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Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide
5.i U! Assessments
5.1. U! Overview ,
U//FOUO! The Attorney General s Guidelines forDomestic FBI Operations AGG-Dom!
combine threat assessments under the former Attorney General s Guidelines for FBI-National
Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection and the prompt and extremely
limited checking out of initial leads under the former Attorney General s Guidelines on General
Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations into a new .
investigative category entitled assessments. All assessments must either be openedin an
investigative classication as an assessment le e laced in a|:|e. . _ . i .|Guardian]!, or placed
in a as discussed'in greater detaifbelow.
U//FOUO! Note: In the DIOG, the word assessment has two distinct meanings..The AGG-
Dom authorizes as an investigative activity an assessment which requires an authorized
purpose as discussed in this section of the DIOG. The USIC, however, also uses the word
assessment to describe written intelligence products, as discussed in DIOG Section l5.7.B. _
U! Assessments authorized underthe=AGG-Dom do~not-requireaparticular factual-predication
but do require an authorized purpose. Assessments may be carried out to detect, obtain
information about, or prevent or protect against federal crimes or threats to the national security
or to collect foreign intelligence. AGG-Dom, Part II and Part II.A!
U//FOUO! Although no paiticular factual predication is required, the basis of an assessment
cannot be arbitrary or groundless speculation, nor can an assessment be.based.solely on the 92_
exercise of First Amendment protected activities or on the race, ethnicity, nationalorigin or
religion of the subject. Although difcult to dene, no particular factual predication is less
than -information or allegation as required for the initiation of a preliminary investigation. For
example, an assessment may be conducted when there is a basis to know: i! whether more
informationor facts are required to determine if there is a criminal or national security threat;
and ii!-there is a rational and atticulable relationship between the stated authorized purpose of
the assessment on the one hand and the information sought and the proposed means to obtain that
information on the other, Regardless of whether specic approval or specic documentation is
required, anFBI employee should be able to explain the purpose of an assessment and the reason
for the methods used to conduct the assessment. Those FBI employees who conduct assessments
'are'responsible for assuring that assessments are. not pursued for frivolous or improper purposes
and are not based solely on First Amendment activity or on the race, ethnicity, national origin, or
religion of the subject of the assessment. AGG-Dom, Part II!
U//FOUO! An FBI employee can search historical information already contained within: i! FBI
data systems; ii! United States Intelligence Communit92L_ USIC! svstems to w ' '
employee has access eiggl . c
I i!;~ iii! any other United States Govemment database to
which an FBI employee has access; and iv! the FBI employee can also conduct open-source
Internet searches without initiating an assessment open-source Internet searches do not include
any paid-for-service databases such as Lexis-Nexis and Choicepoint!, as further discussed in
Section 5.6.A.l and Section I5. The use of such paid-for-service databases requires the initiation.
of an assessment or predicated investigation. This allows the FBI employee to possibly resolve a
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matter without the need to conduct new investigative activity andopen an assessment.
Additionally, through analysis of existing information, the FBI employee may produce productsthat include, but are not limited to. an Intelligence Assessment, Intelligence Bulletin andL - . |If,'while conducting analysis, the FBIemployee nds a gap
in intelligence that is relevant to an authorized FBI activity, the FBI employee can identify the -
a for ossi l eveloprnent of a collection requirement. The applicable|::]r other as directed in the DIPG! must be used todocument this analysis. See the Directorate of Intelligence 1 DI! PG for le classication
guidance. '
5.2. U Purpose and Scope
U//FOUO! The FBI cannot be content to wait for leads to come in through the actions of others;
rather, we must be vigilant in detecting criminal or national security threats to the full extent
permitted by law, with an eye towards early intervention andprevention of criminal or national
security incidents before they occur. For example, to carry out its central mission of protecting
the national security, the FBI must proactively collect information from available sources int
order to identify threats and activities and to infonn appropriate intelligence analysis. Collection
required to inform such analysis will appear as FBI National Collection Requirements and FBI
FBI is not constrained to wait until information is received indicating that a particular event,
activity or facilitylhas drawn the attention ofwould-be perpetrators of terrorism, The proactive
authority conveyed to the FBI is designedfor, and may be used by, the FBI in the discharge of
these responsibilities. The FBI may also conduct assessments as part of its special events
management responsibilities. AGG-Dom, P.art ll!
U! More broadly, detecting and interrupting criminal activities at their early stages, and
preventing crimes from occurring in the rst place, is preferable to allowing criminal plots to
come to fruition. Hence, assessments may alsoibe undertaken proactively with such objectivesas
detecting criminal activities; obtaining information on individuals, groups, or organizations of
possible investigative interest, either because they may be involved in criminal or national
security-threatening activities or because they may be targeted for attack or victimization in such
activities;_ and identifying and assessing individuals who may have value as condential human
sources. AGG-Dom, Partll!; _ '
U//F,OUO!=As described in the below-scenarios, assessments may be used when an allegationor information or an articulable factual basis the predicates for predicated investigations!
conceming crimes or threats to the national security is obtained and the matter can be checked
out or resolved through the relatively non-intrusive methods authorized in assessments use of
least intrusive means!. The checking of investigative leads in this manner can avoid the need to
proceed to more formal levels of investigative activity predicatedinvestigation!, ifrthe results of
an assessment indicate thatfurther investigation is notwarranted. AGG-Dom, Part II!
Hypothetical fact-patterns are discussed below: _ "
A. U//FOUO] . *
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U/EOUO! e FBI employee can analyze historical information already
contained " ' ' i FBI data s stems; ii! USIC systems to which FBI employees haveaccess e.g ;. iii! any other United~States Government .
database to which an~FBI employee has access; and iv! can conduct open-source Internet
searches without initiating an assessment. Qpen-source Intemetsearches do not include any
paid-for-service databases such as Lexis-Nexis and~Choicepoint. ' 1 .
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I 5.3. U! Civil Liberties and Privacy _ i
U! Thepursuit of legitimate goals~with0utinfringing upon the exercise of constitutional
freedoms is a challenge that the FBI meets through the application of soundjudgment and
discretion. In order to ensure that civil liberties are not undermined by the conduct of
assessments, every assessment under this subsection must have an authorized purpose and an
identied objective. The purpose and objective of the assessment mustbe documented and
retained as described in this section andin DIOG Section 14.
U! Even when an authorized purpose is present, an assessment could create the appearance -that *
it is directed at or activated by constitutionally protected activity, race, ethnicity, national origin
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or..religion-particularly under circumstances where the link to an authorized FBI mission is not
readily apparent. In these situations, it isvitally important that the authorized purpose and the
underlying reasons for conducting the assessment and engaging in the proposed methods are well
documented. ~
U! No investigative activity, including assessments, may be taken solely on thetbasis of
activities that are protected by the First Amendment or onthe race, ethnicity, national origin or
religion of the subject. If an assessment touches on or is partially motivated by First Amendment
activities,.race, ethnicity, national origin or religion, it is particularly important to identify and
document the basis for the assessment with clarity.
U//FOUO! Example: Individuals or groups who communicate with each
other or with members of the public in any form in pursuit of social or
political causessuchA as opposing war or foreign policy, protesting
government actions, promoting certain religious beliefs, championing
particular local, national, or international causes, or a change in govemment
through non~criininal'means, and actively recruit others to join their causes-
have a fundamental constitutional right to do so. An assessment may not be
initiated based solely on the exercise of these First Amendment rights. If,
however, a igroup exercising--its First Amendment rights also thgeatens or
advocates violence or destruction of property, an assessment would be I
appropriate. ' -
U! The AGG-Domirequire that the least intrusive" means or method be considered and;if
operationally sound and effective--used-in lieu of more intrusive methods to obtain intelligence
and/or evidence. This principle is also reected in Executive Order 12333, which govems the
activities of the USIC. Executive Order 12333 lays out the goals, directions, duties and
responsibilities of the USIC. The concept of least intrusive means applies to the collection of all
intelligence and evidence, not just that collected by those aspects of the FBI that are part of the
intelligence community. - A
U! By emphasizing the use of the least intrusive means to obtain intelligence and/or evidence,
FBI employees can effectively execute their duties while mitigating the potential negative impact
on the privacy andacivil liberties and the damage to the reputation of all people encompassed
within the investigation or assessment, including targets, witnesses, and victims. This principle is
not intended to discourage FBI employees from seeking relevant and necessary intelligence,
information, or evidence, but rather is intended to encourage FBI employees to choose the least
intrusivebut still effective --means from, the available options-to obtain the information.
AGG-Dom, Pa1tl.C.2! . A
5.4. U! Authorized Purposes AGG-Dom, Part II.A.2.Authorized Activities!
A. U! Assessment Activities: During an assessment, the FBI may:
l. U! Seek information, proactively or in response to investigative leads, relatingto
activities constituting violations of federal criminal law or threats to the national security;
2. U! Seek information, proactively or in response to investigative leads, relating to the
involvement or role of individuals, groups, or organizations relating to activities. .
constituting violations offederal criminal law or threats toithe national security;
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3. U! Identify and obtain information about potential targets of or vulnerabilities to
criminal activities in violation of federallaw or threats to the national security;
4. U! Obtain information to inform or facilitate intelligence analysis and planning AGG-
Dom, Part IV!;
5. U! Seek infonnation to identify potential human sources, assess the suitability, q
credibility, or value of individuals as human sources, validate human sources, or maintain
the cover or credibility of human sources, who may be able to provide or obtain
information relating to criminal activities in violation of federal law, threats to the
national security, or matters of foreign intelligence interest; and -
6. U! Seekinfonnation, proactively or in responseto investigative leads, relating to matters
of foreign intelligence interest responsivetoforeign intelligence requirements. -
5.5. U//FOUO! Standards for Initiating-or Approvingan Assessment
U//FOUO! Before initiating orapproving an assessment, an FBl_ employee or approving official
must determine whether:
A. U//FOUO! An authorized purpose and objective exists for the conduct of the assessment;
B. U//FOUO! The assessment is based on factors other than the 'exerciseof'First Amendment
activities or the,race, ethnicity, national origin or religion of the subject; and
C. U//FOUO!The assessment is an appropriate use of personnel and nancial resources.
5.6. U! Duration, Approval, Notice, Documentation,~File Review and.Responsible
Entity
U//FOUO! FBIHQ and FBI Field Offices have the authority to conduct all assessment activities
as authorized in Section 5.4. Field Office personnel and approving officials, as specified in the.
DIOG Section 5 .6.A.l-6,,equatc to the following FBIHQ personnel and approving officials when
FBIHQ initiates, conducts,<or closesan assessment:
0 U//FOUO! Field Office Analyst or Special Agent SA! = FBIHQ Analyst, SA, or
Supervisory Special Agent SSA!;
v U//FOUO! Field Office Supervisory Intelligence Analysts SIA! = FBIHQ SIA;
92 v U//FOUO! Chief Division Counsel CDC! = FBIHQ Ofce of the General Counsel
OGC!;
~ U//FOUO! Field Ofce SSA = FBIHQ Unit Chief UC!; and
~ U//FOUO! Special Agent in Charge SAC! = FBIHQ Section Chief SC!.
A. U//FOUO! Duration, Approval, Notice, Documentation, File Review and Responsible
Entity: An FBI employee must document on the FD-7l or in Guardian the use of or the
request and approval for the use of authorized investigative methods~in type 1 and 2
assessments see DIOG Section 5.6.A.l and 2, below!. By exception, certain assessment type
l and 2 situations may require the use of an electronic communication EC! to document the
use and approval of particular investigative methods. All type 3, 4, and 6 see DIOG Section
5.6.A.3.4. and 6, below! assessments and authorized investigative methods requiring
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supervisory approval must use an EC to document the approval of the assessment and the
request and approval for the use of an applicable investigative method.
U//FOUO! For type 5 assessment activities, an FBI employee must follow the duration,
approval, and other requirements_specied in the FBls Condential Human Source _Polic_92g _
Manual CHSPM!, Condential Human Source Validation Standards Manual _ Cl-ISVSM!,and The Attorney General s Guiéielines the Use of FBI Confidential Human_ "Sources AGG-Cl-IS!, as implemented i All type 5 assessment activities under this
provision must be documented i unless otherwise d_irected in the DI PG orother
FBIHQ Division PGs. If there is any inconsistency between the CI-ISPM or Cl-ISVSM and
the DIOG, the DIOG controls and OGC should be immediately notied of the conflict.
U//FOUO! Listed below are the applicable duration,documentation, justication/le review,
approval level; and responsible entity for each type of-assessment, described inDlOG
Section 5.4 above.
1. U//FOUO! Seek information, proactively or in response-to investigative leads,
_ relating to activities constituting violations of federal criminal law or threats to the
7 nationgl'security» e.g., the prompt checking of leads on individuals or activity!.
I U//FOUO! Duration: There is no time requirementfor this type of assessment, but it» is
anticipated that such assessments will be relatively short. These assessments require '
recurring 30-day justification reviews by the SSA or.SlA as discussed below.
U//FOUO!.Documentation: Guardian will be used for 1 ' ' _ , I
i i i F I l'The electronic FD-Tl , asd|sc'ussed'below, musfbe used to
Guardian|' _ l ii Q .
. U//FOUO! Approval: An FBI employee-may initiate an assessment under this
subsection without supervisory approvall I . . .'1 . . ' . ' . Ian FD-.71 or Guardian .I [FD-71 oi
4 t ' ~|FD-71 -
or Guardian. The initiation date for this type of assessment is the date the SSA or SIA
assigns an FBI employeeto conduct the assessment.
U//FOUO!"As92soon as practicable following the determination that this type of
_ assessment involves a sensitive investigative matter, the matter must bebrought to the
CDC for review and to the SAC for approval to. continue the assessment. The term
sensitive.investigative matter is dened in Section 5;7 and Section l0I lthe FD-71 or Guardian] l _ . I 92
r igher supervisory approval, as described-in Section 5?, may be required
before using one or more of the following investigative-methods: physical surveillance,
certain interviews, and tasking ofcondential human sources. In addition, as specied in
the Division policy implementation guides PG!, there are agreements-i e.g., Memoranda
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of Agreements/Understanding, Treaties! that may require particular coordination prior tothe release/acquisition of federal, state, local, tribal, and foreign government information.
U//FOUO! Justication Review: if this type of assessment is not concluded within 30days, the SSA or SIA must conduct recurring Q10-day justification reviews in accordance
with Section 3.4. This justification review must:92
a. U//FOUO! Evaluate the progress made toward achieving the authorized purpose and
objective;b. U//FOUO! Ensure activities that occurred during the prior 30 days were appropriate;
c. U//FOUO! Determine whether it is reasonably likely that information willbeobtained that is relevantto the authorized objective, thereby warranting an extension
for another 30-days;
d. U//FOUO! Determine whether adequate predication has been developed to justifyopening a criminal, counteiterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber, or weapons of mass
destruction predicated investigation; and
e. U//FOUO!.Determine whether the assessment should be terminated,U//FOUO "The FBI employee mustrensure-tha't|~ 1 , F F , d
| [in the FD-71 or Guardian. The completed FD-71 or uardianrequires supervisory approval before being uploaded. The FD=7 1 or Guardian must also
document supervisory approval for the use of any investigative method-that requiresapproval, such as: physical surveillance; certain interviews; or tasking of condential human sources see DIOG Section 5.9!; In addition, as specied in the Division PG, there
are agreements e.g., Memoranda of Agreements/Understanding, Treaties!'that mayA require particular coordination prior to therelease/acquisition of federal, state, local, ' ' ' ' ormation.| k I
'Wl'1ll'l the a b/E
classication as described in Section 5.14.
H U//FOUO! Responsible Entity: This type of assessment is conducted by the appropriatesubstantive FieldOfce Squad. ' '
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access, he/she can alsocreviewalready existing data contained in any >United States
Govemment data system and search open source information on the lnternetl:| Opcn-source Intemet searches donot include any paid-for-, ~service ata ases suc as LexisNexis andChoicepointi~ g _ __ . I '- . , [If these
database checks or open source Internet searches do not revealanyderogatory
information, the FBI employee may terminate this activity without opening an assessment
or documenting these activities on an FD-71. * v//P0v_o>| I it i
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U//FOUO! Seek information, proactively or in response to investigative leads, -
relating to the involvement or role of individuals, groups, or organizations in
activities constituting violations of federal criminal law or threats to the national
security e.g.,'the prompt checkingof leads on groups or organizations!.
U//FOUO! Duration: There is no time requirement for this type of assessment, but it is
anticipated that such assessments will be relatively short. These assessments require
recurring 30-day justification reviews by theSSA or SIA as discussed below.ocumentation:Qu£<MQ| , .A " _ g
1 lThe electronic FD-71,. 1 '- _ I _
t 92 i in e itGuardiari I ' ' i V V or lzgin
U//FOUO! Approval: An FBI employe ' ' 'tiate an assessment under this,_5y_bsection without supervisory approval C
; - an - H e
or Guardian. Theinitiation date for this type of assessment is the date the SSA or SIA
assigns. an FBI employee to conduct the assessment A
U//FOUO! As soon as practicable following the detemiination that this type of
assessment involves a sensitive investigative matter, the matter must be brought to the I
CDC for review and to the SAC for approval to continue the assessment. The term
sensitive investigative matter is dened in Section 5.7 and Section 10. When
completing the FD-7l or Guardian lead for an assessment involving a sensitive
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' II-lighersupervisory approval, asvdescribed in Section §.9 may be required beforeusing one or more of the following investigative methods: physical surveillance, certaininterviews, and tasking of condential humantsoixrces. In addition, as specied in the
Division PGs, there are agreements e.g., Memoranda of Agreements/Understanding,Treaties! that may require particular coordination prior to the release/acquisition of _" '
federal, state, local, tribal and foreign govemment information. "
U//FOUO! Justication Review: If this type of assessment is not concluded within 30days, the SSA or SIA must conduct recun'ing 30-day justification reviews in accordance
with Section 3.4. This justication review must:a. ~ U//FOUO!Evaluate the progress made toward achieving the authorized purpose and
objective;b. U//FOUO! Ensure activities that occurred during the prior 30 days were appropriate;
c. U//FOUO! Determine whether it is reasonably likely that information will beobtained that is relevant to the authorized objective, thereby warranting an extension
for another 30-days; .
df U//FOUO! Determine whether adequate predicationhas-been:deiielopedtojustifyopeninga criminal, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber, or weapons of mass
- destruction predicated investigation; and
e. U//FOUO! Determine whether the assessment should be _termina_ted.
U//FOUO The FBI employee must ensure thatl . A 5l l th FD 71' G d' .?Ih l dFD-71 d' in e - or uar ian e comp ete or uar tanrequires supervisory approval beforebeing uploaded. The FD-71 or Guardian must alsodocument supervisory approval for the use of any investigative method that requiresapproval,'such aszphysical surveillance; certain interviews; or tasking of condentialhuman sources see Section 5.9!. In addition, as specied in the Division _PGs, there areagreements e.g., Memoranda of-Agreements/Understanding, Treaties! that may requireparticular coordination prior to the release/acquisition of federal, state,,local, tribal and
foreign government informatio . _ , n
U//FOUO! Responsible Entityi This type of assessment is conducted by the appropriate
substantive Field Ofce Squad. _
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lmmi L l"' U! Identify andiobtain information about potential targets of.or vulnerabilities tocriminal activities in violation of federal law or threats to the national security.
U//FOUO! Assessments in this section may include activities designed to collectinformation for domain analysis that is focused on identifying targets of or vulnerabilities
to criminal conduct or threats to the national security. FBIl-IQ-directed National DomainAssessments must be coordinated in advance with the FBII-IQ DI, Domain ManagementSectio n Dl92/lS!.'See theDI PG for details; . 1 c
U//FOUO! This type of assessment may not be usedfor the purpose of collectingpositive foreign intelligence, although such intelligence may -be incidentally collecteddur_ing'this type of assessment. Positive foreign intelligence can only be, collected .
pursuant to Section 5.6.A.6 and Section 9. ' ,
U//FOUO! Duration: An "FBI employee may initiate an assessment for this purpose onlywith prior SSA or SlA approval. The effective date of the assessment is the date thesupervisor approves the EC. Such an assessment may continue for as long as necessary to
achieve its purpose and objective. When the objective has been met, a closing EC must
be approved by the SSA or SIA and uploaded to the le.
U//FOUO! Documentation: The approval to initiate this type of assessment and thereq ' 'nvestigative methods must -be documented in an
U//EOUO! Approval: All assessments conductedipursuant to this subsection must be |a rovedin advance by an SSA or SIA-and be'o ened in either the appropriate: or other as directed in the DI PG! or theappropriate substantive investigative c assi ication as an- assessment file with an opening
EC._The title/case caption of the opening EC must contain the word Assessment, andthe synopsis must identify the purpose and the objective of the assessment. If at the timeof the opening; or at anytime thereafter, the assessment involves a sensitive investigativematter,_the title/case caption must contain the words Assessment »and Sensitive '
investigative Matter.
U//FOUO!»File Review: This type ofassessment requires recurring 90-day file reviews
of~the assessment le and any sub-le by the SSA or SIA in accordance with Section 3.4.
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Investigative le reviews for probationary FBI employees are recommended every 30days but must be conducted at least every 60 days. This le review must: _
a. U//FOUO! Evaluate the progress made toward achieving the authorized purpose and
objective;
b. U//FOUO! Determine whether it is reasonably likely that information will beobtained that is relevant to theauthoriied objective, thereby wan-anting ancxtension».for another 90 days at least every 60 days for probationary FBI employees!;
c. U//FOUO! Determine whether adequate predication has been developed to justifyopening a criminal, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber, or weapons of massdestruction predicated investigation; and I
d. U//FOUO! Determine whether the assessment should be terminated.
U//FOUO! An SSA or SIA may approve an assessment under this subsection inaccordance with the standards listed in the DIOG Section 5.5. However, if the assessment
involves a sensitive investigative matter, then the initiation requires prior CDC reviewand SAC approval. If a sensitive investigative matter arises after the initiation of anassessment, investigative activity must cease¢until'CDC"review and SAC approvaliis *
acquired. The term sensitive inve_stigative~matter isgdened in Section 5.7 and SectionQ. Higher supervisory approval, as describedin Section 5.9, may be required prior to useof the following investigative methods: physical surveillance, certain interviews, andtasking of condential human sources. In addition, as specied in'the Division PGs, there
are agreements e.g., Memoranda of Agreements/Understanding, Treaties! that mayrequire particular coordination prior to the release/acquisition of federal, state, local,tribal and foreign govemment information.
U//FOUO! Any collection undertaken in order to identify threats, vulnerabilities, orintelligence gaps identied as a result of domain analysis or in response to an*FBINational Collection Requirement or FBI Field Ofce Collection Requirement must beaddressed in a separate substan cording to the
investigative matter e g Additionally, any time an assessment be ic::ar ingivizual a se arate substantive i, P »classication assessment le or suble, as appropriate, according to the investigative
matter must be opened on the individual.
U//FOUO! Responsible Entity: In general, the Field Intelligence Group FIG! orFBIHQ DI will mana e this e ofassessm nt, regar nt is
documented in an or otherdirected in the DI gative classi ication le. This includessubstantive assess rt ' ~ - ' - 1 - -- analysis produced and documented i or otheras directed in the DI PG!. Under the managementof the Fl , sus an ive ie - 0 ce Squads can support the collection of information for
this type of assessment. However, substantive Field Ofce Squads or FBIHQ Units willbe responsible for initiating and managing particular kinds of type 3 assessments. Theseassessments will be documented in the appropriate substantive investigative classicationle. '
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U//FOUO! Obtain information to inform orfacilitate intelligence analysis and
planning. IAGG-Dom, PartIy~|- A
U//FOUO!~Assessments'in this section may include activities designed to collect
information for domain analysis in order to respond to an FBI National Collection
Requirement or FBI Field.Ofce Collection Requirement created in response to FBI
operational needs oran intelligence gap identiédthrough strategic analvsis that wasconducted as part of the FBIs national security or lawenforcement responsibilities, as
discussed in Sections 5. I_l andi. FBIHQ directed National Domain Assessments mustbe coordinated in advance with the FBIHQ DI, Domain Management Section DMS!. Seethe DISPG for details. V
U//FOUO! This type of assessment may not be used for the purpose of collecting
positive foreignintelligence, although such intelligence may be incidentally collectedduring this type of assessment. Positive foreign intelligence can only be colleeted'
pursuant to Section 5.6.A.6 and Section 9.
U//FQUO! Duration: An FBI employee may initiate an assessment for this purpose onlywith prior SSA or SIA approval. The effective date of the assessment isthe date the
supervisor approves the EC. Suchian assessment may continue for as long as necessary toachieve its purpose and objective. When the objective hasbeen met,.a closing EC mustbe approved by the SSA or SIA and uploaded to the le.
U//FOUO! Documentation: The approval to initiate this typeof assessment and the
request for approval to use applicable investigative methods must be documentedin anEC. This e of assessment ma be docum | - - ' n ' er the appropriate|:|
7 as directed in the DI PG! or theappropriatetsubstantive"investigative classication assessment le. g
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U//FOUO! Approval: All assessments conducted pursuant to this subsection must bea roved in advance by an SSA or 'n either the appropriate <<» other . A
objective; '
destruction predicated investigation; and
'd. U//FOUO! Determine whether theassessment should be terminated.
U//FOUO! An SSA orSIA may approve an-assessment under this subsection inaccordance with the standards listed in the DIOG Section 5.5. However, if the assessmentinvolves a sensitive investigative matter, then the initiation requires prior CDC reviewand SAC approval. If a sensitivetinvestigative matter arises aer the initiation of an
assessment, investigative activity must cease until CDC review and SAC approval isacquired. The term sensitive investigative matter? is dened in Section 5.7 and DIOGSection l0. Higher supervisory approval, as. described in Section 5.9, may be required_ before using the fdllowinginvestigative methods: physical surveillance, certain
interviews, and tasking of condential human sources. In addition, as specied in the. Division PGs,.there are agreements e.g., Memoranda of Agreements/Understanding,Treaties! thatmay require particular coordination prior to the release/acquisition offederal, state,-local, tribal and foreign govemmentinformation. 92
matter must be opened on the individual.
" 53 _
____-A -UNCLASSIFIED-FOR_ OFFICIAL USE ONLY U//FOUO! File Review: This type of assessment requires recurring 90-day le reviewsof the-assessment le and any sub-le by the SSA_or SIA in accordance with DIOG
Section 3.4. Investigative le reviews for probationary FBI employees are recommended
every 30 days but must be conducted at least every 60_ days. This le review must:
a. U//FOUO! Evaluate the progress made toward achieving the authorized purpose and
b. U//FOUO! Determine whether it is reasonably likely that information will be" 'obt_ained that'isrelevant*to the authorized objective, thereby warranting an exiensiqn,for another 90 days at least every 60 days for probationary FBI"employees!;
c. U//FOUO! Determine whether adequate predication has been developed to justifyopeninga criminal, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber, or weaponsof mass
U//FOUO! Any collection undertaken in order to identify threats, vulnerabilities, or l
intelligence gaps identied as a result of domain analysis or in response to an FBI ANational C ll ti R ' FBI ' 1 ' "b2
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_ o ec on equirement or Fie d Ofce Collection Requirement must be 'addressedin a separate substantive classi ' _ cording to the 1,2investigative matter e.g., Y Additionall an b?E.Y, Ytime an assessment begins 0 tocus on aparticular individual, a separate substantiveclassication assessment le or suble, asappropriate, according to the investigative
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U//FOUO! Responsible Entity: The FIG or FBll-IQ D1 will manage this tv e Oassessmen reardless of whe ie the assessment isedocumented in an orotheras directed in the DI PG! or a substantive investigativeclassi ication ile. This includes substantive assessments derivedfrom alysis producedand documented in or othe as directed in theDI PG!. Under the management of the F I , substantive Field Office Squads can support
the collection of information in thistype of assessment. e '
U//FOUO!_| l
U//FOUO] I k L
s
U//FOUO!| _ - l '
U//FOUQ! Sleek information to identify potential human sources, assess thesuitability, credibility, or value of particular individuals as human sources, validatehuman sources, or maintain the cover or credibility of human sources, who may be
able to provide or obtain information relating to criminal activities in violation offederal law, threats to the national security, or matters of foreign intelligence
interest. ~
U//FOUO! Durati0n:*All such activities must follow the policy requirementsestablished in the FBls Condential Human Source Policy Manual Cl-IS'PM!,_
CondentiaIHuman Source Validation Standards Manual CHSVSM!, and The AttorneyGeneral s Guidelines Regal-di11g the Use 0fFBI Confidential Human Sources AGG-
Cl-lS!,,and implemented in| I lfthereiis any inconsistency between the CHSPM or
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CHSVSM and the DIOG, the DIOG controls and OGC should be immediately notied of
the conict. '
U//FOUO! Documentation::|must be used-to document alltactivities under thisprovision, unless otherwise directed in the DI PG or other FBIHQ Division PGs. b2
U//FOUO! Approval: All approvals must follow the policy requirements established in MEthe FBIs_ CHSPM, CHSVSM, and the AGG-CHS, and as implemented in|:|,
U//FOUO! File Review: File reviews must be conducted in accordance with. the FBIs
CHSPM. ,
U//FOUO! Responsible Entity: A FIG or substantive squad may conduct and manage
this type of assessment. e ,
U//FOUO! Seek information, proactively or in response to investigative leads,relating to matters of foreign intelligence interest responsive to foreign intelligence
requirements. -
U//FOUO! Foreign Intelligence is information relating to the capabilities, intentions, oractivities of foreign govemments or elementsthereof, foreign organizations, or foreign
persons, or intemational terrorists. The FBI denes a foreign intelligence requirenient tobeea collectionsrequirementissuediby the United States Intelligence Community' USIC!and accepted by the FBI DI. The collection of foreign intelligence pursuant to thisdenition extends the sphere of the FBIs information-gathering activities beyond federal
crimes and threats to the national security, and pemiits the FBI to seek informationregarding a broader range of matters relating to.foreign powers, organizations, or personsthat may be of interest to the .co_nduct of the United States foreign affairs. AGG-Dom,
Introduction A.3!
U//FOUO! Under this authorizedpurposc, an FBI employee may only collect '
informationthat relates to matters of positive foreign intelligence. See DIOG Section_9for a description of fpositive foreigninte]ligence.?! An FBI employee should prioritizecollection against FBI National Collection "Requirements before attempting to collectagainst a positive foreign intelligence requirement. The Dl PG fumishes guidance on the
prioritization of collection, -
U//FOUO! Duration: An FBI employee may initiate an assessment for this purpose onlywith-prior Field Ofce S_SA.or SIA approval and FBIHQ Collection Management Section CMS! approval. The effective date of the assessment is the date F BII-IQ CMS approvesthe assessment. Such an assessment may continue for as long as necessary to achieve itspurpose and objectives. When the objective has been met, a closing EC must be approvedby the Field Ofce SSA or SIAiand FBIHQ CMS and uploaded to the le.
U//FOUO! Documentation: This type of assessment must use an EC to document theinitiation approval of the assessment and the request and approval for the use ofapplicable investigative methods. Forei n intelli ence to this b2subsection must be maintained in the 0r as otherwise b/Edetermined by FBIHQ CMS. The DI _ G furtherdes'c'ribes this process. -
U//FOUO! Approval: Assessments to collect on matters of foreign intelligenceinterestf must be approved in advance by. FBIHQ CMS in accordance with the standards
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listed in Section 5.5.| 7 S , _ i
- . [In addition to the normalqurrement' to use the least intrusive method to gather information during an assessment,when conducting this type of assessment the FBI employee must be mindful of theadditional requirement to operate openly and consensually _with a United States person, tothe extent practicable. _ *
U//FOUO! File Review: This type of assessment requires recurring -90-day le reviewsof the assessment le and any sub-le by the SSA or SIA in accordance with Section 3.4.Investigative le reviews for probationary FBI employees are recommended every 30
daysbut must be conducted at least every 60 days. This le review must:
a. U//FOUO! Evaluate the progress made toward achieving the authorized purpose andobjective; ' I ,
b. , U/lFOUO!.Deterrnine whethereit is reasonably-likely~that information-will be
obtained that is relevantto the authorized objective, thereby -warrantingan extensionfor another 90 days at least every 60 days for probationary FBItemployees!;
c. U//FOUO! Determine whether adequate predication has been developed to justify
opening a criminal, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber, or weapons of mass
destruction predicated investigation; and
d. U//FOUO! Determine whether the assessment should be terminated; _
U//FOUO! If the initiation of the assessment involves asensitive investigative matter, -itmust bereviewed by the CDC and approved by~the SAC, prior, to seeking FBII-IQ CMSauthorization. If a sensitive investigative matter arises after the initiation of an assessment,investigative activity must cease until CDC review and SAC -approval is acquired and
notice provided to_FBIl-IQ CMS. Higher. supervisory approval, as described in Section_5._9, may be required before using the following investigative methods: physicalsurveillance, certain interviews, and tasking of condential humansources. In addition,as.specied inthe Division PGs, there are agreements e.g., Memoranda of , pAgreements/Understanding, Treaties! that may require particular coordination prior to therelease/acquisition of certain federal, state, local, tribal and foreign govemmentinformation. I
U//FOUO! Positive forei n intelli en _ suant to this subsection must bemaintained in or as otherwise determined by _FBH-IQ CMS. e titlE7case caption of the opening EC must contain the word Assessment, and the synopsis must identify the purpose and the objectiveof theassessment. If at the time of the opening, or, at anytime thereafter, the assessment V
involves asensitive investigative matter, the title/case caption must contain the words Assessment and Sensitive Investigative Matter. The Dl PG further describes this
process.
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U//FOU0! Responsible Entity: This type of assessment is managed by the FIG andFBIHQ DI. I
5.7. U! Sensitive Investigative Matter / Academic Nexus / Buckley Amendment
U//FOU0! Sensitive Investigative Matter: An investigative matter involving the activitiesof a domestic public ofcial or political candidate involving corruption or a threat to thenationaisecurity!, religious or political organization or individual prominentin suchlanorganization, or news media, or any other matter which, in thejudgment of the ofcial authorizing an investigation, should be brought to the attention of FBI Headquarters andother DOJ ofcials. AGG-Dom, Part VII;N.! As a matter of FBI policy, judgment meansthat the decision of the authorizingiofcial is discretionary. DIOG _Sectioni| ! and the DIOG
'classiedAppend_ix G denel .
U//FOU0! The sensitivity related to an academic institution arises from the Americantradition of academic freedom e.g., an atmosphere in which students andvfaculty are freeto express" unorthodox ideas and views and to challenge conventional thought without fear of =repercussion!. Academic freedom does not mean, however, that academic institutions are offlimits to FBI investigators in pursuit of information or individuals of legitimate investigative
interest. . U//FOUO%| I g e I i I isee the EIITG classiecaggendix G., '
U//FOU0! Buckley Amendment: A request for academic records must only be madepursuant to the provisions of the Buckley Amendment The Family Educational Rights andPrivacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § l232[g], as amended by Public Law 107-56 [ USAPATRIOT Act ]!. An FBI employee is prohibited from receiving academic records thathave not been properly requested pursuant to the Buckley Amendment. The denition of academic records is very broad and covers almost all records about a student other thanpublic, student directory-type information published by the institution. The BuckleyAmendment contains a penalty provision for those institutions that improperly nLmu.d.e' A
academic records to la I
U//FOU0! A Buckley Amendment request for academic records cannot be made during anassessment. In a predicated investigation, a request for academic records must be made
pursuant to the Buckley Amendments
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5.8. U//FOUO! Standards for Initiating or Approving the Use of an Authorized
Investigative Method
U//FOUO! Prior to initiating or approving the use of an authorized investigative method, an FBI
employee or approving official must detennine whether:
A. U//FOUO! The use of the particular investigative method is likely to further an objective ofthe assessment; _ -
B. U//FOUO! The investigative method selected is the least intrusive method, reasonable under
the circumstances; _
C. U//FOUO! The anticipated value of the assessmentjusties the use of the.selectedinvestigative methodor methods; '
D. U//FOUO! If the purpose of the assessment is to collect positive foreign intelligence, theinvestigative method complies with the AGG-Dom requirement that the ~F BI operate openlyand consensually with a United States person, to theextent practicable; and _
E. U//FOUO! The method is anappropriate use of personnel and nancial resources.
5.9. U! Authorized Investigative Methods in Assessments and Pre_dicated
Investigations _ , _ .
U! The following investigative methodsmay be usedlin assessments and predicated
investigations:
A. U! Obtain publicly available information. AGG-Dom, Part II.A.4.a and Part VII.L.!.
l . U! Scope: Publicly available information is information that is: - ;
a., U! Published or broadcast for public consumption; '
b. U!.Available on request to the public;
c. U! Accessibleon-line or otherwise to the public;
d. U! Available to the public by subscription or purchase;
e. U! Made available at a meeting open to the public; l
f. U! Obtained by visiting any place or attending an event thatis open to the public;.or
g. U! Could'be seen or heard by any casual observer not involving unconsented
intrusion into private places. g A '
U/./F°U0!I S-
_ 2. U//FOUO! Approval: Supervisory approval is not required for use of this method,
tasking a CHS or UCE to attend a religious serviceeduring a predicated investigation,
whether open to the public or.-not, requires SSA approval. Tasking a-CI-IS to attend areligious service, whether open to the public or not, during an assessment requires SAC
approval.
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U//FOUO! Application: This investigative method may be used in assessments, nationalsecurity investigations; criminal investigations, foreign intelligence collection cases, andfor assistance to other agencies.
U! Use/Dissemination; The use or dissemination of information obtained by this
method must comply with 'the AGG-Dom and DIOG Section 14.
U! Engage in observation or surveillance not requiring a court order._Surveillance
includes physical, photographic and -video surveillance where such'surveillance doesnot infringe on a reasonable expectation of privacy andtrespass is not required toaccomplish the surveillance. AGG-"Dom, Part lI.A.4.h! .
U! Scope
a. U//FOUO! Physical Surveillance Dened: Physical surveillance is the deliberateobservation by an FBI employee of persons, places, or events, on either_ a limited orcontinuous basis, in a public or arsemi-public e.g., commercial business open to the
public! setting. . u//rouoj i | I I '
b. U//FOUO!~SurveilIance Enhancement~Device's: The use of mechanical devicesoperated by the user e.g., binoculars; hand-held cameras; radiation, chemical or _biological detectors! is authorized in physical surveillanceprovided that the device isnot used to collect information in which a person has a reasonable expectation ofprivacy e.g., equipment such as a parabolic microphone or other listening device that_ would intercept a private*convers_ation or thermal imaging a home is not permitted!.
U//FOUO! Approval: During an assessment, physical surveillance may be approved fora period of time not to exceed[:|as explained further below.' a. U//FOUO! Standards for Initiating or Approving Physical Surveillance.Duringan Assessment: During an assessment,.in addition tothe standards" containedinnSections §._5 and Q, the FBI employee and supervisor must consider the following:
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i. U//FOUO! Whether the physical surveillance is rationally related to thearticulated purpose and objective of the assessment; _
ii. U//FOUO! Whether the physical surveillance is the least intrusive alternativei for acquiring needed information; 1 4
iii. U//FOUO! If the physical surveillance is for the purpose of determining a
pattem of activity, whether there,is a logical nexus between the purpose of the
assessment and the pattern of activity he or she is seeking to determine; and
iv. U//FOLIO! If being conducted in order to gather positive foreign intelligence,
whether the surveillance is consistent with the requirement that the FBI
employee operate openly and consensually with a United States person, to the
extent practicable.
U//FOUO! A ' - |
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_ in an FD-71,Guardian, or an EC requesting ASAC approval. O
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i e., U//FOUO! Physical Surveillance during Predicatedlnvestigationsz Physical
surveillance undertaken during a- predicated investigation does not require . _ b2| supervisory approval] " * l b7 E
3. U//FOUO!Application: This investigative method may be used in assessments, national
security investigations, criminal investigations, foreign intelligence collection cases, and
for. assistance to other agencies when it is not otherwise prohibitedby AGG-Dom, Part '
III.B.23. 1
4. _ U! Use/Dissemination: '1"-he use or dissemination of information obtained by this
method must comply with the AGG-Dom and DIOG Section l4.
C. U! Access and examine FBI and other Department of Justice DOJ! records, and
obtain information from any FBI or other DOJ personnel.- AGG-Dom, Part II.A.4.b.!
l. U//FOUO! Scope: As part of an assessment or predicated investigation, an-FBI
employee may access and examine FBI and other DOJ records and may obtain
information from any FBI personnel or other DOJ personnel. Access to certain FBI
1f¢¢Qlid§ maybe restrioted to designated FBIpersonnel because of the sensitiv'e' natureof
the information in the record or the classication of the records. These include, but are
not limited to: FBI records concerning human source identication; espionage
investigations; code word; and other compartmented information.
2. U//FOUO! Approval: Supervisory approval is not required to use this method, except
that if the use of records constitutes pattem_-based data mining under the Federalpata
Mining Reporting Act of 2007, it must be reviewed and approved according to paragraph
3 below. ' ~
, 3. U//FOUO! Pattern-Based Data Mining: The vast majority of data analysis performed '
during FBI assessments is based on subjects or events and does not meet the denition of
pattem-based data mining. Pattem-based data mining is the use of one or more data bases
to search. for persons who t a set of group characteristics or pattems of behavior e.g.,
the known characteristics of a particular terrorist organization!. Any such analysis based
solely on racial, ethnic, national origin or religious characteristics is strictly prohibited.
Sensitive Operations Review Committee SORC! approval is required for any analytical,
search of FBI or other agency data bases that constitute pattern-based data mining, as
dened above. Additionally, pursuant to the Federal Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007, '
the FBI must reportall agency initiatives that involve the use of pattern=based data '
mining to Congress. _ - -
4. U//FOUO! Application: This investigative method may be used in assessments, national
security investigations, criminal investigations, foreign intelligence collection cases, andfor assistance to other agencies. i
5. U! Use/Dissemination: The use or dissemination of information obtained by this
method must comply with the AGG-Dom and DIOG Section l4.
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D U! Access and examine records maintained by, and request information from, other
federal, state, local, or tribal, or foreign governmental entities or agencies. AGG-Dom,
Part II.A.4;c.! *
U//FOUO! Scope: As part of an assessment or predicated investigation, an FBI
employee may access andexamine records maintained by, and request information from,
other federal, state, local, or tribal, or foreign govemmental entities oragencies; When
requesting information using this authority, care must'be taken to ensure the entity
concerned understands that it is notcompelled to provide such information or create a
new record for the purpose of assisting the FBI. I I
U//FOUO! Approval: Supervisory approval is not required to use this method for
~routine uses, unless, such approval is required by Memoranda of Understanding MOU!
or other agreements for requesting such information. The FBI may requestanother
federal agency to disclose Privacy Act-protected records pursuant to the other agencys
-routine uses U.S.C. § 522a[b][3]! or through a written request for a law enforcement
purpose U.S.C. § 522a[b][7]!. Such written requests for a law enforcement purpose!
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 522a b!!, may be made by the Director or his designee, provided
that such authority may notebe delegatedfbelolw the~Section ¬hie_f level*8*C.F':R.
§ 16.40[c]; OMB Guidelines, 40 Fed. Reg. at 28,955!. Requests for records or '
information from a foreign govemment entity or agency must beappropriately
coordinated through the applicable F BI- Legat ofce, Office of International Operations
O10!, INTERPOL, relevant _substantive headquarters division, and/or DOJ Ofce of
lntemational Affairs, as necessary. Direct contact is authorized in certain circumstances,
such as an imminent threat situation. I_f the analysis of records obtained in this manner '
constitutes pattern-based data mining under the Federal~Data Mining Reporting Act of
2007, it must be reviewed and approved according to Section.5.9.C.3, above.
U//FOUO!| , . ' I
ELI! 3 i M U//FOUO! Recordsreceived from an outside entity and used during an assessment mustbe maintained as part of the appropriate le e.i!.,| I l
3 U//FOUO! AppIicati0n:This investigative method may be used in assessments, national
security investigations, criminal*investigations, foreign intelligence collection cases, and
for assistance to other agencies.
4 U! Use/Dissemination: The use and/or dissemination of information obtained by this
method must comply with the AGG-Dom and DIOG Section l4. ~
E U! Use online services and resources whether non-prot or commercial!. AGG-Dom,
Part II.A.4.d.! *
l U//FOUO! Scope: _As part of an assessment or predicated investigation, an FBI
employee may use any FBI-approved on-line service or resource that is available by
subscription or purchase, including services available only to law enforcement entities.
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U//FOUO! Approval: Supervisory approval is not required to use this method, although
subscribing to or purchasing any new service or resource must be done according to FBI
contracting procedures.' - ,
U//FOUO! Example: FBI-approved on-line services or resources include, but are not
limited to: Google, Yahoo, or similar Intemet search services; data brokers such as
ChoicePoint, Westlaw, and Lexis-Nexis; and vehicle, casualty, and property insurance
claims databases such as Claim-Search.
U//FOUO! Application: This investigative method may be used in assessments, national
security investigations, criminal investigations, foreign intelligence collection cases, and
for assistance to other avencies
U! Use/Dissemination: The use.or dissemination of information obtained by this
method must comply with the AGG-Dom and DIOG Section I4.
F U! Interview or request information from members of the public and private entities.
AGG-Dom, Part Il.A.4.f!
U//FOUO! Scope: An interview is the questioning of an individual to include the
As'ubject!,designed-to gatherinformation;fron1~the person being"interviewedthatisaccurate,
pertinent to, and within the scope of an authorized assessment or predicated investigation.
In the normal course of an interview, the FBI employee should divulge the employees
affiliation with the FBI and the true purpose of the interview. Informat_ion_ requested
during an interview must be voluntarily provided. lf the person who is being interviewed
expresses a desire not to provide the information, the FBI employee may not state or
imply in any way that the interviewee is compelled to provide information or that adverse
consequences may follow if theinterviewee does not provide the information. If the
person being interviewed indicates he or she wishes to consult an attomey,,the interview
must immediately stop.
U//FOUO! Custodial Interviews: Within the United States, Miranda wamings are
required to be given prior to custodial interviews if the subject is signicantly restricted
in his/her freedom of action to a degree normally associated with a formal arrest. For
more information refer to the Ci and C"li~PGs and The FBI Legal Handbook forSpecial_A2ents LHBSA!, Section 7:34. F '
U//FOUO! Approval: With the exceptions discussed below, interviews do not require
supervisory approval.
a. U//FOUO! Contact With Represented Persons:
U//FOUO! CDC review is required before contact with represented persons. Such
contact may implicate legal restrictions and affect the admissibility of resulting
evidence. Hence, if an individual is known to be represented by counsel in a
particular matter, the CDC will follow applicable law and DOJ procedure when
reviewing the request to contact the represented individual in the absence of prior
notice to counsel. The SAC, CDC, or their designees,» and the United States Attorney
1 or their designees must consult periodically on applicable law and DOJ procedure.
The Field Office may raise the following issues with the United States Attomeys
Office and request that it consult with the DOJ Professional Responsibility Advisory
Office, when the issues include, but are not limited to, the inconsistent application of:
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i! state ethics rules; or ii! rules for contacts with represented persons. AGG~Dom, 1
Part V.B. 1! - »
b. U//FOUO! Members of the United States Congress and their Staffs:
U//FOUO! Generally, F.BI employees maytal<e information received from
congressional offices just as they would take information from other sources, and
they may act upon it accordingly.
U//FOUO! However, prior CDC review, SAC and appropriate FBIHQ AD approval
and prior notice to the AD Ofce of Congressional Affairs OCA ' 'f an
investigator seeks toi _ . I e g
i T I p " I Note: The FBIHQ substantive Division policy implementation
guides may contain additional approval/notice requirements.
c. U//FOUO! White House Personnel: ~
U//F OUO! .CDCil'¬Vl¬W» and SAC_approvalsis requiredbefofe» initiating contact with; A
White House personnel. Additionally, CDC review; SAC approval and appropriate
FBIHQ SectiontChiefAapproval must be obtained prior to conducting an interview of a
member of the»White House staff. Note: The F BIHQ substantive Division policy
implementation guides may contain additional approval/notice requirements.
d, U! FBIHQ Substantive Division Requirements:
i. U//FOUO! Counterintelligence Division: Interviews conducted during
counterintelligence assessments and predicated investigations must comply
with the requirements contained in the Memorandum of Understanding
Between the Department of Stateand the FBI on Liaison for l A
Counterintelligence Investigations. The-FBIHQ Counterintelligence Division PG contains interviewapproval requirements.
ii. U//FOUO! Other FBIHQ Divisions: Each F BIHQ Division mayprovide
additional interview approval requirements inits policy implementation guide.
U//FOUO! Requesting Information Without Revealing FBI Affiliation or the True
Purpose of a Request:a. U//FO_UO!|i U" " I 4 H
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0. U//FOUO!| i
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vii. U//FOUQ!] _ A
viii. U//FO.UOl|;
5. U//FOUO! Application: This investigativemethod may be used in assessments, national
security investigations, criminal investigations, foreign intelligence collection cases, and
for assistance to other agencies when it is not otherwise prohibited by AGG-Dom, Part
*llI.B.2-3.
6. U! Use/Dissemination: The use or dissemination of information obtained by this method
must comply with:the AGG-Dom and DIOG Section I4. -
G. U! Accept information voluntarily provided by governmental or private entities.
AGG-Dom, Part lI.A.4.g.!
l. U//FOUO! Scope: As part of an assessment or predicated investigation, an FBI
employee may accept information voluntarily provided by'federal, state, local, or foreign
govemmental orprivate entities to include individuals. Voluntarily provided information
includes,'but is not limited to, oral as well as documentary &Ild,phySiC8.i evidence such as:
a computer hard drive or other electronic media that contains information, paper
documents containing information, or physical objects e.g., handgun or narcotics!.
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2. U//FOUO! Approval: Supervisory approval is not required to accept voluntarily
provided information. Personnel may not request nor knowingly accept information
where disclosure would be prohibited by federal, law. See, e.g., '18 U.S;C. § 2702
prohibiting an entity providing electronic communications services from divulging
certain communications and other records, except in certain circumstances!.
3. U//FOUO! Application: Thisinvestigative method may be used in assessments, national
security investigations, criminal investigations, foreign intelligence collection cases, and
for assistance to other avencies when it is not otherwise prohibited by AGG-Dom, Part
lII.B.2-3. ' '
4. U! Use/Dissemination: The use or dissemination of information obtained by this
method must comply with the AGG-Dom and DIOG Section 14.
U! Use and recruit human sourceskin conformitywith the Attorney Generals
Guidelines Regarding the Use of FBI Confidential Human Sources. AGG-Dom, Part.
II.A.4.e!
Al . U//FOUO! The FBI may use and recruit human sources inassessments and predicated
'investigations in conformity with the AGG-Dom, AGG-CHS, the FBI CHSPM, and the
. In this context, use means obtaining information from, tasking, or
otherwise .ope'rating» such sources. * AGG-Dom, Pait'Vll.V.!
2. U//FOUO! A CHS can be used in support of an assessment and a predicated
investigation or for the purpose of validating, vetting or determining the suitability of
another CHS as part of an assessment.
3. U//FOUO! Religious ServiceNotwithstanding any other policy, tasking a CHS to
attend a religious service, whether o_r not open to the public, requires SSA approval in a
predicated investigation and SAC approval in an assessment.
4. U//FOUO! All investigative methodsshould be evaluated to ensure compliance with the
admonition that the FBI should use the leastintrusive method practicable. That
requirement should be particularly observed during an assessment whentusing a CHS
because theuse of a Cl-lS during anassessment maybe more intrusive than many other
investigative methods. Use of a CHS in an assessment should take place only after
considering whether there are effective, less intrusive means available to obtain the
desired information, The CHS must comply with all constitutional, statutory, and
regulatory restrictions and limitations. In addition:
a. U//FOUO! CHS use and direction must be limited in focus! and scope to what is
necessary to accomplish the authorized u ose and o ' _ T
or predicated investigatio *t "lzwgzmmwwl
b. U//FOUO! A CHS may be directed to seek information about an individual,
group or organization only to the extent that such information is necessary to
achieve the specicobjective of the. assessment. If such contact reveals
information or facts about an individual, group or organization that meets the
requirements of a predicated investigation, a predicated investigation may be
opened, as appropriate. '
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f. UUFOUO! If there is any conict between the-CHSPM or Cl-ISVSM.and.the
- DIOG, the DIOG controls and~OGCshould*be immediately notied of the
. conict.
5. U//FOUO! Application: This investigative method may be used in assessments, national -
security investigations, criminal investigations, foreign intelligence collection cases,rand
for assistance to other agencies-when itis not otherwise prohibited by AGG-Dom, Part '.IIl.B.2._ S ~
U! Note: When collecting positive foreign intelligence, theF.BI must operate openly
and consensually with a United States person, to the extent practicable.
6. U! Use/Dissemination: The use or dissemination of information obtained by this
method must comply with the AGG-Demand DIOQ Section l4.
I. U! Grand jury subpoenas for telephone or electronic mail subscriberjnformation.
AGG-Dom, Part Il.A.4.i!
l. U//FOUO!S_c0pe: During atype 1 or 2' assessment, an FBI employee may requestfrom
an appropriate'United States Attomeys Office USAO! the issuance of a Federal Grand
Jury FGJ! subpoena for the limited purpose of obtaining subscriber information. A FGJ
subpoena, under this provision, may not be requested for the purpose of collecting
foreign intelligence. For more informationregarding F GJ subpoenas, see DIOG Section
I L9; I
U//FOUO! Note: The use of Federal Grand Jury Subpoenas; to include subpoenas for
telephone or electronic-mail subscriber information, is not authorized in a type 3, 4, or 5
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assessment or in a type 6 assessment or full investigation initiated for the purpose of
collecting positive foreign intelligence.
2. U//FOUO! Approval: In a type 1 or 2 assessment or predicated investigation,
supervisory approvalis not required prior to requesting a USAO to issue a FGJ subpoena
for telephone or electronic mail subscriber information. _ »
3. U! Electronic Communications Privacy Act ECPA! 8 U.S.C. §§ 2701-25712!:
ECPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 .states a provider of electronic communication service or
remote "computing service shall disclose to a govemmental entity the: i! name; ii!
address; iii! local and long distance telephone connection records, or records of sessions,
» times and durations; iv! length of service including start date! and types of service
utilized; v! telephone or instrument number or other subscriber number or identity,
including any temporarily assigned network address; and vi! means and source of
payment for such service including any credit cardor bank account number!, of a
subscriber toior customer of such service when the govemmental entity uses . . . a Federal
Grand Jury [subpoena]'. . . emphasis added! _
4- ' U//EOUQ!APRli¢?!Q1.1¬ This. investigative method may be used in type»1¢anid2 t t
assessments, national security investigations, criminal investigations, and for assistance
to other agencies if relevant to an already open type l or 2 assessment or predicated
investigation. This method may notbe used to collect positive foreign intelligence
information.
5. U! Use/Disseminationzl p ' l
_' The use or dissemination of information obtained by this method must I
comply with the AGG-Dom, D_lOG Section l4 and the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure FRPC! Rule 6.
5.10. U! Investigative Methods Not Authorized During Assessments
U! The following-methods may not be used in an assessment:
U//FOUO! Note: For use of lawful investigative methods during the recruitment, assessment
and validation of a CHS, refer to the AGG-CHS, CHSPM, and CHSVSM.
A. U! Mailcovers ' N
B. U! Physical searches of personal orreal property where a warrant orcourt orderis not
legally required because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy e.g., trash covers!
C. U! Consens'ual_monito_rin<g of communications. including consensual computer monitoring
D. U!Use of closed-circuit televisionrdirectioninders. and other monitoring devices
E. U! Polvgraph examinations
F. U! Undercover operations
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G. U//FOUO! Compulsory_process. including grand jury subpoenas except: subscriber
information during type l and 2 assessments!. administrative and other subpoenas. and
National Security Letters
H. U! Accessing stored wire and electronic communications and transactional records
I. U! Use ofpen registers and trap and trace devices
J. U! Electronic surveillance »
K. U! Physical searches where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy .
L. U! Acquisition of foreign intelligence information in conformity with Title Vll of the
Foreifgn lntelligence Surveillance Act F ISA! '
' 5.11. U//FOUO! FBI National Collection Requirements _ -
U/_/FOUO! The FBI}-IQ'DI establishes FBI National Collection Requirements after coordination
with FBII-IQ OGC, other FBIHQ substantive Divisions, and Field Ofces. An FBI National
Collection Requirement describes information needed by the FBI to: i!_identify or obtain
information about potential targets of, or vulnerabilities-to, federal criminal activities or threats
-to the nationalsecurity;*or ii! inform or -facilitateintelligence-analysis and planning¢pertinent- to
the FBI_s law enforcement or national security missions. q _ _
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» j U//FOUO! Before any investigative activity is initiated in order to respond to an FBLNational
Collection Requirement, an assessment must be initiated or already open. An assessment cannot
be opened solely based upon an FBI National Collection Requirement. An authorized purpose
national security or criminal threat! must exist and an objective must be clearly articulated that
identies an authorized purpose prior to opening an assessment; During an assessment, the FBI
is authorized to collect against any FBI National Collection Requirement that is-relevant to the
assessment because such requirements are issued for information necessary to identify potential
threats or vulnerabilities e.g., type 3 assessment! or to collect information necessary for _
intelligence analysis e.g., type 4 asses'sment!I ' ' -
U//FOU0!| F I V
U//FOUO!| '
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5.12. U//FOUO! FBI Field Ofce Collection Requirements
U//FOUO! An FBI Field Ofce Collection Requirement "describes information needed by the
eld to: i! identify or obtain information about potential targets of or vulnerabilities to federal
criminal activities or threats to the national security; or ii! inform or facilitate intelligence
analysis and planning pertinent to the FBIs law enforcement or national security missions. -
U//FOUO!-Before any investigative activity may be conducted to respond to an FBI Field
Office Collection Requirement,.an assessment must be initiated oralready open. An assessmentcannot be opened solely based upon an FBI ield Office C ' ' _
»
e DTPL1 contains detail guidance regarding the Field Office Collection Requirements.
5.13. U!Retenti0n and Dissemination of Privacy Act Records I
U//FOUO! The Priv_acy*Act restricts the maintenance of records relating to the exercise of First
Amendment rights by individuals who are United States persons. Such records may be
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maintained if the information is pertinent to and within the scope of authorized law enforcement
activities or for which there is otherwise statutory authority for the purposeslof the Privacy Act
U.S.C. § 522a[e] [7]!. Activities authorized by the AGG.-Dom are authorized law enforcement
activities. Thus, information conceming the exercise of First Amendment rights by United>States
persons may be retained if it is pertinent to or relevant to the.FBIs law enforcement or national
security activity._ Relevancy must be determined by the circumstances. If the information is not
relevant to the law enforcement activity being conducted, then it may not be retained: For more
information see DIOG Section 4. AGG-Dom, Part I.C.5!
U//FOUO! Even if informationobtained during an assessment does not warrant opening a
predicated investigation, the FBI may retain personally identifying information for criminal and
national security purposes. In this context, the information may eventually servea variety of
valid analytic purposes as pieces of the overall criminal or intelligence picture are developed to
detect and disrupt criminal and terrorist activities. In addition, such information may assist FBI
personnel in responding to questions that may subsequently arise as to the nature and extent of
the assessment and its results, whether positive or negative; Furthermore, retention of such
information about an individual collected in the course ofran assessment will alert other
Divisions or Field Ofces considering conducting an assessmention the same individual that the.
particular individual is not _a crimjpal or national security threat. As such, retaining personally
identifying information collected in the course of an, assessment will also serve to conserve
resources and prevent the initiation of unnecessary assessments and other investigative activities
U! Marking Closed Assessments That Contain Personal I_nformat1'o_n: Information obtained
during an assessment that has insufficient value tojustify further investigative activity may
contain personal information. As a result: i! when records retained in an assessmentspecically
identify an individual or group whose possible involvement in criminal or national security-
threatening activity was checked out through the assessment; and ii! the assessment tums up no
sufcient basis to justify further investigation of the individualeor group, then the records must
be clearly annotated as follows: It is noted that the individual or group identied during the
assessment does not warrant further FBI investigation at this time. It is recommended that this
assessment be closed. Extreme care should be .taken when disseminating personally identifiable
information collected during an assessment that does notlead to sufficient facts to open a
predicated investigation. If personal information from the assessment is disseminated outside the
FBI according to authorized dissemination guidelines and procedures, it must be accompa_nied"by
the required annotation that the assessment involving this individual or rou did not warrant
further investigation by the FBI at the time the assessment was closed. . A
, , ' ' lMo'reover, an FBI
employee, who shares information from such a closed assessment file, must ensure that the
specicrannotation as discussed above! is included with the shared information.
$.14. U! Assessment File Records Management and Retention
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-regulations.med according to N¬t1on_al792rcHives and-Records Administration NARA!
u//1=ouo!|
irecords 111 ibuardian, or any successor iiitormation technology system, must be retainedThe retention of
according to NARA regulations. i
U//FOUO! Assessments that require prior supe '
e approved'by the SSA or-STA] . _, . . -. .. Jml Ifladditional-objectives ariseduringtlie assessment, they inusfbel I I i Miapproved by the SSA on SIA, and
Assessment classication les must be retained according to NARA
regulations.
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6. U! Preliminary Investigations
6.1. U! Overview ' '
U! The AGG-Dom authorizes a second level of investigative activitypredicated investigations.
Predicated investigations that concern federal crimes or threats to the national security are
subdivided into preliminary investigations and full investigations. Preliminary investigations '
may be initiated on the basi_s of any allegation or information indicative of possible.criminal
activity or threats to the national security.
6.2. U! Purpose and Scope
U//FOUO! Preliminary investigations may be carried out to detect, obtain information about, or
prevent or protect against federal crimes or threats to the national security. However, a
preliminary investigation cannot be initiated or used solelyfor the purpose of collecting against
Positive Foreign Intelligence Requirements, or for conducting enterprise investigations.
Intelligence responsive to Positive Foreign Intelligence Requirements, FBI National Collection-
Requirements and FBI Field Ofce Collection Requirements may be collected incidental to a
pféliminary=investigation~conceming another person, organiz_ation,~or entity.- If -Positive -Foreign
Intelligence Requirement, FBI National Collection Requirement or'F Bl Field OfceACollection
Reguirement information is incidentally cbllected-in a preliminary investigation, it should be
forwarded to the FIG92for evaluation and potential dissemination against collection requirements
U! In preliminary investigations, the immediate objectives include such matters aszdetermining
whether a federal crime has occurred or isoccurring, or if planningor preparation for such a
crime is taking place; identifying, locating, and appiehendingthe perpetrators; obtaining
evidence needed for prosecution; or identifying threats to the national security. '
U! The investigation of threats to the national security may constitute an exercise of the FBI"s
criminal investigation-authority as well as its authority to investigatethreats to the national
security. Asawith criminal investigations, detecting and solving crimes and arresting and
prosecuting the perpetrators are likely objectivesof investigations relating to threats to the
national security. These investigations, however, serve important purposes outside the ambit of
notinalcriminal investigations, by providing the basis for decisions conceming other measures
needed to protectthe national security. "
6.3., U! Civil Liberties and Privacy '
U! The pursuit of legitimate investigative goals without infringing upon the exercise of
constitutional freedoms is a challenge that the FBItmeets through the application of sound
judgment and discretion. In order to further ensure that civil liberties are not undermined by the
conduct of criminal and national security investigations, every preliminary investigation under
this subsection must have an identied authorized purpose and adequate predication.
U! No investigative activity, includingapreliminary investigations, may be taken solely on thebasis of activities that are protected by the First Amendment or on the race, ethnicity, national
origin or religion of the subject. Preliminary,investigations of individuals, groups or
organizations must focus on activities relatedto the threats and or crimes being investigated, not
solely on First Amendment activities or on the race, ethnicity, national origin or religion of the
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subject. In this context, it is particularly important clearly to identify and document the law
enforcement or national security basis of the preliminary investigation.
U! Example: Individuals or groups who communicate with each other or
with members of the public in any form in pursuit of social or political
. causessuch as opposing war or foreign policy, protesting government
actions, promoting .certain religious beliefs, championing particular local,
national, or intemational causes, or a change in government through non-
criminal means, and actively recruit others to join their causeshave a
fundamental constitutional right to do so. A preliminary investigation may not y
be initiated based solely on the exercise of these First Amendment rights.
U! The AGG-Dom present investigators with a number of authorized investigative methodsin
the conduct of a preliminary investigation. Considering the effect on the privacy and civil
liberties of individuals and the potential to damage the reputation of individuals, some of these
investigative methods are more intrusive than others. The least intrusive method feasible is to be
used, but the FBI must not hesitate to use any lawful method consistent with the AGG-Dom. A
more intrusive method maybe warranted 'inlight of the seriousness of a criminal or national
security threat. A ~ A *
U! By emphasizing the use of the least intrusive means to obtain intelligence and/or evidence,
FBI employees can effectivelyiexecute their duties while mitigating the potential negative impacton the privacy and civil liberties ofall people encompassed within the investigation, including
targets, witnesses, and victims. This principle is not intended to discourage FBI employees from -
seeking rcle_vant and necessary intelligence, information, or evidence, but rather is intended to
encourage FBI employees tochoose the least intrusivebut still effective means-from the
available options to obtain the-material. .
6.4. U! Legal Authority I
A. U! Criminal Investigations
U! The FBI has statutory authority to investigaterall federal crime not assigned exclusively
to another federal agency. See.28 _U.S.C..'§ 533; l8 U.S.C. § 3052; 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 [l]!
U! The FBI also has _special investigativejurisdiction to investigate violations of state law in
limited circumstances.lSpecically,,the FBI hasjurisdiction to investigate felony killings ofstate law enforcement ofcers 8 U.S.C. § 540!, violent crimes against ipterstate travelers
8 U.S.C. § 540A!, and serialkillers 8 U.S.C.-§ 540B!. Authority to investigate these
matters is contingent on receiving a request by an appropriate state official.
B. U! Threats to the National Security
U! The FBI has authority to investigate threats to the national security pursuant to executive
orders, Attomey Generaleauthorities, and various statutory sources. See E.O. 12333; 50
U.S.C. §7§ 401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq.! '
_ U! Threats to the national security arespecically dened to mean: intemational terrorism
espionage and other intelligence activities, sabotage, and assassination, conductedby, for, or
on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons; foreign computerintrusion; and othermatters determined by the Attorney General, consistent with Executive Order 12333 or any
successor order. AGG-Dom, Part VII .S!
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.5. U! Predication Q ___ .
A preliminary investigation may be initiated on the basis of information or an allegation
indic
6ating the existence of'a circumstance described as follows: '
U! An activityiconstituting a federal crime or a threat to the national securityhas or mayhave occurred, is or maybe occurring, or will or may occur and the investigation may
obtain information relating to the activity or the involvement or role of an individual,_ group,
or organization in.such activity. AGG-Dom, Part ll.B,3!
U! Anindividual, group, organization, entity,.information, property, or activity is or may
be a target of attack, victimization, acquisition, inltration, or recruitment in connection
with criminal activity in violation of federal law or a threat to the national security and the
investigation mayobtain informati_onthat would help to protect against such~activity or
threat. AGG-Dom, Part II.B.3! _
U//FOUO!|| . el___r l I i!l U//FOUO!| *_ _lA , 'b2.
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.6. U//FOUO! Standards for Initiating or Approvinga Preliminary Investigation
Before initiating or approving the conduct of a preliminaryinvestigation, an FBI employee
¢
B.
.C.
A6proving official must determine whether:
U//FOUO! An authorized purpose and adequate predication exist for initiating a
preliminary investigation;
U//FOUO! The preliminary. investigation is not based solely on the exercise of FirstAmendment activities or on the race, ethnicity, national origin or religion of the subject;
and
U//FOUO! The preliminary investigation is an appropriate use of personnel and nancial
resources.
7. U! Duration, Ap92proval,.Notice, Documentationand File Review ~
U//FOUO! Initiation: The purpose. of and predication for a preliminary investigation mustbe documentedin the initiating EC. The effective date of the preliminary investigation is
the date the nal approval authority e.g., SSA or SAC! approvesthe EC..
1. U//FOUO! The initiation of a preliminary investigatiorl.bythe Field Office requires
prior approval of the SSA. FBIHQ Division policy implementation guides may require
written notication to the appropriate FBIHQ Unit and Section. The initiation of a
preliminary investigation does not require FBIHQ and DOJ notiticationunless the
preliminary investigation involves a sensitive investigative matter as discussedin
paragraph 3, below.
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.2. U//FOUO! The initiation of a preliminary investigation by FBIHQerequires prior '
approval of the Unit Chief with written notication to the applicable Field Office. The
initiation of a preliminary investigation doesinot require DOJ notication unless the
preliminary investigation involves a sensitive investigative matter as discussed inparagraph 3, below. ' I
3. * U//FOUO! Sensitive Investigative Matter: The initiation ofa preliminary i
investigation involving a sensitive investigative matter: >
a. U//FOUO! Initiated by a Field Office: requires CDC review, SAC approval,
and writtenenotication to the appropriate FBIHQ Unit Chief and~Section Chief.
Additionally, written notication must be made by the Eield_Ofce to the United
States Attorney or by the appropriatetF'BlHQ Section to the DOJ Criminal
Division or -NSD as soon as practicable buttin all events no later than 30 calendar
da s after the initiation ' ' ' ' s *
t ' unl'CD'C review and'SAC approval__is acquired andnotice is furnished as
Speciedabovea 7 7 g g 7 7 V _ _ __ _ __ 7 ,
b. U//FOUO! Initiated by FBIHQ: requires OGC review, Section Chief approval,
and written notication to the.United States Attomey and the appropriate Field
Ofce or the DOJ_ Criminal Division or NSD as soon as practicable but in all
_ eventseno later than 30 calendardays after the initiation of such. an investigation.
, l ; lv . . . Imust cease until OGC review and Section l
Chief approval is acquiredand notice is furnished as specied above. _ AGG-Dom,
PartIl.B.5.a!
ti. U//FOUO! The Executive Assistant Director BAD! for the National Security Branch
must notifythe Deputy Attomey General if FBI Headquarters disapprovesa Field
Ofces initiation of a preliminary investigation relating to. a threatto the national
. security on the ground that the predication for the investigation is insufcient, and the
EAD for the National Security Branch is responsible for establishing a system that willallow for the prompt retrieval of such denials. AGG-Dom,_Part Il.B.5.d!_ L
U//FOUO! Extension: A preliminary investigation must be concluded within six months
of its initiation but=may beextended for up to six months by the SAC. This extension
authority may n_ot be delegated by the SAC to the ASAC; Extensions of preliminary
investigations beyond a year are discouraged and may only be approved by the a ro riateFBIHQ Unit and Section for good cause. AGG-Dom. Pi ' i " _ -
U//F_OUO! The following factors must be used to determine if good cause exists toextend the preliminary investigation beyond one year: e
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v U//FOUO! Whether logical investigative steps have yielded information that
tends to inculpate or exculpate the subject;
= U//FOUO! The progress that has been made towarddetermining whether a full
investigation should be opened or the preliminary investigation should be closed;
' v U//FOUO! Whether, based on the planned course of investigation for the
following six months, it is reasonably likely that information will be obtained that
will lead to predication for a full investigation, thereby warranting an extension
for another six months, or will lead to exculpatory information, thereby
warranting closing the preliminary investigation; and
v U//FOUO! Whether adequatepredication has been developed to justify opening afull investigation or whether sufficient information has been developedithat justify
closing the preliminary investigation.
C. U//FOUO!, Closing: When closing a preliminary investigation, the *FieldOfceor FBll-IQwill provide the reason for closing the-investigation. When closing a preliminaryinvestigation, the SSA or Unit Chief must ensure that all pending investigative methods
have been completed/terminated e.g., mail covers _and pen register/trap and trace!.
1.. U//FOUO Closing aprelimina einvesti ationii " i I A > I ' * i,appmval from the SSA.
2. U//FOUO! Closing a preliminary investigation initiated by FBIHQ requires approvalfrom the Unit Chief and notication to the appropriate Field Office;
3, U//FOUO Cl ! osing a preliminary investigation initiated by a Field Ofce involvin asensitive investigative matter require§_agp;val from the SAC |
14,. U//FOUO!~Closing a preliminary investigation-initiated by FBIHQ involving asensitive investigative matter requires agplloval from the Section Chief E
D. U//FOUO! Conversion: When converting a preliminary investigation to a-fullinvestigation, see Section Z for approval and notication requirements.
E. U//FOUO! File Review: Supervisory file reviews must be conducted at least once every~ 90 days in accordance with Section 3.4. File reviews for probationary FB_I employees must be conducted at least every 60 days.
6.8. U//FOUO! Standards for Initiating or Approving the Use of anAuthorized
Investigative Method
U//FOUO! Prior to initiating or approving the use of an investigative method, an F Bl employee
or approving ofcial must determine whether:
A. - U//FOUO! _The use of the particular investigative method is likely to further the purpose of* the preliminary investigation;
B. U//FOUO! The investigative method selected is the, least intrusive method, reasonable under
the circumstances; and I
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C. U//FOUO! The method to be used is an appropriate use of personnel and nancial resources.
6.9.. U! Authorized Investigative Methods in Preliminary Investigations I
A. U! Alllawful methods may be used in a-preliminary investigation, except for mail opening,
physical search requiringa Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure F CRP! Rule 41 search
warrant or a FISA order, electronic surveillance requiring ajudicial order or warrant, or Title
VII F ISA requests. Authorized methods include, but are not limited to, those listed below.
Some of the methods listed are subject to special restrictions or review or approval- requirements. AGG-Dom, Part V.4.A!
B. U//FOUO! A complete discussion of the investigative methods, including approval
requirements, is contained in Sections 5 and l_l. The use or dissemination of information
obtained by the use of the below methods must comply-with the AGG-Dom and DIOG
Section I4. ~
I. U! Obtain publicly available information.
2., U! Access and examine FBI and other DOJ records. and obtain information from any_FBI or other personnel. A
3. U!jAccessand examine records maintained by. and request information from. otherfederal. state. local. or tribal. or foreignigovernmental entities-or agencies.
4. U! Use online services and resources whether non-prot or commercial!.
5. U! Use and recruit human sources in conformity with the AGG-CHS.
6. U! Interview or request information from members of the public and private entities.
7; U! Accept information voluntarily provided by governmental or private entities.
8. U! Engage in observation or surveillance not requiring a court order.
9. U! Grand Jury Subpoenas for telephone or electronic mail subscriber information see
also number 16, below!.
10. U! Mail covers. AGG-Dom, Part V.A.2!_
I1. U! Physical searches of personal or real~property where a warrant or court order is not
legally required because there is no reasonable expectation. of privacy e.g., open elds,
trash covers!.. AGG-Dom, Part V.A.3! , I
I2. U! Consensual monitoring of communications, including consensual computermonitoring, subject to legal review by the CDC or the FBI OGC. When a sensitive
monitoring circumstance is invoIved,*the~monitoring must be approyed by the DOJCriminal Division or, if the investigation concerns a threat to the national security, by the
DOJ NSD. AGG-Dom, Part V.A.4! Sensitive monitoring circumstances include:
a. U! Investigation of a member of Congress, a federal judge, a member of the
Executive Branch at Executive LeveI~IV or above, or a person who has served in such
capacity withintthe previous two years Executive Level I through IV are dened in 5
U.S.C. §§ 5312-5315!;
b. U! Investigation of the Govemor, Lieutenant Govemor, or Attorney General of any
state or territory, or ajudge or justice of the highest court of any state- or territory,
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conceming an offense involving bribery, conict of interest, orextortion related to
the perfonnance of official duties;
c. U! A party to the communication is in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons or the
United States Marshal Service or is being or has been afforded protection in the
Witness Security Program; or -
d; U! The Attorney General, the Deputy Attomey General, or an Assistant Attorney -
General has requested that the FBI obtain prior approval for the use of consensual
monitoring in a specic investigation. AGG-Dom, Part VII.A and O!
U//FOUO! Note; See classied appendix for additional information.
U//FOUO!_| I e 1 A '
U! Use of closed-circuit television. direction nders. and other monitoring devices,
subject to legalreview by the CDC or the FBI OGC. The methods described in this
paragraph usually do not require a court order or warrant unless they involve an intrusion
into an area where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy or non-consensual
monitoring of communications,butlegal review is necessary to ensure compliance with
all applicable legal requirements.! AGG-Dom, Part.V.A.5!
U! Polygraph examinations. AGG-Dom,-Part V.A.6!
U! Undercoverrogerations. In investigations relating to activities in violation- of federalcriminal law that do not concem threats to the national- security or foreign intelligence,
undercover operations must be carried out in conformitytwith The Att0rney'General sGuidelines on Federal Bureau 0f'Invest1'2ati0n Undercover 0per'arion.s'. Investigations
that are not subject to the preceding sentence because they concem threats to the national
security orsforeign intelligence undercover operations involving religious or political
organizations must be reviewed and approved by FBl~Headquarters, with participation by
the DOJ NSD in the review process. AGG-Dom, Part V.A.7! .
U! Compulsorygprocess as authorized by law. including grand jury subpoenas and other
subpoenas. National Securitv Letters I5 U.S.C. §§ l6_8lu, l68lv; l8 U.S.C. §2709; 12U=S.C. § 34l4[a][5][A];50 U.S.C. § 436!, and FISA orders for the production of tangible
things. 0 U.S.C. §§ 1861-63!. AGG-Dom, Part V.A.8!
U! Accessing stored wire and electronic communications and transactional records in
conformity with chapter I21 of title '18, United States Code 8 U.S.C. §§ 270l27l2!.
AGG-Dom, Part V.A.9! I
U! Use of pen registers and trap and trace devices in conformitiylwith chapter 206 of title
18, United States Code l8 U.S.C. §§ 3'12]-3127! or FISA 0 U.S.C. §§. 1841-l846!.
AGG-Dom; Part V.A. 1 0! _ _
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6.10. U! Sensitive Investigative Matter I Academic Nexus / Buckley Amendment
U//FOUO! The title/case caption of the opening or subsequent EC for a preliminary-investigation involving a sensitive investigative matter must contain the words Sensitive
lnvestigativeMatter. DlOG Section IO contains the required approval authority and factors forconsideration when determining whether to initiate or approve a predicated investigationinvolving a sensitive investigative matter. ' .
A.. U//FOUIO! Sensitive Investigative Matter: An investigative matter involving the activitiesof a domestic public official or political candidate involving corruption or a threat to the p
national security!, religious or political organization or individual prominent in such anorganization, or news media, or any other matter which, in thejudgment of the ofcial i
authorizing an investigation, shouldebe brought to the attention of FBI Headquarters andother DOJ ff l AGG D P VII N A fFBI l d , 0 icia s. - om, art . .! s a matter_o po icy, ju gment meansthat the decision.oftheauthorizing official is discretionarv. DlOGSecti _0100 classied Appendix G dene] ' ~ »
B. U,//EOUO! Acad,emic;Nexus:| 7 __ AW g I I __
U//FAOUO! The sensitivity related to an academic institution arises from the American.
tradition of academic freedom e.g., anatmosphere in which students and faculty are free
to expressunorthodox ideas and views and to challenge conventional thoughttwithout fearof
repercussion!. Academic freedom does not mean, however, that academic institutions are offlimits to FBI investigators in pursuit of information or individuals of legitimate investigativeinterest. - _
U//FOLIO! _ ;_ . , e the DTUG classied Appendix G._ 1 I i
C. U//FOUO! Buckley Amendment: Although not~a sensitive investigative matter, a request. for academic records must only be madepursuant to the provisions of the Buckley
- Amendment The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U,S.C. § l232[g],as amended by Public'Law 107-56 [ USA PA'l".RlOT'Act ]!. An FBI employee isprohibitedfrom receiving academic records that have not been properly requested pursuant to theBuckley Amendment. The denition of academic records is very broad and covers almostall records about a student other than public, student directory-type information published by
the institution. The Buckley Amendment contains a penalty provision for those institutionsthat improperly provide academic records to=law enfor
A Buckley Amendment request for academic records cannot be made during an assessment. FIn a predicated investigation, a request for academic recordstmust be made pursuant to the
Buckley Amendment. T. .
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6.11. U! Program Specific Investigative Requirements
U//FOUO! Because of the many investigative programs within the FBI, a single universal
requirement will not adequately address every program. To facilitate compliance within an
existing program, the FBI employee should consult the relevant program golicv guidance.
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7. U! Full Investigations
7.1. U! Overview
U//FOUO! The AGG~Dom authorizes a second level of investigative activitypredicated ~
investigations. Predicated investigations that concern federal crimes or threats to the national
security are subdivided into.preliminary investigationsand full investigations. Full investigations
may be initiated if there is an articulable factual basis of possible criminal or national threat
activity, as discussed in greater detail in Section 7.5, below. There are three types of full
investigations: i! single and multi-subject; ii! enterprise; and iii! positive foreign intelligence
collection.
7.2. U! Purpose and Scope 7 _ " _
U! Full investigations may be initiated to detect, obtain information about, or prevent or protect
against federal crimes or threats to the national security or to collect foreign intelligence.
U! The objective ofa full investigation .includes: determining whether a federal crime is being
planned, prepared for, occurring or occurred; identifying, locating, and apprehending the
perpetrators; obtaining evidence for prosecution; identifying threats to the national security;
investigatingan-enterprise asedened in DIOG*Se'ction*8!; or collecting positivje foreignintelligence. »
U! The investigation of threats to the national securitycan be investigated under both the FBIs
criminal investigation authority and its authority to investigate threats to the national security. As
with criminal investigations, detecting and solving crimes, gathering evidence and arresting and
prosecuting the perpetrators are frequently the objectives of investigations relating to threatsto
the national security. These investigations also serve important purposes outside the ambit of '
normal criminal investigations, however, by providing the basis for decisions concerning other
measures needed to protect the national security. " , _ , U//FOUO!| U
»
U//FOUO! A full investigation solely for the collection of positive foreign intelligence extends
the sphere of the FBIs information gathering activities beyond federal crimes and threats to the
national security and permits the FBI to seek information regardinga broaderrange of matters
relating to foreign powers, organizations, or persons that may be of interest to the conduct of the
United States foreign affairs. SeeDIOG Section 9!
7.3. U! Civil Liberties and Privacy
U! The pursuit of legitimate investigative goals without infringing upon the exercise of
constitutional freedoms is a challenge that the FBI meets through the application of soundjudgment and discretion. In order to further ensure that civil liberties are not undermined by the
conduct of criminal and national security investigations, every full investigation under this
subsection must have an identied authorized purpose and adequate predication.
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U! No investigative activity, including full investigations, may be taken solely on the basis of
activities that are protected by the First Amendment or on the race, ethnicity, national origin or
religion of the subject. Full investigations of individuals, groups or organizations must focus on
activities related to the threats or crimes being investigated, not solely on First Amendment
activities oron the race, ethnicity, national origin or religion of the subject. In this context, iteis
particularly important clearly to identify and document the law enforcement.or national security
basisof the full investigation: _
U! Example: Individuals or groups who communicate with each other or
with members. of the public in any form in pursuit of social or political
causessuch as opposing 'war or foreign policy, protesting government
actions, promoting certain religious beliefs, championing particular local,
national, or international causes, or a change in govemment through non-
criminal means, and actively recruit others to join their causes-have a
fundamental constitutional right to do so. A full investigation may not be
initiated based.solely on the exercise of these First Amendment rights. *
U! The AGG-Dom authorize all lawful investigative methods in the conduct of a full
investigation. Considering the effectontheprivacy=and=civililibertiesiof-individuals and~the= ~
potential to damage the reputation of individuals, some of these investigative methods are more
intrusive than others. The leastintrusive method feasible is to be used, but the FBI must nothesitate to use any lawful method consistent with the AGG-Dom. A more intrusive method maybe warranted in light of the seriousness of a criminal or national security threat or.the importance
of a foreign. intelligence requirement. _ »
U! By emphasizing the use of the least- intrusive means to obtain intelligence or evidence, FBI
employees can effectively execute their duties while mitigating the potential negative impact on.the privacy and civil liberties of all people encompassed within the investigation, including,
targets,'witnesses, and victims. This principle is not intended to discourage FBI employees from
seeking relevant and necessary intelligence, information, or evidence, but rather is intended to
encourage>FBI employees to choose the least intrusivebut'still effective meansfrom the
available options to obtain the material. ~
U! Because-the authority to-collect positive foreign intelligence enables the F Bl to obtaininformation pertinent to the United States_conduct of its foreign affairs, even if that informationis not related to criminal activity or threats to the national security, the information gathered may
concern lawful activities. The FBI must accordingly operate openly and consensually with aUnited States person to the extent practicable when collecting positive foreign intelligence thatdoes not concem criminal activities or threats to the national security.
7.4. u! Legal Authority t 1
A. U! Criminal Investigations
U!, The FBI has statutory authority to investigate all federalcrime not assigned exclusively
to another federal agency. See 28 U.S.C. § 533; 18 U.S.C. § 3052; 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 [l].!
U! The FBI also has special investigative jurisdiction to investigate violations of state law in
limited circumstances. Specically, the FBI hasjurisdiction to investigate felony killings ofstate law. enforcement ofcers 8 U.S.C. § 540!, violent crimes against interstate travelers
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8 U.S.C. § 540A!, and serial killers 8 U.S.C. § 540B!. Authority to investigate these
matters is contingent on receiving a request by an appropriate state official.
B. U! Threats to the National Security
U! The FBI has authority to investigate threats to the national security pursuant to executive
orders, Attorney General authorities, and various statutory sources. See E.0. 12333; 50U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq.!
U! Threats to the national security are specically dened to mean: international terrorism;
espionage and other intelligence activities, sabotage, and assassination, conducted by, for, oron behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons; foreign computerrintrusion; and other
matters determined by the Attorney General, consistent with Executive Order 12333 or any
successor order. AGG-Dom, Part Vll.S!
U! Foreign Intelligence CollectionC.
U! The F Bl authority to collect foreign intelligence derives from a mixture of administrative
and statutory sources. See E.O. 12333; 50 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq.;28 U.S.C. § 532 note incorporates the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act,P.L. 108-458 §§ 2001-2003!. 1
U! Foreign Intelligencé is dened as information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or 0
activities of foreign govemments or elements thereof, foreign organizations or foreign
persons, or intemational terrorists. AGG-Dom, Part VlI.E!
7.5. U! Predication
U! A full investigation may be initiated if.there is an articulable factual basis that reasonably
indicates one of the following circumstances exists:
"A. U! An activity constituting afederal crime or a threat to_ the national security~has or.mayhave occurred, is or may be occurring, orwill or may occur and the investigation may obtaininformation relating to the activity or the involvement or role of an individual, group, or
organization in such activity.
B. U! An individual, group, organization, entity, information, property, or activity is or mayzbe
a target of attack, victimization, acquisition, inltration, or recruitment in comiection withcriminal activity in violation of federal» law or a threat to the national security and the
investigationmay obtain information that would help to protect against such activity or threat.
C. U!.The investigation may obtain foreign intelligence .that is responsive to a Positive Foreign.Intelligence Requirement, as dened in DIOG Section 7.4.C. _ I U//FOUO!l '
i! U//FOUO! 7 I 2%l ii! _ U//FOIQI l
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'/".6. U//FOUO! Standards for Initiating or Approving a Full Investigation V
U//FOUO! Before initiating or approving the conduct of a full investigation, an FBI employee
or approving official must determine whether: i
A. U//FOUO! An authorized purpose_and adequate predication exist for initiating arfull
investigation; K
B. U//FOUO! The full investigation is based on factors other than the exercise of First
Amendment activities or the race, ethnicity, national origin or religion of the subject; and
C. U//FOUO! The full investigation is an appropriate use of personneland nancial resources.
7.7; U! Duration, Approval, Notice, Documentation and File Review -
A. U//FOUO! Initiation: Thepurpose of and predication for a fullinvestigation must be - .documented in the initiating EC. The effective date of thepfull investigation is the date the
nal approval authority e.g., SSA or SAC! approves the EC.
1. U//FOUO! By a Field Office: The initiation of a full investigation for circumstances
describedfinSections7.5.A and 7I5§Bby a Field Ofce requires prior approval of the
SSA with written notication to the appropriate FBIHQ substantive Unit. The initiation
of a fullinvestigation of a United States person relating to a threat to the national"
security for circumstances described in Sections 7.5.A and 'Z.5.B requires the approvalof the Field Office SSA with written notication to the appropriate F BIHQ substantive
Unit. The FBIHQ substantive Unit must notify DOJ NSD as soon as practicable but inall events within 30 calendar days after the initiation of the investigation.
2. U//FOUO! By FBIHQ: The initiation of a full investigation for circumstances
described in Sections."/.5.A and 7.5 .B by FBIHQ requires prior approval of the Unit
Chief with written notication to the appropriate Field Ofce. The initiation of a full
investigation by FBIHQ of a United States person relating to a threat to the nationalsecurity for circumstances described in Sections 7.5.A and 7.5.B requires the approvalof the Unit Chief with written notication to the appropriate~Field Ofce and notice to
DOJ NSD as soon as practicable but in all events within 3.0 days after initiation of theF investigation. i '
~
3. U//FOUO! Sensitive Investigative Matter: The initiation of.a full investigation
involving a sensitive investigative matter:
a. U//FOUO! By a Field Ofce: requires CDC review, SAC approval, and written
notication to the appropriate F BIHQ substantive Unit Chief and Section Chief.
Additionally, the Field Office must notify, in writing, the United States Attorney,
if required. The appropriate FBIHQ Section must notify, in writing, the DOJ
Criminal Division or NSD as soon as practicable, but no later than 30 calendardays aiter the initiation of the investigation. The notice must identify all known
sensitive investigative matters involved in.the investigation see classied
appendix for additional notice requirements!. If a sensitive investigativematterarises after the initiation of a full investigation, investigative activity-must cease
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until CDC review and SAC approval are acquired and notice is fumished as
specied above. _ _
b. U//FOUO! By FBIHQ: requires OGC review, Section Chief approval, and
written notication to*the United States Attorney and the appropriate Field Ofce
or the.DOJ Criminal Division or NSD as soon as practicable, but no later than 30calendar days after the initiation of such an investigation. The noticemust identify-all known sensitive investigative matters 'involved~in the investigation seeclassied appendix for additional notice requirements!. If a sensitiverinvestigativematter arises after thevvinitiation of a full investigation, investigative activity must
cease until OGC review and Section Chief approval are acquired and notice is,fumishedras specied above. AGG-Dom, Part ~II.B.5.a!
4. U//FOUO! The initiation of a full investigation in order to collect positive foreignintelligence must be approved as provided in Section 9. Additionally, writtennotication toFBII-IQ CMS and_DOJ NSD is required as soon as practicable but no later than 30 calendar days after the initiation of the investigation.
5. U//FOUO! The.EAD for the National Security Branch must notify the Deputy.Attomey~General if FBI Headquarters disapproves a~Field Ofces initiation of a fullA investigationrelatingtoathreattoethe national~'security'on"the'groundthat the i ipredication for-the investigation is insufcient, and the EAD for the National SecurityBranch is responsible forestablishing a system that will allow for the prompt retrievalof such denials.* AGG-Dom, Part lI.B;5.d! I i
U/ FOLIO! Closing: When closing the full investigation, the Field Ofce or FBII-IQ willprovide the reason for closing the investigation. When closing a full investigation, the SSA orUnit Chief must ensure-that all pending investigative methods have been completedlterminated , e.g., mail covers and penregister/trap and trace!. Although there is no durationrequirement fora fulllinvestigation, the investigationtmust be closed upon all investigative
activity being exhausted.
1. U//FOUQ! Closing a full investigation initiated by a Field Ofce requires approvalfrom the SSA. Notication to the substantive FBIHQ Unit may be required by program
policy.
2. U//FOUO! Closing a full investigation initiated. by FBIHQ requires approval from theUnit Chief and notication tp the appropriate Field Ofce.
3. U//FOUO! Closing a, full investigation initiated by a Field Ofce involving_a sensitiveinvestigative matter requires approval from the SAC and written notication to'the
FBIHQ substantive. Unit and Section.
4. U//FOUO! Closing a full investigation initiated by FBIHQ involving a sensitiveinvestigative matter requires approval from the Section Chief and written notication tothe appropriate Field Ofce.
5. U//FOUO! Closing a full investigation for the purpose of positive foreign intelligencecollection requires the approval of FBIHQ CMS. .
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U//FOUO! File Review: Supervisory le reviews must be conducted at least once every 90days in accordance with Section 3.4. File reviews for probationary FBI employees must be
conducted at least every 60 days.
U//FOUO! Annual Letterhead »Memorandum: Annual letterhead memoranda re ardinthe status of full investigations are not requir _ - C " g .
7.8. U//FOUO! Standards for Initiating or Approving the Use of an Authoriied
Investigative Method _ _
U//FOUO! Prior to initiating or approving the use of an investigative method, an FBI.employeeor approving ofcial must determine whether: O
A.
B.
C.
D U//FOUO! The useof the particular investigative method is likely to further the purpose of
the full investigation;
U//FOUO! The investigative method selected is the least intrusive method, reasonable.under
the circumstances; .
U//FOUO! If the full investigation is for collecting positive foreign intelligence, theFBI
must=operate openly and consensually withaUnitedStatesperson, to the extentpracticable;
and
U//FOUO! The method to betused is an appropriate use of personnel and riancialresources.
7.9. U! Authorized Investigative Methods in Full Investigations
U!_All lawfulrmethods may be used in a full investigation, unless the investigation is to collectforeign intelligence. The use or dissemination of information obtained by the use of thesemethods must comply with the AGG-Dom and DIOG Section l4.-See foreign intelligencecollectio'n92Section 9 for more information regarding use of authorized investigative methods._
A
B.
C
D
E.
F.
G
-H
I.
J. U! Obtain publicly available information. . .
U! Access and examine FBI and other DO] records. and obtain information from anv FBI orother DO] personnel.
U! Access and examine records maintained by. and reguest information from. other federal,state. local. or tribal. or foreign governmental entities or agencies-
U! Use online services and resources whether non-prot or commercial!.
U! Use and recruit human sources in conformity with the AGG-CI-IS!.
U! Interview or request infomwation from members of the public and private entities.
U!'Accept information volimtarily_provided by governmental or private entities.
U! Engage in observation or surveillance not requiring a court order.
U! Grand Jury Subpoenas for telephone orelectronic mail subscriber information sec also '
P below!. ' I
U! Mail covers. AVGG-Dom, Part V.A.2!
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U! Physical searches of personal or real property where a warrant or courtrorder is not_lc2allv_ required because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy e.g., trash covers!. AGG-Dom, Part V.A.3! 3 p
U! Consensual monitoring of communications , including consensual computer monitoring,subject to legal review by the CDC or the FBI OGC. When a sensitive monitoringcircumstance is involved, the monitoring must be approvedby the DOJ Criminal Division or,if the investigation concems a threat to the national security, by the'DO.I NSD. AGG-Dom,
Part V.A.4! 1
U! Sensitive monitoring circumstances include: ' i
I. U! Investigation of a member of Congress, a federal judge, a member of theExecutive Branch at Executive Level IV or above, or a person who has served in suchcapacity within the previous two years Executive Level I through=IV are defined in 5U.S.C. §§ 5312-5315!; _ '
2. U! Investigation of the Governor, Lieutenant-Govemor, or Attomey General of anystate or territory, or a judge or justice of the highest court of any state or territory,
conceming an offense involving bribery, conict of interest, or extortion re_l_a_t_ed to _theyperformance of official duties;
3. U! A party to the communication is in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons or theUnited States Marshal Service or is being or has been afforded protection in the
Witness Security Program; or ~
4. U! The Attomey General, the Deputy Attomey General, or an Assistant Attomey General has requested that the FBI obtain prior approval for the use of consensual 'monitoring in a specic investigation. AGG-Dom, Part VII .A and O! U//FOUO! Note: See classied appendix foradditional information. _ I I
U//FOUO! Note: For those state, local and tribal govemments that do not sanction orprovide a law enforcement exception available to the FBI for one-party consensual recordingof communications with persons within theirjurisdiction, the SAC must approve theconsensual monitoring of communications as an OIA, as discussed in Section l7. Prior to theSAC.authorizing.the OIA, one-party consent must bctacquired. ThetSAC may delegate thisOIA approval authority to an ASAC or SSA.
U! Use of closed-circuit television. direction nders. and other monitoring devices, subjectto legal review by the CDC or the FBI OGC. The methods described in this paragraphusually do not requirea court order or warrant unless they involve an intrusion i_nto an areawhere there is a reasonable expectation of privacy or non-consensual monitoring of 'communicationsybut legal review is necessary to ensure compliance with all applicable legalrequirements.! AGG-Dom, Part V.A.5! *
U! Polygraph examinations. AGG-Dom, Part V.A.6!
U! Undercover operations. In investigations relating to activities in violation of federal-criminal law that do not concem.threats to the national security or foreign intelligence,undercover operations must be carried out in conformity with The Atlornev General isGuidelines on Federal Bureau of Investigation Undercover Operations. Investigations thatare not subject to the preceding sentence because they concern threats to the national security
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or foreign intelligence undercover operations involving religious or political organizations
must be reviewed and approved by FBI Headquarters, with participation by the DOJ NSD in
the review process. AGG-Dom, Part V.A.7!
P. U! Compulsorv_process as authorized bv law. including grand jury subpoenas and other
subpoenas. National Security Letters 5 U.S.C. §§ 1681u, l681v; 18 U.S.C. § 2709; 12
U.S.C. § 3414[a][5][A]; 50 U.S.C. § 436!, and FISA orders for the production of tangible
things. 0 U.S.C. §§ 1861-63!. AGG-Dom, Part,V.A.,8! I .
Q. U! Accessing stored wire and electronic communications and transactional records in
conformity with chapter 121 of title 18, United S_tates Code 8 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712!.
AGG-Dom, Part V.A.9! I -
-R. U!Use of pen registers and trap and trace devices in conformity with chapter 206 of title 18,
United States Code 8U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127! or PISA 0 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846!. AGG-
Dom, Part'V.A.l0! i
U! The following investigative methods can only be used in fullinvestigations:
S. U! Electronic surveillance in conformity with chapter l 19 of Title 18. United States Code
8 l_J;S;C. 2510-2522!, FISA, or § 2.5. AGG-Dom, Part V.A.11.!
T. U! Physical searches, including mail openings, in conformity with Rule 41 ofthe Eederal I
Rules of Criminal Procedure, PISA, or Executive Order 121333 § 2.5. The classified appendix
to the DIOG, Appendix G, provides additional information regarding certainsearches.
AGG-Dom, Part V.A.12! , , - p
U. U! Acquisition of foreign intelligence information in conformity with Title Vll of FlSA.
AGG-Dom, Part V.A. l 3!
7.10. U! Sensitive Investigative Matter / Academic Nexus / Buckley Amendment
U//FOUO! The-title/case caption of the opening or subsequent EC for a full investigation
involving a sensitive investigative matter must contain the words Sensitive Investigative
Matter. DIOG Section-10 contains the required approval authority and factors to be considered
when determining.whether to conduct or to approve a predicated investigation involving a
sensitive-investigative matter. The AGG-Dom denes sensitive investigative matter as follows:
A. U//FOUO! Sensitive Investigative Matter; Aninvestigative matter involving the activities
of a domestic public ofcial or political candidate. involving corruption or a threat to the
national security!, religious orpolitical organization or individual prominent in such an .
organization, or news media, or any other matter which, in theijudgment of the ofcial -
authorizing an investigation, shouldbe brought to the-attention of FBI Headquarters and
other DOJ ofcials. AGG-Dom, Part VIl.N!. As a matter of FBI policy, judgment means
that the decision of the authorizing ofcial is discretionary. DIOG Section l0.and/or the '
DIOG classied Appendix G-dene domestic public ofcial, political candidate, religious or
political organization or individual prominent in such an organization, and news media. ~
B. U//FOUO! Academic Nexuszl r . . * . . I
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U//FOUO! The sensitivity related to an academic institution arises from the American
tradition of academic freedom e.g., an atmosphere in which students and faculty are free
to express unorthodox ideas and views and to challenge conventional thought without fear of
repercussion!. Academic freedom does not mean,.however, that academic institutions are off
.limits to FBI investigators in pursuit of information or individuals of legitimate investigative
interest. '
U//FOUO For matters not considered a sensitive investigative matter |
th DIOG l 'f' d A d'. G see e c assi ie gpen 1~< .
. U//FOUO! Buckley Amendment: Although not a sensitive investigative matter, a request
for academic records must only be made pursuant to the provisions of the Buckley
Amendment The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § l232[g],
as amended by Public Law 107-56 [ USA PATRIOT Act ]!. An FBI employee is prohibited
from receiving academic records that have not been properly requested pursuant to the
Buckley Amendment. The denition of academic records is very broad and covers almost
allrecords about a student other than public, student directory-type information published by
theinstitution.The*Buckley Amendment contains a penalty provi_sionfor those institutions ethat improperly provide academic records to law enforcement agencies] ~ I r
U//FOUO! A Buckley Amendment request for academic records cannot be madeduring an
assessment. In a predicated investigation, a request for academic records must be made
pursuant to the Buckley Amendment.
7.11. U! Program Specific Investigative Requirements
U//FOUO! Because of the many investigative programs within the FBI, a single universal
requirement will not adequately address every program. To facilitate compliance within an
existing program, the FBI employee should consult the relevant program policy guidance.
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8. U! Enterprise Investigations
8.1. U! Overview
U!.Enterprise investigations may only be opened and operated as full investigations and are
subject to the same requirements that apply to full investigations describedin Section" 7.
Enterprise investigations focus on groups or organizations that may be involved inthemost
serious criminal or nationalsecurity threats to the public, as described in Section 8.5 below.
Enterprise investigations cannot be conducted as preliminary investigationsor assessments, nor _
may they be conducted fonthe sole purpose of collecting positive foreign intelligence. See
Section 8.2, below, regarding preliminary investigations and assessments.
8.2. U! Purpose, Scope and Definitions l
U! The term enterprise includes anypartncrship, corporation, association, or other legal entity,
and any union or group of individuals associated in fact, although not-a legal entity. The purpose
of an enterprise investigation is to examine the structure, scope, and nature of the group or
organization, including: its relationship, if any,»to a foreign power; theidentity and relationship of
its members,» employees, or other persons who may be acting in furtherance of its objectives; its
nances and r'esour'ces;.it'sgeographical dimensions;-its~pasf: and=future~activities and goals;and*~
its capacity for harm. AGG-Dom, Part lI.C.2! '
U//FOUO! Although an enterprise investigation may not be conducted as a" preliminary
investigation, a preliminary investigation may beused to determine whether a groupor
organization is a criminal or terrorist enterprise if the FBI has information or an allegation that
an activity constituting a federal crime or a threat to the national security has or may have
occurred, is or may be occurring, or will or may occur, and the investigation may obtain
infonnation relating to the activity of the groupor organization in such activity. An assessment
may also be initiated to determine whether a group or organization is involvedin activities
constituting violations of'federal,criminal law or threats to the nationalesecurity.
8.3. U! Civil Liberties and Privacy j
U! The pursuit of legitimate investigative goals without infringing upon the exercise of
constitutional freedoms is a challenge that the FBI meetsthrough the application of sound
judgment and discretion. In order to further ensure that civil liberties are not undennined by the
conduct of criminal and national security investigations, every full investigation, including an
enterprise investigation underthis subsection, must have an identiedauthorized purpose and
adequate predication. 1
U! No investigative activity, including enterprise investigations, may be taken solely on thebasis of activities that areprotected by the First Amendment or on the racé_,rethnicity, national
origin or religion of the subject. Enterprise investigations of groups and organizations must focus
on activities related to the threats or crimes being investigated, not solely on First Amendment
activities or on the race, ethnicity, -national origin or religion of the members of the group or
organization; In this context, it is particularly important clearly to identify and document the law
enforcement or national security basis of the enterprise investigation. .
U//FOUO! Example: Groups who communicate with each other or with
members of the public in any form in pursuit of social or political causes
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. such as opposing war or foreign policy, protesting government actions,
promoting certain religious beliefs, championing particular local; national, or
international causes, or a change in govcmment through non-criminal means,
and actively recruit others to join their causeshave '-a fundamental
constitutional right to do so. An enterprise investigation may not be initiated
based solely on the exercise of these First Amendment rights.
U! The AGG-Dom authorize all lawful investigative methods in the conduct of an enterprise
investigation. Considering the effect on the privacy andcivil liberties of individualsand the
potential to damage the reputation of individuals, some of these investigative methods are more
intrusive than others. The least intrusive method feasible is to be used, but the FBI must not
hesitate to use any lawfu_l method consistent with the AGG-Dom. A more intrusive method may
bewarranted in light of theseriousness of a criminal or national security threat.
U! By emphasizing the use of the least intrusive means to obtain intelligence and/or evidence,
FBI employees can effectively execute their duties while mitigating the potential negative impacton the privacy and civilliberties of all people encompassed within the-investigation, includingtargets, witnesses, and victims. This principle is not intended to discourage FBI employees from
seeking relevant and necessary intelligence, information,_or evidence, but rather is intended to
encourage EBl.employees.to choose the-least;intrusive_but stilleffective meansefromthe .
available options to obtain the material.
s.4. U! Legal Authority
U! A full investigation of a group or organization may be initiated as an enterprise investigationif there is an articulable factual basis for the investigation,that-reasonably indicates the group or
organization may~have engaged,.or may beengaged in, or may have ormay be engaged inplanningor preparation or provision of support for: AGG.-Dom, Part Il.C.l! p p
A. U! A-pattern of racketeering activity as dened in l8*U.S.C_. 1961!;
B. U! International terrorism, as dened in the AGG-Dom, Part VII.J, or other threat to the
national security;
C. U! Domestic terrorism as dened in 18 U.S;C. § 2331! involving a violation of federal
criminal law;
D. - U! Furthering politicalor social goals wholly or in part through activities thatinvolve force
, or violence and a violation of federal criminallaw; or
E. U! An offensedescribed in 18 u.s.c. § 2332b g!! B! or 18 U.S.C. § 43.
s.s. , U!Predication ~ t e
U!.An enterprise investigation is predicated»wh'en there is an articulable factual basis for the
investigation that reasonably indicates the group or organization may have engaged or may be
engaged in,~or may-have or maybe engaged in, planningor preparationor provision of supportfor the matters identied in Section 8.4, above. h
U! Thé. articulable factual basis for opening an enterprise investigation ismet with the
identication ofa group whose statements made in furtherance of its objectives, or its conduct,
-demonstrate a purpose of committing crimes or securingthe commission of crimes by others.The groups activities and statements of its membersvmay be considered in combinationto
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comprise the articulable factual basis, evenif the statements alone or activities alone would not
warrant such a determination. '
U//FOUO! Examples of situations inwhieh an enterprise investigation may
be opened:
_ 1. U//Fouogl *
U//FOUO! bg
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iii. U//FOU0
8 6 _ U! Duration, Approval, Notice, Documentation and File Review
A U! Initiation: _ .
1 U//FOUO!.By a Field Ofce: The initiation of an enterprise investigation by an FBI
Field Ofce requires the prior approval of the Field Office SSA with written notication
to the appropriate FBIHQ substantive Unitand DOJ as discussed in greater detail below!.
| l b2 FBIHQ Divisions may require specic facts to be included in this notication. F '
Ll:,flt¬I'pl'lS6 investigations involVing sensitive investigative matters require CDC review,
SAC approval, and written notication to the appropriate FBIHQ substantive "Unit andDOI. L p
U//FOUO! The responsible FBIHQ entity must notify the DOJ NSD or the Organized
Crime and Racketeering Section OCRS! of the initiation of an enterprise investigation;
by a Field Ofce or by FBIHQ, as soon as practicable but no later than 30 daysafter the
initiation of the investigation, The FBI Field Ofce must also notify any relevant USAO,
except incounterintelligence investigations. See the DOJ NSD policy that govems
notication to the USAO for counterintelligence investigations.
U//FOUO! By FBIHQ: The initiation of an enterprise investigation by an FBIHQ
Division requires the prior approval of the appropriate Section Chief with written
notication to the appropriate Field Ofces and DOJ as discussed in greater detail
below!. Enterprise investigations involving sensitive investigative matters require OGC
review, appropriate Assistant Director approval, and written notication to DO].
U//FOUO.! The responsible FBIHQ entity must provide notification of an enterprise
investigation initiationto the appropriate DOJ component NSD or OCRS! as soon as
practicable, butno later than 30 days after the initiation of the investigation. FBIHQ must
notifyany relevant USAO of the initiation of all enterprise investigations, except in
counterintelligence investigations.
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U//FOUO! Note: For enterprise investigations that involve allegations that pertain to
national security matters, the responsible DOJ component for the purpose of notication
and reports is the NSD. F.or enterprise investigationsrelating to a pattem of racketeering
activity that does not involve terrorism offenses, see 18 U.S.C. § 2332b g!! B!, the
responsible DOJ component is the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the
Criminal Division, AGG-Dom, Part II.C.3! '
U! The Assistant Attomey General for National Security or the Chief of-the Organized
Crime and Racketeering Section, as appropriate, may at any time request the FBI to provide areport on the status of an enterprise investigation and the FBI willprovide such reports as
requested. AGG-Dom, Part II C.3.d! _ _ -
B. U//FOUO! Closing: When closing the enterprise investigation, the Field Ofce or F BIHQ
will provide the reason for closing the investigation. When closing an enterprise investigation,
the SSA or Unit Chief must ensure that allpending investigative methods have been -
completed/terminated e.g., mail covers and pen register/trap and trace!, Although there is, noduration requirement for an enterprise investigation, the investigation must be closed upon al_l
investigative activity being exhausted. 1 r
1. U/ZFOUO! Closing an enterprise investigation initiated by a Field Office requires
approval from the SSA withwritten notication to the appropriate FBIHQ substantive
Unit. Unless advised contrary by the FBIHQ UACB! substantive desk, the enterprise
investigation can be.closed 30 days after the date of notication to FBIHQ.
2. U//FOUO! Closing an enterprise investigation initiated by FBIHQ requires approval
frorrrthe Unit Chief and notication to the appropriate Field Ofce.
3. U//FOUO! Closing an enterprise investigation initiatediby a Field Office involving a.
sensitive investigative matter requires approval from the SAC, with written notification
to the_appropriate»FBIHQ substantive Unit. The enterprise investigation can be closed
- 30 days after the notication to FBIHQ, UACB.
4. U//FOUO! Closing an enterprise investigation initiated by FBIHQ involving-a
sensitive investigative matter requires approval from the Section Chief, and written
notication to the appropriate Field Office.
C. U//FOUO!'File Review: ~
U//FOUO! Supervisory le reviews must be conducted at least once every 90 days in '
accordance with Section 3.4. File reviews for probationary agents must be conducted at least
once every 60 days.
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9. U! Foreign Intelligence h
9.1. U! Overview *
U! Foreign intelligence is information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of
foreign govemments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, orinternational terrorists. A Foreign Intelligence Requirement is a collection requirement issuedunder the authority of the DNI and accepted by the'FBIDI. Additionally, the President, a USIC
office designated by the President, the Attorney General, Deputy Attomey General, or otherdesignated DOJ~ofcial may levy a Foreign Intelligence Requirement on the FBI, Foreignintelligence collection by the _FBI is based upon requirements. -
U//FOUO! Foreign Intelligence Requirements issued by one of the parties listed above andaccepted by the FBI Dl will fall into_~one of two categories: i! those that address nationalsecurity issues that are within the F BIs core national security mission; and ii! informationrelating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof,
foreign organizations, foreign persons, or intemational terrorists which are not within the FBls
core national security mission.
U//FOUO! Requirements which _f_a_ll__into _t_h_e __rst~cat_egory may correspond.to_FBI National -Collection Requirements as dened in Sectionr5.1 1. FBI National Collection Requirements willonly be addressed in properly authorized assessments or incidental to predicated investigations. See the DI PG for specic requirements.! I i
U//FOUO! Requirements which fall into the second category are known as Positive Foreign
IntelligenceRequirements and may only be addressed under the authorities described in thissection. Assessments and full investigations intended to result in the collection of positive _-foreign intelligence must be.based upon established requirements and approved by FBIHQ DI-.Preliminary. investigations for the sole purpose of collectingpositive foreign intelligence are not
purpose of positive foreign intelligence co ection must be opened by FBII-IQ CMS. For
assessments, the authorized purpose and identied objective must be documented in the
assessment le. .
U/ZFOUO! The general guidance of the .FBls foreign intelligence collection activities by DNI-authorized requirements does not limit the F BIs authority to conduct investigations supportableon the basis of its other authorities~to investigate federal crimes and threats to the national
securityinareas in which the information sought also falls under the definition of foreignintelligence. AGG-Dom, Introduction A.3! Accordingly, the AGG-Dom authorizes thecollection of foreign intelligence incidental to predicated criminal, counterintelligence,counterterrorism, cyber, and weapons of mass destruction investigations.
U//FOUO! FBlNational Collection Requirements which address national security issues thatare within the F BI's core national security mission will be worked under FBI substantive-caseclassications e.g., 200, 105, 315! asassessments. An assessmentcannot be opened solelybased upon an FBI National Collection Requirement. An authorized purpose national security orcriminal threat! must exist andthe objective of the assessment must be clearly articulated when
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opening an authorized assessment, The authorized purpose and identied objective for all
assessments mustbe documented in the assessment le.
U//FOUO! Example: A '
a i! U//FOUO!| i
ii! _§u//Fouo
I
U//FOUO! Note: FBIHQ DI provides specic guidance in its policy implementation guideregarding FBI National Collection Requirements, FBI Field Ofce Collection Requirements,
and Positive Foreign Intelligence Requirements.
9.2. U! Purpose and Scope
U//FOUO! As stated above, foreign intelligence is information relating to the capabilities,intentions, or activities of foreign govemments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, orforeign persons, or intemational terrorists. The collection ofpositive foreign intelligence
extends the sphere of the FBIs information-gathering activities beyond federal crimes andthreats to the national security and permits the FBI to seek information regarding a broader range-
of matters relating to foreign powers, organizations, or persons that may be of interest to theconduct of the United States foreign affairs. AGG-Dom, Introduction A.3!
9.3. U! Civil Liberties and Privacy
U! Because the authority to collect positive foreign intelligence enables the FBI to obtain ,
infomation pertinent to the United States conductof its foreign affairs, even if that information
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is not related to criminal activity or threats to the national security, the information so gathered"may concern lawful activities. Accordingly, the FBI must operate openly and consensually witha United States person tothe extent practicable when collecting positiveforcign intelligence.
AGG-Dom, Introduction-A.3!
U! The pursuit of legitimate investigative goals without infringing upon the exercise ofconstitutional freedoms is a challenge that the FBI meets through theeapplication of sound ~judgment and discretion. In order to further ensurethat civil liberties are not undermined, everyassessment or full investigation involving the collection of positive foreign intelligence underthis section must have an authorized purpose and an identied objective. Additionally, theauthorized purpose and objective of any assessment conducted must be documented and retainedas prescribed in Sections 5 and H. A
U! No investigative activity, including the collection of positive foreign intelligence, may betaken solely onthe basis of activities that are. protected by the First Amendment or on the race,ethnicity, national origin or religion of the subject. Collection of positive foreign intelligencerequires: i! an assessment relating to a matter of foreign intelligence interest responsive to a~Positive Foreign Intelligence Requirement;.or ii! a full investigation that is predicated on a MPositive Foreign Intelligence Requirement.
U! The,AGG@Dom presen_t_i_nve*sti'gator_s with a number of.authorized investigative methodsin "the conduct of an assessment or full investigationto collect positive foreign intelligence;Considering the effect on the privacy and civil liberties of individuals and the potential todamage the reputation of individuals, some of these investigative-methods are more intrusivethan others. The least intrusive method feasible is to be used, but the FBI must not hesitate to useany lawful method consistentwith the AGG-Dom. For further explanation of the least intrusivemethod refer to Section 4.
U! Moreover, when collecting positive foreign intelligence either as part of an assessmentrelated to_ a matter of foreignintelligence interest or as part of a full investigation predicated on aPositive Foreign Intelligence*Requirement, the FBI must operateopenly and consensually with aUnited States person, to the extent_ practicable.
U! By emphasizing the use of the least intrusive means to collect positive foreign intelligenceand by emphasizing the need to operateopenly and consensually with a United States person,,tothe extent practicable, FBI employees can effectively execute their duties while mitigating thepotential negative impact on the privacy and civil liberties of all people encountered as partpofthe collection. This principle is not intended to disc0urage~FBI employees from seeking relevantand necessary positive foreign intelligence or evidence, but ratherisintended to make sure FBIemployees choose the least intrusivebut still effective-mean_s from the available options toobtain the information. . '
9.4. U! Legal Authority
U! The'FBIs legal authority, to collect positive foreign intelligence derives from a mixtureofadministrative and statutory s0u'rces.~, Se_erE.O. 12333; 50 U.-S.C. §§ 401 .et_seq.; 50 U.S.C. .§§ 1801 et seq.; _28 U.S.C. § 532 note [incorporates the Intelligence Reform and TerrorismProtection Act, P.L. l08~458 §§ 2001-2003]!. In collecting positive foreign intelligence, the FBIwill be guided by Collection Requirements issued under the authority ofthe DNI, including the
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National Intelligence Priorities Framework and the National HUMINT Collection Directives, orany successor directives issues under the authority of the DNI andaccepted by FBIHQ DI.
A. U! Assessment Activities
U//FOUO! As discussed in Section 5 of the DIOG,-the AGG-Dom authorize six types of
assessments, one of which specifically applies to collection of positive foreign intelligence as
follows: seeking information, proactively or in response to investigative leads on-matters offoreign intelligence interest responsive to foreignintelligencerequirements. Positive ForeignIntelligence Requirements can be found on the DIs Collection Management Section website.Further instructions on the collection of positiveforeign intelligence are contained in the Dl PG.
B. U! Full Investigation Activities
U//FOUO! As discussedin Section 7 of the DIOG, theAGG-Dom cites threepredicationcircumstances warranting a full investigation, one of which specically applies to collection ofpositive foreignintelligence: The full investigation may obtain foreign intelligence that is
responsive to a foreign intelligence requirement.
U//FOUO! Predicated positive foreign intelligence collection originates when the Ofceof the v
requirement as one to .which~the FBI will endeavor to respond to as part of its Positive Foreign
Intelligence Program.
U//FOUO! A full investigation to collect positive foreign intelligence is appropriate only when aDNI-authorized requirement exists for a particular issue and that requirement has been acceptedby FBIHQ DI. A
9.5. U//FOUO! Duration, Approval, Notice, Documentation, File Review and FBIHQStandards for A_pproving.the Initiation of Positive "Foreign Intelligenceg
Investigations
A. U//FOUO! Positive Foreign Intelligence Collection Authorities
U//FOUO! The.FBIHQ CMS iseresponsilblefor promulgating FBI policy and oversight ofthe Foreign Intelligence Collection Program FICP!. FBIHQ CMS will provide notice to theDOJ NSD~upon the initiation of a positive foreign intelligence investigation. To ensurethatall positive foreignintelligence collection is focused on authorized Positive'Foreign
Intelligence Requirements, only FBIHQ CMS may approve the initiation of a positiveforeign intelligenceoassessment or full investigation . therwise» determin_ed.byDl!.| g _ , . I A
Lt _ . I Field ofces must request, by EC, FBIHQ CMS approvalo open such assessments and full investigations. ~
B. U//FOUO!-Standards-to be Consideredwhen Initiating an Assessment or FullForeign~
Intelligence Investigation to Collect Positive Foreign Intelligence
U//FOUO! Before initiating or approving an~assessn_1ent or full investigation for the purposeof collecting positive foreign intelligence, the approving ofcial must determine whether:
1. U//FOUO! An authorizedpurpose and objective exists for the conduct of the assessmentor an authorized purpose and adequate predication exists for initiating a full investigation;
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2. U//FOUO! The assessment or full investigation is not based solely on the exercise of
First,Amendment activities or on the race, ethnicity, national origin or religion of the
subject; and
3. U//FOUO! The assessment or full investigation is an appropriate use ofpersonnel and
nancial resources.
9.6. U//FOUO! Standards for Initiating or Approving the Use of an Authorized
Investigative Method
U//FOUO! Before initiating or approving the use of an investigative method in an assessment or
full investigation for the purpose of collecting positive foreign-intelligence, an FBI employee or
approving ofcial must determine whether:
A. U//FOUO! The use of the particular investigative method is likely to further the purpose of
the assessment or full investigation; 1 .
B. U//FOUO! The investigative method selected is the least intrusive method, reasonable under.
the circumstances and, if taken relativeto a United States person,.the method involves open
and consensual activities, to the extent practicable; e
C. U//FOUO!.If open and consensual activity would likely be successful, then covert non-I consensual contact with a United States person may not be approved. 1
D. U//FOUO! In the case of an assessment, the anticipa'ted*value of the assessment justies the
use of the selected investigative method or methods; and
E. U//FOUO! The investigative method is an appropriate use of personnel and financial
resources.
9.7. U! Authorized Investigative Methods in Foreign Intelligence Assessments and
Predicated Investigations I ,
U//FOUO! Prior to initiating or approving the use of a method, an FBI employee and approving
official will apply the standards as provided in Section-9.6. With the exceptions noted below, all
lawful assessment methods may be used during positive foreign intelligence assessments. With
the exceptions noted below, all lawful methods may be used during a full investigation to collect
positive foreign intelligence. If actions are to be taken with respect to a United States person,
the method used must include open and consensualactivities, to the extent practicable.
A. U! Assessments see DIOG Section 5.9 for a complete description of the following methodsthat may be used in assessments!: _
l. U! Obtain publicly available information.
2. -U! Engage in observation or surveillance not requiring a court order.
3. U! Access and examine FB_l and other DOJ records. and obtain information from any
FBI or other DOJ personnel. A _
4. U! Access and examine records maintained by. and request information from. other
federal. state. local. or tribal. orforeign govemmental entities or agencies.
*5. U! Use online services and resources whether non-prot or commercial!.
6. U! Interview or request information fromgmembers of theepublic and private entities.
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7. U! Accept information voluntarily_provided by governmental or private entities.
'8. U! Usc and recruit human sources in conformity with the AGG-Cl-IS.
U//FOUO! Note: The use of Federal Grand Jury Subpoenas, to include subpoenas fortelephone or electronic mail subscriber infonnation, is n_ot_ authorized in a positive foreign
intelligence assessment. ,
B. U! Fulllnvestigations: 1 L
U! In addition to the authorized methods listed in Section 9.7.A, above, the following lawfulmethods may also be used in full investigations opened for the purpose of collecting positive
foreign intelligence: '
1. U! Physical searches of personal or real _propertywhere a warrant orcourt order is not-legally required because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy e.g., trash
covers!. AGG-Dom, Part V.A.3!
2. U! Consensual monitoring of communications. including consensual computermonitoring. subject to legal review by .the CDCror the FBI OGC. Where a sensitive _monitoring circumstanc_e is involved, the-monitoring_must be approved.by_the~DO J» 1Criminal Division or, if the investigation concems a threat to the national security, bythe DOJ NSD. AGG-Dom, Part V.A.4! ' i
U//FOUO! Note: See the classified agpendixfor additional information.
U//FOUO! Note: For those state, local'and tribal governments that do not sanction orprovide a=la_w enforcement exception available to the FBI for one-party consentrecording of communications with persons within'their_ jurisdiction, the SAC mustapprove the consensual monitoring of communications as an OIA. Prior to the SACauthorizing the O_IAj, one-party consent must be acquired. The SAC may delegate the
OIA approval authority to an ASAC or SSA. i
' 3. U! Use of closed-circuit television. direction nders. and other monitoring devices.
subject to legal review by the CDC or the FBI OGC. The methodsdescribed in thisparagraph-usually do not require court orders or warrants unless they involve anintrusion into an area where there-is a reasonable expectation of privacy or non-. consensual monitoring of communications, but legal review is necessary to ensurecompliance with all applicable legal requirements.! AGG-Dom, Part V.A.5! .
4. U! Polygraph examinations AGG-Dom, Part V.A=6!
5. U! Undercover operations. Undercover operations involving religious or politicalorganizations conducted for the purpose of collecting positive foreign intelligence mustbe reviewed and approved by FBIHQ, with participation by the DOJ NSD in the review
process. A'GG-Dom, Part V.A.7!~ ~
. 6. U//FOUO! Use of pen-registers and trap and trace devices in conformity with F [SA0 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846!, for non-United States persons only. AGGDom, Part
V.A.I0!
7. U! Electronic surveillance in conformity with I-Tl SA or. E.O. 12333 § 2.5. AGGDom,Part V.A.l 1! » 3' '
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8. U//FOUO! Physical searches. including mail openings. in conformity with FISA orE.O. 12333 § 2.5. The classiedappendix to the DIOG provides additional information
regarding certain searches. AGG-Dom, Part V.A.12! .
. 9. U! Acquisition ofpositive foreign intelligence information in conformitv with Titlee Lligg. AGG-Dom, Part V.A.l3! i '
'3 10. U//FOUO!_Ohtaining a business records order pursuant to FISA, 50 U.S_.C, §§ 1861-83,for records relating to a non-United States person only. _
9.8. U//FOUO! Investigative Methods Not Authorized During Foreign IntelligenceInvestigations *
U//FOUO! The following investigative methods are notpermitted for the purpose of collecting. positive foreign intelligence:
A. U//FOUO! National Security Letters 5 U.S.C. §§ l681u, 168lv; 18 U.S.C. §2709; 12U.S.C. § 341[a][5][A]; 50 U.S.C. §436!; _
B. U//FOUO! Obtaining a business records order pursuant to FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-18163,for records relatingoto a Un_ited._States_person; e *
~C. U//FOUO! Use of pen registersiand trapand trace devices in conformity with FISAOU.S.C. §§ 1841-1846! on a United States person; u
D. U//FOUO! Use of pen registers and trap and trace devicesin conformity with chapter 206 of18 U.S.C. §_§ 3121-3127; -
E. U//FOUO! Mail covers; 3 ' 7
F. U//FOUO! Compulsoryiprocess as authorized by law~,.inc_luding g rand jury subpoenas andother subpoenas e.g., Administrative Subpoena!; and *
. G. U//FOUO! Accessing stored wire and electronic communications~and transactional recordsin conformity with chapter 121: of title I8,.United States Code 8 U.S.C. .§§ 2701-2712!., AGG-DOIT1, Part V.A.9!
9.9. U! Sensitive Investigative Matter ~ -
U//FOUO! The title/case caption of the opening or subsequent EC for a positive foreignintelligence assessment involving a sensitive investigative matter must, contain the words Assessment and Sensitive Investigative Matter. The title/casecaption of the openingor x_ subsequent EC for a full investigation for the collection of positive foreign intelligenceinvolvinga sensitive investigative matter must contain the words Sensitive Investigative Matter. DIOG 1Section 10 contains the required approval authorities and factors to be considered relative to anassessment or a predicated investigation involving a sensitive investigative matter. The AGG-Dom-denes sensitive investigative matter as follows: 1
A. U//FOUO! Sensitive Investigative Matter: An investigative matter involving the activitiesof a domestic public official or political candidate involving corruption or a threat to thet national security!, religious or political organization or individual promine'nt in such anorganization, or news media, or any other matter which, in the judgment of the official Nauthorizing an investigation, should be brought to the attention of FBI1-Ieadquazters and 'other DOJ ofcials. AGG-Dom, Part VIl.N.! As a matter of FBI-policy, judgment means
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that the decision of the authorizing official is discretionary. DIOG Section 10 and/or theDIOG classied Appendix G dene domestic public ofcial, political candidate, religiousorpolitical organization or individual prominent in such an organization, and news media.
All positive foreign intelligence assessments or full investigations involving a sensitiveinvestigative matter must be reviewed by the CDC, approved by the SAC, and approved bythe appropriate FBIHQ DI Section Chief. see DIOG Section 9.10 below!
B. U//POUO Academi ' ' i
_ _ 4-
U//FOUO! The sensitivity related to an academic institution arises from the Americantradition of academic freedom e.g., an atmosphere in which students and faculty are freeto express unorthodox ideas and views and to challenge conventional thought without fear ofrepercussion!. Academic freedom does not mean, however, that academic institutions areofflimits to FBI investigators in pursuit of information or individuals of legitimate investigative
interest. A I i
U//FOUO!] , i _ ' 92
l _ [see the DIOG classied Apgendix_G.
9.10. U! Approval and Notication
A. U! Initiation _
U//FOUO! The authorized purpose of an assessment or full investigation must bedocumented in the initiating EC.
1. U//FOUO! Approval to Initiate an Assessnientto Collect Positive ForeignIntelligence: No assessment for the purpose of seeking information relating to mattersof positive foreign intelligence interest responsive to a Positive Foreign Intelligence
Requirement may be initiated without rior a roval fromobtaining FBIHQ CMSase caption ofthe opening EC must contain ther ssessment, an the synopsis must identify the authorized purpose and theobjective of the assessment.
2. U//FOUO! Approval to Initiate a Full Investigation: FBIHQ CMS will direct theinitiation of full investigations based on Positive Foreign Intelligence Requirements.
3. U//FOUO! Approval to Initiate an Assessment or Full Investigation Involving a Sensitive Investigative Matter: The initiation of either an assessment or fullinvestigation to collect positive foreignintelligence involving a sensitive investivativematter must have prior CDC review, SAC approval and the appropriate FBII-IQ»DISection Chief approval. L
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U! Notice '
1. U//FOUO! Notication to DOJ is notrequired when an assessment to collect
information relatingto a matter of foreign intelligence interest responsive to a positive
foreign intelligence requirement is initiated.
2. U//FOUO! Notification to DOJ is required when a full investigation to collect
information responsive to a foreign intelligence requirement is initiated. Notice must be
forwarded, from1FBIHQ CMS to the DOJ NSD as soon aspracticable but no later than30 calendar days after the initiation of the investigation. AGG-Dom, Part lI.B.5!
U! Duration I
U//FOUO! A foreign intelligence assessment and full investigation may continue for as long
as necessary to achieve its purpose and objective if an assessment, or until the requirement is
met in a full investigation. -
U! File Review _ -
1. U//FOUO!.Assessments: Foreign_intel1igence assessments require recurring 90 day le
reviews of the assessment le and any sub-le by the SSA/SIA. Filereviews for
probationary agents must be conducted at least every 60-days. The le review must:
a. TU//l5'OUO! Evaluate the progress made toward the achievement of the authorized
purpose and objective; -
b. U//FOUO! Detennineiwhether it is reasonably likely that information may beobtained that is relevant to the authorized objective, thereby warranting a continuation
of the assessment;
c. U//FOUO!-Determine whether the Field Ofce has appropriate access and ability to
collect positive fore_ignintel1i_gence in response to a requirement that has been
accepted-by FBIHQ DI; and
d. U//FOUO! Determine whether the assessment should be terminated.
2. U//FOUO! Full Investigations: Supervisory le reviews must be conducted at leastevery 90 days in accordance with Section 3.4. File reviews for probationary agents mustbe conductedat leastevery 60=days. _
U! Closing V
U//FOUO! Upon its determination or at the request of the Field Office, only FBIHQCMSmay close an assessment or_ full investigation.
U! Annual Letterhead Memorandum _
l. U//FOUO! Field Ofce Responsibility: All FIGs must submit an annual'report'on
each positive foreign intelligence full investigation that was open for any period of timeduring the past calendar year. This.report"_is'due to FBIHQ CMS no later than January30th of the calendar year following each year during which a full investigation is openand must consist of the following: _
a. U//FOUO! The Positive Foreign Intelligence Requirement to which the
investigation was responding;
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b. U//FOUO! All methods of collection used;
c. U//FOUO! All sensitive matters encountered;
d; U//FOUO! A list of all IIRs by number issued based on information collected
during the investigation; .
e. U//FOUO! A summary of the positive foreign intelligence collected; and
f. U//FOUO! The date the full. investigation was opened and, if applicable, the date
closed.
U//FOUO! These reports should be submitted by electronic communication. The EC' must be uploaded into ACS in a le number and in the applicable Foreign Intelligence
Collection Program- FICP! case les as designated in the DI PG.
2. U//FOUO! FBIHQ Responsibility: FBIHQ CMS'must compile data from each FieldOfce regarding the scope and nature of the prior years- positive foreign intelligencecollection program. The F BIHQ CM S must submit an annual comprehensive report of.all activity described above tO<D0J NSD no later than April 15' ofeach year. The reportmust include the following information:
a_._ U_/ZFQUQ! The Positive F oreignIntelligenceRequirement towhichethe. A
investigationiwas responding;
b. U//FOUO! All sensitive matters; and _
c. U//FOUO! The date the full investigation was opened and closed if applicable!.
9;11.' U! Retention of Information
U//FOUO!'FBII-IQ CMS must maintain a database or records systems that permits the promptretrieval of the status of each positive; foreign intelligence collection full investigation open orclosed!, the dates of opening and closing, and the basis for thefull investigation.
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