Document text
BO©
Exercising Command and Control in an Era of Persistent Conflict
Colonel Clinton J. Ancker III, U.S. Army, Retired and
Lieutenant Colonel Michael Flynn, U.S. Army, Retired
Of the many lessons drawn from over seven years of wartime experience, one
that stands out prominently is the critical need to improve our ability to exercise
the cognitive aspects of battle command — understanding and visualizing}
— Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell
Clinton J. Ancker III is the director of
the Combined Arms Doctrine Direc¬
torate, U.S. Army Combined Arms
Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He is a
graduate of the U.S. Military Academy,
the U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College (CGSC) and the Naval
War College, and holds four masters
degrees In various disciplines. He is a
veteran of Vietnam and Desert Storm,
and served for nine years in the 11th
Armored Cavalry Regiment on three
different tours.
Michael Flynn is a doctrine author
at the Combined Arms Doctrine Di¬
rectorate. He is a graduate of Eckert
College, CGSC, and the School of
Advanced Military Science. He is a
veteran of Operation Enduring Free¬
dom in Kuwait and Afghanistan. He
served in various infantry assignments
and planning positions throughout his
career. Mr. Flynn is the lead author
of both the 2005 and 2010 versions
ofFM5-0.
PHOTO: U.S. Army Soldiers control
the crowd of Haitians waiting for food
and water during Operation Unified
Response in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 20
January 2010. (U.S. Air Force, MSGT
Jeremy Lock)
OUR ARMY, as part of a joint interdependent foree, eontinues to
engage in full speetrum operations around the world. Several global
trends — sueh as failing and failed states, resouree demands, and prolifera¬
tions of weapons of mass destruetion — ^make it likely that the next deeades
will be eharaeterized by persistent conflict. Protraeted eonfrontations
among state, nonstate, and individual aetors that are inereasingly willing to
use violenee to aehieve their politieal and ideologieal ends appear eertain.
Whether reaeting to natural disasters or eonfronting armed enemies. Army
forees will eontinue to eonduet operations in eomplex, ever-ehanging, and
uneertain operational environments.
Operational experienee and lessons, transformational ehanges, and reeent
revisions to Joint and Army doetrine now demand major revisions to Field
Manual (FM) 5-0, The Operations Process. Of the many lessons learned
from wartime experienee sinee 2001, the need to improve our ability to
exereise the “thinking” aspeets of eommand and eontrol stands out.^ The
2010 edition of FM 5-0 represents a signifieant evolution in Army doetrine
foeusing on the eognitive aspeets of eommand and eontrol.
The revised FM 5-0 deseribes how eommanders — supported by their
staffs, subordinate eommanders, and other partners — exereise eommand
and eontrol during the eonduet of full speetrum operations. In operations,
eommanders faee thinking and adaptive enemies, ehanging eivilian pereep-
tions, and differing agendas of various organizations in an operational area.
Commanders ean never prediet with eertainty how enemies or eivilians will
aet and reaet or how events may develop. During exeeution, leaders must eon-
tinuously antieipate, learn, and adapt to overeome the dynamies of ehanging
eireumstanees and adaptive adversaries. The best outeomes require leaders
to develop holistie understanding of the environment, frame problems, and
MILITARY REVIEW • March-April 2010
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1. REPORT DATE
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Field Manual 5-0. Exercising Command and Control in an Era of
Persistent Conflict
6. AUTHOR(S)
7. PEREORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leaven worth, KS, 66027
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12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
develop approaehes to solve or manage those prob¬
lems. From sueh understanding, leaders ean develop
simple, flexible plans that eommunieate their vision
and intent by foeusing on the results they expeet to
aehieve. Commanders must eneourage eontinuous
eollaboration aeross the foree to better understand
the situation as they adjust plans or reframe prob¬
lems throughout the eonduet of an operation.
Making the Manual
This revision of FM 5-0 began in parallel with
the revision of FM 3-0, Operations, in 2006. As
part of the development strategy for FM 3-0, the
Combined Arms Doetrine Direetorate (CADD)
staffed a series of issue papers to a broad audienee
of military and eivilian organizations to stimulate
debate and gain eonsensus eoneeming the Army’s
direetion for its eapstone doetrine on operations.
Topies ranged from the Army’s operational eoneept
of full speetrum operations to the eonstruetion of
the warflghting fiinetions (intelligenee, movement
and maneuver, flres, proteetion, sustainment, and
eommand and eontrol). Feedbaek from these issue
papers revealed gaps to inelude insufiieient doetrine
on assessment, a need to better deseribe how stabil¬
ity operations are integrated into full speetrum oper¬
ations, guidelines for eommand post organization
and operations, and an Army position on so-ealled
“effeets-based” operations.^ These shortfalls led
to the development of Field Manual Interim (FMI)
5-0.1, The Operations Process, published in 2006.
This interim fleld manual fllled a signifleant gap in
doetrine until the ideas in FM 3-0 and FM 5-0 eould
be fully examined, evaluated, and published. FMI
5-0.1 provided a basis for the eommand and eontrol
ehapter of FM 3-0 as well as the foundation for the
revision of FM 5-0.
During this period, the Army also examined eon-
eepts to assist eommanders in understanding eom-
plex, ill-struetured problems and ways to visualize
approaehes to solve those problems. Colleetively
known as “design,” several organizations — sueh
as Training and Doetrine Command’s (TRADOC)
Army Coneepts Integration Center, the Sehool of
Advaneed Military Studies (SAMS), and the Army
War College — explored ways to ineorporate the
theories and philosophy of design into praetieal
applieation for military operations. In January 2008,
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, Commander s
Appreciation and Campaign Design, eaptured the
latest ideas of how design eould enhanee eommand
and eontrol. Simultaneously, SAMS developed and
began teaehing its “Art of Design” eurrieulum that
addressed subjeets ranging from the theoretieal
basis of design to praetieal applieation in operations
through three formal exereises. Both the TRADOC
pamphlet and the work from SAMS signifleantly
influeneed the ineorporation of design into eom¬
mand and eontrol in Army."^
With signifleant eollaborative effort over the last
three years, the Army developed and staffed three
drafts of FM 5-0. The manual was also shared with
the Joint staff, eombatant eommands, and seleeted
interageney organizations, ineluding the Depart¬
ment of State and the United States Ageney for
International Development. CADD hosted three
aetion-offleer-level eouneils of eolonels in an effort
to synthesize and integrate over 3,000 eomments
from various organizations over three drafts to
eoalesee as mueh expert knowledge, thought, and
experienee as possible. The meetings provided
a separate forum for fostering debate, gaining
eonsensus, and resolving eritieal and important
eontributions from reviewing ageneies prior to
the TRADOC eommander’s review and approval
eonferenee held in Deeember 2009.
What is Changing and Why?
One of the first ehanges readers will note in
the new FM 5-0 is its title. Changed from Army
Planning and Orders Production to The Opera¬
tions Process, the new title refleets signifleant
modifleation to the material eovered in FM 5-0.
While retaining details of planning and planning
produets, the revised FM 5-0 expands the seope of
the manual to inelude doetrine on the exereise of
eommand and eontrol throughout the operations
proeess. This ehange is intended to better deseribe
the dynamie relationship among all the aetivities of
the operations proeess — not just planning.
The operations proeess is an organizational learn¬
ing model eonsisting of the major eommand and eon¬
trol aetivities performed during operations: planning,
preparing for, exeeuting, and eontinuously assessing
the operation. Commanders drive the operations pro¬
eess through battle eommand. The aetivities of the
operations proeess may be sequential — espeeially at
the start of an operation. However, onee operations
14
March-April 2010 • MILITARY REVIEW
FM 5-0
have begun, a headquarters often eonduets parts of
eaeh aetivity simultaneously and eyeles through the
aetivities of the operations proeess eontinuously as
the situation requires.
While simple in eoneept (plan, prepare, exeeute,
and assess), the operations proeess is dynamie in
exeeution. Commanders and staffs use the opera¬
tions proeess to integrate numerous aetivities eon-
sisting of hundreds of tasks exeeuted throughout the
headquarters. Commanders must organize and train
their staffs to think eritieally and ereatively as they
plan, prepare, and exeeute operations simultane¬
ously while eontinually assessing progress.
The Army’s model for the exereise of eommand
and eontrol through the operations proeess is not
new. The 2001 edition of FM 3-0 and the 2003 edi¬
tion of FM 6-0 eaeh addressed battle eommand and
the operations proeess in detail. The 2005 edition of
FM 5-0 deseribed how planning fit within the opera¬
tions proeess. What is new, however, is a greater
emphasis of the eommander’s role during the eon-
duet of operations and a more detailed deseription
of the interrelationships among the eommander,
staff, subordinate eommanders, and other partners
in the exereise of eommand and eontrol. FM 5-0
now provides doetrine on the operations proeess as
a whole, a ehapter on design, and a ehapter for eaeh
aetivity of the operations proeess. The appendixes
deseribe taeties, teehniques, and proeedures for
organizing the headquarters to eonduet the opera¬
tions proeess, using the military deeision-making
proeess (MDMP), eondueting troop-leading pro¬
eedures, and writing operation plans and orders.
Building on Full Spectrum
Operations
The 2005 edition of FM 5-0 foeused on offensive
and defensive operations both in examples and
in emphasis. To better aeeount for full speetrum
operations, the revised FM 5-0 ineorporates the
eentral idea of full speetrum operations through¬
out the manual. The new manual emphasizes the
importanee of understanding the eivil aspeets of
the operational environment in relationship to the
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and
support available, and time. FM 5-0 now stresses
the fundamental that, during operations, eommand¬
ers eontinually eonsider and eombine stability tasks
foeused on the populations with offensive and
defensive tasks foeused on the enemy during plan¬
ning and exeeution. It deseribes ways to develop
plans for full speetrum operations using lines of
effort and modifies the Army’s operation order to
better aeeount for eivil eonsiderations and stability
or eivil support tasks.
The ehapter on exeeution deseribes how eom¬
manders use forees and other resourees to mass
effeets at deeisive points and times. It deseribes how
eommanders seek to seize and retain the initiative,
build and maintain momentum, and exploit sueeess.
Additionally, the eommand and eontrol philosophy
of mission eommand and aeeeptanee of prudent risk
is addressed in detail in the exeeution ehapter and
throughout the new FM 5-0.
Incorporating Design Into
Army Doctrine
We often fail not because we fail to solve the
problem we face, but because we fail to face the
right problem.
— Russell L. Ackoff®
Full speetrum operations eondueted within a
population are effeetive only when eommanders
understand the issues within the eontext of that
population. Understanding eontext and then deeid-
ing how, if, and when to aet is a produet of design
and integral to the art of eommand. The revised FM
5-0 deseribes the praetiee of design throughout the
operations proeess.
Design is a methodology for applying eritieal
and ereative thinking to understand, visualize,
and deseribe eomplex, ill-struetured problems and
develop approaehes to solve them. Design under¬
pins the exereise of battle eommand within the
operations proeess, guiding the iterative and often
eyelie applieation of understanding, visualizing,
and deseribing. Design assists with the eoneep-
tual aspeets of planning to inelude understanding
The new manual emphasizes the importance of understanding
the civil aspects of the operational environment...
MILITARY REVIEW • March-April 2010
15
the operational environment and
framing the problem, visualizing a
desired end state, and eoneeptual-
izing a broad operational approaeh
to solve or manage a problem situ¬
ation. Commanders deseribe their
U.S. Army MG John A. McDonald, commander of U.S. Forces Afghanistan, speaks
with CPT Jason Adams, a physician’s assistant, Afghanistan, 20 December 2009.
understanding and visualization in
a design eoneept that drives more
detailed planning. Design is prae-
tieed eontinuously throughout the
operations proeess. As eommand-
ers learn during exeeution, they
update their understanding, modify
their visualization, and deseribe
their visualization to modify plans.
In some instanees, eommanders
may go beyond modifying the basie
plan. They may deeide to reframe
the problem and develop a new
operational approaeh resulting in
an entirely new plan.
The revised FM 5-0 devotes a ehapter to design
that deseribes the fundamentals of design and offers
a design methodology. Design is also addressed
throughout the manual to inelude ehapters on the
fundamentals of the operations proeess, planning,
exeeution, and assessment. In addition, the revised
appendix on the MDMP deseribes how design
interfaees with the MDMP.
operations, the warfighting funetions, and the five
Army information tasks.
Fundamentals of the Operations
Process
In addition to the prineiples of operations found
in FM 3-0, the doetrine that FM 5-0 preseribes is
built on six fundamentals:
other Changes
In addition to expanding the seope of the manual
to inelude all the aetivities of the operations pro¬
eess and ineorporating the eoneept of design, other
signifieant ehanges in the new FM 5-0 inelude —
• Replaeing eommand and eontrol teehniques
and produets based on the battlefield operation
systems to the warfighting functions. This affeets
several areas, to inelude organizing the staff for
operations and the formats for operation orders and
their annexes.
• Emphasizing and aeeounting for how eom¬
manders use the five Army information tasks in
shaping the operational environment.
• Deseribing how eommanders organize their staff
into eommand posts, eommand post eells, working
groups, and boards to eonduet the operations proeess.
• Updating the MDMP and operation order
format to better aeeount for design, full speetrum
• Commanders drive the operations proeess
through battle eommand.
• Situational understanding is fundamental to
effeetive eommand and eontrol.
• Critieal and ereative thinking aids in under¬
standing and deeision making throughout the opera¬
tions proeess.
• Commanders eontinually eonsider and eom-
bine tasks foeused on the populations (stability
or eivil support operations) as well as those tasks
foeused on enemy forees (offensive and defensive
operations).
• Mission eommand is the preferred method of
exereising eommand and eontrol.
• Continuous assessment enables organizational
learning and adaptation throughout the eonduet of
operations.
Commanders drive the operations process
through battle command. A key theme in the new
FM 5-0 is the eentral role of the eommander in the
16
March-April 2010 • MILITARY REVIEW
FM 5-0
operations process. While staffs perform essential
functions that amplify the effectiveness of opera¬
tions, commanders play the most important role in
the operations process through battle command.
Battle command is the art and science of under¬
standing, visualizing, describing, directing, leading,
and assessing operations to accomplish missions.
The relationships among the activities of battle
command and the activities of the operations pro¬
cess are dynamic. All activities of battle command
occur in planning, preparation, execution, and
assessment, but take on different emphasis through¬
out the conduct of operations. For example, during
planning, commanders focus their activities on
understanding, visualizing, and describing. During
execution, commanders often focus on directing,
leading, and assessing while improving their under¬
standing and modifying their visualization.
One of the major changes to the Army’s model
for battle command was the addition of the activ¬
ity of “understanding” in the 2008 edition of FM
3-0.^ The new FM 5-0 emphasizes the importance
of developing and maintaining understanding
throughout the operations process. Commanders
collaborate and dialog with superior, adjacent, and
subordinate commanders, and other military and
civilian organizations within the area of operations
to build and maintain their understanding. They
also circulate throughout their areas of operations as
often as possible, talking to subordinate command¬
ers, Soldiers, and members of other military and
civilian organizations as they observe operations for
themselves. Commanders continuously update their
understanding as the operation progresses and adjust
their visualization of the operation as required. Com¬
manders use their running estimate and the running
estimates of the staff and subordinate commanders
to assist them with understanding and visualization.
Situational understanding is fundamental to
effective command and control. Throughout the
operations process, commanders (supported by
their staffs, subordinate commanders, and other
partners) seek to build and maintain their situational
understanding — the product of applying analysis
and judgment to relevant information and knowl¬
edge — to facilitate their decision-making. Situ¬
ational understanding is essential for commanders
in establishing the situation’s context, developing
effective plans, assessing operations, and making
Battle command is the art and
science of understanding,
visualizing, describing, directing,
leading, and assessing operations
to accomplish missions.
quality decisions during execution. Commanders
and staffs must continually work to maintain their
situational understanding and work through periods
of reduced understanding as the situation evolves.
As commanders develop their situational under¬
standing, they see patterns emerge, dissipate, and
reappear in their operational environment. This
helps them direct their own forces’ actions with
respect to other friendly forces and partners, the
enemy, the terrain, and the population. While com¬
plete understanding is the ideal for planning and
decision-making, it rarely exists. Commanders must
accept they will often have to act despite significant
gaps in their understanding.
Collaboration and dialog assist in building learn¬
ing organizations and developing a shared under¬
standing of the situation. Throughout operations,
commanders, subordinate commanders, staffs,
and other partners collaborate and dialog actively,
sharing and questioning information, perceptions,
and ideas to better understand situations and make
decisions. Collaboration is two or more people or
organizations working together toward common
goals by sharing knowledge and building consen¬
sus. Dialog is a way to collaborate that involves
the candid exchange of ideas or opinions among
participants that encourages frank discussions in
areas of disagreement. Effective collaboration and
dialog leads to increased understanding of the situ¬
ation to include the problem or problems at hand.
Critical and creative thinking aids in under¬
standing and decision-making throughout the
operations process. To assist commanders in
understanding and decision-making, commanders
and staff apply critical and creative thinking tech¬
niques throughout the operations process.
Critical thinking is purposeful, refiective, and
self-regulating judgment to determine the meaning
and significance of what is observed or expressed.
Critical thinking involves determining the meaning
MILITARY REVIEW • March-April 2010
17
and significance of what is observed or expressed.
It also involves determining whether adequate
justifieation exists to aeeept eonelusions as true,
based on a given inferenee or argument. Critieal
thinking is key to understanding situations, identify¬
ing problems, finding eauses, arriving at justifiable
eonelusions, making quality plans, and assessing
the progress of operations.
Creative thinking involves ereating something
new or original. Often, leaders faee unfamiliar
problems or old problems requiring new solutions.
Creative thinking leads to new insights, novel
approaehes, fresh perspeetives, and new ways of
understanding and eoneeiving things. Leaders look at
different options to solve problems. Creative think¬
ing ineludes using adaptive approaehes (drawing
from previous similar eireumstanees) or innovative
approaehes (eoming up with eompletely new ideas.
Critieal and ereative thinking are fundamental to
understanding an operational environment, framing
problems, and developing operational approaehes
to solve or manage those problems.
Commanders continually consider and com¬
bine tasks focused on the populations (stability
or civil support operations) and tasks focused
on enemy forces (offensive and defensive
operations). Military operations involve more
than eombat between armed opponents. Winning
battles and engagements is eritieal but not suffieient
for sueeess. Shaping the eivil situation is just as
important to long-term sueeess. Beeause of this,
eommanders eontinually eonsider and eombine sta¬
bility tasks foeused on the population with offensive
and defensive tasks foeused on the enemy during
planning and exeeution. For homeland seeurity,
eommanders foeus operations on eivil support.
Mission command is the preferred method
of exercising command and control. Because of
the complex, uncertain, and ever changing nature
of operations, mission command — as opposed to
detailed command — is the preferred method for
exercising command and control. Mission com¬
mand is the conduct of military operations through
Creative thinking inciudes
using adaptive approaches...
decentralized execution based on mission orders.
Successful mission command demands that subordi¬
nate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initia¬
tive, acting aggressively and independently within
the commander’s intent. Prerequisites for effective
mission command are the use of mission orders; full
familiarity with the mission, commander’s intent, and
concept of operations; and mutual trust and under¬
standing between commanders and subordinates. FM
5-0 describes the philosophy of mission command as
it applies to all activities of the operations process.
Continuous assessment enables organizational
learning and adaptation throughout the conduct
of operations. Assessment is a continuous activity
of the operations process and a primary feedback
mechanism that enables the command as a whole
to learn and adapt. Assessment is also an activity
of battle command. Plans are based on imperfect
understanding and assumptions about how the com¬
mander expects a situation to evolve. Sometimes
results fail to meet expectations or the situation
evolves in a manner that was not anticipated,
including unanticipated success. In these cases,
the commander determines whether the results are
due to a failure in implementing the plan (execu¬
tion) or if the plan and its underlying logic were
fiawed. Continuous assessment helps commanders
recognize shortcomings in the plan and changes in
the situation. In those instances when assessment
reveals minor variances from the commander’s
visualization, commanders adjust plans as required.
In those instances when assessment reveals a sig¬
nificant variance from the commander’s original
visualization, commanders reframe the problem and
develop an entirely new plan as required.
The Way Ahead
As part of the effort to inculcate the doctrine
in FM 5-0 across the Army, the Combined Arms
Center established a doctrine, education, and train¬
ing working group. The purpose of this working
group is to reduce the period of time between doc¬
trine production and its use by the generating and
operating force. The Command and General Staff
College is leading the effort to ensure topics in FM
5-0 are sufficiently addressed in both the officer
and noncommissioned officer educations systems.
The Combined Arms Center-Training is leading
the effort to ensure training at the combat training
18
March-April 2010 • MILITARY REVIEW
FM 5-0
centers is updated to inelude topies addressed in
FM 5-0. The Combined Arms Doetrine Direetorate
is developing an FM 5-0 interaetive media study
guide to assist in the self-study of the operations
proeess. In addition, the Combined Arms Center
put together a mobile training team to inform and
edueate units aeross the Army eoneerning doetrine
on the operations proeess.
The revised FM 5-0 resulted from a signifieant
intelleetual eollaborative effort from aeross the Army.
The revised manual provides a starting point for Army
leaders in the exereise of eommand and eontrol during
operations. It establishes a eommon frame of referenee
and intelleetual tools Army leaders use to plan, prepare
for, exeeute, and assess operations. By establishing a
eommon approaeh and language for eondueting eom¬
mand and eontrol, doetrine promotes mutual under¬
standing and enhanees effeetiveness. The doetrine in
this new manual is a guide for aetion rather than a set
of fixed rules. While it provides an authoritative guide
for leaders, it requires original applieations adapted to
eireumstanees. In operations, effeetive leaders possess
the ability to spot when and where doetrine, training,
or even their past experienee no longer fit the situation,
and then adapt aeeordingly. MR
...effective leaders possess the
ability to spot when and where
doctrine, training, or even their
past experience no longer fit
the situation...
NOTES
1 . William B. Caldwell, “Design and the Art of Battle Command,” reflections from
Frontier Six, Combined Arms Center Blog, 6 March 2009 (17 October 2009).
2. United States Joint Forces Command memorandum, subject: “Vision for a Joint
Approach to Operational Design,” 6 October 2009. In this memo. General Mattis identi¬
fies the need to improve joint doctrine, training, and joint professional military education
in the areas of critical and creative thinking, particularly as they relate to planning.
3. U.S. Army Field Manual-Interim (FMI) 5-0.1 , The Operations Process and FM
3-0, Operations, clearly states that the Army would not adopt the joint concept of
effects based operations (EBO). While aspects of the EBO concept (e.g., assessment
techniques and ways to analyze the operational environment) have enhanced Army
doctrine, the Army’s doctrine on command and control is based on the philosophy
of mission command.
4. See Colonel Stefan Banach’s article, “Educating by Design: Preparing Leaders
for a Complex World,” Military Review {March-Aph\ 2009) and Brigadier General Fluba
Wass de Czege’s article “Systemic Operational Design: Learning and Adapting in
Complex Missions,” Military Review (January-February 2009) for a summary of efforts
that influenced the Army’s thinking on the application of design for military operations.
5. Jamshid Gharajedaghi, Systems Thinking: Managing Chaos and Complexity, 2d
ed. (Burlington, MS: Elsevier Inc., 2006), 126. In his discussion of defining problems,
Gharajedaghi attributes this quote to Russel Ackoff, a pioneer in systems thinking.
6. The 2001 edition of FM 3-0 and the 2003 edition of FM 6-0 discussed under¬
standing as part of the commander’s visualization. The 2008 edition of FM 3-0 added
“understanding” as an activity to the Army’s battle command model to emphasize this
critical activity throughout the conduct of operations.
New Army Field Manual
FM 5-0, The Operations Process
U.S. Army
Combined
Arms Center
“InmiwitaBl Center of thB Ann^"
U.S. Army Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD)
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027
The new FM The Oper^Uons Process, expands Army doctrine on
the exeixise of command and control during the conduct of full apectrum
operations. No longer a manual strictly concerning planning, FM now
describes the relationship of ali activities of the operations process -
planning, preparing for, execution, and asseesfng operations.
In addition^ for the first time in Aimy doctrine, the manual weaves ‘'‘design”
throughout the operations process. This version of FM 5-0 provides a
guide for Army leaders In understanding, visualizing, and describing
complex^ llPstmctured problems and developing approaches to solve them.
FM 5-0 IS scheduled to be available fpr downlped In March 2010 at the
following Combined Arms Center website: httpi^/usacac.army.mil^cac2^50i
More mformer/on may be ottmned by cahtng the U.S. Army Combined
Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD} at: DSN 552^2159.
FM 5-0
The
OPERATtONS
PROCESS
MILITARY REVIEW • March-April 2010
19