Document text
REDACTION KEY
A. CLASSIFIED FBI INFORMATION RE-REVIEWED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE
ORDER 14040.
C-1. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT
THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT
PENDING FURTHER CONSULTATION TO BE COMPLETED BY THE DEADLINE IN
EO 14040 SECTION 2(D).
D. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE IS
REQUIRED. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION IS OBTAINED
WILL BE RELEASED.
F. ADMINISTRATIVELY DESIGNATED FBI FILE AND/OR SERIAL NUMBERS OR
HANDLING INFORMATION.
G. SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION WITHHELD PURSUANT TO THE
LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIVILEGE.
J-1. SECTION 102A(i)(1) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED BY
THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TE RRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004, 50
U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1).
J-2. INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM DI SCLOSURE BY THE BANK SECRECY ACT
(BSA) AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE BSA. SEE 31 C.F.R. § 5311 ET SEQ; 31 C.F.R. CHAPTER X.
J-3 INFORMATION DETERMINED BY ANOTHER DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY TO BE
PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f).
O-1. INFORMATION WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT
AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT.
P. INFORMATION RESTRICTED FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE PRIVACY ACT
OF 1974. SUCH INFORMATION WILL BE PRODUCED IN MDL 03-1570 (S.D.N.Y.) PURSUANT TO THE PRIVACY ACT PROTECTIVE ORDER ENTERED IN THAT CASE.
P-1. INFORMATION SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, DATES OF BIRTH, AND
OTHER SENSITIVE PERSONAL INFORMATION.
S. NAMES AND OTHER PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL.
NOTE: Classification markings (classification banners and portion markings) are redacted
without a code throughout the release.
The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Report
A Review of the FBI’s Handling of Intelligence Inform ation Related to
the September 11 Attacks
Issued July 2004
The following pages were deemed responsive in discovery in MDL 03-1570 (S.D.N.Y.) and are
within the scope of Section 2( b) of Executive Order 14040. The rema ining pages in the Inspector
General’s report were determined in the course of the litigation not to be responsive in discovery
and therefore are outside the scope of the executive order.
EO14040-000492
EO14040-000493
EO14040-000494
EO14040-000495
EO14040-000496
EO14040-000497
EO14040-000498
EO14040-000499
EO14040-000500
EO14040-000501
EO14040-000502
EO14040-000503
EO14040-000504
EO14040-000505
EO14040-000506
EO14040-000507
EO14040-000508
EO14040-000509
EO14040-000510
EO14040-000511
EO14040-000512
EO14040-000513
EO14040-000514
EO14040-000515
EO14040-000516
EO14040-000517
Primary Case:
Ca
se Title: OPERATION ENCORE - MOHDAR
Serial Number:
Seria
lized: 09/14/2017
Categ
ory: Full Investigation
Initiated: 10/26/2007
Seria
l #:
Type: FD542
From: NEW YORK
To: COUNTERTERRORISM
NEW YORK
LOS ANGELES
SAN DIEGO
Document Title
:
TO REPORT INFORMATION GARNERED DURING A DEBRIEFING
Approval Date:
Classification:
Contents
Precedence: ROUTINE Date:
To: Counterterrorism Attn:
Attn:
San Diego Attn:
Los Angeles Attn:
New York Attn:
From: New York
Contact: Det.
(F)
(F)
(
(G)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(G)
(G)
(S)
(S)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(S)
(F)
EO14040-000518
EO14040-000519
EO14040-000520
EO14040-000521
Accomplishment Information:
Claimed By:
SSN:
Name:
Squad:
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Info)
COUNTERTERRORISM
Read and clear.
Set Lead 2: (Info)
AT
Read and clear.
Set Lead 3: (Info)
SAN DIEGO
AT
Read and clear.
Set Lead 4: (Info)
LOS ANGELES
Read and clear.
Set Lead 5: (Discretionary)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(S)
(S)
(G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(G)
(G)
EO14040-000522
NEW YORK
Consider information contained herein for possible
IIR dissemination; coordinate with
(G)
(G)
EO14040-000523
Serial #:
Type:
From: WASHINGTON FIELD
To: NEW YORK
Document Title
:
Approval Date: /2009
Classification:
Contents
F
EDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DOCUMENT
Form Classification:
Date: 2009-
Case
Agent Name:
Field Office: Washington
Squad:
Date of Contact:
Participants/Witnesses:
Type of Contact: In Person
Location
Country: UNITED STATES
City
State:
Date of Report
Substa
ntive Case File Number:
Reporting:
MUSSAED AL-JARRAH was at the EMBASSY OF THE KINGDOM OF SUADI
ARABIA
(EKSA) starting in the early 1990s. He was assigned to the Ministry of Islamic
Affairs. Originally AL-JARRAH started at the EKSA as an administrative person
(A), (G), (J-1)
(G)
(F)
(S)
(G)
(S)
(G)
(F)
(G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-000524
EO14040-000525
AL-JARRAH utilized a Palestinian national residing in
Virginia, to facilitate things for him in his travels to the U.S believes
that AL-JARRAH had a romantic relationship with sister in the U.S.
AL-JARRAH is now currently assigned to the Saudi embassy in Kula Lumpur,
Maylasia. He is in charge of Saudi student groups.
AL-JARRAHs current contact information:
(Malaysia cell phone)
(Saudi cell phone)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(P)
(P)
EO14040-000526
Serial #:
Type: TELETYPE
From: COUNTERTERRORISM
To:
Document Title: TO REQUEST ACCESS TO
Approval Date: 2010
Classification:
Contents
VZCZCFBA685
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUCNFB #0017 0631550
ZNY SSSSS
10
FM FBI WASHINGTON DC
BT
SUBJECT: TO REQUEST FBI ACCESS
IN FURTHERANCE OF OPERATION ENCORE.
DETAILS: ON 2010, JOINT SOURCE
WAS DEBRIEFED BY THE FBI.
OF OPERATION ENCORE SUBJECT MUSAED AL-JARRAH.
AL-JARRAH USED TO WORK IN THE ISLAMIC AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON,
D.C. AL-JARRAH WAS IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY,
PREVIOUSLY IMAM AT THE KING FAHAD MOSQUE IN CALIFORNIA, DURING
THEIR TIME IN THE UNITED STATES. AL-THUMAIRY WAS DESCRIBED BY
AS BEING KIND, KNOWLEDGEABLE, AND SMART, AND THAT HE DID
NOT
APPEAR TO BE AN EXTREMIST.
HOWEVER, AL-THUMAIRY DID HELP TO BRING A MORE RADICAL INDIVIDUAL
INTO THE MOSQUE, MOHAMMED AL-MUHANNA, IN LATE 2000 OR 2001.
(NOTE: MOHAMMED AL-MUHANNA WAS AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER AT THE
SAUDI ARABIAN CONSULATE IN LOS ANGELES. HE WAS ALSO A CLOSE
ASSOCIATE OF OPERATION ENCORE SUBJECT FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, FORMER
IMAM AT THE KING FAHAD MOSQUE IN CALIFORNIA.
AL-MUHANNA DEPARTED THE US IN 2003.)
A, G, J-1
(A),(G),(J-1)
(A),(G),(J-1)
(A),(G),(J-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(F)
EO14040-000527
RECOGNIZED PHOTOGRAPHS OF OPERATION
ENCORE SUBJECTS ADEL AL SADHAN AND MUTAIB AL SUDAIRY, BUT WAS
UNABLE TO RECALL THEIR NAMES. STATED AL SADHAN AND AL
SUDAIRY WORKED FOR AL-JARRAH, AND BELIEVES THEY SPOK E
ENGLISH WELL. DURING THE 2000-2001 TIME FRAME, THERE WERE
SEVERAL SAUDI MALES, LIKE AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY, WHO WOULD
TRAVEL TO CALIFORNIA PERIODICALLY. MANY OF THEM WOULD GO TO
CAMPS IN ARIZONA (NFI); SOME OF THEM CAME DIRECTLY FROM SAUDI
ARABIA, WHILE OTHERS CAME FROM OTHER LOCATIONS WITHIN THE UNITED
STATES. ESTIMATED THAT THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 17
INDIVIDUALS IN THIS GROUP. AL-THUMAIRY ALWAYS MET THEM AT A
HOUSE TO PRAY, BUT NOT AT THE MOSQUE, EXCEPT FOR FRIDAY PRAYERS.
MANY AT THE KING FAHD MOSQUE BECAME CONCERNED ABOUT THIS UNUSUAL
TREND, AND THE FACT THAT THE MOSQUE HAD NO CONTROL OVER THE
TRAVELERS.
MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT AL SADHAN, AL SUDAIRY,
AL-JARRAH AND THEIR ASSOCIATES DURING THE TIME THAT THESE
INDIVIDUALS WHERE IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, COINCIDING WITH EVENTS
SURROUNDING HIJACKERS AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR'S PRE-9/11
ACTIVITIES.
(NOTE: ACCORDING TO HIS I-94 RECORD, ABDULLAH AL-JRAITHEN, DATE
OF BIRTH 1961, COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP AND RESIDENCE SAUDI
ARABIA, PASSPORT NUMBER TRAVELED BY AIR TO PORT OF ENTRY
NEW YORK ON 12 DECEMBER 1999.
AL-JRAITHEN CONTINUED TO LOS
ANGELES, LISTING "HOLIDAY INN, LOS ANGELES" AS HIS INTENDED
DESTINATION. AL-JRAITHEN AND OPERATION ENCORE SUBJECT OMAR
AL-BAYOUMI CHECKED INTO A TRAVELODGE HOTEL TOGETHER IN CULVER
CITY, CALIFORNIA ON 20 DECEMBER 1999 AND CHECKED OUT THE NEXT
DAY. THIS TRAVELODGE HOTEL WAS REPORTEDLY OFTEN USED BY THE KING
FAHAD MOSQUE TO HOUSE VISITORS. TO DATE, NO DEPARTUR E
INFORMATION HAS BEEN LOCATED FOR AL-JRAITHEN. NO FURTHER EVIDENCE
(P)
(P)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(J-3)
(J-3)
EO14040-000528
EO14040-000529
EO14040-000530
EO14040-000531
3
As always, your assistance in
counterterrorism matters is greatly appreciated. We would welcome
any additional information your Government has developed in regards
to this matter.
Sincerely,
Legal Attache
(S)
(S)
EO14040-000532
(Rev. 01-31-2003)
FEDERA L BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: ROUTINE Date: /2003
To:
Counterintelligence Attn:
Los Angeles
From:
Washington Field
Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title:
MUSAED A. AL-JARRAH;
Synopsis: To provide information from
source.
Preliminary Inquiry Instituted:
02/24/2003, set to expire
06/22/2003. Details: The following information was provided to WFO on or
about /03 from a representative of the
asset reported in March 2003
that MUSAED AL-JARRAH is the assistant director
of Islamic
Affairs
at the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA) in WDC.
(A), (G), (J-1)
(S), (G)
(S)
(G)
(G)
(S)
(S)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(F)
EO14040-000533
EO14040-000534
To: nterintelligence Washington Field
Re: , /2003
LEAD(s): Set Lead 1: (Info)
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
AT WASHINGTON, DC
For information. Read and clear.
Set Lead 2: (Discretionary)
For information. File copy of communication
, if desired.
Set Lead 3: (Info)
LOS ANGELES
AT LOS ANGELES, CA
For information. Read and clear.
♦♦
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-000535
EO14040-000536
EO14040-000537
EO14040-000538
EO14040-000539
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: 08/12/2009
AL-BAYOUMI moved from England to Saudi Arabia in
08/2002 and was interviewed by the Saudi
Mabahith in approximately
10/2002. In 08/2003, AL-BAYOUMI was interviewed in Saudi Arabia by members of the PENTTBOM Investigative Team (reference
. AL-BAYOUMI was also interviewed
in Saudi Arabia by representatives of theNational Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "9/11 Commission"), in the presence of the FBI, in 10/2003.
FBI investigation has determined that OMAR AL-BAYOUMI
possibly assisted NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR (hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77 on 09/11/2001) upon their arrival in the San Diego, California, area in early 02/2000. In response to interviews conducted and intelligence gathering, and to provide a comprehensive summary of the investigation to date, the following details of the investigation of AL-BAYOUMI are provided. These details include information garnered from the interviews of AL-BAYOUMI conducted by the FBI, the Saudi Mabahith, and
as well as independent investigation into the
associations and activities of AL-BAYOUMI while residing in the United States.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
AL-BAYOUMI first traveled to the United States on
08/01/1993 using Saudi Arabian passport # On 06/06/1995,
AL-BAYOUMI returned to the United States at Los Angeles, California.
AL-BAYOUMI entered
at that time on a using Saudi
Arabian passport # with an intended address of Beadnell Way, Apartment , San Diego, California (reference
. AL-BAYOUMI and his family resided
at this address until relocating to Beadnell Way, Apartment
San Diego, California, in 02/1996. In the summer of 1999,
AL-BAYOUMI and his family moved to Parkwood Apartments,
Mount Ada Road, San Diego, California.
AL-BAYOUMI returned to Saudi Arabia from 03/21/2000
to 05/31/2000. AL-BAYOUMI then resided with his family in San Diego until the fall of 2000, at which time he relocated to England and enrolled at Aston University in Birmingham. AL-BAYOUMI's wife and children remained in San Diego until 06/2001 when they moved to join AL-BAYOUMI in England. AL-BAYOUMI again traveled to Saudi Arabia from 06/26/2001 to 07/16/2001, then returned to Birmingham, England,
(F)
(C-1)
P-1
(P-1)
(C-1)
(F)
(F)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(J-3)
EO14040-000540
EO14040-000541
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: 08/12/2009
and remained at this level
until the allowance payments ceased in
08/2001 [Note: the time frame of increased payments to AL-BAYOUMIdoes not correspond to the dates that hijackers NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR resided in San Diego]. Review of employment records obtained from the PCA indicates that AL-BAYOUMI received a promotion in 04/2000, and his contract status also was changed from "single" to "married" at that time. As a result, his salary and allowance were both increased.
When applying for school in the United States,
AL-BAYOUMI had provided a letter from stating that AL-BAYOUMI was being supported while in the United States. was also listed as "sponsor" on AL-BAYOUMI'sImmigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Form I-20. When interviewed, , owner of , advised that had
been a subcontractor of Dallah Avco and the PCA and that he was asked to provide the letter of support concerning AL-BAYOUMI. Review of employment records during the time that AL-BAYOUMI was in the United States indicated that AL-BAYOUMI continued to receive his salary and allowance through Dallah Avco.
In addition to attending school in San Diego,
AL-BAYOUMI acted as the manager/facilities supervisor of the Al Medina Al-Munarawah Mosque, also known as the Kurdish Islamic Center, 511 South Magnolia, El Cajon, California. When interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that he had been contacted by SAAD AL-HABIBregarding the local mosque used by the Kurdish population. AL-HABIB,a Saudi Arabian who had attended school in San Diego, informed AL-BAYOUMI that he was interested infunding a new mosque for the Kurdish community because the mosquewas located in a small building without a parking lot. AL-HABIBasked AL-BAYOUMI to assist in acquiring a larger building to house the mosque, to which AL-BAYOUMI agreed. AL-BAYOUMI subsequently looked for and obtained a building in El Cajon, California, that included a parking lot. Al-HABIB provided all of the money to AL-BAYOUMI to purchase the building, to include the USD 10,000 for which AL-BAYOUMI then wrote a check for the initial down payment.
As manager/facilities supervisor, AL-BAYOUMI kept an office at the
mosque. AL-BAYOUMI advised that the position was on a volunteer basis and that he was not paid for his work at the mosque.
VISIT TO THE SAUDI ARABIAN CONSULATE, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
On approximately 02/01/2000, AL-BAYOUMI traveled by
car from San Diego to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles in order
to renew his passport.
AL-BAYOUMI was accompanied on this trip by
KAYSAN BIN DON, an associate from San Diego. BIN DON,
(F)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
EO14040-000542
EO14040-000543
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: 08/12/2009
During an interview of KAYSAN BIN DON by the writer
on 8/2/2007 he advised that he and AL-BAYOUMI did the first prayerof the day at the ICSD and then around 10am or so they left for Los Angeles. BIN DON stated that he is sure they didn't get to Los Angeles until after 12 because he remembers discussing with AL-BAYOUMI a special allowance for traveling Muslims, which allows them to combine the second prayer (which takes place after the apex of the sun, i.e. around noon) and third prayer (which takes place a few hours after that during the winter months) of the day. BIN DON stated that they assumed they would have to do this since they were still on the road when they should have performed their second prayer.
BIN DON stated that when they arrived in the Los
Angeles metropolitan area, AL-BAYOUMI first drove around Santa Monica looking for a halal restaurant AL-BAYOUMI had eaten at before with his son. After failing to locate it, AL-BAYOUMI drove to the Saudi Consulate. At the consulate AL-BAYOUMI met with a male individual unknown to BIN DON and spoke with him in Arabic. BIN DON described this individual as being in his 40s or 50s, bald, a Tunisian citizen, and at that time was giving lectures at the KFM. BIN DON stated this unknown individual and AL-BAYOUMI embraced and then went into a room and closed the door. After approximately twenty minutes, AL-BAYOUMI emerged from the room and he and BIN DON subsequently left. BIN DON did not recall seeing Al-BAYOUMI's passport at such time but assumes he had it as that was the stated purpose of their trip to Los Angeles.
Writers queried BIN DON to give an honest assessment
of his Arabic language skills at the time. BIN DON in response held up his hand in the shape of a "zero." BIN DON added that he had basically no understanding besides being able to exchange "hello's" and "good bye's."
After visiting the consulate, AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON
proceeded to the KFM. BIN DON advised that they did not attend an organized prayer session but merely prayed alone for five or ten minutes. Writers queried if AL-BAYOUMI showed BIN DON around the KFM, as that was ostensibly the reason BIN DON came to Los Angeles.
BIN DON commented that they were in "hurry" because it had taken
(F)
(P)
EO14040-000544
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: 08/12/2009
so
long to drive up to Los Angeles, so there wasn't time. Writers
queried if BIN DON or AL-BAYOUMI was in "hurry," to which BIN DON replied, "I guess AL-BAYOUMI." BIN DON could not fully explain why they were in a hurry since they had already taken care of the visa issue, but offered that they had not eaten yet so they needed to hurry. Before leaving the KFM, AL-BAYOUMI spoke with an unknown individual. AL-BAYOUMI translated for BIN DON, stating that AL-BAYOUMI was asking for a suggestion of where to eat. AL-BAYOUMItranslated that AL-BAYOUMI had been told there was a restaurant on"Venice Boulevard right around here."
BIN DON and AL-BAYOUMI left the KFM and parked off
of Venice Boulevard, just to the east of the two restaurants they entered. The first restaurant they entered was named, "something like 'Mediterranean Deli.'" Upon entering, AL-BAYOUMI spoke to the proprietor of the establishment in Arabic, which AL-BAYOUMItranslated for BIN DON as "he said they 'don't serve sit down meals.'"
AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON then walked a "couple of store fronts" to
another restaurant that BIN DON believed was "in the same building" as the first restaurant. This restaurant was named "Mediterranean Restaurant," according to BIN DON. AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON entered, went up to the counter, ordered and then sat at a table next to the front window while they waited for their food to be prepared.
After approximately five to ten minutes, two men,
BIN DON now knows to be AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR entered the restaurant and proceeded to the front counter. BIN DON described the front counter as being about "30 to 40 feet" away from the table at which he and AL-BAYOUMI were sitting. BIN DON advised that neither he nor AL-BAYOUMI could hear AL-HAZMI or AL-MIHDHAR talking from where they were sitting. BIN DON indicated that AL-BAYOUMI was staring at them from the time they entered the restaurant. BIN DON stated that he believed that this was because AL-BAYOUMI could not tell if the two men were Arab or Hispanic. Writers queried whether AL-BAYOUMI ever stated this or gave any information to indicate that this is why he was staring. BIN DON stated that AL-BAYOUMI did not give any such indication but added that "that must have been why he was staring."
BIN DON stated that AL-BAYOUMI then went up to the
counter and began talking with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR. The three of them then proceeded to the front table near the window and sat down with BIN DON. BIN DON indicated that the entire conversation was in Arabic and so he was dependent on AL-BAYOUMI for any information as to topics being discussed. The three talked for thirty minutes to an hour and then exchanged telephone numbers. AL-BAYOUMItranslated for BIN DON that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR were currently
(F)
EO14040-000545
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: , 08/12/2009
living in an apartment nearby but that he had invited them to come to
San Diego since AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR did not like Los Angeles.
BIN DON added that he believed that AL-BAYOUMI gave his cell phone
number and AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR gave a land-line number. These assumptions are based on the fact that "most Muslim men only give their cell numbers out," because they don't want to risk someone calling their home and their wife answering and the fact that BIN DON did not believe AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR had time to get a cell phone as they had been in the U.S. "only a couple of days."
After exchanging phone numbers, the four separated
with AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR walking off together and AL-BAYOUMIand BIN DON returning to their car. BIN DON stated that he did not see where or which direction AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR went. However, before returning to the car, AL-BAYOUMI wanted to stop at a small grocery store that was about fifty yards from the car. They walked around inside for a few minutes and then without buying anything, returned to the car.
AL-BAYOUMI then drove back to the KFM, where he and
BIN DON prayed for five to ten minutes. Again, this prayer was not part of an organized prayer session at the KFM. AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON prayed alone and then left the KFM to return to San Diego. BIN DON guessed that it would have been after five o'clock and probably closer to six, as it was "fully dark" outside when they began the trip back to San Diego.
These events are significant because it shows
inconsistencies with AL-BAYOUMI'S account of the meeting between himself and the two hijackers. the most important of these is that during AL-BAYOUMI interview with the PENTTBOM team in Saudi Arabia, he states that he didn't know where the King Fahad Mosque was, and had never been there. The time of the meeting is in question also.
ARRIVAL OF AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR IN SAN DIEGO
AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR arrived in San Diego a few
days after meeting AL-BAYOUMI and BIN DON in
the restaurant. When
interviewed, AL-BAYOUMI advised that AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHAR arrived
at the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD), 7050 Eckstrom Avenue, San Diego, California, and asked for him. AL-HAZMI and AL-MIHDHARinformed AL-BAYOUMI that they were looking to obtain an apartment in the area. AL-BAYOUMI then directed them to the nearby Parkwood Apartment complex at which he resided with his family.
Investigation has determined that AL-MIHDHAR and
AL-HAZMI initially attempted to obtain an apartment at Parkwood
(F)
EO14040-000546
EO14040-000547
EO14040-000548
EO14040-000549
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: 08/12/2009
number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.
According to TA, AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY's
first telephonic contact is on 12/ 1998. After which, for almost
the Ar-Ribat
Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included, however also see paragraph below) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring
In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003,
AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMAIRY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMAIRY also worked at the Consulate ( ).
ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat
Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the Ar-Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of their relationship is still unknown. According to TA, the first telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and AULAQI was on 12/18/1999, after which there were calls on 12/28/99, 12/29/99 (possibly two calls on this day depending on to whom ALTHUMARY was talking at the Ar-Ribat Mosque) 1/12/00 and 4/25/00. During a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-THUMARY (
The three telephone numbers which are
attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM . In an interview
conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE ( .
In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."
The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700
and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE
The same serial states that MUSAED
AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his
(F)
(F)
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
EO14040-000550
EO14040-000551
EO14040-000552
EO14040-000553
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: 08/12/2009
and
certain radical elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs
for mutually beneficial goals.
Known Identifiers
Descriptive Data:
Main Subject
Name -
Last: AL-BAYOUMI
First: OMARMiddle: AHMED
Race: WSex: MDOB: 1957
POB: Saudi Arabia
SOC:Alias(es) -
Last: AL-BAYOUMI
First: O
Middle: A
Current Location: Riyadh, Saudi ArabiaMiscellaneous: Subject is a non-USPER.
LEAD(s):
(F)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(G)
(G)
EO14040-000554
EO14040-000555
(Rev. 01- 31-2003)
FEDER
AL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 02/19/2009
To: Counterterrorism Attn:
International Operations Attn:
Riyadh Attn:
San Diego Attn:
New York Attn:
From: New York
Contact:
Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title: FAHAD AL- THUMAIRY
OPERATION ENCORE
Synopsis: Initiate a Full Investigation (FI)on FAHAD AL
-
THUMAIRY
Enclosure(s): 1 - Opening LHM
(S)
(G)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(G)
(G)
(S)
(G)
(S)
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(G)
EO14040-000556
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: 02/19/2009
Full Investigation Initiated: 02/12/2009
Reference: -OPERATION ENCORE,
Details: Administrative Note: New York is opening the
captioned FI based on information developed during interviews and
investigation conducted under the auspices of the referenced
investigation. Due to logistical constraints related to
uploading to any PENTTBOM file and the evolved nature of the
instant investigation, all future documentation related to such
referenced investigation should be uploaded to the captioned
case.
Background: On 08/28/2007, writers opened the
OPERATION ENCORE investigation that contained information
garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets,
which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM
investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both
a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation
into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained
individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11
hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional
intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM
investigation, OPERATION ENCORE was opened. Writers opined that
certain Al Qa'ida (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.
Specifically, writers were interested in gaining a
greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL- MIHDHAR and
NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the
local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an
understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with
which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain
support and safe harbor.
Results : Over the past two years, writers
have interviewed multiple individuals including some of those
detailed in the referenced serial and additional confidential
human sources (CHS) related to the PENTTBOM investigation, who
were also knowledgeable of events and individuals in Los Angeles
and San Diego in late 1999 and early 2000. The results of such
interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has
provided significant insight into i) how AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI
may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what
other objectives AL- MIHDHAR and AL -HAZMI may have had in addition
(F)
(F)
(F)
EO14040-000557
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: 02/19/2009
to preparation for the 9/11 plot, and iii) additional individuals
associated with AL- MIHDHAR and AL -HAZMI during late 1999 and
early 2000.
Exploitation of Muslim Community: Multiple
and other individuals associated with AL-
MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California
believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia"
prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally
defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the
context. , AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI
would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a
certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have
been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival.
Such individual would then, because of this individual's
relationship with the tazkia- providing individual, have provided
any and all assistance that AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI would need
during their time in the United States
). At this time, it is unknown who
would have been the tazkia
-providing individual or to whom the
tazkia would have directed AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI to visit.
believed that it likely would have involved
someone or multiple persons who had access to the Saudi Consulate
in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver
City, California, as support from both communities would have
been necessary for success (see serial
). It is important to note that the individual to whom the
tazkia directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, would not have
necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL- MIHDHAR and AL-
HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact,
, the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a
carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving
assistance.
One individual meeting such description who is
also reported to have had contact with AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI is
FAHAD AL-THUMARY, main subject in closed case# .
AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver
City, California and was described in U.S. State Department
documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California
(Consulate) Additional
documentation from
(F)
(F)
(C-1)
(F)
(A),(G),(J-1)
(A)(G)(J-1)
(P)
(A),(G),(J-1)
(F)
(G)
(F)
(F)
EO14040-000558
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re:
, 02/19/2009
( . AL-THUMARY was
previously the subject of an FI out of the Los Angeles Division
based on his association with OMAR AL- BAYOUMI through phone calls
and AL-THUMARY's potential association with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-
HAZMI . According to the
closing EC
and supplemental closing EC
the FI was closed due to: i) AL- THUMARY's relocation
to Saudi Arabia, ii) an exhaustion of "all reasonable and
practical intelligence collection methods". However, a review of
AL-THUMARY's case file does not appear to reveal any
investigation into AL- THUMARY as a potential "tazkia" contact for
AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was
investigated as the existence of such a protocol as well as the
fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a
protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community appears to
have been unknown at such time.
If AL- THUMARY played any part in providing
assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from
another unknown individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL
-
MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance
from another unknown individual(s) there may have been telephonic
contact between Al- THUMARY and such unknown individual(s). A
review of AL-THUMARY known telephone records for the time period
immediately prior to AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI arriving in the U.S.
is particularly instructive.
During a three- day period at the end of
December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the
arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL- THUMARY made a number of
phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact,
including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been
duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below
documents this pattern:
(F)
(C-1)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)
(F)
EO14040-000559
EO14040-000560
EO14040-000561
EO14040-000562
EO14040-000563
EO14040-000564
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: 02/19/2009
AL-HAZMI; 3) these same San Diego- based individuals provided some
of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL- MIHDHAR and AL-
HAZMI.
Recruitment: Although, AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI,
may not have arrived in southern California with an active
support network, it seems that once they were vouched into the
local community they may have begun to vet individuals for those
individual's willingness to assist AL- MIHDHAR and AL -HAZMI.
Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like
they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential
willingness to assist AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI (
. Additionally AL -MIHDHAR and AL-
HAZMI were reported to have been associating with a group of
similarly-aged and similarly- situated (i.e., students, single)
individuals in Southern California. Of all the nineteen 9/11
hijackers, AL-MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI came to the United States
earliest and stayed the longest. During such time, AL-MIHDHAR
and AL-HAZMI may have been recruiting individuals for potential
future operations.
Predication for the Investigation
As stated above, the prior intelligence gathering
project established a possible modus
operandi of AL-MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI's for integrating into and
receiving assistance from the local Muslim communities, i.e.
tazkia. This methodology could possible be exploited in the
future to help integrate and guarantee assistance to future AQ
terrorists. The recent review of phone records and financial
records coupled with source reporting on the above- described
individuals may indicate the existence of a group of like- minded
individuals who provided assistance, financial and otherwise, to
AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, during their time in the U.S. AL-
MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been able to "plug into," what
appears to be a extremist Saudi
-based financial support group
through the use of tazkia. This information provides specific
and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to
national security may exist, as the group or organization that
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
EO14040-000565
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: 02/19/2009
these above-described individuals compose i) is or may be a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may
be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities
constituting a threat to the national security (or related
preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign
power.
Possible Nexus to a Foreign Power
At this point in the investigation, there are
number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved
could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic
Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were
able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ
operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs
and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the
resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical
element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with
AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical
elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually
beneficial goals.
Known Identifiers
Descriptive Data:
Main Subject
Name -
Last: AL-THUMARY
First: FAHAD
Middle: I. A.
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: 1971
POB: Saudi Arabia
PNO: Official)
SOC:
Alias(es) -
Last: AL-THUMAIRY
First: FN
Middle: MN
Phone #:
Current Location: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
(P)
(P)
(F)
(P)
(P)
EO14040-000566
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: , 02/19/2009
Miscellaneous: Subject is a non- USPER.
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Action)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
is requested to provide
notice of the initiation of this investigation to the DOJ Office
of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and DOJ's Criminal
Division.
Set Lead 2: (Action)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
Coordinate as
required based on information in the Details section above.
Set Lead 3: (Action)
COUNTERTERRORISM
(F)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
EO14040-000567
EO14040-000568
(Rev. 01- 31-2003)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 10/27/2009
To: Counterterrorism Attn:
Attn:
Attn:
Attn:
Attn:
Intelligence Directorate Attn:
Attn:
From: New York
Contact:
Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title: MUSAED AL- JARRAH
Synopsis: To open captioned Full Investigation, document
transmission of and request a
Enclosure(s): (1
)the electronic
Full Investigation Initiated: 10/27/2009
Details: New York Office opened captioned Full
Investigation based on information that MUSAED AL
-JARRAH, former
director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the Saudi Arabian
Embassy, is or was part of a group that may have provided support
to two (2) of the 9/11 hijackers. Through NYO Operation Encore
investigation, more information has surfaced indicating AL-
JARRAH's connection to international terrorism.
(G)
(S)
(S)
(F)
(A)(G)(J-1)
(G)
(S)
(F)
(A)(G)(J-1)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
EO14040-000569
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: 10/27/2009
By way of background, over the past two years
under Operation Encore, NYO sought to gain a greater
understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL- MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-
HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e.
southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding
would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL -
MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and
safe harbor.
As a result, NYO Agents interviewed multiple
individuals related to the PENTTBOM investigation. The results
of such interviews as well as additional analytical inv
estigation
has provided significant insight into i) how AL- MIHDHAR and AL-
HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii)
what other objectives AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI may have had in
addition to preparation for the 9/11 plot, and iii) additional
individuals associated with AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI during late
1999 and early 2000.
other
individuals associated with AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI during their
time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must
have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States.
Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher"
depending on the context. AL-MIHDHAR
and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to
present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may
simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon
their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this
individual's relationship with the tazkia
-provider, ha ve provided
any and all assistance that AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI would need
during their time in the United States (see
At this time, it is unknown who would have
been the tazkia-provider or to whom the tazkia- provider would
have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI to visit.
believed that it was likely a person or multiple persons who had
access to both the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and
the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from
both communities would have been necessary for success (see
. It is important to note that
the individual to whom AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI were directed,
would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-
MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact,
(F)
(A)(G)(J-1)
(A)(G)(J-1)
(P)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
EO14040-000570
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: 10/27/2009
, the nature of tazkia, in general, is to
function as a carte blanche, no- questions- asked method for
receiving assistance.
One individual reported to have had contact
with AL-MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI is FAHAD AL- THUMARY, main subject in
closed case # . Above captioned subject, AL -
JARRAH, has multiple telephonic contacts, with AL- THUMARY. AL-
THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City,
California and was described in U.S. State Department
documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California
(Consulate) ( ). Additional
documentation from the
( ). AL-THUMARY was
previously a main subject of an FI based on his association with
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI (through phone connectivity) and his (AL-
THUMARY's) potential association with AL
-MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI
( ).
According to the closing EC for AL- THUMARY
( ) and supplemental closing EC
the FI was closed due to: i) AL-THUMARY's
relocation to Saudi Arabia, ii) an exhaustion of "all reasonable
and practical intelligence collection methods" and iii) the U.S.
Attorney's Office conclusion that there was insufficient evidence
to prosecute AL-THUMARY at such time. However, a review of AL-
THUMARY's case file does not appear to reveal any investigation
into AL-THUMARY as a potential "tazkia" contact for AL-MIHDHAR
and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the
existence of such a protocol, as well as the fac
t that AL- MIHDHAR
and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the
local Muslim community, appears to have been unknown at such
time.
If AL
-THUMARY played any part in providing
assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI after receiving tazkia from
another individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL- MIHDHAR
and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from
another individual(s), there may have been telephonic contact
between Al-THUMARY and such individual(s). A review of AL-
THUMARY's known telephone records for the time period immediately
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(C-1)
(F)
(F)
(A)(G)(J-1)
(F)
EO14040-000571
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: 10/27/2009
prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is
particularly instructive.
During a three- day period at the end of
December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the
arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI, AL- THUMARY made a number of
phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact,
including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been
duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below
documents this pattern:
Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999,
AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic
contact with (main subject of ).
had just two months prior to this contact moved from
Ottawa, Canada to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why
a Somali/Yemeni student living in San Diego would
located in Los
Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first
introduced.
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)
(P)
(P)
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)
(F)
EO14040-000572
EO14040-000573
EO14040-000574
EO14040-000575
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: 10/27/2009
Arabia and distributing those funds to a few recipients"
The distribution functioned as follows,
"[e]ach time a large wire was received, checks were written and
cash withdrawals were made from the account until the account's
balance was depleted...[a]t that time, the next large wire
transfer was received and the cycle was repeated"
During the period that this account was
examined, 06/10/1999 to 11/15/2002,
and the owned by
received from AL- THUMARY. also the
president of had previously been
associated with members of the Somali- based terrorist
organization, Al-Ittihad Al- Islamia (AIAI). At the time of
MOHDAR ABDULLAH's arrest in 2001, ABDULLAH
possessed business card with the phone number
on his person.
indicated that
MOHAMED, a Somali extremist who immigrated from Toronto, Canada
to San Diego, California in 1995 (case # also
received a portion of the Saudi largesse for his activities.
MOHAMED was selected as the AIAI leader in the U.S. in the
beginning of 2000 . NOTE: AIAI is
a Somali-based terrorist organization which rose to power in the
early 1990s (according to DHS's Terrorist Reference Guide from
2004) and is designated a
terrorist group on the FBI's
MOHAMMED
received a stipend of approximately per month from
the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs
Based on some of the above
it seems likely this stipend was administered by AL-
THUMARY or AL-JARRAH.
However, even
with such extensive contact with AL-
JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole
distributor of funds in California, AL- THUMARY may have been
competing for such funds with AL- BAYOUMI.
interviewed on reported that
"AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be
the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques."
According to "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like
each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of
the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of
the Saudi Government did not say which part of the Saudi
Government AlBayoumi represented)"
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(F)
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(G)
(G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(P)
(F)
EO14040-000576
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: 10/27/2009
The significance of this three- day long heightened
contact remains unclear. However, a few things seem apparent: 1)
AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi- based network operating out of the
Embassy and Consulate(s); 2) this network is reported to have had
the purpose of distributing funds and support to sunni salafist
extremists; 3) there were inexplicable telephonic connections
between Al-THUMARY and a number of San Diego- based individuals
prior to the arrival of AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI; and 4) these
same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most
obvious and tangible assistance to AL
-MIHDHAR and AL -HAZMI.
AL-MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI do not appear to have
arrived in southern California with an active local support
network. However, it appears that once AL- MIHDHAR and AL- HAZMI
were vouched for, via tazkia, they may have begun to assess
individual's suitability for recruitment. Multiple individuals
stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or
"assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL- MIHDHAR
and AL-HAZMI ( ).
Predication for the Investigation
The above information provides specific and
articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to
national security may exist, as the group or organization that
these above-described individuals, including AL- JARRAH, compose
i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power
and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in
activities constituting a threat to the national security (or
related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a
foreign power.
Suspected Foreign Power
At this point in the investigation, there are a
number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved
could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic
Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL -HAZMI were
able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ
operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs
and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the
resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical
element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with
AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical
(F)
(F)
EO14040-000577
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: 10/27/2009
elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually
beneficial goals.
Pertinent Sensitive Investigative Matters :
Not Applicable
Number of Subjects: 1
Code:
Descriptive Data:
Main Subject
Name -
Last: AL-JARRAH
First: MUSAED
Middle: A.
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: 1960
POB: Saudi Arabia
Phone #: Previous -
202-342-3700, 202 -944-3192,
(G)
(P-1)
(G)
(G)
(P)
(F)
EO14040-000578
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: 10/27/2009
Current -
Current Location: Malaysia
Miscellaneous - Subject is a non- USPER.
E-mail Addresses:
Additional Information/ Intelligence :
Not Applicable
(P-1)
(P-1)
(G)
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-000579
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: 10/27/2009
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Info)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, D.C.
To notify of the initiation
of captioned FI.
Set Lead 2: (Action)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
Coordinate as
required based on information in the Details above.
Set Lead 3: (Info)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
Read and clear.
Set Lead 4: (Info)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
Read and clear.
Set Lead 5: (Info)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
Read and clear.
Set Lead 6: (Action)
(G)
(F)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
EO14040-000580
EO14040-000581
EO14040-000582
EO14040-000583
EO14040-000584
EO14040-000585
EO14040-000586
EO14040-000587
(Rev. 06-04-2007)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: IMMEDIATE Date: 09/28/2010
To: Attn:
International Operations
Attn:
Counterterrorism Attn:
Attn:
Oklahoma City Attn:
Indianapolis Attn:
New York Attn:
From: Counterterrorism
Contact:
Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title: OPERATION ENCORE
ADEL MOHAMMAD A AL- SADHAN
OPERATION ENCORE
MUTAIB A A AL
-SUDAIRY
(S)
(S)
(G)
(S)
(S)
(G)
(S)
(F)
(G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-000588
To: From: Counterterrorism
Re: , 09/28/2010
OPERATION ENCORE
DESIGNATED INTELLIGENCE DISCLOSURE OFFICIAL
DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS
FOREIGN DISSEMINATIONS
Synopsis: provides authority to disseminate the
enclosed tearline to the appropriate
authorities.
Full Investigation Initiated:
Administrative: Pursuant to Attorney General Guidelines, for Domestic FBI
Operations (AGG-Dom), Part VI.B.1.d., the dissemination of the enclosed information is in the
interest of national security of the United States. The information is relevant to the recipient's
authorized responsibilities, its dissemination is consistent with the National Security interests of
the United States, and the FBI has considered the effect such dissemination may reasonably be
expected to have on any identifiable U.S. person.
has reviewed the information contained in the enclosed
communication. Passage of this information is consistent with the standards for dissemination
of U.S. person and non-U.S. person information to foreign authorities as authorized in the
AGG-Dom.
The FBI will undertake reasonable steps to ensure that any intelligence
information that the FBI disseminates to the appropriate authorities pursuant to this
authorization is not and will not be used for either assassination prohibited under Executive
Order 12333 or torture, as defined in U.S. criminal law. To this end, the FBI shall take the
following actions:
1. The FBI shall notify the recipient agency that the information in this document is for
intelligence and lead purposes only. The information in this document may not be used in any
legal proceedings or disseminated to any other agency within the recipient's government without
the advanced authorization of the FBI. The FBI shall direct the recipient agency to not take any
overt investigative steps (including but not limited to any type of formal legal process or direct
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(S), (G)
(G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(A), (J-1), (G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(G)
(G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-000589
EO14040-000590
EO14040-000591
To: From: Counterterrorism
Re: , 09/28/2010
who determined Al- Thumairy’s assignment, placing him in Southern
California at the King Fahad Mosque during this time.
He had a reputa
tion for being a "Salafi
fanatic" and as a possible source of motivation for violent or
terrorist activity.
NOTE:
in 1992 or 1994 he was
tasked by
Usama Bin Laden (UBL) to get a list of all Saudi Embassy
employees in the United States. the reason
for this was to find and recruit a sympathizer within the Saudi
Embassy. he went to a local library and
photocopied a list of Embassy employees from a book in the reference
section and hand-delivered the list to UBL. Al-Jarrah began
working
at the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC in 1991. During the time
frame of tasking from UBL, Al -Jarrah would have been on
the photocopied list.
In
1999, both
Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy traveled to
San Diego where they stayed for approximately 6 weeks (approximately
July 1999 to August 1999) and met with Omar Al- Bayoumi, a Saudi student
who had resided in San Diego since 1995. Al- Bayoumi greeted them
and, provided a place to live and
looked after them. FBI investigation indicates Al -Bayoumi may have
provided them with a cell phone.
for a period of time Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy lived at the same
address in San Diego where Al- Hazmi and Al- Mihdhar would later stay
near the Al-Ribat mosque.
In December 1999/January 2000, several of the 9/11 hijackers
met in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia prior to arriving in the US. During
this same time frame, numerous telephone calls occurred between main
Operation Encore subjects Fahad Al- Thumairy, Omar Al- Bayoumi, and
Musaed Al-Jarrah.
On 15 January 2000, 9/11 hijackers Khalid Al- Mihdhar and
Nawaf Al-Hazmi arrived in
Los Angeles, CA via LAX airport on a flight
from Bangkok originating from
Malaysia. The first place they visited
was the King Fahad Mosque where Fahad Al- Thumairy was the Imam.
Al-Thumairy tasked an associate to look after Al- Mihdhar
and Al-Hazmi during their time in Los Angeles, to include
transportation, lodging, etc. In subsequent interviews with the
FBI, the associate stated
that the hijackers asked him specifically
where the “Mediterranean restaurant” was. Approximately one week
later, Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi went to the Mediterranean restaurant
where they met with Omar Al- Bayoumi.
(G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(F)
(J-3)
(J-3)
(J-3)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-000592
To: From: Counterterrorism
Re: 09/28/2010
Al-Bayoumi invited the two to move to San Diego, CA.
Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi moved to San Diego sometime in late
January/early February 2000. At this time, Al- Bayoumi's telephonic
contact with Musaed Al- Jarrah increased. Once the hijackers moved
from Los Angeles to San Diego, Al- Thumairy's telephonic contact with
Al-Jarrah was diminished.
Al-Bayoumi assisted the hijackers in renting an apartment
in San Diego, co-signing a lease agreement with them. He also
assisted them in opening a bank account. Of note, approximately
1 hour before taking
the hijackers to the bank, Anwar Aulaqi called
that specific bank location and had a 2 minute conversation with
an unknown individual. Approximately 1 hour after setting up the
accounts and leaving the bank, Al-Bayoumi placed a call to Aulaqi.
While in San Diego, Al
-Mihdhar and Al- Hazmi attended the
Al-Ribat mosque where Aulaqi was the Imam.
Al-Bayoumi called Al Sudairy five (5) times while the
hijackers were in San Diego with Al- Bayoumi. The dates of the calls
are significant. The first set of calls are 24 January, 26 January,
and 30 January 2000 – this was the week Al- Bayoumi met the hijackers
in Culver City, CA and talked to them about coming to San Diego.
The next call occurred on 2 February 2000. On 4 February 2000
Al-Bayoumi co-signed a loan agreement for the apartment he obtained
for the hijackers and brought them to a Bank of America to assist
them in opening a
bank account. The last call occurred on 7 February
2000. By this date, the hijackers' affairs were in order and a
“welcoming party” for the hijackers was coordinated by Al -Bayoumi
and likely held on 17 February 2000.
In June 2000, Al
-Mihdhar and Al- Hazmi left San Diego and
drove to Los Angeles. Al- Mihdhar was scheduled to leave the US and
return to Yemen. They drove to the King Fahad Mosque where
Al-Thumairy said goodbye to Al-Mihdhar. Al- Mihdhar departed via
LAX on 20 June 2000. Al-Hazmi continued to reside in San Diego.
On 8 December 2000, another hijacker, Hani Hanjour,
arrived in San Diego and joined Al
-Hazmi. They immediately left
for Phoenix, AZ where Hanjour began flight lessons.
In April of 2001, Al- Hazmi and Hanjour arrived in
Falls Church, VA and established residence. They attended the Dar
al Hijra mosque where Aulaqi was now the Imam.
In May 2001, two additional hijackers arrived in the US
–Ahmed Al-Ghambi and Majed Moqed. The four drove to Connecticut
where
they checked into
a Fairfield Inn and then immediately drove
to Patterson, NJ to look for a place to live. Within 3 days, they
began renting rooms at a house in Patterson. Al- Mihdhar also arrived
(G)
(F)
EO14040-000593
EO14040-000594
EO14040-000595
EO14040-000596
EO14040-000597
To: From: Counterterrorism
Re: 09/28/2010
In December 1999/January 2000, several
of the 9/11 hijackers met in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia prior to arriving
in the US. During this same time frame, numerous telephone calls
occurred between main Operation Encore subjects Fahad Al- Thumairy,
Omar Al-Bayoumi, and Musaed Al-Jarrah.
On
15 January 2000, 9/11 hijackers Khalid
Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al- Hazmi arriv ed in Los Angeles on a flight
from Bangkok originating from Malaysia. The first place they visited
was the King Fahad Mosque where Fahad Al- Thumairy was the Imam.
Al-Thumairy tasked an associate to look
after Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi during their time in Los Angeles, to
include
transportation, lodging, etc. In subsequent interviews with
the FBI, the associate stated that the hijackers asked him
specifically where the “Mediterranean restaurant” was.
Approximately one week later, Al- Mihdhar and Al- Hazmi went to the
Mediterranean restaurant where they met with Omar Al- Bayoumi.
Al-Bayoumi invited the two to move to San
Diego, CA. Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi moved to San Diego sometime in
late January/early February 2000. At this time, Al
-Bayoumi's
telephonic contact with Musaed Al- Jarrah increased. Once the
hijackers moved from Los Angeles to San Diego, Al- Thumairy's
telephonic contact with Al- Jarrah was diminished.
Al-Bayoumi assisted the hijackers in
renting an apartment in San Diego, co-signing a lease agreement with
them. He also assisted them in opening a bank account. Of note,
approximately 1 hour before taking the hijackers to the bank, Anwar
Aulaqi called that specific bank location and had a 2 minute
conversation with an unknown individual. Approximately 1 hour after
setting up the accounts and leaving the bank, Al -Bayoumi placed a
call to Aulaqi.
While in San Diego, Al- Mihdhar and Al- Hazmi
attended the Al-Ribat mosque where Aulaqi was the Imam.
Al-Bayoumi called Al Sudairy five (5) times
while the hijackers were in San Diego with Al- Bayoumi. The dates
of the calls are significant. The first set of calls are 24 January,
26 January, and 30 January 2000 – this was the week Al- Bayoumi met
the hijackers in Culver City, CA and talked to them about coming
to San Diego. The next call occurred on 2 February 2000. On 4
February 2000 Al-Bayoumi co-signed a loan agreement for the apartment
he
obtained for the hijackers and brought them to a Bank of America
to assist them in opening a bank account. The last call occurred
on 7 February 2000. By this date, the hijackers' affairs were in
(G)
(F)
EO14040-000598
EO14040-000599
EO14040-000600
To: From: Counterterrorism
Re: , 09/28/2010
Questions regarding this communication should be directed
to SSA , IA
, or SOS .
(G)
(F)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)
EO14040-000601
To: From: Counterterrorism
Re: , 09/28/2010
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Info)
requests to pass the
attached tearline to the appropriate authorities. Please
report any non-compliance with the tearline caveat, in accordance
with the instructions set forth in the Administrative Section of
the EC. Legat is also requested to coor
dinate a meeting between
FBI NY, CTD, and representatives of regarding this
investigation.
As required by the Memorandum of Understanding
Concerning of the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (MOU),
Set Lead 2: (Info)
ALL RECEIVING OFFICES
Read and clear.
(G)
(F)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(O-1)
(G)
(O-1)
EO14040-000602
(Rev. 05- 01-2008)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 12/28/2009
To: Counterterrorism: Attn:
New York: Attn:
From: New York
Contact:
Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title: OPERATION ENCORE
FAHAD AL
-THUMAIRY
OMAR AL- BAYOUMI
MUSAED AL- JARRAH
IYAD MAHMUD MUHAMMAD MUSTAFA AL RABABAH
Synopsis: Disseminate working document outlining the
aforementioned investigations. Request
disseminate document to
(G)
(S)
(S)
(G)
(G), (S)
(S)
(S)
(F)
(G)
(A),(G),(J-1)
EO14040-000603
(Rev. 05- 01-2008)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Full Investigation Initiated: 08/28/2007
Details: Documented below is the contents of a working
document outlining the results of the captioned investigations.
It is important to note that this is a document that is
currently being worked on by investigators and analytical staff
and should be viewed currently as a incomplete document.
For Background
On 06/28/2007, a subfile under the PENTTBOM
investigation was opened by NYO to contain information garnered
from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were
previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The
PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal
investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the
9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with
various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could
be further exploited for additional intelligence value. By
revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, NYO opined
that certain Al Qaeda (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be
revealed.
Specifically, the NYO was interested in gaining a
greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL- MIHDHAR and
NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the
local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an
understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with
which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain
support and safe harbor.
Operation
Encore (FI) was eventually opened in
New York to fully investigate the emerging network uncovered
during the initial investigation conducted under PENTBOM.
Further, full investigations were initiated to
investigate Fahad Al- Thumairy, Omar Ahmed Al- Bayoumi, and Musaed
Al-Jarrah, due to their association with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Al
Hazmi and Khalid Al- Mihdhar. There is a significant amount of
information uncovered through phone analysis, financial
analysis, and numerous interviews that suggests the
aforementioned subjects assisted the hijackers, in a
support/logistics role while they were in the United States,
preparing for the 9/11 attacks. They are suspected of providing
EO14040-000604
EO14040-000605
EO14040-000606
EO14040-000607
EO14040-000608
EO14040-000609
EO14040-000610
EO14040-000611
EO14040-000612
EO14040-000613
To: Counterterrorism: Attn:
From: New York
Re: 01/15/2010
(S)
(S)
(S)
(G)
(G)
(F)
EO14040-000614
To: Counterterrorism: Attn:
From: New York
Re: 01/15/2010
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Action)
COUNTERTERRORISM
Is respectfully requested that
disseminate this document to .
(G)
(G)
(S)
(G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(S)
(S)
(F)
(G)
(G)
EO14040-000615
EO14040-000616
EO14040-000617
EO14040-000618
EO14040-000619
EO14040-000620
EO14040-000621
EO14040-000622
EO14040-000623
EO14040-000624
EO14040-000625
EO14040-000626
To: Counterterrorism: Attn:
Re: , 02/18/2010
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Action)
ALL RECEIVING OFFICES
ALL RECEIVING OFFICES
Read and Clear.
ii
(G)
(G)
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-000627
FM
FBI WASHINGTON DC
TO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
BT
C
ITE:
PASS:
SUBJECT: INEXORABLE/POSTDILUVIAN - TO REPORT INFORMATION
ON OPERATION ENCORE.
DEATILS: ON 24 FEBRUARY 2010, THE FBI BRIEFED
REPRESENTATIVES FROM CTC/GJ AT LANGLEY REGARDING OPERATION ENCORE
THE BELOW INFORMATION
SERVES TO SUMMARIZE THIS BRIEFING.
ON 28 JUNE 2007, A SUBFILE UNDER THE PENTTBOM
INVESTIGATION WAS OPENED BY FBI NEW YORK TO CONTAIN INFORMATION GARNERED FROM THE PLANNED EXPLOITATION OF INTELLIGENCE TARGETS PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED DURING THE PENTTBOM INVESTIGATION.
THE PENTTBOM INVESTIGATION FUNCTIONED AS BOTH A CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION AND AN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING OPERATION INTO THE
9/11 TERRORIST ATTACKS. HOWEVER, THERE REMAINED INDIVIDUALS WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF CONNECTIVITY TO THE 9/11 HIJACKERS WHOM COULD BE FURTHER EXPLOITED FOR ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE VALUE. BY REVISITING SOME ASPECTS OF THE PENTTBOM INVESTIGATION, THE FBI
BELIEVED THAT CERTAIN AL -QAEDA TACTICS AND TRADECRAFT COULD BE
REVEALED.
SPECIFICALLY, THE FBI WAS INTERESTED IN GAINING A GREATER
UNDERSTANDING OF 9/11 HIJACKERS KHALID AL -MIHDHAR AND NAWAF
AL-HAZMI'S PAST INTERACTION WITH AND CONNECTIVITY TO THE LOCAL
(SOUTHERN CALIFORNIAN) MUSLIM COMMUNITY. SUCH AN UNDERSTANDINGWOULD ASSIST IN EXPLAINING THE APPARENT EASE WITH WHICHAL-MIHDHAR AND AL -HAZMI EXPLOITED THAT COMMUNITY TO GAIN
ASSISTANCE AND SAFE HARBOR.
OPERATION ENCORE WAS EVENTUALLY OPENED BY FBI NEW YORK TO
FULLY INVESTIGATE THE NETWORK UNCOVERED DURING THE INIT IAL
(G)
(G)
(J-3)
(J-3)
EO14040-000628
EO14040-000629
EO14040-000630
AND, ACCORDING TO PROVIDED A PLACE
TO L
IVE AND LOOKED AFTER THEM. FBI INVESTIGATION INDICATES
AL-BAYOUMI MAY HAVE PROVIDED THEM WITH A CELL PHONE.
ALSO INDICATES THAT FOR A PERIOD OF TIME AL SADHAN AND
AL SUDAIRY LIVED AT THE SAME ADDRESS IN SAN DIEGO WHERE AL -HAZMI
AND AL -MIHDHAR WOULD LATER STAY.
THE COMMUNICATIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF AL -THUMAIRY,
AL-JARRAH, AND AL -BAYOUMI IN THE WEEKS PRECEDING THE HIJACKERS'
ARRIVAL IN LOS ANGELES ON 15 JANUARY 2000 IS TELLING.
SPECIFICALLY, IN DECEMBER 1999 THERE WAS A UNIQUE PATTERN OF
TELEPHONIC CONTACT THAT OPERATION ENCORE INVESTIGATORS REFER TO
AS "THE SET- UP CALLS" CALLS THAT OCCURRED BETWEEN A NUMBER OF
INDIVIDUALS WHO WOULD LATER PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN ASSISTING THE HIJACKERS.
ON 12 DECEMBER 1999 ABDULLAH AL -JRAITHEN, A SAUDI
RELIGIOUS SCHOLAR, ENTERED THE US IN NEW YORK AND CONTINUED TO
LOS ANGELES, LISTING "HOLIDAY INN, LOS ANGELES" AS HIS INTENDED DESTINATION. AL -JRAITHEN AND AL -BAYOUMI CHECKED INTO A
TRAVELODGE HOTEL TOGETHER IN CULVER CITY, CA ON 20 DECEMBER 1999
AND CHECKED OUT THE NEXT DAY. THIS TRAVELODGE HOTEL WAS
REPORTEDLY OFTEN USED BY THE KING FAHAD MOSQUE TO HOUSE VISITORS.
(NOTE: AN ADDITIONAL HOTEL REGISTRATION WAS FOUND AT THIS SAME
TRAVELODGE FOR ABDULLAH ALGHAMDI WHO STAYED AT THE HOTEL FROM 8
MAY 2001 TO 15 MAY 2001. AHMED ALGHAMDI AND HAZMA ALGHAMDI WERE
TWO OF THE HIJACKERS ON UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 175 AND SAEED ALGHAMDI WAS ONE OF THE HIJACKERS ON UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 93.)
AL-BAYOUMI CHECKED INTO THIS SAME TRAVELODGE HOTEL AGAIN ON 9
JANUARY 2000, THE NEXT MONTH, ABOUT A WEEK PRIOR TO THE
HIJACKERS' ARRIVAL. AL -BAYOUMI CHECKED IN AND THEN CHECKED OUT
AFTER APPROXIMATELY TWENTY MINUTES. HE THEN CHECKED INTO THE
HALF -MOON HOTEL FOR ONE NIGHT. THIS SEQUENCE OF EVENTS SEEMS TO
IMPLY HE CONFUSED THE HOTELS.
W
HICH INVESTIGATORS BELIEVE INDICATES AL -BAYOUMI WAS EITHER
CHECKING THE MINUTES THAT WERE UNUSED ON THE CARDS OR LEARNING HOW TO USE THEM BY LISTENING TO THE AUTOMATED PROMPTS.
(A),(G),(J-1)
(A),(G),(J-1)
(A),(G),(J-1)
(O-1)
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)
EO14040-000631
EO14040-000632
EO14040-000633
EO14040-000634
EO14040-000635
EO14040-000636
(Rev. 05-01-2008)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 06/16/2010
To: Counterterrorism Attn:
New York Attn:
Oklahoma City Attn:
San Diego Attn:
Washington Field Attn:
From: San Diego
Squad
Contact:
Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title: MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL MIHDAR ZAID
aka MOHDAR ABDULLAH
CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST
OPERATION ENCORE
FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY
(G), (S)
(G)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(F)
EO14040-000637
To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: 06/16/2010
OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI
MUSAED AL-JARRAH
ADIL ALSADHAN
MUTAIB A A ALSUDAIRY
Synopsis: Additional information regarding ABDULLAH A S
ALJRAITHEN.
Reference:
Details: As outlined by writer in referenced serial,
ABDULLAH ALJRAITHEN registered at the Travelodge Hotel in Culver City, California with OMAR AHMED ALBAYOUMI on 12/20/1999 and checked out the following day. Little additional information was located regarding ALJRAITHEN at the time referenced serial was written.
After the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks,
ALBAYOUMI was detained by New Scotland Yard (NSY), his apartment was searched and documents were seized. A recent review by
of documents
obtained by NYO-JTTF from NSY yielded further information regarding ALJRAITHEN (this information is also described on
ALBAYOUMI's telephone book
contained an entry for Dr. ABDULLAH ALJOAITHEN, with the numbers 325 0877 and C (cell) 55154240. (Analyst note: the first number
(F)
(G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(F)
(S)
(S)
(F)
EO14040-000638
To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego Re: 06/16/2010
is presumed to be a Saudi number, the second number appears to be a Saudi cell phone number given the code "5" followed by a 7-digit number; neither number was found in the Telephone Application.)
ECF searches on "3250877" and "55154240" both
yielded a hit on
, which describes reporting from a foreign
government service regarding "names and telephone numbers appearing on a laminated card retrieved from the villa in Madinah, Saudi Arabia, where SHAYKH 'ALI KHUDAYR FAHD ALKHUDAYR AND SHAYKH AHMAD HAMUD MUFARRIJ ALKHALIDI were arrested during a raid conducted in late May 2003. The relevant entry on this contact list was for ABDALLAH BIN 'ALI AL-J'AYTHAN 3250877 and cell 55154240. An IDW search on 3250877 yielded additional other government service information "DR.
'ABDALLAH AL-JUHAYN 3250877" was found on a confiscated hard-drive from an October 6, 2001 raid on the Al-Haramayn offices in
According to a report on ABDALLAH
BIN ALI ALJAYTHAN: Intelligence Assessment: Shaykh Ali KHUDAIR is a probable terrorist supporter (Financier). KHUDAIR was believed to be the source of weapons, passports, money and supplies for ANSAR AL-ISLAM operations in Iraq. Ali KHUDAIR is believed to be detained in Saudi Arabia.
Also according to the report, a 22-page
Arabic language document containing instructions for making a variety of improvised explosives devices (IEDs) was found on a hard drive seized during the 05/27/2003 arrests of radical clerics and extremist shaykhs Ali KHUDAIR and Ahmad Humud AL-KHALIDI in Medinah, Saudi Arabia. Much of the material in the document closely parallels that in an explosives manual handwritten by Abu Khabab AL-MASRI, the former explosives and poisons trainer at the AL-QAIDA associated DERUNTA TRAINING CAMP in Afghanistan.
KHUDAIR appears to have at least indirect links to
ABU ZUBAYDAH via AL QAEDA in IRAQ (AQI) member Abu Muhammad AL-NAJRANI. NAJRANI was reportedly an instructor at Al Qaeda's Camp Khaldan (ZUBAYDAH indicated he was trained by NAJRANI) and later became KHUDAIR's student
(F)
(O-1)
(O-1)
(F)
(F)
(O-1)
(G)
(G)
(O-1)
(G)
EO14040-000639
EO14040-000640
To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego Re: 06/16/2010
(F)
EO14040-000641
To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego Re: 06/16/2010
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Info)
ALL RECEIVING OFFICES
For information.
(F)
EO14040-000642
EO14040-000643
EO14040-000644
To: nt : San Diego
Re: , 11/26/2001
25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to
which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.
On 09/17/2001, OMAR KHADIB, who was one of many Muslim
community ders interviewed regarding the 09/11/2001 hijackings,
insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.
San Diego appreciates FBIHQ’s assistance in this matter.
Set Lead 1:
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC.
(P)
(P)
(F)
EO14040-000645
To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: , 11/26/2001
FBIHQ is requested Experian for credit
informa aining to Omar Abdi Mohame ib, date of
birth, 1960, SSAN , La Mesa, CA.
91941
♦♦
(P-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(F)
EO14040-000646
EO14040-000647
EO14040-000648
EO14040-000649
To: C unterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: 11/16/2001
insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that
the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.
San Diego appreciates FBIHQ’s assistance in this
matter.
♦♦
(F)
EO14040-000650
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of
Investigation
In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI
and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. San Diego, California 92123
February 10, 2004
OMAR ABDI MOHAMED,
Investigative Summary:
, advised that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, also known as Omar Abdi
Mohamed AlKhadib, was born on , in Mogadishu, Somalia.
MOHAMED was a resident of Canada from 1990 to 1995. His last known address in Canada was Ontario. His
telephone number at that address was ( MOHAMED was
allowed entry into the United States on July 8, 1995. His status at that time was SR
-1 (Lawful Alien Permanent Resident - Religious
Worker). That status was granted as the result of being offered employment by Masjidul Taqwa (Islamic Institution), 2575 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, CA 92101, telephone (619) 239-6738. The offer was made by . On April 11, 2000, MOHAMED submitted
his Application for Naturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
advised that OMAR
MOHAMED of San Diego, was selected as the Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI) leader in the United States in early 2000. stated that members of the AIAI are very secretive. A close friend of advised that AIAI raises large amounts of money in the United States and transfers it to Somalia
AIAI is an international terrorist
organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). AIAI is a faction of a foreign nation and a political organization that is engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof, which is not substantially composed of United States citizens.
AIAI was previously identified by
FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. A terrorist threat summary received from members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) suggested that the AIAI is developing cells of supporters in the U.S. primarily responsible for fund-raising and at a future date, possible attacks directed at U.S. targets. One of the goals of the AIAI is to seize the Ogaden region of Ethiopia by force and form an Islamic state composed of Ogaden and Somalia. , has reported that
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(G)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(P)
G
(G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-000651
EO14040-000652
EO14040-000653
EO14040-000654
EO14040-000655
FD-36 (Rev. 1 -31-2003)
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ORGANIZATIONAL MESSAGE FORM
TRANSMIT VIA: PRECEDENCE:
CLASSIFICATION:
SAMNET IMMEDIATE
NE
PTUNE PRIORITY
IIR SENT VIA ACS ROUTINE
CONFIDENTIAL
F T O
Date
Approved by: Cas e ID #/Serial:
Original Filename:
******* FOR SAMNET OPERATIONS USE ONLY
*******
Time Received SAMNET filename:
Time of Transmission MRI/JUL/ISN
DTG
PAGE 1 OF 6
12/20/2004
FM DIRECTOR FBI
TO ALL FBI FIELD OFFICES/PRIORITY/ LEGAT LONDON/PRIORITY/ LEGAT CANBERRA/PRIORITY/ INFO DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/ LEGAT RIYADH/PRIORITY/ LEGAT CAIRO/PRIORITY/ LEGAT NAIROBI/PRIORITY/ BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/ CIA WASHINGTON DC//CTC//PRIORITY/ COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/ DA AMHS WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/ DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/ DEPT OF JUSTICE COMMAND CENTER WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/ DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC//COUNTERTERRORISM SECTION// PRIORITY/ DEPT OF STATE WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/ DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/ DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/ DIA WASHINGTON DC//JITF-CT//PRIORITY/ DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD/PRIORITY/ DIDIR USINS WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/ DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHINGTON DC//OI//PRIORITY/ FAA NATIONAL HQ WASHINGTON DC//ACI-100//PRIORITY/ HQ BICE INTEL WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/ NGA NAVY YARD WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
EO14040-000656
NSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//F3//PRIORITY/
NRO WASHINGTON DC//OS-HCO//PRIORITY/
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//INR//PRIORITY/ AMEMBASSY LONDON/PRIORITY/ AMEMBASSY CANBERRA/PRIORITY/ AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA/PRIORITY/ AMEMBASSY NAIROBI/PRIORITY/ AMEMBASSY RIYADH/PRIORITY/ TTIC WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/ US
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC//HQ INTEL//PRIORITY/
US SECRET SERVICE WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/ WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/ WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC//OHS BOX//PRIORITY/ BT
SERIAL: COUNTRY: SAUDI ARABIA (SA);SOMALIA (SO);UNITED STATES (US);ETHIOPIA (ET). IPSP: IFC2400. SUBJ: SAUDI MINISTRY OF DAWA AND ISLAMIC AFFAIRS OFFICE (IFTA) SUPPORT
FOR ISLAMIC ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AND ASSISTANCE TO THE SOMALI COM
ITY
WARNING: THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE REPORT CLASS -------------------------------------------------------------- FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
---------------------------------------
SOURCE:
TEXT: 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. THE SAUDI MINISTRY OF DAWA AND ISLAMIC AFFAIRS OFFICE SUPPORTED THE KING FAHD MOSQUE IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA. POSSIBLE SAUDI SUPPORT OF THE SOMALI COMMUNITY IN SAN DIEGO HAD BEEN PROVIDED THROUGH A FORMER LOCAL LEADER OF AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISLAMI (AIAI). -------------------- ---------------
WARNING:
THIS INFORMATION IS BEING RELEASED TO ONLY.
IT MAY NOT TO BE SHARED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES WITHOUT PRIOR CONSENT
OF THE FBI.
SERIAL:
(G)
(F)
(S)
(G)
(S)
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-000657
EO14040-000658
FD-36a (Rev. 1- 31-2003)
AL-
HIBER WAS AN ISLAMIC POLITICAL ACTIVIST WHO WAS VERY POLITICALLY
ADEPT AND EXCELLENT AT MAKING SPEECHES. AL-HIBER SUPPORTED THE SPREAD OF RADICAL FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAM.) 3. AL-THUMAIRY ALSO WORKED FOR THE IFTA AS
IMAM AT KING FAHD MOSQUE. AL-THUMAIRY DISLIKED AL-HIBER, KHALIL, AND CONSIDERING AL-HIBER TOO POLITICAL FOR A RELIGIOUS OFFICE. RARELY DID AL-THUMAIRY ALLOW HIS IFTA RESPONSIBILITIES TO TAKE HIM OUT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA. ALTHOUGH AL-THUMAIRY ASSOCIATED WITH SOME EXTREMISTS, HE DID NOT SHARE THEIR ISLAMIC VIEWS NOR WAS HE EVER HEARD TO PREACH JIHAD OR ANTI-WESTERN SERMONS. IT WAS DUE TO LEADERSHIP ISSUES WITH KHALIL AND , RATHER THAN BEING CONSIDERED AN EXTREMIST, THAT AL-THUMAIRY WAS SUBSEQUENTLY EXPELLED FROM KING FAHD MOSQUE. AL-THUMAIRY WAS VERY
FUNDAMENTALIST (STRICT SALAFI) IN HIS BELIEFS, BUT WAS NOT CONSIDERED TO BE RADICAL OR EXTREMIST.) 4. AL-THUMAIRY AND OMAR AL-BAYOUMI DISLIKED
EACH OTHER BECAUSE AS WITH THE DISAGREEMENT WITH KHALIL AND , AL-BAYOUMI WAS NOT A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SAUDI IFTA OFFICE. AL-BAYOUMI REPRESENTED A DIFFERENT PART OF THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT (NFI). AL BAYOUMI FOUGHT WITH AL-THUMAIRY BECAUSE AL-BAYOUMI WANTED TO BE THE POINT OF CONTACT FOR DISBURSING IFTA MONEY TO MOSQUES. 5. AL-THUMAIRY REPRESENTED IFTA, AND KHALIL
AND REPRESENTED THE PRINCE. THIS RESULTED IN CONFLICTS REGARDING WHICH SEGMENT OF THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT SHOULD CONTROL KING FAHD MOSQUE. A BREAKING POINT CAME WHEN KHALIL AND BANNED SOME MUSLIMS FROM WORSHIPING AT THE MOSQUE. AL-THUMAIRY BELIEVED IT WAS COMPLETELY UN-ISLAMIC TO PROHIBIT BELIEVERS FROM WORSHIPING REGARDLESS OF THEIR POLITICAL BELIEFS. ALTHOUGH KHALIL AND BANNED AL-THUMAIRY FROM THE MOSQUE, THEY ALLOWED HIM TO GIVE THE FRIDAY WORSHIP SERMONS. AFTER BEING BANNED FROM THE MOSQUE, AL-THUMAIRY JOINED WITH SOME EXTREMISTS AND STARTED ANOTHER U.S. MOSQUE, DAR AL QUARAN (HOUSE OF KORAN), AKA OVERLAND MOSQUE. ( THE ONLY THING AL-THUMAIRY HAD IN COMMON WITH THE
EXTREMISTS AT DAR AL QUARAN WAS A DISLIKE OF THE LEADERSHIP AT KING FAHD MOSQUE.)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-000659
^PAGE 5 OF 6
FD-36a (Rev. 1- 31-2003)
6. (FBI COMMENT. IN AUGUST 2002, AL-THUMAIRY
WAS ASSOCIATED WITH DAR AL QUARAN WHERE HE PROMULGATED ISLAMIC EXTREMIST VIEWS TO THE FOLLOWERS. THE BELIEF THAT THE KING FAHD MOSQUE LEADERSHIP MISMANAGED FUNDS LED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DAR AL QUARAN.) 7. AL-THUMAIRY HAD CONTACT WITH U.S. PERSON,
OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA OMAR KHADIB (NFI). WHEN THE PRINCE OPENED KING FAHD MOSQUE, MOHAMED PETITIONED THE PRINCE AND WAS GRANTED ASSISTANCE FROM SAUDI ARABIA FOR A SOMALI OUTREACH PROGRAM. MOHAMED MADE HIMSELF THE POINT OF CONTACT FOR DISTRIBUTING THE ASSISTANCE IN
8. (FBI COMMENT. MOHAMED ESTABLISHED THE
WESTERN SOMALI RELIEF AGENCY (WSRA), A U.S. ORGANIZATION AND AN ALLEGED HUMANITARIAN AID FOUNDATION FOR PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA, ETHIOPIA, AND PARTS OF KENYA. WSRA RECEIVED FUNDING FROM THE GLOBAL RELIEF FOUNDATION, AN ORGANIZATION DESIGNATED BY THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY AS PROVIDING FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. MOHAMED WAS A FORMER LEA -ITTIHAD AL-ISLAMI.)
9. (FBI COMMENT. AL-THUMAIRY WAS LINKED TO
OMAR AL-BAYOUMI WHO UNWITTINGLY HELPED AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 77 HIJACKERS NAWAF AL-HAZMI AND KHALID AL-MIHDHAR SETTLE IN SAN DIEGO.)
--------------- --- END TEAR LINE --------------------- COMMENTS: 1. FBI COMMENTS. SOURCE IS AVAILABLE FOR
RECO
2. THE PRECEDING TEARLINE HAS BEEN APPROVED FOR RELEASE
TO .
3. CITE FOR MORE INFORMATION ON FAHAD
AL-THUMAIRY AND USPER 2. 4. THE FOLLOWING NAMES ARE PROVIDED FOR INDEXING PURPOSES: DR. KHALIL ((KHALIL)); PRINCE ABDUL AZIZ BIN ((FAHD)); FAHAD
(G)
(F)
EO14040-000660
EO14040-000661
EO14040-000662
^PAGE 8 OF 6
FD-36a (Rev. 1- 31-2003)
FIELD OFF E: COUNTRY: ETHIOPIA (ET);SAUDI ARABIA (SA);SOMALIA (SO);UNITED STATES (US).
THREAT: NOAGENT: SA
TERRORIST D AL-ISLAMI (AIAI)
SERIAL:
LIAISON:
DRAFTED BY:
COPY DESIGNATIONS:
(S)
(A) (G) (J-1)
(S)
(F)
(G)
(S)
EO14040-000663
^PAGE 9 OF 6
FD-36a (Rev. 1- 31-2003)
COPY RECEIVED WITHOUT ADMINISTRATIVE TICKLER:
(S), (G)
(S), (G)
EO14040-000664
EO14040-000665
EO14040-000666
EO14040-000667
To: General Counsel From: San Diego
Re: 01/17/2002
Arrangements should be made with Experian to provide
the records personally to a representative of your office.
Experian
should neither send the records through the mail nor utilize the
name of the subject in any telephone calls to your office. Experian should not contact FBIHQ directly in any manner.
Consumer reports received from a consumer reporting
agency must be clearly identified when reported in any Bureau communication. Subsequent dissemination of such information is prohibited, except to other Federal agencies or military investigative entities as may be necessary for the approval or conduct of a foreign counterintelligence investigation.
Any questions regarding the above can be directed
to San Diego Division, Attention: .
(F)
(S)
EO14040-000668
EO14040-000669
EO14040-000670
EO14040-000671
To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re:
, 06/05/2002
has been asked to teach at the mosque, but has declined because he wants to keep a low profile.
ii
(F)
EO14040-000672
FD-36 (Rev. 1 -31-2003)
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ORGANIZATIONAL MESSAGE FORM
TRANSMIT VIA: PRECEDENCE:
M
NET IMMEDIATE
NE
PTUNE PRIORITY
IIR SENT VIA ACS ROUTINE
F T O
Date
Approved by: Cas e ID #/Serial:
Original Filename:
******* FOR SAMNET OPERATIONS USE ONLY
*******
Time Received SAMNET filename:
Time of Transmission MRI/JUL/ISN
DTG IIR
TEMPLATE (NEW 7- 04).wpd
SBX001S0.184
07/XX/04
1 OF 7
FM
DIRECTOR FBI
TO ALL FBI FIELD OFFICES/PRIORITY/
LEGAT XXXX/PRIORITY/ LEGAT XXXX/PRIORITY/ INFO DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/ LEGAT XXXX/PRIORITY/ LEGAT XXXX/PRIORITY/ CIA WASHINGTON DC//CTC//PRIORITY/ DIA WASHINGTON DC//JITF-CT//PRIORITY/ DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD/PRIORITY/ SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//INR//PRIORITY/ AMEMBASSY XXXXXX/PRIORITY/ AMCONSUL XXXXXX/PRIORITY/ AFIAA AMHS BOLLING AFB DC/PRIORITY/ CDR902DMIGP FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//IAMG-OP-CM//PRIORITY/ CDRINSCOM FT BELVOIR VA//IAOP-OR-HCM//PRIORITY/ CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE/PRIORITY/ CDR USTRANSCOM INTEL CELL SCOTT AFB IL/PRIORITY/ CIFA WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/ COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/ COMBINED INTEL AND FUSION CENTER PETERSON AFB CO//CIFCC//PRIORITY/ COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC/PRIORITY/ DA WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/ DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/ DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/ DEPT OF JUSTICE COMMAND CENTER WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/ DEPT OF STATE WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/ DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/ DIDIR USINS WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/ DIRACIC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//IAMG-C-ACIC/PRIORITY/ DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV WASHINGTON DC//22A/NAVATAC-22A4//PRIORITY/ FAA NATIONAL HQ WASHINGTON DC//ACI-100//PRIORITY/
EO14040-000673
EO14040-000674
EO14040-000675
EO14040-000676
EO14040-000677
EO14040-000678
^PAGE 7 OF 7
FD-36a (Rev. 1- 31-2003)
BT ////
(S)
(A)(F)(G)(J-1)
EO14040-000679
EO14040-000680
EO14040-000681
EO14040-000682
EO14040-000683
To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re:
, 08/30/2005
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Info)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
For information only.
ii
(F)
EO14040-000684
FD-542 (Rev. 01-31-2003)
安守宇守宕宄宏 宅官宕守宄官 宒安 完宑宙守宖宗完宊宄宗完宒宑
Precedence: ROUTINE Date:03/06/2006
To:San Diego
From:San Diego
Contact:
Approved By:
Drafted By:Case ID #:
Title: MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL-MIHDAR ZAID, aka
Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah;
OMAR ABDI MOHAMMAD
Synopsis: Claiming statistical accomplishments.
Details: Case agent met with and debriefed ,
hereinafter Asset, on /2005.
Asset provided intelligence information and reported
on the activities of Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah,
and Omar Abdi Mohammad.
(S)
(S)
(S)
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(G)
(P)
(P)
(G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-000685
To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re:
, 03/06/2006
Accomplishment Information:
Number: 1
Type: ITU: ITU: LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCYITU: LIAISON WITHIN FBIITU: AGENT INTERVIEWClaimed By:
SSN: Name: Squad:
Number: 1Type: ITU: ITU: LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCYITU: LIAISON WITHIN FBIITU: AGENT INTERVIEWClaimed By:
SSN: Name: Squad:
ii
(F)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(P-1)
(G)
(S)
(P-1)
(G)
(G)
EO14040-000686
EO14040-000687
These documents were subsequently translated.
Of interest, these documents contain written directions from the Saudi
Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance to Omar
Abdi Mohamed
to collect information on Muslim converts and the Islamic publications produced
by local mosques and the Somali community. The seized documents include mention of a contractual relationship between Mohamed and the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance; a Saudi Ministry checklist of Muslim convert reporting criteria; a request for reports on the Arab and Somali communities in Canada and San Diego; and a note of leadership personnel
changes within the American Dawa Office.
These Ministry letters to Muslim "Propagators"
in General, and "Propagator Mohamed" in specific, document requests dating in the mid 1990's from the Saudi Government Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance for information collection on Muslims and the Muslim community in Canada, America, and the Carribean. The seized documents do not indicate the end use of the information collected by the Ministry.
For the purposes of captioned investigation,
Mohamed received, by his own admission, over $100,000 from the Saudi Ministry. Mohamed apparently began receiving this money in the mid 1990's, and was
recently receiving $1,750.00 USD a month up and until he was arrested. After his arrest, it appears that the Ministry payments into Mohamed's bank account were discontinued.
One letter from the Ministry of Islamic
Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance that was addressed to Mohamed indicated
that a housing and travel ticket allowance and a salary was to be paid to those
Propagators working under contract outside their countries of origin.
The Propagators would loose their housing and travel benefits if they became
citizens of the country in which they were working. In several different letters, the Ministry indicates that Mohamed's "contract will be renewed" and provides him with raises or bonuses to "encourage you to double your effort and propagation related activities." One such letter from the Ministry had
an enclosed check "as a financial award granted by his Royal Highness Prince Sultan Bin Abd al- Aziz Al- Saud, Second Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of
Defense and Aviation, which he (ALSAUD) has authorized for all propagators belonging to this office" (Dawa office in America). This letter provided contact email addresses of [email protected], www.islamicpage.org, and
www.islam.org.sa. The letters were signed by the Director of the Dawa office
in America Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.
An indication of the extent of Saudi control
over their Propagators is given in a letter from the Ministry dated November 18, 1996. The letter was issued by the Ministry “affirming that no propagator should leave his post or take leave without first obtaining a written authorization from the relevant authority. Whoever violates this guideline will be subject to disciplinary action to include termination of service.”
The letter was signed by the Director of the Dawa office in America Khalid
bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.
EO14040-000688
With regards to the Saudi Ministry of Islamic
Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance requesting information about Muslim
converts in the Islamic community: an undated and unsigned letter noted that the Director of Dawa activities conducted abroad received information that "during the past few years a number of Christian clerics and well known personalities have converted to Islam. The Director of Dawa is requesting that you provide him with the names of individuals who have converted to Islam in you locality." The letter requests the Muslim converts previous name, occupation and social status; the Islamic name that the person has acquired and the personal attributes of the individual that may be conducive to using him in propagation activities; the type of services that the individual has received and the party that provided the services; the languages in which the individual is proficient; the address of the individual where he can be
reached; (the Propagators) impression about how to deal with the individuals who have converted to Islam and what services might benefit them.
With specific regards to captioned subject,
the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance sent Mohamed a letter dated February 14, 1996, requesting Mohamed to "provide us with information about well known personalities in their respective communities who have converted to Islam. Especially on such figures like well known Christian ministers and clerics, government ministers, ambassadors, businessmen, doctors, engineers, laureates and intellectuals, and university instructors, individuals who play an influential role in their communities and are highly regarded." The Ministry attached a form with the mentioned letter that was to be filled with the converts full name prior to conversion to Islam, full name after conversion to Islam, and date of conversion to Islam,
occupation prior to conversion, occupation after conversion, social activities prior to conversion, social activities after conversion, impact that his conversion to Islam had on others, current address, and other information. The letter was signed by Director of Dawa Office in America, Khalid bin Ibrahim
AlSuwaylim.
Another Letter dated November 22, 1995, from
the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance addressed to "Propagator: Omar Abdo Al- Khatib" requests that Mohamed comply
with the Ministry's solicitation of information regarding "certain parties and communities." According to the letter, the Ministry was interested in the Somali and Arab communities of Canada and San Diego. The request was signed by Khalid bin Ibrahim Al- Suwaylim. According to the letter, the report
should cover the following points:
1-Description of Community and it's size.
2-History of the community and its areas of presence.
3-Reason why the community immigrated.
4-The leaders of the community and its well known figures.
5-Religious dogma of the community.
6-Organizational structure of the community.
7-Financial condition of the community.
EO14040-000689
8-Literacy rate and educational level of the community.
9-Schools and mosques of the community. 10-Organizations established by the community. 11-Organizations that cooperate with the community. 12-Influence that the community has in its locality. 13-Other observations about the community
In one undated letter from the Ministry to
Propagators the conversion of non-Muslims is stressed. According to the letter, "Conversion of non-Muslims who are living in non-Muslim countries into the faith takes on critical importance since they are the inhabitants of the land. Among them is the doctor, the engineer, and the pilot, as well as others. By having these people convert to Islam, the effort to propagate the faith gains a tremendous boost in the country where this activity is being conducted."
With regards to the Saudi Ministry of Islamic
Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance requesting information about the activities of local mosques, a letter dated March 20, 1996, and addressed to "all Propagators in America, Canada and the Islands of the Carribean Sea" states "due to the fact that a number of Islamic magazines are being published by Islamic centers that you are working with, and in order to strengthen the relation with these centers and to become acquainted with all the various Islamic activities that you are engaged in, we are requesting that you provide us with all the various publications or magazines or newsletters that are being published by the Islamic center or Association that you are working with." The requested material was asked to be sent to the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Islamic Affairs, IFTA Office, 601 new Hampshire Avenue N.W., Washington DC 20037. The letter was signed by the Director of the Dawa office in America, Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.
A second letter written in February 22, 1997,
and also signed by AlSuwaylim, requested that all Propagators in America and the Carribean, "provide the Ministry with everything that is being published in your locality about Islam and Muslims in general and about the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in particular, such as books, research papers, articles and media programs."
The Ministry also sent out notices of personnel
changes within the Saudi Dawa Office in America. One letter dated January 17, 1998, was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California." FBI investigation determined that AL-THUMAIRY had substantial contact with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. ALBAYOUMI had significant contact with two September 11th hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar who lived in San Diego, California, in 2000.
In a letter from the Ministry dated December
17, 1996, from Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim, an advisory was sent to all
EO14040-000690
EO14040-000691
EO14040-000692
To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego Re: , 06/18/2004
actively participating in the financial and material support of Hamas
in violation of the Anti Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. had been a paid fund raiser for
traveling throughout the U.S. for this purpose. The was shut down by the USG on 12/04/2001 due to its Hamas fund-raising connections.
The FBI Los Angeles division is investigating
source allegations that the King Fahd Mosque and/or some of its leaders received UBL money, then sent the money to San Diego, including to . These funds were distributed through LA subject Fahd Al Thumairy. Financial records for 's personal and business accounts have been requested, received and analyzed, to determine the money trail of these funds. Financial information has been uploaded
The financial analysis of the personal
and business bank records has indicated at least one source of funds from Saudi Arabia, and a lead to Riyadh was sent to identify the originator individual or organization. The analysis also revealed funds received by from LA subject Al Thumairy, referenced above.
SD is awaiting response from leads sent to Riyadh
and to LA to follow up on the source of the Saudi funds, and the veracity of the original LA source allegation regarding the involvement of UBL money funneled through LA subject Al Thumairy and the Kind Fahd Mosque.
Omar Abdi Mohamed
Omar Abdi Mohamed is the current subject of a
San Diego FFI. This FFI was initiated on information thatreliable sources identified Mohamed as the leader of
the Al-Ittihad al Islamia (AIAI) in the United States. AIAI was previously identified by FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. Later investigation indicated that Mohamed was removed from leadership of the AIAI because he was too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues.
On January 20, 2004, Mohamed was arrested for
immigration fraud. Investigation by San Diego JTTF determined that Mohamed was in charge of the "Western Somali Relief Agency" (WSRA). WSRA was a fund raising entity that allegedly provided drought and humanitarian relief money to the people of Somalia and Ethiopia. During a US naturalization interview, Mohamed lied about receiving approximately $350,000 from Global Relief Foundation. The US
(
(G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(P)
(F)
(P)
(P)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-000693
EO14040-000694
To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego Re: , 06/18/2004
LEAD(s): Set Lead 1: (Info)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
Read and Clear.
♦♦
(F)
EO14040-000695
EO14040-000696
EO14040-000697
2
A computerized search of FBI databases for Al-Bayoumi
ated him in numerous documents, one being
wherein he is associated with Hanjour and Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar.
He was a known associate with these three and appeared on their apartment lease and frequently paid their rent.
A computerized search of FBI databases for Omar Abdi
Mohamed revealed numerous references and serial
and serials A search of
Telephone Applications for Mohamed is referenced above.
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
EO14040-000698
(Rev. 01 -31-2003)
FEDERA L BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 10/23/2007
To:
Counterterrorism Attn:
Attn:
Attn:
Riyadh Attn:
Sanaa Attn:
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)
EO14040-000699
(Rev. 01 -31-2003)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Ottawa Attn:
San Diego Attn:
Los Angeles Attn:
Washington Field Attn:
New York Attn:
From: New ct: Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title: OPERATION ENCORE
Synopsis: Initiate a Full Investigation (FI) on the
below-described group.
Enclosure(s): 1 - Opening LHM
1 - submitted under separate cover
(G)
(G)
(G)
(S)
(S)
(G)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(F)
(G)
(G)
(A),(G),(J-1)
EO14040-000700
To: Counterterrorism From: New York Re: ( 10/23/2007
Full Investigation Initiated: 10/23/2007
Reference:
Details: Administrative Note: New York is opening the
captioned FI based on information developed during interviews and investigation conducted under the auspices of the referenced investigation. Due to logistical constraints related to uploading to any PENTTBOM file and the evolved nature of the instant investigation, all future documentation related to such referenced investigation should be uploaded to the captioned case file.
Background: On 06/28/2007, New York opened a subfile
under the PENTTBOM investigation to contain information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, New York believed that certain Al Qa'ida (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.
Specifically, New York sought to gain a greater
understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.
Results: Over the past two months, writers
interviewed multiple individuals related to the PENTTBOM investigation. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition to preparation for the 9/11 plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.
Exploitation of Muslim Community: Multiple San
Diego sources and other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. According to such sources,
(F)
(F)
EO14040-000701
EO14040-000702
EO14040-000703
EO14040-000704
EO14040-000705
EO14040-000706
EO14040-000707
EO14040-000708
EO14040-000709
To: Counterterrorism From: New York Re: 10/23/2007
At this point in the investigation, there are a number
of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could
be AQ,
Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs,
or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.
Pertinent Sensitive National Security Matters
A sensitive national security matter exists as a number
of individuals identified herein were or may currently hold diplomatic status in the Saudi Arabian government, including FAHAD AL-THUMARY, MOHAMMED AL-MUHANNA and MUSAED A. AL-JARRAH.
Known Identifiers
Descriptive Data:
Main Subject
Name -
Last: AL-THUMARY
First: FAHAD
Middle: I. A.
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: 1971
POB: PNO: SOC: Alias(es) -
Last: AL-THUMAIRY
First: FN
Middle:
Phone #: Current Location: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Main Subject
Name -
(P)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(A)(G)(J-1)
(A)(G)(J-1)
(F)
EO14040-000710
EO14040-000711
To: Counterterrorism From: New York Re: 10/23/2007
Miscellaneous - Subject is a non-USPER and
UHANNA
Main Subject
Name -
Last: AULAQI
First: ANWAR
Middle: NASSER
Current Case #
Main Subject
Name -
Last:
First: Middle:
Race: B/W
Sex: M
DOB: 1975
POB: Mogadishu, Somalia
ARN: PNO:
SOC: Address(es) -
House #: Street Name: City: State: Postal Code: Country: Canada
Phone #:
Miscellaneous - Subject is an USPER.
Main Subject
Name -
Last: AL-JARRAH
First: MUSAED
Middle: A.
Race: W
Sex: M
DOB: 1960
(P-1)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(P)
(P-1)
(P-1)
(P)
(A)(G)(J-1)
(A)(G)(J-1)
(F)
(F)
EO14040-000712
To: Counterterrorism From: New York Re: 10/23/2007
POB:
Phone #:
Miscellaneous - Subject is a non-USPER.
(P-1)
(P)
(A)(G)(J-1)
(A)(G)(J-1)
(F)
EO14040-000713
To: Counterterrorism From: New York Re: 10/23/2007
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Action)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
is requested to provide notice
of the initiation of this investigation to the DOJ Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and DOJ's Criminal Division. Set Lead 2: (Action)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
Coordinate as
required based on information in the Details section above. Set Lead 3: (Action)
COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, DC
The is
requested to process the which is being submitted via email to the mailbox at case to the
and appropriate supported systems. ♦♦
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(F)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
EO14040-000714
FD-542 (Rev. 06- 13-2007)
FEDERA L BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 12/4/2007
To: Counterterrorism Attn:
From:
New
ct:
Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #: (Pending)
Title:
ORE
Synopsis:
FBI New York requests conduct baseboard traces
on MUSAED AL-JARRAH
Details:
OPERATION ENCORE is an FBI New York Full investigation
which includes MUSAED AL-JARRAH. FBI New York requests financial traces be conducted on this subject.
Background: On 06/28/2007, writers opened a subfile
under the PENTTBOM investigation to contain information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further
(S)
(G)
(A) (G) (J-1)
(F)
(G)
(S)
(G)
(G)
(S)
(G)
(S)
(S)
EO14040-000715
EO14040-000716
EO14040-000717
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: 12/4/2007
diplomatic status in the Saudi Arabian government, including FAHAD
AL-THUMARY, and MUSAED A. AL-JARRAH. Descriptive Data:
Main Subject
Name - Last: AL-JARRAH
First: MUSAED
Middle: A.
Race: W
Sex: DOB: /1960
POB: Saudi Arabia
Phone #: 202-342-3700,
Miscellaneous - Subject is a non-USPER.
Prior Case#:
(S) Questions r atter should be directed
to or
(S)
(S)
(F)
(P-1)
(F)
(P)
(P)
EO14040-000718
To: om: New York
Re: 12/4/2007
Accomplishment Information:
Number: 1 Type: POSITIVE TERRORISM (DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE FBI) ITU: Claimed By:
SSN: Name: Squad:
SSN: Name:
Squad:
(F)
(P-1), (S)
(S)
(G)
(G)
(S)
(P-1), (S)
(G)
EO14040-000719
To: C om: New York
Re: 12/4/2007
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Action)
COUNTERTERRORISM
Conduct baseboard traces on MUSAED AL-JARRAH.
Set Lead 2: (Info)
COUNTERTERRORISM
Read and clear.
♦
♦
(G)
(G)
(F)
EO14040-000720
EO14040-000721
EO14040-000722
EO14040-000723
(Rev. 01-31-2003)
安守宇守宕宄宏 宅官宕守宄官 宒安 完宑宙守宖宗完宊宄宗完宒宑
Precedence: ROUTINE Date:11/22/2005
To:San Diego Attn:
From:San Diego
Contact:
Approved By:
Drafted By:Case ID #:
Title: MIHDAR MOHAMMAD AL-MIHDAR ZAID,
aka Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah;
;
OMAR ABDI MOHAMED,
aka, Omar AlKhatib;
Synopsis: debrief
Details: On November 29, 2005, SA and SA
met with
.
provided the following
information:
(G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(G)
(F)
(F)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(A), (G), (J-1)
EO14040-000724
EO14040-000725
EO14040-000726
EO14040-000727
To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: , 11/22/2005
the two men were Saudi who had no money, often used the internet,
never used the home phone, and often made telephone calls from payphones.
In particular, Shaikh spoke about it being strange that
the pair never had any money. Shaikh also asked about how to get the pair enrolled in English as a Second Language (ESL) classes.In retrospect, believes the two house guests were Khalid AlMihdar and Nawaf AlHazmi two hijackers who flew a plane into the Pentagon. Shaikh was always suspicious of Mohdar Abdullah because Abdullah brought people by Shaikh's house when they needed a place to stay.
ii
(F)
(G)
EO14040-000728
EO14040-000729
(Rev. 01-31-2003)
安守宇守宕宄宏 宅官宕守宄官 宒安 完宑宙守宖宗完宊宄宗完宒宑
the San Diego community are wary about being associated with Aulaqi
because of his publicized ties to the 9/11 terrorists.
understands that Mohdar Abdullah is still in
Yemen and has not yet traveled to England. believes that Abdullah wants to go to England because he enjoys living in the West more than the Middle East. According to
many people who have
been deported from the United States make an effort to immigrate to England or Australia.
One Somali named Ahmed Murshid, was deported from
San Diego in the late 1990's and moved to England. Murshid was of Somali/Yemeni descent and his father was a well known Somali pilot.
The Somali community in San Diego recently collected
money for the wife of Omar Abdi Mohamed. If Mohamed is deported,
believes that he will attempt to immigrate to Kenya, or more
likely, the United Arab Emirate. believes that Mohamed's San Diego wife will leave the country to follow Mohamed if he is deported.
Mohamed's Australian wife will probably also leave Australia to
follow Mohamed. Almost all of the Somali community believe that Mohamed still has access to the $350,000 he received from Global Relief Fund.
ii
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
(G)
EO14040-000730
EO14040-000731
EO14040-000732
EO14040-000733
EO14040-000734
EO14040-000735
EO14040-000736
To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: , 04/17/2008
LEAD(s): Set Lead 1: (Info)
ALL RECEIVING OFFICES
For information only.
♦♦
(F)
EO14040-000737