Document text
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* ALL FBI INFORMATION CDHTAII-IED .
5" - HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED,
DATE D7-03'-2009 BY 60322 UCILP/STP/JCF
UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide
Appendix A: The.Att0rney General? s Guidelines for Domestic FBI
Operations
The Attorney Generalis Guidelines for
Domésti"cf:~FBl' Operations
A-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
q
. PREAMBLE -
These Guidelines are issued under the authority of the Attomey General as provided in
sections 509, 510, 533, and 534 of title 28, United States Code, and Executive Order 12333. 1
They apply to domestic investigative activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI! and
other activities as provided herein. -
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B.
C.INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .
A. FBI RESPONSIBILITIES. FEDERAL CRIMES, THREATS TO THE' TABLE OF CONTENTS
. . . . . . ...5
NATIONAL SECURITY, FOREIGN IN'IELLIGENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 6THE FBI AS AN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9OVERSIGHT . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...- . . . . . ...
B.
II. INVESTIGATIONS AND92INTELLIGENCE GATHERING . . . . . . . .. .I. GENERAL AUTHORITIES AND PRINCIPLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .A.SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .
A.
C._ B. .ASSESSMENTS .......................... . . ............ . .
ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .
IV. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND PLANNING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .IH. ASSISTANCE TO OTHER AGENCIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . .. .A.THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .FEDERAL AGENCIES GENERALLY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .~ - . ¢ n - ~--
- - . . - -.~GENERAL AUTHORITIES .................................... . .USE OF AUTHORITIES AND METHODS ........................ . .NATURE AND APPLICATION OF THE GUIDELINES ............ . .
- » ¢ u ¢ »~-
Q ¢ - - . ---PREDIGATED INVESTIGATIONS .......... . I .................. . .
¢ - ~ | - ~--
Q - - ¢ - no-10
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1525
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STATE, LOCAL, ORTRIBAL AGENCIES ........................ . . 27FOREIGN AGENCIES .................................. ... . . . ...27APPLICABLE STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..28
- A.
B.
C.. . . . . ...29STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 29REPORTS AND ASSESSMENTS GENERALLY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 29INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . .. .- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 29
A.
B.
C.
VI. RETENTION AND SHARING OF INFORMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .V. AUTHORIZED METHODS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 31PARTICULARMETHODS ............................. ..s1SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . .............................. . . 32OTHERWISE ILLEGAL ACTIVITY ............................ . . 33
A.
B.RETENTION OF INFORMATION . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .INFORMATION SHARING GENERALLY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .INFORMATION RELATING TO CRIMINAL MATTERS . . . . .INFORMATION RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY ANDFOREIGN INTELLIGENCE MATTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .
A 3. . . . . ...35
. . . . ...35
....._..35
. . . . ...36
. . . . ...37
VII. DEELMIIIIONS . . . . . . . . .. .
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INTRODUCTION - .
As the primary investigative agency of the federal government,~the.Federal Bureau of
Investigation FBI! has the authority and responsibility to investigate all violations of federal law
that are not exclusively assigned to another federal agency. The FBI is further vested by law and
by Presidential directives with the primary role in canying out investigations the United
States of threats to the national security. This includesthe lead domestic role,-in investigating
international terrorist threats to the United States, and in conducting counterintelligence activities
to meet foreign entities espionage and intelligence ebrts directed against the United States.
The FBI is also vestedwith important functions in collecting foreign intelligence as a member
agency of the U.S. Intelligence Community. The FBI accordingly plays crucial roles in the
enforcement of federal law and the proper administration of justice in the United States, in the
protection of the national security, and in obtaining information needed by the United States for
the conduct of its foreign affairs. These roles reect the wide range of the FBIs current
responsibilities and obligations, lwhich require the FBI to be both an agency that eectively
detects, investigates, and prevents crimes, and an agency that effectively protects the national
collects intelligence, '
The general objective of these Guidelines is the full utilization of all authorities and
investigative methods,rconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, to protect-
the United States and its peopletfrom terrorism and other threats to the national security, to
protect the United States and its people om victimization by all.crim__cs in violation of federal _
law, and to nther the foreign intelligence objectives of the United States. At thesame time, it is
axiomatic that the FBI must conduct its investigations and other activities in a lawful and ' ,
reasonable manner that respects liberty and-privacy and avoids unnecessary intrusions into the_
lives of law-abidingpeople. The purpose of these Guidelines, therefore, is to establish consistent
policy in such matters. They will enable ie FBI to perform its duties with effectiveness,
certainty, and condence, and will provide the American people with a nn assurance that the
FBI is acting properly under the law. '
The issuance of these Guidelines represents the culmination of the historical evolution of
the FBI and the policies governing its domestic operations subsequent to the September ll 20019 9terrorist, attackson the United States. Reecting decisions and directives of the President and the
AttomeyGeneral,~ inquiries and enactmentsof Congress, and the conclusions of national
commissions, it wasrecognized that the FBIs functions needed to be expanded and better
integrated to meet contemporary realities: ~ »
[C]ontinuing coordination . .- . is necessary to optimize the FBIs_perforrnance in
both national security and criminal investigations . . . . [The] new reality requires -first
that the FBI and other agencies doa better job of g"atlieringintelligence inside the United
States, and second that we eliminate the remnants of the old wall between foreign
intelligence and domestic law enforcement. Both tasks be accomplished withoutsacricing ouridomestic liberties and the rule of law, and both depend on building avery
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different FBI from the one we had on September 10, 2001. Report of the Coinmission
on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass _ i _' Destruction 466, 452 005!.!
In line with these objectives, the FBI has reorganized and reoriented its programs and
missions, and the guidelines issued by the Attorney General for FBI operations have been
extensively revised over the past several years. Nevertheless, the principal directives of the
Attorney General governingthe FBI?s conduct of investigations, national security e '
investigations, and foreign intelligence collection have persisted as separate documentssinvolving
different standards and procedures for comparable activities. These Guidelines effect a more
complete integration and harmonization of standards, thereby providing the FBI and other
affected Justice Department components with clearer, more consistent, and more accessible r
guidance for their activities, and n1a.king available to the public in a single document the basic
body of rules for the FBIs domestic operations. R
These Guidelines also incorporate effective oversight measures involving many
Department of Justice and FBI coinponents, which have been adopted to ensure that all FBI-
activities are c,oriductedin' a mannerconsistentwith law and policy; * *
The broad operational areas addressed by these Guidelines are the FBIs conductlof
investigative and intelligence gathering activities, including cooperation and coordination with
other components and agencies insuch activities, and the intelligence analysis and-planning
functions of the FBI. ' _ -
_A. FBI RESPONSIBILITIES - FEDERAL CRIMES, THREATS T0 THE
- NATIONAL SECURITY, -FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
~ Part I1 ofthese Guidelines authorizes the FBI to carry out investigations to detect, obtain
information about, or prevent or protect against federal crimes or threats to the national security
or to collect foreign intelligence. The major subject areas of information gathering activities
under these Guidelines federal crimes, threats to the national secm-ity, and foreign intelligence
- are not distinct, but rather overlap extensively. For example, an investigation relating to
international terrorism'w_ill invariably crosscut these areas because international terrorism is r
included under these Guidelines denition of threat to the national security, because
international terrorism subject to investigation within the United States usually involves criminal
acts that violate federal law, and because infonnation relating to international terrorism also falls
within the denition of foreign intelligence. Likewise, counterintelligence activities relating to
espionage are likely to concem matters that constitute threats to the national security, that
implicate violations or potential violations of federal espionage laws, and that involve
infonnation falling under the definition of foreign intelligence.
. While some distinctions in the requirements and procedures for investigations are
necessary indifferent.subject areas, the general designof these Guidelines is to take a uniform
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approach wherever possible,» thereby promoting certainty and consistency regarding the
applicable standards and facilitating compliance with those standards. Hence, these Guidelines
do not require thatthe FBIsinforma'tion gathering activities be differentially labeled as criminal
investigations, _national security investigations, or foreign intelligence collections, or that
the categories of FBI persomrel who carry out investigations be segregated 'om each other based
on the subject areas in which they operate. Rather; all of the FBIs legal authorities are available
for deployment in all cases to which they apply to protect the public bm crimes and threats t_o
the national security and to further the United States.foreign intelligence objectives. In many
cases, a single investigation will be supportable as an exercise of a number of these authorities
i.e., as an investigation of a federal crime, or crimes, as an investigation of a threat to the national
security, and/or_as a collectionof foreign intelligence.
1. Federal Crimes '
The FBI has the authority to investigate all federal crimes that are not exclusively
assigned to other agencies. In most ordinary criminal investigations, the immediate objectives
include suchgmatters as: dpetegrminingfwhether a federal crime has occurred or is occurring, or if
planning or preparaon for such a criiiie_ is takingplace;*identifying, locating, and apprehending
the perpetrators; and obtaining the evidence needed for prosecution Hence, close cooperation
and coordination with federal prosecutors in the United States Attorneys Ofces and the Justice
Department litigating divisions are essential both to ensure that agents have the investigative
tools and legal advice at their disposal for which prosecutorial assistance or approval is needed,
and to ensure that investigations are conducted in a manner that will lead tosuecessful p
prosecution. Provisions in many parts of these Guidelines establish procedures-and requirements
for such coordination.
_2. Threats to the National Security ,
The FBIs authorityto investigate threats to the national security derives from the,
executive order concerning U.S. intelligence activities, from delegations of fimctions by the
Attomey General, and from various statutory so'urces.. See, e.g., E.O. 12333; 50 U.S;C. 401 ~et
seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq. These Guidelines Part VIl.S!' specically dene threats to the
national security to mean: international terrorism; espionage and other intelligence; activities,
sabotage, and assassination, conducted by, for, or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or
persons; foreign computer intrusion; and other matters determined by the Attomey General,
consistent with Executive Order 12333 or any successor order. ~
p Activities within thedenition of threat to the national security that are subject to
investigation rmder these Guidelines commonly involve violations or potential violations! of r
federal criminal laws. Hence, investigations of such threats may constitute an exercise both of
the FBIs criminal investigation authority and of the FBIs authority to investigate threats to the
national security. As with criminal investigations generally, detecting and solving the crimes,
and eventually anesting and prosecuting the perpetrators, are likely to be among the objectives of
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investigations relating to threats to the national security. But these investigations also oftenserve
important purposes outside the ambit of normal criminal investigation and prosecution, by
providing the basis for, and informing decisions concerning, other measures needed to protectthe
national security. These measures may include, for example: excluding or removing persons
involved in terrorism or espionage om the United States; recruitment of double agents; eezing
assets of organizations that engage in or support terrorism; securing targets of terrorism or
espionage; providing threat information and warnings to other federal, state, local, and private .'
agencies and entities; diplomatic or military actions; and actions by other intelligence agencies to
counter intemational terrorism or other national security threats. Y
In line with this broad range of purposes, investigations of threats to the national security
present special needs to coordinate with other Justice Department components, including
particularly the Justice Departments National Security Division, and to share information and
cooperate with other agencies with national security responsibilities, including other agencies of
the U.S..Inte1ligence Community, ie Department of Homeland Security, and relevant White
House including National Security Council and Homeland Security Council! agencies and
entities. Various provisions in these Guidelinesjestablish procedures and requirements to
facilitate such coordination. * *
3. Foreign Intelligence l '
As with the investigation ofthreats to the national security, the FBIs authority to collect
foreign intelligence derives-om a mixture of administrative and statutory sources. See, e.g.,
E.O. 12333; 50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.;;50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.; 28 U.S.C. 532 note incorporating
P.L. 108-458 §§ 2001-2003!. These Guidelines Part VII.E! dene foreign intelligence to mean
information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or
elements thereof, foreign organizations or foreign persons, or intemational terrorists.
The FBIs-foreign intelligence collection activities have been expanded by legislative and
administrative reforms subsequent to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, reecting the
FBIs role as the primary collector of foreign intelligence within the United States, and the
recognized imperative that the United States foreign intelligence collection activities become
more exible, more proactive, and more eicient in order to protect the homeland and adequately
inform the United States crucial decisions in its dealings with the rest of the world: * _
The, collection of information is the foundation of everything that the Intelligence
Community does. While successful collection cannot ensure a good analytical product,
the failure to collect information . . . turns analysis into guesswork. .And as our review
demonstrates, the Intelligence Com1nunitys human and technical intelligence collection
agencies have collected far too little information on manyof the issues we care about
most. Report of the Colmnission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction 351 005!.!
.3
These Guidelines accordingly provide standards and procedures for the FBIs foreign intelligence
collection activities that meet current needs and realities and optimize the FBIs ability to
discharge its foreign intelligence collection mctions. - ,
The authority to collect foreign intelligence extends the sphere of the FBIs information
gathering activities beyond federal crimes and neats to the national security, and permits the
FBI to seek information regarding a broader range of matters relating to foreign powers,
organizations, or persons that may be of interest to the conduct of the United States foreign
aairs. The FBIs role is central to the effective collection of foreign intelligence within the
United States because the authorized domestic activities of other intelligence agencies are more
constrained than those of the FBI imder applicable statutes and Executive, Order 12333. In
collecting foreign intelligence, the FBI will generally be guided by nationally-determined
intelligence requirements, including the National Intelligence Priorities Framework and the
National HUMINT Collection Directives, or any successor directives issued under the authority
of the Director of National Intelligence DN1!. As provided in Part VlI.F of these Guidelines,
foreign intelligence requirements -may also be established by the President or Intelligence
Community ofcials designated by the President, and by the Attomey General, the DeputyAttorney General, or an oicial designated by the Attomey General; s
The general guidanceof the FBIs foreign intelligence collection activities by DNI-
authorized requirements does not, however, limit the FBIs authority to -conduct investigations
supportable on the basis, of its other authorities to investigate federal crimes and threats to the
national security - in areas in which the information sought also falls-under the definition of
foreign intelligence. The FBI conducts investigations offederal crimes and threats to the
national security based on priorities and strategic objectives set by the Department of '1 ustice and
-the FBI, independent of DNI-established foreign intelligence collection requirements.
_ Since the authority to collect foreign intelligence enables the FBI to obtain information
pertinent to the United States conduct of its foreign affairs, even if that information is not related
to criminal activity or threats tothenational security, the information so gathered may concem
lawful activities. The FBI should accordingly operate openly and consensually with U.S. persons
to the extent practicable when collecting foreign intelligence that does not concem criminal
activities or -threats to the national security.
B. THE FBI AS AN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
The FBI is an intelligence agency as well as a law enforcement agency. Its basic
mctions accordingly extend beyond limited investigations of discrete matters, and include
broader analytic and planning functions. The FBIs responsibilities in this area derive 'om
various administrative and statutory sources. See, e.g., E.O. 12333; 28 U.S.C. 532 note incorporating P.L. 108-458 §§ 2001-2003! and 534 note incorporating P.L. 109-162 § 1107!.Enhancement of the FBIs intelligence arialyfsis capabilities and functions has consistently beenrecognized as a key priority in the legislative and administrative reform efforts following the
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September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks:
[Counterterrorism] strategy should . . . encompass specic ebrts to . . . enhance the' depth and quality of domestic intelligence collection and analysis . . . . [T]he FBI should
strengthen and improve its domestic [intelligence] capability as fully and expeditiously aspossible by immediately instituting measures to . . . signicantly improve strategic
analytical capabilities . . . . Joint Inqiliry into Intelligence Community Activities Beforeand After the Terrorist Attacks of September ll 1',-.2001, S. Rep. No. 351 & H.R', Rep. No.792,_10'7th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7 002! errata print!.! _
A smart government would integrate all sources of infonnation to see the enemy as a
whole. Integrated all-source analysis should also inform and shape strategies to collectmore intelligence. . . . The importance of integrated, all-source analysis carmot be _
overstated, Without it, it is not possible to cormect the dots. Final Report of theNational Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 401, 408 004!.!
Part IV of these Guidelines accordingly authoriz_es the FBI to engage in intelligence *analysis"and*pla1ming, drawing on all lawful sources ofinformation. Themctionsauthorized'
under that Part include: i! development of overviews and analyses concerning threats to andvulnerabilities of the United States and its interests, ii! research and analysis to produce reportsand assessments concerning matters relevant to investigative activities or other authorized FBIactivities, and iii! the operation of intelligence systems that facilitate and support investigationsthrough the compilation and analysis of data and information on an ongoing basis.
C. OVERSIGHT p _
The activities authorized by these Guidelines must be conducted in a manner consistentwith all applicable laws, regulations, and policies, including those protecting privacy and civilliberties. The Justice Departments National Security Division and the FBI"sInspectionDivision, Ofce of General Cotmsel, and Ofce of Integrity and Compliance, along with othercomponents, share the responsibility to ensure thatthe Department meets these goals with respectto national security and foreign intelligence matters. In particular, the National SecurityDivisions Oversight Section, in conjunction with the FBIs Ofce of General Counsel, isresponsible for conducting regular reviews of allaspects of FBI national security and foreignintelligence activities. These reviews, conducted at FBI eld ofces andheadquarter units;broadly examine such activities for compliance with these Guidelines and other applicable
requirements. p 1
Various features qf these Guidelines facilitate the National Security Divi_sions oversightmctions. Relevant requirements and provisions include: i! required notication by the FBI tothe National Security Division concerning full investigations that involve foreign intelligencecollection or investigation of United States persons in relation to threats of the national security, ii! annual reports by the FBI to the National Security Division concerning the FBIs foreign
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intelligence collection program, including information on the seope andnatnre of_foreign
intelligence collectionactivities in each FBI eld oce,¢and iii! access by the-National Security
Division to information obtained by the FBI through national security or foreign intelligence I
activities and general authority for the Assistant Attorney General for National Security to obtain
reports -om the FBI concerning these activities. ' .
Pursuant to these Guidelines, other Attomey General gui_delines,and institutional ~
assignments of responsibility within the Justice Department, additional Department components
including the Criminal Division, the United States Attomeys Qices, and the Ofce:of '
Privacy and Civil Liberties are involved in the common endeavor with the FBI of ensuxing that
the activities of all Department components are lawful, appropriate, and ethical as well as
eective. Examples include the involvement of both FBI and prosecutorial-personnel in the
review of undercover operations involving sensitive circumstances, notice requirements for
investigations -involving sensitive investigative matters as dened in Part VII.N of these
Guidelines!, and notice and oversight provisions for enterprise investigations, which may involve
a broad examination of groups implicated inthegravest criminal and national security threats.
_ These requirements and procedures help to ensure that the mle of law is respected in they
Depa11in'ents activities aiid1thatpubl_ic'condence is rnaintainedein these activitiesr 7
11. -
I. GENERAL AUTHORITIES AND PRINCIPLES
A. sc0PE p
These Guidelines apply to investigative activities conducted by the_FBI within the United
States or outside the territories of all countries. They do not apply to investigative
activities of the FBI in foreign countries, which are governed by the Attomey Generals~
Guidelines for Extraterritorial FBI Operations. 1 .
B. GENERAL AUTHORITIES
1. The FBI is authorized to conduct investigations to detect, obtain information
about, and prevent and protect against federal crimes and threats to the national
- security and to collect foreign intelligence, as provided in Part 11 of these
Guidelines. .
i 2. ' The FBI is authorized to provide investigative assistance to other federal agencies,
Guidelines. I
3. The FBI is authorized to conduct intelligence analysis and planning as provided in
Part IV of these Guidelines. '
4. The FBI is authorized to retain and share infonnation obtained pursuant to these
Guidelines as provided in*PartVI4 of these Guidelines.
C, USE OF AUTHORITIES AND METHODS
1. Protection of the United States and Its People
The FBI shall fully utilize the authorities provided and the methods authorized by
these Guidelines to protect the United=States and its people from crimes in
violation of federal law and threats to the national security, and to further the
foreign intelligence objectives of the United States. _
2. Choice of Methods l
a. The conduct of investigations and other activities authorized by.these
Guidelines may present choices between the use of dierent investigative
methods that are each operationally sound and effective, but that aremore
or less intrusive, considering such factors as the effect on the privacy andcivil liberties of individuals and potentialdamage to reputation. The leastintrusive method feasible is to beused insuch situations. It is recognized,
12state, local, or tribalagencies,;and-foreign agencies~as~providedin Part l]I»o£these-
however, that the choice of methods is a matter of judgment. The FBI
shall not hesitate to use any lawful method consistent with these
Guidelines, even if intrusive, where the degree of intrusiveness is
warranted in light of the seriousness of a criminal or national security
threat or the strength of the information indicating its existence, or in light
of the importance of foreign intelligence sought to the United States
interests. This point is to be particularly observed in investigations
relating to terrorism. ~. -
b. United States persons shall be dealt with openly and consensually to the
A extent practicable when collecting foreign intelligence that does not
concem criminal activities or threats to the national security.
Respect for Legal Rights . - ,
All activities imder these Guidelines must have a valid? purpose_ consistent with
these Guidelines, and must be carried out in conformity with the Constitutionand
all applicable statutes, executive orders, Department of Justice regulations and
policies; andAttorney General guidelines. These Guidelinesdo not authorize *
invwtigating or collecting or maintaining information on United States persons.
solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment
or the lawful exercise of other rights secured by the Constitution or laws ofthe
United States. These Guidelines also do not authorize any conduct prohibited by
the Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal» Law Enforcement Agencies.
Undisclosed Participation in Organizations
Undisclosed participation in organizations in activities under these Guidelines
shall be conducted in accordance w_ith~FBI policy approved by the Attomey
General.
Maintenance of Records under the Privacy Act
The Privacy Act restricts .the maintenance of records relating to certain activities
of individuals who are United~States persons, with exceptions for circumstancesin which the collection of such information is pertinent to and within the scope ofan authorized law enforcement activity or is otherwise authorizedby statute. 5
U.S.C. 552a e!!. Activities authorized by these Guidelines are authorized lawenforcement activities or activities for which there is otherwise statutory authority
for purposes of the Privacy Act. These Guidelines, however, do not provide an
exhaustive enumeration of authorized FBI law enforcement activities or FBIactivities for which there is otherwise statutory authority, and no restriction is
implied with respect to such activities carried out by the'FB1 pursuant to other
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authorities. Further questions about the application of the Frivacy Act to
authorized activities of the FBI should be addressed to the FBI Otce of the
General Counsel, the FBI Privacy and Civil Liberties Unit, or the Department of
Justice Otce of Privacy and Civil Liberties. ,
NATURE AND APPLICATION OF THE GUIDELINES
Repealers . t .
These Guidelines supersede the following guidelines, which are hereby repealed:
a. The Attorney Generals Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering _
Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations May 30, 2002! and allpredecessor guidelines thereto. '
b. The Attomey Generals Guidelines for FBI National Security
Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection October 31, 2003! and
all predecessor guidelines thereto. I
c. The Attorney Generals Supplemental Guidelines for Collection,
Retention, and Dissemination of Foreign Intelligence November 29_,
2006!. .
d. The Attomey General Procedure forReporting and Use of Information
Conceming Violations of Law and Authorization for Participation in
Otherwise Illegal Activity in FBI Foreign Intelligence, Coimterintelligence
_or IntemationalTerrorism Intelligence Investigations August 8, 198 8!.
e. The Attomey Generals Guidelines for Reporting on Civil Disorders and
Demonstrations Involving a Federal Interest April 5, 1976!.
Status as Internal Guidance
These Guidelines are set forth solely for the purpose of intemal Department of
Justice guidance. They are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to
create any rights, substantive or procedmal, enforceable by law by any party in
any matter, civil or criminal, nor do they place any limitation on otherwise lawful
investigative and litigative prerogatives of the Department of J usce. ,
Departures from the Guidelines ~
Departures om these.Guidelines must be approved by the Director of the FBI, bythe Deputy Director of the FBI, or by an Executive Assistarit Director designated
14
by the Director. If a departure is necessary Without such prior approval because of
the immediacy or gravity of a threat to the safety of persons or property or to the
national secmity, the Director, the Deputy Director, or a designated Executive
Assistant Director shall be notied as soon thereafter as practicable. The FBI
shall provide timely written notice of departuresfrom these Guidelines to the
Criminal Division and the National Secmity Division, and those divisions shall
notify the Attorney General and the Deputy Attomey General. Notwirithstanding
this paragraph, all activities in all circumstances must be carried out in a manner
consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Other Activities Not Limited
These Guidelines apply to FBI activities as provided herein and do not limit other
authorized activities of the~FBI, such as the FBIs responsibilitiesto conduct
backgrolmd checks and inquiries concerning applicants and employees under
federal personnel security programs, the FBIs maintenance and operation of *
national criminalrecords systemsand preparation of national crime statistics, and,the forensic assistance andadministratiori mctionsof the FDl~Laboratory. 1
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II. INVESTIGATIONS AND
This Part of the, Guidelines authorizes the FBI to conduct investigations to detect, obtain
informationabout, andprevent and protect againstfederal crimes and threats to the national
security and to collect foreign intelligence.
When an authorized purpose exists, the focus of activities authorized by this Part may be
whatever the circumstances warrant. Thesubjectof such an activity may be, for example, a
particular crime or threatened crime; conduct constituting a threat to the national security; anindividual, group, or organization that may be involved incriminal or national security-
threatening conduct; or a topical matter of foreign intelligence interest. i
Investigations may also be undertaken for protective pu'rpo_ses in relation to individuals,
groups, or other entities-that may betargetedfor criminal victimization or acquisition, or for
terrorist attack or other depredations by the enemies of the United States. For example, the
participation of the FBI'in special events management, in relation to public events or otheractivities whose character may make them attractive targets for terrorist attack, is an authorizedexercise of the. authorities conveyed by these Guidelines. Likewise, FBI counterintelligence
activities directedto idénrifyiiig and securing facilities, peisenne1;*or 'in.f<>nna1ion that may be
targeted for inltratiomrecruitrnent, or acquisition by foreign intelligence services are authorizedexercises of the authorities conveyed by these Guidelines. >
The identication and recruitment of human sources . who may be able to provide orobtain information relating to criminal activities, infoirnation relating to terrorism, espionage, orother threats to the national security, or infonnation relating to matters of foreign ~intellige'nce~interest is also criticaltothe eectiveness of the FBIs law enforcement, nationalsecurity, and
intelligence programs, and activities rmdertalcen for this purpose are authorizedand encouraged.
The scope of authorized activities under this Part is not limited to investigation in a '
narrow sense, such as solving particular cases or obtaining evidence for use inparticular criminal
prosecutions. Rather, these activities also provide critical information needed for broader <analytic and intelligence purposes to facilitate the solution and prevention of crime, protect the
national security, and rrther foreign intelligence objectives. These purposes, include use of theinfonnation in intelligence analysis and planning under Part "IV;-and dissemination of theinfonnation to other law enforcement, Intelligence Community, and White House agencies underPart VI. Infonnation obtained at all stages of._im/estigative activity is accordingly to be retainedand disseminated for these purposes as provided in these Guidelines, or in FBI~policy consistentwith these Guidelines, regardless of whether it irthers investigative objectives in a narrower or
more irmnediate sense.
_ the coiuse of activities u.nder.these Guidelines, the FBI may incidentally. obtainrnfonnatron relating to matters outside of its areas of primary investigative responsibility. Forexample, rnforrnatiorr relating to violations of state or local 'law or foreign law may be
16
92
t
incidentally obtained in the course of investigating federal crimes or threats to the nationalsecurity or in collecting foreign intelligence. These Guidelines do not bar the acquisition of suchinformation in the course of authorized investigative activities,,the retention of such information,
or its dissemination as appropriate to the responsible authorities in other agencies or -
jurisdictions. Part VI of these Guidelines includes specic authorizations and requirements for
sharing such infonnation with relevant agencies and ofcials.
This Part authorizes different levels of information gathering activity, which abrd the
FBI exibility, under appropriate standards and procedures, to adapt the methods utilized and theinfonnation sought to the nature of the matter under investigation and the character of the
information supporting the need for investigation. 1
Assessments, authorized by Subpart A of this Part, require an authorized purpose but notany particular factual predication; For example, to carry out its central mission of preventing thecommission of terrorist acts against the United States and its people, the FBI must proactivelydraw on available sources of information to identifyterrorist threats and activities. It cannot becontent to wait for leads to come in, through the actions of others, but rather must be vigilant in
detecting terrorist activities to_the ill extent permitted bylaw, with an eye towards earlyintervention and prevention of acts of terrorism beforethey occur. Eikewise, iii the exercise ofits protective ftmctions, the FBI~is not constrained to wait tmtil-infonnation is received indicating
that a particular event, activity, or facility has drawn the attention ofthose who would threatenthe national security. Rather, the FBI must take the initiative to secureand protect_activiti_es andentities whose character may make them attractive targets for terrorism or espionage. The
proactive investigative authority conveyed in assessments is designed for, and may be utilized by,the FBI in the discharge of these responsibilities. For example, assessments may be conducted as
part of the FBIs special events management activities.
More broadly, detecting and interrupting criminal activities at their early stages, andpreventing crimes from occurring in the rst place, is preferable to allowing criminal plots andactivities to come to fruitio_n. Hence, assessments may be undertaken proactively with suchobjectives as detecting criminal activities; obtaining information on individuals, groups, or
organizations or possible investigative interest, either because they may be involved in criminalornational-security-threatening activities or because they may be targeted for attack or victimization by such activities; and identifying and assessing individuals who may have value ashuman sources. For example, assessment activities may involve proactively surng the Intemetto nd publicly accessible websites and services through which recruitment by terrorist
organizationsand promotion of terrorist crimes is openly taking place; through which childpomography is advertised and traded; through which efforts are made by-sexual predators to lurechildren for purposes of sexual abuse; or through which fraudulent schemes are perpetrated _against the public.. . - ' 1
The methods authorized in assessments are generally those of relatively lowintrusiveness, such as obtaining publicly available information, checking government records, '
' 17 I
and requesting information from members of the public. These~Guidelines do not impose
supervisory approval requirements in assessments, given the types of techniques that areauthorized at this stage e.g., perusing the Intemet for publicly available information!. However,
FBI policy will prescribe supervisory approval requirements for certain assessments, considering
such matters as the pmpose of the assessment and the methods being utilized.
Beyond the proactive infonnation gathering functions described above, assessments may~be used when allegations or other information con-ceming crimes or threats to thenationalsecurity is received or obtained; and the matter can be checked out or resolved through the
relatively non-intrusive methods authorized in assessments. The checking of investigative leadsin this manner can avoid the need to proceed to more formal levels of investigative activity, if the
results of an assessment indicate that further-investigation is not wananted.
Subpart B of this Part aurorizes a second level of investigative activity, predicated .
investigations. The purposes or objectives of predicated investigations are essentially the sameas those of assessments, but predication as provided in these Guidelines is needed generally, -allegations, reports, facts or» circumstances indicative of possible criminal or national security-threatening activity, or the potentialfor acquiring information responsive to foreign; intelligencerequirements "and supervisory approval must beobtained, to initiate prédicatedi_nv'estigations;Corresponding to the stronger predication and approval requirements, all lawful methods may beused in predicated investigations. A classied directive provides further specication concerning
circumstances supporting certain predicated investigations.
_ Predicated investigations that concem federal crimes or threats to the national security aresubdivided into preliminary investigations and full investigations. Preliminary investigations -may be initiated on the basis of any allegation, or infonnation indicative of possible criminal or
national security-threatening activity, but more substantial factual predication is required for fullinvestigations- While time limits are sét for the completion of preliminary investigations, fullinvestigations may be pursued without preset limits on their duration. ' _
The nal investigative category under this Part of the Guidelines is enterprise H
investigations, authorized by Subpart C, which permit a, general examination of the structure,scope, and nature of certain groups and organizations. Enterprise investigations are a type of fullinvestigations. Hence, they are subject to the purpose, approval, and predication requirementsthat apply to full investigatio'ns,~and all Iawil methods may be used in carrying them out. Thedistinctive characteristic of enterprise investigations is that they concern groups or organizationsthat may be involved in the most serious criminal or national security threats to the public-generally, patterns of racketeering activity, terrorism or other threats to the national security, orthe commission of offenses characteristically involved in terrorism as described in 18 U.S.C.2332b g!! B!. A broad, examination of the characteristics of groups satisfying these criteria isauthorized in enterprise investigations, including any relationship of the group to a foreignpower, its size and composition, its geographic dimensions and nances, its-past; acts and goals,and its capacity for harm. e
.18
ASSESSMENTS
1. Purposes p
Assessments may be carried out to detect, obtain information about, or prevent or
protect against federal crimes or threats to the national security or to collect
foreign intelligence. , ' '
2.- Approval
The conduct of assessments is subject to any supervisory approval requirements
prescribed by FBI_policy. ' -
3. Authorized Activities l
Activities that may be carried out for the purposes described in paragraph l. in an
assessment include: - ' "
a, seeking information, proactively or in response to investigative leads,relating to: , _ Z '
i. activities constituting violations of federal criminallaw or threats
to the national security, .
ii. the involvement or role of individuals, groups, or organizations in
such activities; or Z
iii. matters of foreign intelligence interest responsive to foreign
intelligence requirements;
_ 1h. identifying -and obtaining information about potential targets of ori vulnerabilities to criminal activities in violation of federal law or threats to
the national sectuity; »
c. seeking infonnation to identify potential human sources, assess the
y suitability, credibility, or value of individuals as hmnan sources, validatehuman sources, or maintain the cover or credibility of human sources, whomay be able to provide or obtain information relating to criminal activities
in violation of federal law, threats to the national security, or matters of 1
foreign intelligence interest; and
d. obtaining infonnation to infomi or facilitate intelligence-analysis and
planning as described in Part92IV of these Guidelines. - -
19
I 4. Ailthbrlzed Methods
Only the following methods may be used in assessments:
a. Obtain publicly available information.
b. Access and examine FBI and other Department of Justice records, and
obtain infonnation *om-any FBI or other Deparnnelnt of Justicepersonnel.
rc. Access and examine records maintained by, and request information om,other federal, state, local, or tribal, or foreign govemmental entities or
agencies.
d. Use online services and resources whether nonprot or commercial!.
e. Use and recruit human sources in conformity with the Attomey General?s
Guidelines Regarding the Use of FBI Condential Human Sources.
f. _ Interview or request infonnation-from members of the public and privateentities. '
g. Accept infonnation voltmtarily provided by governmental or private
entities.
h. Engage in observation or surveillance not requiring a court order.
i. Grand jury subpoenas for telephone or electronic mail subscriber
. information.
B. PREDICATED INVESTIGATIONS
1. Purposes 4
- -Predicated investigations may be carried out to detect, obtain infonnation, about,or prevent or protect against federal crimes or threats to the r_1ati0nal:security or tocollect foreign intelligence. '
2. Approval I
The initiation of a predicated investigation requires supervisory approval at a levelor levels specied by FBI policy. A predicated investigation based on paragraph3.c. relating to foreign intelligence! must be approved by a Special Agent in -Charge or by an FBI Headquarters otcial as provided in such policy.
20'
J. _ J :_
Circumstances Warranting Investigation
A predicated investigation may be initiated on the basis of any of the following
circumstances: .
a. - An activity constituting a federal crime or a threat to the national security
has or may have occurred, is or may be occurring, or will or may occur and
the investigation may obtain information relating -to the activity or the
involvement or role of an individual, group, or organization in such
activity. ' .
' b. An individual, group, organization, entity, information, property, or
activity is or may be a target of attack, victimization, acquisition,
inltration, or recruitment in connection with criminal activity in violation
of federal law ora threat to the national security and the investigation may
obtain information that would help to protect against such activity or
threat.
c. The investigation rnayiobtain foreign intelligence that is resporisiveto a -
. foreign intelligence requirement.
Preliminary and Full Investigations '
A predicated investigation relating to a federal crime or threat to the national
security may be conducted as a preliminary investigation or a full investigation. A
predicated investigation that is based solely on the authority to collect foreign
intelligence may be conducted only as a full investigation. .
a. Preliminaryinvestigations
i. Predication Required for Preliminary investigations
A- preliminary investigation may be initiated on the basis of
infonnation or'an allegation indicating the existence of a
circumstance described in paragraph 3.a;-.b.
i ii. ' Duration of Preliminary Investigations I
A preliminary investigation must be concluded within six months
of its initiation, which may be extended by up to six months by the
Special Agent in Charge. Extensions of preliminary investigations-
beyond a year must be approved by FBI'Headquarters.
21
i am _ in
biii. Methods Allowed in Preliminary Investigations
All lawfulmethods may be used in a preliminary investigation
except for methods within the scope of Part V.A.ll.-.13. of these
Guidelines.
Full Investigations -
i. Predication Required for Full Investigations
i A full investigation may be initiated if there is an articulable
factual basis for the investigation that reasonably indicates that a
circumstance described in paragraph 3.a.-.b. exists or if a
circumstance described in paragraph 3.0. exists.
ii. Methods Allowed in Fullalnvestigations
- All lawful methods may be used in a full investigation.
Notice Requirements .
a.
b.
C.An FBI eld ofce shall notify FBI Headquarters and the United States
Attorney or;other appropriate Department- of Justice ofcial of the
initiation by the eld oice ofa predicated investigation involving a»
sensitive investigative matter. Ifthe investigation is initiated by FBI
Headquarters, FBI Headquarters shall notify the United States Attorney or
other appropriate Department of Justice ofcial of the initiation of such an
investigation. If the investigation concerns a threat to the national
secmity, an ofcial of the National Security Divisionlmust be notied.
The notice shall identify all sensitive investigative matters involved in the
investigation.
The FBI shall notify the.National Security Division of:
i. M the initiation of any full investigation of a United States person
- relating to a threat -to thenational security; and .
ii. the initiation of any full investigation that is based on paragraph
3.c. relating to foreign intelligence!. _
The notications undér subparagraphs a; and b. -shall be made as soon as g
practicable, but no later than 30 days after the initiation of an
investigation.
22
d. The FBI shall notity the Deputy Attorney General if FBI Headquarters
v_ disapproves a eld oces initiation of apredicated investigation relating
to a threat to the national security on the ground that the predication for the
investigation is insufcient.
C. ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS
_1. Denition
A full investigation of a group or organization may be initiated as an enterprise
investigation if there is an articulable factual basis for the investigation that '
reasonably indicates that the group or organization may have engaged or may be
engagedin, or may have or may be engaged in planning or preparation or ,
provision of support for:
a. - a pattem of racketeering activity as dened in 18 U.-S.C. 1961!;
* bi. * intérnatiofial terrorism or other threat tothe national security; 1
c. domestic terrorism as dened in 18 U.S.C. 2331! involving a violation
~of federal law; '
d. furthering politicalor social goals wholly or in part through activities that
involve force or violence and a violation of federal criminal law; or
e. an offense described in 18 U.S.C. 2332b g!! B! or 18 U.S.C. 43.
2. Seope 1
The informationsought in an enterprise investigation may include a general
examination of the structure, scope,'and nature of the group or organization
including: its relationship, if any, to a foreign power; the identity and relationship
of its members, employees, or other persons who may be acting in furtherance of
its objectives; its nances andresources; its geographical dimensions; and its past
and future activities and goals. -
3. Notice and Reporting Requirements
a. The responsible Department ofJustice component for the purpose of
notication and reports in enterprise investigations is the National92Security
Division, except that, for the purpose of notications and reports in an
enterprise investigation relating to a pattern of racketeering activity that
does not involve an oense or offenses described in 18 U.S.C.
. 2332b g!! B!, the responsible Department of Justice component is the
23
Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Criminal Division.
An FBI eld ofce shall notify FBI Headquarters of the initiation by the
eld oice of an enterprise investigation.
The FBI shall notify the National Security Division or the Organized
Crime and Racketeering Section of the initiation of an enterprise
investigation, whether by a eld oce or by FBI Headquarters, andithe
component so notied shall notify the Attorney General and the Deputy
Attorney General, The FBI shall alsonotify any relevant United States
Attomeys Oce, except that any investigation within the scope of Part
VI.D.1.d of these Guidelines relating to counterintelligence
investigations! is to be. treated as provided in that provision. Notications
by the FBI tmder this subparagraph shall be provided as soon as
practicable, but no later than.30 days aer the ini_tiatio_n of the
investigation. ' t
The Assistant Attorney General for National Security or the Chief of the
Organized Crinie arid;Rackéteering Section, as_appropriate,_may atany
time request the FBI to provide a report on the status of an enterprise
investigation andvtheFBI will provide such reports as requested.
, 24
H
I
III. ASSISTANCE_T_O OTHER AGENCIES
The FBI, is authorized to provide investigative assistance to other federal, state, local, or
tribal, or foreign agencies as provided in this Part. _
The investigative assistance authorizediby this Part is often concemed with the same
objectives as those identied in Part I1 of these Guidelines _- investigating federal crimesand
threats to the national security, and collecting foreign intelligence. In some oases, however,
investigative assistance to other agencies is legally a_uthorized for purposes other than those
identied in Part 11, such as assistance in certain contexts to state or local agencies in the
investigation of crimes under state or local law, see 28 U.S.C. 540, 540A, 540B, and assistance
' to foreign agencies in the investigation of foreign law violations pursuant toiintemational
agreements. Investigative assistance for s_uch legally authorized pmposes is permitted under this
Part, even if it is not for purposes identied as grounds for investigation under Part 11.
Theauthorities provided by this Part are'curnulative to Part II and do not limit the FBIs
investigative activities under Part 11. For example, Subpart B.2 in-this Part authorizes
i11'v'e'stigative' activities by the FBIIin certairrcircurnstances to inform decisions by the President
concerning the deployment of troops to deal with civil disorders, and Subpart B.3 authorizes
investigative activities toxfacilitate demonstrations and related public health and safety measures.
The requirements and limitations in these provisions for conducting investigations for the '
specied purposes do not limit the FBIs authority under Part Ilto investigate federal crimes or
threatstothe national security that occur in the context of or in connection with civil disorders or
demonstrations. i - I '
A. THE INTELLIGENCE CO192/IMUiNITY i g '
The FBI may provide investigative assistance including operational support! to
authorized» intelligence activities of otherlntelligence Community agencies.
B. FEDERAL AGENCIES GENERALLY
. " 1. In General , i
The FBI may provide assistance to any federal agency in the investigation of
federal crimes or threats to the national security or in the collection of foreign
p intelligence, and investigative<_assis_tance to any federal agency for any other
>1 -purpose that may be legally authorized, including investigative assistance to the
Secret Service in support of its protective responsibilities. _
. 2. 1 The President in Relation to Civil Disorders
a. At the direction of the Attomey General, the Deputy Attorney General, or
25
the Assistant Attomey General for the Criminal Division, the FBI shall
collect information relating to actual or threatened civil disorders to assist
the President in determining pursuant to the authority of the President
under 10 U.S.C. 331-33! whether use of the armed forces or militia is
required and how a_decision_to commit troops should be implemented.
The information sought shall concem such matters as: '
i. The size of the actual or threatened disorder, both in number of
people involved or affected and in geographic area.
ii. The potential for violence.
iii. The potential for expansion of the disorder in light of community
conditions and tmderlying causes of the disorder.
iv. The relationship of the actual or threatened disorder to__the
, enforcement of federal law or court orders and the likelihood that
state or local authorities will assist in enforcing those laws or
orders; * ~ » . A 1
v. The extent of state or local resources available to handle the
disorder.
Investigations under this paragraph will be authorized onlyfor a period of
30 days, but the authorization may be renewed for subsequent 30 day
periods.
Notwithstanding Subpart E.2 of this Part, the methods that may be used in
an investigation under this paragraph are those described in subparagraphs
a.-.d., subparagraph f. other than pretext interviews or requests!, or
subparagraph g. of Part lI.A.4 of these Guidelines. The Attorney General,
the Deputy Attorney General, or the Assistant Attomey General for the
Criminal Division may also authorize the use of other methods described
in Part II.A.4.
3. Public Health and Safety Authorities in Relation to Demonstrations
At the direction of the Attomey General, the Deputy Attomey General, or
the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, the FBI shall
collect information relating to demonstration activities that are likely to
require the federal govemment to take action to facilitate the activities and
provide public health and safety measures with respect to those activities.
The information sought in such an investigation shall be that needed to
facilitate an adequate federal response to ensure public health and safety
26 -
and to protect the exercise of First Amendment rights, such as:
i. The time, place, and type of activities planned.
ii. The number of persons expected toparticipate.
111. The expected means and routes of travel for participants and _
expected time of arrival.
1v. Any plans for lodging or housing ofparticipants in connection with
the demonstration.
b. Notwithstanding Subpart E.2 of this Part, the methods that may be used in
an investigation under this paragraph are those described in subparagraphs
a.-.d., subparagraphf. other than pretext interviews or requests!, or
subparagraph g. of Part II.A.4 of these Guidelines. The Attorney General,
the.Deputy Attorney General, or the Assistant Attorney Generalfor the
CriminalDivision may also authorize the use'of other methods described
in Part II.A.4.
STATE, LOCAL, OR TRIBAL AGENCIES
The FBI may provide investigative assistance to. state, local, or tribal agencies in the
investigation ofmatters that may involve federal crimes or threats to the national security,
or for such other purposes as may be legally authorized.
FOREIGN AGENCIES
l. At the request of foreign law enforcement, intelligence, or security agencies,~the
FBI may conduct investigations or provide assistance to investigations by such
agencies, consistent with the interests of the United States including national
security interests! and with due consideration of the effect on any UnitedStates
person. Investigations or assistance under this paragraph must be approved as
provided by FBI policy. The FBI shall notify the National Security Division
concerning investigation or assistanceunder this paragraph where: i! FBI
Headquarters approval for the activity is required pursuant to the approval policy
adoptedby the FBI for purposes othis paragraph, and ii! the activity relates to a
threat to the national security. Notication to the Nationa1»Security Division shall
be made as soon as practicable but no later than30 days after the approval.
Provisions regarding notication to or coordination with the Central Intelligence
Agency by the FBI in memoranda of understanding or agreements with the
Central Intelligence Agency may also applytto activities under this paragraph.
2. The FBI may not provide assistance to foreign law enforcement, intelligence, or
L 27 .
s
security. ofcers conducting investigations within the United States unless such
oicers have provided prior notication to the Attomey General as required by 18
2 U.S.C. 951.
3. The FBI may conduct background inquiries concerning consenting individuals
when requested by foreign government agencies. _
4. The FBI may provide other material and technical assistance to foreign
governments to the extent not otherwise prohibited by law.
E. APPLICABLE STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES ' _
1. Authorizedjinvestigative assistance by the FBI to other agencies underthis Part
includes-joint operations and activities with such agencies.
2. All lawful methods may be used in investigative-assistance activities under this
Part. '
3. Where the methods used in investigative assistance activities under. this Part go I
beyond the methods authorized in assessments under Part II.A.4 of these
Guidelines, the following-apply: *
a:- Supervisory approval must be obtained for the activity at a level or levels
specied in FBI policy. _
b. Notice must beprovided concerning sensitive investigative matters in the
' manner described in Part lI.B.5.
c. A database or records system must be maintained that permits, with
respect to each such activity, the prompt retrieval of the status of the
activity open or closed!, the dates of opening and closing, and the basis
for the activity. This database or. records system may be combined with
the database or records systeni for predicated investigations required by
Part VI.A.2. -
28
-tIV. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND PLANNING
The FBI is authorized to engage in analysis and planning. The FBIs analytic activities
enable the FBI to identify.»andui1derstand trends, causes, and potentialindicia of criminal activity
and other threats to the United States that would not be apparent om the investigation of
discrete matters alone. By means of intelligence analysis and strategic planning, the FBI cana
more efectively discover crimes, threats to the national security, and other matters of national
intelligence interest and can provide the critical support needed for the effective discharge of its
investigative responsibilities and other authorized activities. For example, analysis of threats in
the context of special events management, conceming public events or activities that may be
targeted for terrorist attack, is an authorized activity under this Part.
In;carrying out its intelligence functions under this Part, the FBI is authorized to draw on
all lawful sources ofinforrnation, including but not limited to the results of investigative
activities under these Guidelines. Investigative activities under these Guidelines and other
legally authorized activities through which the FBI acquires information, data, or intelligence
may properly be utilized, structured, and prioritized so as to support and effectuate the FBI?s
intelligence mission. Theremainder of this~Part provides 1rtlier:speciE:¬itio conceming.
activities and ftmctions authorized as part of that mission. , '
A. STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
The FBI is authorized to develop overviews and analyses of threats to and vulnerabilities
of the United States and its interests in areas re1ated"to the FBIs responsibilities,
iiicltiding domestic and international criminal threats and activities; domestic and
intemational activities, circumstances, and developments affecting the national security;
and matters relevant to the conduct of.the United States foreign affairs. The overviews
and analyses prepared under this Subpartmay encompass present, emergent, and potential
threats and vulnerabilities, their contexts and causes,.and identication and analysis of
means ofresponding to them. ~
B. REPORTS AND ASSESSMENTS GENERALLY
The FBI is authorized to conduct research, analyze information, and prepare reports and
assessments concerning matters relevant to authorized FBI activities, such as reports and
assessments conceming: types oficriminals or criminal activities; organized crime groups;-
terrorism, espionage, or other threats to the national security; foreign intelligence matters;
or the scope and nature of criminal activity in particular geographic areas or sectors of theeconomy. '
C. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS
p The FBI is authorized to operate intelligence, identication, tracking, and information
29 '-
1
systems in support of authorized investigative activities, or for such other or additional
purposes as may be legally authorized, such as intelligence andtracking systems relating
to terrorists, gangs; or orgaraizederirne groups.
30
V. AUTHORIZED METHODS
A. PARTICULAR METHODS
All lawful investigative methods may be used in activities under these Guidelines as
authorized by these Guidelines. Authorized methods include, but are not limited to, those '
identied in the following list. The methods identied in thelist are in some instances subject to
special restrictions or review or approval requirements as noted:
1. The methods described in Part H.A.4 of these Guidelines.
2. Mail covers. _ .
3. Physical searches of personal or real property where a warrant or court order is not
legally required because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy e.g., trash
covers!. *
* '4. Consensual monitoringof comrhuiiications,.including_consensual,compute1j _ 7
. * monitoring, subject to legal review by the Chief Division Counsel or the FBI
Ofce of the General~Counsel. Where a sensitive monitoring circumstance is
involved, the monitoring must be approved_by the Criminal Division or, if the
investigation concems a threat to the national security or foreign intelligence, by
the National Security Division. _ -
5. Use.of closed-circuit television, direction nders, and other monitoring devices,
subject tovlegal review by the Chief Division Counsel or the FBI Ofce of the
. General Counsel. The methods described this paragraph usually do not require
court orders or warrants unless they involve physical trespass or non-consensual
monitoring of comniunications, but legal review is necessary to ensure '
compliance with all applicable legal requirements.!
.6. Polygraph examinations.
7. Undercover operations. Ininvestigations relating to activities in violation of
federal criminal law that do not conoem threats to the national security or foreign
intelligence, undercover. operations must be carried out in conformity withthe
Attorney Generals Guidelineson Federal Bureau of Investigation Undercover
Operations. In investigations that are not subject to the preceding sentence
because they concern threats to the national.security or foreign intelligence,
undercover operations involving religious or political orgaIniz"atio'ns must be
reviewed and approved by FBI Headquarters, with participation by the National .
Security Division in the review process.
8. Compulsory process as authorized by law, including grand jury subpoenas and
.31
r
other subpoenas, National Security Letters 5 U.S.C. 1_681u, 1681v; 18 U.S.C.
2709; 12 U.S.C. 3414 a!! A!; 50 U.S.C. 436!, and Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance.Act orders for the production of tangible things 0 U.S.C. 1861-63!.
Accessing stored wire and electronic communications and transactional records in
conformity with chapter 121 of title 18, United States Code 8 U.S.C. 2701-2712!". ~ '
Use of pen registers and trap and trace devices in conformity with chapter 206 of
title United StatesCode 8 U.S.C. 3121-3127!, or the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act 0 U.S.C. 1841-1846!. _
Electronic surveillance in confonnity with chapter 119 of title 18; United States
Code 8 U.S.C. 2510-2522!, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or
Executive Order 12333 § 2.5.
Physical searches, including mail openings, in conformity with Rule 41 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,.or
E>¬ecutive*Or;der-'12333*§ 2.5. A classied-directive provides additionalilimitation
on certain searches.
Acquisition of foreign intelligence "information in conformity with title VII of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. '
SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS .
Beyond the limitations noted in the list above relating to. particular investigative methods,
the following requirements are to be observed: .
Contacts with Represented Persons ~
Contact with represented persons may implicate legal restrictions and affect the
admissibility of resulting evidence. Hence, if an individual is known to be
represented by counsel in a particular matter, the FBI will follow applicable law
and Department procedure concerning contact with represented individuals in the
absence of prior notice to counsel. The Special Agent iii Charge and the United
States Attomey or their designees shall consult periodically on applicable law and
Department procedure- Where issues arise concerning the consistency "of contacts
with represented persons with applicable attorney conduct rules, the United States
Attomeys Ofce should consult with the Professional Responsibility Advisory
Ofce.
32
"i 1
Use of Classied Investigative Technologies
Inappropriate use of classied investigative technologies may risk the
compromise of suchtechnologies. Hence, in an investigation rel_ating to activities
in violation of federal criminal law that does not concem a threat to the national
security or foreign intelligence, the use of such technologies must be in
conformity with the Procedures for the Use of Classied Investigative
Technologies in Criminal Cases.
C. OTHERWISE ILLEGAL ACTIVITY
Otherwise illegal activity by an FBI agent or employee in an imdercover operation
relating to activity in violation of federal criminal law that does not concern a
threat to the national security or foreign intelligence must be approved in
conformity with the Attorney Genera1s Guidelines on Federal Bureau of
Investigation Undercover Operations. Approval of otherwise illegal activity in
conformity with those guidelines is sufcient and satises any approval
requirer_ne_nt- that would otherwise apply under these Gpidelines. '
Otherwise illegal activity by a human source must be approved in conformity with
the Attorney Generals Guidelines Regardingthe Use of FBI Condential Human
Sources. - r r i A
Otherwise illegal activity by an FBI agent or employee thatisnot within the scope
of paragraph l. must be approved by a United States Attorney s Ofce or a
Department of Justice Division, except that a Special Agent in Charge may
authorize the following:
a. otherwise illegal activity that would not be a felony under federal, state,
local, or. tribal law;
b. * consensual monitoring of communications, even if a crime understate,
local, or tribal law; '
c. the controlled purchase, receipt, delivery, or sale of drugs, stolen property,
or other contraband;
d. the_payment of bribes; 7
e. the making of false representations in concealment of personal identity or
the true ownership of a proprietary; and -
fl conducting amoney laundering transaction or transactions involving an
aggregate amount not exceeding $1 million.
'33 ,
However, in an investigation relating to _a threat to the national security or foreign
intelligence collection, a Special Agent in Charge may not authorize an activity
that may constitute a violation of export control laws or laws that concern the
proliferation of weapons of mass destructionl In such an investigation, a Special
Agent in Charge may authorize an activity that may otherwise violate prohibitions
of material support to terrorism only in accordance with standards established by
the Director of the FBI and agreed to'by the Assistant Attorney Generalfor
National Secmity. _ '
The following activities may not be authorized:
a. Acts ofviolence. ~
b. Activities whose authorization is prohibited by law, includingunlawful
investigative methods, such as illegal electronic surveillance or illegal
searches. ' .
Subparagraph a.,howeve_r, does not limit the right of FBI agents or employees to
engage in any lawful use of force',Iinc1uding theluse~of-force~in~seltldefense or
defense of others or otherwise in the lawful discharge of their duties. _
An agent or employee may engage in otherwise illegal activity thatcould be
authorized under this Subpart without the authorization required by paragraph 3. if
necessary to meet an immediate threat to the safety of persons or property or to the
national security, or to prevent thecompromise of an investigation or the loss of a»
signicant investigative opportunityl In s1'1ch,a case, prior to engaging in the
otherwise illegal activity, every effort should be made by! the agent or employee to
consultwith the Special Agent in Charge, and by the Special Agent in Charge to
consult with the United States Attomeys Oice or appropriate Department of
Justice Division where, the authorization of that oice or division would be
required under paragraph 3;, unless the circurnstances-preclude such consultation.
Casesin which otherwise illegal activity occurs pursuant to this paragraph without
the authorization required by paragraph 3.. shall belreported as soon as possible to
the Special Agent in Charge, and by the Special Agent in Charge to FBI
Headquarters andto the United States Attorneys Ofce or appropriate
Department of Justice Division.
In an investigation relating toia threat to the national security or foreign
intelligence collection, the National Security Division is the approving component
for otherwise illegal activity for whichparagraph 3. requires approvallbeyond
intemal FBI approval. However, ofcials in other components may approve
otherwise illegal activity in suchinvestigations as authorized by the Assistant
Attorney General for National Security. -
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VI. RETENTION AND SHARING OF
A. RETENTION OF INFORMATION
1. The FBI shall retain records relating to activities under these Guidelines in
accordance with a records retention plan approved by the National Archives and
Records Adininistration. _ ,
2. The FBI shall maintain a database or records system that permits, with respect to
eachlpredicated investigation, the prompt retrieval of the status of the
investigation open or closed!, the dates of opening and closing, and the basis for
_ the investigation. , I
B. INFORMATION SHARING GENERALLY
1. Permissive Sharing , 1
' Consisterit with law and with any applicable agreements-orunderstandingis -with
other agencies concerning the disseminationof infonnation they have provided,
the FBI maydisscminate information obtained or produced through activities
under these Guidelines: " -
. a. withiri the FBI and to other components of the Department of Justice;
b. to other federal, state, local, or tribal agencies if related to their
responsibilities and, in relation to other Intelligence Community agencies,
the determination whether the information is related to the recipients
responsibilities may be left to the recipient; -
c. to congressional committees as authorized by the Department of Justice
Ofce of Legislative A_ffairs§
rd. to foreign agencies if the infonnation is related to their responsibilities and
the dissemination is consistent with the interests'_ of the United States
including national security interests! andthe FBI has considered the effect
such dissemination may reasonably be expected to have on any identiable
United States person;
e. if the information is publicly available, doestnot identify United States
persons, or is disseminated with the consent of the person whom it
concerns;
ti if the dissemination is necessary to protect the safety or security of persons
or property, to protect against or prevent a crime or threat to the national
- 3st ,
security, or to obtain information for the conduct of an authorized FBI
investigation; or
g. if dissemination of the information is otherwise permitted by the Privacy
_Act 'U.S.C. *552a!. ~
Required Sharing _
The FBI shall share and disseminate information as required by statutes, treaties,_
Executive Orders, Presiden_tial'directives, National Security Council directives,
Homeland Security Council directives, and'Attorney General-approved policies,
memoranda of understanding, or agreements. , .
INFORMATION RELATING TO CRIMINAL MATTERS
Coordination with Prosecutors
an investigation relating topossible criminal activityii violation of federal law,
the agent conducting the investigation shall maintain periodic written or. oral
contact with the appropriate federal prosecutor, as circumstances warrant and as
requested by the prosecutor. When, during such an investigation, a matter appears
arguably to warrant prosecution, the agent shall present the relevant facts to the t
appropriate federal prosecutor. Information on investigations that have been
closed shall be available on request to a United States Attorney or his or her
designee or an appropriate Department of Justice ofcial.
Criminal Matters Outside FBI Jurisdiction,
When credible information is received by an FBI eld ofce concerning serious
criminal activity not within the FBIs investigative jurisdiction, the eld office
shall promptly transmit the information or refer the complainant to a law -
enforcement agency having jurisdiction, except where disclosure would
jeopardizean ongoing "investigation, endanger the safety of an individual, disclose
the identity of ahuman source, interfere with a human sources cooperation, or
reveal legally privileged information. If full disclosure is not made for the reasons
indicated, then, whenever feasible, the FBI eld oice shall make at least limited
-disclosure to a law enforcement agency or agencies having jtuisdiction, and fllil
disclosure shall be made as soon as the need for restricting disclosure is no longer
present; Where full disclosure is not made to the appropriate law enforcement
agencies within 180 days, the FBI eld ofce shallpromptly notify FBI
I-Ieadquarters in writing of the facts and circumstances ccncerningthe criminal
activity. The FBI shall make periodic reports to the Deputy Attorney General on
such nondisclosures and incomplete disclosures, in a form suitable to protect the
identity of human sources. .
I 36
3. A Reporting of Criminal Activity p
a. Whenyit appears that an FBI agent or employee has engaged in-criminal
- _ activity in the course of an investigation under these Guidelines, the FBI
shall notify the United States Attomeys Oice or an appropriate
Department of Justice Division. When it appears that ahuman source has
engaged in- criminal activity in the course of an investigation underfthese
Guidelines, the FBI shall proceed as provided in the Attomey Generals
Guidelines Regarding the Use of FBI Condential Human Sources. When
information concerning possible criminal activity by any other person
aPP¢ars in the course of an investigation under these Guidelines, the FBI
shall initiate an investigation of the c_riminal activity if warranted, and
shall proceed as provided in paragraph 1'. or 2. '1
b. ~ The reporting requirements under this paragraph re1ating- to criminal '
. .activity,by FBI_agen'ts, or employees or sources do not apply.to
otherwise illegal activity that is authorized-in confonnityivvith these
Guidelines or other Attorney General guidelines or to minor traic
offenses. l
INFORMATION RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN
INTELLIGEN CE MATTERS
The general principle reected in current laws and policies is thatlthere is a responsibility
to provide information as consistently and fully as possible to agencies with relevant
responsibilities to protect the United States and its people from terrorism and other threats
to the national security, except as limited by specic constraints on such sharing. The
FBIs responsibilities in this area include carrying out the requirements of the
Memorandmn of Understanding Between the Intelligence Commimity, Federal Law _
Enforcement Agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security Concerning
Information Sharing March 4, 2003!, or any successor memorandum of mrderstanding or ~~
agreement. Specic requirements also exist for internal coordination and consultation
with- other Department of Justice components, and for provision of national security and
foreign intelligence infonnation to White House agencies, as provided in the ensging
paragraphs.
I. Department of Justice
a. The National Security Division shall have access to all infonnation
obtained by the FBI through activities relating to threats to the national
security or foreign intelligence. The Director of theFBI and the Assistant
Attorney General for National Security shall consult concerning these
activities whenever requested by either of them, and the~FBI shall provide
such reportsvand information concerning these activities as the-Assistant
37 I
b.
c.
t d.Attorney General for National Security may request. In addition to any
reports or information the Assistant Attorney General for National
Security may specially request under this subparagraph, the FBI shall
provide annual reports to the National Security Division concerning its
foreign intelligence collection program, including information concerning
the scope and nature of foreign intelligence collection activities in eachFBIreld ofce. ' Q
The FBI shall keep the<National Security Division apprised of all
infonnation obtained through activities under these Guidelines that is
necessary to the ability of the United States to investigate or protect
against threats to the national security, which shall include regular
consultations between the FBI and the National Security Division to
exchange advice and~inforrnat:ion relevant to addressing such threats
through criminal prosecution or other means.
Subject to subparagraphs d. and e., relevant United States Attomeys
Offices shall have access to and shall receive.inforn1atiorr_fron_1 the FBI
relating to threats to the national security, and may engage in consultations
with the FBI relating to such threats, to the same-extent as the National
Security Division. The relevant United States Attorneys Ofces shall
receive such access and infomiation ,'om the FBI eld ofces.
In a counterintelligence investigation '- i.e., an investigation relating to a
matter described in Part .VII.S.Z of these Guidelines, the FBIs provision
of information to and consultation with a United States Attomeys Office
are subject to authorization by the National Security Division. In
consultation with the Executive Office for United States Attomeys and the
FBI, the National Security Division shall establish policies setting forth
circumstances in which the FBI will consult with the National Security
Division prior to infonning relevant United States Attorneys Ofces
about such an investigation. The policies established by the National
Security Divisionunder this subparagraphshall among other things!provide that: ' I '
i. the National Security Division will, within 30 days, authorize the
" FBI to share with the United States Attomeys Oices information
relating to certain espionage investigations, as defmed by the
policies, unless such information is withheldbecausetof substantial
national security considerations; and
ii. the FBI may consult freely with United_States Attorneys"Ofces
concerrring investigations within the scope of this subparagraph
during an-ernergency, so long as the National Security Division is
38 e
notied of such consultation as soon as practical after the
consultation.
Information shared with a United States Attomeys Office pursuant to
subparagraph c. or d. shall be disclosed only to the United States Attomey
or any Assistant United States Attorneys designated by the United States
Attomey as points of contact to receive such information, The United
States Attomeys and designated Assistant United States Attorneys shall
have appropriate security clearances and shall receive trainingin the '
handling of classied information and information derived orn the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, including training concerning the
secure handling and storage of such information and training concerning
requirements and limitations relating to the use, retention, and
dissemination ofsuch information. V
The disclosure and sharing of information by the FBI under this paragraph
is subject to any limitations required in orders issuedby the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, controls imposed by the originators or
sensitive material, and restrictions established by the Attorney General or
tlie Deputy Attomey General in particular cases. The disclosure and
sharing of information by the FBI imder this paragraph that maydisclose
the identity of humansources is governed by the relevant provisions of the
Attomey Generals Guidelines Regarding the Use of -FBI Condential
Human Sources. .
White House
In order to carry out their responsibilities, the President, the Vice President, the
Assistant to the President for NationalSecurity Affairs, the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security Affairs, the National Security Coimcil and its
staff the Homeland Security Council and its sta, and other White House
ofcials and ofces require informationifrom all federal agencies, including
foreign -intelligence, andinfonnation relating to international terrorism and other
threats to the national security. The FBI accordingly may disseminate to the
White House foreign intelligeiice and national security information obtained
through activities imder these Guidelines, subject to the following standards and
procedures: *
Requests to the FBI for such information om the White House shall be
made throughthe National Security COUnCll'St8 or Homeland Secinity
Council staff including, but not limited to,.the National Security Council
Legal and Intelligence Directorates and Oice of Combating Terrorism,
or through the Presidents Intelligence Advisory Board or the Counsel to
the President. -
, 39
4"
Compromising information concerning domestic officials or political
organizations, or information concerning activities of United States
persons intended tqaffect the political process in the United States, may
be disseminated to the White House only with the approval of the -Attomey
General, based on a determination that such dissemination is needed for
foreign intelligencepurposes, for the purpose of protecting against
intemational terrorism or other threats to the national security, or for the
conduct of foreign affairs. However, such approvalis not requireckfor
dissemination to the White House of information concerning efforts of _
foreignintelligence services to penetrate the White House, or concerning
contacts by WhiteHouse personnel with foreign intelligence service
personnel.
Examples of types of information that are suitable for dissemination totthe
White House onra routinebasis include, but. are not limited to:
i. ~ information conceming-intemational terroiisrn; -1
ii. infonnation concerning activities of foreign intelligence services in
the United States;
iii. information indicative of imminent hostilities involving any
foreign power; '
lV_. information concerning potential cyber threats to the United States
1 or its allies;
v. information indicative of policy positions adopted by foreign
1 officials, govemménts, or powers, or their reactions to United '
States foreignpolicy initiatives;
V1. infonnation relating to possible changes in leadership positions of
foreigngovernments, parties, factions, or powers;
vii. information concernirigforeigri economic or foreign political
matters that might have national security ramications; and
viii. infonnation set forth in regularly published national intelligence
requirements.
Communications by the FBI to the White "House thatrelate to a national
security matter and concern a litigationissue for a specicpendingcase
must be made known to the Office of the Attorney General, the Office of
A 40 ' r
'92
L
the Deputy Attorney General, or the Oice ofthe Associate Attorney
General. White House policy may specially limit or prescribe the White
House personnel who may request information concerning such issues
:om the FBI. -
The limitations on dissemination of information by the FBI to the White
House tmder these Guidelines do not apply to dissemination to the White
House of infonnation acquired in the course of an FBI investigation
requested by. the White ~House into the backgrotmd of a potential: employee
or appointee, or responses to requests -om the White House under
Executive Order 10450.
3. Special Statutory Requirements
Dissemination of information acquired under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act is, to the extent provided in that Act, subject to
minimization procedures and other requirements specied in that Act. -
Information obtained through the use of National Security Letters under 115
U.S.C._ 1681v may be disseminated in conformity with the general
standards of this Part. Information obtained through the use of National
Security Letters tmder other statutes may be disseminated in conformity
with the general standards of this Part, subject to any applicable limitations
in their governing statutory provisions: 12 U.S.C. 3414 a!! B!; 15U.S,C. 1681u t!; 18 U.S.C. 2709 d!; 50 U.S.C. 436 e!. _ '
41
DEFINITIONS _
CONSENSUAL MONITORING: monitoring of communications for which a court order
or warrant is not legally required because of the consent of'a partyto the comnnmication.
EMPLOYEE: an FBI employee or an employee of another agency working under.the
direction and control of the FBI.
FOR OR ON BEHALF OF A FOREIGN POWER: the detennjnaon that activities are
for or on behalf of a foreign power shall bebased on consideration of the extent to which
the foreign power is involved in: _
1. control or policy direction;
2. nancial or material support; or i
3. leadership, assignments, or discipline.
FOREIGN COMPUTER INTRUSION: -re useor.atteinpted use of anyJcyber=activity or
other means, by, for, oron behalf of a foreign powerto scan, probe, or gain unauthorized
access into one or more U.S.-based computers. I
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE; infonnation relating to the capabilities, intentions, or
activities of foreign govemments or elements thereof, foreign organizations or foreign
persons, or intemational terrorists. _
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS: _
1. - national intelligence requirements issued pursuant to authorization by the Director
of National Intelligence, including the National Intelligence Priorities Framework
and the National HUMlNTCollection Directives, or any successor directives
thereto; _ .
2; requests to collect foreign intelligence by the President or by Intelligence
Community officials designated by the'President; and i
3. directions to collect foreign intelligence by the Attorney.Gen_eral, the Deputy
Attomey General, or an official designated by the Attomey General.
FOREIGN POW-ER: _ ,
I. _ a foreign govemment or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the
United States; ~
_42
2. a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of UnitedStates persons; - '
3. an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or govemments to
be directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments;
4. ' a group engaged in intemational terrorism or activitiesin prepa.ration'therefor;
5. a foreign-basedepolitical organization, not substantially composed of United States
persons; or .
6, an entity that is directed or controlled bya foreign govemment or governments.
HUMAN SOURCE: a Condential Human Source as dened in the Attomey Generals
Guidelines Regarding the Use of FBI Condential Human Sources.
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: any activity conducted for intelligence purposes or to .
affect po1i_tic_a_1 or governmental processes by, for, or on behalf of a foreign power.
JNTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
Activities that: . '
1. involve violent acts oracts dangerous to human life that violate federal,,state, A
local, or tribal criminal law or would violate such law if committed within the
- United States or a state, local, or tribal jurisdiction;
2. appear to be intended:
i. to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
ii. to inuence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or ~
iii. Z to affectthe conduct of a govemment by assassination or kidnapping; and
3. . occur totally outside the United -States, or transcend national boundaries in terms
of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear to be
intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate
- or seek asylum. y -
PROPRIETARY: a sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, or other business entity
operated on a commercial basis, which is owned, controlled, or operatedwholly or in part
onbehalf of the FBI, and whose relationship with the FBI is concealed om third parties.
43_
PUBLICLY AVAILABLE: information that has been published orbroadcast for public
consumption, is available on request to the public, is accessible on-line or otherwise to
the public, is available to the public by subscription or purchase, could be seen or heard
by any casual observer, is made available at a meeting open to the public, or is obtained»
by visiting any place or attending any event that is open to. the public.
RECORDS: any records, databases, les, indices, information systems, or other. retained
information. -
N. SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER: an investigative matter involving the
activities,of a domestic public ofcial or political candidate involving corruption or a
threat to the national security!, religious or political organization or individual prominent
in such an organization, or news media, or. any other matter which, in the judgment of the
o-ic_i_al authorizing an investigation,.should be brought to the attention of FBI
Headquarters and other Department of Justice ofcials.
SENSITIVE MONITORING CIRCUMSTANCE:
l. investigation of a member of Congress, a federal judge, a member of the I
Executive Branch at Executive Level IV or above, or a person who has served in
I such capacity within the previous two years;
1
2. investigation of ie Governor, Lieutenant Govemor, or Attorney General o_f any
state or territory, or a judge or justice of the highest court of any state or territory,
conceming an o'ense involving bribery, conict of interest, or extortion related totheperformance of o~icial*duties; I
3. a party to the communication is in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons or the
United States Marshals Service or is being or has beenaorded protection in the
Witness Sectuity Program; or _
4. the -Attom_eyGeneral, the Deputy Attomey General, or _an Assistant Attorney
General has requested that the FBI obtain prior approval for the use of consensual
monitoring in a specic investigation. ' '
SPECIAL AGENT lN CHARGE: the Special Agent in Charge of an FBI eld ofce
including an Acting Special Agent in Charge!, except that thefunctions authorized for
Special Agents in Charge by these Guidelines may alsobe exercised by the Assistant
Director in Charge or by any Special Agent in Charge designated by the Assistant
Director in Charge in an FBI eld oice headed by an Assistant Director, and by FBI
Headquarters officials designated by the Director of the FBI. _
SPECIAL EVENTS MANAGEMENT: planning and conduct of public events or
activities whose character mayfnake them attractive targets for terrorist attack.
44
STATE, LOCAL, OR T RIBAL: any state or territory of the United States or political
subdivision thereof} the District of Columbia, or Indian tribe.
THREAT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY : S
l. intemational terrorism; , .
2. espionage and other intelligence activities, sabotage, and assassination, conducted
by, for, or on behalf offoreign powers, organizations, or persons;
3. foreign computer intrusion; and _
4. other matters determined by the Attomey General, consistent with Executive
Order 12333 or a successor order. e
UNITED STATES: when used in a geographic sensefmeans all areas under theterritorial
sgvereignty of the United States.
UNITED STATES PERSON:
Any of the following, but not including any association or corporation that is a foreign
power as dened in Subpart G. l~.-.3.:
.1. an individual who is a United States citizen or an alienlawfully admitted for
permanent residence; '
2. i an unincorporated association substantially composed of individuals who are
United States persons; or 7
3. -a corporation incorporated in the United States. B
In applying paragraph 2., if a group or organization in the United States that is affiliated
with a foreign-based intemational organization operates directly under the cdntrol of the
international organization and has no independent program or activities in the United
States, the membership of the entire international organization shall be considered in
determining whether it is substantially composed of United Statespersons. If, however,
the U.S.-based group or organization has programs or activities separate om, or in
addition to, those directed by the'internatior_1al organization, only its membership in the
United States shall be considered in determining whether it is substantially composed of
United States persons. A classied directive provides further guidance concerning the
detennination of United States person status.
45
i 1~ mi
i i _ i< ,92 .
V. USE: when used with respect to human sources, means obtaining information from,
_ tasking, or othenivise operatingtsuch sourees.
' Date: 7%/ff? 1 -
M i Michael B. ukaisey »-D/
Attomey General
46
i _
UNCLASSIFIED ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide
Appendix,B: Executive Order 12333 I
ALI. FBI II-IFORI-IATION 001-rr.u1m>'
HEREIN Is macmssrrrxn
DATE 0'?-08~2D09 BY 60322 UC/LPISTP/JCF
92
92
B-1 S
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ALL INFURHQTION UUNTAIHED
HREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DBIE 07-08-2009 BY 60322 UCILPISTPIJCF
EXECUTIVE ORDER
12333
_ urqrrsn s'1'A'1r-:s INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
DECEMBER 4, 1981 1
AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDERS 13284 003!, 13355 004!
l _AND 13470 000!! K
PREAMBLE
Timely, accurate, and insightful information about the
activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign
powers, organizations, and persons, and their agents, is
essential to the national security of the United Statest All
reasonable and lawful means must be used to ensure that the
United States will receive the best intelligence possible. For
that purpose, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the
Constitution and the laws of the'United States of America,
including the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, Act!
and as President of the United States of America, in order to
provide for the effective conduct of United States intelligence
activities and the protection of constitutional rights, it is
hereby ordered as follows:
PART 1 Goals, Directions, Duties, and Responsibilities with
Respect to United States Intel1igenceEfforts _
1.1 Goals. The United States intelligence effort shall provide
the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland
Security Council with the necessary information on which to base
decisions concerning the development and conduct of foreign,
defense, and economic policies, and the protection of
United States national interests from foreign security threats.
All departments and agencies shall cooperate fully to fulfill
this goal. 1
a! All means, consistent with applicable Federal law and
this order, and with full consideration of the rights of
United States persons, shall be used to obtain reliable
intelligence information to protect the United States and its
1 .
V 1
interests. ' ,
b! The United States Government has a solemn obligation,
and shall continue'in the conduct of intelligence activities
' under this order, to protect fully the legal rights of all
.United States persons, including freedoms, civil liberties, and
privacy rights.guaranteed by Federal law.
c! Intelligence collection under this order should be
guided by the need for information to respond to intelligence
priorities set by the President.
d! Special emphasis should be given to detecting and
countering:
!, Espionage and other threats and activities
»directed by foreign powers or their intelligence
services against the United States and its interests;
! Threats to the United States and its interests
from terrorism; and
! Threats to the United States and its interests
from the development, possession, proliferation, or
use of weapons of mass destruction. .
, e! Special emphasis shall be given to the production
of timely, accurate, and insightful reports, responsive to
" decisionmakers in the executive branch, that draw on all
appropriate sources of information, including open source
, 92 -
information, meet rigorous analytic standards, consider
diverse analytic"viewpoints, and accurately represent
Iappropriate alternative views. .
- f! State, local, and tribal.governments are critical *
partners in securing and defending the United States from
terrorism and other threats to the United States and its
interests. Our national intelligence effort should take into
account the responsibilities and requirements of State, local,
and tribal governments and, as,appropriate, private sector
' 2
92
t I
entities, when undertaking the collection and dissemination of
inormation and intelligence to protect the United States.,
g! All departments and agencies have a responsibility
to prepare and to provide intelligence in a manner that allows
the full and free exchange of information, consistent with
applicable law and presidential guidance.
1.2 The National Security Council.
a! Purpose. The National Security Council NSC!
shall act as the highest ranking executive branch entity that
provides support to the President for review of, guidance
for, and direction to the conduct of all foreign intelligence,
counterintelligence, and covert action, and attendant policies
and programs: . . '
b! Covert Action and Other Sensitive Intelligence
Operations. The NSC shall consider and submit to the President
a policy recommendation, including all dissents, on each
proposed covert action and conduct a periodic review of ongoing
covert action activities, including an evaluation of the
effectiveness and consistency with current national policy
of such activities,and consistency with applicable legal
requirements. The NSC shall perform such other functions
related to covert action as the President may direct, but shall
not undertake the conduct of covert actions; The NSC shall also
review proposals for'other sensitive intelligence operations.
1.3 Director of National Intelligehce. Subject to the
authority, direction, and control of the President, the Director
of National Intelligence Director! shall serve as the head of
the Intelligence Community, act as the principal adviser to the
President, to the NSC, and to the Homeland Security Council
for intelligence matters related to national security, and
shall oversee and direct the implementation of the National
Intelligence Programand execution of the National Intelligence
3
Program budget._ The Director will lead a unified, coordinated,
and effective intelligence effort. In addition, the Director
shall, in carrying out the duties and responsibilities under
this section, take into account the views of the heads of
departments containing an element of the Intelligence Community
and of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
a! Except as otherwise directed by the President or
prohibited by law, the Director shall have access to all
information and intelligence described in section 1.5 a! of this
order. For the purpose of access to and sharing of information
and intelligence, the Director:
! Is hereby assigned the function under
séctién 3! of the Act, to d.ete.rm.in_e that intelliqeqe/,
regardless of the source from which derived and including
information gathered_within~or outside the United States,
pertains to more than one-United States Government agency; and
! Shall develop guidelines for how information
or intelligence is provided to or accessed by the Intelligence '
Community in accordance with section 1,5 a! of this order, and
for how the information or intelligence may be used and shared
by the Intelligence Community. All guidelines developed in
accordance with this section shall be approved by the Attorney
General and, where applicable, shall be consistent with
guidelines»issued pursuant to section 1616.05 the Intelligence
Reorm and Terrorism Protection Act of 2Q04 Public Law 108-458!
IRTPA! .
b! In addition to fulfilling the obligations and
responsibilities prescribed by the Act, the Director:
! Shall establish objectives, priorities, and
guidance for the Intelligence Community to ensure timely and
effective collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of
intelligence, of whatever nature and from whatever source
4
_ 1 _ _ i
derived;
! May designate, in consultation with affected
heads of departments or Intelligence Community elements, one or
more Intelligence Community elements to develop and to maintain
services of common concernon behalf of the Intelligence
Community if the Director determines such services can,be more
efficiently or effectively accomplished in a consolidated
manner;
! Shall oversee and provide advice to the '
President and the NSC with respect to all ongoing and proposed, ,
covert action programs;
14! In regard to the establishment and conduct of
intelliqense a¥ra.nqem.e11t§ a.ns1*e<z.1:eement§ with §9=;<-=i_g.n
governments and international organizations:
A! May enter into intelligence and
counterintelligence arrangements and agreements with foreign
governments and international organizations;
B! Shall formulate policies concerning
intelligence and counterintelligence arrangements and agreements
with foreign governments and-international organizations; and
i 4C! Shall align and synchronize intelligence and
counterintelligence foreign relationships among the elements of
the Intelligence Community to further United States national
security, policy, and intelligence objectives;
! Shall participate in the development of
procedures approved by the Attorney General governing criminal
drug'intelligence activities abroad to ensure that these
activities are consistent with foreign intelligence<programs;
! Shall establish common security and access
standards for managing and handling intelligence systems,
information, and products, with special emphasis on
facilitating: '
5
ii o A! The fullest and most prompt access to and
dissemination of information and intelligence practicable,
assigning the highest priority to detecting, preventing,
preempting, and disrupting terrorist threats and activities
against the United States, its interests, and allies; and
B! The establishment of standards for an
interoperable information sharing enterprise that facilitates
the sharing of intelligence information among elements of the
Intelligence Community;
! Shall ensure that appropriate departments and
agencies have access to intelligence and receive the support
needed=to-perform independent analysis! i '
8! Shall protect, and ensure that programs are
developed to protect, intelligence sources, methods, and
activities from unauthorized disclosure; ~
9! 'Shall, after consultation with the heads of
affected departments and agencies, establish guidelines for
Intelligence Community elements for:
' A! Classification and declassification of all
intelligence and intelligencerelated information classified .
under the authority of the Director or the authority of the head
of a department or Intelligence Community element; and
B! Access to and dissemination of all
intelligence and intelligencerelated information, both in its
final form and in the form when initially gathered, to include
intelligence originally classified by the head of a department
or Intelligence Community element, except that access to and
dissemination of information~cQncerning United States persons
shall be governed by procedures developed in accordance with
Part 2 of this order; .
0! May, only with respect to Intelligence
Community elements, and after consultation with the head of the
¢
originating Intelligence Community element or the head of the
originating department, declassify, or direct the
declassification of, information or intelligence relating to
intelligence sources, methods, and activities. The Director may
only delegate this authority to the Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence;
a ll! May establish; operate, and direct one or more
national intelligence centers to address intelligence
priorities; _
i 2! May establish Functional Managers and Mission
Managers, and designate officers or employees of the
United States to serve in these positions.
A! Functional Managers shall report_to the,
Director concerning the execution~of their duties as Functional
Managers, and may be charged with developing and implementing
strategic guidance, policies, and procedures for activities
related to a specific intelligence discipline or set of
A
intelligence activities; set training and tradecraft standards;
and ensure coordination within and across intelligence -
disciplines and Intelligence Community elements and with related
nonintelligence activities. Eunctional Managers may also
advise the Director on: the management of resources; policies
and procedures; collection capabilities and gaps;~processing and
dissemination of intelligence; technical architectures; and
other issues or activities determined by the Director.
i! The Director of the National
Security Agency is designated the Functional Manager for signals
intelligence; '
ii! The Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency is designated the Functional Manager for
human intelligence; and
iii! The Director of the National
. 7
~
»
GeospatialIntelligence Agency is designated the Functional
Manager for geospatial intelligence.
B! Mission Managers shall serve as principal
substantive advisors on all or specified aspects of intelligence
related to designated countries, regions, topics, or functional
issues; _
3! Shall establish uniform criteria for the
determination of relative priorities for the transmission of
critical foreign intelligence, and advise the Secretary'of
Defense concerning the communications requirements of the
Intelligence Community for the transmission of such
communications;
4! Shall have ultimate responsibility for I
production and dissemination of intelligence produced by the
Intelligence Community and authority to levy analytic tasks on
intelligence production organizations within the Intelligence
Community, in consultation with the heads of the Intelligence
Community elements concerned; _
5! May establish advisory groups for the purpose
of obtaining advice from within the Intelligence Community to
carry out the Director's responsibilities, to include
Intelligence Community executive management committees composed
of senior Intelligence Community leaders. _Advisory groups shall
consist of representatives from elements of the Intelligence
Community, as designated by the Director, or other executive
branch departments,"agencies, and offices, as appropriate;
I6! Shall ensure the timely exploitation and
dissemination of data gathered by national intelligence '
collection means, and ensure that the resulting intelligence is
disseminated immediately to appropriate government elements,
including military commands; V
7! Shall determine requirements and priorities
8
0
a
I_
i *'**for, and manage and direct the tasking, collection, analysis,
production, and dissemination of, national intelligence by
elements of the Intelligence Community, including approving
requirements for collection and analysis and resolving conflicts
in collection requirements and in the tasking of national
collection assets of Intelligence Community elements except
when otherwise directed by the President or when the Secretary
of-Defense exercises collection tasking authority under plans
and arrangements approved by the Secretary of Defense and the
Director!; .
l8! May provide advisory tasking concerning
collection and analysis of information or intelligence relevant
to national intelligence or national secgrity to departments,
agencies, and establishments of the Uhited States Government
that are not elements of the Intelligence Community; and shall
establish
procedures, in consultation with affected heads of
departments or agencies and subject to approval by the Attorney
General, to implement this authority and to monitor or evaluate
the responsiveness of United States Government departments,
agencies, and other establishments;
9! Shall fulfill the responsibilities in
section l.3 b! l7! and 8! of this order, consistent with
applicable law and with full consideration bf the rights of
United States persons, whether information is to be collected
inside or outside the United States;
0! Shall ensure, through appropriate policies and
procedures, the deconfliction, coordination, and integration of
all intelligence activities conducted by an Intelligence
Community element or funded'by the National Intelligence
Program. In accordance with these policies and procedures:
A! The Director of the Federal Bureau of
9
Investigation shall coordinate the clandestine collection of
foreign intelligence collected through human sources or through
humanenabled means and counterintelligence activities inside
the United States;
B! The Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency shall coordinate the clandestine collection of foreign
intelligence collected through human sources or through human-
enabled means and counterintelligence activities outside the
United States;
C! All policies and procedures for the _
coordination of counterintelligencexactivities and the
clandestine collection of foreign intelligence inside the
United States shall be subject to the approval of the Attorney
General; and '
D! All policies and procedures developed under
this section shall be coordinated with the heads of affected
departments and Intelligence Community elements;
1! Shall, with the»concurrence of the heads of
affected departments and agencies, establish joint procedures to
deconflict, coordinate, and synchronize intelligence activities
conducted by an Intelligence Community element or funded by the
National Intelligence Program, with intelligence activities,
activities that involve foreign intelligence and security
services; or activities that involve the use of clandestine
methods, conducted by other United States Government
departments, agencies, and establishments;,
2! Shall, in coordination with the heads of
departments containing elements of the Intelligence Community,
develop proceduresdto govern major system acquisitions funded in
whole or in majority part by the National Intelligence Program;
3! Shall seek advice from the Secretary of State
to ensure that the foreign policy implications of proposed
10
intelligence activities are considered, and shall ensure,
through appropriate policies and procedures, that intelligence
activities are conducted in a manner consistent with the
responsibilities pursuant to law and presidential direction of
Chiefs of United States Missions; and
4! Shall facilitate the use of Intelligence
Community products by the Congress in a secure manner.
c! The Director's exercise of authorities in the
Act ahd this order shall not abrogate the statutory or
other responsibilities oE'the~heads of departments of the
United States Government or the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency. Directives issued and actions taken by
the Director in the exercise of the,Diréctor!s-authorities
and responsibilities to integrate, coordinate, and make the
Intelligence Community more effective in providing intelligence
related to national security shall be implemented by the '
elements of the Intelligence Community, provided*that any
department head whose department contains an element of the
Intelligence Community and who believes that a directive or
action of the Director violates the requirements of section 1018
»of the IRTPA or'this subsection shall bring the issue to the
attention of the Director, the.NSC, or the President for
resolution in a manner that respects and does not abrogate the
statutory responsibilities of the heads of the departments.
d! Appointments to certain positions. -
! The relevant department or bureau head shall
provide recommendations and obtain the concurrence of the'
Director for the selection of: the Director of the National
Security Agency, the Director of the National Reconnaissance
Office, the Director of the National GeospatialIntelligence
Agency, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Intelligence and Analysis, the Assistant Secretary of State for
ll/
v
iii lili-
Intelligence and Research, the Director of the Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of
Energy, the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of
the Department of the Treasury, and the Executive Assistant
Director for the National Security Branch of the Federal Bureau
of investigation. If the Director does not concur in the
recommendatioh, the department head may not fill the vacancy or
make the recommendation to the President, as the case may be.
If the department head and the Director do not reach an
agreement on the selection or recommendation, the Director and
the department head concerned may advisevthe President directly
of the Director's intention to withhold concurrence.
! The relevant department head_shall~consult»with
the Director before appointing an individual to fill a vacancy
or recommending to the President an individual be nominated to
fill a vacancy in any of the following positions: the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency; uniformed heads of the intelligence
elements of the Army, the Navy,the Air Force, and the Marine
Corps above the rank of Major Ceneral or hear Admiral; the
Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard for Intelligence; and
the Assistant Attorney General for National Security.
e! Removal from certain positions.
! Except for the Director of the Central
intelligence Agency, whose removal the Director may recommend to
the President, the Director and the.relevant department head
shall consult on the removal, or recommendation to the President
for removal,'as the case may be, of: the Director of the -
National Security Agency, the Director of the National
Ge0spatialIntelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security
for Intelligence and Analysis, the Assistant Secretary of State
12v
_- -11
.
for Intelligence and Research, and the Assistant Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury. If
the Director and the department head do not agree on removal, or
recommendation for removal, either may make a recommendation to
the President for the removal of the individual.
! The Director and the relevant department or
bureau head shall consult on the removal of: the Executive
Assistant Director for the National Security Branch of the_
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Office of
Intelligence and-Counterintelligence of the Department of"
Energy, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office,
the Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard for Intelligence,
and the'Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. withl 7 _ _
respect to an individual appointed by a department head, the
department_head may remove the individual upon the request of
the Director; if the department head chooses not to remove the
individual, either the Director or the department head may
advise the'President of the department head's intention to
retain the individualI In.the case of the Under Secretary of~
Defense for Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense may recommend
to the President either the removal or the retention of the
individual. For uniformed'heads'of the intelligence elements of
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, the
Director may make a recommendation for removal to the Secretary
of Defense.
! Nothing in this subsection shall be construed
to limit or otherwise affect the authority of the Presideht to
nominate appoint, assign, or terminate the appointment or A
assignment of any individual, withor without a consultation,
recommendation, or concurrence.
1.4 The Intelligence Community. Consistent with applicable
Federal law and with the other provisions of this order, and
13
under the leadership of the Director, as specified in such law
and thisorder, the Intelligehce Community shall:
a! Collect and provide information needed by the
President and, in the performance of executive functions, the
Vice President, the NSC, the Homeland Security Council, the
Chairman of~the Joint Chiefs of Staff, senior military
commanders, and other executive branch officials and, as
appropriate, the Congress of-the United States; 92
b! In accordance with'priorities set by the President,
collect information concerning, and conduct activities to
protect against, international terrorism, proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, intelligence activities directed
against the United States, international criminal drug
activities; and otherhostile activities directed against the
United States by foreign powers, organizations, persons, and
their agents; 4
c! Analyze, produce, and disseminate intelligence;
d! Conduct administrative, technical, and other support
activities within the United States and abroad necessary for
the performance of authorized activities, to include providing
services of common concern for the Intelligence Community as
designated by the Director in accordance with this order;
e! Conduct research, development, and procurement of
technical systems and devices relating to authorized functions.
and missions or the provision of services of common concern for
the Intelligence Community; ' '
f! Protect the security of intelligence related
activities, information, installationsf property, and employees
by appropriate means, including such investigations of
applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with
similar associations with the Intelligence Community elements a
are necessary; '
14
g! Take into account State, local, and tribal
governments! and, as appropriate, private sector entities
information needs relating to national and homeland security:
h! Deconflict, coordinate, and integrate all intelligence
activities and other information gathering in accordance with
section 1.3 b!0! of this order; and
i! Perform such other functions andduties related to
intelligence activities as the President may direct.
1.5 Duties and~Responsibilities of the Heads of Executive
Branch Departments and Agencies. The heads of all departments
and agencies shall:
a! Provide the Director access to all information and
intelligence relevant to the national security or that otherwise
is_required-for_the performance-of the Direétorls duties,
to include administrative and other appropriate management
information, except such information excluded by law, by the
President, or by the Attorney General acting under this order
at the direction of the President;
. b! Provide all programmatic and budgetary information
necessary to support the Director in developing the National
Intelligence Program;
c! Coordinate development and implementation of
"intelligence systems and architectures and, as appropriate,
operational systems and architectures of their departments,
agencies, and other elements with the Director to respond
to national intelligence requirements and all applicable
information sharing and security guidelines, information
privacy, and other legal requirements;
d! Provide, to the maximum extent permitted by
law, subject to the availability of appropriations and not
inconsistent with the mission of the department or agency, such
further-support to the Director as the Director may request,
15
after consultation with the head of the department or agency,
for the performance of the Director's functions;
e! Respond to advisory tasking from the Director
under section 1.3 b!8! of this order to the greatest extent
possible, in accordance with applicable policies established
by the head-of the responding department or agency;
f! 'Ensure that all elements within the department
or agency comply with the provisions of Part 2 of this order,
regardless of Intelligence Community affiliation, when
performing foreign intelligence and counterintelligencé
functions;
g! Deconflict, coordinate, and integrate all
intelligence activities in accordance with section 1.3 b!0!
and intelligence and other activities in accordance with
section 1.3 b!1! of this order;
h! Inform the Attorney General, either directly or
through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Director
of clandestine collection of foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence activities inside the United States not
coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation; '
i! Pursuant to arrangements developed by the head of
the department or agency and the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency and approved by the Director, inform the
Director and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
either directly or through his designee serving outsidethe
United States, as appropriate, of clandestine-collection of
foreign intelligence collected through human sources or through
humanenabled means outside the United States that has not been
coordinated with the Central Intelligence Agency; and
j! Inform the Secretary of Defense, either directly or
through his designee, as appropriate, of clandestine collection
of foreign intelligence outside the United States in a region of
-
combat or contingency military operations designated by the
Secretary of Defense, for purposes of this paragraph, after
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence.
1.6 Heads of Elements of the Intelligence Community. The heads
of elements of the Intelligence Community shall:
a! Provide the Director access to all information and
intelligence relevant to the national security or that otherwise
is required for the performance of the Director's duties,
to include administrative and other appropriate management
information, except~such information excluded by law, by the
President, or by the Attorney General acting under this order
-at the direction of the President;
Q2!: Repeat; 15° the Attorney Ge.I1§£B.l possible vi<>I.ations.
of Federal criminal laws by employees and of specified Federal
criminal laws by any other person-as provided in procedures
agreed upon by the Attorney General and the head of the
department, agency, or establishment concerned, in a manner
consistent with-the protection of intelligence sources and
methods, as specified in those procedures;
c! Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board, consistent
with-Executive Order 13462 of February 29; 2008, and provide
'copies of all such reports to the Director, concerning any
intelligence activities of their elements that they have reason
to believe may be unlawful or contrary to executive order or
presidential directive;
d! Protect intelligence and intelligence sources,
methods, and activities from unauthorized disclosure in
accordance with guidance from the Director;
e! Facilitate, as appropriate, the sharing of information
or intelligence, as directed"by law or the President, to State,
local, tribal, and private sector entities;
fh Disseminate information or intelligence to foreign
l7
governments and international organizations under intelligence
or counterintelligence arrangements or agreements established in
accordance with section l.3 b!! of this order;
g! Participate in the development of procedures approved
by the Attorney General governing production and dissemination
of information or intelligence resulting from criminal drug t_
intelligence activities abroad if they have intelligence
responsibilities for foreign or domestic criminal drug
production and trafficking; and
h! Ensure that the inspectors general, general counsels,
and agency officials responsible for privacy or civil liberties
protection for their respective,organizations have access to any
information or intelligence necessary to perform their official
duties. '
1.7 Intelligence Community Elements. ~Bach element of
the Intelligence Community-shall have the duties and
responsibilities specified below, in*addition to those
specified by law or elsewhere in this order. Intelligence
Community elements within executive departments shall servé the
information and intelligence needs of their respective heads
of departments and also shall operate as part of an integrated
Intelligence Community, as provided in law or this order.
a! rat CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. The Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency shall:
!Collect including through clandestine means!,
analyze, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence and.
counterintelligence; Q i
! Conduct counterintelligence activities without
assuming or performing any internal security functions within
the United States;
! Conduct administrative and technical support
activities within and outside the United States as necessary for
18
cover and proprietary arrangements;
! Conduct covert action activities approved by t
President. No agency except the Central Intelligence Agencyhe
Or
the Armed Forces of~the United $tates in time of war declared by
the Congress or during any period covered by a report from th
President to the Congress consistent with the War Powers,
Resolution, Public Law 93-148! may conduct any covert action
activity unless the President determines that another agency
more likely to achieve a particular objective;
_ ! Conduct foreign intelligence liaison
relationships with intelligence or security services of forei
governments or international organizations consistent with
section 1;3 b!! of this order;
! Under the direction and guidance of the Direct
and in accordance with section l.3 b!! of this order,
coordinate the'implementation of intelligence and
counterintelligence relationships between elements of the '
Intelligence Community»and the intelligence or security servi
of foreign governments or international"organizations; and
! Perform such other functions and duties relate
to intelligence as the Director may direct.
b! THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. The Director of t
Defense Intelligence Agency shall: _
! Collect including through clandestine means!,
analyze, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence to support national and departmental
missions;
! Collect,~analyze, produce, or, through tasking
and coordination, provide defense and defenserelated
intelligence for the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of th
Joint Chiefs of Staff,-combatant commanders, other Defense
components, and nonDefense agencies;
19
92e
is
9!
or,
ces
d
he
E
> v -! Conduct counterintelligence activities;
! Conduct administrative and technical support
activities within and outside the United States as necessary for
cover and proprietary arrangements;
! Conduct foreign defense intelligence liaison
relationships and defense intelligence exchange programs with
foreign defense establishments, intelligence or security
services of foreign governments, and international organizations
in accordance with sections l.3 b!!, l.7 a!!, and 1.10 i! of
this order;
! Manage and coordinate all matters related to the
Defense Attaché system; and
! Provide foreign intelligence and :
_counterintel1igencéstaff support as directed by the Secretary
of Defense. v
C! THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY. The Director of the
rNational security Agency shall: . V
! Collect including through clandestine means!,
process, analyze, produce, and disseminate signals intelligence
information and data for foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence purposes to support national and
departmental missions; '
! Establish and operate an effective unified
organization for signals intelligence activities, except for the
delegation of operational control over certain operations that
are conducted through other elements'of the Intelligence
Community. No other department or agency may engage in signals
intelligence activities except pursuant to a delegation by the
Secretary of Defense, after coordination with the Director;
! Control signals intelligence collection and
processing activities; including assignment of resources to an
appropriate agent for such periods and tasks as required for the
20
direct support of military commanders;
! Conduct administrative and technical support
activities within and outside the United States as necessary for
cover arrangements;
! Provide signals intelligence support for national
and departmental reguirements and for the conduct of military
operations;
! Act as the National Manager for National Security
Systems as established in law and policy, and in this capacity
be responsible to the Secretary of Defense and to the Director;
! Prescribe, consistent with section lO2A g! of
the Act, within its field of authorized operations, security
regulations covering operating practices, including the
transmission, nandring, and distribution of signals intelligence
and communications security material within and among the
elements under control of the Director of the National Security
Agency, and exercise the necessary supervisory control to ensure
compliance with the regulations; and
8! Conduct foreign cryptologic liaison relationships
in accordance with sections 1.3 b! A!, 1r7 a!!, and l.10 i! of
this order. w
d! THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE. The Director of
the National Reconnaissance Office shall:
! Be-responsible for research and development,
acquisition, launch, deployment, and operation of overhead
systems and related data processing facilities to collect
intelligence and information to support national and
departmental missions and other United States Government needs;
and
! Conduct foreign liaison relationships relating
to the above missions, in accordance with sections l.3 b!!,
l.7 a!!, and l.lO i! of this order. .
92 21
i
e! THE NATIONAL GEOSPATIALINTELLIGENCE AGENCY. The
Director of the National Geospatial<Intelligence Agencylshallz
! Collect, process, analyze, produce, and
disseminate geospatial intelligence information and data for
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes to support
national and departmental missions; '
! Provide geospatial intelligence support for
national and departmental requirements and for the conduct of
imilitary operations;
! Conduct administrative and technical support
activities within and outside the United States as necessary for
cover arrangements; and
! Conduct foreignigeospatial intelligence liaison
relationships; in accordance with sections l.3 b!!, 1.7 a!!,
and 1.10 i! of thi-s order. '
f! THE INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELDIGQNCE ELEMENTS OF
THE ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE, AND MARINE CORPS. The Commanders and
heads of the intelligence and counterintelligence elements of
the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps shall:
! Collect including through clandestine means!,
produce, analyze, and disseminate defense and defenserelated
intelligence and counterintelligence to support departmental
requirements, and, as appropriate, national requirements; '
! Conduct counterihtelligence activities;
! Monitor the development, procurement, and
management of tactical intelligence systems and equipment and
conduct related research, development, and test and evaluation
activities; and '
! Conduct.military intelligence liaison
relationships and military intelligence eichange programs with
selected cooperative foreign-defense establishments and
international organizations in accordance with
2292 a
9
sections l,3 b!!, 1.7 a!!, and l.10 i! of this order.
q! INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS or was FEDERAL BUREAU or
INVESTIGATION; Under the supervision.of the Attorney General
and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General'may
establish, the intelligence elements'of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall: ,
! Collect including through clandestine means!,
analyze, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence to support national and departmental
missions, in'accordance with procedural guidelines approved by
the Attorney General, after consultation with the Director;
! Conduct counterintelligence activities; and
! Conduct foreign intelligence and<
counterintelligence liaison relationships with intelligence,
security, and law enforcement services of foreign governments
international organizations in accordance with
sections l.3 b!! and l.7 a!!.of this»order.
h! THE INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTBRINTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS OF
THE COAST GUARD. The Commandant of the Coast Guard shall: '
I! Collect including through clandestine means!q
analyze, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence and
counterihtelligence including defense and defenserelated
information and intelligence to support92national92and
departmental missions;
! Conduct counterintelligence activities;
! Monitor the development, procurement, and
management of,tactical intelligence systems and equipment ands
conduct related research, development, and test and evaluation
activities; and
! Conduct foreign intelligence liaison
relationships and intelligence exchange programs with foreign
intelligence services, security services or international
23
organizations in accordance with sections 1.3 b!!, l.7 a!!,
and, when operating as part of the Department of Defense,
1.111! of this order.
i! THE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE; THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE,AND ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF
THE TREASURY; THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE, DRUG
- ENFORCEMENTADMINISTRATION; THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND I
ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; AND THE OFFICE OFu
INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY.
The heads of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department
of State; the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department
of the Treasury; the Office of National Security Intelligence,
Drug Enforcement Administration; the Office of Intelligence and-
Analysis, Department of Homeland Security; and the Office of >
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Department of Energy
shall: -
! Collect overtly or through publicly available
sources!, analyze, produce, and disseminate informationp
intelligence, and counterintelligence to support national and
departmental missions; and
! Conduct and participate.in analytic or
information exchanges with foreign partners and international
organizations in accordance with sections'1.3 b!! and
_ l.7 a!! of this order.
j! THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
The Director shall collect overtly or through publicly
available sources!, analyze, produce, and disseminate
information, intelligence, and counterintelligence to support
the missions of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, including the National Counterterrorism Center,
and to support other national missions.
1.8 The Department of State. In addition to the authorities
24
I
exercised by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research under
sections 1.4 and l.7 i! of this order, the Secretary of State _
shall: >
a! Collect overtly or through publicly available
sources! information relevant to United States foreign policy
and national security concerns;
b! Disseminate, to the maximum extent possible, reports
received from United States diplomatic and consular posts;
c! Transmit reporting requirements and advisory taskings
of the Intelligence Community to the Chiefs of United States
Missions abroad; and
d! Support Chiefs of United States Missions in
discharging their responsibilities pursuant to law and
presidentialdirection.
1.9 The Departmentof the Treasury. In addition to the
authorities exercised by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis
of the Department of<the Treasury under sections 1.4 and l.7 i!
of this order the Secretary of the Treasury shall collect
overtly or through publicly available sources! foreign
financial information and, in consultation with the Department
of State, foreign economic'information.
1.10 The Department of Defense. The Secretary ofDefense
shall: "
a! Collect including through clandestine means!,
analyze, produce, and disseminate information and intelligence
and be responsive to collection tasking and advisory tasking by
the Director;
b! Collect including through clandestine means!,
analyze, produce, and disseminate defense and defenserelated
intelligence and counterintelligence, as required for execution
of the Secretary's responsibilities; _
c! Conduct programs and missions necessary to fulfill
25
i
<
national, departmental, and tactical intelligence requirements;
d! Conduct counterintelligence activities in support
of Department of Defense components and coordinate
counterintelligence activities in accordance with
section l.3 b!0! and l!~of this order; '
e! Act, in coordination with the Director, as the
executive agent of the United States Government for signals
intelligence activities;
f! Provide for the timely transmission of critical
intelligence, as defined by the Director, within the
United States Government;
g! Carry out or contract for research, development,
and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to
authorized intelligence functions;
h! Protect the security of Department of Defense
installations, activities, information, property, and
employees by appropriate means, including such'investigations
of-applicants, employees, contractors, and.other persons with
similar associations with the Department of Defense as are
necessary; W
ii Establish and maintain defense intelligence
relationships and defense intelligence exchange programs
with selected-cooperative foreign defense establishments,
intelligence or security services of foreign governments, and
international organizations, and ensure that such relationships
and programs are in accordance with sections l.3 b!X4!,
1.3 b!l! and 1.7 a!! of this order}
j! Conduct such administrative and technical support
activities within and outside the United States as are necessary
to provide for cover and proprietary arrangements, to perform
the functions described in sections a! though ii! above, and to
support the Intelligence Community elements of the Department of
26|
v
Defense; and
k! Use the Intelligence Community elements within the
Department of Defense identified in section 1.7 b! through f!
and, when the Coast Guard is operating as part of the Department
of Defense,
h! above to carry out the Secretary of Defense's
responsibilities assigned in this section or other departments,
agencies, or offices within the Department of Defense, as
appropriate, to conduct the intelligence missions and
responsibilities assigned to the Secretary'of Defense.
1.11 The Department of Hbmeland'Security. In addition to the
authorities exercised by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis
of the Department of Homeland Security under sections 1.4 and
I.7 i! of this order[Tthe secretary of homeland Security shall
conduct, through the United $tates Secret Service; activities to
determine the existence and capability of surveillance equipment
being used against the President or the Vice President of the
United States, the Executive Office of the President, and,
as authorized by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the
President, other Secret Service protectees and United States
officials. No information shall be acquired intentionally
through such activities except to protect against use of such
surveillance equipment, andthose activities shall be conducted
pursuant to procedures agreed upon by the Secretary of Homeland
Security and the Attorney General. '~
1.12 The Department of Energy. In addition to the authorities
exercised by the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
of the Department of Energy under sections 1.4 and 1.7 i! of
this order, the Secretary of Energy shall: V
a! Provide expert scientific, technical, analytic, and
research capabilities to other agencies within the Intelligence
Community, as appropriate;
27
' b! Participate in formulating intelligence collection and
analysis requirements where the special expert capability of the
Department can Contribute; and
cl Participate with the Department of State in overtly
collecting information with respect to foreign energy matters.
1.13 The Federal Bureau,of Investigation. sin addition to the
authorities exercised by the intelligence elements of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice
under sections l.4 and l.7 g! of this order and under the
supervision of the Attorney General and-pursuant to such
regulations as the Attorney General may establish, the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall provide technical
assistance, within or outside the United States, to foreign
intelligence andIaw enforcement services, consistent with
section 1.3 b!0! and 1! of this order, as may be necessary
to support national or departmental missions.
PART 2 - Conduct of Intelligence Activities .
2.1 Need. Timely, accurate, and insightful information about
the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign
powers, organizations, and persons,_and their agents, is
essential to informed decisionmaking in the areas of national
security, national defense, and foreign relations. Collection
of such information is a priority objective and will be pursued
in a vigorous, innovative, and responsible manner that is
consistent with the Constitution and applicable law and
respectful of the principles upon which the United States was
foundedu -
2.2 Purpose. This.Order is intended to enhance human and
technical collection techniques, especially those undertaken
abroad{ and the acquisition of significant foreign intelligence,
as well as the detection and countering of international
terrorist activities, the spread of weapons of mass destruction,
28
92
n
and.espionage conducted by foreign powers. Set forth below are
certain general principles that, in addition to and consistent
with applicable laws, are intended to achieve the proper balance
between the acquisition of essential information and protection
of individual interests. Nothing in this Order shall be
construed to apply to or interfere with any authorized civil or
criminal law enforcement responsibility of any department or
agency. ~
2.3 Collection of information. Elements of the Intelligence
Community are authorized to collect, retain, or disseminate
information concerning United States persons only in accordance
with procedures established by the head of the Intelligence
Community element concernedgqy by the head of a»department
containing such element and approved by the Attorney General,
consistent with the authorities provided by Part 1 of this
Order, after consultation with the Director. Those~procedures
shall permit collection, retention, and dissemination of the
following,types of information:
a! Information that is.publicly available or collected
with the consent of the person concerned;
b! Information constituting foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence, including such information concerning
corporations or other commercial organizations. Collection-
within the UnitedStates of foreign intelligence not otherwise
obtainable shall be undertaken'by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation FBI! or, when significant foreign intelligence is
sought, by other authorized elements of the Intelligence
Community, provided that no foreign intelligence collection by
such elements may be undertaken for the purpose of acquiring
information concerning the domestic activities of United States
persons;
c! Information obtained in the course of a lawful foreign
29
intelligence, counterintelligence, international drug or
international terrorism investigation;
d! Information.needéd to protect the safety of any persons
or organizations, including those who are targets, victims, or
hostages,of international terrorist organizations; '
e! Information needed to protect foreign intelligence or-
counterintelligence sources, methods, and activities from
unauthorized disclosurea Collection within the United States
shall be undertaken by the FBI except that other elements of the
Intelligence Community may also collect such information
concerning preseht or former employees, present or former '
intelligence element contractors or their present or former
employees, or applicants for such employment or contracting;
~ f! Information concerning persons who are reasonably
believed to be potential sources or contacts for the purpose of
determining their suitability or credibility;
lg! Information arising out of a lawful personnel,
physical, or communications security investigation; t
h! Information acquired by overhead reconnaissance not
directed at specific United States persons;
Ki! Incidentally obtained information that may indicate
involvement in activities that may violate Federal, state,
local, or foreign laws; and
j! Information necessary for administrative purposes.
In addition, elements of the Intelligence Community may
disseminate information to each appropriate element within the
Intelligence Community for purposes of allowing the recipient
element to determine~whether the information is relevant to its
responsibilities and can be retained by it, except that
information derived from signals intelligence may only be
disseminated or made available to Intelligence Community
elements in accordance with procedures established by the
30
»
Uireetor in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and
approved by the Attorney General. _
2.4 Collection Techniques. Elements of the Intelligence
Community shall use the least intrusive collection techniques
feasible within the United States or directed against
United States persons abroad. Elements of the Intelligence
Community are not authorized to use such techniques as
electronic surveillance, unconsented physical searches, mail
surveillance, physical surveillance, or monitoring-devices ~
unless they are in accordance with procedures established by the
head of the Intelligence.Community element concerned or the head
of a department containing such element and approved by the
Attorney General, after consultation with the Director. Such
procedures shall protect constitutional and other legal rights
and limit use or such informationhto lawful governmental
purposes. These procedures shall not authorize:
a9 The Central Intelligence Agency CIA! to engage in
electronic surveillance within the United States except for the
purpose of training, testing, or conducting countermeasures to
hostile electronic surveillance;
b! Unconsented physical searches in the United States by
elements of the Intelligence Community other than the FBI,
except for: ' ,
! Searches by counterintelligence elements of the
military services directed against military personnel_within the
United States or abroad for intelligence purposes, when
authorized by a military commander empowered to approve physical
searches for'law enforcement purposes, based upon a finding of
probable cause to believe that such persons are acting as agents
of foreign powers; and
f Searches by CIA of personal property of non- -
United States persons lawfully in its possession;
31
c! Physical surveillance of a United States person in the
United States by elements of the Intelligence Community other
than the FBI, except for: -
! Physical surveillance of present or former
employees, present or former intelligence element contractors or
their present or former employeesr or applicants for any such
employment or contracting; and V
! Physical surveillance of a military person.
employed by a nonintelligence element of a military service;
and .
d! Physical surveillance of:a.United States person abroad
to collect foreign intelligence, except to obtain significant
information that cannot reasonably be acquired by other means.
2.5 AttorneyGeneral Approval. TheAttbrnéy General hereby is
delegated the power to approve the use for intelligence
purposes, within the United States or against a United States
person abroad, of any technique for which a warrant would be
required if undertaken for law enforcement purposes, provided
that such techniques shall not be undertaken unless the Attorney
General has determined in each case that there is probable cause
to believe that the technique is directed against a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power. The authority delegated -
pursuant to this paragraph, including the authority_to approve
the use of electronic surveillance as defined in the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, shall be
exercised in accordance with that Act.
2.6 Assistance to Law Enforcement and other Civil Authorities.
Elements of the Intelligence Community are authorized to:
a! Cooperate with appropriate law enforcement agencies for
the purpose of protecting the employees, information, property,
and facilities of any element of the Intelligence Community;
' b! Unless otherwise precluded by law or this Order,
32
participate in law enforcement activities to investigate or
prevent clandestine intelligence activities by foreign powers.
or international terrorist or narcotics activities;
c! Provide specialized equipment, technical knowledge, or
assistance of expert personnel for use by any department or
agency, or when lives are endangered, to support local law
enforcement agencies. Provision of assistance by expert
personnel shall be approved in each case by the general counsel
of the providing element or department; and
d! Render any other assistance and cooperation to law
enforcement or other civil authorities not precluded by
applicable law.
2.7 Contracting. Elements of the Intelligence Community are
authorized to enter into~contracts'or arrangements for the
provision of goods or services with private companies or
institutions in the United States andneed not reveal the
sponsorship of such contracts or arrangements for authorized
intelligence purposes. Contracts or arrangements with academic
institutions may be undertaken only with the consent of
appropriate officials of the institution.
2.8 Consistency With Other laws. Nothing in this Order shallbe
construed to authorize any activity in violation of the
Constitution or statutes of the United States.
2.9 Undisclosed Participation in Organizations Within the
Uhited States. No one acting on behalf of elements of the
Intelligence Community may join or otherwise participate in any
organization in the United States on behalf of any element of
the Intelligence Community without disclosing such person's
intelligence affiliation to appropriate officials of the
organization, except in accordance with procedures established
by the head of the Intelligence Community element concerned or
the head of a department containing such element and approved by
33
the Attorney General, after consultation with the Director.
Such participation shall be authorized only if it is essential
to achieving lawful purposes as determined by the Intelligence
Community element head or designee. No such participation may
be undertaken for the purpose of influencing the activity of the
organization or its members except in cases where: .
a! The participation is undertaken on behalf of the FBI in
the course of a lawful investigation; or
b! The organization concerned is composed primarily of
individuals who are not United tates persons and is reasonably
believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power.
2.10 Human Experimentation. No element of the Intelligence
Community shall sponsor, contract for, or conduct research on
human subjects except in accordance with guidelines issued by
the Department of Health and Human Services. The subject's
informed consent shall be documented as required by those
guidelines. '
2.11 Prohibition on Assassination. No person employed by or
acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in
or conspire to engage in assassination.
2.12 Indirect Participation. No element of the Intelligence
Community shall participate in or request any person to
undertake activities forbidden by this Order.
2.13 Limitation on Covert Action. No covert action may be
conducted which is intended to influence United States political
processes, public opinion, policies, or media.
PART 3 General Provisions
3.1 Congressional Oversight. The duties and responsibilities of
the Director and the heads of other departments, agencies,
elements, and entities engaged in intelligence activities to
cooperate with the Congress in the conduct of its
responsibilities for oversight of intelligence activities shall
34 '
4
be implemented in accordance-with applicable law, including
title V of the Act. The requirements of applicable law,
including title V of the Act, shall apply to all covert action
activities as defihed in this Order. _
3.2 Implementation. The President, supported by the NSC,
and the Director shall issue such appropriate directires,
procedures, and guidance as are necessary to implement this
order. Heads of elements*within the Intelligence Community
shall issue appropriate procedures and supplementary directives
consistent with this order. No procedures to implement Part 2
of this order shall be issued without the Attorney General's
approval, after consultation with the'Director. The Attorney
General shall provide a statement of reasons for not approving
any procedures established by the headlof an element in the
Intelligence Community or the head of the department containing
such element! other than the FBI. In instances where the
element head or department head and the Attorney General are
unable to reach agreements on other than constitutional or other
legal grounds, the Attorney General, the head of'department
concerned, or the Director shall refer the matter to the NSC.
3.3 Procedures. The activities herein authorized that
require procedures shall be conducted in accordance with
existing procedures or requirements established under Executive
Order 12333. New procedures, as required by Executive
Order 12333, as further amended! shall be established as
expeditiously as possible. All new procedures promulgated
pursuant to Executive Order l2333, as amended, shall be made
available to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives.
3.4 References and Transition. References to "Senior Officials
of the Intelligence Community" or "SOICs" in executive orders or
35
n
other Presidential guidance, shall be deemed references to the
heads of elements in the Intelligence Community, unless the
President otherwise directs; references in Intelligence
Community or Intelligence Community element policies or
guidance, shall be deemed to be references to the heads of
elements of the Intelligence Community, unless the President or
the Director otherwise directs.
3.5 Definitions. For the purposes of this Order, the following
terms shall have these meanings:
a! Counterintelligence means information gathered and
activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or
protect against espionage, other intelligence activities,
sabotage, or assassination§_conducted for or on behalf of '
foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or their agents, or
international terrorist organizations or activities. -
b! Covert action means an activity or activities of the
United States Government to influence political, economic, or
military conditions ahroad, where it is intended that the role
of the United States Government will not be apparent or
acknowledged publicly, but does not include: _
! Activities the primary purpose of which is to
acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence
activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the
operational security of United States Government programs, or
administrative activities;
! Traditional diplomatic or military activities or
routine support to such activities}
! Traditional law enforcement activities conducted
by United States Government law enforcement agencies or routine
support to such activities; or 4 K
! Activities to provide routine support to the
overt activities other than activities describedin
36
paragraph !, !, or !! of other United States Government
agencies abroad.
c! Electronic surveillance means acquisition of a
nonpublic communication by electronic means without the consent
of a person who is a party=to an electronic communication or, in
the case of a nonelectronic communication, without the consent
of a person who is visibly present at the place of
communication, but not including the use of radio direction-
finding equipment solely to determine the location of a
transmitter.
d! Employee means a person employed by, assigned
or detailed to, or acting for an element within the Intelligence
Community. _ _ e
e! Ebreign intelligence means information relating to the
capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments4
or elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or
international terrorists. ~
f! Intelligence includes-foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence.
g! Intelligence activities means all activities that
elements of the Intelligence Community are authorized to conduct
pursuant to this order. ~ '
h! Intelligence Community and elements of the
Intelligence Community refers to: u '
! The Qffice of the Director of National
Intelligence;
! The Central Intelligence Agency;
! The National Security Agency;
I
! The Defense Intelligence Agency;
! The National GeospatialIntelligence Agency;
! The National Reconnaissance Office;
! The other offices within the Department
.37
iof Defense for the co
intelligence through
8! The i
elements of the Army,Corps; n
9! The i
of Ineestigation;
0! The O
the Drug Enforcement
- ll! The O
Counterintelligence o
112! The B
Department of State;
l3L fhe O
Department of the Tre
4! The O
Department of Homelan
5! The i
elements of the Coast
6! Such
as may be designated
the Director and the
as an element of the
i! National In
National Security mea
source from which der
within or outside the
determined consistent_ if
llection of specialized national foreign
reconnaissance programs: . '
ntelligence and counterintelligence
the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine
ntelligence elements of the EederaloBureau
ffice of National Security Intelligence of
Administration;
ffice of Intelligence and
f the Department of Energy;
ureau ofIntelligence and Research of the
ffice of Intelligence and Analysis of7the
asury;
ffice of Intelligence and Analysis oi the
d Security;
ntelligence and counterintelligence
Guard; and
other elements of any department or agency
by the President, or designated jointly by
head of the department or agency concerned
Intelligence Community.
telligence and Intelligence Related to
ns all intelligence, regardless of the
ived and including information gathered
'United States, that pertains, as
with any guidance issued by the President
or that is determined for the purpose of access to information
by the Director in ac
order, to pertain tot
agency; and that invocordance with section 1.3 a!! of this
more than one United States Government
lves threats to the United States, its
38
F 92
people, property, or interests; the development, proliferation,
or use or weapons of mass destruction; or any other matter
bearing on United States national or homeland security.
j! The National Intelligence Program means all programs,
projects, and activities of the Intelligence Community, as well
as any other programs of the Intelligence Community designated
jointly by the Director and the head of a United States -
department or agency or by the President. Such term does not
include programs, projects, or activities o the military
departments to acquire intelligence solely for the planning and
conduct of tactical military operations by United States Armed
Forces.
k! United States person means a United States citizen, an
alien known-by the intelligence element concerned to be a
permanent resident alien, an unincorporated association
substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent
resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the _
United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled
by aforeign government or governments.
3.6 Revocation. Executive Orders 133543and 13355 of August 27,
2004, are.revoked; and paragraphs 1.3 b! 9! and 0! of Part 1
supersede provisions within Executive Order 12958, as amended,
to the extent such provisions in Executive Order 12958, as
amended, are inconsistent with this Order.
3.7 General Provisions:
a! Consistent with section 1.3 c! of this order, nothing
in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
! Authority granted by law to a department or
agency, or the head thereof; or
! Functions oi the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget relating to budget,
administrative, or legislative proposals.
g 39
a
i _'* _ J " ~ * ' 92
>
b! This order shall be implemented consistent with
applicable law and subiect tp the availability of
appropriations. '
c! This order is intendeq only to improve the internal
management of the executive branch and is not intended to,
and does not, create any rignt or benefit, substantive or
_ s procedural, enfoiceable at law or in equity, by any party
against the United States, its departments, agencies or
entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other
person. '
/s/ Ronald Reagan
THE WHITE HOUSE
December 4, 1981
46
ALL FBI INFORHQTIQK CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
~ DAIE ovens-2009 BY 60322 UCfLPf5TP/JCF
UN CLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Q
Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide
Appendix D: Supel-ceded Documents and NFIP, MIOG, and MAOP
Sections
U//FOUO! This Manual supersedes the following FBI policies and procedures:
U//FOUO! The following MIOG sections are superseded by the DIOG:
MIOG Section
Introduction
MIOG 1-1 Authority of a Special Agent
MIOG 1-2 InvestigativeResponsibility
'MIOG"1-3'TheAttorney Geiiéralifs Guidelines
Mail Cover SitesDIOG Section
DIOG Preamble W
DIOG 2.4.H
DIOG 3.3
DIOG 3.4
DIOG"5.6
DIOG Preamble
DOIG 2.1
MIOG 1-4 Investigative Authority and 1stAmendment 'D1OG'4.2
DIOG 2.4.A
MIOG~Pa1't 2, 10-6.2 and 3 i DIOG 11.3
Consensual Monitoring
MIOG Part 2,10-10.1_1O.,1O.6 _ DIOG 11.5
Monitoring Communications with Persons Outside the US
M100, Part 2, 23-4.10.
MIOG Pm 2 10-10.4
M100, Part 2, 10-10.3,
CCTV
M100 Part 2 10-10-8
MIOG Pan 2 10-10.9.1
M10G pm 2 101-10.9.1
MIOG Pan 2 10-19
MIOG part 210-10.9.4
Pen~Registers0100
I DIOG
and Part 1, 289-13.3. 0100
DIOG 11.6.3
DIOG 11.6.4
0100 11.6.5
0100 1 1.5.6
DIOG 11.6.6
]DRAF'11
D-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY1
UNCLASSIFIED -"FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Domestic Investigations andOperati0ns Guide
MIOG Part 2, Section 10-10-7 and 10-10.17
Electronic Surveillance
MIOG 10-8.1
MIOG 2-9 Grand Jury [6e]
MIOG, Part 2, 10-8.3.2
MIOG, Part 2, 2-9.4
MIOG Part2, 2-9.5 .1
MIOG Part 2, 2-9.7
MIOG Part 2, Section 2-9.8
MIOG, Part 2, 10-9
MIOG, Part 2, 10-9.10, § 3[a]
MIOG, Pan 2, 10-9.10, § 3[b]
MIOG, Part'2, 10-9.10, § 3[c]»
MIOG, Part 2, 10-9.10, § 3[d] 1
MIOG, Part2, 10-9.10, § 4
MIOG, Part 2, 10-9.10, § 5
NFIPM
Mail Cover Cites
NFIPM 2-2 1
Physical Searches~Court Order Not Required
NFIPM 2-15
Consensual Monitoring
NFIPM 3-01
NSLs
NFIPM 2-17. A
Pen Registers
NFIPM 3-04
Electronic Surveillance-
NFIPM 3-O4 _
NFIPM 3-05.4, 3-05.8
NFIPM 28
[DRAFT],
D2 .010011.11
D1OG11.11.1 thru 11.11.10
DIOG 11.12
DIOG~11.12
DIOG11112
DIOG11.12
DIOG11.12
DlOG11.12
DIOG 1.1.12
DIOG 11.12
DIOG 11.12
DlOG11.12
DIOG11.12
D1OG11.12
D1OG11.12
DIOG-41.1.-12*
U//FOUO! The following NFIPM.provisions are superseded by the DIOG:
DIOG Sectir
DIOG 1 1.3
DIOG 1 1.4
DIOG 1 1.5
DIOG 11.9
DIOG 11.9.3
13106.1 1.111
DIOG11.11.1thru
DlOG11.12
DlOG11.12
DIOG 11.12
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY11.11.10
1
I
UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Domestic InYestigati0DS and Operations Guide
U/_/FOUO! The following Electronic Communications EC! and FD Forms, are superseded
by the DIOG:
EC/FD Form H 7 DIO/G
To Provide Guidance on Least Intrusive Techniques DIOG 4
in National Security and Criminal Investigations,~OGC DIOG 4.4
EC l9X-l-IQ-A1487720-QGC Serial !, 12/2_0/2007. DIOG -11.1.1
Mail Cover Cites '
Current policy EC dated 12//22/2004 DIOG 11.3
Consensual Monitoring ~
FD-670, Consensual Monitoring - Telephone Checklist DIOG 11.5
FJD-671, Consensual Monitoring Nontelephone Checklist
Electronic Surveillance -
EC issued by OGC on 12/20/07 DIOG 11.12
7 [DRAFT]
D3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
ALL FBI II~IFORMATION cuirnmrrzn
HEREIN Is UNCLASSIFIED
DATE or-us-2009 BY 60322 UC/LP/STP/JCF A
~ UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide
Appendix E: Key Words, Denitions, and Links _
Aggrieved Person: | I _ _
sessments: The Attorney General s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations AGG-'Dom!
combine threat assessments under the former Attorney General 's Guidelines for FBI National
Security Investigations and'Foreign Intelligence-Collection and the prompt and extremely"
limited checking out of initial leads under the former Attorney General s Guidelines on GeneralCrimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terroris h ' ' ' '
investigative category entitled assessments.|* l A _ I I
i
| - e FBI may also conduct assessments as part of its special events management
responsibilities. AGG-Dom, Part II! ,
Closed Circuit Television CCTV!: a fixed-location video camera that is typically concealedfrom view or that is, placed on or operatedby a consenting patty. _
C0n'sensual»Monit0ring: Monitor_ing.of communications for which a court order or warrant isnot lcgallyrequired because of the consent ofa paxtyto the communication.
Electronic Communication Service: Any service that provides to users thereof the ability tosend or receive wire or electronic communications. For example, telephone companies and
electronic mail companies generally act as providers of electronic communication services.
Electronic Communications System: Any wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical orphotoelectronic facilities for the transmission of wire or electronic communications, and any
_ E-1 7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYb2
b7E
b2
b'7E
b2
b7E
UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide
computer facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such
communications.
Electronic Storage: Any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication
incidental to the electronic transmission thereof, or any storage of such communication by an
electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication. In
short, electronic storage" refers only to temporary storage, made in the course of transmission,by a provider of an electronic communication service. _ .
Electronic Tracking Device: Direction nder including electronic tracking devices,.such as,
radio frequency beacons and transmitters, vehicle locator units, and the various devices that use aGlobal Positioning System or other satellite system for monitoring non-communication activity.
Employee: An FBI employee or an employee of another agency working under the direction and
control of the FBI.
Enterprise investigations are a type of full investigation and are subject to the same requirementsthat apply to full investigations described in Section 7. Enterprise investigations focus on groups
or organizations that may be involved in the most serious criminal or national security threats to
the public, as described in Section 8.5. Enterprise investigations cannot be conducted as
preliminary investigations or assessments, nor may they be»c_:onduct_ed for the sole purpose ofcollected foreign intelligence. ' I I I
Enterprise Investigationzi i
PISA: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended: The law establishes a
process for obtaining judicial approval of electronic surveillance and physical searches for the
purposes of collecting foreign intelligence. Orders for ELSUR surveillance are provided for theperiod of time not to exceed: 90 days for United States persons; 120 days for Non-United States
persons; and one year for a foreign-power. Renewal of FISA Orders may be requested for the
same period of time originally authorized based upon a continued showing of probable cause.For Non-United States persons, renewals can be for aperiod not to exceed one year. _, _ 92
i lat least 45 days prior to the expiration of the_ existing order.
92
E-2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYb2
b7Eb2
b7E
~
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For or On Behalf of a Foreign Power: The determination that activities aretfor or on behalf ofa foreign power shall be based on consideration of the» extent to which the foreign power isinvolvedlin control or policy direction; nancial ormaterial-support; or leadership, assignments,
or discipline.
Foreign Computer Intrusion: The use or attempted use of any cyber-activity or other means,by, for, or onbehalf of a foreign power to scan, probe, or gain unauthorized access into one ormore United States-based computers. -
Foreign Intelligence: Information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreigngovernments or elements thereof, foreign organizations or foreign persons, or intemational
terrorists.
Foreign Intelligence Requirements: .
5. National intelligence requirements issued pursuant to authorization by the Director ofNational Intelligence, including the National Intelligence Priorities Framework and theNational HUMINT Collection Directives, or any successor directives thereto; '
6. -Requests to collect foreign intelligence by the President or by'Intelligence"Commun_ityofficials designatedvbythe;President;andr r * i * i i
Directions to collect foreign intelligenceby the Attomey General, the Deputy AttorneyGeneral, or an ofcial designated by the Attomey General.
Foreign-Power: A foreign government or any component thereof, whether ornot recognized bythe United States; a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of UnitedStates persons; an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governmcntsttobe directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments; a group engaged inintemational terrorism or activities in preparation therefore; a foreign-based politicalorganization, not substantially composed of United States persons; oran entity that is directed orcontrolled by a foreign govemment or govemments.
Full Investigation: A full investigation may beinitiated if there is an articulable factual basis forthe investigation that reasonablyaindicates that a circumstance described in paragraph 3.a.-.b.exists orif acircumstance described in paragraph 3.0. exists All lawful methods may be used-in afull investigation.
A full investigation of a group or organization may be, initiated as an enterprise investigation ifthere is an articulable factualbasis fortthe investigation thatreasonably indicates that the groupor organization may have engaged or may be engaged in, or may have or may be engaged inplanning or preparation or provision of support for:
l. apattern of racketeering activity as dened in l8 U.S.C. § l96l !;
2. intemational terrorism or other threat to the national security;
3. domestic terrorism as dened in 18 U.S.C. § 2331! involving a violation of federal
criminal law; .
4. furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through activities that involve forceor violence and a violation of federalcriminal law; or i
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5. an offense described in l8 U.S.C. §§'2332b g!! B! or 18 U.S.C. § 43.
Human Source: A Condential Human Source as dened in the Attomey General=s Guidelines
Regarding the Use of FBI Condential Human Sources.
Intelligence Activities: Any activity conducted for intelligence purposes or to affect political or
govemmental processes by, for, or on behalf of a foreign power. _
International Terrorism: Activities that involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life
that violate federal, state, local, or tribal criminal law or would violate such law if committed
within the United States or a state, local, or tribaljurisdiction; appear to be intended to intimidate
or coerce.a civilian population; to inuence the policy of a govemmentby intimidation or
coercion; or to affect the conduct of a govemmentby assassination or kidnapping; and occur
totally outside the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by
which they are accomplished, the persons they appear to be intendedto coerce or intimidate, or
the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
National Security Lettersr an administrative demandfor documents or records that can be made
by the FBI during apredicated investigation relevant-to a threat to national security The standard
for issuing an NSL, except under 15 U.S;C. § I68lv, is relevance to an authorized investigation
to protect against intemational terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, prov_id§d»that such
an investigation of at Unitéd"States person is not predicated solely on activities protected by the .First Amen ' ' ' ' '
Pen Register Device: Records or decodes dialing, routing addressing or signaling information I
transmitted by an instrument or facility from whicha wire or electronic communication is e
transmitted, provided that such information must not include the content's.of any communication.
Physical Surveillance: The deliberate observation by an FBI employee of persons, places, or
events, on either a limited or continuous basis, in a public or arsemi-public e.g., commercial
business open tothepublic! setting. - _ -
Preliminary Investigation: Preliminary investigations may be carried out to detect, obtaininformation about. or prevent ' _ > ' 'b2
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The investigation of threats to the national security may constitute an exercise of the FBIs
criminal investigation authority as well as its authority to investigate threatsto the national
security. As with criminal investigations, detecting and solving crimes and arresting andprosecuting the perpetrators are likely objectives of investigations relating to threats to thenational security. These investigations, however, serve important purposes outside the ambit ofnormal criminal investigations, by providing the basis for, and informingdecisions conceming
other measures needed to protect the national security. '
Proprietary: A sole proprictorship, partnership, corporation, or other business entity operated on
a commercial basis, which is owned, controlled, or operated wholly or in part on behalf of the
FBI, and whose relationship with the FBI is concealed from third parties.
Provider of Electronic Communication Services: Any service that provides the user thereof '
the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.
Publicly Available: Information that has been published or broadcast for public consumption, isavailable on request to the public, is accessible on-line or otherwise to the public, is available tothe public by subscription or purchase, could be seen or heard by any casual observer, is madeavailable at a meeting open to the public, or is obtained by visiting any place or attending any
event that is open to the public.
Records: Any records, databases, les, indices, information systems, or other retained I
information.
Remote Computing Serviceszi
Sensitive Investigative Matters An investigative matter involving a domestic public official,
political candidate, religious or political organization or individual prominent in such anorganization, or news media, or any other matter which, in the judgment of the officialauthorizing an investigation, should be brought to the attention of FBI Headquarters andiotherDepartment of Justice ofcials. '
Sensitive Circumstance:
Sensitive Monitoring Circumstance:
l. Investigation of a member of Congress, a federaljudge, a member of the Executive
Branch at Executive Level IV or above, or a person who has served in such capacity
within the previous two years; Note: Executive Levels Ithrough IV are dened in 5"
U.S.C. §§ 53l_2-5315.!
2. Investigation of the Govemor, Lieutenant Govemor, or Attomey General of any state orterritory, or ajudge orjustice of the highest court of any-state or territory, concemingan offense involving bribery, conict of interest, ortextortion related to the performance
of ofcialduties; .
3. A party to the communication is in the custody of the-Bureau of Prisons or the United
_ States Marshals Service or is being or hasbeen afforded protection in the Witness
Security Program; or
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4. The Attomey General, the Deputy Attorney General, or an Assistant Attomey Generalhas requested that the FBI obtain prior approval for the use of consensual monitoring in
aspecic investigation.
Special Agent in Charge: The Special Agent in Charge of~an~FBl Field Ofce including an"Acting Special Agent in Charge!, except that the functions authorized for Special Agents inCharge by these Guidelines may also be exercised by the Assistant,Director in Charge or by anySpecial Agent in Charge designated by the Assistant Director in Charge in an FBI Field Oiceheaded by an Assistant Director, and by FBI Headquarters ofcials designated by the Director of
the FBI.
Special Events Management: Planning and conduct of public events or activities whose. * character may make.them attractive targets for terrorist attack,
State, Local, or Tribal: Any state or territory of the United States or political subdivision
thereof, the District of Columbia, or Indian tribe. 4
Surveillance: _ *
I. Electronic surveillance ELSUR! is the non-consensual electronic collection of
information usually communications! under circumstances in which theparties have a .* reasonable expectation ofprivacv an 0 1 t t - .. . . . - . - ' - - - ' - D
r
2. Physical surveillance is the deliberate observation by an FBI employee or a CHS of
persons, places, or events, on either a limited or continuous basis, in a public or a semi-public e.g., commercial business open to the pub ' _ ' , .
Threat~to the National Security: Intemational terrorism; espionage and other intelligenceactivities, sabotage, and assassination,- conducted by, for, or on behalf of foreign powers, .organizations, or persons; foreigncomputer intrusion; and other matters determined by theAttorney General, consistent with Executive Order 12333 or a successor order.
Trap and Trace Device: Captures the incoming electronic or other impulses that identify the toriginating number or other dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information reasonably
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likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, provided -that such
information does not include the contents of any communication.
Undercover Activity: Any investigative activity involving the use of an assumed identity by anundercover employee for an official purpose, investigative activity, or function;
Undercover Employee: An employee of the FBI, another federal, state, of local lawenforcement agency, another entity of the United States Intelligence Community, or another
foreign intelligence agency working under the direction andcontrol of the FBI whoserelationship with the FBI is concealed from third parties by themaintenance of a cover or alias
identity for an official purpose, investigative activity,_or function.
Undercover Operggnj -
United States: When used in a geographic sense, means all areas under the territorial
sovereignty of the United States. ' p
United States Person: Any of the following, but not including any association or corporation
that=is a foreign power as definedig Subpart .1;-.3.: .
1. An individual who is.a United States citizenor an alien lawfully admitted for
permanentresidence; '
2. An unincorporated association substantially composed of individuals who are UnitedStates persons; or - ,
3. A corporation incorporated in the United States.
In applying paragraph 2,, if a group or organization in the United Statesthatis affiliated with
a foreign-based intemational organization operates directly under the control of the -intemational organization and has no independent program or activities in the United States,the membership of the entire international organization shall be considered in determiningwhether it is substantially composed of United States persons. If, however, the _United States-based group or organization has programs or activities separate from, or in addition to, thosedirected by the intemational organization, only its membership in the United States shall beconsidered in determining whether it is substantially composed of United States persons. A,
classied directive provides further guidance concerning the determination of United States
person status.
Use: When used with respect to human sources, means obtaining information from, tasking, or
otherwise operating such sources.
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Appendix F: Acronyms
ACS
AD
ADIC
AFID
AG
AGG
AGG-CHS
AGG-Dom
AGG-ElxtAGG-UCO
AOR
ASAC
ATF
AUSA
CHSVSM
CIA
CID
CLEA'
CMS
CPO
cso
c"ru
CUORC
cw
DAD-
DAGUNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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.1
Condential Human Source Validation Source Manual
Central Intelligence Agency
Criminal Investigative Division
Criminal Law Enforcement Application
Collecti0n_Management Section
Corporate'Policy Office '
Chief Security Ofcer
Counterterrorism Division
Criminal Undercover Operations Review Committee
Cooperative Witness ~
DeputyAssistant Director A
Deputy Attomey General l
EQS
ELSUR
E0
ERS
Esn ~
ESU
FAA
FBI
FBIHQ
remer
FCC
FCRA
FGJ
FGUSO
FI
F1
»FIC_P
FIG
FISA
FISAMS
YFISC
Ii!
FRCP
FYIUNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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Electronic Communication Service
Electronic Surveillance '
Executive Order
ELSUR Records System
Electronic Serial Number
Electronic Surveillance Unit
Federal Aviation Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBI Headquarters
FBI Network
Federal Communications Commission
Fair Credit Reporting Act '
Federal Grand Jury
Field Guide for Undercover and Sensitive Operations
Foreign Intelligence
Full Investigation
Foreign Intelligence Collection Program
Field Intelligence Group
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
FISA Management System
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court b2
l:] W
Federal Rules oi Criminal Procedure
For Your Informationg = » b2
V | -we
GPS Global-Positioning System
1223 .
FOR OFFICIAL USEONL_Y
cc
HIMUHR
HSC
HSPD
HUMINT
IA
l 1
NAFTA
NARA
NATO
NCTAUS
NCTC
NCMEC
NFIPM
NFPO
NI-ICD
NIPF
NISS
NS_B
1NSC
NSD
NSL I
NSLBNSPD
NSSE
OCA
00OTD
PCLU
PCTDD
PD
PDD
PI
PI-A
PG
PIOB
P.L. X
PR
PR/TT
RCS
RF
RFPA
SMTJ
soc
SORC
SPM
SSA '
sso
SSRATA
TFO
l
l
l
l .
UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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USPER US Person »
USPS United States Postal Service I
USSS United States Secret Service L
WITT Wireless Intercept Tracking Technology
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction ,
F-8 or
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ALL FBI INFURI-IATIUH CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 0?082009 BY 60322 UC/I-P/STP/JCF
UNCLASSIFIED - FOROFFICIAL USE ONLY
I Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide *
Appendix G: Investigations Manual -=-Classied Provisions
See DIOG Appendix G: x. I b2I b7E
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D
IFED ER_A.L- B U REAU O F I NVESTI GATI O N
1 FO I PA
D ELLE-TED PAGE I N FO RMATI O N S H EET
N0 Duplication Fees are ch cl f arge or Deleted Page Inorrnation Sheet s!
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mason: 1.4 £0, cl! DERIVATIVE
nacmsszw 01-1: 0':-be-3034
' U! Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide Classied Provisions
U! This Part supplements the unclassiedprovisions of the AGG-Dom and DIOG. U!
F
A. U!iLIMlTATION ON CERTAIN SEARCHES
U! Classied AGGDOM Provision U! _
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U! Policy To Implement Classied AGGDOM Provision
U!.Refer_to_the Domestic lnvestigations and Operations Guide DIO _3!_ Section 111.13for procedures to obtain a FISA search warrant. 7
B. U! CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTING A PRELIMINARY OR FULL
INVESTIGATION
U! Classied AGGDOM Provision?
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on: Decem er , i
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U! Policy to Implernent Classied AGG-Dom Provision
The provisions of DIOG Section 6 Prelimary Investigations! or 7 Full Investigations!
with regard to the purpose, approval and notication requirements apply fully to
investigations predicated under this provision.
C. U! DETERMINATION OF UNITED STATES PERSON STATUS
:53 ........... .. *
iii ....... __
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/ ----- ._9292
E. » U!;ASS1STANCE TO~AND/OR F-ROM FOREIGN AGENCIES1
F. U! CONSENSUAL MONITORING _
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""1-- S>4NE!Member of the media or ainews organization.An investigation of a member
of the media or a news organization is a.sensitive investigative matter. A news
organization is an entity that regularly publishes or broadcasts news. Smi:5? ___________ M Archive v. Department ofDefense, Civil No. 86-3454 D.D.C. June 16, 19ss1]_|_| '
1131ttttttttttt eeeeeeeeeeeeeee Il4.l4 e 1
W1 Academic Nexus¥l i
,1 5! ................ -
1u1~ 92
llll*- ! Any subject matter related to the Memorandum of Understanding MOU!
1 etween the FBI and United States Department of State must comply with the existing
process contained within the MOU. '
1-1. .U!DATA~MIN_ING
i ~};S#NE! Data analysis conducted by the FBIHQ Counterintelli ence Division such as* l y 1 E-lmuvstbe coordinated with
the ,FETHeadquarters Office of the General Counsel, Privacy and Civil Liberties Unit
regarding the proper documentation and disposition of such analysis.
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I. U! NOTICE REQUIREMENTSF OR DOJ NATIONAL SECURITYDIVISION
iUl -~-1-.-.-$§{Sensitive Investigative Matter: For a national security investigation or
, assistance to other agencies involving a sensitive investigative matter that is
classied Secret the a ro riate FBII-I Section should send electronic noticeto DO_J NSD at For a national security investigation
or assistance to other agencies involving a sensitive investigative matter that is
classied Top Secret the a ro riate FBIHQ Section should send electronicnotice.to DOJ NSD a -Notices to DOJ NSD must only
contain the Letterhead Memorandum LHM!the electronic communication EC!
is not sent to DOJ NSD.
H11"-----2~.@-~-]§S§[National Security Fulltlnvestigation of a United States Person: For a full
investigation of a United States person relating to a threat to the national security
that is classied Secret, the appropriate FBIHQ ' should send-electronicnotice to DOJ NSD ati _ _ A _ iF'or-a full investigation of
a United Statespersonrelating to a*threat~to the~national securitythat-is classied
Top Secret, the a ro riate FBII-I tion should send electronic notice toDOJ NSD at Noticesto no.1 NSD must only contain
the Ll-lMthe EC is not sent to DOJ NSD.
92
"1 §f!~Assistance to a Foreign Agency: When F BlllQ approval is required to
provide assistance to a foreign agency in a matter involvinga threat to the _
national security, notice must be provided to DOJ NSD. For a foreign assistance
matter that is classied Secret, the appropriate FBIHQ Division approving the
investiative method to . ~ send electronic notice, to DOJ -NSD at
For a foreign assistance matter that is classied Top
Secret,~the appropriate FBIHQ Division approvin the investi ative methodshould send electronic notice to DOJ NSD at Notices to
DOJ NSD must only contain the Ll-lMthe EC is not sent to DOJ NSD.
_
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