMI continues.
EO14040-003338-UPDATED
(F)
(S)
To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: , 11/05/2001
7
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Adm)
Counterterrorism
Read and clear.
Set Lead 2: (Adm)
INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES
AT WASHINGTON, DC
Read and clear.
Set Lead 3: (Adm)
NEW YORK
AT NEW YORK
Read and clear, provide S A with enclosed
FD-302s.
Set Lead 4: (Adm)
SAN DIEGO
AT SAN DIEGO
Read and Clear.
Set Lead 5: (Adm)
AT
Read, clear, and disseminate enclosed FD -302s to New Scotland
Yard in a manner prescribed by the Bureau.
EO14040-003339-UPDATED
(F)
(S)
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(G)
Synopsis: To file. To provide summary and historical information
for subsequent agents of
Administrative Notes: Attached to this EC is a document summarizing
the connections between the 9/11 investigation and elements affiliated
with the Saudi Arabian government in the U.S.
Thos replaces Serial which was intended as a draft for review but was serialized. Serial will be removed at a later date.
Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:
1. Saudi 9/11 Connections
Details:
PURPOSE:
The purpose of this communication is to consolidate information related to the involvement of personnel and
entities controlled by the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia(EKSA) and its affiliates within the United States with the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11 Attacks /PENTTBOMB ). Such an analysis is deemed essential for future case agents of this program to understandthe origin of the investigation. Due to the purpose noted, this document only discusses entities that are part ofor closely tied to the Saudi Arabian government. Other aspects of the 9/11/2001 investigation are only notedif related to this purpose. This report should not be considered an intelligence assessment and is not intendedas such.
Title: Connections to the
Attacks of September 11, 2001
Re: 07/23/2021
2
EO14040-003479-UPDATED
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(F)
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An additional purpose of this communication is to document investigations and supporting documentation
regarding the Saudi(Wahhabi)/Salafi/militant network that was created, funded, directed and supported by theKSA and its affiliated organizations and diplomatic personnel within the U.S. As Saudi government officialsand intelligence officers were directly operating and supporting the entities involved with this network, theirinvolvement with the activities of these organizations/individuals would logically be supposed to have theknowledge or concurrence of the KSA government. This knowledge and/or concurrence by the SAG isrelated to the 9/11 investigation not only be the direct involvement of some personnel but also via the creationof a larger network for such activities.
In addition, the below analysis will update information available on the ties of some of these entities to Saudi
Arabian intelligence services. Much of the publically known information regarding the 9/11/2001 terroristattacks was documented in the 9/11 Commission Report which was published in 2004. Thus much availableinformation from subsequent and ongoing investigations was not noted in the Commission’s Report. Inaddition, the classified “28 pages” was subsequently de-classified and investigations since 2004 shedadditional light on the information that was contained within these 28 pages which were created in 2004 aspart of the original Commission Report.
there was located within the EKSA the offices of the
Islamic Affairs Department and the office of Dawa (or Propagation). Investigation of the 9/11 hijackers and
their support networks identified significant connections to these offices either directly or via the SaudiArabian Consulate in Los Angeles. As such, a primary portion of this communication will focus on theseoffices and connections to the 9/11 hijackers. In addition, the SAG/EKSA was also involved with the fundingand creation of a multitude of Islamic organizations, offices, imams and other religious figures within the US– many of which were involved with militant ideology. Several of these were known to be tied directly toPrince Bandar and/or were involved with the collection of information on US based Islamic entities. As thepropagation of militant ideology would naturally provide justification for those who were in the hijacker’ssupport network – these organizations will also be listed below ( below is not an all-inclusive list as thiswould be too large.)
Administration:
was originally formed as in 2002 as a result of the
PENTTBOMB investigation identifying connections between the 9/11 hijackers, their support network andindividuals associated with the SAG. As is well known, 15 of the deceased 19 hijackers were from SaudiArabia with a possible 20th - Mohammed Alqahtani - subsequently captured in Afghanistan and confined atGuantanamo Bay after unsuccessfully attempting to enter the US. At the time of creation of there was
a few investigations of some Saudi ArabianTitle: Connections to the
Attacks of September 11, 2001
Re: 07/23/2021
3
EO14040-003480-UPDATED
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(A), (G), (J-1)
(G)
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(G)
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(A), (G), (J-1)
government personnel and organizations had been previously established. was quickly
transferred to the new and changed to and then subsequently During a
portion of this time the squad's FBIHQ oversight was within the
and much of the squad investigative efforts were focused on Saudi Arabian charities in the
AOR as well as individual subjects with established or alleged AQ or militant connections. After
approximately ten years in the program was again transferred to
before returning to
of Saudi Arabian entities before and shortly after 9/11/2001 were
captioned under the classification. Later this designation was changed to investigations
prior to and shortly after 9/11/2001 were captioned under and These
were later combined under and then classifications. For the most part, serials noted within thisdocument utilize the case caption of the relevant time period.
As the purpose of this document is to highlight and encapsulate the connections between the Saudi
Arabian establishments and government entities in the U.S. with the 9/11 hijacker support network writer is
not investigating or re-investigating the 9/11 investigation. This is particularly relevant due to a lack ofresources and analytical assistance. As such, writer has located relevant serials and have copied thatinformation directly within this communication. The language, spelling, source symbol numbers,
grammar, formatting and emphasis of the original serials is retained.
As the original language of the referenced serials is retained, a note on how sources were referenced is
necessary. During the 9/11/2001 time period, Letter Head Memorandums (LHMs) were necessary for
dissemination to DOJ. The LHMs removed the standard source number
replaced by a non-standard designation that was created entirely by the writing agent.
Thus research is necessary in order to locate and identify the original source. During this time period,
♦♦Title: Connections to the
Attacks of September 11, 2001
Re: 07/23/2021
4
EO14040-003481-UPDATED
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1)
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The Saud i Arabian Government (SAG), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
(EKSA) and their affiliated offices within the U.S.; their connections to the support
network for the a ttacks of September 11, 2001 ; and the SAG creation of and support and
direction for a network of o ffices and personnel involved with m ilitan t Salafi Islamic
activities and proselytization within the United States.
PURPOSE:
The purpose of this communication is to consolidate information
related to the involvement of personnel and entities controlled by the
Saudi Arabian Government (SAG), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia (EKSA) and its affiliates within the United St ates with the
attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11 Attacks / PENTTBOMB ). Such an
analysis is deemed essential for future case agents of this program to
understand the origin of the investigation. Due to the purpose noted,
this document only discusses enti ties that are part of or closely tied
to the Saudi Arabian government. Other aspects of the 9/11/2001
investigation are only noted if related to this purpose. This report
should not be considered an intelligence assessment and is not
intended as such.
An additional purpose of this communication is to document
investigations and supporting documentation regarding the
Saudi(Wahhabi) /Salafi/militant network that was created, funded,
directed and supported by the KSA and its affiliated organizations and
diplomatic personnel within the U.S. As Saudi government officials
and intelligence officers were directly operating and supporting the
entities involved with this network, their involvement with the
activities of these organizations/individuals would logicall y be
supposed to have the knowledge or concurrence of the KSA government.
This knowledge and/or concurrence by the SAG is related to the 9/11
investigation not only be the direct involvement of s ome personnel but
also via the creation of a larger network for such activities .
EO14040-003482-UPDATED
(F)
In addition, the below analysis will update information available on
the ties of some of these entities to Saudi Arabian intelligence
services. Much of the publically known information regarding the
9/11/2001 terrorist attacks was do cumented in the 9/11 Commission
Report which was published in 2004. Thus much available information
from subsequent and ongoing investigations was not noted in the
Commission’s Report. In addition, the classified “28 pages” was
subsequently de -classified and investigations since 2004 shed
additional light on the information that was contained within these 28
pages which were created in 2004 as part of the original Commission
Report.
there was located
within the EKSA the offices of the Islamic Affairs Department and the
office of Dawa (or Propagation). Investigation of the 9/11 hijackers
and their support networks identified significant connections to these
offices either directly or via the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los
Angeles. As such, a primary portion of this communication will focus
on these offices and connections to the 9/11 hijackers. In addition,
the SAG/EKSA was also involved with the funding and creation of a
multitude of Islamic organization s, offices, imams and other religious
figures within the US – many of which were involved with militant
ideology. Several of these were known to be tied directly to Prince
Bandar and/or were involved with the collection of inform ation on US
based Islamic entities. As the propagation of militant ideology would
naturally provide justification for those who were in the hijacker’s
support network – these organization s will also be listed below (
below is not an all -inclusive list as this would be too large.)
Administration :
was originally formed as
in 2002 as a result of the PENTTBOMB investigation
identifying connections between the 9/11 hijackers, their support
network and individuals associated with the SAG. As is well known, 15
of the deceased 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia with a possible
20th - Mohammed Alqahtani - subsequently captured in Afghanistan and
confined at Guantanamo Bay after unsuccessfully attempting to enter
the US. At the time of creation of there was
a few inve stigations of some
Saudi Arabian government personnel and organizations had been
previously established. Squad was quickly transferred to the new
and changed to and then subsequently
During a portion of this time the squad's FBIHQ oversight was
within the and much of
the squad investigative efforts were focused on Saudi Arabian
charities in the AOR as well as individual subjects with
established or alleged AQ or mil itant connections. After
approximately ten years in the program was again transferred to
EO14040-003483-UPDATED
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Background of Movement of 9/11 Hijacking Team
According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the 9/11 planning and
recruitment of personnel for the operation was being developed through
2000 and early 2001. The pilots who were selected were the first to
enter the U.S. and the “muscle hijackers”, although r ecruited in 2000,
were the last – not arriving until the Spring/Summer of 2001.
According to the 9/11 Commission Report and open source information ,
Khalid Almihdar and Nawaf Alhazmi (described by the report as the 2nd
in command after Mohammed Atta) were two original hijackers in volved
in the attack planning and, although other known hijackers had prior
entries into the US, appeared to be the first to enter the U.S. as an
operational component of the 9/11 plan. According to investigation
and the 9/11 C ommission report, Almihdar and Alhazmi first entered the
U.S. via Los Angeles on January 15, 2000. Per the 9/11 Commission
Report, neither Almihdar nor Alhazmi were well prepared for the
operation, spoke little English and their only qualifications appear ed
to be their support of UBL and their ability to obtain visas. Although
the initial plan may have been for Alhazmi and Almihdar to have been
pilots for the plot, neither passed initial flight training and both
had problems acclimating to the U.S. Almihda r’s difficulties may have
resulted in his sudden return to Yemen on June 10, 2000 (or he was
possibly working on logistics overseas) that would have left Alhazmi
alone in California except for elements of his support network.
Almihdar would not return to the US as a “muscle hijacker” until July
2001. Both Alhazmi and Almihdar arrived in the U.S. after having
attended what is presumed to be the planning meeting for the attacks
that were held in Kuala Lumpur.
It is important to note that both Alhazmi and Almihdar were known AQ
operatives. Both were Saudi nationals who had traveled together to
Bosnia in 1995. Alhazmi conducted training with KSM in Pakistan in
late 1999 and both Alhazmi and Almihdar were present in the planning
meeting in Kuala Lumpur in De cember 1999. Alhazmi was reportedly
personally selected by UBL for the operation. Almihdar was from a
prominent family and married into a family with extensive AQ
connections. Both Alhazmi and Almihdar were known to Saudi and U.S.
intelligence as being AQ members . After Almihdar departed the U.S.
Alhazmi was left alone until Hani Hanjour was sent in December 2000.
The second primary group of hijackers were the “Hamburg Group”
EO14040-003485-UPDATED
(Mohammed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi and Ziad Jarrah (along with Ramzi
Binalshibh) who arrived in Afghanistan in November 1999 and began to
be selected for the operation. Unlike Alhazmi and Almihdar, these
four spoke English and were acclimated for living in the West. Their
need for a support network would be minimal.
Due to the la ck of preparedness of Alhazmi and Almihdar for the
operation and residing in the West without arousing suspicion the
existence of a support network would make operational sense.
Investigation determined that a significant portion of the network
assisting these two hijackers centered on offices affiliated with the
KSA to include the Saudi Arabian Los Angeles Consulate, the King
Fahd Mosque as well as multiple individuals associated with these
locations and/or the Saudi Arabian government .
EO14040-003486-UPDATED
Islamic Affairs Department (IAD) Islamic Affairs Office (IAO)
(Ministry of Islamic Affairs)(MIA) / Dawa Office Connections to Saudi
Arabian Intelligence
Summary: Within the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, D.C.
(as in other Saudi Arabian Embassies throughout the world) was located
an Islamic Affairs Office and a Dawa Office (Dawa means
proselytizing). The D.C. offices were staffed with both Saudi Ara bian
diplomats and local hires and their roles were often mixed. The
Islamic Affairs Offi ces worldwide and in the U.S. played a key role in
supporting the Saudi Arabian Government’s objective to be perceived as
the leader of the Islamic world and also played a key role in Saudi
Arabia’s religious and political competition with Shia Iran.
, the key personnel within the Islamic Affairs office
and one of the roles of the Islamic Affairs
Office was to provide intelligence on local Islamic populations and to
provide cover for the movement of
. Saudi Arabian “non -governmental organizations” (NGO), ie.
“charities”, supplemented this activity with large funding streams as
well as cover for personnel.
One of the primary speculative questions regarding the PENTTBOMB
investigation is whether the SAG was significantly connected to, had
prior knowledge of or supported the attacks of September 11,
2001. Due to the involvement of the Islamic Affairs/Dawa Office
personnel within the support network of the hijackers it is of
possible significance to identify the connections of these offices to
Saudi Arabian intelligence.
Relevant Serials:
FBI Serial
) reported that as of early 2001 the EKSA had one of the
largest Ministry of Islamic Affairs sections in the world with
approximately 50 MIA officers.
Many Saudi
Embassy officials believed that the chief of the MIA section,
Majid Aljashaihan (SA NOTE: This would be Majed Alghesheyan ),
was either a GIP officer or had some type of special connection to the
GIP. The same opinions were held about Khalil Khalil, the deputy
EO14040-003487-UPDATED
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(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)
The above information helps verify the involvement of the GIP within
the MIA offices. and
Aljarrah's subsequent replacement by Alajroush is classic intelligence
officer . This is significant considering the
MIA/Dawa office's involvement, and Aljarrah's in particular, with the
support network of the 9/11 hijackers as well as with the creation,
funding, direction and support of the extensive Salafi proselytizing
network that extended throughout the U.S.
EO14040-003490-UPDATED
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
Musaed A Al Jarrah ( Musaed Aljrarrah )
DOB:
Occupation: Accountant
Address: McLean, Va
Telephone: (home) (cell)
Summary: Aljarrah was a Saudi diplomat assigned to the EKSA and was a
high level employee in the Islamic Affairs Office. Aljarrah was
and was heavily
involved with the movement and support of the Saudi Salafi network
within the U.S. to include those members of the 9/11 hijacker support
network in Southern California. Aljarrah had numer ous contacts with
terrorism subjects throughout the U.S. Aljarrah was closely
associated with Bandar bin Sultan.
Aljarrah, an EKSA employee, is one of the key figures of the
9/11 investigation as it pertains to Saudi Arabian government
involvemen t. Per in vestigation and subsequent affidavits Aljarrah had
a “controlling, guiding and directing in fluence on all aspects of
EO14040-003496-UPDATED
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(P-1)
(J-3)
(P)
(P)
(P)
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Southern California Based Investigations
A portion of the PENTTBOMB investigation focused on the support
network for 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi and this
was also a focus of the subsequent New York investigation Operation
Encore. During the
as well as the King Fahd Mosque were noted to be
involved. The individuals in these locations were known to h ave
contact with individuals assigned to the MIA/Dawa offices in the
EKSA. As noted above, Fahad Althumairy was employed at the Saudi
Arabian Consulate in LA in addition to being listed as employed in the
EKSA Dawa office. The following additional person s of interest were
working at the Consulate:
EO14040-003500-UPDATED
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
Fahad bin Ibrahim Al Thumairy
Fahad I A Al Thumairy ( Fahad Althumairy )
DOB:
Abdullah Fahad Althumairy DOB: , believed to be Althumairy’s
son, was initially to visit California (google was
listed) in 2013 but was later revoked.
Summary: Fahad Althumairy was a Saudi Arabian diplomat assigned to
EKSA as well as the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles.
Althumairy was a representative of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and
FBI queries were of interest to the highest levels of the Saudi
government. Althumairy was a close contact of the 9/11 hijackers
support network and may have known Alhazmi and Almihdar and/or
arranged for their meeting key members of the support network.
Althumairy was an imam at the King Fahad mosque.
Investigation was opened on Althumairy by LA in 2002 under
.
This investigation was originally predicated on
information that ALTHUMAIRY was associated with an individual who
had extensive contacts with two of the September 11th hijackers.
EO14040-003501-UPDATED
(F)
(P-1)
(J-3)
(P-1)
(F)
(J-3)
(J-3)
On 03/10/2020 Operation Encore agents
interviewed regarding any knowledge that he
may have regarding the relationship between
and the two 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Al -Mihdhar (Al -Mihdhar) and
Nawaf Al -Hazmi (Al -Hazmi). stated that he was told
by that Fahad Al -Thumairy, the Imam of the King Fahad
Mosque, had asked him to look after tw o very "significant"
people. did not inquire into the word "significant" or
why he referred to them this way, other then to say, that if
Thumairy assigned him to look after someone it meant that they
were important. did request to meet the two men,
(Al-Mihdhar and Al -Hazmi), whenever they came across each other
at the mosque. would see with the two men at the
mosque almost every day, even sometimes in the company of Al -
Thumairy in the library of the mosque.
states he was told by that the two
men were living at his house on . stated to
that he had asked his sister, who was living there at
the time, to move out and stay with other sister for a
couple of weeks, that he was having visitors stay with him and
needed the space in the house. was unaware when
had requested that of his sister.
recalls a conversation that he had with
shortly after the Al -Mihdhar and Al -Hazmi arrived in L.A.
regarding the Mediterranean Restaurant on Venice Blvd. He states
that told that he needed to take the two men to
the Mediterranean Restaurant on Venice Blvd. asked why
he was taking them to that restaurant because the food was not
very good, and the service was poor. stated to
that he just needed to take them there. did not
question him any further about this topic, but advised the
interviewing agents that people would go to that restaurant to
have private mee tings. [See Bayoumi]
EO14040-003503-UPDATED
(P)
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(P)
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(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
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(P)
(P)
(P)
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(P)
(P)
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(P)
(P)
(P)
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(F)
Mohammed S Almuhanna ( Mohammed Almuhanna / Mohammed Almohanna )
DOB:
Phone #: , ,
Summary: Almuhanna was a Saudi diplomat and employee of the Saudi
Arabian Consulate in LA. Almuhanna was known to be a leader and
spiritual guide amongst a militant group that separated from the King
Fahd Mosque. Almuhanna was a close associate of Althumairy.
Investigation was predicated on MOHAMMED
ALMUHANNA's direct ties to FAHAD AL -THUMAIRY, a Sunni
Salafi extremist with
ties to 9/11 (subject of ).
ALMUHANNA was previously a consular official at the Saudi
Consulate in Los Angeles, and is reported to have founded, with
ALTHUMAIRY, the King Fahad Mosque.
"ALMUHANNA is a Sunni Islamic extremist
associated with a radical form of the Salafi ideology...and a
graduate of the Ibn Mohammad Islamic University in Riyadh"
.
EO14040-003504-UPDATED
(J-3)
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(P-1)
(F)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(J-3)
(F)
(O-1)
(F)
(O-1)
Almuhanna is t he son of prominent Saudi judge – Sulaiman Almuhanna
(DOB: .
A brother is most likely Abdulmajed Almohna (DOB:
).
Relevant Serials :
[ dated 11/13/2003]
that Almuhanna had made an inflammatory speech at the King Fahd Mosque
on 01/11/2002 calling for jihad.
Per interview of Mohammed
Alqudhaieen (see herein) Almuhannad was invited by Alqudhaieen to
provide sermons while in Tucson.
Interviewee stated that al -Muhanna was a virulent critic of
America and American society. According to al-Muhanna
was disdainful of Western values and was openly hostile to non -Muslims
and Muslims who did not meet al -Muhannas religious standards.
stated that many people in the Muslim community were
surprised when al -Thumairy was not allowed to re -enter the United
States, but no one was surprised that al -Muhanna was excluded.
EO14040-003505-UPDATED
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(P-1)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(F)
(F)
(F)
Adel Alsadhan
DOB:
Relevant Serials:
Captioned investigation was opened based on
AL SADHAN works under WFO FI subject
MUSAED AL-JARRAH ) at the Islamic Affairs Section of
the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia (RESA) and helps AL -JARRAH
coordinate/direct all Saudi Imams assigned to and/or financially
supported by the Saudi
government in the United States. AL SADHAN is believed to help AL -
JARRAH support extremist Saudi Sunnis in the United States. AL SADHAN
a believer in a radical form of Sunni
Salafiyism and reportedly travels frequently within the United States.
[ Serial dated 09/26/2001] Interview of Doctor
Abdussattar Shaikh: Omar Albayoumi introduced Shaikh to Mat'Ab
Alsudairy and Adil Al'Sadhan, two scholars visiting from Saudi Arabia.
They did not seem to know Albayoumi very well. Albayoumi was looking
for somewhere for these two visitors to stay. Shaikh allowed them to
stay with him. They stayed with him for approximately six or seven
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DOB:
SSN:
Possible phone prior to 9/11/2001: (LA) /
Possible present address:
Anaheim, CA
May be USPER of origin
Summary: was a local hire as an employee of the Saudi
Arabian Consulate in LA. was a close associate of Alhtumairy and
may have met Albayoumi prior to his supposed chance encounter with
Alhazmi and Almihdar. A phone associated with l ater had contact
with the support network of the hijackers in Virginia.
Relevant Serials :
Listed employees of the Saudi
Arabian Consulate as of 09/1999 which listed as a translator with
a US arrival date of 10/23/ 1991 although the biographical section
noted he was an employee of the Saudi Cultural Attache in LA from
1979-1983.
In February of 2000, Omar Al-Bayoumi and Kaysan
Bindon, aka Isamu Dyson, traveled from San Diego to the Saudi
Consulate where Al-Bayoumi handled paperwork for passports for
his family and picked up some religious materials. Afterwards
they went to a restaurant near the King Fahd mosque where they
met 9/11 hijackers Khalid Al -Mihdhar and Nawaf Al -Hamzi. When
later interviewed, Al -Bayoumi and Bindon characterized
this initial meeting as a chance encounter. On 08/03/2004, Bindon
identified a photograph of as the person at the Consulate
who gave religious materials to Al -Bayoumi.
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Omar Albayoumi was a major subject of interest due to his close
and confirmed contact with several of the 9/11 hijackers. The 9/11
Commission report speculated that Albayoumi worked for Saudi
intelligence; however, could not locate any evidence and
Albayoumi claimed his association with the two hijackers was based on
a chance meeting. Information contained herein ,
This is
significant as Al bayoumi (as well as others) was almost immediately
available to Hazmi and Mihdar up on entry into the U.S. during a time
period that both of these ill -prepared operatives were most vulnerable
to possible detection. Albayoumi was being paid as a “ghost employee”
of a Saudi company during his time in California. A relative of
Albayoumi’s boss within this company would later move in to the same
apartment with Alhazmi after Mihdar’s departure.
The earliest reference to Albayoumi in electronic indices noted by
writer were from 1998.
[ Serial ] On 1998,
new
property has been purchased for a mosque, located at
in El Cajon. The mosque will cater mainly to the Kurdish
people. The person in charge is a Saudi (Egyptian descent), Omar
Bayoumi, aka Abu Emad. The mosque number is ,
Bayoumi's residential number is and his cellular
phone is . The property cost $580,000.00 and is going to
be renovated. Saudi financing appears to be the means by which the
property was bo ught and renovated.
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Date 04/01/1999 ] In this communication
an interviewee advised that Omar Bayayoomi (phonetic), user of
had delivered $400,000 to the Islamic Kurdish community in El
Cajon, CA for the purpose of building the Al Medina Mosque. The money
originated from the neighbors of Sheikh Al Zamel, Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia. Interviewee also opined that Bayayoomi must be an agent of a
foreign power or of Saudi Arabia. Omar Al-Bayoumi, pdob ,
address San Diego, CA (Villa
Balboa Apt. Complex), wife Manal Bagader, telephone ,
may be identical to the "Omar Bayayoomi"
[ ] An interview of an employee of
Dallah Al Baraka in S audi Arabia noted that Albayoumi first appeared
to his knowledge in early 1995 as a result of AVCO Overseas Services
dropping its contract with the Saudi Presidency of Civil Aviation
(PCA) in part for the presence of "ghost employees" which AVCO was
forced to pay for under the cont
…[truncated]