documents-responsive-to-executive-order-14040-section-2-b-ii-part-01-of-01

FBI Vault

9 11 Attacks Investigation And Related Materials

9 11 Material Released In Response To Executive Order 14040

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REDACTION KEY  
 
 
A. CLASSIFIED FBI INFORMATION RE-REVIEWED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE 
ORDER 14040. 
 C-1. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT 
THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT 
PENDING FURTHER CONSULTATION TO BE COMPLETED BY THE DEADLINE IN 
EO 14040 SECTION 2(D).  
 D. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE IS 
REQUIRED. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION IS OBTAINED 
WILL BE RELEASED. 
  
F. ADMINISTRATIVELY DESIGNATED FBI FILE AND/OR SERIAL NUMBERS OR 
HANDLING INFORMATION. 
 
G. SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION WITHHELD PURSUANT TO THE 
LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIVILEGE.  
 
J-1. SECTION 102A(i)(1) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED BY 
THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TE RRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004, 50 
U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1). 
 J-2. INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM DI SCLOSURE BY THE BANK SECRECY ACT 
(BSA) AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE BSA. SEE 31 C.F.R. § 5311 ET SEQ; 31 C.F.R. CHAPTER X. 
 
J-3 INFORMATION DETERMINED BY ANOTHER DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY TO BE 
PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f). 
 
O-1. INFORMATION WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT 
AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT. 
 
P.     INFORMATION RESTRICTED FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE PRIVACY ACT 
OF 1974.  SUCH INFORMATION WILL BE PRODUCED IN MDL 03-1570 (S.D.N.Y.) 
PURSUANT TO THE PRIVACY ACT PROTECTIVE ORDER ENTERED IN THAT CASE.
 
 
P-1.  INFORMATION SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, DATES OF BIRTH, AND 
OTHER SENSITIVE PERSONAL INFORMATION. 
 
S.   NAMES AND OTHER PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OF LAW 
ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL.  
 
NOTE: Classification markings (classification banners and portion markings) are redacted 
without a code throughout the release. 
 
 
 Case Background
 On 11 September 2001 four coordinated suicide attacks occurred in the
United States in New York City and the Washington D.C. area. 19 
terrorists from the Islamist militant group, al-Qaeda (AQ), hijacked four
passenger jets and intentionally crashed two planes, American Airlines 
Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175, into the Twin Towers of the 
World Trade Center in New York City. Hijackers crashed American Airlines 
Flight 77 into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. The fourth jet, 
United Airlines Flight 93, crashed into a field near Shanksville, 
Pennsylvania, after passengers attempted to take control before it could 
reach the hijacker's intended target in Washington D.C.
 The FBI investigation into the attacks, internally named PENTTBOM, 
which included the cooperation of local, state, and other federal 
agencies, identified the 19 hijackers and linked the hijackers to AQ. 
Subsequently, in a number of publicized video, audio, interview, and 
printed statements, senior members of AQ asserted responsibility for 
organizing the September 11 attacks. Ultimately, the core investigation 
revealed that Usama Bin Laden (UBL) and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) each
played critical roles in the 9/11 attack plot.
 In June 2007, the FBI’s New York field office (NYO) opened a 
subfile under the PENTTBOM investigation file to organize information 
obtained from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets that were 
previously identified throughout the PENTTBOM investigation. 
Specifically, the NYO sought to obtain a greater understanding of 9/11 
hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi's (Hazmi) and Khalid al-Mihdhar's (Mihdhar) past
interaction with and connectivity to the Southern California Muslim 
community in an attempt to explain how they may have gained assistance 
after their arrival in Los Angeles in January 2000.
 In October 2007, the NYO administratively moved the Title:   To administratively close case
Re:   05/27/2021
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EO14040-000002
(F)

aforementioned subfile to its own separate NYO investigation casefile 
named “Operation Encore.” The predication of the investigation had the 
same purpose as the original PENTTBOM subfile investigation in that it 
served as an enterprise counterterrorism investigation into a possible 
network of individuals who were suspected of providing assistance to the 
hijackers and as an intelligence gathering operation into AQ’s tactics 
and tradecraft. Specifically the named main subjects, Fahad Al-Thumairy 
(Thumairy), Omar Al-Bayoumi (Bayoumi), and Musaed Al-Jarrah (Al-Jarrah), 
allegedly provided (or directed others to provide) Hazmi and Mihdhar with
assistance in daily activities, including procuring living quarters and 
assistance with assimilating into Southern California. The investigation 
sought to determine whether these three subjects wittingly provided such 
assistance with the knowledge that Hazmi and Mihdhar were here to commit 
an act of terrorism.
Additionally, separate full investigations on other associated 
individuals from other field offices, some of which were opened before 
and after Operation Encore, were also administratively consolidated under
the Operation Encore casefile. Refer to Serial 
 
 Thumairy, Bayoumi, and Al-Jarrah, all NON-USPERs, remain 
OCONUS, and are believed to live in Saudi Arabia.  
 
 Investigation Summary
 The investigation was predicated upon the theory that Al-Jarrah
used his position as the Head of Islamic Affairs at the Saudi Arabian 
Embassy in Washington D.C. to oversee and direct the facilitation of the 
hijackers through his subordinates, Thumairy and Bayoumi, as well as, hisTitle:  To administratively close case
Re:   05/27/2021
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EO14040-000003
(A),(G),(J-1)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(G)

revealed outside of the CHS reporting and telephone information.
 Al-Jarrah was also the subject of an FBI
investigation opened in January 2003 predicated upon information 
He was interviewed 
twice by the FBI in 2004 in connection with that investigation. Al-
Jarrah permanently departed the United States in July 2006 
. While Al-Jarrah maintained regular 
contact with the Saudi Embassy after leaving the United States, he was
no longer employed there. The investigation was closed in July 2007.
 Thumairy
 Thumairy, a Saudi national, was an Imam at the King Fahd 
Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in United 
States State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at 
the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, 
California.
 Prior to Operation Encore, Thumairy was a main subject of a 
Los Angeles full investigation based on his phone connectivity with 
Bayoumi and his potential association to Hazmi and Mihdhar. 
Furthermore reported that he was a "hard core extremist" 
whose sermons at the KFM appealed to the extremist and militant 
attendees of the mosque.
 Lastly, a review of Thumairy's financial transactions revealed
connections with a Saudi individual, Jarallah Al-Jarallah, which were 
believed to be linked to a Saudi based money laundering scheme to move
money around the Middle East region. FBI Los Angeles opened a full 
investigation into those transactions in April 2005 and closed it in Title: To administratively close case
Re:   05/27/2021
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EO14040-000005
(F)
(A),(G),(J-1)
(A),(G),(J-1)
(C-1)
(A), (G), (J-1)
(J-3)
(J-3)
Hazmi and Mihdhar in San Diego, California in February 2000 because 
the hijackers did not have the necessary credit history for the rental
application and also because the leasing company did not permit cash 
payments. In the fall of 2000, Bayoumi moved to Birmingham, England, 
where he resided with his family and attended Aston University. 
Bayoumi was detained by New Scotland Yard (NSY)
 In a 2003 interview in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Bayoumi stated 
he received a salary from his employer, Dallah AVCO, and a stipend to 
cover tuition fees, housing, and other living expenses while he 
attended school in the United States.
 According to Telephone Application (TA) there was telephone 
connectivity between Bayoumi and Thumairy beginning in December 1998 
and then sporadically until Bayoumi left the country in the fall of 
2000. Connection periods included periods of time when Hazmi and 
Mihdhar were in the Los Angeles and San Diego areas; however the 
nature and/or content of those discussions were not revealed as part 
of the investigation efforts.
 Investigative Evidence
 As part of the investigation that spanned from 2007 to 2016, the 
case team reviewed financial records, telecommunication records, travel 
records, conducted hundreds of interviews relating to the main subjects 
in addition to known associates (voluntarily , 
conducted search warrants of various residences in Southern California, Title:   To administratively close case
Re:   05/27/2021
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EO14040-000008
(F)
(C-1)
(C-1)
(D)
including a review of materials collected by New Scotland Yard via search
warrant,  and coordinated 
efforts with foreign partners, in order to determine if the Southern 
California Muslim community had a pre-existing support network in place 
with advanced knowledge that the hijackers, Hazmi and Mihdhar, were in 
the United States to commit an act of terrorism.
 Additionally, during 2019 and 2020, the FBI re-examined the 
Operation Encore case file to identify any missed leads, opportunities, 
or investigative actions which may advance the case, including the 
summarization ECs serials in Serials
documented in April 2016. Various CONUS based persons of interest were 
re-interviewed; no additional information was obtained as part of those 
interviews and no material contradicting statements were made as compared
to the initial interviews.
AQ Tradecraft
 Consent statements from various AQ members, including KSM, 
Abdul Rahim Abdu Al Nashiri, Walid Muhammad Salih Khallad Bin Attash, 
Ramzi Bin Al Shibh, Abd Al Aziz Ali Ali aka Ammar Al Baluchi, and Mustafa
Ahmed Al Hawsawi, regarding the operational planning of AQ's larger scale
terrorist attacks, 9/11 and USS Cole, indicated that the AQ leadership 
compartmentalized the attack groups and roles within the operation. They 
did not make the attack plans known in advance to others for fear the 
nature of the attack would be discovered, which is consistent with the 
FBI's assessment of the last two decades of large scale AQ-related 
attacks. Specifically, in relation to the 9/11 attacks, the hijackers 
knew there was a martyrdom operation, but did not know about the nature 
of the operation until shortly before the attack for operational security
reasons. Refer to Serials
 This information corroborated that Thumairy, Bayoumi, and Al-Title:  To administratively close case
Re: 05/27/2021
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EO14040-000009
(F)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(A),(G), (J-1)
(F)
Jarrah did not knowingly conspire to assist the AQ hijackers in 
furtherance of the 9/11 attack.
 Material Support to Terrorism
 For federal criminal charges of conspiracy to provide material 
support and resources to terrorists to be filed in accordance with 18 
U.S.C. 2339B, the totality of evidence from the investigation needed to 
establish that Thumairy, Bayoumi, and Al-Jarrah each had "knowledge that 
the organization is a designated terrorist organization...that the 
organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity...or that the 
organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (section 6603(c)(2))."
 As further explained in United States vs Warsame, 537 F.Supp.2d
1005 (D.Minn. 2008), “under the plain language of 2339B...the government 
must prove that the defendant ‘knowingly provides material support or 
resources to a Foreign Terrorist Organization [FTO]’, rather than to 
individuals who happen to be FTO members...In other words, even where a 
donor’s contribution to an individual FTO member confers some benefit 
upon the terrorist organization, the prosecution must prove that the 
donor knew the intended recipient of his contribution was a designated 
FTO...Whether the donor knew the recipient was a member of a FTO could, 
of course, be relevant to a determination that the donor ultimately 
intended the contribution to go to the FTO itself. Nonetheless, the 
prosecution must prove that the donor knowingly provided material support
or resources to the FTO.”
Based on the the totality of these investigative efforts and in
coordination with the Assistant United States Attorneys of the Southern 
District of New York, it was jointly determined, that insufficient 
evidence existed to prosecute Thumairy, Bayoumi, and Al-Jarrah for 
wittingly conspiring to assist the AQ hijackers in furtherance of the 
9/11 attack. The United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern Title:  To administratively close case
Re:  05/27/2021
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EO14040-000010
(F)

District of New York (USAO-SDNY) was consulted regarding FBI-NYO’s intent
on closing this investigation. USAO-SDNY had no objection to the closing 
of this investigation.
Conclusion
 After nearly twenty years after the attack, the FBI has not 
identified additional groups or individuals responsible for the attack 
other than those currently charged, which is consistent with the final 
conclusion of the 9/11 Commission Report which stated that "no new 
information to date that would alter the original findings of the 9/11 
Commission regarding the individuals responsible for the 9/11 attacks or 
for supporting those responsible for the attacks."
 The NYO completed all logical and reasonable investigative 
steps in accordance with established CTD guidance. No potential criminal 
violations or priority threats to national security warranting further 
investigation were identified. All leads have been completed. The NYO is 
closing captioned matter. In the event additional derogatory information 
is discovered regarding the captioned subjects, NYO will consider re-
opening this investigation.
 Lastly, the SDNY concurs with the closing of the investigation;
SDNY is willing to re-engage investigative measures if new information 
comes to light which may bear investigation.
 
♦♦Title:   To administratively close case
Re:  05/27/2021
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EO14040-000011
(F)

 
 Addendum to Operation Encore Closing Electronic  Communication  Title: 
Re: , 09/08/2021  
 
3  
  
 
 
offered case managers the ability to electronically filter for specific 
types of files such as FD- 302, FD-1057, etc. As documents were migrated 
from ACS to Sentinel, the text of documents that were entered into the ACS system were usually, but not always, available in Sentinel, and were 
all classified as “legacy” documents. This migration, however, did not 
allow any electronic filtering of specific types of files, such as what was offered via Sentinel. 
 
 A manual re- review of the Operation Encore case file to 
quantify the number of interviews conducted to include both FD- 302s, 
which are most commonly used for interviews, and the ACS legacy files, 
showed that approximately 60 interviews were conducted between 2007 and 
2016 as it related to the case's main subjects and associates, and not hundreds as previously stated.
 
 
 Therefore, the statement should be modified in the closing EC to 
state that the FBI conducted approximately 60 interviews between 2007 to 
2016 relating to the main subjects in addition to known associates (voluntarily and via Grand Jury). 
 
 
♦♦ 
EO14040-000014
(F)