Document text
HEADQUARTERS
FM 7-10
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE INFANTRY RIFLE
COMPANY
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
FM 7-10
C1
HEADQUARTERS
CHANGE 1
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington, DC, 31 October 2000
The Infantry Rifle Company
1. Change FM 7-10, dated 14 December 1990, as follows:
REMOVE OLD PAGES
INSERT NEW PAGES
None
L-1 through L-54
2. A star (*) marks new or changed material.
3. File this transmittal sheet in front of the publication.
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTIONApproved for public release; distribution is
unlimited.
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
Official:
ERIC K. SHINSEKI
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0028602
US NATIONAL POLICY
ON
ANTIPERSONNEL LAND MINES
On 16 May 96, The President of the United States announced a national policy that
eliminates or restricts the use of antipersonnel land mines, beginning with those that do
not self-destruct but eventually including all types. This policy is in effect now. It applies
to all Infantry units either engaged in, or training for, operations worldwide.
Current US policy allows the use of non-self-destructing antipersonnel land mines only
along internationally recognized national borders or in established demilitarized zones,
specifically for the defense of Korea. Such mines must be within an area having a clearly
marked perimeter. They must be monitored by military personnel and protected by
adequate means to ensure the exclusion of civilians.
US national policy also forbids US forces from using standard or improvised explosive
devices as booby traps.
Except for units in Korea or units going there for a designated exercise, this policy
specifically forbids all training on or actual employment of inert M14 and M16
antipersonnel land mines either at the unit's home station or at a Combat Training Center
except in the context of countermine or de-mining training. No training with live M14
mines is authorized, and training with live M16 mines is authorized only for soldiers
actually on Korean soil.
This policy does not affect the standard use of antivehicular mines. It does not affect
training and use of the M18 Claymore mine in the command detonated mode.
For the immediate future, units may still use self-destructing antipersonnel mines, such as
the ADAM, when authorized by the appropriate commander. Under proper command
authority, units may still emplace mixed minefields containing self-destructing
antipersonnel land mines used to protect antivehicular land mines, for example, MOPMS
or Volcano.
Users of this manual should consider all references to antipersonnel mines and the
employment of minefields in the light of the national policy limiting the use of non-self-
destructing antipersonnel land mines.
Readers should not construe any uses of the terms mines, antipersonnel obstacle,
protective minefield, or minefield contained in this manual to mean an obstacle that
contains non-self-destructing antipersonnel land mines, or booby traps.
i
FIELD MANUAL
*FM 7-10
HEADQUARTERS
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 14 December 1990
THE INFANTRY RIFLE COMPANY
CONTENTS
Page
Preface............................................................................................................................... vii
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Section
I. Preparation for War .............................................................................. 1-1
1-1. The Soldier................................................................................... 1-1
1-2. The Leader ................................................................................... 1-1
1-3. The Unit ....................................................................................... 1-2
1-4. The Training Program.................................................................. 1-2
Section
II. AirLand Battle ..................................................................................... 1- 2
1-5. Combat Power.............................................................................. 1-2
1-6. Tenets of AirLand Battle ............................................................. 1-4
1-7. AirLand Battle Imperatives.......................................................... 1-5
Section
III. Battlefield Operating Systems .............................................................. 1-6
1-8. Intelligence System...................................................................... 1-6
1-9. Maneuver System......................................................................... 1-6
1-10.Fire Support System..................................................................... 1-7
1-11.Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability System................. 1-7
1-12.Air Defense System ..................................................................... 1-7
1-13.Combat Service Support System ................................................. 1-7
1-14.Command and Control System .................................................... 1-8
Section
IV. Organization.......................................................................................... 1-8
1-15.Mission......................................................................................... 1-8
1-16.Employment Considerations........................................................ 1-8
1-17.Company Organizations............................................................... 1-9
CHAPTER 2. COMMAND AND CONTROL
Section
I. Command and Control System............................................................. 2-3
2-1. Definitions.................................................................................... 2-3
2-2. Commander’s Leadership............................................................ 2-4
2-3. Mission-Oriented Command and Control.................................... 2-4
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION—Approved for public release; distribution is
unlimited.
____________________________________
*This publication supersedes FM 7-10 (HTF), 8 January 1982; and FM 7-71, 28 August
1987.
FM 7-10
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Page
2-4. Commander’s Intent..................................................................... 2-5
2-5. Mission Orders............................................................................. 2-6
2-6. Duties and Responsibilities of Key Personnel............................. 2-6
2-7. Succession of Command.............................................................. 2-9
2-8. Orders Group ............................................................................... 2-9
2-9. Company Command Post ............................................................ 2-9
Section
II. Command and Control Process........................................................... 2-10
2-10.Troop-Leading Procedures......................................................... 2-10
2-11.Communications ........................................................................ 2-14
2-12.Electronic Counter-Countermeasures ........................................ 2-18
Section
III. The Estimate of the Situation.............................................................. 2-19
2-13.Conduct a Detailed Mission Analysis........................................ 2-19
2-14.Analyze the Situation................................................................. 2-21
2-15.Analyze the Terrain.................................................................... 2-22
2-16.Analyze the Enemy.................................................................... 2-25
2-17.Analyze Troops Available ......................................................... 2-28
2-18.Analyze the Time....................................................................... 2-28
2-19.Develop Courses of Action........................................................ 2-28
2-20.Analyze the Courses of Action .................................................. 2-32
2-21.Compare the Courses of Action................................................. 2-35
2-22.Make a Decision ........................................................................ 2-37
2-23.Complete the Tentative Plan...................................................... 2-38
Section
IV. Continuous Operations ....................................................................... 2-40
2-24.Sustained Operations ................................................................. 2-40
2-25.Degradation of Combat Capability............................................ 2-40
2-26.Techniques to Sustain Operations.............................................. 2-40
2-27.Unit Sleep Plan .......................................................................... 2-41
CHAPTER 3. MOVEMENT
3-1. Fundamentals ............................................................................... 3-1
3-2. Locations of Key Leaders and Weapons ..................................... 3-2
3-3. Movement Formations................................................................. 3-3
3-4. Movement Techniques............................................................... 3-11
3-5. Control Techniques.................................................................... 3-15
3-6. Security During Movement........................................................ 3-15
3-7. Movement as Part of a Battalion................................................ 3-17
CHAPTER 4. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
Section
I. Offensive Fundamentals ....................................................................... 4-4
4-1. Purpose......................................................................................... 4-4
4-2. Characteristics of Offensive Operations ...................................... 4-4
4-3. Phases of Offensive Operations................................................... 4-5
4-4. Offensive Framework .................................................................. 4-5
4-5. Forms of Maneuver...................................................................... 4-8
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Page
Section
II. Infiltration........................................................................................... 4-14
4-6. Fundamentals ............................................................................. 4-14
4-7. Considerations............................................................................ 4-15
Section
III. Movement to Contact.......................................................................... 4-18
4-8. Fundamentals ............................................................................. 4-18
4-9. Considerations............................................................................ 4-18
4-10.The Search-and-Attack Technique ............................................ 4-19
4-11.The Approach-March Technique............................................... 4-25
Section
IV. Attacks ................................................................................................ 4-30
4-12.Types.......................................................................................... 4-30
4-13.Offensive Concept Development............................................... 4-30
4-14.Actions on the Objective............................................................ 4-33
4-15.Reorganization........................................................................... 4-34
4-16.Consolidation............................................................................. 4-34
4-17.Fire Support ............................................................................... 4-35
Section
V. Attack Techniques .............................................................................. 4-37
4-18.Assault of a Strongpoint............................................................. 4-37
4-19.Attack During Limited Visibility............................................... 4-44
4-20.Deception Operations................................................................. 4-54
4-21.Security Operations.................................................................... 4-54
4-22.Rifle Company as the Reserve................................................... 4-55
CHAPTER 5. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
Section
I. Defensive Fundamentals....................................................................... 5-3
5-1. Purpose......................................................................................... 5-3
5-2. Characteristics of the Defense ..................................................... 5-3
5-3. Defensive Framework.................................................................. 5-4
Section
II. Plans and Preparations.......................................................................... 5-6
5-4. Defensive Concept Development ................................................ 5-6
5-5. Sectors and Battle Positions......................................................... 5-8
5-6. Company Fire Plan .................................................................... 5-12
5-7. Security Requirements............................................................... 5-16
5-8. Employment of the Reserve....................................................... 5-18
5-9. Logistics Considerations............................................................ 5-21
5-10.Command Post Location............................................................ 5-22
Section
III. Conduct of Operations........................................................................ 5-23
5-11.Reconnaissance.......................................................................... 5-23
5-12.Occupation of the Defense......................................................... 5-23
5-13.Priority of Work......................................................................... 5-24
5-14.Time Management ..................................................................... 5-26
5-15.Daylight Scenario....................................................................... 5-27
5-16.Defensive Battle......................................................................... 5-27
5-17.Counterattack............................................................................. 5-28
5-18.Reorganization........................................................................... 5-29
FM 7-10
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Page
Section
IV. Defensive Techniques......................................................................... 5-30
5-19.Nonlinear Defense ..................................................................... 5-30
5-20.Defense in Sector....................................................................... 5-32
5-21.Defense from Battle Positions ................................................... 5-34
5-22.Defense on a Reverse Slope....................................................... 5-37
5-23.Perimeter Defense...................................................................... 5-40
5-24.Linear Defense........................................................................... 5-45
5-25.Defense of a Strongpoint ........................................................... 5-47
CHAPTER 6. OTHER TACTICAL OPERATIONS
Section
I. Passage of Lines.................................................................................... 6-1
6-1. Purpose......................................................................................... 6-1
6-2. General Considerations................................................................ 6-1
6-3. Specific Considerations ............................................................... 6-1
6-4. Conduct of the Forward Passage.................................................. 6-3
6-5. Conduct of a Rearward Passage................................................... 6-4
Section
II. Relief in Place....................................................................................... 6-5
6-6. Purpose......................................................................................... 6-5
6-7. Planning Considerations .............................................................. 6-5
6-8. Conduct of the Relief................................................................... 6-9
Section
III. Retrograde Operations........................................................................ 6-10
6-9. Delays ........................................................................................ 6-11
6-10.Withdrawals............................................................................... 6-14
6-11.Retirements ................................................................................ 6-18
Section
IV. Linkups ............................................................................................... 6-18
6-12.Planning ..................................................................................... 6-18
6-13.Conduct of the Linkup ............................................................... 6-19
Section
V. Water Crossing ................................................................................... 6-20
6-14.With Opposition......................................................................... 6-20
6-15.Without Opposition.................................................................... 6-21
Section
VI. Patrolling............................................................................................. 6-21
6-16.Involvement ............................................................................... 6-21
6-17.Organization............................................................................... 6-22
6-18.Raid............................................................................................ 6-26
6-19.Ambush...................................................................................... 6-30
6-20.Patrol Base ................................................................................. 6-35
Section
VII. Stay-Behind Operations...................................................................... 6-35
6-21.Purpose....................................................................................... 6-35
6-22.Types.......................................................................................... 6-36
6-23.Planning ..................................................................................... 6-36
6-24.Breakout from Encirclement...................................................... 6-37
CHAPTER 7. COMBAT SUPPORT
Section
I. Relationships......................................................................................... 7-1
7-1. Command Relationships.............................................................. 7-1
7-2. Support Relationships.................................................................. 7-1
FM 7-10
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Page
Section
II. Nonorganic Assets................................................................................ 7-2
7-3. Battalion....................................................................................... 7-2
7-4. Supporting Units.......................................................................... 7-3
Section
III. Fire Support Planning........................................................................... 7-9
7-5. Maneuver Commander’s Intent ................................................... 7-9
7-6. Planning Process .......................................................................... 7-9
7-7. Targets........................................................................................ 7-11
7-8. Final Protective Fires ................................................................. 7-12
7-9. Special Munitions ...................................................................... 7-13
7-10.Forward Observer’s Positions.................................................... 7-13
7-11.Rehearsal and Execution............................................................ 7-14
7-12.Communications ........................................................................ 7-14
7-13.Indirect Fires in Close Support .................................................. 7-15
7-14.Tactical Air Support................................................................... 7-15
CHAPTER 8. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Section
I. Fundamentals........................................................................................ 8-2
8-1. AirLand Battle Imperatives.......................................................... 8-2
8-2. Battalion Support ......................................................................... 8-2
8-3. Responsibilities and Organization ............................................... 8-3
Section
II. Resupply Operations............................................................................. 8-4
8-4. Requirements ............................................................................... 8-4
8-5. Distribution of Supplies from Battalion to Company.................. 8-6
8-6. Company Resupply Techniques .................................................. 8-6
8-7. Considerations.............................................................................. 8-7
8-8. Transportation.............................................................................. 8-8
8-9. Maintenance................................................................................. 8-8
Section
III. Soldier’s Load..................................................................................... 8-10
8-10.Load Planning............................................................................ 8-10
8-11.Load Calculation........................................................................ 8-12
8-12.Load Management Techniques.................................................. 8-12
Section
IV. Personnel Service Support.................................................................. 8-15
8-13.Personnel Services ..................................................................... 8-15
8-14.Replacement Operations ............................................................ 8-17
Section
V. Medical Support.................................................................................. 8-18
8-15.Preventive Medicine .................................................................. 8-18
8-16.Treatment ................................................................................... 8-18
8-17.Evacuation of Casualties............................................................ 8-18
APPENDIX A. Low Intensity Conflict......................................................................... A-1
APPENDIX B. Light/Heavy Operations........................................................................B-1
APPENDIX C. Obstacles...............................................................................................C-1
APPENDIX D. Helicopter Support............................................................................... D-1
APPENDIX E. Company Mortars .................................................................................E-1
APPENDIX F. Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Environment Operations.................F-1
APPENDIX G. Orders Formats and Supplements........................................................ G-1
FM 7-10
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Page
APPENDIX H. Road Marches and Assembly Areas.................................................... H-1
APPENDIX I.
Demolition Guard ..................................................................................I-1
APPENDIX J.
Employment of Antiarmor Weapons.....................................................J-1
APPENDIX K. Directed-Energy Weapons................................................................... K-1
Glossary ...............................................................................................................Glossary-1
References........................................................................................................ References-1
Index .........................................................................................................................Index-1
vii
"Look at your mission, see what you have to do it with, and then work
out the most sensible (which may frequently be the most unusual and most
audacious) way of doing it–and let fly. Use your brain, your imagination,
your initiative."
GENERAL HAMILTON H. HOWZE
PREFACE
This manual provides doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures on how all infantry
rifle companies fight. Infantry rifle companies include light infantry companies, air
assault, airborne, ranger, and H-series infantry (Reserve Component). This manual is
aligned with the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine and is not intended to be a stand-alone
publication. An understanding of FM 7-8 and FM 7-20 is essential. Also, the references
section provides publications that users of this manual must be familiar with.
The primary audiences for this manual are the rifle company commander; his
executive officer, first sergeant, and platoon leaders; instructors in TRADOC schools;
and writers of infantry training literature. The secondary audiences include other infantry
company commanders (HHC and antiarmor), infantry battalion staff officers, service
schools, and ROTC and military academy instructors.
Tough, realistic training is inherently dangerous; therefore, commanders and leaders
must instill an awareness of individual and unit safety and always consider the welfare of
their soldiers. All soldiers must be alert to potential risks and safety violations. The
specifics of how to train the company are explained in ARTEP 7-10 MTP, requiring users
to understand the TTP discussed in this manual.
This manual does not present the tactical solution to all tactical situations. Infantry
leaders are expected to use the doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures discussed in
this manual as part of a detailed estimate of the situation. They can then develop an
effective plan to accomplish the assigned mission.
This publication implements the following international agreement:
STANAG 2017/QSTAG 508
Orders to the Demolition Guard,
(Edition 3)
Commander and Demolition Firing
Party Commander
The proponent of this publication is US Army Infantry School. Send comments and
recommendations on DA form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank
Forms) directly to Commandant, US Army Infantry School, ATTN: ATSH-ATD, Fort
Benning, Georgia 31905-5410.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer
exclusively to men.
1-1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In operations in which light forces predominate, airborne, air assault,
or other light infantry lead the combined arms attack, and all other arms
support the infantry.
FM 100-5, May 1986
The infantry company is organized to fight anywhere in the world and
win. The basic fighting doctrine for the US Army is called AirLand Battle.
AirLand Battle at the company level equates to maneuver warfare. This
requires bold, aggressive leaders who are willing to accept known risks in
pursuit of mission accomplishment. Infantry leaders on the modern
battlefield must be capable of using their initiative and making rapid
decisions to take advantage of unexpected opportunities. Infantry
companies must be aggressive, physically fit, disciplined, and well-trained
organizations. The inherent strategic mobility of infantry units dictates a
need to be prepared for rapid deployment into combat. The potential
locations and possible enemy threats that an infantry company may face
require infantry companies to maintain a high state of readiness.
Section I. PREPARATION FOR WAR
The infantry rifle company is organized and equipped to close with the enemy to kill him,
destroy his equipment, and shatter his will to resist. This close personal fight requires
combat-ready units composed of skilled soldiers and resourceful leaders. These units are
the result of a tough, thorough, and demanding training program conducted by leaders
who understand the effective employment of infantry forces.
1-1.
THE SOLDIER
Our infantrymen must be proficient in marksmanship, close combat, and fieldcraft. They
should be proficient with other weapons in the unit as well as their own. They should also
be familiar with foreign–made weapons they are apt to meet in battle. In the close fight,
our infantrymen must be skilled in the employment of all weapons (rifles, bayonets,
LAWs/AT4s, grenades, mines, and even their bare hands). They must be totally confident
in their ability to fight with these weapons. These infantrymen must be highly skilled in
land navigation, camouflage, and tracking and stalking techniques. Each soldier must be
capable of moving undetected in close proximity to enemy soldiers for reconnaissance,
for infiltration, and for achieving surprise in all operations. Our infantrymen must have
the skill and the will–not to just participate in the close fight, but to dominate it.
1-2.
THE LEADER
Our infantry leaders must be the most capable soldiers in the unit. Their leadership will
determine the unit's success or failure in battle. They must be tactically and technically
proficient. They must be proficient at land navigation and have a thorough appreciation
for terrain. For a foot soldier, the terrain is both protector and ally. When properly
FM 7-10
1-2
exploited it will increase the combat potential of the unit and support the achievement of
surprise. The infantry leader must be a resourceful, tenacious, and decisive warrior. The
leaders in the rifle company are the combined arms integrators that are closest to the
fight; they must be highly skilled in the employment of all the weapons and assets in the
combined arms team. The infantry leader must be innovative and flexible in the
employment of his unit. He must have the mental agility to quickly grasp the situation
and the initiative to take independent action based on the situation and the commander's
intent. Above all else, he must possess the leadership skills and attributes essential to his
unit's survival and success in close combat.
1-3.
THE UNIT
The strength of our infantry units comes from the skill, courage, and discipline of the
individual soldiers. The individual capabilities of these men are enhanced by the
teamwork and cohesion in the squads and platoons. This cohesion is essential to the
survival and success of our infantry units in close combat. It provides the infantryman's
will and determination to persevere, to accept the hardships, and to refuse to accept
defeat. In the close fight when the decision hangs in the balance, these are the factors that
will decide the victor. It is at the squad– and platoon–level that cohesion and teamwork
provide the greatest benefits to the combat effectiveness of the unit. This horizontal
bonding within squads is crucial, but there must also be a vertical bonding within the
infantry force. Vertical bonding occurs when the soldiers have complete trust and
confidence in their leaders. Leaders earn their soldiers trust and confidence by sharing the
hardships and by displaying the leadership attributes described in FM 22-100. Leaders
must have the same confidence in their soldiers.
1-4.
THE TRAINING PROGRAM
The unit training program must instill these individual and collective attributes. This
training must focus on developing tough combat-ready units. It must consist of difficult,
challenging training events that prepare the soldiers, leaders, and units for the close fight.
It must be conducted IAW SOPs, FM 25-100, and ARTEP 7-10-MTP. It should
emphasize physical fitness and marksmanship skills. The soldiers must be challenged to
achieve expert proficiency in all of the combat critical skills. Night training, especially
night live–fire exercises, should be routine. The environment of the close fight should be
simulated whenever possible. Training events that require subordinate leaders to use their
initiative and take independent action are essential to prepare for the decentralized
operations that the unit normally conducts. The training must be harsh, realistic,
physically demanding, and mentally stressful to prepare the soldiers for combat. This will
also develop cohesive, tenacious squads and platoons that will overcome all obstacles to
ensure the safety of their unit and the accomplishment of the mission. This training
program must continue even after the unit begins conducting combat operations. To
maintain the combat effectiveness of the unit, the skills, teamwork, and cohesion must be
sustained as replacements arrive in the unit.
FM 7-10
1-3
Section II.
AIRLAND BATTLE
The company commander must understand the concepts and fundamentals of AirLand
Battle to effectively lead his company in battle. First and foremost among these is the
concept of combat power.
1-5.
COMBAT POWER
AirLand Battle doctrine defines combat power as the ability of a unit to fight. To fight
outnumbered and win, AirLand Battle requires commanders to rapidly concentrate their
combat power at decisive points on the battlefield. A commander must understand
How to apply the combat potential of his unit.
How to generate maximum combat power.
How the enemy will attempt to degrade his unit's combat power.
How the terrain and other environmental factors affect the combat potential of
his unit and the enemy.
How to sustain the combat power of his unit.
Combat potential is the ability of a unit to fight before enemy contact. Combat power is
the actual amount of combat potential that is brought to bear on the enemy. Both are
dynamic concepts; they are constantly changing based on the situation. They are also
affected by enemy actions to degrade the unit's ability to generate combat power.
Commanders must seek conditions where their relative mobility, firepower, and
protection exceeds those of the enemy. For example, the infantry company fights in
restrictive terrain where the enemy is reduced to foot movement or, they fight in close
with the enemy to limit his ability to employ his heavier weapons effectively. A primary
means of gaining protection for dismounted infantry is conducting operations at night.
Combat power is not determined just by the number of weapons or systems that a unit
has; the unit's ability to fight is determined by maneuver, firepower, protection, and
leadership. It is measured by the effect on the enemy force resulting from these four
factors during combat. Superior combat power is generated through a commander's
skillful combination of these factors.
a.
Maneuver. Maneuver is defined as movement, supported by fires, to a position of
advantage from which to destroy or threaten destruction of the enemy. An infantry rifle
company is designed to move by foot. The company uses stealth, camouflage, and
dispersion to close with the enemy. It uses the terrain and all available fires (organic and
supporting) to support its movement. These fires may not always be needed, but the
company always plans them. Maneuver is the primary means of gaining or retaining the
initiative. It may also preserve the company's freedom of action and reduce the unit's
vulnerability to enemy fires. Infantry companies take advantage of their ability to move
across difficult terrain in any weather to surprise the enemy. Infantry commanders
understand their mobility capabilities and avoid fighting heavy forces on terrain that
allows the heavy force a distinct mobility advantage. The commander's concept orients
on reaching the decisive point using the indirect approach. This requires avoiding the
enemy's strength, moving through gaps or weaknesses or around his flanks, and striking
him at critical locations to rapidly destroy his will and ability to fight. The CO must also
have a thorough understanding of time-space relationships and the impact that their
soldiers' loads have on mobility, and plan accordingly.
FM 7-10
1-4
b. Firepower. Infantry rifle companies, properly employed, have significant organic
firepower. They also have supporting fires (direct and indirect) available. The elements of
maneuver and firepower are complementary. Maneuver allows weapon systems to reach
a position of advantage where their fires will be most effective. It is the effect of our fires
on the enemy that matters. A few weapons firing accurately from a location that surprises
and shocks the enemy has a greater effect than many weapons with a large volume of less
accurate fire. Firepower supports maneuver by suppressing the enemy's weapon systems.
Infantry companies destroy enemy forces and their will to fight with accurate fires
directed at critical targets. Leaders must understand the techniques of controlling and
integrating all available fires. They must understand the capabilities of their weapons and
supporting weapons. They must be experts at positioning and employing these systems.
c.
Protection. Protection is the conservation of the fighting potential of the force. It
includes all actions that degrade the enemy's ability to maneuver against or place fires on
the friendly unit. These include security measures and the use of limited visibility, cover
and concealment, air defense, camouflage, and dispersion. Protection also includes
maintaining the soldiers' health and morale. Maneuver provides protection for the
company by preventing the enemy from fixing the unit and concentrating firepower
against it. Firepower can also provide protection, such as suppressive fires during an
assault. Infantry companies gain protection by avoiding detection during movement and
digging fighting positions when stationary.
d. Leadership. This is the most essential element of combat power. The commander
and subordinate leaders in the company determine how to employ their units. The combat
power generated by their units is dependent upon the concepts and plans they develop.
Leaders in an infantry company are expected to lead by personal example and to provide
direction for their soldiers. They must be at the point of decision to maintain control,
understand the situation, and issue orders if required. They must be capable of motivating
their men to accomplish dangerous tasks under difficult circumstances. They must be
proficient soldiers themselves, able to act decisively and confidently under any
conditions.
1-6.
TENETS OF AIRLAND BATTLE
The tenets of AirLand Battle are the essential principles for success in battle. They apply
at company level and in every operation.
a.
Initiative. Initiative means setting or changing the terms of battle by action.
Infantry companies maintain their freedom of action while attempting to limit the
enemy's freedom of action. Commanders preserve the initiative by preventing the enemy
from reducing their unit's freedom of action. When the enemy force has the initiative, the
company commander must reduce this advantage by protecting his company and forcing
the enemy to react to his actions. This requires an offensive spirit in all operations.
Decentralized operations, in which the squads and platoons aggressively fight through
enemy
resistance
with
the
immediately
available
resources,
support
the
seizure/maintenance of the initiative. On an individual basis, initiative requires the
willingness and ability of subordinates to act independently within the framework of their
commanders' concept. This willingness is generated from an environment of mutual trust
and confidence between commanders and their soldiers. To provide his soldiers the
ability to use their initiative, the leader must ensure his men understand the intent of the
FM 7-10
1-5
commanders two echelons above their level. The commanders do this by using mission–
type orders and clear and concise directions, and by ensuring that each of their
subordinates understands the concept and how he fits within it.
b. Agility. For an infantry unit to seize or retain the initiative, it must be capable of
acting/reacting faster than the enemy it is fighting. This begins with the agility of the
commander, which includes his ability to rapidly analyze a tactical situation. He
determines the most effective use of all available resources to accomplish the mission.
This requires the mental agility to rapidly think through many possible COAs and the
likely enemy reactions to them, and to determine the most effective and least costly COA.
The company must also be an agile unit capable of rapidly executing assigned missions.
This often depends on the unit's SOPs, which reduce the need for long detailed orders and
allow subordinates to accomplish routine, recurring tasks without instructions.
c.
Depth. Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, and resources.
Planning operations in depth results in maintaining the momentum in an attack and
flexibility in the defense. Commanders seek to fight the enemy throughout the depth of
his formations by properly positioning his forces or by skillfully maneuvering his unit.
This allows the unit to seek out and concentrate against enemy weaknesses. By swiftly
concentrating against first one then another enemy weakness, a skilled commander can
begin to seize the initiative on a local level. This success may then allow commanders at
a higher echelon to exploit this opportunity. Fighting in depth also requires a commander
to anticipate likely events or requirements and plan for them.
d. Synchronization. Synchronization is the arrangement of battlefield activities in
time, space, and purpose to produce maximum combat power at the decisive point. A
commander synchronizes his subordinates' actions on the battlefield by assigning clear
missions, by having them understand the timings required in the operation, and by
focusing all actions toward achieving overwhelming combat power at a decisive point.
Synchronization begins in the mind of the commander as he conducts his estimate. The
CO concentrates on the synchronization of his company's fires and movement. He also
ensures that his concept maintains the synchronization required by his battalion
commander's concept. Issuing mission orders, identifying the main effort, and assigning
each platoon clear task(s) and purpose(s), are the best means of maintaining
synchronization in a fast paced, fluid environment. These tools allow subordinate leaders
to focus on the critical actions of the main effort at the decisive point. Synchronization is
also achieved through a detailed time schedule and control measures; however, this
synchronization is more likely to be disrupted by enemy actions and changes in the
situation.
1-7.
AIRLAND BATTLE IMPERATIVES
AirLand Battle doctrine is based upon the Principles of War found in Appendix A of FM
100-5. Leaders at every level should know and understand these principles. They have
proven sound over the 60 years that they have been a part of our doctrine. The AirLand
Battle imperatives were derived from the principles of war. These imperatives prescribe
key operating requirements and provide more specific guidance than the principles of
war. The 10 imperatives apply in all operations.
a.
Ensure Unity of Effort. Leaders in the rifle company provide purpose, direction,
and motivation to their soldiers. The company's mission and how he supports it must be
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clearly understood by every soldier in the unit. Plans are kept simple, and control
measures are easy to understand, apply, and communicate. Each subordinate's concept or
plan fits within the next higher leader's plan. A main effort is always clearly designated.
All actions throughout the unit must ensure the success of the main effort.
b. Anticipate Events on the Battlefield. To maintain or gain the initiative, a rifle
company commander must anticipate the enemy's action. Failure to do so results in the
commander reacting to the enemy's actions throughout the fight. The ability to effectively
anticipate enemy actions depends on the commander's knowledge of the enemy's
doctrine, tactics, and weapons, and the commander's experience gained from fighting that
enemy.
c.
Concentrate Combat Power Against Enemy Weaknesses. The rifle company
commander must have enough knowledge of the enemy to determine his vulnerabilities
and weaknesses. The concentration of fires/effective maneuver can also create enemy
weaknesses. Once weaknesses are identified or created, the rifle company commander
must have a plan to quickly exploit them. At company level, enemy weaknesses may be
of short duration and easily corrected by the enemy commander.
d. Designate, Sustain, and Shift the Main Effort. The subordinate unit with the
most important task in the commander's concept is designated the main effort for the
company. The commander concentrates all of his resources to ensure the quick success of
this unit. During the fight, the actions of the main effort provide focus, orientation, and
synchronization to all other subordinate units. If the main effort does not succeed or a
more lucrative enemy weakness develops, the commander must quickly shift the
orientation of the main effort or shift the main effort to another subordinate unit.
e.
Press the Fight. The commander's plan should be aggressive and offensively
oriented. Once the fight begins, the rifle company commander must be persistent in the
pursuit of accomplishing his mission. When the enemy is off balance, the company must
maintain or increase the pressure to prevent the enemy from recovering. The commander
is in a position to personally lead and motivate his men in the decisive action. A well–
trained, physically tough rifle company led by capable leaders can increase the tempo
when the fight hangs in the balance.
f.
Move Fast, Strike Hard, and Finish Rapidly. Infantry companies must be
capable of fast, dispersed movements followed by a rapid concentration of combat power
at a decisive location. The violent attack on the enemy should be directed at enemy
weaknesses and from an unexpected direction. Once completed, the unit disperses again
to avoid the enemy's counterattack.
g. Use Terrain, Weather, Deception, and OPSEC. Terrain and weather
significantly impact on a rifle company's operations. The commander should be expert at
land navigation. He must understand the potential of the terrain to support maneuver,
provide protection, and support the employment of all organic weapon systems. The
commander who uses the terrain and weather better than his enemy gains a combat
multiplier. The commander's personal reconnaissance helps him understand the effects
the environment can have on both forces. Deception operations are planned above
company level, but the rifle company commander often uses simple deception tasks or
actions to confuse or mislead the enemy. Operations security is continuous for an infantry
rifle company. The commander denies the enemy useful information on his unit.
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h. Conserve Strength for Decisive Action. The company commander protects his
unit's combat potential. He ensures that in each fight he brings the maximum combat
power to bear on the enemy. He identifies risks and reduces them without unnecessarily
taking resources away from his main effort. He reduces his soldiers' loads and ensures his
company is organized and trained to conduct continuous operations.
i.
Combine Arms and Sister Services to Complement and Reinforce. A rifle
company commander must be a proficient combined arms' warrior. He is the combined
arms integrator who is closest to the fight. Therefore, he must be expert in employing not
only his organic assets but also the resources and weapons that may support a rifle
company. These may include TOWs, tanks, field artillery, engineers, and ADA systems.
At times, he may also control attack helicopters and close air support.
j.
Understand the Effects of Battle on Soldiers, Units, and Leaders. The infantry
company commander must ensure that his unit is trained to withstand the rigors of the
modern battlefield. He should know his men before entering the fight. Once in battle, he
monitors the condition of his men and sustains the unit's effectiveness. Well–trained,
physically fit soldiers in cohesive units retain the qualities of tenacity and aggressiveness.
Section III. BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEMS
The seven battlefield operating systems allow the commander to analyze the various
functions of his unit in battle. His plan integrates each of these systems to effectively
accomplish his mission.
1-8.
INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM
The rifle company commander depends on intelligence from higher headquarters to
conduct operations. However, the company commander can collect critical information
required to complete his plan. This requires an aggressive, continuous reconnaissance
effort conducted by small units moving undetected close to enemy forces. His company
also assists in the battalion's intelligence collection effort. He does this by assigning his
platoons specific reconnaissance or security tasks. Organic equipment, such as PEWS
and NVDs, enhance the companies ability to collect information on the enemy.
Additional assets, such as the battalion's scout platoon or GSRs, may support the
company.
1-9.
MANEUVER SYSTEM
The primary maneuver asset of a rifle company commander is the rifle platoon. The three
organic platoons provide him the ability to maneuver independently. The maneuver or
positioning of these units allows him to bring firepower to bear on the enemy. The
commander must know the capabilities of his platoons; he also maneuvers the antiarmor
and mortar sections to bring the effects of their fires on the enemy. The commander must
develop an appreciation for the movement rates of his subordinate units across all types
of terrain. At times, the rifle company will receive additional maneuver assets such as
tanks or other infantry platoons. The direct-fire capabilities of these maneuver assets are
considered part of the maneuver system.
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1-10.
FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEM
The primary fire support system for the rifle company is the 60-mm mortar section or the
81-mm mortar platoon. These assets provide the commander an organic, indirect–fire
support resource immediately responsive to the company's request for fires. The
commander must know the capabilities and limitations of these assets and integrate their
fires in every operation. Normally, the company will also have field artillery support
available. The company has a FIST habitually attached to his company. The company
FSO, in charge of the FIST, assists the commander with the indirect-fire support planning
and execution. The FOs with each platoon also plan and coordinate fire support, locate
targets, and request and adjust fires to support the platoon leader's concept.
1-11.
MOBILITY, COUNTERMOBILITY, AND SURVIVABILITY SYSTEM
Even without augmentation, the infantry company has significant engineering
capabilities. Digging fighting positions, constructing obstacles, preparing minefields, and
breaching or reducing enemy obstacles are all unit measures the rifle company may be
responsible for. At times, the infantry company is supported by engineer units and
equipment. Although the commander may rely on the engineer leaders recommendations,
he must understand the capabilities of the engineer units and equipment. He prioritizes
the work and ensures the engineering effort supports the friendly schemes of maneuver
and fire plans. Survivability includes those activities and procedures that protect the
company from the effects of NBC weapons.
1-12.
AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
The rifle company commander's primary means of air defense are passive measures that
prevent the enemy from detecting and engaging his company. Moving during limited
visibility and using all available cover and concealment and effective camouflage are the
primary passive measures infantry companies employ. The company can also defend
itself from air attack using organic direct–fire systems. The company must be well trained
in the techniques for employing small–arms fire against enemy aircraft. The soldiers must
also know under what conditions they have the freedom to engage enemy aircraft. The
company may have ADA systems (Stingers and Vulcans) in support. The commander
must ensure these systems are fully integrated into his plan.
1-13.
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT SYSTEM
Infantry rifle companies have an austere supporting CSS structure—some organizations
are more austere than others. The sustainment of his company in combat is one of the
greatest challenges facing every rifle company commander. He must be innovative in his
techniques of resupply and casualty treatment and evacuation. The company executive
officer, first sergeant, and supply sergeant are key players in the company's CSS system.
The maintenance program within the company must be effective and continuous, and
must have leader involvement at every echelon. (A detailed discussion of CSS for the
infantry company is found in Chapter 8).
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1-14.
COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
The command and control system consists of the activities and procedures employed by
the commander to plan, direct, coordinate, and control the company. It includes the
personnel and equipment that assist the commander with command and control. The
commander employs his unit in accordance with guidance and orders received from
battalion. He delegates authority to his subordinates and clearly assigns their
responsibilities. The company XO is the 2IC and is employed in that role to assist the
company commander. The company commander does not restrict his subordinates
freedom of action with unnecessary control measures. He uses mission–type orders and
trains his subordinates to operate within the framework of his concept. He clearly states
his intent so every member of his unit can effectively use their initiative. A commander
must be proficient at analyzing a situation to develop a plan that has the greatest chance
of accomplishing his mission with the least cost in lives and equipment.
Section IV.
ORGANIZATION
The infantry rifle company organization varies, depending on the parent battalion.
Airborne and air assault companies differ only slightly from the light infantry company.
The ranger and H–series infantry companies are different from each of the others. Despite
the differences in organization, the mission and employment considerations for each are
nearly the same. The tactics for fighting each of these companies are also essentially the
same.
1-15.
MISSION
The mission of the infantry rifle company is to close with the enemy by means of fire and
maneuver to destroy or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and
counterattack.
1-16.
EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
The fundamental considerations for employing infantry companies result from the
organization, equipment, and capabilities of these units. Other capabilities result from a
unit's training program, leadership, morale, personnel strengths, and many other factors.
These other capabilities constantly change, depending on the current status and situation.
The infantry leader must be aware of them and plan accordingly. The capabilities and
special considerations for all infantry companies are as follows:
a.
Capabilities.
(1) Conduct offensive and defensive operations in all types of environments,
primarily at night. Specific tasks include the following:
Seize, secure, occupy, and retain terrain.
Destroy, neutralize, suppress, interdict, disrupt, block, canalize, and fix enemy
forces.
Breach enemy obstacles.
Feint and demonstrate to deceive the enemy.
Screen and guard friendly units.
Reconnoiter, deny, bypass, clear, contain, and isolate. (These tasks may be
oriented on both terrain and enemy.)
(2) Conduct small–unit operations.
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(3) Participate in air assault operations.
(4) Participate in airborne operations (airborne and ranger companies).
(5) Operate in conjunction with heavy or special operating forces.
(6) Participate in amphibious operations.
b. Special Considerations.
(1) Austere CS and CSS assets.
(2) Limited vehicle mobility.
(3) Vulnerable to enemy armor, artillery, and air assets.
(4) Vulnerable to enemy NBC attacks and limited decontamination capability.
1-17.
COMPANY ORGANIZATIONS
A rifle company can be part of a light infantry, air assault, airborne, ranger, or infantry
battalion. Each rifle company is organized differently, but all are similar in size, number
of platoons, and capabilities.
a.
A light infantry rifle company consists of a headquarters section, three rifle
platoons, a 60-mm mortar section, and an antiarmor section (Figure 1-1).
b. An airborne rifle company consists of a headquarters section, three rifle platoons,
and a 60-mm mortar section (Figure 1-2).
c.
An air assault rifle company consists of a headquarters section, three rifle
platoons, and a weapons platoon (Figure 1-3).
d. A ranger company consists of a headquarters section, three rifle platoons, and a
weapons platoon, which consists of a 60-mm mortar section and an antiarmor section
(Figure 1-4).
e.
An infantry rifle company consists of a headquarters section, three rifle platoons,
and an 81-mm mortar platoon (Figure 1-5).
Figure 1-1. Light infantry rifle company.
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Figure 1-2. Airborne rifle company.
Figure 1-3. Air assault rifle company.
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Figure 1-4. Ranger company.
Figure 1-5. Infantry rifle company.
2-1
CHAPTER 2
COMMAND AND CONTROL
The more fluid the battlefield, the more important and difficult it will
be to identify decisive points and to focus combat power there….
Communications will be interrupted by enemy action at critical times….
Subordinate leaders will be expected to act on their own initiative within
the framework of the commander's intent.
FM 100-5, 1986
Command and control is the process of directing, coordinating, and
controlling the unit to accomplish the mission. The purpose of command
and control is to implement the commander's will in pursuit of the unit's
objective. Command and control is both a system and a process. At
company level, the system consists of the personnel, equipment,
procedures, and concepts that carry out the C2 process. The essential
component for both the process and the system is leadership. Effective
mission–oriented C2 is critical to success in battle. A detailed discussion
of the key concepts and principles for M–OC2 is in Section I. The
following historical vignette clearly depicts the critical importance of
many of these fundamentals.
During operation "Just Cause" in Panama in December 1989, Company A, 4th
Battalion, 17th Infantry was assigned the mission of seizing the PDF barracks at Fort
Espinar to prevent the PDF infantry company from deploying into their combat positions.
The objective consisted of two multistory concrete buildings. These buildings were
surrounded by a chain link fence built on top of a 2-foot high brick wall. Approximately
95 PDF soldiers armed with small arms, machine guns, and RPG-18 antitank rocket
launchers actually occupied the buildings, although the company commander had been
told to expect from 150 to 160 enemy.
The commander's concept was to isolate and suppress the objective with a support
element consisting of one rifle platoon, a smaller fire support position consisting of an
M60 machine gun team secured by three riflemen, and a third position occupied by the
company's antitank section and a towed Vulcan 20-mm ADA gun. The three separate
support positions were necessary in order to obtain the right firing angles against the
objective's two main buildings, and to isolate the objective area.
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Diagram of the objective area.
The company XO was designated the support element leader while the CO went with
the assault element (company main effort). The support element's mission was to
suppress the enemy within the barracks complex to allow the breach element to breach
the obstacle. The commander's intent (the purpose) for this element was to support the
breach element's successful breach of the fence. The support element was also tasked to
isolate the objective area and provide suppressive fires to allow the assault element to
clear the objective. The XO's instructions were to initiate fires against the PDF barracks
at H–hour minus two minutes. (Radio listening silence had been imposed.) He was to fire
for two and one–half minutes and then cease fire while a recorded surrender request was
broadcast. The breach element needed this suppressive fire to support its move from the
assault position up to the designated breach positions and to prepare their demolitions.
The element of surprise was lost about 26 minutes before H–hour when shooting
started at Coco Solo, about two miles away. About 10 minutes later, firing started at
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another building on Fort Espinar as a platoon from an adjacent battalion was moving into
its position.
The XO was under pressure from soldiers in the fire support element to initiate their
fire early since the PDF were obviously alerted. He resisted this pressure and repeatedly
cautioned the soldiers around him to hold their fire. At the exact preplanned time, he
initiated the support element's fires.
The XO understood that the battalion commander's intent for the company (the
purpose) was to prevent the deployment of the PDF company into their combat positions.
Since he could observe the gate, he could initiate fires if the PDF began to deploy. He
also knew that his purpose (his commander's intent) of the fire was not to inflict the
maximum casualties on the PDF, it was to cover the movement of the breach element as
it moved forward to prepare the bangalore in the enemy's obstacles. If he had initiated fire
early, he would not have helped the breach/assault element still moving in the jungle. As
it was, his timing was perfect. The assault element had just reached the edge of the jungle
when the XO opened fire. They were able to move undetected up the steep slope to the
compound under excellent suppressive fires.
As a result of the XO's proper decision, the mission was accomplished with near
perfection. The company captured 84 enemy soldiers and killed several. Company A
suffered no casualties and was ready to continue combat operations immediately
following this action.
The actions of Company A provide an excellent example of many of the key
fundamentals of mission–oriented command and control. The utility of the commander's
intent is clearly evident as is the need to understand the intent of both higher commanders
(two levels up). By clearly stating the assigned missions (task and purpose) for their
subordinates in his concept, each commander ensured his subordinates were able to
effectively use their initiative during the conduct of decentralized operations. In addition,
the identification of the main effort provided the focus for all other subordinates to base
their actions on. Because these commander's used effective mission orders, they were
able to depend on their subordinates to make the proper decision allowing the
commander of Company A to command well forward and locate himself at the decisive
point with his main effort.
Section I. COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
The company's command and control system must be reliable, responsive, and durable. It
must withstand crises, even the loss of the commander, and still continue to function.
Although it is the most complex system in the company, the result must be clear, concise
instructions that focus the entire unit toward the company's objective. This section
describes the structure and key concepts of the command and control system.
2-1.
DEFINITIONS
Success in battle will require a combination of command and control. The proper mix of
command and control is determined by the situation, but commanders must emphasize
command and reduce control measures that restrict their subordinate's freedom of action.
a.
Command. Command is the process that instills the commander's will among his
subordinates. It provides focus and direction to the company. The commander's
leadership is an integral part of command.
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b. Control. Control, as the counterpart of command, follows up a decision and
minimizes deviation from the commander's concept. Control provides supervision to the
operation while synchronizing all systems and activities.
c.
Synchronization. Commanders must avoid depending on close control of their
units to achieve synchronization. This slows execution and limits their subordinates'
initiative. Synchronization is maintained during execution by the proper decision of
subordinates. A clear understanding of the commander's intent and a simple effective
concept are the keys to maintaining synchronization.
2-2.
COMMANDER'S LEADERSHIP
Leadership is the critical element of both combat power and the command and control
system. Through leadership the commander causes his unit to complete demanding tasks
in difficult situations. Commanders must understand the military leadership philosophy in
FM 22-100. In addition, the following factors are key to the company commander's
ability to lead his company on the AirLand battlefield.
a.
Will. Often the victor in battle is the unit that refuses to lose. Competent leaders
and tough, realistic training are the keys to developing this determination. The CO must
develop a "will to win" in his soldiers and his company.
b. Trust. The CO must earn the trust of his men. They must have confidence in his
abilities. He must also trust his soldiers and develop a command climate that allows
subordinates to make decisions.
c.
Delegation. After ensuring his subordinates are well trained, the CO must
delegate the proper authority and freedoms to his men. The CO focuses his time and
energy on what is critical and delegates the remainder to his subordinates.
d. Discipline. The CO instills discipline in his soldiers. Discipline ensures proper
standards are maintained in the absence of leader supervision. The decentralized
operations, which the company routinely conducts, require self–discipline of every
soldier in the company.
2-3.
MISSION–ORIENTED COMMAND AND CONTROL
Mission–oriented command and control is the Army's doctrinal approach to C2 on the
AirLand battlefield. It is a method of directing military operations that encourages and
expects subordinates to take action consistent with the intent and concept of higher
headquarters. The following principles provide the fundamentals for M-OC2.
a.
Expect Uncertainty. The commander must understand the environment of
combat; the battle will be dynamic and nonlinear. Communications will be degraded, and
the chaos of battle will often prevent the commander from knowing what is happening
beyond his own senses. The situation during planning will always change before
execution.
b. Reduce Leader Intervention. Plan and direct operations to require the absolute
minimum intervention during execution. When soldiers expect the commander to make
the decision or initiate the action, they are reluctant to take action. When precise control
is required for synchronization, such as an on-order task, the commander should also
provide the subordinate the criteria for making the decision. Leaders must realize that
some loss of precision is better than inactivity.
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c.
Increase Subordinate Planning Time. The CO ensures the effective use of all
available planning time. Although the majority of the planning takes place at company
level, the squads and platoons require extra time to conduct their rehearsals and
inspections. SOPs and warning orders are key tools for using time well.
d. Give Subordinates Maximum Freedom of Action. Given the expected
battlefield conditions, leaders at every level avoid unnecessary limits on their soldiers'
freedom of action. The leader at the point of decision must have the knowledge, the
training, and the freedom to make the correct decision that supports the commander's
intent.
e.
Command/Lead Well Forward. The commander locates where he can best fight
his company. This is determined by a number of factors. His leadership is most effective
face-to-face when he can see the situation and his soldiers can see him. Since he can not
be everywhere, the CO focuses on the decisive action that will accomplish his mission.
He normally locates with his main effort (the subordinate unit assigned the decisive
action) to provide his leadership and to be in a position to shift or retask the main effort.
2-4.
COMMANDER'S INTENT
Knowing the commander's intent enables subordinates to use their initiative during the
execution of an operation. Clear and concise terms are used to state the intent to ensure
understanding throughout the force. It must be clearly understood by all means of
communication; written, face–to–face, or spoken via radio or land line. The relationship
between the battalion commander's intent for the company, the company's role in his
concept, the designation of the main effort, and the development of the CO's concept and
assignment of his subordinate's intent is the focus of mission orders.
a.
Intent. Intent is defined as the result the commander expects the unit to
accomplish in a specific operation. At the lowest tactical levels (company and below),
intent is normally the purpose from the mission statement. As such, it is assigned by the
battalion commander when he determined the company's mission statement. This mission
statement consists of the mission essential task to be accomplished and the purpose
(result) it achieves.
b. Commander's Concept. When the battalion commander develops his concept, he
determines the mission for the company. He first determines the purpose the company
must achieve and then assigns the task(s) he feels will achieve that purpose. During the
fight, if the assigned task will not achieve the purpose, the CO is expected to retask the
company to achieve it. Soldiers should make every effort to inform their commander of
their actions, but they must not wait for an order to act. Another example of how the
assigned purpose/intent guides actions could be: During execution, the CO sees the
opportunity to achieve his assigned purpose faster or less costly by acting now. When
making this decision, he must consider what his company's role is within his
commander's concept. He must make every effort to operate within the framework of the
battalion commander's concept because it provides the synchronization and concentration
of combat power for the operation. If he determines that his actions will not jeopardize
the unit or the mission, then in the absence of communications he must act.
c.
Concept Development. To accomplish the assigned mission, the CO assigns
missions to his platoons and sections. Just as the battalion commander assigned company
missions and designate d his main effort, the CO does the same for the company. He also
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ensures that his concept fits within the battalion commander's concept. This results in a
unity of effort but supports decentralized execution. At each level, the commander is
given his mission by his superior, develops a concept to accomplish the mission,
organizes his unit to fight the concept, and assigns each subordinate his responsibilities.
The vehicle for providing this information is the OPORD.
d. Main Effort. The platoon with the most important task in the CO's concept is
designated the main effort. This unit is the focus; all other units support the quick success
of the main effort. Success by the main effort should result in the accomplishment of the
commander's mission. When considering independent action, each leader makes his
decision based on his relationship to the main effort. The linkage between supporting and
main efforts must be maintained except in extraordinary cases, such as when a leader of a
supporting effort sees the chance to accomplish the purpose of the main effort. This
leader asks the question, "What would my commander do if he knew what I know?"
Since the proper response would be to shift the main effort to this leader's unit, he should
immediately retask himself and accomplish the purpose that was assigned to the main
effort. If the original main effort leader was informed or became aware of this
development, he should determine how to best support the new main effort, retask
himself, issue a FRAGO to his soldiers, and join the fight.
2-5.
MISSION ORDERS
AirLand Battle doctrine requires the use of mission-type orders. Mission orders focus on
what tasks must be accomplished without specifying how they will be done. Whenever
possible, they are oral orders issued face-to-face on the ground where the fight will take
place. Mission orders require well–trained subordinates who understand their
commanders' intent and concepts (two levels higher).
a.
Mission orders address only the required information. Avoid unnecessary detail
and redundancy; do not restate doctrine or SOPs. Develop unit SOPs that reduce the
length of orders; use clear and concise terms and graphics. FM 101-5-1 is the doctrinal
source for terms and graphics, every leader in the unit must understand these.
b. The commander determines exactly what he wants his platoons to accomplish and
clearly communicates these requirements to them. If one of his leaders has not earned his
trust or has not displayed the tactical competence to operate with a mission order, then
the order must be tailored, based on the training, experience, and capability of the leader
receiving the order.
(1) This may include nothing more than providing additional instructions,
establishing more restrictive control measures, or directing a specific use for one of his
organic assets, such as positioning one of the grenadiers to block enemy movement up a
ravine to prevent the enemy from flanking the platoon's battle position.
(2) Or in an unusual situation, the CO may detail exactly how the platoon leader will
employ his entire platoon, clearly state the limits for using his initiative, and collocate
himself or the XO with this platoon. This should be only a short-term solution; leaders
must be trained to meet their responsibilities.
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2-6.
DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF KEY PERSONNEL
The company must accomplish many different tactical, administrative, and logistical
tasks. To accomplish these, the duties and responsibilities of key personnel must be
defined, coordinated, and understood.
a.
Company Commander.
(1) The commander is responsible for everything the company does or fails to do.
This includes the tactical employment, training, administration, personnel management,
and sustainment of his company. He must know the capabilities of his men and
supporting weapons and how to tactically employ them. He must also know the
capabilities of the enemy.
(2) The CO exercises command through his subordinate leaders.
(3) The CO employs his company to support the accomplishment of the battalion and
brigade missions. He requests additional support from battalion when required.
b. Executive Officer.
(1) The XO is second in command. His primary role is to help the commander fight
the company. He ensures the tactical reports from the platoons are forwarded to the
battalion tactical operations center. The XO may locate where he can maintain
communications with the company commander and the battalion TOC. He may require
additional soldiers to provide security and provide a CONOPS capability (see Section
IV). The XO assumes command of the company as required.
(2) Before the battle, the XO (with the 1SG) plans and supervises the company CSS.
They make sure precombat inspections are complete. He plans and coordinates logistical
support with agencies outside the company while the 1SG does the same internally. He
prepares or assists in the preparation of paragraph 4 of the OPORD. He may also assist
the CO in planning the mission.
(3) The XO coordinates with higher, adjacent, and supporting units. He may aid in
control of a phase of the battle, such as passage of lines, bridging a gap, breaching an
obstacle, or assumption of control of a platoon attached on the move.
(4) The XO may be assigned tactical missions, such as the following:
(a) Landing zone/pickup zone control officer. This may include straggler control or
casualty evacuations and resupply operations as well as air/ground liaison.
(b) Quartering party/detachment OIC. The XO may be the OIC of an element
consisting of representatives of various company elements. Their purpose is to precede
the company and reconnoiter, secure, and mark an assembly area or battle position. Or
they remain behind the company to move or secure excess equipment and personnel
while the company moves to a new location or conducts combat operations.
(c) Element leader. The XO may be assigned a mission and a task–organized element
with which to accomplish it. He may, for instance, control all the company machine guns,
the 60-mm mortars, and one rifle platoon as the support element leader in a company raid
or attack. Common missions of this nature include
•
Lead the reserve.
•
Lead the DLIC during a withdrawal.
•
Control attachments to the company.
c.
First Sergeant.
(1) He is the senior NCO and normally the most experienced soldier in the company.
He is the commander's primary tactical advisor and expert on individual and NCO skills.
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He assists the commander in planning, coordinating, and supervising all activities that
support the unit mission. He operates where the commander directs or where his duties
require him.
(2) His specific duties include the following:
(a) Execute and supervise routine operations. This includes enforcing the tactical
SOP; planning and coordinating training; coordinating and reporting personnel and
administrative actions; and supervising supply, maintenance, communications, field
hygiene, and medical evacuation operations.
(b) Supervise, inspect, or observe matters designated by the commander. (For
example-observe and report on a portion of the company's sector or zone, inspect the
mortar section, or inspect all range cards.)
(c) Assist and coordinate with the XO. Be prepared to assume his duties.
(d) Lead task–organized elements or subunits on designated missions.
d. Fire Support Officer.
(1) The FSO helps plan, coordinate, and execute the company's fire support. During
planning, he develops a fire support plan based on the CO's concept and guidance. He
coordinates the fire support plan with the battalion FSO.
(2) During the planning, the FSO also
•
Advises the CO of the capabilities and current status of all available fire
support assets.
•
Assists the CO in developing the OPORD to ensure full integration of fires
into the commander's concept.
•
Designates targets and fire control measures and determines method of
engagement and responsibility for firing the targets.
•
Determines the specific tasks and instructions required to conduct and control
the fire plan.
•
Briefs the fire support plan as part of the company OPORD and coordinates
with platoon FOs to ensure they understand their responsibilities.
•
Integrates platoon targets into the company target overlay and target
worksheet. Passes these products to the battalion FSE.
(3) During the battle, the FSO normally locates with the CO. This allows greater
flexibility in conducting or adjusting the fire support plan. At times, the FSO may locate
away from the CO to more effectively control supporting fires. The FSO informs the CO
of key information received on his radio net.
(4) The FSO must understand infantry tactics. This not only provides better fires
integration, but if the CO becomes a casualty, the FSO may need to assume control of the
operation until the XO is able to.
(5) The FSO may coordinate CAS or NGF, or employ and control the company
mortar section.
(6) The FSO ensures the indirect fire plan is part of each company rehearsal.
e.
Communications Sergeant.
(1) He supervises operation, maintenance, and installation of organic wire and FM
communications. This includes sending and receiving routine traffic and making required
communication checks.
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(2) He supervises the company CP to include relaying information, monitoring the
tactical situation, establishing the CP security plan and radio watch schedule, and
informing the commander and subordinate units of significant events.
(3) He performs limited troubleshooting of organic communication equipment and
provides the link between the company and the battalion for maintenance of
communications equipment.
(4) He is responsible for supervising all aspects of COMSEC equipment, to include
requesting, receipting, training, maintaining, securing, and employing this equipment and
materials.
(5) He advises the CO in planning and employing the communication systems. Based
on the CO's guidance, he prepares or assists in preparation of paragraph 5 of the OPORD.
f.
Radiotelephone Operators.
(1) The RATELO is responsible for operating and performing maintenance on his
assigned radio to include preparation for special operations (waterborne, cold weather,
airborne, or air assault).
(2) He encodes and decodes messages and makes field expedient antennas.
(3) The RATELO must understand the company mission. In the event the commander
becomes a casualty, the RATELO may be the only man on the radio for a time. At these
times, he may request and adjust artillery, and request medical evacuation or resupply.
(4) The RATELOs may assist in the preparation of the OPORD by copying the
overlays and building sand tables.
g. Supply Sergeant.
(1) The supply sergeant requests, receives, issues, stores, maintains, and turns in
supplies and equipment for the company. He coordinates requirements with the 1SG and
the battalion S4.
(2) When positioned in the battalion field trains, the supply sergeant is supervised by
the HHC commander or the support platoon leader. He uses the battalion
administrative/logistical radio network to communicate with the company.
(3) He may also control the vehicle and driver when one is provided to the company.
(4) He monitors the tactical situation and anticipates logistical requirements. Chapter
8 has a more detailed discussion of the CSS requirements.
h. NBC Noncommissioned Officer.
(1) He assists and advises the company commander in planning NBC operations. He
conducts and supervises the NBC training within the company (NBC decontamination
and equipment maintenance and operation).
(2) He operates forward with the company CP and assists the communications
sergeant with CP operations and security.
(3) His specific duties include the following:
•
Provide the commander with unit operational exposure guidance.
•
Process and disseminate information on enemy and friendly NBC attacks.
•
Monitor and supervise decontamination operations.
•
Make recommendations to commander on decon and smoke support.
•
Requisition NBC specific items of equipment and supply.
i.
Armorer.
FM 7-10
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(1) He performs organizational maintenance on the company's small arms. He
evacuates weapons to the DS maintenance unit. Normally, he assists the supply sergeant
in the BSA.
(2) He may operate forward with the company CP to support continuous CP
operations.
j.
Antiarmor Section Leader.
(1) He is responsible for employing the antiarmor section.
(2) He must be prepared to execute the following tasks with his section.
(a) Provide antiarmor support to the company during defensive and offensive
operations, to include assisting the CO in planning the section's employment,
reconnoitering tentative firing positions, and controlling antiarmor fires.
(b) Plan and lead reconnaissance, security, and combat patrol operations.
k. Mortar Section Leader/Platoon Leader.
(1) He is responsible for employing the mortar section.
(2) He ensures effective mortar support for the company. He also assists the CO in
planning the employment of the mortar section, coordinates with the company FSO/FIST,
and controls the section during tactical operations.
2-7.
SUCCESSION OF COMMAND
The chain of command provides for the succession of command should leaders become
casualties. The normal succession of command in the rifle company is commander, XO,
platoon leaders by seniority, other combat arms officers, 1SG, and NCOs by seniority.
a.
To reestablish the chain of command, the new commander establishes
communications with the battalion and all elements of the company. He informs them of
the situation, receives status reports from the company and any new orders from
battalion, and continues operations. He issues FRAGOs as required.
b. The company tactical SOP should cover reestablishment of the chain of
command. The allocation of radios and radio nets, and the location at which command is
reestablished should be planned for during both static and mobile situations.
2-8.
ORDERS GROUP
A standardized orders group assists the rapid planning and dissemination of orders. It also
ensures all key personnel attend the OPORD. The orders group normally includes the
XO, 1SG, commo chief, NBC NCO, company FSO, platoon leaders, antiarmor section
leader, mortar section leader, and leaders of supporting units. The warning order includes
when and where the orders group should assemble.
a.
Based on guidance from the commander, members of the orders group prepare
portions of the OPORD and briefing aids (sand tables, sketches, overlays, matrixes, and
so forth). These activities are supervised by the XO or 1SG, freeing the commander to
perform other duties (reconnaissance, a detailed estimate, rest, and so forth).
b. The unit tactical SOP should address the composition and duties of the orders
group. For example, the 1SG can prepare paragraph 4 and the communications sergeant
can prepare paragraph 5b.
FM 7-10
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2-9.
COMPANY COMMAND POST
The company CP does not have a set organization. It consists of the CO and other
personnel and equipment required to support the C2 process for a specific mission. It
locates where the CO determines it can best support his C2 process. Its purpose is to
provide communications with higher, lower, adjacent, and supporting units; to assist the
CO in planning, coordinating, and issuing the company OPORDs; and to support
continuous operations by the company. Often the CP must also provide its own security.
a.
Normally, the CP consists of the CO and his RATELOs, the FIST HQs, the
communications sergeant, and the NBC NCO. The XO, 1SG, armorer, reserve element
leader, and the leaders of attached or supporting units may also locate with the CP.
b. When positioning the CP, the CO considers his communication requirements, the
security needs for the CP, and above all, the location where he can best fight his company
from.
(1) In static positions (assembly areas, battle positions, and so forth), a stationary CP
location may be designated by the CO. This allows wire communications to be
established with battalion and the units of the company, field expedient antennas to be set
up, and fighting positions to be dug. It also provides a designated spot to which
messengers can report. The CP should be off natural lines of drift and key terrain
features. It must be well camouflaged from ground and air observation. Local security is
provided, either by its relation to the rifle platoons, by collocating with the company
reserve element, or by its own personnel. When the CO leaves the CP, the XO or the 1SG
normally assume control.
(2) When moving, the CO designates where the CP will move (Chapter 3). At times,
he may locate away from the CP. For example, to control the company's movement
better, he may move with the lead platoon; or in the attack, he may locate with the main
effort. In these situations, he may designate a part of the CP (his RATELOs or the FSO)
to move with him.
c.
The CP personnel also assist the commander by preparing parts of the company
OPORD. They also
•
Provide recommendations or input during the planning.
•
Receive and send required reports and SITREPS.
•
Lay land lines to subordinate units.
d. The CP must be capable of conducting continuous operations. Section IV of this
chapter provides additional guidance for conducting sustained and continuous operations.
Because of the impact that stress and fatigue will have on the C2 process, commanders
should consider the following:
•
Organize and man the CP to allow continuous operations.
•
Cross train personnel.
•
Discuss critical decisions with the XO or 1SG.
•
Set up a CP sleep plan and ensure compliance of it.
•
Ensure key decision makers get sleep (do not wait until fatigue requires this–
do it from the start).
FM 7-10
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Section II.
COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCESS
The leader uses the command and control process to figure out what is going on, decide
what to do about it, tell soldiers what to do, then keep track of how well his soldiers are
doing. The troop–leading procedures are the leader's tools to guide the command and
control process. These procedures provide a common framework for all echelons of
command to apply the C2 process. Two other tools that are part of the C2 process are the
estimate of the situation and METT–T analysis. The relationship of these three tools is
depicted in Figure 2-1.
2-10.
TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES
The troop-leading procedures are the dynamic process by which a commander receives a
mission, plans it, and executes it. It should be an instinctive and familiar way of thinking
for a company commander. The sequence of the individual TLPs is not rigid. It is
modified to meet the mission, situation, and available time. Some steps are done
concurrently while others may go on continuously throughout the operation. The TLPs
are time savers; as such, the leader conducts them in the order that most effectively uses
the available time.
a.
Receive the Mission. A mission may be received in the form of either a written or
oral warning order, operation order, or fragmentary order. At times, a leader may deduce
a hange in mission, based on a change in the situation. When the battalion OPORD is
issued, the company commander should have his company FSO with him.
(1) Once an upcoming mission is identified, actions to begin preparing the unit are
conducted. The CO conducts an initial METT–T analysis to determine the requirements
for his warning order.
(2) With the information available, the commander sets his time schedule by
identifying the actions that must be done (time–critical tasks) to prepare his unit for the
operation. These preparatory actions are identified by a preliminary consideration of the
information on the mission, enemy, terrain, and own troops. An initial reconnaissance
(may be a map reconnaissance) is conducted to allow the leader to more fully understand
the time requirements for the mission. He then develops his time schedule by starting at
"mission time" and working backward to the time it is now (reverse planning). The
mission time is normally the most critical time in the operation.
FM 7-10
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Figure 2-1. Tools of the tactician relationship.
(3) The commander must ensure that all subordinate echelons have sufficient time for
their own planning needs. A general rule of thumb for leaders at all levels is to use no
more than one-third of the available time for planning and issuance of the OPORD. This
will leave the rest of the available time for subordinate leaders to use for their planning
and preparation. This is a tentative time schedule, which may require adjustment as the
TLP process continues.
•
0600, execute mission.
•
0530, finalize/adjust the plan, based on the leader's reconnaissance.
•
0400, establish ORP; begin leader's reconnaissance.
•
0200, begin movement.
•
2100, conduct platoon inspections.
•
1900, hold rehearsals.
•
1800, eat meals (tray packs).
•
1745, hold briefbacks (SLs to PL).
•
1630, issue platoon OPORD.
•
1500, hold briefbacks (PLs to CO).
•
1330, issue company OPORD.
•
1045, conduct reconnaissance.
•
1030, update company warning order, if required.
•
1000, receive battalion OPORD.
•
0900, receive battalion warning order; issue company warning order.
b. Issue a Warning Order. Do not wait for more information. Issue the best
warning order possible with the information at hand and update it as needed with
additional warning orders. The warning order lets units prepare for combat as soon as
possible after being alerted of an upcoming mission. This normally involves a number of
standard actions that should be addressed by SOP. The warning order should address
those items not covered in the SOP that must be done to prepare for the mission. The
specific contents for each warning order will vary, based upon the unique tactical
situation. (Appendix G provides an example warning order.)
FM 7-10
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c.
Make a Tentative Plan. Tentative plans are the basis for the OPORD. The leader
uses the commander's estimate of the situation to analyze METT–T information, develop
and analyze a COA, compare courses of action, and make a decision that produces a
tentative plan. (See Section III for details on the estimate of the situation.)
d. Initiate Movement. This can be done by having a subordinate leader move the
unit to an assembly area or attack position. The instructions for this move can be given in
the warning order. The CO ensures that security is provided and fires are integrated for
all company movements.
e.
Conduct Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance is a continuous process during the
TLP. The tentative plan should include an R&S plan. Plan and conduct reconnaissance to
confirm or adjust the tentative plan. A thorough tentative plan helps the reconnaissance
because specific R&S guidance can be given to subordinates. In every tactical operation
the CO requires additional information, and at the same time, he must deny the enemy
information about his company. These requirements provide the focus for the company
R&S plan.
(1) Prepare the plan. The CO determines—
•
What are his information requirements?
•
What are his security requirements? (The higher headquarters may also assign
R&S responsibilities to the company.)
•
What are the priorities for these requirements?
•
What assets are available to meet these requirements? (The CO may request
support from higher, adjacent, and supporting units.)
•
How much time is available to collect the information or establish security?
•
What is most critical (and thus the focus) for his personal reconnaissance?
•
To whom will he assign tasks to meet the R&S needs?
(2) Issue the plan. The CO provides additional instructions to supplement the
assigned tasks to his subordinates. The amount of detail depends on the specific situation.
A leader's reconnaissance that has several subordinate units involved requires more
specific instructions. These may include the following:
•
A specific tasking for selected soldiers from subordinate units, such as the lst
Platoon's RATELO.
•
A specific time schedule for the reconnaissance (report, inspection, departure,
and return times).
•
Specified routes and formations.
•
Special equipment required.
•
Likely contingency plans.
•
Fire support coordination.
•
Withdrawal plan from the reconnaissance site.
•
Link up with the company.
(3) Select the technique. The leader's reconnaissance is crucial to every operation. An
effective leader reconnaissance provides the required information without being detected
by the enemy. The risk of detection and the effect that this loss of surprise will have on
the mission must be weighed against the benefit of collecting the information. Generally,
the closer the reconnaissance element is to the objective, the greater the risk of detection.
The two primary techniques for conducting the leader's reconnaissance are:
FM 7-10
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(a) Long–range observation/surveillance. Reconnaissance personnel generally stay
beyond small–arms range from the objective. This will usually be outside the enemy's
security positions also. Tentative OP sites are selected from a map reconnaissance and
confirmed after the unit has occupied the ORP. This technique is generally more effective
during daylight hours. When possible, OPs should provide 360–degree coverage and may
require repositioning at night.
(b) Short–range observation/surveillance. This technique generally requires the
reconnaissance personnel to move inside the enemy's security positions and small–arms
fire range. It depends on stealth and effective use of available cover and concealment.
Limited visibility may support this technique. OPs are also designated for short–range
observation.
(4) Conduct the reconnaissance. The leader's reconnaissance should be conducted as
any reconnaissance patrol; only essential personnel should take part. The smaller this
element is, the less likely the enemy will detect them. This should include a leader from
each of the key elements. Additional tasks during the reconnaissance may include:
•
Testing communications if authorized.
•
Making final coordination on precise timings, signals, weapons/personnel
locations, and sub-unit responsibilities.
•
Establishing security/surveillance on the objective area.
f.
Complete the Plan. The CO must be prepared to adjust his tentative plan based
on the results of the reconnaissance. He may have to change COAs if the situation is not
what he expected. In this case, one of the previously analyzed and discarded COAs may
be adjusted to quickly finalize his new plan. Coordination continues with all supporting
agencies, higher headquarters, and adjacent units. This, along with his recon, gives the
leader the information he needs to expand the tentative plan into a five-paragraph
OPORD. (See OPORD format, Appendix G.)
g. Issue the Order. Preferably issue the order while viewing the avenues of
approach/objective area. Make maximum use of visual aids (sketches and terrain models)
to enhance the presentation of the order. When the CO issues the tentative plan before the
leader's reconnaissance, he issues a FRAGO to finalize the plan prior to execution (see
Appendix G).
h. Supervise. The best plan may fail if it is not managed right. Briefbacks,
rehearsals, inspections, and continuous coordination of plans must be used to supervise
and refine troop–leading procedures. Briefbacks and rehearsals are not the same;
briefbacks focus on the planning process, and rehearsals focus on execution.
(1) Inspect. During pre–combat inspections, check—
•
Weapons and ammunition.
•
Uniforms and equipment.
•
Mission–essential equipment.
•
Soldiers' knowledge and understanding of the mission and their specific
responsibilities.
•
Communications.
•
Rations and water.
•
Camouflage.
(2) Rehearse. Rehearsals are always conducted. They are essential to ensure complete
coordination and subordinate understanding. The warning order should provide
FM 7-10
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subordinate leaders sufficient detail for them to schedule and conduct rehearsals of
drills/SOPs before receiving the company OPORD. Rehearsals conducted after the
OPORD can then focus on mission specific tasks. Rehearsals are conducted as any other
training exercise except the training area should be as much like the objective area as
possible, including the same light and weather conditions. Mock–ups of the objective
should be used for these practices. Rehearsals include holding soldier and leader
briefbacks of individual tasks and using sand tables or sketches to talk through the
execution of the plan. These are followed by walk-through exercises and then full-speed,
blank-fire or live–fire rehearsals. The CO should establish the priority for rehearsals
based on the available time. The priority of rehearsals, as COA development, flows from
the decisive point of the operation. For example, actions on the objective, battle drills for
maneuver, actions on enemy contact, special teams, movement techniques, and others as
required. Security must be maintained during the rehearsal.
(3) Briefback. Subordinates should briefback the commander right after the OPORD
to ensure they understand their instructions. Briefbacks of the subordinates' plans should
also be conducted. These briefbacks may be given collectively at a meeting of the orders
group. Such a technique allows exchange of information, coordination among units, and
rapid distribution of changes to the initial plan.
(4) Coordinate. The commander visits his subordinates and adjacent units to discuss
their plans. The CO ensures that all necessary preparations are being made. These may
include coordination of fire support and engineer activities, maintenance, resupply,
movement, and other required actions.
(a) Any departures from the plan, both before and during the operation, are
coordinated with the battalion commander and staff.
(b) During execution, the CO issues FRAGOs to modify or refine the operation as the
situation develops. He personally supervises and or leads the critical actions.
2-11.
COMMUNICATIONS
The CO communicates to control his platoons and weapons, to gather and pass
information, and to call for fires. He ensures required communications are available and
functioning.
a.
The CO analyzes each situation to determine the effect that the terrain, weather,
and enemy may have on his ability to communicate. He reduces these effects by proper
positioning of units, establishing visual signals for critical events, requesting a relay site
be established by the battalion, and other similar measures. The best way to limit these
effects is to reduce the need for communication throughout the operation by developing a
simple plan, which requires the least amount of command intervention during the
execution.
b. Several means of communications should be planned so the company does not
depend on only one. Considerations in selecting means of communications are:
•
How long does it take to install?
•
How long does it take to send a message?
•
How vulnerable is it to enemy action?
•
How critical is it to communicate? On which net? At what time?
•
How reliable is it?
•
What does it cost in resources?
FM 7-10
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c.
There are several means available to the CO. He should use each of them, as
appropriate, to complement each other. They are radio, wire, visual signals, sound, and
messenger.
(1) Radio. This is probably the most common means of communications. Radios are
well suited for use when the company is on the move or in an attack. Different units often
have different types of radios, but the basic company command net remains about the
same (Figure 2-2). The CO normally has two radios–one for the battalion command net
and the other for the company command net. He may operate from his vehicle (if
assigned), which is equipped with two vehicular–mounted radios. He normally has a
speech security device for secure communications on the battalion command net. The XO
and platoon leaders have a radio for communications with the CO. Although most
infantry companies have a radio available for the XO (three in the company
headquarters), the lack of a RATELO and the limitations of the radio often limit the
ability of the XO to maintain communications with higher and adjacent units. When
planning radio communication, the CO considers several factors.
(a) Constant radio contact is not essential for all operations. Often, due to the terrain,
radio limitations, and type of operation, radio contact will be lost. At other times, signal
security will require radio listening silence be imposed. The CO must determine when
and where communication will be critical during the operation and then ensure the
required units can communicate.
(b) He must think through the movement of the company to ensure that he knows
when the terrain may disrupt radio communications. The key lies in maintaining line–of–
sight within the planning ranges of his radios. These ranges can be extended two to three
times through the use of field expedient antennas (FM 24-18). When required, the CO
may establish or request battalion to set up a relay site.
(c) He must ensure that all leaders know what to do in the event radio
communications are lost. Redundant communications are provided through the company
fire support net, if it is needed. This should be done only as a last resort.
(d) Many infantry companies have the capability to operate a secure company net.
This decision should be based on the enemy threat and balanced against the soldier's load
and the possible loss or capture of this equipment.
FM 7-10
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Figure 2-2. Company command net.
(2) Wire. Wire is more secure than radio. Wire usually provides better
communications because it is less subject to interference from weather, terrain, and man–
made obstacles. It is not subject to enemy electronic warfare actions, such as jamming
and direction finding. It is, however, subject to breakage by direct and indirect fire and
ground traffic.
(a) Although wire is more secure, it can be tapped, so transmissions must be kept
secure. The time needed to install it depends on the terrain, the weather, the length of the
lines, and the way they are laid. As wire can be easily broken by weapons fire, it should
be buried when possible. In areas heavily traveled by vehicles, wire that cannot be buried
should be put overhead. Wire lines must be checked frequently and repaired as required.
(b) The decision to use wire depends on the company's mission, amount of wire and
time available, and the company's capability to install and maintain it. Most infantry
companies have limited amounts of wire. Only the H-series infantry has adequate wire,
equipment, and personnel to routinely use wire as the primary means of communication.
The CO must prioritize the communication needs and use the available wire where
required.
FM 7-10
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(c) As with the company's radio net, different types of rifle companies have different
types of wire equipment. However, the company wire net normally includes the same
leaders as does the company command radio net (Figure 2-3).
Figure 2-3. Company wire system.
(3) Visual signals. The company commander may use visual signals to send
prearranged messages quickly and to identify friendly units. They include arm–and–hand
signals, flags, panels, lights, weapon fires (both direct and indirect) and pyrotechnics. He
may use visual signals to identify friendly positions for aircraft. Visual signals, however,
may be seen by the enemy or be misunderstood by friendly units.
(a) Pyrotechnics are available in several types and colors. They include smoke
grenades, smoke streamers, star clusters, star parachutes, and a variety of artillery and
mortar rounds. The commander uses pyrotechnics for signals, friendly unit identification,
fire control, target marking, and ground–to–air communications. Pyrotechnic signals may
FM 7-10
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be prescribed by the SOI, SOP, or the OPORD. Their advantage is the speed with which
information can be transmitted.
(b) Combinations of colors fired at the same time or in a series increase the chance of
error, as it is easy to miss part of a series.
(c) Visual signals may be seen by the enemy as well as by friendly units. The enemy
may even imitate friendly signals. Therefore, visual signals should not be trusted fully
unless the signaler can be identified.
(4) Sound. The company commander may use whistles, sirens, gongs, shots, and
explosive devices for sound communications. These can attract attention, transmit
prearranged messages, and spread alarms. Sound signals are usually good for short
distances only. Their range and reliability may be further reduced by battle noise. Sound
signals must be simple to avoid misunderstandings. Meanings for sound signals should be
stated in the unit SOP and SOI.
(5) Messenger. Aside from personal contact, messengers are the most secure and
reliable communications means. Messengers should always be available at the company
CP. They are ideal for transmitting lengthy written messages. Their speed depends on
their mode of travel, the tactical situation, and terrain. They are vulnerable, however, to
enemy action in forward areas, and they lack sender–to–receiver contact. Hard copy
messages are preferred over oral messages. If oral messages are sent, have the messenger
repeat the message to ensure he understood. At times, the platoons may be tasked to
provide a messenger to the company CP.
2-12.
ELECTRONIC COUNTER–COUNTERMEASURES
The ECCM are those things the company does to defeat enemy electronic warfare efforts.
Although the company is not usually the focus of intercept, jamming, or direction finding
systems, proper COMSEC procedures are required by all radio operators. At company
level, ECCM consists mainly of proper communications security and antijamming
techniques. Although the SINCGARS radios have built–in ECCM features, units still use
proper COMSEC procedures.
a.
Communications Security. The use of COMSEC delays or stops the enemy from
gaining information from radio transmissions. It includes the following:
•
Authenticating.
•
Using only approved codes.
•
Changing frequencies and call signs, when specified.
•
Designating periods for radio listening silence.
•
Restricting the use of radios.
•
Using the lowest transmitting power possible.
•
Enforcing net discipline and proper radiotelephone procedure.
•
Using only authorized call signs and prowords.
•
Limiting transmissions to official traffic.
•
Keeping transmissions short.
•
Selecting radio sites with hills or other obstructions between them and the
enemy.
•
Using directional antennas when possible.
b. Antijamming Procedure. Radio operators should use the following antijamming
procedures to defeat enemy jamming efforts.
FM 7-10
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(1) Recognition. The first thing an operator must do when his radio receives
interference is to find the cause. He should not immediately assume jamming. Some
jamming is similar to other types of radio interference. To help identify the problem, the
operator should remove the antenna. If the interference decreases with the antenna
removed, then its cause is external and may be jamming. If the interference does not
decrease, the problem is in the radio.
(2) Continued Operation. An operator must continue normal radio operation once
jamming has been identified so that the enemy will not know that his jamming is
working. The rule is: During jamming, continue operating unless ordered by the net
control station to shut down or to change frequencies. An operator being jammed should
never mention over unsecured radio that he is being jammed. If the company cannot
continue to operate on the jammed net and also continue the mission, they should switch
to the antijamming frequency and continue the mission.
c.
Reporting. Report all jamming using the meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and
interference report. The MIJI report should be sent by another secure means of
communications; for example, wire or messenger. A MIJI report format is usually found
in the SOI or unit TACSOP and contains the following:
•
Date and time of jamming.
•
Frequencies jammed.
•
Type and strength of jamming signal.
•
Designation of the unit making the report.
Section III.
THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
The estimate of the situation is the Army's decision–making process. It helps the leader
determine his mission, understand his situation, and select the best course of action to
accomplish his assigned responsibilities. Leaders use the estimate for EVERY tactical
decision. Their experience, ability, and the time available will determine the amount of
detailed analysis in each estimate. The estimate is a continuous process; the CO
constantly receives information about the situation. Whenever he receives the
information (during planning, en route to the objective, or just before the assault begins),
he must decide if this information affects his mission. If it does, then he decides how to
adjust his plan to meet this new situation. It is only through the estimate process, however
hasty, that the leader can make the proper decision. The estimate has five steps.
Step 1: Conduct a detailed mission analysis.
Step 2: Analyze the situation and develop courses of action.
Step 3: Analyze courses of action (wargame).
Step 4: Compare courses of action.
Step 5: Make a decision.
2-13.
CONDUCT A DETAILED MISSION ANALYSIS
Leaders conduct a detailed mission analysis whenever they receive instructions to begin a
new operation. These instructions may be received as warning orders, OPORDs, or
FRAGOs. The leader may also deduce a change to his mission based on a change in the
situation. In any case, the CO conducts the mission analysis to determine the following:
•
Commander's concept and intent (battalion and brigade).
•
All tasks his unit must accomplish.
FM 7-10
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•
All limitations on his unit's freedom of action.
•
His unit's restated mission statement.
a.
The Higher Commanders' Concept and Intent. The company commander must
know what both his battalion and brigade commanders want accomplished as the result of
the operation. He must also understand his role and responsibilities within their concepts.
This information is found in the battalion OPORD in paragraph 1b for the brigade and in
paragraph 2 and 3 for the battalion.
b. The Unit's Tasks. The CO determines all the tasks that his unit must accomplish;
they may be found throughout the order. Tasks that are clearly stated in the order, during
the oral OPORD, or on the operation overlay are called specified tasks. Examples of
specified tasks are:
•
Retain hill 545 to prevent envelopment of B Co.
•
Provide one squad to the 81-mm platoon to carry ammo.
•
Establish an OP vic GL124325 NLT 301500 NOV 89.
(1) In addition to these specified tasks, other requirements may become apparent as
the OPORD is analyzed. These are called implied tasks; they are not routine or SOP–type
requirements. Nor are they requirements inherent to other assigned tasks or to military
operations. Routine or SOP tasks depend on the specific unit, but generally the following
type tasks would be considered routine:
•
Provide security during movement.
•
Conduct resupply operations.
•
Coordinate with adjacent units.
(2) If the company was assigned a mission to seize an enemy position for some
purpose, some examples of inherent tasks might be as follows:
•
Task-organize the unit to accomplish the mission.
•
Conduct reconnaissance to locate enemy weak points.
•
Isolate the area at the point of attack.
(3) In some cases or for some units, tasks that should be routine, inherent, or SOP
may not be. In this case, the CO (understanding the training and limitations of his unit)
would identify that task as an implied task. It is not important to classify the tasks. What
is important is to identify all the requirements (tasks) that the unit must complete to
accomplish its mission. Once the CO identifies these tasks, he then ensures that his plan
includes all of them.
c.
The Unit's Limitations. The CO next determines all control measures or
instructions in the OPORD that restrict his freedom of action; these are called limitations.
In every operation, there are some limitations on the company. The operations overlay
has graphic control measures that restrict the unit's freedom to maneuver. The
coordinating instructions often include limitations. Throughout the order, there may be
specific times that the unit must meet. The following are some examples of common
limitations:
•
Cross the LD at 100030 OCT 94.
•
MOPP4 in effect.
•
ADA weapon status, tight; warning status, yellow .
At times, it may be confusing whether something is a task or a limitation. The first
example given above is both a specified task (cross the LD) and a limitation (at exactly
FM 7-10
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0030 hours on 10 OCT). What is important is that the information is included in the CO's
concept, and that all subordinates understand and comply with it.
d. Mission-Essential Task(s). After reviewing all the above factors, the CO
identifies his mission–essential task(s). Failure to accomplish a mission-essential task
results in the company's failure to accomplish its primary purpose for that operation. In a
well-written OPORD, the CO will find his mission-essential task in the maneuver
paragraph.
e.
The Restated Mission Statement. If the mission analysis began as the result of
receiving a battalion OPORD, the mission statement should have been clearly stated in
the battalion concept of the operation, (paragraph 3a). The mission essential tasks and
purposes for each of the companies should be stated in the battalion scheme of maneuver.
(1) If the mission analysis began as the result of a short FRAGO or a significant
change to the situation, the company's mission may not be clearly stated. In this case, the
commander must determine his mission essential task. He does this by reviewing the
battalion commander's concept and determining what his companies role is for the
decisive action. What must his unit achieve to support the battalion's mission
accomplishment? The relationship of his unit to the battalion's main effort may also
clarify his mission essential task. If his company is the main effort, there should be a
direct relationship between his purpose and the battalion's purpose. If the CO reviews
each of his assigned tasks by this process, it should be clear which task is essential to the
success of the battalion commander's concept.
(2) Time is continuously analyzed during the operation. Once the CO has conducted
his mission analysis, he has a better understanding of the time requirements for his unit.
If a time schedule was issued prior to conducting the detailed mission analysis, it may
need to be updated now.
(3) The restated mission statement becomes the focus for the remainder of the
estimate process. This is a clear, concise statement of the essential task(s) to be
accomplished by the company and the purpose to be achieved. The mission statement
will normally state WHO (the company), WHAT (the task), WHEN (the critical time),
WHERE (usually a grid coordinate), and WHY (the purpose the company must achieve).
It also becomes paragraph 2 of the company OPORD. The other specified and implied
tasks and limitations are included in the plan where required. Some examples of restated
missions follow:
•
(WHO)"A Company attacks (WHEN) 090500Z Dec 92 (WHAT) to seize
HILL 482 (WHERE) vicinity NB 457271 (OBJ BLUE) (WHY) to enable the
battalion's main effort to destroy enemy command bunker and reserve
platoon."
•
(WHO)"C Company defends (WHEN) NLT 281530Z Oct 97 (WHAT) to
destroy enemy forces (WHERE) from AB163456 to AB163486 to AB123456
to AB123486 to (WHY) prevent enemy forces from enveloping 1-66 Infantry
(L) from the south."
FM 7-10
2-24
2-14.
ANALYZE THE SITUATION
With the restated mission statement from Step 1 to provide focus, the CO continues the
estimate process. Step 2 involves analyzing the situation, using the remaining factors of
METT–T (enemy, terrain, troops and time). The IPB integrates the enemy doctrine with
the terrain and weather to evaluate enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and possible
COAs. FM 7-20 discusses the IPB process in detail.
a.
Once the CO has a full appreciation for the situation, he then develops several
COAs that will accomplish his mission. Throughout this section, the analysis process is
presented in a very deliberate, step–by–step manner. In reality, it is a very dynamic
process. For example, this section describes the terrain analysis coming before the enemy
analysis. In a tactical situation, the commander will normally have a great deal of
knowledge about the enemy. In effect, this allows a more rapid estimate and decision.
What must be avoided is jumping to a hasty conclusion/decision without first doing an
honest analysis of the situation. Step 2 is normally the most time consuming step of the
estimate.
b. During the analysis, the CO determines facts about the situation. He also
determines questions for which he has no facts. He then tries to answer these questions
through additional analysis or reconnaissance. When these questions impact on his ability
to develop valid courses of action, he must plan from assumptions.
(1) Assumptions are used in the absence of facts. They are based on the facts that he
has developed, his knowledge of the enemy's doctrine, and also his experience from
fighting this enemy. An example of a valid assumption might be: The enemy has
prepared antipersonnel minefields on the dismounted avenues of approach into his
position. Possible minefield locations can then be deduced based on the enemy's doctrine
and the CO's knowledge of his tactics. During this analysis, assumptions are treated as
facts to allow the CO to deduce the impact they may have on his unit. The CO reduces
the number of assumptions by conducting reconnaissance to gather the required facts.
(2) The CO also analyzes the facts to determine how they impact on his mission, on
his unit, and on the enemy. For example: The CO's terrain analysis identifies a creek that
is an obstacle to mounted movement. The CO analyzes this fact to deduce the impact it
may have on the operation. If he is defending, he must determine how the creek will
affect the enemy's movement. It may only be an obstacle to wheeled vehicles and not to
tracked ones. Are there choke points along the obstacle which would allow him to
concentrate combat power against the enemy? How will the obstacle affect friendly
units? Is vehicle resupply and casualty evacuation possible forward of the creek or will he
have to use soldiers to move supplies and casualties? How can this obstacle assist in the
accomplishment of his mission? The quality of these deductions will determine the
effectiveness of the courses of action developed later in Step 2. Figure 2-4 shows this
analysis process for Step 2.
FM 7-10
2-25
Figure 2-4. Analysis process.
(3) Throughout Step 2, the CO identifies potentially decisive points where he can
generate superior combat power in relation to the enemy. These points may result from
his terrain analysis (locations on the ground which provide an advantage or put the enemy
at a disadvantage), from the enemy analysis (an identified enemy weakness that can be
exploited), or possibly from the time analysis (a time when the combat potential of the
enemy force is degraded). Ideally, a decisive point will be identified where an enemy
weakness is positioned at a time and a location that allows the company to generate
overwhelming combat power. These points are potentially decisive because the effects of
the company's combat potential, when applied there, should lead to accomplishing the
mission.
FM 7-10
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2-15.
ANALYZE THE TERRAIN
The factors of METT–T guide the leader through the estimate process. Although the first
factor is mission analysis, the next factor analyzed should be the terrain, not the enemy.
By understanding the terrain prior to the enemy analysis, the leader will have a better
appreciation for the enemy's capabilities and limitations.
a.
The leader considers the terrain from both his view–point and from the enemy's.
The battalion assigns the company its area of operations. If there is terrain or enemy units
outside the assigned AO that could impact on the mission, the leader must be concerned
with them. This terrain, including the area of operations, is called the area of interest. The
leader conducts a detailed terrain analysis of this area.
b. The mnemonic OCOKA provides the significant military aspects of the terrain.
These will assist the leader with his terrain analysis. In order, analyze obstacles, avenues
of approach, key terrain, observation and fields of fires, and cover and concealment.
Because of the effect that the weather has on the terrain, it is analyzed at the same time.
(1) Obstacles. Identify the existing and reinforcing obstacles and hindering terrain
that will affect mobility. All terrain is evaluated and coded as either NO–GO, SLOW–
GO, or GO. When time permits, a combined obstacle overlay is developed to graphically
depict the mobility capability of the terrain. Figure 2-5 shows an example of a combined
obstacle overlay.
•
NO–GO terrain is impractical for the type of force being considered to move
through it. NO–GO terrain does not always mean that units cannot pass
through that terrain, but only that the speed of movement will be substantially
reduced unless considerable effort is expended to enhance mobility.
(Example: nonfordable stream and slopes of greater than 45 degrees for
mounted movement.) With mounted forces, this would mean substantial
engineer support.
•
SLOW–GO terrain hinders ground movement to a lesser degree than NO–GO
terrain. Little effort is needed to enhance mobility. (Example: sparsely
vegetated forests and fordable streams.)
•
GO terrain is fairly open terrain that presents no problem to ground
movement.
(a) Offensive considerations:
•
How is the enemy using these obstacles?
•
How will these obstacles affect my movement?
•
Where are the weapons/units that are covering these obstacles?
•
How can the company avoid these obstacles?
FM 7-10
2-27
Figure 2-5. Combined obstacle overlay.
(b) Defensive considerations:
•
How will the existing obstacles affect the enemy?
•
How do the existing obstacles support my mission?
(2) Avenues of approach. Avenues of approach are developed next and identified one
level down. These are areas through which a unit can maneuver. Normally, they are
thought of in terms of mounted movement, but they can be applied to dismounted
movement as well. Both mounted and dismounted avenues of approach must be
identified. When selecting them, the commander uses tactical judgment with respect to
the type unit to be used. They traverse GO terrain, bypass NO–GO terrain, and
occasionally pass through or over SLOW–GO terrain. They are considered for both the
enemy and friendly units. As such, a doctrinal width guideline for a platoon is 250
meters, a company is 500 meters, and a battalion is 1,500 meters. Aerial and subterranean
avenues must also be considered.
(a) Offensive considerations:
•
How can these avenues support my movement?
•
What are the advantages/disadvantages of each? (Consider enemy, speed,
cover, and concealment.)
•
What are the likely enemy counterattack routes?
(b) Defensive considerations:
•
How can the enemy use these approaches?
•
Which avenue is most dangerous? Least? (Prioritize each approach.)
•
Which avenues would support a counterattack?
(3) Key terrain. Key terrain is any location or area that the seizure, retention, or
control of affords a marked advantage to either combatant. Using the map and
FM 7-10
2-28
information already gathered, look for key terrain that dominates avenues of approach or
the objective area. Next, look for decisive terrain that if held or controlled will have an
extraordinary impact on the mission. The retention or seizure of decisive terrain is
necessary for accomplishment of the mission. During the war–game process, other terrain
may be identified as potentially key or decisive, based on likely changes in the situation.
By this analysis, the commander should get a good feel for potential positions for friendly
and enemy units and weapon systems. These locations are important during the
development of COAs.
(a) Offensive considerations:
•
Is the enemy controlling the key terrain? How?
•
How does this terrain affect my mission?
•
How can I gain control of this terrain?
(b) Defensive considerations:
•
What advantage do I gain by controlling the key terrain?
•
How can the enemy gain control of this terrain?
(4) Observation and fields of fire. Determine locations that provide the best
observation and fields of fire along the approaches, near the objective, or on key terrain.
Determine the potential of friendly or enemy forces to overwatch or support (with direct
fire) the movement of their forces, and to observe movement along the avenue of
approach and place fire on it from various positions on the terrain. The analysis of fields
of fire is mainly concerned with the ability to cover the terrain with direct fire. Positions
with good observation for the FIST personnel are also identified. Look at the capability
of direct fire weapons from likely or known positions. Reconnaissance from the enemy's
viewpoint is most effective when conducting a defensive analysis. Determine where fires
may be concentrated.
(a) Offensive considerations:
•
What are the fields of fires and observation for enemy weapons on or near the
objective? En route?
•
Is there any dead space around the objective? On the approaches into it?
•
What are the fields of fires and observation from likely support positions?
•
Where can the enemy concentrate fires? Where is he less able to concentrate
his fires?
(b) Defensive considerations:
•
What locations provide good fires and observation on the enemy approaches?
•
How obvious are these positions to the enemy?
•
Determine possible locations for the key weapons (M60 MGs, Dragons,
mortars).
(5) Cover and concealment. The analysis of cover and concealment is often
inseparable from the fields of fires and observation. Weapon positions must have both to
be effective and to be survivable. Infantry units are capable of improving poor cover and
concealment by digging in and camouflaging their positions. When moving, the terrain is
used to provide cover and concealment.
(a) Offensive considerations:
•
Determine the routes with good cover and concealment.
•
Identify areas along the approaches to the objective with poor cover and
concealment.
FM 7-10
2-29
•
Consider the use of smoke missions/limited visibility to provide concealment.
(b) Defensive considerations:
•
Focus on the locations with good fields of fires.
•
Think about how the enemy can use the available cover and concealment.
c.
Weather factors are considered at the same time as terrain. Primary emphasis is on
temperature/humidity, precipitation, wind, cloud cover and visibility. Light data is
considered as part of cloud cover and visibility. The commander focuses on how the
weather affects the terrain, equipment, and soldiers of both forces.
(1) Terrain. The terrain is most affected by rain, snow, or freezing temperatures. GO
terrain may become NO–GO terrain after a heavy rain because it will no longer support
vehicle movement. Freezing this same terrain may revert it to GO terrain if it will now
support vehicles. The frozen ground may prevent digging fighting positions.
(2) Equipment. The temperature and humidity can change the amount of maintenance
required to keep equipment operating. Batteries may not last as long. The soldiers'
clothing and boots wear out faster under some conditions.
(a) Vehicles. Aviation assets are grounded by a number of weather conditions.
Vehicles freeze to the ground or fail to start in extreme cold. Hot and dusty conditions
increase the maintenance needs.
(b) Weapons. The operation and maintenance of weapons are affected by extreme
temperatures. Even if the weapon is not affected, the capability to acquire targets may be
severely degraded. High winds affect the accuracy of all projectiles particularly indirect
fires.
(3) Soldiers. The spirit and morale of the soldiers are affected by the conditions they
fight in. In winter zones, more energy and resources may be spent on just surviving the
elements than fighting the enemy. Nonbattle casualties may outnumber the battle
casualties.
2-16.
ANALYZE THE ENEMY
Often, a major portion of the enemy analysis has already been completed for the
company commander by the brigade and battalion S2s, who had access to much more
information. The important enemy information is provided to the company commander in
paragraph 1a of the OPORD. The CO must accept this information as accurate because it
is what the battalion commander based his concept on. If a company commander
developed his concept based on a different enemy COA, he could disrupt the entire
battalion plan. Therefore the company commander begins his enemy analysis from the
information provided by battalion. However, it is important to realize that the battalion
S2's analysis did not focus on the enemy expected in the company's sector or the
company's portion of the objective. He was looking at the situation from a broader
perspective and with different concerns. It is the company commander's responsibility to
refine this information to develop the detailed understanding required to complete his
concept. The focus of this analysis is to locate the enemy's strengths (to avoid them) and
his weaknesses (to exploit them). The end result of the enemy analysis should be a
detailed statement of the enemy's most probable COA. At this point, the commander
analyzes the enemy's composition, disposition, recent activities, reinforcement
capabilities, possible courses of action, and weaknesses.
FM 7-10
2-30
a.
Composition. This is an analysis of the forces and weapons that the enemy can
bring to bear. Determine their strength, what weapons systems they have available, and
what additional weapons and units are supporting him. The CO must know the enemy's
weapons as well as his own. It is this detailed knowledge of the specific characteristics
for each weapon that allows the leader to pinpoint the enemy's weaknesses.
b. Disposition. The enemy's disposition is how he is arrayed on the terrain, such as
in defensive positions, in an assembly area, or moving in march formation. Use enemy
doctrinal templates to develop situational templates. Consider how long the enemy has to
prepare his defense or attack. When analyzing the situational templates, search for his
weak points, which may be exploited to destroy him or to control the decisive ground.
Consider where he is accepting risk and where the terrain limits his ability to defend,
attack, or gain mutual support. Finally, determine what his intentions are.
c.
Recent Activities. Identify recent and significant enemy activities that may
indicate future intentions. These activities may point out a weakness that the company
can exploit. They may also provide a better understanding of what the enemy is likely to
do in reaction to the company. This will result in a more effective war–game process.
d. Reinforcement Capabilities. Determine positions for reserves and estimated
time to counterattack or reinforce. Although the enemy analysis must focus on the enemy
force on the company's objective or expected in the company's sector, the CO should
consider all enemy forces in his area of interest. To fully understand his enemy force, the
CO must understand how the enemy he is fighting fits into the larger enemy force.
e.
Possible Courses of Actions. Determine the enemy's possible COAs. Analyzing
these COAs may ensure that the friendly unit is not surprised during execution.
Determine the enemy's most likely COA; use the other possible COAs to develop
contingency plans or security taskings. Develop a narrative description and sketch of the
enemy COA from start to finish. Examples of enemy COAs follow.
(1) "The enemy will continue to defend with one platoon in a deliberate defense
vicinity of HILL 482 oriented to the north and west. Two squads and two MGs are
oriented north overlooking a mounted avenue of approach. One squad and one MG is
oriented west against a dismounted approach. The platoon CP is on the topographical
crest of Hill 482. There are between 20 and 30 personnel in this position. A minefield is
located NW of the position at the bottom of the hill. A suspected minefield is west of the
position. The confirmed OP is rotated every 8 hours. Security patrols (5 to 7 men) operate
north and west of the position at random intervals. An OP is positioned vicinity of HILL
524. Suspected OP locations are at the trail intersection NW of the platoon and on the
trail SW of the platoon. We can expect the enemy platoon to retain its position to prevent
its parent company from being enveloped from the NW. If forced to withdraw, he will
most likely move to the SE where there are supporting fires from the parent company.
This company could reinforce the platoon position with up to 20 men in 20 minutes.
Figure 2-6 is a situational template of this enemy position.
(2) "The enemy will attack NLT 120800 Dec 87 to seize the high ground vicinity
HILL 464 with two MRC (+) conducting the main attack in prebattle formation along
avenue of approach C, and one MRC (+) in the second echelon. The CRP and FSE will
arrive first and attempt to locate gaps in our defenses. At PL YANKEE, the MRB main
body will assume attack formation with tanks leading and will attempt to seize their
objective mounted. Specific objectives for the lead MRCs will most likely be the
FM 7-10
2-31
intersection at GL123456 and HILL 464. Artillery concentrations will be fired on Hill
464 as he crosses PL YANKEE. Smoke will be used to screen his left flank. Although he
has the capability to employ chemical weapons, this is not likely. After seizing these
objectives, the enemy will continue the attack to seize objectives along the battalion rear
boundary. I expect BTR and BMP recon vehicles in our sector within the next 24 hours."
Figure 2-6. Enemy situational template.
NOTE:
In addition to a narrative COA statement for the enemy, the commander
develops a situational template of how he expects the enemy COA to look. For
example, in the offense, a company commander develops a situational template
that depicts enemy squads and their fighting positions, individual vehicles, AT
weapons, and crew-served weapons. In the defense, the attacking enemy
should be templated down to platoon level. His R&S activities, artillery
targets, C2 assets, and obstacles should be templated. Also consider how he
may employ smoke, chemical agents, CAS, and deception to support his
operation.
f.
Weaknesses. Identify the enemy weaknesses. Others may result from the war–
game process. Determine how to exploit these weaknesses.
FM 7-10
2-32
2-17.
ANALYZE TROOPS AVAILABLE
The CO analyzes his troops available to ensure he knows the current status of his
company. He also considers the friendly situation to determine how adjacent and
supporting units may affect his mission. The purpose of this step is to identify all
available resources and to identify any new limitations resulting from recent fighting. The
CO considers his current location, disposition, supply status, and personnel strength. He
is particularly concerned with losses to key leaders and weapons, ammunition status, and
the morale of his men. The CO considers his current task organization and if any changes
are planned. He considers the capability of any attached or supporting units and
determines the impact of the company's priority in the battalion's fire priorities. Other
considerations include:
•
The location of the battalion trains and aid station.
•
The locations for the battalion main CP and command group.
2-18.
ANALYZE THE TIME
The commander continuously updates his initial estimate of time and the time schedule.
He considers the times specified in the battalion order and any other key times that may
have resulted from his analysis of the situation. The deductions made here will assist in
synchronizing subordinate units. The CO evaluates time and space considerations (the
consideration for how specific units will move in a given situation, the time required, the
formations used, and so forth) throughout the estimate.
2-19.
DEVELOP COURSES OF ACTION
A course of action is a possible plan that accomplishes the company's mission. It is as
detailed as necessary to clearly describe how the unit will accomplish the mission and to
allow effective war–gaming later in Step 3 of the estimate. It is generally a scheme of
maneuver supported by a COA sketch. It describes the employment of the rifle platoons,
the antiarmor and mortar sections, and possibly other significant resources, such as
attached units, weapons, or engineer support.
a.
Normally two or three courses of action are developed; however, the amount of
planning time may limit the CO to only one. In this case the XO may assist by also
developing a COA and wargaming the two with the CO. Each COA must be:
•
FeasibleIt accomplishes the mission and supports the commander's concept.
•
ReasonableThe company remains an effective force after completing the
mission.
•
DistinguishableIt is not just a minor variation of another COA.
b. During the analysis of the situation, the commander integrates the facts, makes
deductions, and analyzes further. Before developing the COAs, he determines the most
critical facts and deductions for this mission. These provide greater focus to the COA
development process. Examples of these might be:
•
Potential decisive points determined from the integration of the terrain and
enemy analysis.
•
Limited planning time requiring an immediate decision and quick execution.
•
A critical ammunition shortage for the machine guns.
•
An identified mistake in positioning of enemy weapons, resulting in a major
weakness in his defense.
FM 7-10
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•
A complete lack of information on the enemy force.
c.
These critical factors, the restated mission statement and the other facts and
deductions provide the focus for developing the COAs. Each COA should be developed
starting at a potential decisive point. If one has not already been identified, consider the
focus of the company's mission statement. If it focuses on
•
Gaining or retaining ground, then determine what terrain is most important. If
key or decisive terrain has been identified, the decisive point is probably on
this ground.
•
Enemy destruction, then determine what the enemy's weakness is. This may
result from his organization, his doctrine, or his disposition on the ground.
There may be a critical unit, weapon, or asset that is of great importance to the
enemy. Its destruction will have a decisive effect on the enemy's ability to
generate combat power. A deception task may cause the enemy to react in a
way that exposes a weakness. If an obvious weakness is not identified, locate
his strengths and plan to avoid these while making an enemy weakness
through maneuver or the effect of the company's fires.
•
Security of a friendly force, then determine the most vulnerable part of the
friendly force. Consider how the enemy may attack that unit. Look for the
terrain that will provide an advantage to the enemy. Consider the approaches
he will use to get to this terrain. From this analysis, the CO should be able to
identify the area of greatest risk and a potential decisive point.
d. Once the CO has identified his potential decisive point(s), he develops his COAs
using the following process.
(1) Determine decisive points and times to focus combat power.
(2) Determine the results that must be achieved at the decisive points to accomplish
the mission.
(3) Determine the purposes to be achieved by the main and supporting efforts. (The
supporting purposes must be clearly linked to the main effort's assigned purpose).
(4) Determine the essential tasks for subordinate units (main and supporting efforts)
that achieve these purposes.
(5) Task–organize squads to accomplish each mission that has been determined. (The
loss of cohesion when moving a squad to another platoon is critical. Normally, platoons
do not cross–attach squads.)
(6) Assign C2 headquarters. (The platoon headquarters, section leaders, XO, 1SG,
and other company leaders are used as required.)
(7) Complete a generic task organization by assigning all organic or attached units.
(8) Establish control measures that clarify and support the accomplishment of the
platoon's assigned mission. (This may also include critical timings for key events.)
(9) Prepare a COA statement and sketch.
(10) Repeat this process for additional courses of action. (Other COAs may begin with
a different potential decisive point, or they may concentrate combat power at the same
one using different tasks, purposes, positions, and so forth.)
e.
Consider the following while developing courses of action.
(1) Where can risk be taken to enable weighting the main effort? What is the
likelihood of this action being overwhelmingly decisive?
FM 7-10
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(2) What assets are needed for immediate subordinates to achieve their specific tasks
and purposes? Ensure the main effort is resourced first. If insufficient resources remain to
ensure the supporting efforts' missions are attainable, change the tasks or modify the
purpose. Do not take resources from the main effort to reduce risk in less important areas.
(3) Ensure mutual support is achieved. This may be done by the physical positioning
of units and weapons in relation to each other, or it may be achieved by the clear linkage
of purposes in subordinate's mission statements. Often, during decentralized operations,
mutual support between the main and supporting efforts is solely dependent on a clear
linkage of purposes in the unit's missions.
(4) What freedom of action do subordinates have? Use control measures (axis, DOA,
assault positions, objectives, BPs, sectors, engagement areas...) to synchronize
subordinate actions without stifling initiative.
f.
The essential part of the COA, dealing with the actions at the decisive point
(normally on the objective), has been completed. There may be additional details required
to allow a thorough war game of each COA from start to finish. These may include:
•
Movement prior to the maneuver at the decisive point or following the
decisive action.
•
Positioning other assets, such as the CP, mortars, or the company trains, and
assigning them missions.
•
Establishing additional fire control measures or signals.
•
Significant soldiers' load decisions such as leaving the rucksacks, Dragons, or
company mortars behind for an attack.
If these details are not needed to clarify the COA or to allow a complete war-game
process, they should not be included at this time because they will complicate the war-
game process.
g. A sketch of the COA will enhance clarity. The sketch should graphically capture
the maneuver aspects of the COA. Proper graphic control measures (see FM 101-5-1)
should be used, but additional graphics may also be used to clarify the COA. When using
this sketch as a concept sketch (as part of an OPORD), these nonstandard graphics must
be explained in a legend. The following scenarios and Figures 2-7 and 2-8 show
examples of an offensive and a defensive COA statement and sketch. For additional
information on concept sketch development, see Appendix G.
(1) Offensive course of action.
•
COMPANY MISSION STATEMENT: A Co/2-66 IN(L) attacks at 190600
OCT 89, to seize high ground vicinity NB 459270 (OBJ DOG) to prevent the
enemy from disrupting 3-66 IN's (BDE Main Effort) attack.
•
COA STATEMENT: The company crosses the LD at 0600 along direction of
attack Blue and occupies the ORP. After the leader's reconnaissance, one
platoon (2 infantry squads, 2 Dragons, and the 60-mm mortars) occupy a
support position vicinity hill 455 to suppress enemy positions to support the
company's seizure of OBJ DOG. The antiarmor section (4 Dragons) follows
the supporting PLT to checkpoint 1, then it establishes ambush positions
vicinity road junction at NB459260 to isolate OBJ DOG. The remaining two
platoons (3 squads each) occupy the assault position. The lead platoon seizes
the western enemy squad position (OBJ TOOL) to allow the trail platoon to
pass through and seize the decisive terrain. The trail platoon (company main
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effort) remains in the assault position. On-order, it moves through the lead
platoon, seizes the high ground vicinity NB459270 (OBJ BOX) to disrupt the
enemy's command and control and to dominate the remaining squad positions.
Then it destroys any enemy remaining in these positions to the south and east
to prevent the enemy from disrupting 3-66 IN's attack. The 1SG with one
infantry squad will follow and support the main effort by resupplying
ammunition and evacuating casualties.
(2) Defensive course of action.
•
MISSION STATEMENT: C Co/2-67 IN(L) is prepared NLT 281700 AUG 93
to destroy enemy forces from GL375651 to GL389650 to GL394660 to GL
373665 to prevent the envelopment of A Co (BN Main Effort).
•
COA STATEMENT: The company defends with two PLTs forward in sector
and 1 PLT in a depth BP. The PLT ( 2 squads) forward in the north destroys
enemy forces to prevent enemy bypass of the main effort PLT. The PLT (3
squads, 2 Dragons) in sector to the south destroys enemy forces to prevent an
organized company attack against the Co main effort. The main effort PLT (3
squads, 2 TOWs) retains Hill 657 (vic. GL 378659) to prevent the
envelopment of Co A (BN Main Effort) from the south. The antiarmor section
(1 squad, 4 Dragons) establishes ambush positions at the road junction (vic
GL 377653) to destroy enemy vehicles to prevent a concentration of combat
power against the main effort PLT. The Co mortars locate vic GL 377664.
The antiarmor section initiates fires when the enemy combat reconnaissance
patrol reaches the intersection.
2-20.
ANALYZE THE COURSES OF ACTION
Step 3 of the estimate is the analysis of courses of action. This analysis is conducted by
war-gaming the friendly courses of action against the enemy's most probable courses of
action. This step of the estimate ensures the COA is viable and that the CO understands
how the fight will take place. It clearly shows where the company is taking risks,
when/where decisions may be required, and also the advantages and disadvantages of
each course of action. Do not begin to compare the friendly COAs at this point in the
estimate process. The comparison occurs during Step 4.
a.
Techniques. Basic techniques for conducting the war game include the box, the
belt, and the avenue of approach methods.
(1) The box. This method is used to focus the war–game process on a specific area of
the battlefield. This may be the objective area, an engagement area, or some other critical
area where the decisive action will take place. The leader uses the same action–reaction–
counteraction method already discussed, but he limits himself to the actions within the
box. The size of the box is determined by the situation, but it should include the units and
actions that impact on the decisive action. When time is limited, this technique ensures
that the war–game process considers the decisive action, but the disadvantage is that
other critical actions/events may not be considered.
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Figure 2-7. Offensive COA sketch.
FM 7-10
2-37
Figure 2-8. Defensive COA sketch.
(2) The belt. The leader using the belt technique, divides the COA into sections in
depth and then war–games each of these belts in sequence. The offensive COA war–
game example used the belt technique initially. The COA was divided into the following
phases:
•
Movement from the AA into the ATTACK POSITION.
•
Movement from the LD to the ORP.
•
Actions in the ORP.
•
Deployment prior to the assault.
•
The assault.
•
Consolidation.
Each of these phases was war-gamed in sequence. In the example, once the war game
reached the assault phase, the box technique was used to war-game the decisive action in
detail. This technique may also be used to war-game a defensive COA.
(3) The avenue of approach. It is most often used to war-game a defensive COA
when there are several avenues of approach that must be considered. The leader war–
games the selected COA against the enemy's most probable COA by focusing the process
on one avenue of approach at a time.
b. War Game. To war–game the friendly COAs against the enemy most probable
COA, the CO mentally fights the battle as he expects it to occur. He divides the COAs
into a series of actions or events, analyzes each to determine the likely result or reaction,
and then considers the likely counteraction. This process of action, reaction, and
FM 7-10
2-38
counteraction continues until the mission is accomplished or the COA fails. An example
for war–gaming an offensive and defensive course of action is provided.
(1) Offensive COA war game. This is a war game of the COA presented in paragraph
2-19g(1).
(a) First action: The company moves from the AA into the attack position.
•
Enemy reaction: None. Risk of detection is slight.
(b) Second action: The company crosses the LD and moves along DOA BLUE.
•
Enemy reaction: Moderate risk of detection at danger area (HWY 27). If
detected, the enemy may engage with indirect fires.
•
Friendly counteraction: Suppress known enemy position (vic Hill 325) and
suspected enemy position (vic NB423243). Break contact and continue
movement on DOA BLUE to the ORP.
(c) Third action: Occupy the ORP.
•
Enemy reaction: None.
(d) Fourth action: Conduct leader's reconnaissance.
•
Enemy reaction: If detected, the enemy will increase the security on his
perimeter and possibly increase his patrolling.
•
Friendly counteraction: Options include complete the reconnaissance,
immediately initiate the artillery preparation and execute the tentative plan, or
move to the alternate ORP and issue a FRAGO.
(e) Fifth action: Support and security elements move into position. The company(-)
occupies the assault position.
•
Enemy reaction: If he detects the company, his options include engaging with
direct and indirect fires, repositioning soldiers or vehicles within his
perimeter, or withdrawing to an alternate position.
•
Friendly counteraction: Initiate the assault once the support element is in
position.
(f) Sixth action: Support element initiates fires; the lead platoon breaches the wire.
•
Enemy reaction: Returns direct fire on the support element. Requests indirect
fires (TOT- 2 minutes if we are on his planned targets, 5-7 minutes if we have
avoided them.) Once detected, the breach site will be the enemy leader's main
concern. The two positions with good observation will place effective small–
arms fire on the breaching element. The enemy will attempt to reposition the
eastern squad to the trench vicinity of the breach site.
•
Friendly counteraction: The support element repositions as necessary to
prevent enemy movement toward the breach site. The close–in support
element (with the breaching platoon) suppresses the two enemy positions in
vicinity of the breach. The lead PLT seizes a foothold and begins clearing the
trench towards the enemy CP. If the breach is unsuccessful due to
reinforcement by the enemy eastern squad, the breaching platoon will
maintain pressure here while the trail platoon moves to the alternate breach
site (vicinity of the enemy's vacated eastern squad position), to conduct a
breach and clear toward the enemy CP. On–order, the lead platoon will
disengage and follow through the alternate breach site.
(g) Seventh action: The lead PLT seizes its objective and begins to pass through the
trail PLT (main effort).
FM 7-10
2-39
•
Enemy reaction: Options include repositioning soldiers, committing his
reserve, withdrawing from this position, or counterattacking with another unit.
•
Friendly counteraction: Continue the attack. Once the lead platoon has seized
its objective, any enemy repositioning will have little effect. If the enemy has
a reserve, it should be too small to have much effect. If he attempts to
withdraw, the support element (with the FSO) will destroy him. A
counterattack is unlikely and would be engaged by the isolation forces,
providing at least 15 minutes early warning.
(h) Eighth action: Main effort platoon seizes the dominant terrain and destroys the
enemy CP. Both platoons clear their objectives.
•
Enemy reaction: Withdraw or wait for outside assistance. His remaining
positions are dominated by the high ground (OBJ BOX) seized by the main
effort.
•
Friendly counteraction: None.
(2) Defensive course of action war game. This is a war game for the COA presented
in paragraph 2-19g(2).
(a) First action: Enemy divisional or regimental reconnaissance assets arrive in the
company sector.
•
Friendly reaction: Security forces engage with direct and indirect fires.
•
Enemy counteraction: If the reconnaissance unit was destroyed, the enemy
may send other assets to replace them. If not destroyed, they will withdraw
and attempt to bypass.
(b) Second action: Enemy CRP enters the company sector.
•
Friendly reaction: Forward platoons report situation. Confirm enemy most
probable COA. Antiarmor section prepares to initiate ambush at intersection.
•
Enemy counteraction: None unless the CRP detects the forward platoons or
prior reconnaissance has located the company's positions. If so, the enemy
will use indirect fires while the CRP determines the company's dispositions.
(c) Third action: The antiarmor section initiates ambush on the CRP. Forward
platoons engage enemy in sectors with direct and indirect fires.
•
Enemy reaction: CRP seeks cover and reports. Lead companies deploy, return
fire, and attempt to fight through forward platoons. Indirect fires called on any
friendly concentrations located.
•
Friendly counteraction: Avoid decisive engagements. Maintain dispersed
formations.
(d) Fourth action: Main effort platoon engages enemy south of hill 657. Priority of
fires shift to the main effort.
•
Enemy reaction: He attempts to concentrate against the main effort by fixing
with direct and indirect fires. Then he conducts a flank attack with dismounted
infantry and repositions indirect assets (AGS 17s and BN mortars) to support
this attack.
•
Friendly counteraction: Forward platoons engage following forces to disrupt
the attack against the main effort. Destroy/disrupt C2 and CS assets as they
move into sector. Request CAS on enemy concentrating south of hill 657.
(Preplanned CAS mission.)
FM 7-10
2-40
(e) Fifth action: Enemy assault against the main effort platoon. The enemy second
echelon battalion may begin moving through forward platoon sectors.
•
Friendly reaction: Depends on the combat potential the enemy has positioned
to support the assault. Possibly issue a FRAGO to the antiarmor section and
the platoon(-) in the northern sector to reorient against the enemy attacking the
main effort. Arrival of a second echelon battalion indicates the enemy main
attack is in our sector. This is a change to the enemy most probable COA
requiring a FRAGO by battalion.
(f) Sixth action: The main effort successfully retains hill 657.
•
Enemy reaction: Remnants of the attacking unit occupy defensive positions
vicinity hill 657 to reorganize and prepare to assault again or support another
unit's assault. If the lead battalion is unsuccessful, it is unlikely that the second
echelon battalion will be committed in this sector.
•
Friendly counteraction: Issue a FRAGO to focus all available combat power
to destroy this enemy force before he can reorganize.
OR
Action: The main effort is unsuccessful in retaining hill 657.
•
Enemy reaction: If the enemy attack is successful, he will reorganize and
continue the attack. Depending on his losses, he may pass through another
company at this time.
•
Friendly counteraction: The main effort platoon withdraws to a rally point in
the restricted terrain, reorganizes, and interdicts enemy moving north.
Forward platoons continue to destroy enemy in sector. The company reports
the situation to battalion and continues to operate to disrupt enemy forces
moving through sector.
(g) Seventh action: Exploit success of the main effort. (Even if the main effort did not
retain hill 657, the enemy combat potential is degraded and his momentum disrupted.)
Concentrate combat power against enemy weaknesses exposed throughout the company
sector, such as isolated enemy positions, C2, and CS assets.
•
Enemy reaction: He will attempt to reorganize to continue the attack.
•
Friendly counteraction: Maintain pressure on the enemy throughout the depth
of his unit. Use artillery, mortars, and CAS against his strengths.
c.
Information Learned. Upon completing the war game of each COA, the leader
should know its advantages and disadvantages. He also has identified any critical events
that will determine the success or failure of each COA. These factors are used during
Step 4 to compare the COAs. In addition, the commander now has a much greater
appreciation for the conduct of this mission. The CO will use this information later as he
expands the selected COA into the tentative plan for his company.
2-21.
COMPARE THE COURSES OF ACTION
At Step 4 in the estimate process, the CO compares the COAs and selects the one that is
most likely to accomplish the assigned mission. The CO considers the advantages and
disadvantages for each COA. He also considers how the critical events impact on each
COA. Then he selects significant factors based on this mission; the COAs are then
compared using these factors. The CO may also compare the COAs using only the
FM 7-10
2-41
advantages and disadvantages for each COA. This method is more subjective than using
the significant factors that are common to all COAs.
a.
Advantages and Disadvantages. These are the specific strengths and weaknesses
that were noted during the war-game process. They may pertain to the mission, the
terrain, the enemy, or any other aspect of the operation. They may apply to just one COA
or to all of them.
(1) Examples of advantages include:
•
Uses the most covered and concealed routes.
•
Allows extra time for the leader's reconnaissance.
•
Supports the reduction of the soldier's loads.
•
Provides an excellent chance of surprise.
•
Limits the risk on the secondary approach.
(2) Examples of disadvantages include:
•
High risk of detection by the enemy's OP.
•
Mortar ammunition requirements increase the soldier's loads.
•
Time constraint requires daylight movement.
•
Does not attack the enemy's weakest point.
b. Critical Events. In every operation, there are certain events or activities that will
have a major impact on the success of the mission. These may have been identified
during the mission analysis, the analysis of the situation, or the war-game process.
Normally at company level, these critical events will apply to each COA. The significant
factors for the comparison will often result from these critical events. Examples of
possible critical events include:
•
A forward passage of lines.
•
Crossing a major stream en route to the objective.
•
Breaching the protective obstacles.
•
Gaining a foothold on the objective.
•
Evacuating the casualties.
•
Defeating the enemy's reconnaissance.
•
Controlling the unit's fires into an engagement area.
c.
Significant Factors. These are common factors that provide the focus for
comparing each COA. They are selected for each tactical mission based on mission
accomplishment. These factors are significant because they impact directly on the success
of the mission. A long list reduces the importance of the most significant factors;
therefore, the CO should limit the number of factors to a manageable number. Normally
three to seven factors will provide a good comparison. There are two basic types of
significant factors, mission-specific and general.
(1) Mission-specific factors. These are generated from the requirements for a specific
mission. They are often determined by the critical events identified during the war–game
process. They may also result from the advantages and disadvantages for each COA.
Examples include:
•
Casualty evacuation.
•
Soldier's load.
•
Effectiveness in accomplishing the mission.
•
Time usage.
FM 7-10
2-42
(2) General factors. These are for the employment of infantry in all operations. They
include the Principles of War, the imperatives of AirLand Battle, the risk involved, the
characteristics of the offense or defense, and other such doctrinal guidelines. Although
these apply in every tactical operation, certain ones are more important to the mission at
hand. The CO determines which these are and then lists them as significant factors for
this mission. Examples include:
•
Security.
•
Simplicity.
•
Surprise.
•
Exploitation of enemy weaknesses.
•
Risk.
•
Disruption of the enemy attack.
•
Concentration at the decisive point.
•
Use of limited visibility.
•
Employment of key weapons.
d. Decision Matrix. Once the CO has selected the significant factors, he must
decide which COA supports each factor the best. The CO compares the COAs using each
factor and then makes his decision.
(1) A more detailed technique involves a simple COA decision matrix. This may be
required when there are too many factors for the CO to compare. It is important that the
CO uses significant factors from his estimate of the situation to develop the matrix.
Mission specific factors are used as much as possible. Figure 2-9 provides an example of
a COA decision matrix.
(2) There are several ways to use this matrix. The simplest way is to give a + to the
COA which best supports each factor. All other COAs would receive a -. Another way is
to rank order each COA for each factor. The best COA for each factor receives a 1, next
best a 2, and the COA that supports the factor the least would receive a 3. The COA with
the lowest sum supports the significant factors best.
2-22.
MAKE A DECISION
Step 5 of the estimate process involves making the decision. The CO selects the COA
that he believes has the best chance of accomplishing the mission. The results of the
comparison in Step 4 assist him in making this decision, but they do not make it for him.
The CO may not select the COA that the decision matrix indicates is the best. There may
be factors that were not included in the matrix but now have a significant impact on the
mission. For example: As he analyzed the troops available in Step 2 and selected his
significant factors during Step 4, he was unaware of the current status of his company's
physical condition. Upon learning of the extent of his company's fatigue, the CO may
decide this is the most significant factor to consider in making this decision. Even if the
decision had already been made and orders issued before this new information was
determined, the CO should immediately update his estimate and decide what impact this
may have on his mission. It is this continuous estimate process that allows the CO to
make rapid decisions during the fight.
FM 7-10
2-43
Figure 2-9. Course of action decision matrix.
2-23.
COMPLETE THE TENTATIVE PLAN
The focus of this process is to generate overwhelming combat power at the decisive
point. To do this, the CO positions his units and weapons, assigns them tasks and
purposes, allocates resources, designates control measures, and synchronizes activities.
He refers back to the deductions from his estimate to complete his plan. To complete the
tentative plan, the CO begins with the COA selected at Step 5 of the estimate. He
expands this COA into a complete five-paragraph OPORD. The OPORD format is a
guide for deciding what information is required to complete the plan.
a.
Task Organization. The generic task organization from the COA is the basis for
this; some changes may have resulted from the war-game process. The CO refers to the
task organization in the battalion order and ensures all assets under his control are
included in his plan. The CO takes the generic task organization from the COA and
develops a specific task organization that assigns squads and weapons to each of his
platoons. An example of a company task organization follows:
FM 7-10
2-44
1st PLT(-)
2d PLT
3d PLT
1&2 Tms/AA SEC
AA SEC(-)
Co Control
60-mm SEC
1/1st PLT
b. Enemy Situation. The enemy situation in the BN OPORD (paragraph 1a) is the
basis for this, but the CO refined this to provide the detail required by his subordinates.
The CO considers the results of his enemy analysis to determine the information he
includes in his paragraph 1a. This may include the enemy's composition, disposition,
strength, recent activities, and capabilities. He also includes the enemy's most probable
COA, which was used in the war-game process. A sketch or enemy overlay should be
included.
c.
Friendly Situation. This information is found in paragraphs 1b, 2, and 3 in the
BN OPORD. The BN mission and concept are stated in paragraphs 2 and 3a respectively.
The units adjacent to the company (left, right, front, and rear) are found on the operations
overlay. Their mission statements are found in both paragraph 1b (adjacent BNs) and 3a
(adjacent Cos). Units supporting the company will be found in the battalion task
organization and in paragraphs 1b (external to the BN) and paragraph 3 (BN assets).
d. Mission Statement. The company mission statement was determined at Step 1 of
the estimate. It is normally clearly stated in paragraph 3 of the BN OPORD.
e.
Concept of the Operation. This paragraph describes how the CO intends to
accomplish his mission. At company level, a maneuver and fires subparagraph will
always be included. When needed to clarify the concept or to ensure synchronization,
additional subparagraphs, such as engineering, EW, intelligence, and counterair
operations may be included. The operations overlay/concept sketch is referenced here.
(1) Maneuver. The maneuver paragraph should be focused on the decisive action. It
may, however, describe the maneuver throughout the operation. At company level, a
maneuver paragraph that assigns the missions to each platoon/section and identifies the
main effort normally requires no additional clarification. When additional information is
required to clarify the concept, the CO may insert this information in the concept of the
operation paragraph. Information such as movement formations and techniques, or the
order of movement, should only be included if it clarifies the concept. Normally, the
coordinating instructions paragraph is the appropriate location for this type of
information.
(2) Fires. This paragraph describes how the CO intends for the fires to support his
maneuver. The company FSO may prepare this paragraph based on the CO's guidance.
This paragraph normally states the purpose to be achieved by the fires, the priority of
fires for the company, and the allocation of any priority targets. A target list or overlay
may be referenced here. Specific taskings for the company mortars should only be stated
here if they clarify the concept of the operation.
(3) Engineering. Often, especially in defensive operations, this paragraph is required
to clarify the CO's concept for preparing obstacles, mines and fortifications. When the
company is supported by engineer equipment or units, the CO would state his guidance
for employing these assets here. He may do this by stating the priority of effort
FM 7-10
2-45
(survivability, countermobility, and mobility) and the priority of support for his
subordinates (3d PLT, 1st PLT, AA section, 2d PLT, mortar section, and the CP).
f.
Tasks to Maneuver Units. This paragraph lists the tasks/limitations for each of
the platoons and sections. Each of these subordinate units will have a separate paragraph.
The information included here comes from two sources–the tasks and limitations
identified during the mission analysis and from the war game process.
(1) The tasks from the mission analysis may require only one subordinate unit to
complete them. In this case, the CO decides which unit should do this task and assigns it.
Examples of these tasks are listed.
•
Provide one squad to carry ammunition for the battalion mortar platoon.
•
Establish an OP at NB233876 NLT 231000.
Others may require two or more subordinate units or even the entire company to comply
with them. In this case, the CO would list these tasks or limitations in the coordinating
instructions.
(2) Most of these requirements result from the war game of the COA. They include—
•
How to synchronize the operation.
•
How to secure the company throughout the operation.
•
How to concentrate the combat potential at decisive points.
•
How to manage the soldier's load.
•
How to degrade the enemy's combat potential.
To accomplish each of these requirements, the CO assigns specific taskings to each of his
units. He also assigns specific limitations to certain subordinates. These may be listed
here or noted on the company operations overlay/concept sketch.
g. Tasks to Combat Support Units. The 60-mm LWCM section and other CS units
(engineers, ADA, and so forth) are addressed here.
h. Coordinating Instructions. These are requirements that apply to two or more
subordinate units. These also may have been assigned by battalion or required based on
the COA developed by the company CO. If they do not apply to all the subordinate units,
then clearly state those units that must comply. Examples might be:
•
MOPP4 in effect at 160730 MAR 94.
•
The company time schedule.
•
2d and 3d PLT will each carry 30 mortar rounds.
•
The consolidation plan.
•
The BN rehearsal is at 211500 DEC 91.
i.
Service Support. This paragraph provides the critical logistical information
required to sustain the company during the operation. Most of this information is
extracted from the battalion OPORD. There are also certain requirements generated from
the company commander's concept. These may include:
•
The location for the company trains.
•
The casualty evacuation plan.
•
Instructions for caching rucksacks, supplies, or other equipment.
•
The resupply plan.
j.
Command and Signal. This paragraph states where the C2 facilities and key
personnel will be located during the operation. It includes the following information from
the BN OPORD that subordinates require.
FM 7-10
2-46
(1) Locations for the BN main CP and the command group.
(2) Critical communication requirements, such as radio listening silence in effect
forward of the LD.
(3) Signals for specific events or actions. The company concept will have similar
requirements for the company commander to include. These may include:
•
The locations for the CO or CP, and the XO.
•
Adjustments to the unit SOP, such as a change to the succession of command
or the standard PZ markings.
•
Emergency/visual signals for critical actions.
•
Signal information.
NOTE:
The tentative plan should stand alone and have essential information so that it
can be issued and executed if time does not permit physical reconnaissance to
verify.
Section IV.
CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS
Continuous operations are combat operations that continue around the clock at a high
pace, requiring soldiers to fight without letup for extended periods. Opportunities for
sleep are scattered throughout the day and night. (See FM 22-9.) Sustained operations are
operations conducted 24 hours a day with little or no opportunity for sleep.
2-24.
SUSTAINED OPERATIONS
Sustained operations are when the same soldiers or small units engage in combat
operations with no opportunity for the unit to stand down and little time for soldiers to
sleep. Infantry units must routinely plan to conduct sustained operations.
2-25.
DEGRADATION OF COMBAT CAPABILITY
As sustained operations continue, all soldiers begin to show effects of general fatigue and
lack of sleep. Unless counteracted, unit performance of combat tasks decline. Recent
studies indicate performance is degraded by 25 percent for each 24–hour period without
sleep. After 96 hours, performance can be expected to be near zero. Determination to
endure must be supplemented by countering the adverse effects to slow the rate of
decline. It becomes more difficult to perform assigned tasks to the required standard.
Leaders need to recognize signs of serious sleep deprivation in their subordinates.
a.
Studies show that the performance in all duty positions does not degrade the
same. Performance in a duty position where there is a heavy load of mental tasks
(determining, calculating, thinking, decision-making) degrades faster than the
performance in a position whose tasks are mainly physical (firing, running, lifting,
digging).
FM 7-10
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b. In addition to the degradation caused by fear, fatigue, and loss of sleep, there is a
significant loss of effectiveness caused by operation in MOPP4. When units are using full
NBC protective equipment, judgment is degraded, communications are less effective, and
information flow between units is reduced.
2-26.
TECHNIQUES TO SUSTAIN OPERATIONS
To maintain effectiveness, adverse conditions of sustained operations must be overcome.
The following are methods the commander can use to reduce degradation, develop the
required abilities in soldiers, and prepare his unit to fight sustained operations.
a.
Build Individual Soldier Resources. Preventive measures are often more
effective for keeping groups healthy and active. They include improving or maintaining
good physical condition, balanced nutrition, and immunizations.
b. Provide Good Leadership. Leadership is the keystone for sustained unit
performance.
c.
Set High Standards. Achieving success during sustained operations demands the
highest standards of military professionalism.
d. Develop Individual Confidence. It is easier for units to withstand the adverse
conditions of sustained operations if they maintain an optimistic, confident outlook.
Confidence is the strongest bulwark against stress and performance degradation.
e.
Establish Reliable Communication Channels. In combat, knowledge of the
situation and the status of both enemy and friendly units sustains soldiers.
f.
Cross-train. This helps ensure that someone is always available to perform a
critical task or to help perform it. Criticality of tasks should determine the priority for
cross-training.
g. Develop Coping Skills. Coping with stress is an important combat skill in
sustained operations. (See FM 26-2.) Severe problems may develop after several days if
leaders and soldiers do not sleep at least 4 hours every 24 hours. Ideally, the 4 hours
should be continuous.
h. Develop Good Physical Fitness. Being physically fit strengthens the ability to
recover from exhaustion.
i.
Build Stamina. Fit soldiers withstand the stresses of sustained operations better.
j.
Foster a Spirit and Attitude of Winning. In sustained operations, a genuine and
single-minded dedication often gives the extra strength needed to win.
k. Foster Cohesion, Esprit, Morale, and Commitment. Cohesion holds units
together; esprit keeps them dedicated to the mission. Unit cohesion and esprit are key
sources of strength for enduring the stresses of sustained operations.
l.
Guarantee and Encourage the Free Exercise of Soldier's Faith. Regardless of
their religious background, most soldiers are reassured and calmed if the commander
encourages and assists the battalion chaplain in his visits to the unit.
FM 7-10
2-48
2-27.
UNIT SLEEP PLAN
The commander must ensure his unit can conduct both sustained and continuous
operations. The only way a unit can conduct CONOPs is that all soldiers and leaders get
enough rest.
a.
The CO must devise and enforce a work–rest–sleep plan for the company. It must
include provisions for leaders as well as soldiers to sleep. Priority for sleep should go to
those whose judgment and decision-making are critical to mission accomplishment.
b. The plan should allow soldiers at least 4 to 5 hours of sleep each 24 hours; this
will sustain performance for several days. Six to 8 hours of sleep can sustain performance
indefinitely.
3-1
CHAPTER 3
MOVEMENT
Movement should be as rapid as the terrain, the mobility of the force,
and the enemy situation, will permit.
FM 100-5, 1986
One of the strengths of the infantry rifle company, is its ability to move
across almost any terrain in any weather conditions. When the rifle
company is able to move undetected, it gains an advantage over the enemy
force. If detected during movement, the enemy may be able to apply
substantial combat power against the company. The ability to gain and or
maintain the initiative often depends on undetected movement by the unit.
The rifle company depends heavily upon the terrain for protection from
the enemy's fires. The CO also protects his company during movement, by
ensuring the company is using proper movement formations and
techniques, and by applying the movement fundamentals discussed in this
chapter.
3-1.
FUNDAMENTALS
The CO's estimate of the situation assists him in deciding how to most effectively move
his unit. There is no set method for this. The following fundamentals provide guidance
for planning effective company movements.
a.
Do Not Confuse Movement With Maneuver. Maneuver is defined as movement
supported by fire to gain a position of advantage over the enemy. At company level, there
is considerable overlap between the two. When planning company movements, the CO
must ensure the unit is moving in a way that supports a rapid transition to maneuver.
Once contact with the enemy is made, squads and platoons receiving effective fire
execute the appropriate battle drills, and leaders begin to maneuver their units.
b. Conduct Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance should be conducted by all echelons.
The enemy situation and the available planning time may limit the unit's reconnaissance,
but leaders at every level must aggressively seek information about the terrain and
enemy. One effective technique is to send a reconnaissance element forward of the lead
platoon. Even if this unit is only 15 minutes ahead of the company, it can still provide
valuable information/reaction time for the company.
c.
Effectively Use the Terrain and Weather. The company should move on
covered and concealed routes. Moving during limited visibility provides more
concealment, and the enemy may be less alert during these periods. Plan to avoid known
danger areas.
d. Move As Squads and Platoons. The advantages to moving the company by
squads and platoons include:
Faster movement.
Better security. A small unit is less likely to be detected because it requires
less cover and concealment.
FM 7-10
3-2
More dispersion. The dispersion gained by moving the company by squads
makes it much more difficult for the enemy to concentrate his fires against the
company, especially indirect fires, CAS, and chemical agents. Subordinate
units also gain room to maneuver.
Better OPSEC. It is much more difficult for the enemy to determine what the
friendly force is doing if all he has are isolated squadsized spot reports.
Although the advantages normally outweigh the disadvantages, when planning
decentralized movements, the CO should also consider the following:
Numerous linkups are required to regroup the company.
In the event of enemy contact, massing combat power to support a hasty
attack or disengagement may take longer.
There may be some squads without radio communications. This problem can
be reduced by planning for contingencies and by using all available resources.
e.
Maintain Security During the Movement. A primary responsibility of the CO is
to protect his unit at all times. This is critical during movement because the company is
extremely vulnerable to enemy fires. In addition to the fundamentals listed earlier, the
CO provides security for the company by applying the following:
Use the proper movement formation and technique.
Move as fast as the situation will allow. This may degrade the enemy's ability
to detect the unit and the effectiveness of his fires once detected.
Ensure that subordinate units correctly position security elements to the
flanks, front, and rear at a distance that prevents enemy direct fire on the main
body. (Normally, the company formation and movement technique provides
greater security to the front, it is the flanks and rear that must be secured by
these security elements. The company SOP should state who is responsible for
providing these security elements.)
Enforce noise and light discipline.
Ensure all personnel camouflage themselves and their equipment.
f.
Make Contact With the Smallest Element Possible. By making contact with a
small element, the CO maintains the ability to maneuver with the majority of his combat
potential. The soldiers who first receive enemy fires are most likely to become casualties.
They also are more likely to be suppressed and fixed by the enemy.
3-2.
LOCATIONS OF KEY LEADERS AND WEAPONS
The locations for key leaders and weapons depend on the situation, the movement
formation and technique, and the organization of the rifle company. This paragraph
provides guidance for the CO in deciding where these assets should locate.
a.
The Company Commander. The CO locates where he can see and control the
company. Normally, he positions the CP at his location, but at times he may move
separate from the CP. He may take just his company net RATELO and travel with one of
his platoons. This allows him to move with a platoon without disrupting their formation.
Generally, the CO (with the CP) operates just behind the lead platoon.
b. The Company Command Post. The CP consists of the CO, his RATELOs, the
FIST HQ, the communications and NBC sergeants, and possibly other personnel and
attachments (XO, 1SG, or a security element). The company CP is located where it can
best support the CO and maintain communications. To maintain communications, the CP
FM 7-10
3-3
may need to locate away from the CO. In this case, the XO would control the CP (or part
of it) and maintain communications with higher or adjacent units while the CO locates
where he can best control the company. Although the CP can move independently, it is
normally located in the company formation where it is secured by the other platoons and
sections.
c.
The Company Fire Support Officer. The company FSO normally moves with
the CO. At times, he may locate elsewhere to control indirect fires or relay calls for fire
from the platoon FOs.
d. The Company Mortars. The company mortars are located in the formation
where they can provide responsive fires in the event of enemy contact. They should be
positioned where they gain security from the other units in the company. They normally
are not positioned last in the company formation, because they have limited capability to
provide security and their soldier's load often makes them the slowest element in the
company. Also, when last in movement, their ammunition, carried by the other soldiers in
the company, is not readily available. The mortar squads may be attached to platoons.
This would allow two platoons the ability to provide indirect fires (of reduced effects)
when in overwatch without having to shift the mortar section each time.
e.
The Antiarmor Section. This section may move as a unit or attach its teams to
the platoons. Moving as a section allows the CO to more quickly mass his antiarmor
fires. Attaching teams to the platoons provides some antiarmor and thermal capability
throughout the company. This also allows alternating overwatch platoons without having
to shift the antiarmor section from platoon to platoon.
f.
Other Attachments. The locations of other attachments will depend on the
situation. CS assets, such as engineers or Stinger teams, are positioned where they can
best support the company. For example, the engineers may follow the lead platoon where
they would be more responsive, and the Stinger team positioned where the terrain best
supports engaging enemy aircraft.
g. Wheeled Vehicles. Wheeled vehicle attachments, such as TOWs, the mortar
platoon, ambulances, or resupply vehicles, present certain problems to the rifle company
commander. The terrain that the infantry company normally moves along will not support
wheeled vehicles. It may be possible for the company to secure the roads or trails these
vehicles will move on by moving through and securing more restrictive terrain on the
flanks.
3-3.
MOVEMENT FORMATIONS
The company uses six basic movement formations; the column, the line, the vee, the
wedge, the file, and the echelon, right or left. These formations describe the locations of
the company's platoons and sections in relation to each other. They are guides on how to
form the company for movement. Each formation aids control, security, and firepower to
varying degrees. The best formation to use depends on the
Mission.
Enemy situation.
Terrain.
Weather and visibility conditions (ability to control).
Speed of movement desired.
Degree of flexibility desired.
FM 7-10
3-4
a.
When moving crosscountry, the distance between soldiers and between platoons
varies according to the terrain and the situation. Soldiers should constantly observe their
sectors for likely enemy positions, and look for cover that can be reached quickly in case
of enemy contact.
b. The commander may specify the platoon formations to be used within the
company formation. If he does not, each platoon leader selects his platoon's formation.
For example, the lead platoon leader may select a formation that permits good
observation and massing of fire to the front (vee formation). The second platoon leader
may select a formation that permits fast movement to overwatch positions and good flank
security (wedge formation). (Squad and platoon movement formations and techniques are
discussed in FM 7-8.)
c.
When moving in a formation, the company normally guides on the base platoon to
ease control. This should be the lead platoon. In the line or the vee formation, the CO
must specify which is the base platoon. The other platoons key their speed and direction
on the base platoon. This permits quick changes and lets the commander control the
movement of the entire company by controlling just the base platoon. The commander
normally locates himself within the formation where he can best see and direct the
movement of the base platoon. Terrain features may be designated, using the control
measures discussed in paragraph 3-5, for the base platoon to guide on.
d. One technique used to alert units for possible movement or for units to report their
readiness to move is an alert status. With this technique, a system of four readiness
conditions is used to reflect the amount of time a unit will have before it is required to
move.
REDCON 1: Be prepared to move immediately.
REDCON 2: Be prepared to move in 15 minutes.
REDCON 3: Be prepared to move in 1 hour.
REDCON 4: Be prepared to move in 2 hours.
Using this technique, a CO can quickly and concisely alert a unit for movement or report
its readiness to move.
e.
The following is a discussion of the infantry company movement formations. (See
Figure 3-1 for a legend of symbols for company personnel and elements.)
(1) Column. This movement formation allows the company to make contact with one
platoon and maneuver with the two trail platoons. It is a flexible formation, allowing easy
transition to other formations. It provides good all–round security and allows fast
movement. It provides good dispersion and aids maneuver and control, especially during
limited visibility. The company can deliver a limited volume of fire to the front and to the
rear, but a high volume to the flanks. Figure 3-2 depicts one version of a company
column; it shows the lead platoon in vee formation, the middle platoon in a wedge
formation, and the last platoon in column.
FM 7-10
3-5
Figure 3-1. Legend of symbols.
(2) Company line. This formation puts three platoons forward along the same
direction of movement and provides for the delivery of maximum fire to the front, but
less to the flanks. It is the most difficult formation to control. The company commander
should designate a base platoon (normally the center platoon) for the other platoons to
guide on. Flank and rear security is generally poor but is improved when the flank
platoons use echelon formations. Figure 3-3 depicts one example of a company line; it
shows the left platoon in echelon left, the center platoon in line, and the right platoon in
echelon right.
(3) Company wedge. This formation has two platoons in the rear that can overwatch
or trail the lead platoon. It provides for immediate fire to the front or the flanks. The
commander can make contact with a small element and still maneuver one or two
platoons. If the company is hit from the flank, one platoon is free to maneuver. This
formation is hard to control, but it allows faster movement than the company vee
formation. Figure 3-4 depicts one example of the company wedge; it shows the lead
platoon in wedge, the left platoon in column, and the right platoon in echelon right.
FM 7-10
3-6
Figure 3-2. Company column.
FM 7-10
3-7
Figure 3-3. Company line.
Figure 3-4. Company wedge.
(4) Company vee. This formation has two platoons forward to provide immediate fire
on contact or to flank the enemy. It also has one platoon in the rear, which can either
overwatch or trail the others. If the company is hit from either flank, two platoons can
provide fire and one is free to maneuver. This formation is hard to control and slows
movement. The commander designates one of the forward platoons as the base platoon.
Figure 3-5 depicts one example of a company vee; it shows all platoons in wedge.
FM 7-10
3-8
Figure 3-5. Company vee.
(5) Company file. This formation is formed by arranging platoon and section files
behind the lead element. This is the easiest formation to control. It allows rapid
movement in close/restricted terrain or limited visibility and enhances control and
concealment. It is also the least secure formation and the hardest from which to
maneuver. Figure 3-6 depicts one example of a company file; it shows all units in file.
FM 7-10
3-9
Figure 3-6. Company file.
FM 7-10
3-10
(a) The commander locates well forward with the lead platoon headquarters or right
behind the lead security element. This increases the commander's control by being in
position to make critical decisions. The CP can be placed farther back (behind the lead
platoon) to avoid interfering with the lead platoon's movement and to aid
communications with other elements.
(b) The XO or 1SG is placed last, or nearly last, in the company file to provide
leadership and to prevent breaks in contact within the file.
(c) The company file is vulnerable to breaks in contact and should only be used when
necessary and for short periods of time. A company of 120 men will stretch out over 600
meters in a company file with a pass time of more than 20 minutes.
(6) Echelon right or left. This formation is used if the situation is vague and enemy
contact to the front or on one of the flanks is likely. Normally, an obstacle or another
friendly unit exists on the flank of the company opposite the echeloned flank. This
prevents enemy contact on that side. This formation provides a good volume of fire and
protection to the echeloned flank, but less to the opposite flank. Figure 3-7 depicts one
example of the echelon right formation; it shows the lead platoon in echelon left, the
middle platoon in wedge, and the last platoon in column.
FM 7-10
3-11
Figure 3-7. Echelon right.
(7) Formation selection. The CO selects the formation that provides the proper
control, security, and speed. Table 3-1 provides a comparison of the six movement
formations.
FM 7-10
3-12
FORMATION
SECURITY
FIRES
CONTROL
SPEED
COLUMN
GOOD DISPERSION
GOOD 360
SECURITY
GOOD TO FRONT
REAR
EXCELLENT TO
THE FLANKS
EASY TO
CONTROL
FLEXIBLE
FORMATION
FAST
LINE
EXCELLENT TO THE
FRONT
POOR TO THE
FLANK REAR
EXCELLENT TO
THE FRONT
POOR TO THE
FLANK REAR
DIFFICULT TO
CONTROL
INFLEXIBLE
FORMATION
SLOW
WEDGE
GOOD 360
SECURITY
GOOD TO THE
FRONT FLANKS
LESS
DIFFICULT
THAN THE LINE
FLEXIBLE
FORMATION
FASTER
THAN
THE LINE
VEE
BETTER TO THE
FRONT
VERY GOOD TO
THE FRONT
VERY
DIFFICULT
SLOW
FILE
LEAST SECURE
EFFECTIVE USE OF
CONCEALMENT
POOR
EASY TO
CONTROL
FAST
ECHELON
GOOD TO THE
ECHELONED
FLANK FRONT
GOOD TO THE
ECHELONED
FLANK FRONT
DIFFICULT
SLOW
Table 3-1. Formation comparison chart.
3-4.
MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES
There are three techniques for moving when not in contact. The commander decides
which one to use based on the likelihood of enemy contact, the need for speed, and the
terrain and visibility. Movement techniques are not fixed formations. The distances
between the soldiers and the units vary based on the mission, enemy, terrain, visibility,
and any other factor that affects control. The three movement techniques are traveling,
traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch.
a.
Traveling. This technique is used when speed is important and enemy contact is
not likely (Figure 3-8). The company moves in a company column with 20 to 50 meters
between platoons.
…[truncated]