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- FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIQN
Precedence: IMMEDIATE. Date: 4/13/2001
To: All Field Offices Attn: SAC
From: Counterterrorism
Usama Bin Laden Uni Ca; A
. Contact: UC Iss |SSA
Approved By: Pickard Thomas Jl
Watson Dale L b2| b6b7C
Drafted By:
Case ID #= >¬!l:T_T;|.99NNY-257503 Pending! Q
Title: >¬!|:T_T:|UsAMA BIN LADEIN
IT-UBL/ALQAEDA
OO:NY
Synopsis: Zsih To advise all SACs of continued aggressive and
proactive efforts to counter Usama Bin Laden UBL! related
threats, as evidenced by recent pre-operational planning of key
UBL lieutenant and mujahideen facilitator, Zain A1-Abideen, alsoknown as Abu Zubaida. I .
;}S : Derive : Multiple es .
See Classificati ority Reference
Section. "
Dec ify On: X1
tH%3Z1~Qla sification Authority Reference::>¥§Zh£Uj CIR 316/00794-01
Details: E§?NF! The Intelligence Community, in a coordinated
Community Advisory, estimates that there is a heightened threat
of terrorist attacks against U.S. facilities, personnel, and
other interests in coming weeks by Sunni extremists associated
with Usama Bin Laden. Reporting strongly suggests an increased
I SE RCON/NOFORN
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To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism-
Re: l99NNY-257503, 4/13/2001
level of planning and activity may be underway which may presage
one or more attacks. Indications of terrorist planning and _
logistical preparation in recent weeks seem to focus on Saudi
Arabia and Israel as possible target locations. U.S. interests in
Saudi Arabia, particularly U.S. military interests, remain UBL's
preferred target. Al-Qaeda associated personnel also are reported
to be stepping up efforts to conduct possible attacks in Israel.
The reporting available on Al-Qaeda operations possibly being
planned for Israel contains no information on specific targets.
The current reporting sugge ' '
warning is a compilation of
lUl W :%§;;F! The Al-Qaeda organization and associated
extremists are known to be searching worldwide for security
vulnerabilities which might enable a successful attack against
U.S. facilities or personnel. Lack of reporting is not
indicative of reduced risk as, in addition to the areas discussed
above, Sunni extremists are known to have associates located in
many areas worldwide. As demonstrated by the attack on the USS
Cole, they are capable of long term surveillance and planning in
a target area that enables them to recognize and exploit
vulnerabilities, including those that have a limited window of
opportunity. Historically, attack planning and execution have
taken at least several months.
iuifmfi iiiiiiii lM :E§ZéF! Notably, reporting has indicated that
IE FAl-Qaeda operatives, including Abu Zubaida, have been involved in
operational planning in several different geographic locations.
Reports have noted the continued movement of personnel and
material between Afghanistan and the Arabian peninsula, as well
as between Afghanistan and Europe. Additionally, reporting
implied that support activities must be completed in the next fewweeks, buojgiignot address specific dates.
NF! Multiple sources indicate that UBL's
organization may be in the advanced planning stages of a
terrorist attack against U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia. The
reporting involves movement of terrorists from Afghanistan
following training there. Furthermore, explosives and arms are
being smuggled into Saudi Arabia for use against U.S. and Western
targets. However, the Intelligence Community has been unable to
narrow the list of potential targets. It should be noted that
although UBL's stated preference for military targets, other
targets could include U.S. diplomatic facilities. Other possible
targets could include commercial establishments and/or businesses
which would be prominently be identified as American.~ slsw/Noroxm/oncon
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'Qu§ /S%E§ET/NOFORN/ORCON &§
To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: l99NNY2S7503, 4/13/2001
iU} :1§<gT! Several Islamic jihadists have had a
heightened interest in targeting Israel since the renewal of the
Palestinian Intifada in September 2000. In late March 2001, a
Gulf Arab extremist in Afghanistan and a colleague in Saudi
Arabia made plans to expedite work on a suspicious, probably
terrorist-related activity, which might take place in Israel.
The Afghanistan-based associate stressed the need for haste, as
travel was planned at the end of the month.
%>*§ZNF! Also in early March, Abu Zubaida engaged in
apparent o era ional preparation with colleagues in Europe and
Saudi Arabia. In particular, he planned and facilitated the
production of photographs of operatives to be used in high
quality European passports. The current status of preparation
indicates
necessary
completed
passports
passports
where theat least several more days, and possibly weeks, are
before arrangements for the passports will be
Yet more time would be needed after receipt of the
to complete attack preparations. The use of European
suggests an attempt to infiltrate personnel into areas
holders of non-European passports likely would face
greater scrutiny. One limiting factor which seems to be evident
is funding. Intelligence suggests that preparation is slowed by
the lack of available funding to support the operation s!.
snbxéélnosonn/oncon
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To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: 199NNY2S7503, 4/13/2001
LEAD s!:
Set Lead 1:
mi»
ALL RECEIVING OFFICE§
jXQ/OC! Information contained in this communication
should be treated as strictly ORIGINATOR CONTROLLED. There
should be no dissemination outside of the FBI. It is provided for
Uj~ the information of receiving offices as background only.fé;}<gOffices are requested to task all resources to
include el ctr nic databases and human sources for any
information pertaining to the current operational activities
relating to Sunni extremism. Recipients are again reminded that
the information in this communication should not be used or
referred to during discussions with sources/assets.
U! Any information uncovered through investigations
should be provided to FBIHQ, UBLU, immediately via telephone
and/or e-mail. o
M '
S ET/NOFORN/ORCON
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