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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ALL II-IFIJDIISITIUI-I CEEI-TTEIIIIEII
HEPEEIIJ I5 UI~ICL£aS5IFIED
DATE ]..Zl52EIUEi BY 55324 UII EATJ§;"DH,.~RY5Date of transcription O 1 Z 12 Z 2 O O '7
.=
92On January 12, 2007,%b ]date of birth[::;::%::::] social security nu er] Iwas interviewed
te ep onically via United States Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases USAMRIID!, telephone number
After being advised of the identity of the agent an the purpose of
the interview,[:::::]provided the following information:
] ]severalfermentors which are no longer at USAMRIID.] ]explained,that
sometime] ]
]and that in reality] ]never used these
~fermentors] Ifurther explained, with regards Q9 the 5 literHBio Flow III fermentorJ 9%4_ bdvised that this was
the first of two"Ebntracts with KBI which entailed the transfer of
fermentors] ][:::::]reiterated thEE£i:]never used the 5 L Bio Flow
III fermentor mentioned above. could not recall the exact
physical location for this fermen or but was sure it was not
located in[::::::::::::::::]area in Building l425.[::::::]opined
that the fermentors would have been decontaminated before being
transferred to KBI.] ]could not recall who the actual receiptIholder fo?§this fermentor was]
s a e a
other individual§92at USAMRIID, may also be able to
provide that recise information. cou on y provide a generaltime frame of? as a time reference as to
when
suggested th t USAMRIID]
should also be able to provide a more acc a e
and detailed historical trail regarding this fermentor.
Investigation on 1 / 12 /2 O 0 7' at Frederick, Maryland C81 ¬phOI1iC&llY!
mm 279AWF-222936USAMRIID -- /Q5 ?
by PI ] ]
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
/ /55!/%/4.5, ]:]/22> , I//40omemmma January 12, 2007If: *L»- - ]FDw2$w.w69Q I ~ }
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| Irecalled that H b7c
Iwas of the belief that] I
Since[::::::]never used the 5 L Bio Flow III fermentor,
questions pertaining to its usaq§___1indicated could best be
answered by contacting| |
After the initial telephone conversation with[;;:::::]ended,[:::::]called this agent approximately 25 minutes ater and
volunteered the following information:
|:|relayed that spoken to BRU IVINS
concerning the 5 L Bio Flow III fermentor issues raised n the
earlier telephone conversation. IVINS suqgested that he
ld t t twou assis inves iga ors| gin going to t e
library at USAMRIID and identifying those a notebooks possibly
associated with research involving the 5 L Bio Flow III fermentor
in question. advised that IVINS volunteered his assistance
but that he woul not be able to speak directly with investigators,
and that communications would have to be through his attorney.
| Iadvised that IVINS also recalled having discussions and
input with before the 5 L Bio Flow III fermentor was
purchased. e iscussions dealt with the justification and/orlogic behind purchasing the fermentor. IVINS also relayed tothat he recalladE;:::::;;having some difficulty operating
t e new fer n e t e purc ase went through and that this
resulted in having to call the manufacturer, New
Brunswick, and resolve the issues.
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ALL INFDFELATIUIJ EE|I~ITEtl'I~1ED
HEREIN IS T_1l1ICLAfiSIFIED _1_
IILATZE 1?;-1.15-381313 B31 ELIIIEI;-7.3% TJII B.£thI_fIJI{;5."ff:i
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Date of transcription O 1 Z 1'7 Z 2 Q J '7
| | Socigl Security Account Number SSAN!:
I was interviewed, asLpre~arran ed, at| |place of b6employment, q_Lat-the_United_States bycArmy Medical Research Institutes Infectious ' ID!Fort Detrick, Maryland, work telgéhbne number: I i on
the afternoon of January 17, 2007. After being advised of the
identity of the interviewing Special Agent SA! and the nature of
the interview,[::::::]provided the following information:
WFO NOTE: enclosed in the FD-340 associated with I'communication are USAMRIID floor plans[:::::]was provided for
review.! _
, [;;::::Ladvised there was a five ! liter L! fermentor iflocated wit in t eE:] hot suite in USAMRIID building 1425. /0
further advised this 5 L fermentor was located in room on the
provided USAMRIID floor plans. [:::::::bpined the 5 L fermentor was I
manufactured by New Brunswick.
I Iwas knowledgeable of the 5 L fermentor pursuant to
b¬
.7-1 I Ithe hot suites in USAMRIID 1425 and 1412] | 11»
|indicated| |wou be knowledgeable of the 5 L
fermentor's use; however, Iwas
unaware of an one using it, and opined the 5 L fermentor 'ust satthere. [:::::E]reiterated to the best of| kecollectioni |ne:Frrecalled observing the 5 L fermentor in use
ertainin to the following USAMRIID em lovees who were in the bfon similar davs and/or timesrp 'C
UM
File# 279A-WF222936USAMRIID ""]La5<5 Datedictated N/A by
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.advised[::]had no derogatory information v| |
b /
investigation on O 1/ 1 7/2 O O '7 at FOIt Detrick , Maryl and
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CmmmmmnMTD8W0f __I[::::::::::::::] ,OnO1/17/2007 ,m@ _2_
I Irecalledl Ientered thel Isuite on oneoccasion in Icould not
ifI Iever observed a lyophilizer in theI Isuite.advised[::]had no knowled e of an bacteria contamination 9
issues or concerns specific to the suite.
I IadvisedI Ihad also been in the B3 hot suite inUSAMRIID l425.I Iadvised to the best of[:::]recollection I. . . . _ hthere was no lyophilizer in the B3 hot suite, owever,
0 ined the lyophilizer was located in the B5 suite. advisedIiinhad no derogatory information pertaining to the followingUSAMRIID persoggfl who were in theI Isuite on davs and/or I
I BRUCE IVINS,I I
[:::::]advised[::]had no knowledge of when the 5 Lfermentor was purchased bv USAMRIID, nor who at USAMRIID purchasedit; however,L1 paper workthat would he p to document the same. I Iagreed to contactwriter at a later date and advise the results of[:::]search.
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FD-302 Rev. 10-6-95!
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ELL IIIFCIIIIIEATIDBI CUIJTAIIJEIJ
I'IEIPfZIN I5 LIIIIIILABSIFIEIJ
]I*£tTZ L2-15-EDGE! El 5113324 UE E.P1.I'I,*":'K_*'P'~'I'F§ Date of transcription O1 I1 6 I2 O 0.7
birth: SSAN: was i terviewed at b7c
I I After92be1ng advised of the identity92of theinterviewing agents and the purpose of the interview,[::::::::] '
provided the following information:92On Janua 12, 2007,I I Ix I date of b6
[::::::::]works at the United States Army' ch
Institute of Infectious§&iseases USAMRIID! in the b6I_I:|_und.erJ : 1n E1:.£1E.1:Ig bic
indicated that recently therekis very little talk of the AMERITHRAX
investigation throughout USAM IID.
When referring to the dry aerosol study that was
conducted by the described it as atside ro'ect whigh occurred over a relatively sgort time period. 1I Ibelieves it wasI' Iexplained
thatI
The purpose of this project was to bridge the gap between use of
wet aerosolization techniques as the model for studying a disease
which in the real world would be caused by a dry aerosol. [::::::::]
elaborated that if conducting aerosol vaccine challenges using a
wet suspension of Ba spores did not accurately reflect a disease
e.g. inhalational anthrax! caused by a dry aerosol then the
results of the model had limited value. The purpose of the
bridging study was to demonstrate bhat a wet aerosol vaccine
challenge was a suitable model. I I
USAMRIIDI I
| Iwas directed b ho attempt to aerdsplizeI I
Work erformed by on this proiect wasconducted in roomI Iof building I[:::::] designated area at the time.
E:::::::]explained that during this project[:::]inquired b6
about possibility of using a dried biological agent. However, the b7@
administration at the USAMRIID denied the use of dried biologicallaqents due to their dual use perception. I 1 I
Investigation on O 1/ 12 /2 O O '7 at I I
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by SA b7C
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.ne# 279AWF-222936-USAMRIID -I aQ,Q92 mmdmmw 01/16/2007
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]considerLd
this proiect iust another of]
[::::::::]conveyed that there were discussionsE:::::::]about attainipq dried Bacillus anthracis Baa. Discussions
detailed that could be contracted
to provide this material. There was also discussion as to whether
or not the material acquired would need to be milled, and if so,
from where would a mill be obtained. [::::::::]described that the
use of dried biological agents was deemed out of the question by
the administration due to its dual use implications.
] Ihas no recollection of discussions about dried
agents between] ht
USAMRIID. | Ispokeabout the dry aerosol project, but to] Iknowledge this wasthe only individual from spokehto about thisroject. ] Ibelieve e projec was sh't down] ]tp Ibelieves that] ]got along well
ibecause both] ' furthered this by explaining
tha
] Iamongst some of the individuals at USAMRIID.
[:::;::::]believes that] Iworking on the driedrpowder aeroso lzatlon project, specifying that]
BecauseL] fbackqround was in the]
' [:::::::]<does not recall there being a cease and desist
order, however the project died on its own when the word came down
that there would be no dried biological agents used. ] ]admitted that] Ldue to theapplicability and relevance that this project had wit actual
threat dynamics.
[::::::::]knew of some Bacillus globigii Bg! that was on
site for use with the Ultra Violet Aerodynamic Particle Sizer,
which is a component of the biodetectors used throughout106
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Continuation of FD-3 02 of_I I ,OnQl/16/2007 ,Page 3
, T 1S particle sizer used UV 1' h 1g t fluoresce to
detect biological agents. This machine was tested with both live
aerosolized Bg w 11 s Bg that had been killed usingformaldehyde. E?::?:::Tstated that had a vague recollection of
the acquisition of dried Bg for the
I Ihas limited contact withI I after having n
I Ibelieves thatI
I IdescribedI__q as aI I whob5
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[::::] however,| Idoes not recall| ever speakin of the b6AMERITHRAX investigation, interviews, or po ygraphs. [:ji::::]
be1ieves[::]took issue or offense to the investigation, mainl dueto its abilit to tarnishE;::]reputation, but also due toE::::' at[:E]was above t ose involved in the investigation.f%iff:fTexpressed that[:::hould be "shocked" if[:::]had any
involvement in the anthrax mailings.b7C
E:::::::]has no recollection of anyone in the[:::::::::::]
at the time mailings who growing or preparing bacteria.
does not recall any large quantities of Ba in being stored
in ui ing[::::]at or around the time of the mailings aside from
particular batches brought over for specific aerosol challenges
these samples were autoclaved in the hoodlines when the challenge
was complete!.
[::::::::]has no knowledge of any Ba fermentation being
performed, but believes the current spore production procedure and
ac uisition of wet spore preparations is perceived as an issue.[:iE::::]elaborated by saying that spore preparations provided by
BRUCE IVINS lack overall consistency in preparation parameters
between batches. This consistency diminished along with the Dugway
produced s ores writer believes these Dugway sopres to be RMRlO29!.[::ii::::]believes that IVINS grows batches of spores in
order to meet the quantitative demand, with little parameter
consistency between batches.
[::::::::]was not involved in roviding samples for the2002 subpoena of Ba stocks, nor does[::freca1l anyone from theI Ibeing involved either.
9292 and OWGVG I
describesbelieves compared to]
However] Idoes not believe these individual were involved
with the mailing and restated that[::]could not believe thatE:::]
was involved.
I |described| I
k:::::::::::] However,| |believes| Hb6
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[::::::::]believes that in the wake of the 2001 anthrax
attacks that there has been a stead decline in funding tobiological programs at USAMRIID. [f¬:;;::]could not remember any
specific programs which were in jeopar y at the time of the
mailings, but knows that tularemia caused by Francisella
tularensisL, Q fever, and Rift Valley Fever research had all beentabl edI I at USAMRI ID.
[::::::::]was asked if any ofI Ico-workers were big StarTrek fans and indicated|thatI I
At approximately 2:07 pm on the same afternoon,[:::::::]
recontacted SA's Iin order to provide
information about II InI Iabsence,I I |
Original notes from this interview will be kept in the
FD34O section of the file, Serial 1A7123.
I:I 606a.302
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ALL IIJFURIXDXTIUBI EIflI~iTAl'I~1'ED
EEREIIII IS TJIJIILAESIFIED
D'_i&TE 12-ll':'~~2ElEl3 BY TJC B.£&lJ_.-I314,
On Januar 12, 2007,I I date of birthDate of transcription O ]_ Z 1 6 Z 2 O O '7
Y -- weSSAN: I I Email; Tedemployment, the Uited States Army Medica?92Tnstitute of Infectious
Diseases USAMRIID!, located at Fort Detrick, Maryland. After
being advised of the identit of the interviewing agents and thepurpose of the interview,[:ii]provided the following information:
began working at USAMRIID iBefore was hot suite qualified at92USAMRIID etween t e dates
ofI I initiated a projectusing aI Itogether92with a particle sizer, inRoomI I Building 1412, in order character ze aerosolized
that upon initiation of this project by] Iwas givenI~ D 92-/Iwas interviewe atI Iplace of /
b6particulate ofI Explained I b7@
II I expressed thatI Iworking on this
ro'ect due toI Ifor this work.Ei:i]only worked on this projectI Idoes notbelifve an SOP was written up for this proIect, but does believe
that
I Ihad the notebgpk for this project transferred toI Iwas not sure ifI I bg
i_iossibly furthere this project b7@
using Bacillus globi ll Bq!.I believed thatI IisIcurrentlv workinq92at¬ I 92 I
3 [::::Idoes rezall the 2002 subpoena re uest for BacillusI anthracis Ba! strains as hallwa talk during[:§::::::::::::::]E;:::]along with SA[::::::::::: went through stocks of sam lesuring the subse uent consent search of USAMRIID in[:::::::ii:]didnot know[::::::i%:::]or whether or not[:::::]was made aware of,
or com lied with 4he 2002 sub oena. P P
[::::]explained that was provided Ba
in individual aliquots by BRU . oes not recall ever
seeing stocks of Ba being stored 'n buil ing 1412. These aliquots
Investigation on Ol/12 /2 O07 at FI¬d¬IiCk, Maryland
Hm# 279AWF222936USAMRIID' I QQ§ mwdmmw 01/16/2007
SAIW SA
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
It and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.6
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Continuation ofFD-302 of _ , On 0 1 / 12 / 2 0 0 7 , Page 2
were used during the aerosol challenge and subsequently destroyed
prior to being removed from the hoodline.1
-
Iknew fermentors were located in building
| but he didn't believe they were used in 2001.couég not recall an one else in the| |who grew anymic -organisms. E%é:]has not seen a ermen or use in Building
Iby researchers in either the| Ior the
Afterthe Ba attacks of 2001 researchers were required to enter'the
containment suites with another person i.e. the buddy system! and
the Elite Roaming Observation Force EROF! was instituted. The
EROF was tasked with performing random checks of the containment
suites. I Iduring the post September 112001 attacks,| 1After the September 11, 2001 attacks] 92 b5
13/
[::::]explained that[:::::]aerosol research was mainly to
take the existing s stems used for aerosolizing agents and attempt
to improve them. I |explained thatIbelieved that] was able tol ll
[::::]identified IVINS as someone in the[::::::::::::]
division who had the ex ertise to produce the Ba used in the 2001mailings, however,[::::ibelieves that IVINS only works with wet
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spores. [::::]explained that IVINS su lies the Ba spores for theAerobiology division, most of which[:¬be ieves were produced by
Dugway Proving Ground and purified by IVI S.
[::::]has heard IVINS'| Iname used byinterviewing agents in relation to the mailihgil
Original notes from this interview as well as a Non-
disclosure Agreement signed by[:::]on January 12, 2007 will be
kept in the FD34O section of the file, Serial 1A-7122.
L|:P1607b.302
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-1-FD-302 Rey. l0-6-95!
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ALL II-IFDPILETIIJI-I EDI-ITAINE3
HEPEIIII IS UbIIL£s.55IFIEII92r:~m'E 12-15-2:|0e 50224 UC £=.r=.r.|.r,-'r:t1-:,.r-'1=t1-*:;1 92 Date of transcription O1 :26 {Z007
On J uary 23, 2007, I I date of birth; ,SSAN: I I was interviewed atI Lplace EZCof emplovmentJ FlI Iwork telephone: I I After biing advised of the
identity of the int viewing agents and the p rpose of the
interview,[:::::::]provided the following information:
[::::::::Ibegan working at the United States Arm Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases USAMRIID! on
Iwas originally hired asI _Iimmediate supervisor at USAMRIID wasI I 1
supervisor and thus indirectly oversawI Ias well.
Due toI Iprevious experience with theI IIwas oriqinallv tasked by] I/
[believes thatI Iworked on this b§~project for aboutIa Ithat they had to b
stop working with ried powder aerosolization due to its duel use
implications. worked on this project alone in building
1412, suite onl arts of this suite are classified as a
containment area!. I Idid not actively work or even
corroborate withI I nor wasI I
informed thatI I
I l92
I Idid not have any knowledge of discussions taking b6lace over the use theI 57¢received all direction on this project fromI I
had no interaction with on this project.Conse uently,[::::::::]believes theI HI[:::::%::]believes that all notebooks created in reference to t is
project would have been property of USAMRIID and thus would still
be at that facility.
While at USAMRIID, I:I knew of a bottle of dried
Bacillus globigii B that was kept in a walk-in refrigerator in
building 1412. indicatedI I
Investigation on O 1 /2 3 /2 O O '7 a Mafryl and
_ IFi|e# 279A-WF222936USAMRIID - I QQOS mare dictated 01/26/2007
by i
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. it is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.b6
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I Iworked with Bacillus anthracis Ba![::::::::]
Iwhile at USAMRIID. Additionally,worked oni ' I studies for
'L1S¬ 6.
92» >b[::::::::]i;;gno knowledge of an Ba bein stored in bbuilding 1412 while was at USAMRIID. f::::::::stated that all
Ba was provided by for individual studies, at the timethe experiments were to 92§ake place.rC
7C~
E:::::::]believes that, of the scientists at USAMRIID, -
considered odd, but added thatI Iindividual.
I Iwas approximatelvIat USAMRIID. I Iworked v92iithI I
characterized as a
Ihas continued contact with
has heard nothing about the Amerithrax investigation
through these contacts.
Qriginal notes from this interview will be kept in the
FD-340 section of the file, Serial 1A-7132.
I:I
607a.302 I
1:IVINS has the knowledge to perpetrate the 2001 anthrax mailings. ZS
[::::::::]believes that many of the individuals at USAMRIID could be iv
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ALT. TI~IFl'|F!Tli1.TIl'll~I l".l'l?~I'U1aT]92IFIT3
HEFEEIIJ IS TIIIIELASSIFIEIII
DATE li-1.5-ZUDB BY 5Cl32-4 UIIBM'I 'DK-*"1:"T5 Date of transcription O 1 Z 3 1 Z 2 Q Q '7
date Of birth= |:| losocial selurity account number work telephone number b
[:::::::::::], was interviewed at place of employment, the U.S.
A m Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases USAMRIID! located at[::fjPorter St. Frederick, Maryland. After being advised of the
identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the
interview[::::]provided the following information:
I Ia project aimed at evaluating the
feasability of conducting a dry aerosol Bacillus anthracis Ba! be
vaccine challenge was initiated. The purpose of the study was to b7C
determine the breakthrough point for the recombinant protective
antigen rPA! Ba vaccine, in other words, what concentration of Ba
spores would cause the vaccine to fail. Using the wet aerosol
systems in place at the time, a high enough concentration of Ba
spores could not be achieved. However, generation of a dry aerosol
of Ba spores was expected to provide a sufficient concentration of
spores thus achieving this breakthrough point. Additionally, a dry
aerosol more closely resembles the type of Ba exposure a so ' onthe battle field would likely encounter. For these reasonshiifj
felt that to demonstrate the true efficacy of the vaccine, they
needed to evaluate it against this more applicable threat.
[::::]indicated that the dried aerosol project never got
off the ground. Some equipment was purchased and only preliminary
experiments were performed using inert dusts or avirulent
simulants. The proiect was ended becausd
A and as a result, the dryaerosol work didn't need to be complete . Discussions about
possible sources for dried Ba took place. Specifically,
discussions as to whether spores would be produced at USAMRIID orobtained externally through DUGWAY PROVING GROUND ensued. I;
recalled no discussions with other departments at USAMRIID ou_producing dried Ba. I ' I
I
I I
Investigation on O 1/3 U /2 O 0 7 at Frederick , Maryland
File # 279AWF222936USAl92/IRIID "" I 8 Date dictated O7/31/2007
SA b6
by SA bqc
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.4 l
;:
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Continuation of FD-302 of I I , On O 1 / 3 O / 2 O O 7 , Page 2 13 5
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was good at "playing with equipment" and was interested in trying
to develop the capabilitv to qenerate drv aerosols at USAMRIID.
Imay have b6
he1pedI Iwith this work. I Imay have also been involved b7C
with the project. I Ibelieved that this work was conducted in
theI Ilocated in building|:|
I Idried Bacillus qlobiqii Bq! fromDugway Proving Ground and indicated thatI g3 CI
work may have been done with the Bg from Dugway.
I Iwas shown a cogy of the
which fists
1 hindicated that some prefiminary
I as an accomp is ment for fiscal
yearI Iindicated that Imeant theyI I
I I [A copy of tis document wiI1 be placed in the 1A section
of the file.]
I I IdescribedI Ias:I
q .L u_
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Ba spores used by the Aerobiology group were always
provided by BRUCE IVINS, who was known as the "star spore grower."
The spores would be brought to building 1412 just before the
challenges and were not stored in building 1412. If a challenge
was going to span a few days then the spores were brought to
building 1412 before the challenge and stored in the Aerobiology
laboratory until needed. If material intended for a challenge went be
missing it would not be noticed. There were only a few b7C
shaker/incubators in building 1412, so if s were growinglarge quantities of Ba it would stand out. i iknew that spme
Ames was stored in building 1412'
' Growth of bacteria in building 1412 would most likfly be
done
FNQ one inl |grew bacteria excepET:::::::::::#INO fermentation took place in building
Regarding the Federal Grand Jury subpoena requiring the b5
submission of all samples of Ba Ames to the FBI in the spring of b7C
| |a discussion as to which samples
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Continuation of ED-302 of I I , On O 1 / 3 O / 2 O O '7 , Page 4
needed to be submitted. The discussions centered on thedefinition
of the la e in the subpoena for the terms stock and "workingstock." Efffiiindicated that the sample[::::::]had would fall under
a "working stock" and therefore it would not need to be submitted
to the FBI because the stock from which it came would have been
submitted by IVINS.
[:%::]recal1ed first hearing that small amounts
Ba were eit er made or kept at USAMRIID during a meetingof dried
after the
anthrax mailings occurred. explained these spores were used
| | [Other sources indicate that
these spores were irradiated prior to being dried.] Upon hearing
this| |t th t a e ime,
became very upset.
E:::]opined that the Personal Responsibility Program
PRP! instituted at USAMRIID "sucks," and it is difficult to apply
the rules of the PRP, which was intended for research inthe
nuclear field, to the biological field. [:::] indicated that the
PRP is not funct'onal f ' 'l' l '
Y 91 or ClVl ian emp oyees because they can tforce em lo ees to submit to a dru test. I I[::::::::had their access to the containment suites revoked due to
the PRP.
g:;::]would not provide names of individuals atwhom[::] e ieved had the capabilities to perpetrate the
mailings. [::::]indicated that there were a lot of weird
at USAMRIID and would not want to see an innocent person
responsible for the anthrax mailings.USAMRIID
anthrax
scientists
held
E:::]obtained
from the University of
| Iobtainedl IfrnmtheUniversity o
[:::] expressed concern that if it is shown that the
perpetrator of the anthrax mailings was a USAMRIID employee or the
Ba spores used in the mailings came from USAMRIID that it would1 .
6
bi?
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:1
destroy the institute and that the new USAMRIID building would be bi,
"down the tubes." b'*
£:::;lwas presented with a nondisc1osure agreement which[:::]signe . is will be placed in the 1A section of the file.
tlf
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FD-302 Rev. 10-6 95!
_ 1 -
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
AL L II~IFEiPl!.TI EII-I C I31-TTAIIJED
HERE IIII I UNC LE5 5 IFIEI3
DATE 1.2-1 5-21] U8 BY I':'-[I324 T_TC BllT.IT;DE_f'P.Y9§ Date of transcription O 2 1 1 51 2 0 Q 7
On O2/O8/2007 Special Agent[::::::::::::::]received a
telephonic voice mail message from BRUCE EDWARD IVINS, of the
Bacteriology Division of the U.S. Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases USAMRIID!, Fort Detrick
Maryland. IVINS relaved, for information thatthe USAMRIID,| 1 telephone
might be a person to speak with regardinglat USAMRIID. Accordirig to IVINS,
mwwwmnm 02/08/2007 at Fort Detrick, Maryland telephonically!
F%# 279AfWF"222936-USAMRIID ']Q:7£5 Imemmm O2/15/2007
W SA v A Zic
04602 W. pd
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. it is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
I
. I
FD-302 Rev. 10-6-95!
_ 1 _
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ALL IIJFUDIELTIUI-I CIIII-ITAIIIED
I-EPIEIIII UTIICLAHSIFIEIJ
DAIE 12-16-2008 BY E0324 UC EAUyDEfRYS Dmggfummcmmn 0]_g [2 !Q7
On January 25, 2007, S ecial A ent SA![::::::::;::::::]and Postal Inspector PI!| Iof the U.S. Posta beInspectiongervice interviewed ' S ' bvc
account nu erl Igate of bir
was interviewed at]
voluntarily provided the following information:
92
InI II Ifrom the U.S. Armi Medical ResearchIlnstitute of Infectious Diseases USAMRII?!,EBRUCE E. I/"I}I92I92S, is
occasionally had spoken with
the FBI regardingI Iformer employment at USAMRIID andI I
correspondin res onsibility to[ff2fffi2f]to had not informed anyI I
of scheduled meeting with the FBI for January 25,
2007.|aware ofi |
[::::::::]was asked to relay the perceived impressionsfrom[:::]former USAMRIID coworkers in regards to the
investi ation into the anthrax mailings of 2001. [::::::::]
IIVINS found it stressful to meet with the FBI but
since he hired a lawyer, it had been better. I I
Ihad not talked about the investigation in a while and
_wa§ qlgg to be out of UI had not said an thin to Y g' Iregarding the investigation.
I Irelaved to the interviewers th§;I___1wgs- l
DurinqI Itime in the hot suites at USAMRIID
H IIVINS had figured'out how to make'good spores.
Investigation on 1 5 O 0 7
File# 279AWF222936-USAMRIID '~i c>7I Daledictated N/A
SA beby PII I bi;
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be disiributed outside your agency.
U0! 0"H1?0k.WF!*
5%
BACK PAGE
' < N
FD-302a Rev. 10-6-95!
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Continuation of FD-302 of _ , On 1 / 2 5_/ 2 O O 7 , PageAr92./
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believed there might have been
a project that IVINS was involved with requiring the growth of a
large amount of Ba spores, however, did not remember the
details.
Most of the projects[::::::::]worked were geared for
publications, although since USAMRIID was a military institution
not all of the projects would be published. Occasionally
[:::::::] worked on Good Laborator Practice GLP! projects, butdidn't remember what they were.[i%:::::]could not remember all
of the details to the projects because of the time lapse, but
believed|[::]could remember more details if[:::]looked at[:::]
laboratory notebooks.
I Besideslaboratory notebooks,[:::::::]did not believe there was a
system for tracking the amount of Ba spores made, then used or
destroyed.
E:::::::]perceived the normal laboratory hours to start
between the morning hours of 7:00AM to 9:00AM and last through
5:00PM, although there would be occasions when someone would
come in later. If someone came in on the weekend it was to look
at the animals/count the dead animals. This could take
approximately two hours and was usually a oneperson job.
[:::::::]was shown a 28page graphic representation ofthe:E;::%]hot suite usage from September ll, 2001 through
Octo er , 2001. Each page represented a individual day, marked
t I
asFD-302a Rev. 10-6-95!
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2"/9AWF222936USAMRIID C
Continuation of FD-302 of | , On 1 / 2 5 / 2 O O 7 , Page 3
with the date and the identity of the persons who accessed the
suite along with their corresponding time of access and
duration. 15 of the 28 days depicted IVINS accessing the
laboratory outside of the normal work hours[:::]described above.was aske? to comment on why E::]believed this would
occur.] could not say if the above
ordinar || Idescribed IVINS as having weird behavior.
IVINS liked to take showers in the suites on days that he was
not working. He did this to get away from his home or use the
internet, etc. [::::::::]acknowledged IVINS was quirky with
unusual social skills and depression, but didn't believe he did
it [anthrax mailing]. IVINS thought of his office and the hot
suite as a safe place.
[:;;;;;:]stated that even prior to September 11th IVINSstruggled|wi epression, familv issues, and coped with beifghimself.
I It was common knowledge that he
was odd. He was also slightly paranoid and prone to _fluctuations in his mood. I ll
L
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Continuation of FD-302 of | , On 1 / 2 5 / 2 O O 7 , Page 4
b 6
was shown a highlighted portion in an email
from IVINS dated O3/04/01. The portion read:
" Obviously 1 someone says that he or she is about to commit a
crime, you should share it with the right people.!
C f'd t' l't ' t h t k f h h ld on i en ia 1 y lS o muc o as o you, so per aps I s ou
just take the Celexa an let whatever is going to happen take
its course." stated that this didn't raise any red-
flags with because he had a guilty conscious about
everything, including old memories, etc.
I Iwas asked apgu; IylN5'
girls. I
When[:::::::]first met IVINS he was more I
conservative, but over time his views became more liberal. He
recognized that there was a grey area, not just black and white.b7C
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Continuation of FD-302 of | , On 1 / 2 5 / 2 0 O 7 , Page
E:::::::]was asked who the FBI should look toward at
USAMRIID in regards to the investigation. [::] replied that
obviously IVINS should be looked at.
was not familiar with| |
only knew by face.
[::::::::]was asked how[:::]believed a person atUSAMRIID could have accomplished this crime. [:::]believed that
getting Ba to aerosolize for the challenges was difficult
enough. [:::]believed that the most difficult aspect of growing
enough spores to commit the mailing would be findin enough. h _ . [::::%:::]s ace in t e shakers There was one shaker in one inEf:]and one in| Ibelieved that in order to
obtain the room needed to accomplish such a growin someonewould have to borrow other laboratory space. [::::fi::]also
offered that Ba could have been grown in smaller frames of timeand then stored in a freezer until it was needed. [:EEEE§::]does
not know how to dr Ba or how to use a L o hilizer. also Y Y P
thinks that removing such a large amount of Ba from the suites
would be a big task.
He had an email account that was not work relate?*_lT__Jwill
provide that to the interviewers in the future. had_been 'ncontact withl fb"/C
l 1
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_6_ I Continuation of FD-302 of _ , On 1 / 2 5 / 2 O O 7 , Page
[::::::::] ' d d' l reement at the signe a non 1sc osure ag
beginning of the interview. |:|also initialed and dated the
back of the two documents previously mentioned in the interview.
All of these items were placed in the 1A section of the file at
lA7147 .
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FD-302 Rev. 10-6-95!
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
LLL IMFBPHATIUM EUMTAIMED
I-EPEIIJ IS Ul~]CL.i'1S5IFIEII*
DATE 12-16-2003 BY 50324 UC BnI|I_mK,.- Mai Date of mnsmpmm 12 :11 Z200 6
Individual who is in a position to testify, provided the
following information: A
92 On occasion,| Iindividualreceives an email from former United States Army Resea ch be
Inst tute of Infectious Diseases US b/C
i |Individual alleges that email, 92
communi tions are strictly work related in nature. Individual
acknowle Med that he/she has in the past| I' I Individgggl Irecalled
IIndividual acknowledged that at some point during the I
b2
Investigationon 11/28/2006 at Washington, 13.0. M3
m# 279A~WF-222936USAMRIID| | Dmemmm 12/10/2006
PIY I Ib SA
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.b7D
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FD-302a Rev. 10-6-95!
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Continuation ofFD-302 of Individual , On 1 1 /2 8 /2 O O 6 , Page
Individual recalled thatl l_
Throuqh the many conversations Individual
I Individual recalled that
Individual recalled that]
IVINS, despite USAMRIIDs disapproval
conducted environmental swabbing of hlS various administrative workareas at USAMRIID. IVINS was'concerned about contamination betausel|of92concerns expressed to him
obsessive/compulsive personality.IIVINS had an 92b6
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Continuation ofFD-302 of Individual , On 1 1 / 2 8 / 2 0 O 6 , Page -3-
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1004302 Rev.10-6-95! '
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ALL II~IFtIlP!l{ATIEll!~I CUITTAIIJED
HEEEEIIJ IS TIBIELASSIFIEIII
DATE L2-l 6 ~ 2005 El" EU E1 2 -il UE B.§LI],»"DK,"'P92'i'l? Date of transcription O 2 Z 2 6 Z 2 O O 7
On 02/23/2007 Special Agent SA! |
received a telephone call from BRUCE EDWARD IVINS of the
Bacteriology Division of the U.S. Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort De '
regarding an email he had rece' from| || of USAMRIID. The e-mail was
sent to several USAMRIID employees including IVINS! and I
provided guidance to USAMRIID personnel regarding interactions
with FBI Agents. IVINS forwarded the email, which is attached
hereto and considered a part of this document, to SA.[::::::]be
b"C
mwwwwnw O2/23/2007 m Fort Detrick, Maryland
eee 279A-WF222936USAMRIID ~92 O'7 O Datedictated 02/26/2007
W SA Telephonically!
fU1.wpd I
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.b6
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» I. mi' -' - - 9FD-302 Rev. 10-6-95!
-1-
I FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ALL II-IFDFEYLETIUIJ CElI1ITEtI3ZED
HEPEEIIJ If-3 '_§l*ICLA55IFEEIl92DATE ].2lf;72ClClEi BY ISDSZ4 UC BAT.|I;"[1H;'Rl1'S 92 Dam of transcripgign O 2 I Q8 Z 2 Q Q7
On February 1,2007,I daue of birth
I I social security account nu er cell
phone number I I was interviewed at resid nce
located atI I
telephone number I I After being advised of theidentity of the agents and the purpose of the interview,[:::::::]
signed a NonDisclosure Agreement form which was placed in a FD34O
and maintained in the 1A subfile.[::::::] provided the following
information:
irmed that[::]was previously employed as a
at the United States Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases USAMRIID! froml I
[:::;;:]received a Ide reeIfrom t e University Iprior to/m,
i I
. During] Iat USAMRIID I I
advisedI I
Iadvfsed that much ofI Iwork while at
USAMRIID dea$t_with immunological studies involving Bacillus
anthracis Ba! toxins in relation to anthrax vaccine research.[::]
indicated that most of time spent at USAMRIID was_spent inBuildingI Iin the suiteI I I
Investigation on 02 / O 1 / 2 0 0 7 at I I
File# 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-" Datcdictated O2/O8/2007
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
F/46/I/4///SJI IZ<95~b6
b"/C
197C
13"»SA b;C
by PI
@6Al:_l
BACK PAGE
1 ,-r ,.
FD-302:1 Rev. 10-6-95! ' '1
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279AWF222936USAMRIID
Continuation of FD-302 of _ ,0 02 / 0 1/2 0 0 7 , Page 2
advised that it wasn't until- . - I t
USAMRIID thad Iwas assigned work in BuildingI IwherebyI Iparticipated in aI I study pertaining to The
primarily assisted with research involvingI I
never grew or harvested Ba.
[:::::::]ex lained that exce t on one or two occasions,
E:]conducted all ofI Iwork inI I at USAMRIID.I Iadvised
that incident toI I
I There was a period in time whenL__Jwas
required to assist with some aerosol animal challenges in building
1412 and[::]needed to be fully immunized E::]explained that
building 1412 was not compartmentalized like building 1425 and that
the entire building was treated as if it were hot.
I Irecalled that may have been asked on one ortwo occasions, in to conduct research in the[:::] or
I Isuites but onl' to fill in for an absent or sick
researcher.I recalled tha may have done this on an
occasion or two for but could not provide any
specifics about the nature of activity other than the work most
likely involvedI Iexplainedthat this was a basic fundamental task.I Iwould simply follow the
instructions which were left for[:::]to follow.
simplistically categorized the various lab areas
in building s the following:
lab
lab
labbotulism research was conducted,
tularemia research was conducted.
anthrax research was conducted.
lab area where anthrax research was conducted .
which also housed various fermentors.
BSL1 lab area, not a hot suite.
advised that in Building1425 whicg was located in theI Ibetween thd A I
suites.I Irecalled thatI I es was locatedI_ II hdvised that there werearea where
area where
area where b2
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Continuation ofFD-302 of _ , On O 2 / D 1 /2 O O '7 , Page 3
|:|further volunteered that|:|maintain a lockerin the locker room located in the cold side of t suites.|:|
stated tha entered the locker room an a jacent
change/shower room to take a shower and/or use the toilet. |:|
ex lained that in order to access the shower room, had to enter | digit personal identification code. intimated that
access to just the locker area did not require the use of a unique
personal identification code. |:|advised that initially access to
the shower areas could be gained via the cold side locker room but
at some point,|:|could not recall when, access to the showers was
curtailed in a way that access could only be gained to the showers
by entering from the hot suites. To enter the hot suites one must
enter their personal identification code. '
When qiven an ogportunitv to viewl IUSAMRIID kg/' card
access records]. law
When asked to explain|:| response to a question during
an interviewwith the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI! on
_ |wherebv| Iresponded thatl Idoes not CIO 1'_j;1_to thelob
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Continuation 0fFD-302 of _ , On O2 / O l/ 2 0 O 7 , Page 4
Questioning of[:::::::]continued as[::]was asked a
variety of uestions dealing with background related issues.Re arding aia[::?::::]cou not recall or confirm the circumstances surrounding
this purchase.
J Upon questioning pertaining to al I - I
_ |provfded the following information:
I Iconfirmed that I
Subsequent to being advised that significant information
has been developed which indicates a strong possibility that the
perpetrator of the anthrax laced letter mailings in 2001 may haveat one time or another worked at USAMRIID,[:::::::%volunteered that
the only two USAMRIID employees[::]could o ine as avin somethingto do with the anthrax letters would be[;;?:;:::::;;::;For EBQQEIVINS.[::::::] suggested these two indivi ua s par y ecause of
their expertise with Ba and partly because of their personality
traits.
E::::::]characterized IVINS as being eccentric, funny,
and simply different,always appearing to be in a good mood. IVINSis one of the foremost anthrax vaccine experts at USAMRIID.[:::::::]
further volunteered that IVINS has in the a '
the editor of the Frederick News Post.
| Ialsoadvised that IVINS is quite a good juggler and unicycle rider as
well. E::::::]advised that[::]was not aware if IVINS favored a
particular political view but had heard a rumor that he had shipped
a sample of Ba to the Iraqis.[:::::::]cou1d not provide any further
92
92
92
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Continuation of FD-302 of | , On O 2 / O 1 / 2 O O '7 , Page 5
information pertaining to this rumor.[:::::::]also advised that
IVINS does not have a harmful bone in his body.
As far as suspecting] I
i Iadvised that] Iderived a lot of|information about the anthrax-laced letter mailings from a book
titled Biohazard and from various rumors floating around.
I |§d*92;j_sed hat] i ITwhilq |was employed at USAMRIID.
As a follow-up to a previous question pertaining to
1 lstated that sometime around | Fort
Detrick shut down the old athletic facility while they began
construction on a new facility. During the construction of the new
athletic facility, Fort Detrick erected a temporary athleticlfacility which they nicknamed the "Hot Dome."|
2 .. 3 *
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Continuation oFFD-302 of I I , On O 2 / O 1 /2 O O '7 , Page _6_
When asked if would be willing to submit to a
polygraph examination,| Iinitially expressed doubts about the
reliability of polygraph examination results and expressed a
hesitancy to submit to one. |:|expressed concern that the line
of questioning during a ol graph examination would extend intoother personal areas of life that would have no correlation as
to whether or not|:|was involved with the anthrax laced letter
3 mailings in 2001. After being informed that the line of questioning1 during a polygraph examination would not stra from the topic ofthe anthrax mailings, |:|advised that would probably submit
to the examination but would need more time to think about it.
r
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ALL IHFURHATIHN CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLQSSIFIED
DATE 12-is-zone ET E5324 UC B£J.I.T,-'Ii~E,*'R'fS We of transcription O2 [2 3 1 2 O O7
92On Febarv 21, 2007,J I,
date of birth: I ISSANEW I wasinterviewed atI Egace of employment,I I I
I r92Ajter being advised
of the identit of the interviewing agents and the purpose of theinterview,[::ii]provided the following information:
During theI I
This work did not continue for two reasons, dried agents are
difficult to contain and decontaminate and dried agents have duel
use implications. Ba simulants were not considered by Aerobiology
due to the fact that their facility had the capability to use
virulent agents. I Iwas mainly interested in
the physiological effects of an agent on the animal, and because ananimal's pgysiological response was achievable using either wet or
dry agent erosols, the dried project was not initiated.
I Iworked forI I
Investigation on O2 /2 1/2 O O7 at I I
File # 2'79AWF222936USAMRIID " Date dictated 0'2/23/2007 _
L by
a.5U2
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is Ioaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.b6
1;-7C
[:::::Iworked in theI Iat the United
States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Di ases * USAMRIID! from I I worked with M
I
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279AWF222936USAMRIID
Continuation of FD-302 of , On O 2 / 2 1 / 2 0 0 7 , Page 2
may have talked about the use of dried
aerosols, but had little time for deviation from |:|researchto delve into new/side projects. | |<?oes not remember anythingi
about the purchase or preliminary use of
Asa
I However,Idoes not know of any discussions with individuals outside of
thel lregarding the use of dried agents.
92
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279AWF222936USAMRIID
Continuation of FD-302 of , On O 2 / 2 1 / 2 O O 7 , Page 3
indicated that all the scientists at USAMRIID werepeculiar.[E;;;;%]informed that short periodic visits to the lab
after hours was necessary to check on experimental animals. These
usually involved animal caretakers. However in the case that a PI
was checking animals, any prolonged durations for these purposes
involved the death of an animal and a pathologist for necropsy andtissue sampling. According to[:;;;:] prolonged offhour access to
suites over two hours in the mi e of the night!, especially a
Bio~Safety Level3 BSL3! suite is abnormal, as well as a safety
violation. Because fatigue could lead to accidents, entering into
a BSL3 environment alone for extended periods of time in the
middle fo the night was a significant safety issue.I I Ioffice was in building I but
92I Ibelieved that while at USAMRIIDI
Ibelieves thatI does not have the skills or experience to
perpetrate the anthrax mailings.
delt with BRU§h IVINS extensively while atUSAMRIID. described IVI§ as a workaholic, who was easily
stressed, had health issues, an had a good sense of humor. Due toIVINS' nature and close proximity to USAMRIID,E;:::]would not be
surprised if IVINS worked in his office at off ours. However,
could not imagine anyone would be in the suites late at night.
[:::::]knewI Iworked for IVINS, however, in
dealing with IVINS directlyI I
92~ ,
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Continuation of FD-302 of , On O 2 / 2 1 / 2 O O 7 , Page i.
suggested tha4E::;:;;:;:::;]who often worked withwould be someone o a o a out[::::::::]
E:::::]recalls Ba samples being kept in the walkin
freezer for very short periods of time surrounding experiments.
However, these sam les were usually already diluted foraerosolization. [:?:::]believes that all glass impingers containing
Ba may have been stored in this walkin, but only for very short
periods. E::::]does not recall storage of any larger stocks e.g.
500ml flasks! of Ba.
I interacted withl
Ihad no discussions withl lpersonnel as to who
perpetrated of the anthrax attacks.
Original notes from this interview as well as a Non-
disclosure Agreement signed by[:::::]on February 21, 2007 will be
kept in the FD34O section of the file, serial 7170.
ALL II-IFIUPILETICII-I IITl1lI|]'"I"'AIlIEII|9 FEEIIJ IS UEICLQESIFIEIB 0 Rev 01312003! TE ].2l62ClClG DY E0324 UC D1lT.IU'DH_.*'R
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 01/31/2007
To: Washington Field »Attn: IICI
AMERITHRAX SSAS
SSA R
From: Washington Field
AMX2
Contact: | I
Approved BY= |:|
Drafted By: I 1
Case ID #= 279AWF-222936USAMRIIAD Pending! *-4532
Title: AMERITHRAX; ~
MAJOR CASE 184.
Synopsis: To document information obtained from.[:::::::]
Details: During an interview of B Ivin n 01/23/2002,Ivins provided Special Agent SA!iEff:::::f:E::] with two
images he had captioned with a description of the image. The
images were placed in an FD34O and submitted to the file as
item 279AWF222936lA 1037. Each image bears a date and time
stamp in the bottom right side of the image, an alphanumeric
label in the upper left side of the image, and displays a
sheep's blood agar SBA! plate labeled with typewritten
identifiers to the left of the plate. Each caption describes
the Bacillus anthracis Ames material used to innoculate the .
respective plate. _
One caption describes: "Ames strain From[::::][::::::::]culture collection at USAMRIID. Similar in
appearance to Bacillus anthracis colonies from mail. Sent toPorton Down who sent it to] I who sentit t [:::::f::::::::::] This version of the Ames strain waso
serially passaged before freezing down and storing in the
culture collection".ht
h./L
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Re: 279AWF222936~USAMRIID, Ol/31/2007
The second caption describes: "Ames strain from
original agar slant from Ames, Iowa USDA. This is theversion of the Ames strain used by[::::::::::::::]Bruce
Ivins. This version of the Ames strain given to Dugway
Proving Ground, Battelle Memorial Research Institute, DRES,
and U. of New Mexico."
During the interview with SAI |Ivins furtherdescribes the image of the| |material to have been
inoculated with a stock that had been prepared subsequent to
multiple growths, during which the organism was transferred
from one plate to the next, instead of starting from the
original material. Ivins further explained that this process
can result in the introduction of mutations that can cause
differences in morphology.
Ivins further describes the image of the Poriginal"
material to have been inoculated using a culture that is "just
a slant away from the cow". Ivins explained, "The Ames stock
from the original slant was sent to "Dugway Proving GroundBattelle Memorial Research Institute,| 1
D.R.E.S the De n r h Establishment at Suffield,Canada!, and toff:ff:%ffff:f:]the University of New Mexico."
When material is shipped from the U.S. Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases USAMRIID!, the
researcher preparing the shipment describes the items to be
shipped on a USAMRIID shipping document, known as a Form llR,
which is used during the approval process for the shipment,
and ultimately maintained in the USAMRIID Safety Office. The
l1R must be signed by the Principle Investigator PI!
responsible for the shipment, the PI's Division Chief, and the
Safety Office prior to shipment. Review of llR documents
from the USAMRIID Safety Office show that the only shipments
to the University of New Mexico and Battelle were described to
be samples taken from RMR1029, which is a large preparation
of Bacillus anthracis Ames spores compiled from multiple
productions grown in both, shaker flasks at USAMRIID and
fermentors at Dugway Proving Ground. Analysis to date has
found RMR~1029 to be the only Bacillus anthracis Ames material
to have matching genetic signatures identical to the
evidentiary spore material from the anthrax attacks of 2001.
Since RMR1029 was the only
have been shipped to Battelle and the
Mexico, AMERITHRAX Investigators were
the source material descriptions, andmaterial described to
University of New
confused with regard to
the analysis of the»
morphological variations depicted in the images provided by
Ivins. ,
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Re: 279ArWF222936USAMRIID, O1/31/2007
Evidence item 1B 1308 consists of a CD containin an beima e labeled "Iv1ns spore culture.jpg". The image,[;::g%:::] b7Q[:::%::::::] 1S identical to the image Ivins describes o e
from the "original agar slant" having the same date and time
stamp and alphanumeric labelI
On 01/30/2007, SAsI I
[:::::::::]net withI IatI Iplace of
employment, USAMRIID, Fort Detrick, Maryland, to obtain
clarification re arding the image, which had been produced bonfirmed the image to be an SBA plate [::i
a spore culture obtained from Bruce Ivins
prior to 1991. believed the culture to be one of Ivins
first spore preparations of Bacillus anthracis Ames spores.
I Irelated that the image identified bv Ivins
to beI Iidentified the I Imaterial to have originated from a
frozen stock of Bacillus anthracis Ames spore materialacquired fromI I Istock samples, subsequent to[:::]
Ifurther explained that the images were
prepared from material E::]had in[:::]possession prior to the
anthrax attacks of 2001. '
§§
[::p3lO11vpd 3 I gs
Q xi,
FD-302 Rev. l0-6-95!
-1- t
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ALL IHFDPHATIUE cunriimtn
HPEIN IS UNCLEESIFIED
DATE 12-1 6-2008 BY 503 24 UC BM-.F,-"DH,sR'r'S Date of transcription O 3 1 2 612 0 O 7
_ On March O3, 2007, and individual who is not in the
position to testify provided the following information:
~.
This individualL_ IBRU _ E
IVINS of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infecti us
'5iseases. This individual informed SAI IFBI, that
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investigation on 05/03/2007 at Washington, D. C.
279A-WF'-222936USAMRIIDi -" ' K CgHe#| | omemmmw N/A
I b6W SA b7c
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
U"0% IWM
BACK PAGE
9' |92
3
|- '2:K _2 7 9A-WF - 2 2 2 93 6 -USAMRI ID - 1 Q Q Q ALL Irrrcmmrlnmr I: urrriirnrn
MDC : mdc . HERE IH IS T_1IJCLAS IFIED
D£TE l2~l62UUB B? 5:324 UC EAUEDRIRYE
1
The following investigation was conducted by PostalInspector between the dates of February 28, 2007 and 92
March 22, 2007 in Frederick, Maryland: b6
2007 with] -bf,-7 IQSubsequent to an interview conducted on January 3l
I Ito Postal Inspector]| BRUCE-92IVINS is currently a civftan research scfentist eniployed at t e
United States Army Medical Research Institute of nfectious
Diseases USAMRIID! located in Frederick, Maryland.
Attached herewith are| I
during the time periods mentioned above. In summar'92L,
Copies of the are attached.
b6f/150/7246; 3<;;<1:| 5 W
$9 *
6*
I 1:6
92 137C
6?
BACK PAGE 1
Ne Duplieatien Fees are eharged fer Deleted Page Infenatien Sheet sFEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIP.A
DELETED PAGE INFORI-.-'I.ATION SI-IEET
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