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FEDERAL BUREAU .OF INVESTIGATION
ALL INFUI-ILT-TATIIJN CDIJTAII-TED
HEREIN IS UIQIILASSIFIED
DATE 12-1-5-2555 BY 6-U32-*1 UII EMU,-=DK:TH
Datc oftranscription 12 Z29£2 !Q3
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. Fre§ie.¥.it¢l<rM2511ea1t.n11¢:2§_a2e@12ea After beingadvised ofmthe ' vofwthe int rviewing agents and the natureof the interview, provided th following information;
|:|is currently employed at USAMRIID as| I
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Most of the timesis able to perform routine
b3
has not had any un equest for maintenance to b"/Cany equipment that;|can recall. d not notice any _
suspicious activity y any particular individuals and never saw any
Investigation on 12/10 / 2 O O3 at Frederick, Maryland
/¥92Z I 92'5Q%
File# 2"/9A~WF222936-USAMRIID. 279A-BAC1Ol392 Date dictated
SA Iby V SA-I U
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
lt, does not have the training or access to enter any
Iii
s 1%
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279A-WF222936USAMRIID, 279ABAClO1392
Continuation ofFD-302 of I | , On 12 /1 O /2 O 0 3 , Pageb6
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unauthorize usual activity surroundin an laborator9 Y Yequipment. E:?f:jdid not recall any instances of seeing
unauthorize or unusual personnel in any area of USAMRIID.
[:::::]did recall individuals who violated USAMRIID~
security protocol by improper use of their access badges or "piggy
backing" into laborat RIID stated that itwas a common practiceTff:iffii:if:Eifad allowed people ' b6laboratory areas of USAMRIID without using their badge. Lf:ffffffj b7Cstated that[::]always knew the individuals allowe or
observed "pig backing" into laboratory areas recalled
containing anthrax which
BROKAW and UNITED STATES
and does not know anyone[::::]has occasionally wo te while at USAMRIIDBR ' ' ' [Xe ra iifrequeé ' ' . *rememb rs IVINS was in Suite|[::]of Buildin me a terSeptember 11, 2001, working with an envelope that[f??i?Theard was
used in the anthrax mailin s. IVINS was accompanied by a group ofindividuals with whmn[::::%]is unfamiliar.Mmggggg lS the only person that could identify
ntly works at USAMRIID during late ev ours
[::::::]has no knowledge of any research of Bacillus
anthracis being conducted at USAMRIID and do now where anystocks of any strain of anthrax are stored. Ef:2?i:has never
worked with and has never had any contact with the letters
were mailed to the NEW YORK POST, TOM
SENATORS TOM DASCHLE and PATRICK LEAH
who has.
know anyone who has expressed anti-
American views ile attitudes toward any individual or
organization. oes not know of anyone who expressed
interest in gaining access to anthrax or any other biological or
chemical agents without a specific need or responsibility to do so.b6
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e time |allowed an individual to "piggy back" Tnto aI area of USAMRIID. I Td_]allowed to enter. ' ' orW1 ou adge I Iwas iscipline actions and has
not allowed anyone e se to "piggy back" since. has not
observed any unauthorized access to any hot suite o SAMRIID.
[::;:::ldoes not associate with any scientists at USAMRIIQ
and has no now edge of any activities surrounding any laboratoryareas. [:::::]does not know what select agents are used at USAMRIID
or where they are stored.
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[::::]has no knowledge of anyone who would be capable of
being involved in the anthrax attacks.
' |[:::::]was working at USAMRIID during the time of both
anthrax mailings in September and October of 2001 and did not visit
New Jersey during that timeframe.
[::::::]has not used pre-stamped envelopes like the ones
used in the anthrax mailings and has no knowledge of anyone who
does. '
[::::::]has not used plastic sterilite boxes for storage
purposes at USAMRIID
[::::::]did not know| land does not haveany useful information regarding| lrelevant to this
investigation.
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HPEIN IS UNCLA55IFIED
~ _1_ DATE 12-15-2005 BY E0324 UC BAUHEKETH
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
b6
Date of transcription 12 Z 2 4 Z2 O Q 3 b7 C
92kl date of birth Social' Security, _ was interviewed Special AgentsI [and| Jat| A place of employment at tU.S. Army Medical Research Institute o Infectious Diseases ¬ an-¬ USAMRIID!, Ft Detrick, Maryland, 01! 6194887. After being I "
advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the natu
of the interview,[:::::]voluntarily provided the following
information: -
I I received |_:| ef
de ree in
and hegree at the|.Hr ega career atUSAMRIID on] L I esponsibilities at USAMRIID[has:inEreased since that time, but duties have not changed.onductsL1 |Bac1l1usanthracis B a tularemia, and Ehe plague tudies with B.a.
inv ximately 30 different strains rovided SAsand1ifi:ffffTwith a computer printout listing fhe jifferent strL;n;:]
the list has been sent to the corresponding 1A file!.
eceives all of[::] B.a. from BRUCE IVINS and/or
All[::::::]B.a. are stored in e orf screwcap b?
- refrigerator located in Laboratory Room of Building bic
always archives a sample of th " 'nal B.a. in case bo go back to it for[:::]studies. E:?fifjuses live B.a. b7F
spores for aerosol challenges in monkeys. Afterwards, the monkeys
i [iff:?ffiff§%::] Any extra B.a. s ores left from the studies aredestro ed using an autoclave. [;:?::]grows'B.a.| I d to do la - p te dilu ions to get spore counts. If an
animal dies during a study, a necropsy is conducted and the B.a. is
reisolated from the deceased animal to check for any changes from-
the original strain. Parts of the animals used for reisolation
are lungs, spleen, and the mediastinal lymph nodei The tissue
samples are stored in a refrigerator under a bench in laboratoryroom[:::] Ever bod who has access to the suite has access to the
refrigerators. uses Mueller~Hinton plates or Blood AgarplateE%E?§§Tow .a. uses multiple colony techniques to cultureB.a. does not use New Sporulation Media NSM! or Modified G
media. believes that IVINS uses a modified growth media to
mwnamnml 12/18/2003 n Frederick, Maryland b6_JG /4Q¥ ,Y5%2 b7Cmm# 27 ~ SAMRIID; 279A~BAC1013921mmdmmm N/A
' SA
by SA |
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
B§k31Uf33Pé§é
FD-3 02a Rev. 10-6-95!
279AWF222936USAMRIID; 279ABAC1Ol392
Continuation of FD-3 02 of
be Modified G.
.. 92I I ,On
obtain a higher yield of spores. This modified
nutrient deficient, causing vegatative cells tosooner. [:::::]thinks that this modified growth12/24/2003 Jags
growth media is
produce spores
media may possibly2 13,.
t l to 2 f
to at the in
ive study sent B.a.
I Iin small tubes a couple of months
ago. It took approximately 1 yearof thf paperwork involved. Other than the agar stabs to[::;;:::::]to transfer the samples because
has not sent any B a samples to anyone outside or wi in
USAMRIID. ~
B.a. and other biological agents
in in only uses the walkin cooler in
has a lar e amount of plates to be stored, whichdoes not ha en often. [¬::::]knows that| |frequentlv usesy the[:::é:::Efcooler for storage. Technicians in| |
group a so ave access to the cooler id reca
technician who was not part of roup with. _ . b' I1~a _
OIiunsupervised access to the Room cooler. does not recall the
I lhas nevernoticed anybody in RoomE::jor| Ithat did not belong.
|:| is the|:|[::::] People with access to one suite will have access
suites within the building. Some
centrifuge, are limited
access to all the suites to gain a
occasion, the freezers will malfunand kept in one room, so peoplefor all the suites in Building
to other
such as a
must have
ccess to certain equipment. On
ction and everything inside willlaboratory equipment,
be moved to another freezer; When this happe le find itdifficult to locate their equipment. However?E::ffjdoes not
recall any incidences when equipment or a biological agent could
not be found. [:::::]is very strict about not allowing cticeof "pigg backing" others into BSL suites to occur. IftEf:Efiist,E::]will tell people to badge themselves in. However,Efffffis not always in the laborat
backing" never occurs.ory and cannot say that "piggy-
echnicians that work forl L IwasThere are
and
prior o r ing for s
shortly be re the anthrax mailingtarted in aboratory
s in 2001. was working inx.
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Continuation of FD-302 of i I , On 12 / 2 4 / 2 O O 3 , Page 3
theLb Lof USAMRIID prior to workin for[::::] [:::]has een in| |la oratory for approximately[:?years.
. Notebooks for the research conducted by[:::::]and[:::]
technicians are kept inside the hot suite and faxed to the coldside. Much of the information and data[:?:::]has are kept in[:::]
computer.
Bacterial contaminations in Building[:::]have occurredtwice to[::::::]knowle few months ago, r u i e surveys ofthe door handles in theEff:::floor of Building[?:E:were found to
be contaminated with B.a., although the strain was not identified.-
The cause of the contamination was traced back to poor
decontamination procedures by some employees who work on aerosol
challenges. This issue was resolved this past November. The other
contamination issue was discovered 6 to 9 months ago when a
| laboratory technician had a
routine test conducted by come up positive for
contamination. What was first thought to be the result of poor
laboratory practices by the technician later turned out to be a
contaminated container that caused the crosscontamination. It is
believed that this contamination occurred about 1 year ago.
The Standard Operating Procedures SOPs! for
decontamination calls for the use of bleach. Everything in the
laboratory is wiped down with bleach, which can cause damage over
time because of the corrosiveness of the substance. Items such as
plates, flasks, and other smaller equipment are autoclaved after it
is cleaned with bleach. People who work in the animal rooms wear-
hoods, tyvec suits, and 2 pairs of gloves. The protective gear is
removed upon exiting the animal rooms and all employees step onto a
small puddle of bleach to decontaminate their shoes. Animals who
die in the laboratory are placed in a bag, sprayed with bleach,
brought into the cold side, autoclaved, and then disposed.
Building
Wh n USAMRIID received the land anthrax
letters, was responsible for| I
| I It took approximately to make that
determination and was in USAMRIID for e entir uration of
the ' received a subc the material
from to analyze. The material was brought to
in powder form in a plastic bag from took a136
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does not have access to the Virology suites in ¤
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,on12/24/2003 h$4 b7C1 Continuation of FD-302 of I |
loop o powder and inoculated it into a flaFk_;g_g;Qw_in_Lg;g1L1
' then cultured the B.a. in a plate to
As with all the other aqent Iwork with,| Ikepta small sample of the origina andl imaterials andstored it in Room[::]of Building .
|:| was pre sent when| |
ma r' and observed that it consisted of 2 colony phenotypes.
noticed that this was very similar to the B.a. that IVINS
received from Dugway Proving Ground. This B a, wa eventuall usedin aerosol challenge studies by| I I &Ltold[::::E;::;]
not divulge that information to others in USAMRIID ecause it ea t
with FBI evidence.
[:::::]uses small to medium sized plastic sterilite
1 nes believes that - ' ' rs, but does not use any arge 0 .
' bi er sized containers. has never might use the gg
purchased prestamped or prefranked envelopes, nor are there any
stocked in the office.
' lJ- QQDJ I Lmasl
During Columbus Da weekend in October 2001,L_____Jcould
not recall exactly where as not working at av ll =
[::::::]does not recall ever meeting .
d t USAMRIID approximately the same time was starte a
lea ' It is possible that the two crossed paths at U AMRIID,
but does not remember it, if it ever happened.
is not a me Aeromedical Isolation Team.
A former technician of was a member of the Team.
f red lin A O01 was trans er to] ' .
and change emails once in awhile, but has never
mentioned
has never hosted a foreign vi ' ' scientist norhas E] seen one in the hot suites of Building .bu
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There is an annual conference for Antibiotics Resistanceheld in Februar in Princet N J h h[:::::] ' y on, ew ersey w 1C attended in[:;:::;:;:::::] Durin one ference was helda a 1 ton Hotel. I !attended this
_ conference in| |does not Eow of anybo y else from
USAMRIID who has been to this conference.
[:::::]believes that the anthrax used in the 2001 mailings
could not have been produced at USAMRIID. | Isaw the fine
owder from the Daschle letter when] IEE::::::::] and believes that when the powder was produced, it
created a large amount of contamination that would be impossible to
clean up properly. If it had been produced at USAMRIID, the
contamination would have been detected" E::::]also theorized that
the woman who died of inhalation anthrax in New Jersey could have
been the actual mailer. She was most likely approached to mail the
letters without her knowing what was in them. This may explain how
she was exposed to anthrax even though a connection could not be
found between her and the anthraxlaced letters. '
[:::::1was asked whether he would agree to take a
polygraph administered by on questions related to theanthrax mailings of 2001. Eii:f?jvoluntari1y agreed to take the
polygraph.
/1:6
1;
pl V *' FD-302 Rev. 104-95!
LLL IIJFEPHJLTICII-I EDI-I'I'AII92TED
' HEHEIIJ IS UNCL2'&55IFIEII~
'1' DPJE 13-15-2005 Bl E5324 UC EE1.T.I.T;DKfl'H
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
- I I date of birthI I Social _
f Securitv NumberI I home address3 L I home telephone number I I wasI interviewed at[::] place of employment the Unite States Army
Medical Research Institute of-Infectious Diseases USAMRIID!.
After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents andthe nature of the inter§iewIUUUUprovided the following information:
i
E::::::::]wasja United States Arm laboratory technician
who first reported to USAM jnI Iworked in theClinical Laborator in thei IuntilI I Duringthis time,[::::::2jw@s assigned to assist on m ent
studies that needed rlinical research support.with both human and énimal samples and was the
|:|
ml IH I AfTer_cQpleting this course,I IEigenfnfdjto U AMRIID where assigned to the' [::%:::::]worked in theI_ I
perfo ' ue cultures and toxicity assavs. From 1986 untill99O,Tfifi:fifjbecame th I
I nature and K¬ptI Iout or the labs. AsI
I Exam L999 until 1992, was the
continue wit
onsibilities. Between 1992I ketirement in
served as theI II In Ibecame am works with ce cultures on theer WE '
currently has access toIlaboratories and assistsI I
Between 1992 a isted in an anthrax
aerobioloqy study run b statedI I
hW"@m""°" 1/9/04 at Frederick, Marvland bg_
_ 1371:F119 # 279A-WF222936USAl@I ID Dale dimied l/9/O4
SI I I by S /2520:»?
. This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
/ Date of transcriptim Q 1 Z Q 9 [2 O O 4
b 6
I I W
_ ¢- ..0-92.~ 9I FD-302a Rev. 10-6-95!
2'79AWF222936POI 279AWFClOl392-
Continuaticn of FD-302 of I I , On 1 / 9 / O 4 , Page 2
| Iwas not involved with Egcthe preparation or growth of any of the material e stud Yand was not involved with infecting the animals. tff?:i2:idoes not
thrax used in the study came from but advised that
might know.
[;:;::::::]ordered a glove box fod Iand provi e copies of information on the for
E:::] The glove box was purchased throughl Iand the
92 purchase had to be approved by vario ' ' inside of USAMRIID.
The glove box carrie d s ro uct numberTf:fifiifFand a quote for thebox was listed as[::::?::::]
[:::::::::kas shown an envelo ' ent with the ones- used in the anthrax mailings in 2001. advised[:::::::]has
never seen or used an envelope like s own.
Q 1 E -
Rev. os-zs-2000! . D
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedencei ROUTINE Date: 01/06/2003
To: Washington Field Attn: IIC I
SSA AMX 1
SSA AMX 2
' SA AMX 2
From: Washington Field K
AMX 3 QfmContact: I II O
d_ _ ALL IHFDPHATIUN EDHTAINEDApprove BY I-IE1l!EIl-I ::-; Z3192ICLASSIFIEI:~ '
DATE 12-15~2uus BY 50224 UC BAHHDHHTHDrafted By: I I e
Case ID #:J;79A-WF-222936[::::] Pending!'QMdB279A-WF222936-USAMRIID Pending!q3i5 »
Title: AMERITHRAX I
MAJOR CASE 184 »
Synopsis: Report results of elimination investigation regarding
I No evidence has been discovered to
date which suggests tha may have been involved in theanthraxlaced letter mai ings. Unless ' ence is haidentified, no further investigation ofiEfE:ffifis intended in hm;
this case.
Details: has been investigated in the
captioned investigation based upo access to the Ames Strain
of Bacillus anthracis B.a.!, and nowledge and expertise
related to Ames B.a. ' on, former coworker,Bruce Ivins, describedt?:7iiiijas someone obsessed with
bioterrorism, who had the knowledge and character to mail the
anthrax letters. » ~ J
[:::::::]worked at the United States Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases USAMRIID!, Fort
Detrick, Mar land, froml I to
worked as a in the ivisionI I After leavigi USAMRIID in I Iworked at the I
11
began working at theI I
y b6emn ove as F I bl?I I land] |Iin| ;I
,
m'.§To: Washington mld From: Washington Fiem
Re: 279AWF222936POI, O1/O6/2003
holds a doctorate[::::::::::::] While at b6
USAMRIID ' ' ' *0, ked accine against B.a. |:| b~studied t e and of B.a. bya t e culture collection of B.a1 strains.|
obtained a sample of a B.a. strain from]
. Review of[:::::::::]finan ' s from 2000 through
2002 was unremarkable. A review of telephone records
and financial records revealed no connection to New Jersey.
A time-line ofL lactivities for the_likely time periods of t e two mailings of the n etters
from Princeton, New Jersey was compiled using telephone
and credit card records. In additio '
and e- ' I from the
I here collected Noted Idid not-maintainelectroni s records dating back to September and October2001!. [:f:?fffjwas also interviewed and accounted for"E;::]
whereabouts during the two windows of opportunity for t e
September and October mailing ime-line is focused uponany sixhour period for whichT:::fEi:jwou1d be unaccounted. This
time period is premised upon e round trip travel time between%_ ' 'nceton, New
ersey and_between office and
Princeton, New Jersey.
Time-line First Mailing :30 p.m., 09/17/2001 through 11:30
a.m. , 09/18/2001!:
A review of[::::::::::kime and atte cordsrevealed a fifteenhour time period for whichE¬ijif:fjcannot be
accounted for after[::]left work at 5:00 p.m. on 09/17/2001 until
E::]returned to work at 8:00 a.m. on 09/18/2001. There are nocredit card or telephone records whic?_indicaLe Iwhereabouts
during this fifteenhour time frame. time andattendance records were signed b I but
there is no electronic record of entered left work.However,[:::::::]provided copies o wor emailsE% sen ~
a:m., 9- and 3:22 p.m. on 09/17/2001, suggesting _
prese during his work shift from 8:00 a.m. to -
p.m. a so provided copies of eleven work e-mails sent
on 09_18 2001 that range from 1:08 p.m. to 2:53 p.m.
[::::::::Ldvise ' ' mailin eriod[::::::]was not at work, were in1:E:]company and can corroborate] Iwhereabouts.
2
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To: Washington Qld From: Washington Fieg
Re: 2'79AWF222936POI, O1/O6/2003
1
Timeline Second Mailing :30 p.m., 10/06/2001 through 11:30
a.m., 10/09/2001!:
A review of[::::::::]time and attendance records and
credit card records revealed a twent -two hour period for which
cannot be accounted left work at 5 00 m on griday, 10/05/2001. Travel tE%g:%g%§2::::::::]from . . 0 is
a roximatel thirt to fort -five min y y ' ' utes. On 10/05 2001,
I left after 6:48 p.m.[::::]arriva1 time inw ' 7@1B n_m and 7-if
F3-FL
On Saturday, 10/06/2001,[:::::::]sent an e-mail from
-32 p.m. The next independent corroboration of
h b t d ' t h d t [?ffE:7i:;]w erea ou s occurre nine een ours an wentyminutes ater on 10/07/2001 when] I
The next independent record of[:::::::::] uts
occurred at 12:50 .m. on Monda 10 08 2003 when en p Y,//, st
another e-mail at work, leaving a span 0 ' hours and 50
minutes. The last independent record whereabouts on
10/08/2001, occurred at 3:30 p.m. whe sent another e-
mail at work. On Tuesday, 10/09/2001, returned to work ~
at 8:00 a.m., a span of sixteen hours an t ' tes from the
last independent record ofE:::]whereabouts. sent an e
mail from work on,10/09/2001 at 2:20 p.m.
_ I ladvised th ' ' ' iod
was not a work,
an corroborate| lwhereabouts. »
was asked t mit to a polygraph examination;
however e used to do so. explained that in February
2003, had passed the olygraph examination in advance of
i __ PETE not want to risk a raise positive
result in the FBI's requested polygra h examination which wouldjeopardize[:::]security clearance. [:5 also explained that the
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To: Washington lgld From: Washington Fiet
Re: 279AWF222936POI, O1/O6/2003
|:|polygraph examination questionedqon any involvement in b6criminal activit which covered the perlo of the mailings. As a b7<3
result of refusal,| Iattended an interview in the
office of Assistant United States Attorney, on
11/20/2003. as cooperative and answered the questions
posed to during the interview.
' In addition to the findings presented above and the
fact that h coo t d 'th th' ' t ' | as pera e W1 1S inves igationevidence as een discovered to date which suggests that
may have been involved in the preparation or mailing of the
anthrax letters. Unless such evidence is identified, no furtherinvestigation of|:| is intended in this case.
O0
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FD6020v10685! ~ ALL IHFDHHATIUN Ennriinrn
HHEIN IS 3MtLis5IF1En
DATE l2l52UU BY 50324 UC -1-
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Date of transcription Q 1 Z O 6 l 2 O Q4
| ldate of birth[::::::::::] SocialBAT.|I;'DI{,*'TH
b6Securit Number| I was interviewed by Special Agent SA! ycitthFd1B f ~ a e e era ur Investigation s FrederickMaryland Taskforce Office. [:ff%iij already acquainted with SAt:::]
voluntarily provided the following information:
During a previous interview conducted on December 18,2003,[:::::]stated that there had been 2 incidences of bacterialcontamination in Building[:::;} One of those incidences was
discovered a few months ago w en a routine surve of a door handlecame up positive for Bacillus anthracis B.a.!. f:::::]clarified
that the door handle was located on the inside of the hot suite onthe[;::::lfloor of Building [:::] The source of the contaminationwas race back to carelessness by someone in the[:;:;:::;:::]
section. It could have happened when someone for o o c angegloves after decontaminating the suite. [::::::::?::::]was the one
who cultured the swab and determined the contamination to be B.a.
She did not, however, determine the B.a. strain. [:::::::]would be
the person to talk to regarding whether any of the culture or the
swab still remains.
There are no B.a. samples in laboratory that are
1eftovers from previous researchers. stated that an old
inventory of registered agents listed B.a. belonging to BRUCE IVINS
was located in the first floor cold room. This inventory is
relatively dated, and the sam le, if it were ever in the cold room,has since been removed. [::::fjdoes know any further detailsregarding this inventory or sample. fffjstated that IVINS would be
the person to talk to for further details.
During the previous interview, skad[::::]was
ever approached by the FBI to submit samples B.a. collection
into the FBI repository. [:::::]stated that never been
approached wi ' request, nor has any aboratortechnicians. t?:i&;Tdid statel;;:;;:;Lis wi ing to submitT;:::]archived B.a. samp es to the quested. During the astinterview,[::::]was given an instruction sheet for submittingg::::]B.a. samples to the FBI repository in the future. [:::::]state
that there is a major error in the instructions. The instructions
call for the frozen samples to be thawed. [:::::]believes that
frozen B.a. samples should never be thawed completely because it
hwyhnml 1/6/2004 M Frederick, Maryland I be
b7C 4A0mu#V2;9A WF 222936 USAMRIID;| Pwmmmd N/A
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.b6
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FD-302a Rev. 10-6-95!I
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will cause a 99% loss in viability. |:|stated that the proper
way to collect a sample would be to scrape the surface of the
frozen B.a. .
Ab¬
b7C
vi 11' é - h
FD-302 Rev. 10-6-95!
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ALL II-IFDPIYELTIUI-I EDI-TTAIIITEII
1-LI1I1#!]1III=J 15 I_t192.|l."LA5SIE"ll£I.1
DATE ].2l52UU13 BY ISDBZ4 UC E£UE:"DH,.*TH*1
_ 1 _
Date of transcription - Q 1 Z 13 Z 2 O O4
b6I Iborn b7C
esiding at
[Itelephone number
I
ILelephQne__numberI Iwas interviewed atI Iresidence. After
being advised of the identit of the interviewing agent and thenature of the interview,[:::Iprovided the following information:
Stat[:::::::]has been working forI Isince February2001. Prior to being employed byI II Iworke at the United
es Armv Medical Institute of n ec ious Diseases USAMRIID!e r_I
I Ireceived PhD inL Ifrom theI me ical sc ool. I Ihas a Bachelor ofbias asked to ble the
Arts
in
on BA! degree id IandII L_____Ia1aI [J
until From
worke
From untilworked'initiallv at USAMRIID prom approximatelywas employ the
. From until
worked atH
worked again at USAMRIID.
While employed at USAMRIID,[;::::]supported the BacillusAnthracis Ba! program and worked on P ague vaccines. E::::]is a
by trade and training however, E:::]was well versed and
ist with bacteria studies to include conducting assays 1. EISSFrom [::] untilI
testing!never personally worked with the live Anthrax ' [;;;;]
I All of the agent, work utilizedjgemplo ees workin in the YAnthrax. ecalled thatIIdepartment had access to %_¬
was_in charge I
Investigation on 01/12/2 O O4 at2'79AWF222936LEAD; ~E923q
File # »279AWF222 936USAl92/IRI ID ~4b;92 Date dictated O1/13 /2 Q 04:
by SA I I4
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI.
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
7 _ _It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
-FD-302:1 Rev?l0-6-95!
2'79AWF222936LEAD; 2'79AWF2Z2936USA1/IRIID
Continuation ofFD-302 of I i , On O 1/ 12 / 2 O 0 4 , Page 2 |
b6of a group that worked on Ba. [::::%:::]worked with ' ents bc con Vaccine strains. [:;:::]also reme ers a man named Last
Name Unknown LNU wor ing on Anthrax and being highly regar ed in
the field. was the manufacturer of the Anthrax
vaccination.
, , . 92 E;:;;:::]never was involved in the dr in of Ba and never
witnesse t 1S process being accomplished. advised that
although[:::]never used a lyophilizer its use would have been
common. The strains were fully characterized and their origin
should be documented somewhere at USAMRIID. was unable to
recall specifically where the documentation paperwork regarding the
orig'ns of the strains of bacteria were kept. worked with
BRUCE§;VINS and the Ames strain of Ba but does not bel'eve thestrain riginated with IVINS. [::::::Eoes not know[::::%:%:::::1
[:::::]is not aware of anyone with the expertise in
weaponization techniques, and could not come up with a name for the
FBI to contact concerning the weaponization of Anthrax.
was not aware of any bacteria contamination
concerns in the virology suites.
by virtue of[:::]status and vaccination d
access to every room at USAMRIID, but only worked out of labs,
on the floor of facility rooms within the hot zonedenote W1 he markings[::::]£;dEE%:] enclosed in boxes!, on theblueprint. also had an office in building[::::]
could not recall the cooler s ecifically within thehot zone of building|[:::] but advised that[:fi] laboratory staff b?
and others working there would definitely use and have access to Bicthe cooler in the course of their work. E§F
[:::::]never allowed anyone to "piggy-back" in and out ofthe hot areas of building[::::] To the best ofE;;:;;;Jknowledge
the measures and vaccinations required to be in e o zones made
access fairly restricted. Unvaccinated visitors would have to wear
"Rakal", phonetic! suits with a dedicated air supply to gain
access to the hot zones. This access would always be escorted.
believes that Select Agents could be removed from ibuildingH????qUlut that the key was to gain access to building
E:::] Once you have access, removing a Select agent would be
relatively easy. Only a small sample would be needed to be removed
. . Q . Q
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Continuation of FD-302 of I | , On 0 1/ 12 /2 O 0 4 , Page 3
as it could be grown on the outside very easily. The sample would b6
need to be protected while the person went through the showering b7Cprocedures, but E::::] ' d that it would not be terriblydifficult to achieve. Tiiifijis not aware of anyone who attempted
to or talked about removing a Select agent out of the hot zone.
[::::::]never heard any one make the statement that themight make a Select agent for use in an improper fashion. [::::f]is
not aware of anyone expressing hostile intentions or attitudes
toward any political organization, the media, or anyone else.
does not suspect anyone thatL::;]knows at USAMRIID
or anywher for being responsible for t e nthrax letter
mailings. would be very surprised if someone from USAMRIID
was involved.
dangerous items or was inappropriatel interested in agents thatcould b ned into harmful agents. E:::::]does not know of anyone
nor has heard any rumors regarding anyone interested in gaining
access to anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents or the
means to produce them without specific need or authority.
[:::::]does not know how to go about preparin dried Baand sending it through the mail, but if[;:g had to could
accomplish it by consulting the mailing i erature. does not
know of anyone who expressed a special interest in being able to
get around forensic techniques.E::::]never worked with anyone that was lax in handling
'r[:::::]does not h Personal or professionalassociation with, nor doesEif:jknow of anyone with an asso ' ' nwith Trenton, New J n eptember and October 2001, Eifffiwasalready working foriiiii:]and did not travel to New Jersey.
[::::::]recalls that specific decontamination procedures of
class II and Class III biosafety cabinets in work area existed,but[;::lcould not recall them verbatim. [:::E;i;Llieved that they
invo ve a combination of bleaching and rinsing. Paraformaldehyde
has been used ' h the virology and bacteriology areas ofUSAMRIID, but|tf:?¬jdoes not recall the use of glutaraldehyde as a
fumigation agent at USAMRIID.
Since Paraformaldehyde is used for deco ' tion of
both the virology suites and bacteriology suites, has smelled
it in both places.
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Continuation of FD-302 of , , Page
[:;::;]could not recall specificall but ' re that[::;!has use p astic storage containers in[:f:;Pabs. does
no know wh actures these containers or rom where they were
purchased. s not recall a time when any storage boxes
were missing. advised that it was common for other lab
workers to come into a lab and take unused equipment.
[:::::]does not know of any unrecor official work
being done with Ba or its simulants. All of laboratory
work fell under the auspices of GLP Good Laboratory Practices!
com liance and as such was meticulously documented and archived.[:::%:lcould not recall which room was used for archiving the lab
recor s.
[:::::]has never purchased or used prestamped envelopes
from any store or vending machine.
B se[::::]left USAMRIID prior to the Anthrax lettermailings,[:f§ftnever handled nor did any of the analytical work on
th A th t d l s. e n rax e ers an enve ope
I Iwas slightl familiar with the name prior%1 elieves that aveto 'see%%___Jln the halls of bui dingI !in the past. couldnot e more specif's on whenr__1_may A Seed____1 didrecognize the facep '
confident thatI Inever saw in building does
not know what em loyment status held when last saw him,badge[:¬lmay have been wearing.[%::r1E%nfffj allowedto piggy ack into any area with . never saw
takin equipment out of USAMRIID or bringing equipment to aplace where[:%]could use it unobserved.
does not know what orked on at USAMRIIDnor does if[:::::::]showe£ any interest in Anthrax. [:::::]
sa workin on bacterial cultures or lyophilizers.f?fij does not 'f[j%:::::]ever r borrowed equipmenth1bdTj|- t 4% c'1;bt' from t e a an is no aware o ever rying o o ain
discarded lab equipment.
[:::£;%%%d not do any work withI I I Idoes notknow, nor has heard about an samples of any kind that| Imay have brought to USAMRIID. [i%;::]never discussed experimentswith[:::::::] to include any invo ving[::::::::]1 ~ ,I be
1373 I I on Ol/12/Z004 4
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is familiar with[;;;;;:;;;;;:Jand is aware of who
s, but never had any ith re arding
these peop e. | hever heard anyone, to include
discuss killing peop e or Senators or media personnel. never
heard anyone complaining about political views or other issues.
[:::;]is unaware of any connection[:::::::]nmy have to
New Jersey or rinceton.
To the best of[::; reco ion, [::::]never hosted a b§
foreign visiting scientist uring tenure at USAMRIID. bc
é;;;;:]does not know anything about milling or weaponizing
Anthrax. is not aware of anyone that the Federal Bureau of
stigation FBI! would be interested in ' to based upon
experiences at USAMRIID. At this time, is not aware of
any other information that could be of assis ance to the FBI's
Anthrax investigation. "
[:;:::]was unable to provide further details, but is
willing to e recontacted at any time.
FD-302 Rev. 10-6-95!
_ 1 _v4 A '-1 '1, 4
ALI. IIIIFDPIYJLTIUI-I CDIIITAIHED
HEIIEEIIII IS Til-ICLASSIFIEEI
DATE J.2l¬EElEli3 BY I5ElZ3;2¢1 UC EMIUDEQ.-*'TIi
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION '
Date of transcription 12 I 12 I 2 Q Q 3
I Ph.D. date of birth, social secdkitv number| I UIS. ARMY MEDICAL KRESEARCH INST QF CTIOUS DISEASES USAMRIID!, Ft. Detrick, ii;
MD, telephone , was interviewed at lace of Ef?l2fmeni:]USAMRIID, by Spec al Agents and
After being advi d of the identity of theinterviewing Agents and the purpose of the interview,[:::::::] 2provided the following information: I
was hired by USAMRIID inI I
assign d the Bacillus anthracis Ba] Ito
. was previously working with guinea pigs
on the B before left emplo ent at USAMRIID.I Iwas no longe§92em IID wh n began[:::]
' employment at USAMRIID. provided with the
nd inf ation and paperwork ertaining to the Ba[::::::::::] »11 in I I BRUCE VINS provided with most of the protocols b7Q
needed for the B The Ba collection used bv E2
d f th I I b7F [:::::::]was also se on to or e[:::::::kn s-there is no o her Ba Ames strain in
collection, except[:::::1 [:::::::]]cnew that the samplelabeled ' was Ba n onl because FBI a ents told[::::] Y 9
it was the Ames strain. knows very little about[:;:::g:Iknows that has the Ames strain. isS ore either in BRUCE IVINS' Room[:::]or in the col room in the
hallway of suite[::::]
[:::;;:]picked the 10 hottest strains from[%;;:::]guinea be
i studies an will use these strains to challenge ra its , bvc[?:f::::]wrote an addition to the already approved protocol to use
to challenge the rabbits. The rabbits are vaccinated at[::::::::]
I I USAMRIID receives the rabbits
at 9 weeks post vaccination. The rabbits are challenged at 10
weeks post vaccination.
roduces own s ores for the rabbit challen es gpmp 9 from Spo The spores are stored in 1% phenol at 4degrees Celsius. Ef:?ff?iItakes a loop from the spore prep, streaks
a plate for isolation, picks a single colony to produce spores
hwsmnml 12/12/O3 M Fort Detrick, MD
by SA APM 279A-WF-222936USAMRIID ebigo Dmdimred
' ' S I I
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is 1he property of The FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
j
E
QKn
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a
B Nbf s F / HF¢
.. . , 1 Q Q
FD-302a Rev. 10-6-95!
279A-WF222936USAMRIID bk?
b"/C ~
Continuation of FD-302 of I I , On 1 2 / 1 2 / O 3 , Page i
using Leighton and Doi medium, spins it down into a pellet, and
,finally resuspends the spores. The concentration is approximately
3 x 10 9 CFU/volume. He then uses these spores for the rabbit bg
challenges. p b7;
[::;::;::1recommended that the Agents obtain a copy of the
15-6 Comman er s nquiry Report which summarized the results of the
Ba contamination issue.
[:::::::§:::i:::::]WOr I [:::::::::::bn a Ba Q Ibelieves that may have been given a rrom Iraq. The
Ba has an unusual orange color.
The following is a list of the documents[::::::::krovided
to the Agents that will be submitted to the 1A section of the file:
1! Protocol for Ba Vaccine Resistance Study
2! Strain list of Ba for Vaccine Resistance Study
3! Agenda for International Biomedical Conference in 2003, titled
"Crossing Boundaries"
4! PowerPoint slides showing results of Ba vaccine resistance study
i
<9
Q FD-302 Rev. 10-6-95! t ~
ALL IIJFUELT-LLTIDN CCIIJTAIIJED
HEREIN I3 T_II~ICL&55lFIED
-1- DATE 12-15-3008 BY 6033-11 LIE BA'1;LT,-DI-UTE
FEDERAL,BUREAITOFIEHTSTTGAITON
Date of transcription O 1 Z 2 8 Z 2 O
U. S. Citizen!, born b6
residing b7C .I,|IJ|
Telephone Number wasinterviewed a3 Ipiace of employment,! IAfter being a vised of the identities o the interviewing agents
and the nature of the interview,[::::::::]voluntarily provided the
following information:
I IreceivedI Ideqree from theI EJII Iand1 IPHD in
Ifrom heI
. was employed at USAMRIID from
throug . o ' departmentat USAMAIID. Fr0mg£;g:;Ehr6gghEfff:if:iEff555g;;;;d::;imari1 with
animal models ro ents of viral infections of the
|- Froml hmrke -
FromIworked with theI I I
InI promoted toI I. Ithen and finall .IInI has transferred toI Ian
I Iis currentlvgjfployfd bv thdas a
U Ihas been detai ed to theI
[::::::::]has never worked with Bacillus anthracis Ba!,but worked extensively with theI I
indicated thatI I
BRUCE IVINSIi?and were
with Ba. was theandIUUUUsu or inates wou d have worked with Ba.I Iworked
with animal models to research the effects of aeroso exposure of
I I ._ b 6Investigation on 1 - 2 2 - 2 Q at I I b7 C
File # 2 '7 9A-WF - 2 -- LI Date dictated
USPIS
by USPIS
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
FD-302a Rev. 10-6-95! '
279AWF222 93 6USAMRIID
!
Continuation of FD-302 of I I , On l 2 2 - 2 0 U 4 , 1>age 2lo 7 C306
animals to Ba.[::::::::::::]is the one individual that would have
had the expertise to have produced the Ba found in the letters.
[::::::::]was not aware of any problems of contaminationwhile|:| worked at USAMRIID.
worked primari in the and laboratories
of building rom| l in icate access
to the buil nd received the v ' ' but does not recallbeing in building ' the[::::%fTifEifff]stated[:::::]
probably in the Roo cooler but did not recall any reasonsexactly. [:::::::]t oug t the[:::]cooler was a storage place where
the animal care takers kept the fruit for the non human primate
study on| |and possibly a storage place for
media, but did not recall seeing anyone enter or leave the room.
[::::::::]never allowed anyone to piggyback into any suite
and was not aware of anyone who did so.
In 1986-1987 knew of visiting scientists from
the] that were conducting experiments
with the Alpha Virus, Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis VEE! to
develop vectors for vaccines. The procedures that were necessary
for these scientists to enter the lab would be handled by the
Safety Office. The scientists were required to either have the
vaccinations or they had to use respirators in order to access the
laboratories.
[::::::::]indicated it would have been possible to remove
agents from the hot suites, but it would not have been easy because
some security measures were in place. One had to remove all
clothes for decontamination when leaving the lab, and had to pass
through the airlock which had Ultra Violet light. It could be
possible to place an agent into an orifice or hold a small vial inone's hand to remove it from the lab. [:;::::::]was not aware of
anyone who tried to remove an agent in t is manner nor anyone who
would use an agent in an inappropriate way.
was the onl individual cy ' ' ' ould havesus ected gecausei Iworked in the£:::::g%;gl;g:;%l was different,
d not expect[::] to have one t e mailings. According to
all scientists are ifferent, but it just made sense thatpeople were looking at[:::::fib6
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/f
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FD-302:1 Rev. 10-6-95! 0
279AWF222936-USAMRIID
Continuation of FD-302 of __l , On 1 - 2 2 - 2 O O 4: , Page 3
rked with and does not know how to work
with Ba; only would have the ability and expertise tobe able to lyophilize and or weaponize Ba. Zia' L»
has no family or friends in New Jersey nor has[::] traveled there.
as inl Ion 9/11/2001 and was forced to
drive bac || t°' I
Standard Operating Procedures for decontamination were in
place and consisted of sealing off an area and fumigating it with
paraformaldehyde. Paraformaldehyde was also used in the virology
labs when any equipment was in need of repair or replacing. The
Safety Office handled this and paraformaldehyde was used in the air
locks for the decontamination.
never used any plastic storage containers nor b7C
saw any o t em in the laboratories.
E::::::::hlways recorded[:::]work in green hard bound
laborator notebooks which are possibly stored in the suites now 'After[:::f::::]left USAMRIID, the labs began using the numbered lab
notebooks.
[::::::::]:never utilized pre stamped envelopes nor ever
purchased any envelopes from vending machines.
[::::::::]did not handle any of the Anthrax letters nordid[:] perform any of the analytical work on the evidence.
I lknew ofg:::::::1p¬ior to the ' osure ofI worked in th Division. was eitherthel ' [br| L y |when was working atUSAMRIID. began working at USAMRIID in approximately
as a| |Post Doctoral Fellow.
According tol I allE::::::Jnmst go through a selection
process] |then a bgUSAMRIID selec ' 'ttee reviews each application and decides bac
who to select. was selected] |
I Ion I
saw usually in the hallw of ' 'neag;;;;;;;g5Of ice, an possibly in the[:::fE?Lnqg:7;:i;:labs in a space suit, possibly working with[::::::] infect s
FD-302a Rev. 10-6-95! . 9
7
279AWF222936USAMRIID
, .
.0 6 10 7 c
' - I s
or tiss left USAMRIID while[:::::::lwas still working
there. use a USAMRIID badge for access as we all had the
same type o adge.
- [:::::::]never saw[::::::]remove any equipment from any
laboratories.
[g::;;:::%2%§%]not recall ever 'ng[;::::;:]in the hot bésuites of ui ing or in the coo er, ut did see[::::] b7
in the cold side of buildin was believed tstored things in the but id not know ifT:Eifi:::]
ever brought any agen s o AMRIID
[:::::::]never talked abou I bg
creating any bio weapons did not socia ize with b7Q
but named| land possibly some of the technicians as
possible sources of information
was familiar with the bi
Foreiqn Scientists that visited USAMRIID In 1998 there was a b§C
that was given a tour and slide show but they
were alwa s escor ed b off l d t
y cro io oqy a s T ere
were also NRC Fellows was aware of
was responsible for two e ows from that worked in
the non-bio annex section and u ervised| |who now works at ? worked
in the Q abs and had access to the virology lab but did
- not have access to the hot suites. Each Fellow had their- access badge and could have possibly removed samples, but Efft:::::]
did not suspect anyone of doing so. ACmmmmmoH®3Mof onl-22-2004 Hg _£_
I i' t° M
l . %92s|. ..
I - y EJ y icia s an were no given access to anyr labs. The visitors weTi:;i;;iijen b the mi |b' 1 l b . h I
m _ I ' _ I A I
I .I, E I I llnl _ - I _an ,
was not a member of the| I -
b as a me id a lot to build b6
up the team. did not recall if was a member. b7@
[:::::;:] indicated[::]would be willing to take a
polygraph regar ing|iEEknowledge of the mailings and the
information presented in this report.
Ft-92;3Q;>, Rev. 10-6-95!Q ALL II~IFElP!I{ATII]l~I CEIICITAIIEIEIJ
I EEETEIIJ I3 UIITIILAESIFIEIII
I -1- [BATE l2.'|.l:1-ZIIIIIIEI Eli 5lIlIEi2-ii UE BERT,-"D§{_-*'TH
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION '
I06
Date of transcription 1 1 Z O 3 Z 2 O O 3 b7 C
FOn 10 31/2o03,I Idate ofbirth:I I social securitv numberI qhomeaddress:I home phonenumber:I Iwork phohe:I Iwas interviewed atI Iplace of employment, the United States Army Medical Research
Institute for Infectious Diseases USAMRIID!, Fort Detrick,
M l d Aft b ' d ' d f th d ' th ' t ' ' ary an . er eing a vise o e i e e in erviewingagents and the purpose of the interview,Tfiif:?f]provided the
following information:
I Iis aI L__J' Iat USAMRIID in the
I division.I Ihas a PhD in
from theI I
I Iworke as a at USAMRIIDwithI fro o . '
was assigned to inI I IFort Detric , ary an in where
worked in eI I division at USAMRIIDI
I IwasI Idivision atUSAMRIID from Ithrou¢r1TI I DuringI:I
service perio was t e or acteria vaccine
product development studies. if92/
has worked with Bacillus anthracis Ba! in.E::] §§F
career. last worked with Ba in E::::::::] work at USAMRIID was
all conducted in building[:::] A b5
b7C
does not know how to weaponize Ba.
believes thatI II IandBRUC IVINS might know something about ho one wou weaponize ai~~l%F Qbut is not sure.
, b2
bi/E
I b6
Fil==# 2'79AWF222936USAMRII . Dare'di¢wv=d 11 3 03 Wemwnmmm1m 10/31/O3 at F%ederick, Marvlad
by SA
/
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the F y;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
F]1;302?_. Rev. 10-6-95! Q I '
279AWF222936USAMRIID, 279ABAClO1392
/1, Q2 km cwmmmmonmsmof _l ,On1O/31/O3 ',Hs
wor ed in building[::;:]suites ' in
the lab and and did no work in buildin _ | |' "'9
prior to 2001.
[::::::::]does not think the Ba used in the mailings was
lyophilized as "the spore would get everywhere."
[;:::::;Jdoes not know of any ' '
[::] knows o one yophilizer located in
purchased it. '
[:;;::;:]believes a foreign national with help from
someone in e nited States is responsible for mailing the
anthrax-laced letters but he does not have any idea who it might
be.
oes not know of any contamination problems at
USAMRIID.
believes anyone could shower out of the hot
suites w lect agent it any se .
[::::::::]does not know anyone to have hostile attitudes
toward the government, political organizations, or the media.
[:::::::]knows of only one person to be ' ' ' r
not following proper safet procedures at work. was
found to be careless in handling procedures.eventually came down with because[::]was no using
gloves around |:| work.
[;:;::::]is aware that approximately 200 organisms of Bawere detec e near the pass box in.[::::]during the examination of
the anthraxlaced letters. [::] believes BRUCE IVINS caused the
contamination.
[:::::::]was cal Ito accompanyE:::]out front of building montH92after the anthrax-
laced letters were mailed. was outside on the front
wa1k_ BRUCE IVINS and ' 'ned the group.
[:::::::]wanted to "show Ehem somefhing . opened a brownbriefcase containing several jars with whaqmqmustat 'mulantEach jar had different types of white partic es andE?::ii:flwas
inquiring as to which simulant was most like the actua evi enceb /c
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Continuation of FD-302 of I I , On IO / 3 l / O 3 , Page 36
b7C
found in the letters. IVINS stated that the one that looked like
"smoke in a glass" looked like the actual evidence.
[::::::::]believes that to prepare Ba for mailing one would
have a wet preparation first and then lyophilize it, mill it down
perhaps in a milling machine but[::]is not sure-that would work for
bacteria. Preventing self contamination would be difficult and one
would need a glove box but the box would become highly
contaminated. The particles would have to become staticallyneutralized in some way, however[::]does not know how that is done.
[::::::]understands that the normal decontamination
procedures for surface areas in bacteriology is a 10 percent bleach
solution. [::]has never known there to be a bacterial contamination
problem in the virology suites.
[::::::]did not know whenI Iwas
at USAMRIID, and had only heard aboutI Iafter I
[:::::::]was responsible for hosting several foreign
visiting scientists. USAMRIID provided ' forei 'sitorseither hosted directly by or approved byT:iifi:fjduringii:frtime at
USAMRIID. Attached hereto and considered part of this document is
the list of names.[::::::]reviewed the list of names with
investigators and commented on each name as follows:
I IfromI Ivisited USAMRIID on[::::::::].[::::::]was at USAM$IID for a ay an was accompanied by a
translator NU! and a representative from the State Department
NU!.E::::::]again visited USAMRIID on[:::::::::]
I nationality unknown! visited onI I. rdoes92not recall who this individual was.
from[::::]visited USAMRIID from
to for an interview. USAMRIID could not hire
due to nationality.L
[:::::::]does not knowI I nationalityunknown! at all. 92
fromI I visited Ulgékllb on] or a meeting to discuss[iinifiminiil:jrojects related to the |b6
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279AWF222936USAMRIID, 279A~BAClO1392 b7C
Continuation ofFD-302 of I I , On 1 0 / 3 1 / 0 3 ,Page 4
92from Ivisited USAMRIID on
. e~ ay rom t eI I
to discuss plans for the development of
immunogenicity testing of mice.
student fromI I
I Iwas aI I 0 | I 0
, was at USAMRIID to perform a student research internship in
t e Bacteriolo Division [:::::::]was allowed in the cold areasof bui1ding[::%%]un ed, but did not have access to the[:::::::]suites, or buildingffffff
[::::::::;::::::] from[::::::]is unknown to[:::::::]
I IfromI IvisitedUSAMRIID onI Ias part of a working group to discusspotential collaboration betweenIE:::]and USAMRIID.
I:| fro isited nsnnnnnn On|:|[::::]to discuss an rax vaccine work and theraputics.
from is unknown to[:::::::] [::] is
listed as I on the USAMRIID list of
foreign visitors.
Ifrom theI I1[::::]visited USAMRQID onI Ito discuss experimenta
projects. -
I I1 Idbes not recall the specific reason.
IfromI Iis unknown to[::::::].
Ialso recalled thatITsponsored a esearch Center NRC! fellowfrom] I II Icould not recall the specific ime perio s.I had authorization to be in the hot suites.
lLh | tnonly visiting scientists t at knew and ha access o the
lyophilizer in room f building during their time at
USAMRIID as far as knows.Ifrom[::::::]visited USAMRIID on[::::::]
8J6
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Continuation of FD-302 of I I , On 1 O / 3 1 / O 3 , Page _5,
b6[;;:::;::]was never a member nor was[::]ever involved with b7Q
the Aerome ica Isolation Team.
E:::;:;:;lhad nothing to do with the mailing of the
anthrax- ace e ers and has never given any strain of Bacillus
anthracis to anyone.
[:::::::]is willing to submit to a polygraph examination
on November 18, 2003 at 10:00 a.m.
92
92
r
i
K
>
92
»
L
r
-302 Rév. 10-6-95!El? ALL IHFUFJXIATI U1-I III3I~TTE1.I1~1E1T1
HEIRE IIII I S TJIIC LA5 EFIFIED we
-1- DE-.'I'E l2-15-EEIDS BY I:TEI3E=1 UC EM|I,,-"[iI~U'TH
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Date of transcription 12 Z 1 8 Z 2 Q Q 3
__wq¥1§__Pe+cep439ne W erewor S a ar or ..1Yf'te"rtb"é*1ng' r ;; V c dent itles of the
' 0 "- urpose of the interview, provided the
g information:
provided the a ents with a copy ofl lcrriculum
h h 1' t d| Ihome address asfollowin
vitae c.v.i w 1c lS e
J home telephone|c.v. is maintained in an FD34O 1A enve ope. I
| Ieducational historv is as follows: | |O i | ' b5 idate of birth I was interviewed a I i
place of emp oymenc, i " '37C
E::;;:;::::;:;:1employment history with|Iwit a l iona e ails from |c.v., is as foI1ows:
e Q:
Investigation on 12 /1'7 / 2 Q at i I
A<°e°92 279A-wF-2229361 F92oL92, G53File #922'79A-WF222936USAlV'IRIID/ 2'79ABAClO1392'Dat° dictated N A
SAby SA 92 I
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. tg
b2
137E
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FD-302a Rev. 10-6-95!
279A-WF222936USAMRIID, | 279AWF222936
Continuation of FD-302 of I i , On 1 2 / 1'7 / 2 O O 3 , Page 2
During the time w '
- Di ' ' D, bot and served
as . I worked under the su ervision of| || | with whom worked again a
I While at USAMRIIDJ Iworked on
Deoxyribonucleic acid DNA! vaccines were and
worked with BRUCE IVINS and| lto develop an anthraxvaccine. as never wor e with live Bacillus
anthracis B.a. .
| performed an anthrax DNA va ' t' CCl1'l8_ Gexperimental animals and then returned them to IVINS an to
be challenged with anthrax. The DNA vaccine consisted of a portion
of the anthrax gene which was inserted into a plasmid. A gene gun
last the vaccine into the skin of the animals.thought ' ject was|:| only collaborationwit anyone rom the Division. At mosqgmay have
had casual conversations w1 some other individuals rom
| regarding DNA vaccines.
_ |:| vi-ral work was done in Building t USAMRIID, and
a laboratory bench work was done in Buildin |:|l buildin '
OEher individuals who worked 1n| Iincludedzb6
Io"/C
b6
b7CI1:6
ma:
FD-302a R.ev.10-6-95! b6
r b7
279AWF222936USAMRIID, 279ABA-C1Ol392, 279A-WF-222936-
CmmmmmoHDJMof _l i ,On12/17/2003 ,m@ 3
b6I we
lw conducted in a bf!Division Biosafety Level BL! andH____________%::] bC
was ork was done in the| B
s own a floor plan of Buildings and however| | couldnot recall specifically in which suites ad worked. '
[:::]did not work directly with[::::::::::::]in the bf [::::::::] Division at USAMRIID, however they did work on some b
similar ro'ects and each knew of the others work thoughtthat[:::?::2]had too big of an ego to talk to someone
which at the time which was eitherdid work with[:::::::::::::::]who may have been ini Ilab
group at that time.
L:;;:::::::::]advised thaE¥;;;l"plays by the rules", andgave the o owing reasons for why ventuallv left the
Division. A chloroform spill occurred in a lab| I
|followed the hazardous material spill protocolA |, an,action which upset
Radiation Safety office after a radioisotope spifl.
arrived at USAMRIID close to the time when
; e t position there in early[:::] Although they
1 ot wor e in the same division f approximately three to fourmonths,[::::::::::::]spent most ofir |in| l
Shor
at the ,
and introduced] |to IVINS an . was
working on general immune stimulatory work wherein a DNA vaccine
with a particular genetic sequence is used to stimulate the immune
system as a whole in orde t it. [::::::::::::]had no
knowledge of how involved became with the project.
g:::::::;::::]never worked with[:::::::] but spoke with[;;;]regar ing pro essional issues approximatel six to ten times.ing by| |cubicle wherel isat backtobackwithEffiiiff:fif?j to discuss| j.| lnever saw
FD-302 .10-6-95 i a R" ! be
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b oContinuation of FD-302 of I I , On 12 / 1 '7 / 2 O O 3 , Page 4 bl C
[:::::::]outside of USAMRIID, never traveled with[;;;] and never
dated or had drinks with[:::::] 92
recalled that there was an ite ' m on or near
desk that was something[::] would not expect to see int e office of someone at[::] professional level. Although[:::%::::]|could not recall what the specificlitem was, it was related toThis item started a '
conversation regarding collaborative work[::Ihad done with peoplein the bio-defense community. [:::::::]seemed to have familiarit
with people at higher levels in that communit thanwould have eXpected.[:::] recalled that[::::f¬]vws eit writing
a proposal or drafting a document that was unrelated to work at
'QiaJ _
I I th0uQhtl_______1may have tioned thaqmmgnhad workedwith the mf I Isai that[:;§
had worked with the military, however did not reca
thaq:::]claimed to have been with the I I ItoldE::] somethi aboutL;;:ltimeI howeverI I could notrecall wh?E;§] clai o be doinq there. 'that what had Lahas become indistinguishale from w a toldI Iabout it.
never discussed New Jersey or Princeton University withI
could not recall any instances of bacterial
contamination in Division laboratory s ace, and never saw . an . . . . . ggg ything pecu iar in the division. spoke with[::::] '
re arding poolin of efforts and co a oration on somepro ects never met nor did[:::lever attend a conference a no involvement wit thel:::]at
USAMRIID, and never used a lyo hilizer or a spee vac whileworkin in th Division i:::::::::::::hever worked with
reviewed[::] travel since 1997 for the
agents attended the American So ' . ciety for Virology meeting in
Toronto, Canada, and advised that[:::]likely traveled to several of
these meetings, as well as meetings of the American Society for
MicrobiolO9Y, with coworkers from USAMRIID.[:::]recalled
in an American Veterin ' on meeting where either,orI Ias well as and First Name Unknown
FD-302a Rev. 10-6-95!
279AWF222936USAMRIID, 279A~WF222936
Continuation of FD-302 of I i , On 1 2 / 1 '7 / 2 O O 3 , Page £-
[:::::;:::::;]were in attendance, however[:::]did not actualltrave to t e meeting with these LnJ
r ~ - 1spent three weeks in% I I -
Ias not reencountered any of
Ehe individuals EhaE| | met during | at FortDetrick.| Ialso traveled to Fhe |
h I con erence t at occurs 51- earl .Although no one from USAMRIID traveled to the meeting withE::::%:::]
recalled bein sur rised to see someone from USAMRIID at t econference. [?::::f::::::]could not recall who this individual was.
did not spons eign vi ' 'USAMRI ID . Whil was the
requ 'stance with a State Department
sponsored scientist who thought may have been from
South Korea. | |could not recall the scientist's name,
but remembered that was at USAMRIID for approximately four to
six weeks.[::] would not have had access to the hot suites, as it
takes longer than six weeks to receive the vaccinations necessaryfor entry. [::::::::::::]thought that this sc' ' s
photocopying too much information, and called about the
situation.
After the mailings,[:::::::::::]looked at the bio-
defense field and colleagues in a questioning manner. Although
was "weir an not average", there was no indication that| lwould have committed such an act. No one strikes[::;Aas being
capable of such a thing, particularly because those in e bio-
defense community all know what can happen with anthrax. No one ~
who was familiar with the biodefense field would have done this,
as the amount of anthrax in the letters could have done even more
dama ' ually did The only motivation for the mailingsthatTf:iii?:if:iffkould think of was money.b6
137$
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Fnao2g¢w10eos! i
ALL I]5IFlIRIi!lTIElI-I CDIBITAIIIEII
HEFEIH IS T_EJIILAS5IFIED
-1- Di-STE l2~l5-EEIEIF3 BY 1513251 UC EiAII.T;DEiA.- TH
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Date of transcription 1 Z 14 Z 2 Q Q 4
I date of birth[::::::], social security number was interviewed a T
place of employment, United States Arm Medical Institute ofInfectious Diseases USAMRIID! on[:::fi::::::::::1 After being
advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of
the interview,[::::]provided the following information:
[::::]does not know of any other foreign national visitors
besides what has been documented by USAMRIID building security on
August 4, 2003. [::::]recalled that the Russian group that visited
the facility had been given a tour through the hot side of building
[::::] but were escorted during the entire tour.
Neither[:::]nor any of[::g associates traveled to New
Jersey during September or October o 2001.
92 E:::]is unaware of ever working with any uncharacterized
strain of Bacillus anthracis B.a.!
stock of B.a. that was being used by[::::::::::::::]
and was returned back to BRUCE IVINS stock.
I E::::]will be willing to participate in a polygraph
regarding the anthrax mailings.
:
hwymml 1/13/2004 m Fort Detrick, Maryland
File # 2 79A-WF- 2 2 - D _ Date dictated
SA
by SA
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.b6
b7C
;|
I Q C
FD-302 Rev. 104-95!
-1-
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ALL II-IFDEEIIATIUI-I EDI-ITAIHED
I-IEIIEEIIJ IS UNCLASSIFIEIB
DATE ].2l62UUf3 BY 65324 UC Bi§.T.ITf'DI-5.-ITHDate of transcription Q 2 Z Q 2 Z 2 Q Q4
L I date of birthI I Social b6Security Num5erI 92home addressI b7C
I home telephone numberI
employer I
I work telephone number
was interviewed a lace of em lo ment. Afte t|_Ip py r
being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and thenature of the interview,[::Iprovided the following information:
I IearnedI II Iand then eegned e Master's Degree inL______Jfrom theI
[::::::]began working at the United States Army MedicalR rchdInstitute of Infectious Diseases USAMRIID! art time in
InIto USAMRIID. I Iwas t eIandI__Iworked in theIuntilI I
[::::::]worked ' and building b6
had access to Bio and Biosafet b7@[:LLaboratories. speci ica worked in
La oratories that supported the division. was
responsible for animal n t e various laboratories and
would provide animal
I Iworked on Ebola injection challenges and injection
vaccine studies with . This study involved nonhuman ~r__i__1__§;__J berimates NHP!. wo ldI I to the NHP, b7@
the chaflenge locations, evaluate eachand bleed the animals if necessary. J:::::;]was b?
never responsi e for re aring any of the agents use in t e bi?study. In addition, [f¬:i%]<did not perform necropsies or transport
carcasses.
Sometime duringI II Iassisted[::::;%;vdth a monkey pox study that was conducted in bui ingin ro [::]. E:::::]administered anesthesia to the animals and
Iwwwmww 1/30/O4 M Washington, D.C.
HW#_279AWF222936USAMRIIDI Fmemwmd 2/2/O4
by SA I I SAI I
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your 5 ,
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
FD-302a Rev. 10-6-95! 0 0
279AWF222936~USAMRIID 279ABAClOl "lib
137C
Continuatim of FD-302 of I I ,0n 1/30/04 ,Iagc 2
'ntubate the animals. At the direction of the investigators,§?iE%:jwould administer treatments wh' e mixed with a lesauceto the a ' . During this study,| Ispent most of 'mein Rocm1Efff%Fwhich was the I I wasalso involved in this study. believes that92this study
started before[::]reported to USAMRIID.
I Imet sometime in 1997 or 1225.
Ihad Ifrom in theI ' ' '
believe was
escribe as accommodating and
easy o wor wit . advised that - e
in a hurry, and described
felt that was less sa onscious, and because ofwas more careful aroundI I Someone toldI Ithat
was I I Istated that
had a reputation tor being cocky.
[::::::]was always aware of the color of scrubs that b6
people were wearing and paid att ' o wethb6
b7
er or not ople by;showered out of the hot suites. considers[::::::?fto be
safet co ' d 'y nscious an pays attention to others that ma ut at
risk. For exam le after leavin room[::::]which was[::::]in.roomI EI and Fco~workers would s each otheroff immediatel . remembers workin in roomIEfiTat the sametime as advised that[:::?:::]would frequently walk
betwee and the laboratory which was designated
I hit out spraying off.
9292.I Inever discussed II Ihuman anthrax outbreaks or pieces of laboratory equipment
had or wanted t tain from USAMR 'tion, b§
did not discu pe ss ife or any b
connections to New Jersey with thatE:]nmy
have had a discussion about monkey pox with butE:] is not
,sure.[::::::]thou ht that was a contragtif;remembers seeingl Iwith Iand but
does not recall seeing spend a lot o time wit anyone
else. .
[::::::]nay"have seen a picture in office of[:::::::]in military fatigues holding a weapon. said thatCC
b6
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FD-302a Rev. 104-95! ' .
279AWF222936USA192/IRIID 2'79ABAC1Ol
b6
b'7CContinuation of FD-302 of _| , On 1 / 3 O / O 4 , Page 3
the fatigues did not appear to be U.S. military issue because the
pattern on the fatigues was not like the patterns used by the U.S.
military.-[;;;;::;;Felieves that[:] saw£;;;g:::]on the first floor Q5hot side o ui ing| Ian m on the second floor of 97¢E?i%%fing[::::] In addition,i:iE:fffa'so saw[:::::::]in building
ated that tion of being a be
remembers sta in awa b7C92 Y 9 Yfrom and being very standoflish to| |
wprked on a| I
stud with This study ried out on the ,0 uildin I also assisted with K
a with . This study involved bf
nonhuman rimates NHP! and too place on the hot side of building bC[::::] [::§:::]advised that the NHP's were eventually x-rayed,
euthanized and the carcasses were double bagged.
is familiar with a1kincooler located on theE::::::]floor ot side of building [::::::]thinks that animal K
carcases may have been stored in that room.
' ' in a stud at that involved rabbits. I Y I b6
. b792,
does not recall seeing a lyophilizer at USAMRIID.
believes that BRUEE IVINS was involved with an
anthrax stu y using rabbits. '
has never grown, cultured or dried Bacillus
anthracis Ba
s not aware of any area inside of USAMRIID that
had probl bacterial contamination [::::::]advised[:::::::]
worked ne nd does not remember hearing anyems wi .Kt to the I: '
"chatter" about a con amina ion problem. -
When[;:::::]reported to USAMRIID, it was made clear to[:::]that the ba ges were important f ing emplo ees,especially in case of an emergency. advised.[2E::::]took
/
FD~302a Rev. 10-6-95! .
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_ b E5Continuatlm ofFD-302 of , On -1 / 3 O / O4: , Page 4 be C
piggybacking very seriously and cannot recall ever seeing anyone
piggyback into a hot suite.
Animal Caretakers were responsible for disinfecting the
' rooms and they followed a routine maintenance schedule.
was aware that items were autoclaved or decontaminated in an
airlock, but is not aware of all of the specific procedures that
were used. '
While inside of a hot suite [::::::]would take[:::] t , no es
on acetate pa er and then ass them through a "dip box". Aftertranscribing notes,[::?:::]would discard the acetate paper.
has never seen or utilized a sterilite box at
USAMRIID.
[::::::] was shown an envelo e consistent with the one used
in the anthrax mailings of 2001 advised has neverseen or used an envelope like theE;i%iii?was sho£;;::::]
forei n visitor while at USAMRIID.I fronIE%:::::] was a visiting veterinary
resident. I Iwas at take theI V II In addition Iglreviewed training slides to help prepare for[:::]board exam.[::::::::]did not have access to any of the hot suites.
One of I colleagues, named[::%;;;;;;;;;:]used to live ' New worked and lived in I ,|@rI ° E&H;|I - |:| --
Ilnl I>rI I I Ibelieves that visited
. is no longer living in New
Jersey.
92 .[:::::]does not recall takin leave in September orI October 2001. During that time,I l Iwas working at[::::::::::]
[::::::]was asked if[::]was aware of anyone who might have I
been involved with the anthrax mailings or if anyone at USAMRIID
had expressed hostile attitudes toward USAMRIID or others. [::::::]
does not know anyone who fit either description.
[::::::]stated that there were a f e who were fired
or moved because of their work habits while at USAMRIID.
92 1 £8 h 1
FD-30221 Rev. 10-6-95! 0 0
_2'79AWF_222936USA192/IRIID 2'79ABA-C101
CmmwmmoHD8W0f _l ,0n1/30/O4 ,m$ 5
92
106
b7C
hoes not recall who had the NHP
ct but believes that the manager of that contract wasl |
Q
4
ALL IIJFDPEEATIUN E['J]51TAII~1EEI
HEFEII-I IS TEICLASSIFIEB~92
FD-302 Rev. 10-6-95!
I D!-JIE 1.2-l':'-ECICIE BY 50324 UC BAH.-DKA»*TH
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONI92
Date of lranscriplim ! 1 Z 14 Z 2 ! Q 4
I I date of birthI I
ephone Qumbe _work telephone numberI I was interviewed a Iplace
of employment the United States Army Medical Institute of '
Infectious Diseases USAMRIID!. After being advised of the
identity o interviewing agents and the nature of the
interview, provided the following information:
I Ireceivef_an_underaraduate_deare from.|alml I I
As part of
both administrative end research support duties. Ihome addressgj I b6I 1<>"c
USAMRIID i I DuringI I firstI |§ears at b6
USAMRIID, I I ich bvc
was run byI had
andE::j assisted with necro ies in buildingsand While in this position,I IandE:::l__1I subordinates, worked atl I
In [:::::;:;;::;:;;]transferred to h
Division and assume e 1 e of . b6
remained at this position tad blc
1
InI Ibeqan working at
aI I
I,
mwmwwon 1/14/O4 at Fort Detrick, Mar land
Fi|@# 2'7 WJ~77'7-'3°B.5[ITSAMRIID K 1/14/O4
SA
by I106
b7C
I:-s
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. -
{ I
i I
-1
FD-3 02a Rev. 10-6-95! 0 Q
_ 279A~WF222936USAMRIID 279ABAClOl392
Continuation of FD-302 of I I , On 1 / 14 / O 4 , Page 2 b 5
b7C
was employed I While employed byworked in theI IDivision and was
responsible for_research support. On occasion,E:::]worked as a
Principal Investigator and was involved with performing necropsies,
particle sizing, histology, aerosol studies and a study involving
the effects of toxins on mice.
LEh I Iwas hired as a Microbiolo ist and advisedat Ehis positionI ? Iheld that position untilI khenI Ibecame a
|:|-
[::::::::::Ihas been involv ' ious aerosol studies
involvin Bacillus anthracis g ' Ba!. has worked with the
following scientistsLprincipal inves igators durin B erosolS = I I BRUCE VINS andIE:;;:;;]
. During théaerosol studies, m in y dealt it
the animals, and seeing to t e animals well being.
a t ' l d ' h w s no invo ve wit the preparation, culturing or
row o any of the Ba used in the abovementioned studies.Ei::::::::]advised that it would have been rare forE::]to handle
the wet spore preparations and advised that the principal
investigator usually handled the Ba.
h b 1 d h as een invo ve wit the culturin and
growth of I During this study, was
assisting an Arm Major FNU LNU. After was deployedoverseajtEEEEEEE2;§]was instructed to continue the study until[::]
return conducted blood cultures, isolated bacteria,
conducted necropsies, grew bacteria and extracted DNA and RNA.[::;;:::::::hdvised that[:::]made streaks on blood agar plates and
use a tan colored a er as well as some other type of selectiye *media. Af [:::;::fg;Ireturned I
comp ete the study. elieves~Ehgtmav currently be worTing at I
IVINS told[::::::::::]that the Ba at USAMRIID came from
Dugway.
I Istated thatI I has had a few laboratory
notebooks signed out to| | The first time was while
working for stated that
signe or the notebook and advised that the notebook is in t e A
4Q
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Continuation of FD-302 of | i , On l / 14 / Q 4 , Page 3
13 *5
library. Additionally, thinks that been '3Ia few notebooks siqfed out to while[:::]was
ta|:|¢ " Iii tnE;;::::g and Biosafety advisedat t is is due to| |posiEion as] Ian it is[:::]
responsibility to per orm safety inspections.
[::::::::::]advised that the submarine went "hot" shortly
before Christmas.
[::::::::::]stated that animal carcase t icallystored in a freezer in the basement of buildingi:ifj. stated
that a Primary Investi ator might put a carcase in room the' ler on thE%:;:::;floor hot side of buildingI has been insi e o roomE::].[:;::lhas mopped the floor,
and] |h 'as turned on the ig t to make sure it was
neat. i that reagents are stored in room[:::]but
is not sure. has never seen anyone else inside of room
[::::::::::]recalls that there w terial contamination
found in one of the passboxes in building After thisincident, weekly tesEinf:hif:hfin conducts: within the[:::::]and[:::::]la ' . inside the suites, on
a Hepa filter, the
e ui ment, doorb6
b7C
b6
b7
boratories advised that
a weekly basis, the floors are vacuumed with
floors are mopped with bleach and all of thehandles and light switches are sprayed down. [§::¬:%::::]stated
that occasionally spores are found in one of t e sa ety cabinets or
centrifuges and then the equipment is decontaminated with bleach
and retested.
Approximately everv tenday§| lthevarious suites. I Iand on bg occasion picks u trash and drags laundry into Ehe suites for b§Fautoclaving. [::?:::::::]stated that after the passbox incident all
of the used scrubs, socks and towels are returned to the hot suites
and sterilized with steam before they are taken away to be
laundered. This change took place after the laundry companies
expressed concern with possible bacterial contamination of the
laundry and potential threat to their employees.
FD-302a Rev. 10-6-95! D
279AWF222936USAMRIID 279ABAClOl392
5bucmmwmmonmamor _J I ,on1/14/04 ,m$ 4 b7C
[::::::::::]has access to the various places where FBI
evidence is stored, but stated that all freezers, rooms etc. are
' with special locks, and[::] does not have access to them.Effffiiffij was not involved with the processing of any FBI
evidence.
[::::::::::] was shown an envelo e consistent with the onesused in the anthrax mailings in 2001. [j%:::;;::]advised that[:::]
has seen photographs of the anthrax letters, ut h s neverpersonally seen or used envelopes like the one[:::iwas shown.
has never seen or used a clear sterilite box
at USAMRIID. advised that large colored Rubbermaid tubs
are used to transpor monkeys and to hold toys used by the monkeys.[::;;:::::]stated that some of the monkeys are too large for the
tra itional "hat boxes" used to transport monkeys and the
Rubbermaid totes were purchased to alleviate that problem. . _
r met or saw whil§IwQrking
at USAMRIID. advised that tol th t
thouqhtI " Additionally,
o that I:I observed
e wi out showering.
[:::::::::]stated that id Ithe first fewweeks following Sjptember 11, 2001. Idvised that[::::]involved with and stated that
was busy conducting necropsies during this time period.
When asked about October 6-9 200l, 'that[;:g did travel or take leave durinq this time.state nFat_[f$fwas supposed to take Q II Ii some time during October, but it was cancelled
because ofI I
advised that[:::]worked withI I
stated that provided technical reports an
for some of research, but none of it has been
because ofI I b6
b/C
stated that was involved with
[:::::]stu ies, an worked in suites. To
knowledge, E:::::]never had access o BSL3 or BSL-4 suites.
|
Q I .
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b 6Continuatim of FD-302 of I I , On 1 / 1 4: / 04 , Page 5 b7 L
Additionally,[:::]is not aware of any vaccinations that[:::::]may
have had.
Iwas IbetweenNov and A ril- Also inI Ichain of command were
and L] advi|Z<lI§ J:_'|Ihasl I surrouaijnq Add't' llI tha Istated tfaq 1 lona I
I Ihad brofessional problems ith te_fQllomina__Tindividua s in t eI IDivision: I I 92 ,II g| La.nd¢aJstated tha
ut| Idid not know who put it there.
There was anI Iinvestigation revolving aroundI I I Ibelieves that the invesfigation was run by
anHwho was assigned to the
[::::::::::]socialized witH:::::::]a few times andremTmbers having dinner wi;hr__1 ' ' 'and I
stated thatL and advisedthat|iUUtal ed abou amil quite a lot. would travel
frequently and told that] Ihad fami v a over the
world, Q Iisunaware of| Ihaving a| [I stated that[:g:::::bid not isplay the fact that Iand felt
t at someone would have had to work wit closely before
would tell them. I Iadvised that on QQ§ '
traveled toI I
I andI Iboth attended t[:::::::::]In , as starting a program andEfffii:jwas finishing
one. emember ving difficulty wit a computer andadvise a helpedif:?flog on.
1
_
'1-rm
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[:::::::::]worked on a study whereE:::::]vms the' ipal Inve t1 ator. Also assisting with this study was[:::;;]
an . This study involved nonhuman primates ancollec ed tissue samples from[::::::::]work.
advised thad::::::]expected the people that
worked or work verv hard and stated tha____Lwork qengrgte*1
.seen| idurinI q has not talke to[:::::::Fecent1y and has only
I |also butted heads with| i l
I I. | Psed to oversee the| |at
USAMRI ID O
FEDERAL BUREAU CIF INVESTIGATION
FOIP.A
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