Document text
FM 20-3
Headquarters,
Department of the Army
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Field Manual
No. 20-3
Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 30 August 1999
FM 20-3
CAMOUFLAGE,
CONCEALMENT, AND
DECOYS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE
CHAPTER BASICS
1 Doctrinal Considerations
Responsibilities
Priorities
Training
Other Considerations
CHAPTER THREAT
2 Doctrine
Organization
Data Collection
Sensor Systems
CCD Versus Threat Sensors
CHAPTER FUNDAMENTALS
3 Section I — Principles
Avoiding Detection
Identifying the Threat
Avoiding Detection by Routine Surveillance
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 20-3, 14 November 1990.
Taking Countermeasures
Employing Realistic CCD
Minimizing Movement
Using Decoys
Avoiding Operational Patterns
Applying Recognition Factors
Site Selection
CCD Discipline
Section II — Techniques and Materials
Techniques
Tests and Evaluations
Natural Conditions
Data Sources
Materials
CHAPTER
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
4
Preparations
Battle
CHAPTER
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
5
Preparations
Survivability Positions and Obstacles
Battle
CHAPTER
HIGH-VALUE TARGETS
6
Section I — CCD Planning
Plans
Objective
Planning Process
Section II — Fixed Installations
Concept
Command Posts
Supplv and Water Points
Army Aviation Sites
Section III — Relocatable Units
Mobility and CCD
Built-In Capabilities
CHAPTER
SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS
7
Desert
Snow-Covered Areas
Urban Terrain
APPENDI
METRIC CONVERSION CHART
X A.
APPENDI
XB.
GUIDELINES FOR TACTICAL STANDING OPERATING
PROCEDURES
Content
Commanders' Responsibilities
Fratricide
APPENDI
XC.
CAMOUFLAGE REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES
Lightweight Camouflage Screen System
Supplemental Camouflage
Vehicle Camouflage
Training
APPENDI
XD.
INDIVIDUAL CAMOFLAGE, CONCEALMENT, AND
DECOYS
Materials
Discipline
Dispersal
Considerations
Employment
APPENDI
XE.
STANDARD CAMOUFLAUGE MATERIALS
APPENDI
XF.
THE GENEVA EMBLEM AND CAMOUFLAGE OF
MEDICAL FACILITIES
GLOSSARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AUTHORIZATION PAGE
Preface
This field manual (FM) is intended to help company-level leaders understand the principles and
techniques of camouflage, concealment, and decoys (CCD). To remain viable, all units must
apply CCD to personnel and equipment. Ignoring a threat's ability to detect friendly operations
on the battlefield is shortsighted and dangerous. Friendly units enhance their survivability
capabilities if they are well versed in CCD principles and techniques.
CCD is equal in importance to marksmanship, maneuver, and mission. It is an integral part of a
soldier's duty. CCD encompasses individual and unit efforts such as movement, light, and noise
discipline; litter control; dispersal; and deception operations. Each soldier's actions must
contribute to the unit's overall CCD posture to maximize effectiveness.
Increased survivability is the goal of a CCD plan. A unit commander must encourage each
soldier to think of survivability and CCD as synonymous terms. Training soldiers to recognize
this correlation instills a greater appreciation of CCD values.
A metric conversion chart is provided in Appendix A .
The proponent of this publication is HQ TRADOC. Send comments and recommendations on
Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank
Forms) directly to Commandant, United States Army Engineer School (USAES), ATTN: ATSE-
DOT-DD, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-6650.
This publication implements Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 2931 , Orders for the
Camouflage of the Red Cross and Red Crescent on Land in Tactical Operations.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively
to men.
Chapter 1
Basics
CCD is the use of materials and techniques to hide, blend, disguise, decoy, or disrupt the
appearance of military targets and/or their backgrounds. CCD helps prevent an enemy
from detecting or identifying friendly troops, equipment, activities, or installations.
Properly designed CCD techniques take advantage of the immediate environment and
natural and artificial materials. One of the imperatives of current military doctrine is to
conserve friendly strength for decisive action. Such conservation is aided through sound
operations security (OPSEC) and protection from attack. Protection includes all actions
that make soldiers, equipment, and units difficult to locate.
DOCTRINAL CONSIDERATIONS
1-1. CCD degrades the effectiveness of enemy reconnaissance, surveillance, and target-
acquisition (RSTA) capabilities. S ki lled observers and sophisticated sensors can be
defeated by obscuring telltale signs (signatures) of units on the battlefield. Preventing
detection impairs enemy efforts to assess friendly operational patterns, functions, and
capabilities.
1-2. CCD enhances friendly survivability by reducing an enemy's ability to detect,
identify, and engage friendly elements. Survivability encompasses all actions taken to
conserve personnel, facilities, and supplies from the effects of enemy weapons and
actions. Survivability techniques include using physical measures such as fighting and
protective positions; nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) equipment; and armor. These
actions include interrelated tactical countermeasures such as dispersion, movement
techniques, OPSEC, communications security (COMSEC), CCD, and smoke operations
(a form of CCD). Improved survivability from CCD is not restricted to combat
operations. Benefits are also derived by denying an enemy the collection of information
about friendly forces during peacetime.
1-3. Deception helps mask the real intent of primary combat operations and aids in
achieving surprise. Deception countermeasures can delay effective enemy reaction by
disguising information about friendly intentions, capabilities, objectives, and locations of
vulnerable units and facilities. Conversely, intentionally poor CCD can project
misleading information about friendly operations. Successful tactical deception depends
on stringent OPSEC.
1-4. Smoke and obscurants are effective CCD tools and greatly enhance the effectiveness
of other traditionally passive CCD techniques. Smoke and obscurants can change
battlefield dynamics by blocking or degrading the spectral bands used by an enemy's
target-acquisition and weapons systems. More recently developed obscurants are now
able to degrade nonvisual detection systems such as thermal infrared (IR) imaging
systems, selected radar systems, and laser systems. (See FM 3-50 for more information
on planning smoke operations.)
RESPONSIBILITIES
1-5. Each soldier is responsible for camouflaging and concealing himself and his
equipment. Practicing good CCD techniques lessens a soldier's probability of becoming a
target. Additionally, a thorough knowledge of CCD and its guiding principles allows a
soldier to easily recognize CCD as employed by an enemy.
1-6. A commander is responsible for CCD of his unit, and noncommissioned officers
(NCOs) supervise well-disciplined soldiers in executing CCD. They use established
standing operating procedures (SOPs) and battle drills to guide their efforts. CCD is a
combat multiplier that should be exploited to the fullest extent.
1-7. An engineer is a battlefield expert on CCD. He integrates CCD into higher unit
operations and advises commanders on all aspects of CCD employment as it relates to a
unit's current mission.
PRIORITIES
1-8. Every soldier and military unit has an inherent mission of self-protection, and they
should use all CCD means available. However, CCD countermeasures have become more
complicated due to advancing technology. Commanders must recognize that advanced
technologies have—
• Enhanced the performance of enemy recon and surveillance equipment.
• Increased an enemy's ability to use electromagnetic (EM) signature analysis for
detecting friendly units.
• Reduced the time available to apply CCD because units must perform nearly all
aspects of battlefield operations at an increased speed.
1-9. When time, camouflage materials, or other resources are insufficient to provide
adequate support to units, commanders must prioritize CCD operations. Considerations
for establishing these priorities involve analyzing the mission, enemy, terrain, weather,
troops, time available, and civilian considerations (METT-TC). The following sets forth a
METT-TC methodology to help determine CCD priorities:
• Mission. The mission is always the first and most important consideration. CCD
efforts must enhance the mission but not be so elaborate that they hinder a unit's
ability to accomplish the mission.
• Enemy. An enemy's RSTA capabilities often influence the camouflage materials
and CCD techniques needed to support a unit's mission. Before beginning a
mission, conduct an intelligence analysis to identify the enemy's RSTA
capabilities.
• Terrain and weather. The battlefield terrain generally dictates what CCD
techniques and materials are necessary. Different terrain types or background
environments (urban, mountain, forest, plains, desert, arctic) require specific CCD
techniques. (See Chapter 7 for more information.)
• Troops. Friendly troops must be well trained in CCD techniques that apply to
their mission, unit, and equipment. A change in the environment or the mission
often requires additional training on effective techniques. Leaders must also
consider the alertness of troops. Careless CCD efforts are ineffective and may
disclose a unit's location, degrade its survivability, and hamper its mission
accomplishment. Intelligence analysis should address the relative detectability of
friendly equipment and the target signatures that unit elements normally project.
• Time. Time is often a critical consideration. Elaborate CCD may not be practical
in all tactical situations. The type and amount of CCD needed are impacted by the
time a unit occupies a given area, the time available to employ CCD
countermeasures, and the time necessary to remove and reemploy camouflage
during unit relocation. Units should continue to improve and perfect CCD
measures as time allows.
• Civilian considerations. From conflict to war and from tactical to strategic,
civilians in the area of operation (AO) may be active or passive collectors of
information. Commanders and their staffs should manage this collection
capability to benefit the command and the mission.
TRAINING
1-10. CCD training must be included in every field exercise. Soldiers must be aware that
an enemy can detect, identify, and acquire targets by using resources outside the visual
portion of the EM spectrum.
INDIVIDUAL
1-11. Each member of the unit must acquire and maintain critical CCD skills. These
include the ability to analyze and use terrain effectively; to select an individual site
properly; and to hide, blend, disguise, disrupt, and decoy key signatures using natural and
artificial materials.
CAUTION
Ensure that local environmental considerations
are addressed before cutting live vegetation or
foliage in training areas.
UNIT
1-12. Unit CCD training refines individual and leader skills, introduces the element of
team coordination, and contributes to tactical realism. If CCD is to conserve friendly
strength, it must be practiced with the highest degree of discipline. The deployment and
teardown of camouflage; light, noise, and communications discipline; and signal security
must be practiced and evaluated in an integrated mission-training environment. CCD
proficiency is developed through practicing and incorporating lessons learned from
exercises and operations. A unit must incorporate CCD (who, what, where, when, and
how) into its tactical standing operating procedure (TACSOP). ( Appendix B provides
additional guidance on integrating CCD into a unit's field TACSOP.) Generally, CCD is
additive and synergistic with other defensive measures. CCD enhances unit survivability
and increases the likelihood of mission success. A unit that is well trained in CCD
operations more easily recognizes CCD as employed by an enemy, and this recognition
enhances a unit's lethality.
EVALUATION
1-13. CCD training should be realistic and integrated with a unit's training evaluations.
Employ the following techniques to enhance training evaluations:
• Have small-unit leaders evaluate their unit's CCD efforts from an enemy's
viewpoint. How a position looks from a few meters away is probably of little
importance. Evaluators should consider the following:
■ Could an approaching enemy detect and place aimed fire on the position?
■ From what distance can an enemy detect the position?
■ Which CCD principle was ignored that allowed detection?
■ Which CCD technique increased the possibility of detection?
• Use binoculars or night-vision or thermal devices, when possible, to show a unit
how it would appear to an enemy.
• Use photographs and videotapes, if available, of a unit's deployments and
positions as a method of self-evaluation.
• Incorporate ground-surveillance-radar (GSR) teams in training when possible. Let
the troops know how GSR works and have them try to defeat it.
• Request aerial multispectral (visual, IR, radar) imagery of friendly unit positions.
This imagery shows how positions appear to enemy aerial recon. Unit leaders
should try to obtain copies of opposing forces (OPFOR) cockpit heads-up display
(HUD) or videotapes, which are excellent assessment tools for determining a
unit's detectability from an enemy's perspective. Another valuable assessment tool
is the overhead imagery of a unit's actions and positions. Overhead imagery is
often difficult to obtain; but if a unit is participating in a large-scale exercise or
deployment, the imagery probably exists and can be accessed through the unit's
intelligence channels.
• Use OPFOR to make training more realistic. Supporting aviation in an OPFOR
role also helps. When possible, allow the OPFOR to participate in the after-action
review (AAR) following each mission. The unit should determine what factors
enabled the OPFOR to locate, identify, and engage the unit and what the unit
could have done to reduce its detectability.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
1-14. Warfare often results in personnel losses from fratricide. Fratricide compels
commanders to consider CCD's effect on unit recognition by friendly troops.
1-15. Army policy prescribes that camouflage aids be built into equipment and supplies
as much as possible. Battle-dress uniforms (BDUs), paint, Lightweight Camouflage
Screen systems (LCSSs), and decoys help achieve effective camouflage. These aids are
effective only if properly integrated into an overall CCD plan that uses natural materials
and terrain. During training exercises, ensure that cutting vegetation or foliage does not
adversely effect the natural environment (coordinate with local authorities). CCD aids
should not interfere with the battlefield performance of soldiers or equipment or the
installations that they are designed to protect. (See Appendix C for more information on
CSSs.)
1-16. When employed correctly, expedient CCD countermeasures are often the most
effective means of confusing an enemy. Along with the standard items and materials
listed above, soldiers can use battlefield by-products, construction materials, and
indigenous or locally procurable items to enhance unit CCD posture. For example, a
simple building decoy can be constructed with two-by-fours and plywood. With the
addition of a heat source, such as a small charcoal pit, the decoy becomes an apparently
functional building. However, as with all CCD countermeasures, ensure that expedient
treatments project the desired signatures to the enemy and do not actually increase the
unit's vulnerability to detection. Expedient CCD countermeasures are also beneficial
because the enemy has less time to study and become familiar with the selected
countermeas ure s.
Chapter 2
Threat
The enemy employs a variety of sensors to detect and identify US soldiers, equipment,
and supporting installations. These sensors may be visual, near infrared (NIR), IR,
ultraviolet (UV), acoustic, or multispectral/hyperspectral. They may be employed by
dismounted soldiers or ground-, air-, or space-mounted platforms. Such platforms are
often capable of supporting multiple sensors. Friendly troops rarely know the specific
sensor systems or combination of systems that an enemy employs. When possible,
friendly troops should protect against all known threat surveillance systems.
DOCTRINE
2-1. Many threat forces were trained and equipped by the former Soviet Union. Its long¬
standing battlefield doctrine of maskirovka is a living legacy in many former Soviet-
client states. Maskirovka incorporates all elements of CCD and tactical battlefield
deception into a cohesive and effective philosophy. During the Gulf War, Iraq used
mask ir ovka to effectively maintain its capability of surface-to-surface missiles (Scuds) in
the face of persistent coalition-force attacks. Enemy forces that are trained in maskirovka
possess a strong fundamental knowledge of CCD principles and techniques. Friendly
forces must be very careful to conduct CCD operations so that a well-trained enemy will
not easily recognize them.
2-2. Typical threat doctrine states that each battalion will continuously maintain two
observation posts when in close contact with its enemy. An additional observation post is
established when the battalion is in the defense or is preparing for an offense.
2-3. Patrolling is used extensively, but particularly during offensive operations. Patrols
are used to detect the location of enemy indirect- and direct-fire weapons, gaps in
formations, obstacles, and bypasses.
2-4. Enemy forces use raids to capture prisoners, documents, weapons, and equipment. A
recon-in-force (usually by a reinforced company or battalion) is the most likely tactic
when other methods of tactical recon have failed. A recon-in-force is often a deceptive
tactic designed to simulate an offensive and cause friendly forces to reveal defensive
positions.
ORGANIZATION
2-5. A typical enemy force conducts recon activities at all echelons. A troop recon is
usually conducted by specially trained units. The following types of enemy units might
have specific intelligence-collection missions:
• Troops. An enemy uses ordinary combat troops to perform recon. One company
per battalion trains to conduct recon operations behind enemy lines.
• Motorized rifle and tank regiments. Each regiment has a recon company and a
chemical recon platoon.
• Maneuver divisions. Divisions have a recon battalion, an engineer recon platoon,
a chemical recon platoon, and a target-acquisition battery.
DATA COLLECTION
2-6. An enemy collects information about United States (US) forces for two basic
reasons—target acquisition and intelligence production. Enemy weapons systems often
have sensors that locate and identify targets at long ranges in precise detail. Soldiers and
units should take actions to hinder the enemy's target-acquisition process. These actions
include all practical CCD operations expected to reduce the identification of soldiers,
units, and facilities.
2-7. An enemy uses sensor systems to locate and identify large Army formations and
headquarters (HQ) and to predict their future activities. Enemy detection of rear-area
activities, such as logistics centers and communications nodes, may also reveal friendly
intentions.
2-8. An enemy uses tactical recon to provide additional information on US forces'
dispositions and the terrain in which they are going to operate. The enemy's tactical recon
also attempts to identify targets for later attack by long-range artillery, rockets, aircraft,
and ground forces.
SENSOR SYSTEMS
2-9. An enemy uses many different types of electronic surveillance equipment. Sensor
systems are classified according to the part of the EM spectrum in which they operate.
Figure 2-1 shows the EM spectrum and some typical enemy sensors operating within
specific regions of the spectrum. An enemy uses detection sensors that operate in the
active or passive mode:
• Active. Active sensors emit energy that reflects from targets and is recaptured by
the emitting or other nearby sensor, indicating the presence of a target. Examples
of active sensors are searchlights and radar.
• Passive. Passive sensors do not emit energy; they collect energy, which may
indicate the presence of a target. Examples of passive sensors are the human eye,
night-vision devices (NVDs), IR imaging devices, acoustic sensors, and
photographic devices.
Radio Heat Light
Figure 2-1. EM spectrum
VISUAL
2-10. Visual sensors work in the parts of the EM spectrum that are visible to the human
eye. Enemy soldiers' eyes are the principle sensors on a battlefield. They may be aided by
binoculars, telescopic sights, and image intensifiers. Civilian populations, enemy agents,
recon teams, and patrols are visual-sensor systems from the enemy's intelligence
viewpoint. Three types of enemy visual sensors are—
• Image intensifiers. Image intensifiers are passive night-observation devices.
They amplify the low-level light that is present on even the darkest nights. These
devices are used for surveillance and as weapon sights on small arms and
vehicles. Airborne platforms are also capable of supporting image intensifiers.
• Low-light television (LLTV). LLTV combines image intensification with
television technology, and it is usually mounted on airborne platforms.
• Aerial recon, remote sensing, and imagery. Aerial photography, satellite
imagery, and video imagery allow image analysts to record and study visual
information. These analysts then produce target nomination lists that are, in effect,
priority lists of targets in a given target scene. Since analysts often have to make
subjective determinations of the identity and/or importance of a given target, the
ranking of targets provides the defender with an opportunity to use CCD to
impact an enemy's target-prioritization process. Video systems allow transmission
of visual images to the ground while the manned aircraft, satellite, or unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) is still in flight.
NEAR INFRARED
2-11. NIR sensors operate at a wavelength immediately above the visible light
wavelength of the EM spectrum (Figure 2-1 ). NIR energy reflects well from live
vegetation but reflects better from dead vegetation and most man-made materials. NIR
sensors, such as sights and periscopes, allow the human eye to detect targets based on
differences in their reflection of NIR energy. NIR sensors are partially blocked by fog,
mist, and smoke operations, although not as completely as visual sensors. An enemy's
combat vehicles use active NIR sensors that employ searchlights, scopes, and sights; but
these sensors are rapidly being replaced with image intensifiers and thermal gun sights.
INFRARED
2-12. IR sensors detect the contrasts in heat energy that targets radiate on the battlefield
and display the contrasts as different colors or shades. Because longer wavelength IR
radiation is more susceptible to atmospheric absorption than NIR radiation, IR sensors
are less affected by typical concentrations of fog or conventional smoke.
2-13. Differences in thermal mass and surface properties (reflectivity) of man-made and
natural materials result in target-to-background contrasts. These contrast levels change
dramatically over a daily cycle. For example, operating vehicles and generators, heated
buildings and tents, and soldiers are usually hotter than their background. Also,
equipment exposed to direct sunlight appears hotter than most natural backgrounds. At
night, however, equipment might appear cooler than its background if it is treated with
special emissivity coatings. In other words, military equipment, particularly metallic
equipment, generally heats up and cools off more quickly than its background.
2-14. Sophisticated, passive IR sensors (such as the Forward-Looking Infrared System
[FLIRS]) can be mounted on aircraft. FLIRS sensors provide aircrews and enemy ground
forces with real-time IR imagery that is displayed on video monitors.
2-15. Recon aircraft often employ special IR films to record temperature differences. Due
to film processing, however, these systems are subject to time delays in obtaining the
data. Newer versions of this sensor produce non-film-based images.
ULTRAVIOLET
2-16. The UV area is the part of the EM spectrum immediately below visible light. UV
sensors are more important in snow-covered areas, because snow reflects UV energy well
and most white paints and man-made objects do not reflect UV energy very well.
Photographic intelligence systems with simple UV filters highlight military targets as
dark areas against snow-covered backgrounds. These backgrounds require specially
designed camouflage that provides a high UV reflectance.
RADAR
2-17. Radar uses high-frequency radio waves to penetrate atmospheric impediments such
as fog, mist, and smoke. Radar works by transmitting a very strong burst of radio waves
and then receiving and processing the reflected waves. In general, metal objects reflect
radar waves well, while radar waves are either weakly reflected by or pass through most
other objects. The shape and size of a metal object determine the strength of the reflected
signal. A large, metal object generally reflects more signal than a small object. Therefore,
large, metal objects can be detected from greater distances. The method by which the
received radio wave is processed determines the type of radar. Radar systems commonly
used against ground forces on the battlefield include—
• Moving-target indicators (MTIs). When an EM wave hits a moving target, the
wave is reflected and changes frequency. The faster the target moves, the larger
the changes in frequency. The simplest and most common battlefield radar detects
this frequency change. Threat forces use MTIs for target acquisition. More
sophisticated developmental radar systems, such as the Joint Surveillance Target
Attack Radar System (JSTARS), use airborne surveillance platforms that
downlink captured data to ground-station modules in near real time. Ground-
based operators are then able to manipulate the data and gain heightened
situational information, which is forwarded to command-and-control (C~) nodes
to enhance tactical decision-making.
• Imaging radar. An imaging radar's receiver and processor are so sensitive that an
image of the detected target is displayed on a scope. Imaging radar, such as side¬
looking airborne radar (SLAR), is generally used on airborne or space-bome
platforms. Imaging radar typically does not provide the same resolution as the
FLIRS and is less likely to be used for terminal target acquisition.
• Countermortar (CM) and counterbattery (CB) radar. CM and CB radar
usually transmit two beams of energy that sweep above the horizon. An artillery
or mortar round or a rocket passing through the beams reflects two signals that are
received and plotted to determine the origin of the round.
ACOUSTIC
2-18. The three predominant types of acoustical detection systems are—
• Human ear. Every soldier, whether engaged in normal operations or at a listening
post, is an acoustic sensor. However, visual confirmation is usually preferred.
• Flash-sound ranging. Flash-sound ranging is used against artillery. Light travels
faster than sound, so enemy sound-ranging teams can determine the distance to a
gun tube by accurately measuring the time between seeing a muzzle flash and
hearing the sound. If the sound is detected by two or more teams, analysts plot the
ranges using automated data-processing computers. The target is located where
the plots intersect.
• Ground-based microphone array. Ground-based microphone-array systems
allow listeners to record acoustic signatures and accurately triangulate their
positions.
RADIO
2-19. Threat forces make a great effort to search for, detect, and locate the sources of US
radio communications. They use various direction-finding techniques to locate opposing
emitters. Once an emitter is detected, an enemy can take a number of actions, ranging
from simply intercepting the transmissions to jamming or targeting the emitter for
destruction. (See FM 34-1 for more information on radio sensors.)
MULTISPECTRAL AND HYPERSPECTRAL
2-20. Recent advancements in sensor acquisition and information-processing
technologies have fostered the advent of multispectral and hyperspectral sensors:
• Multispectral. Multispectral sensors typically scan a few broad-band channels
within the EM spectrum. An example of a multispectral sensor might be one
which coincidentally scans the visual and thermal IR portions of the EM
spectrum. Such sensors allow an enemy to assess a cross section of EM
wavelengths and acquire a target in one wavelength even though it might be
effectively concealed in another.
• Hyperspectral. Hyperspectral sensors collect data across a continuous portion of
the EM spectrum. These sensors scan many channels across a relatively narrow
bandwidth and provide detailed information about target spatial and spectral
patterns. Absorption and emission bands of given substances often occur within
very narrow bandwidths. They allow high-resolution, hyperspectral sensors to
distinguish the properties of the substances to a finer degree than an ordinary
broadband sensor.
CCD VERSUS THREAT SENSORS
2-21. Target acquisition can be accomplished by a variety of sensors that operate
throughout the EM spectrum. This poses a challenge in CCD planning and
employment—determining which enemy sensor(s) that CCD operations should be
designed to defeat. Unfortunately, no single answer is correct for all situations. Unit
commanders without specific guidance from higher echelons assess their tactical situation
and plan CCD operations accordingly. If intelligence data indicate that an enemy will use
visual sensors for recon and target acquisition, then visual countermeasures must be
employed. For IR or radar sensors, countermeasures that are effective in those spectra
must be employed. If a multispectral or hyperspectral threat is anticipated, CCD
operations are conducted to protect a unit in its most vulnerable EM bandwidths. Very
few available camouflage materials or techniques provide complete broadband
protection.
Chapter 3
Fundamentals
To remain a viable force on the battlefield, units must understand CCD fundamentals
because they are essential to survivability. To design and place effective CCD, soldiers
must constantly consider an enemy's point of view. (What will it see? What
characteristics will its sensors detect?) Placing a low priority on CCD because of time
constraints, minimal resources, or inconvenience could result in mission failure and
unnecessary loss of life. (Appendix D contains more information on individual CCD.)
SECTION I — PRINCIPLES
AVOIDING DETECTION
3-1. The primary goal of CCD is to avoid enemy detection; however, this is not always
feasible. In some cases, CCD may succeed by merely preventing an enemy from
identifying a target. Simply avoiding identification is often sufficient to increase
survivability. The following seven rules are critical when considering how to avoid
detection or identification:
• Identify the enemy's detection capabilities.
• Avoid detection by the enemy's routine surveillance.
• Take countermeasures against the enemy's sensors.
• Employ realistic, CCD countermeasures.
• Minimize movement.
• Use decoys properly.
• Avoid predictable operational patterns.
IDENTIFYING THE THREAT
3-2. Obtain as much information as possible about an enemy's surveillance capability.
Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) should—
• Include the sensors that an enemy may use in a particular AO.
• Include information on the enemy's tactical employment of the sensors, if
possible.
• Assess the impact of the enemy's surveillance potential on the target under
consideration. This assessment varies with the relative positions of the sensor and
the target on the battlefield, the role of the target, and the physical characteristics
of the sensor and the target.
AVOIDING DETECTION BY ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE
3-3. Sophisticated sensors often have narrow fields of view. Furthermore, sensors can be
very expensive and are unlikely to be deployed in such numbers as to enable coverage of
the entire battlefield at all times. Sophisticated sensors are most likely to be deployed in
those areas where an enemy suspects that friendly targets are deployed. The enemy may
suspect that an area contains targets because of detection by less sophisticated, wider-
coverage sensors or because of tactical analysis. Therefore, an important aspect of
remaining undetected is to avoid detection by routine enemy surveillance.
3-4. Many sensors operate as well at night as they do during the day. Therefore, darkness
does not provide effective protection from surveillance. Passive sensors are very difficult
to detect, so assume that they are being used at night. Do not allow antidetection efforts
to lapse during the hours of darkness. For example, conceal spoil while excavating a
fighting position, even at night. Certain types of smoke will also defeat NVDs.
TAKING COUNTERMEASURES
3-5. In some cases, it might be appropriate to take action against identified enemy
sensors. The ability to deploy countermeasures depends on a number of factors—the
effective range of friendly weapons, the distance to enemy sensors, and the relative cost
in resources versus the benefits of preventing the enemy's use of the sensor. An additional
factor to consider is that the countermeasure itself may provide an enemy with an
indication of friendly intentions.
EMPLOYING REALISTIC CCD
3-6. The more closely a target resembles its background, the more difficult it is for an
enemy to distinguish between the two. Adhering to this fundamental CCD principle
requires awareness of the surroundings, proper CCD skills, and the ability to identify
target EM signatures that enemy sensors will detect.
VISUAL SENSORS
3-7. The most plentiful, reliable, and timely enemy sensors are visual. Therefore, CCD
techniques effective in the visual portion of the EM spectrum are extremely important.
Something that cannot be seen is often difficult to detect, identify, and target. BDUs,
standard camouflage screening paint patterns (SCSPPs), LCSS, and battlefield obscurants
are effective CCD techniques against visual sensors. Full-coverage CCD helps avoid
visual detection by the enemy. When time is short, apply CCD first to protect the target
from the most likely direction of attack and then treat the remainder of the target as time
allows.
NEAR INFRARED SENSORS
3-8. NIR sights are effective at shorter ranges (typically 900 meters) than enemy main
guns. While red filters help preserve night vision, they cannot prevent NIR from
detecting light from long distances. Therefore, careful light discipline is an important
countermeasure to NIR sensors and visual sensors (such as image intensifiers). BDUs,
LCSS, battlefield obscurants, and SCSPPs are designed to help defeat NIR sensors.
INFRARED SENSORS
3-9. Natural materials and terrain shield heat sources from IR sensors and break up the
shape of cold and warm military targets viewed on IR sensors. Do not raise vehicle hoods
to break windshield glare because this exposes a hot spot for IR detection. Even if the IR
system is capable of locating a target, the target's actual identity can still be disguised.
Avoid building unnecessary fires. Use vehicle heaters only when necessary. BDU dyes,
LCSSs, IR-defeating obscurants, and chemical-resistant paints help break up IR
signatures; but they will not defeat IR sensors.
ULTRAVIOLET SENSORS
3-10. UV sensors are a significant threat in snow-covered areas. Winter paint patterns, the
arctic LCSS, and terrain masking are critical means for defending against these sensors.
Any kind of smoke will defeat UV sensors. Field-expedient countermeasures, such as
constructing snow walls, also provide a means of defeating UV sensors.
RADAR
3-11. An enemy uses MTL imaging, CM, and CB radars. Mission dictates the appropriate
defense, while techniques depend on the equipment available.
Moving-Target Indicator
3-12. MTI radar is a threat to ground forces near a battle area. Radar-reflecting metal on
uniforms has been reduced, and Kevlar helmets and body armor are now radar-
transparent. Plastic canteens are standard issue, and buttons and other nonmetal fasteners
have replaced metal snaps on most field uniforms. A soldier wearing only the BDU
cannot be detected until he is very close to MTI radar.
3-13. Soldiers still carry metal objects (ammunition, magazines, weapons) to accomplish
their mission, and most radar can detect these items. Therefore, movement discipline is
very important. Moving by covered routes (terrain masking) prevents radar detection.
Slow, deliberate movements across areas exposed to radar coverage helps avoid detection
by MTI radar.
3-14. Vehicles are large radar-reflecting targets, and a skilled MTI operator can even
identify the type of vehicle. Moving vehicles can be detected by MTI radar from 20
kilometers, but travelling by covered routes helps protect against surveillance.
Imaging
3-15. Imaging radar is not a threat to individual soldiers. Concealing vehicles behind
earth, masonry walls, or dense foliage effectively screens them from imaging radar. Light
foliage may provide complete visual concealment; however, it is sometimes totally
transparent to imaging radar. When properly deployed, the LCSS effectively scatters the
beam of imaging radar. (See Appendix C for more information.)
Countermortar and Counterbattery
3-16. Radar is subject to overload. It is very effective and accurate when tracking single
rounds; however, it cannot accurately process data on multiple rounds (four or more) that
are fired simultaneously. Chaff is also effective against CM and CB radar if it is placed
near the radar.
ACOUSTIC SENSORS
3-17. Noise discipline defeats detection by the human ear. Pyrotechnics or loudspeakers
can screen noise, cover inherently noisy activities, and confuse sound interpretation.
3-18. It is possible to confuse an enemy by screening flashes or sounds. Explosives or
pyrotechnics, fired a few hundred meters from a battery's position within a second of
firing artillery, will effectively confuse sound-ranging teams. Coordinating fire with
adjacent batteries (within two seconds) can also confuse enemy sound-ranging teams.
RADIO SENSORS
3-19. The best way to prevent an enemy from locating radio transmitters is to minimize
transmissions, protect transmissions from enemy interception, and practice good
radiotelephone-operator (RATELO) procedures. Preplanning message traffic,
transmitting as quickly as possible, and using alternate communication means whenever
possible ensure that transmissions are minimized. To prevent the enemy from
intercepting radio communications, change the radio frequencies and use low-power
transmissions, terrain masking, or directional or short-range antennas. (FM 24-33
provides an in-depth review of reducing the threat to friendly communications.)
MINIMIZING MOVEMENT
3-20. Movement attracts the enemy's attention and produces a number of signatures
(tracks, noise, hot spots, dust). In operations that inherently involve movement (such as
offensive operations), plan, discipline, and manage movement so that signatures are
reduced as much as possible. (See Chapter 4 for information on disciplined movement
techniques.)
USING DECOYS
3-21. Use decoys to confuse an enemy. The goal is to divert enemy resources into
reporting or engaging false targets. An enemy who has mistakenly identified decoys as
real targets is less inclined to search harder for the actual, well-hidden targets. The keys
to convincing an enemy that it has found the real target are—
• Decoy fidelity (realism), which refers to how closely the multispectral decoy
signature represents the target signature.
• Deployment location, which refers to whether or not a decoy is deployed so that
the enemy will recognize it as typical for that target type. For example, a decoy
tank is not properly located if it is placed in the middle of a lake.
3-22. A high-fidelity decoy in a plausible location often fools an enemy into believing
that it has acquired the real target. Deploying low-fidelity decoys, however, carries an
associated risk. If an enemy observes a decoy and immediately recognizes it as such, it
will search harder for the real target since decoys are generally deployed in the same
vicinity as the real targets. Plausible, high-fidelity decoys specifically designed to draw
enemy fire away from real targets should be deployed to closely represent the
multispectral signatures of the real targets. Properly deployed decoys have been proven in
operational employment and experimental field tests to be among the most effective of all
CCD techniques.
AVOIDING OPERATIONAL PATTERNS
3-23. An enemy can often detect and identify different types of units or operations by
analyzing the signature patterns that accompany their activities. For example, an
offensive operation is usually preceded by the forward movement of engineer obstacle-
reduction assets; petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL); and ammunition. Such
movements are very difficult to conceal; therefore, an alternative is to modify the pattern
of resupply. An enemy will recognize repetitive use of the same CCD techniques.
APPLYING RECOGNITION FACTORS
3-24. To camouflage effectively, continually consider the threat's viewpoint. Prevent
patterns in antidetection countermeasures by applying the following recognition factors to
tactical situations. These factors describe a target's contrast with its background. If
possible, collect multispectral imagery to determine which friendly target signatures are
detectable to enemy sensors.
REFLECTANCE
3-25. Reflectance is the amount of energy returned from a target's surface as compared to
the energy striking the surface. Reflectance is generally described in terms of the part of
the EM spectrum in which the reflection occurs:
• Visual reflectance is characterized by the color of a target. Color contrast can be
important, particularly at close ranges and in homogeneous background
environments such as snow or desert terrain. The longer the range, the less
important color becomes. At very long ranges, all colors tend to merge into a
uniform tone. Also, the human eye cannot discriminate color in poor light.
• Temperature reflectance is the thermal energy reflected by a target (except when
the thermal energy of a target is self-generated, as in the case of a hot engine). IR
imaging sensors measure and detect differences in temperature-reflectance levels
(known as thermal contrast).
• Raclar-signal reflectance is the part of the incoming radio waves that is reflected
by a target. Radar sensors detect differences in a target's reflected radar return and
that of the background. Since metal is an efficient radio-wave reflector and metals
are still an integral part of military equipment, radar return is an important
reflectance factor.
SHAPE
3-26. Natural background is random, and most military equipment has regular features
with hard, angular lines. Even an erected camouflage net takes on a shape with straight-
line edges or smooth curves between support points. An enemy can easily see silhouetted
targets, and its sensors can detect targets against any background unless their shape is
disguised or disrupted. Size, which is implicitly related to shape, can also distinguish a
target from its background.
SHADOW
3-27. Shadow can be divided into two types:
• A cast shadow is a silhouette of an object projected against its background. It is
the more familiar type and can be highly conspicuous. In desert environments, a
shadow cast by a target can be more conspicuous than the target itself.
• A contained shadow is the dark pool that forms in a permanently shaded area.
Examples are the shadows under the track guards of an armored fighting vehicle
(AFV), inside a slit trench, inside an open cupola, or under a vehicle. Contained
shadows show up much darker than their surroundings and are easily detected by
an enemy.
MOVEMENT
3-28. Movement always attracts attention against a stationary background. Slow, regular
movement is usually less obvious than fast, erratic movement.
NOISE
3-29. Noise and acoustic signatures produced by military activities and equipment are
recognizable to the enemy.
TEXTURE
3-30. A rough surface appears darker than a smooth surface, even if both surfaces are the
same color. For example, vehicle tracks change the texture of the ground by leaving
clearly visible track marks. This is particularly true in undisturbed or homogeneous
environments, such as a desert or virgin snow, where vehicle tracks are highly detectable.
In extreme cases, the texture of glass or other very smooth surfaces causes a shine that
acts as a beacon. Under normal conditions, very smooth surfaces stand out from the
background. Therefore, eliminating shine must be a high priority in CCD.
PATTERNS
3-31. Rows of vehicles and stacks of war materiel create equipment patterns that are
easier to detect than random patterns of dispersed equipment. Equipment patterns should
be managed to use the surroundings for vehicle and equipment dispersal. Equipment
dispersal should not be implemented in such a way that it reduces a unit's ability to
accomplish its mission.
3-32. Equipment paint patterns often differ considerably from background patterns. The
critical relationships that determine the contrast between a piece of equipment and its
background are the distance between the observer and the equipment and the distance
between the equipment and its background. Since these distances usually vary, it is
difficult to paint equipment with a pattern that always allows it to blend with its
background. As such, no single pattern is prescribed for all situations. Field observations
provide the best match between equipment and background.
3-33. The overall terrain pattern and the signatures produced by military activity on the
terrain are important recognition factors. If a unit's presence is to remain unnoticed, it
must match the signatures produced by stationary equipment, trucks, and other activities
with the terrain pattern. Careful attention must also be given to vehicle tracks and their
affect on the local terrain during unit ingress, occupation, and egress.
SITE SELECTION
3-34. Site selection is extremely important because the location of personnel and
equipment can eliminate or reduce recognition factors. If a tank is positioned so that it
faces probable enemy sensor locations, the thermal signature from its hot engine
compartment is minimized. If a vehicle is positioned under foliage, the exhaust will
disperse and cool as it rises, reducing its thermal signature and blending it more closely
with the background. Placing equipment in defilade (dug-in) positions prevents detection
by ground-mounted radar. The following factors govern site selection:
MISSION
3-35. The mission is the most important factor in site selection. A particular site may be
excellent from a CCD standpoint, but the site is useful only if the mission is
accomplished. If a site is so obvious that the enemy will acquire and engage a target
before mission accomplishment, the site was poorly selected to begin with. Survivability
is usually a part of most missions, so commanders must first evaluate the worthiness of a
site with respect to mission accomplishment and then consider CCD.
DISPERSION
3-36. Dispersion requirements dictate the size of a site. A site has limited usefulness if it
will not permit enough dispersal for survivability and effective operations.
TERRAIN PATTERNS
3-37. Every type of terrain, even a flat desert, has a discernible pattern. Terrain features
can blur or conceal the signatures of military activity. By using terrain features, CCD
effectiveness can be enhanced without relying on additional materials. The primary factor
to consider is whether using the site will disturb the terrain pattern enough to attract an
enemy's attention. The goal is not to disturb the terrain pattern at all. Any change in an
existing terrain pattern will indicate the presence of activity. Terrain patterns have
distinctive characteristics that are necessary to preserve. The five general terrain patterns
are—
• Agricultural. Agricultural terrain has a checkerboard pattern when viewed from
aircraft. This is a result of the different types of crops and vegetation found on
most farms.
• Urban. Urban terrain is characterized by uniform rows of housing with
interwoven streets and interspersed trees and shrubs.
• Wooded. Woodlands are characterized by natural, irregular features, unlike the
geometric patterns of agricultural and urban terrains.
• Barren. Barren terrain presents an uneven, irregular work of nature without the
defined patterns of agricultural and urban areas. Desert environments are
examples of barren terrain.
• Arctic. Arctic terrain is characterized by snow and ice coverage.
CCD DISCIPLINE
3-38. CCD discipline is avoiding an activity that changes the appearance of an area or
reveals the presence of military equipment. CCD discipline is a continuous necessity that
applies to every soldier. If the prescribed visual and audio routines of CCD discipline are
not observed, the entire CCD effort may fail. Vehicle tracks, spoil, and debris are the
most common signs of military activity. Their presence can negate all efforts of proper
placement and concealment.
3-39. CCD discipline denies an enemy the indications of a unit's location or activities by
minimizing disturbances to a target area. To help maintain unit viability, a unit must
integrate all available CCD means into a cohesive plan. CCD discipline involves
regulating light, heat, noise, spoil, trash, and movement. Successful CCD discipline
depends largely on the actions of individual soldiers. Some of these actions may not be
easy on a soldier, but his failure to observe CCD discipline could defeat an entire unit's
CCD efforts and possibly impact the unit's survivability and mission success.
3-40. TACSOPs prescribing CCD procedures aid in enforcing CCD discipline, and they
should—
• List specific responsibilities for enforcing established CCD countermeasures and
discipline.
• Detail procedures for individual and unit conduct in assembly areas (AAs) or
other situations that may apply to the specific unit.
3-41. Units should have frequent CCD battle drills. CCD discipline is a continuous
requirement that calls for strong leadership, which produces a disciplined CCD
consciousness throughout the entire unit. Appendix B contains additional guidance for
incorporating CCD into a unit TACSOP.
LIGHT AND HEAT
3-42. Light and heat discipline, though important at all times, is crucial at night. As long
as visual observation remains a primary recon method, concealing light signatures
remains an important CCD countermeasure. Lights that are not blacked out at night can
be observed at great distances. For example, the human eye can detect camp fires from 8
kilometers and vehicle lights from 20 kilometers. Threat surveillance can also detect heat
from engines, stoves, and heaters from great distances. When moving at night, vehicles in
the forward combat area should use ground guides and blackout lights. When using heat
sources is unavoidable, use terrain masking, exhaust baffling, and other techniques to
minimize thermal signatures of fires and stoves.
NOISE
3-43. Individuals should avoid or minimize actions that produce noise. For example,
muffle generators by using shields or terrain masking or place them in defilade positions.
Communications personnel should operate their equipment at the lowest possible level
that allows them to be heard and understood. Depending on the terrain and atmospheric
conditions, noise can travel great distances and reveal a unit's position to an enemy.
SPOIL
3-44. The prompt and complete policing of debris and spoil is an essential CCD
consideration. Proper spoil discipline removes a key signature of a unit's current or past
presence in an area.
TRACK
3-45. Vehicle tracks are clearly visible from the air, particularly in selected terrain.
Therefore, track and movement discipline is essential. Use existing roads and tracks as
much as possible. When using new paths, ensure that they fit into the existing terrain's
pattern. Minimize, plan, and coordinate all movement; and take full advantage of cover
and dead space.
SECTION II — TECHNIQUES AND MATERIALS
TECHNIQUES
3-46. CCD is an essential part of tactical operations. It must be integrated into METT-TC
analyses and the IPB process at all echelons. CCD is a primary consideration when
planning OPSEC. The skillful use of CCD techniques is necessary if a unit is to conceal
itself and survive. A general knowledge of CCD methods and techniques also allows
friendly troops to recognize CCD better when the enemy uses it. Table 3-1 lists the five
general techniques of employing CCD—hiding, blending, disguising, disrupting, and
decoying.
Table 3-1. CCD techniques
CCD
Techniq
ues
Sensor Systems
Optical
Thermal
Radar
Hiding
Earth cover
Earth embankments
Vegetation
LCSS
Screens
Smoke
Earth cover
Earth embankments
Vegetation
LCSS
Screens
Smoke
Chaff
Earth cover
Earth
embankments
Vegetation
Nets
RAM
LCSS
Blending
Paint
Foam
Lights
Vegetation
LCSS
Thermal paint
Foam
Air
conditioning/heating
Vegetation
Vegetation
LCSS
RAM
Reshaping
Textured mats
Textured mats
LCSS
Textured mats
Water
Insulation
Disguisi
Reshaping
Reshaping
Corner
ng
Paint
LCSS
Paint
reflectors
Disrupti
Camouflage sails
Flares
■■1
ng
FOS
Smoke
issE ammim.
Pyrotechnics
Smudge pots
Balloons
Strobe lights
Tracer simulators
Smoke
reflectors
Decoyin
Decoy target (pneumatic or rigid
Decoy target
Decoy target
g
structures)
Flares
Corner
Lights
Air
reflectors
Smoke
conditioning/heating
Signal
Smoke
generators
HIDING
3-47. Hiding is screening a target from an enemy's sensors. The target is undetected
because a barrier hides it from a sensor's view. Every effort should be made to hide all
operations; this includes using conditions of limited visibility for movement and terrain
masking. Examples of hiding include—
• Burying mines.
• Placing vehicles beneath tree canopies.
• Placing equipment in defilade positions.
• Covering vehicles and equipment with nets.
• Hiding roads and obstacles with linear screens.
• Using battlefield obscurants, such as smoke.
BLENDING
3-48. Blending is trying to alter a target's appearance so that it becomes a part of the
background. Generally, it is arranging or applying camouflage material on, over, and/or
around a target to reduce its contrast with the background. Characteristics to consider
when blending include the terrain patterns in the vicinity and the target's size, shape,
texture, color, EM signature, and background.
DISGUISING
3-49. Disguising is applying materials on a target to mislead the enemy as to its true
identity. Disguising changes a target's appearance so that it resembles something of lesser
or greater significance. For example, a missile launcher might be disguised to resemble a
cargo truck or a large building might be disguised to resemble two small buildings.
DISRUPTING
3-50. Disrupting is altering or eliminating regular patterns and target characteristics.
Disrupting techniques include pattern painting, deploying camouflage nets over selected
portions of a target, and using shape disrupters (such as camouflage sails) to eliminate
regular target patterns.
DECOYING
3-51. Decoying is deploying a false or simulated target(s) within a target's scene or in a
position where the enemy might conclude that it has found the correct target(s). Decoys
generally draw fire away from real targets. Depending on their fidelity and deployment,
decoys will greatly enhance survivability.
TESTS AND EVALUATIONS
3-52. Until recently, the effectiveness of CCD techniques had not been scientifically
quantified. As such, CCD was not widely accepted in the US military as an effective
means of increasing survivability. However, the Joint Camouflage, Concealment, and
Deception (JCCD) Joint Test and Evaluation (JT&E) completed in 1995 measured the
effectiveness of CCD against manned aerial attacks. It provided military services the
basis for guidance on CCD-related issues. JCCD field tests were conducted in multiple
target environments using a broad cross section of US attack aircraft flying against
different classes of military targets. In controlled attack sorties, targets were attacked
before and after employing CCD techniques.
3-53. The presence of CCD greatly reduced correct target attacks, particularly when
decoys were employed as part of the CCD plan. Other JCCD findings included the
following:
• CCD significantly increased aircrew aim-point error.
• CCD increased the target's probability of survival.
• Each CCD technique (hiding, blending, disguising, disrupting, and decoying) was
effective to some degree in increasing the probability of survival.
• CCD was effective in all tested environments (desert, temperate, and subarctic).
NATURAL CONDITIONS
3-54. Properly using terrain and weather is a first priority when employing CCD. Cover
provided by the terrain and by conditions of limited visibility is often enough to conceal
units. The effective use of natural conditions minimizes the resources and the time
devoted to CCD. The terrain's concealment properties are determined by the number and
quality of natural screens, terrain patterns, and the type and size of targets.
FORESTS
3-55. Forests generally provide the best type of natural screen against optical recon,
especially if the crowns of the trees are wide enough to prevent aerial observation of the
ground. Forests with undergrowth also hinder ground observation. Deciduous (leafing)
forests are not as effective during the months when trees are bare, while coniferous
(evergreen) forests preserve their concealment properties all year. When possible, unit
movements should be made along roads and gaps that are covered by tree crowns. Shade
should be used to conceal vehicles, equipment, and personnel from aerial observation.
OPEN TERRAIN
3-56. Limited visibility is an especially important concealment tool when conducting
operations in open terrain. The threat, however, will conduct recon with a combination of
night-surveillance devices, radar, IR sensors, and terrain illumination. When crossing
open terrain during limited visibility, supplement concealment with smoke.
DEAD SPACE
3-57. Units should not locate or move along the topographic crests of hills or other
locations where they are silhouetted against the sky. They should use reverse slopes of
hills, ravines, embankments, and other terrain features as screens to avoid detection by
ground-mounted sensors. IPB concealment and terrain overlays should identify areas of
dead space. If overlays are not available, use the line-of-sight (LOS) method to identify
areas of dead space. (See FM 21-26 for more details.)
WEATHER
3-58. Conditions of limited visibility (fog, rain, snowfall) hamper recon by optical
sensors. Dense fog is impervious to visible sensors and some thermal sensors, making
many threat night-surveillance devices unusable. Dense fog and clouds are impenetrable
to thermal sensors (IR). Rain, snow, and other types of precipitation hinder optical,
thermal, and radar sensors.
SMOKE
3-59. Smoke is an effective CCD tool when used by itself or with other CCD techniques.
It can change the dynamics of a battle by blocking or degrading the spectral bands that an
enemy's target-acquisition and weapons systems use, including optical and thermal
bands. (See FM 3-50. for more information on planning smoke operations.)
DATA SOURCES
3-60. Commanders must be able to evaluate natural conditions in their area to effectively
direct unit concealment. They must know the terrain and weather conditions before
mission execution. In addition to IPB terrain overlays, weather reports, and topographic
maps, commanders should use aerial photographs, recon, and information gathered from
local inhabitants to determine the terrain's natural concealment properties.
MATERIALS
3-61. Using natural conditions and materials is the first CCD priority, but using man¬
made materials can greatly enhance CCD efforts. Available materials include pattern-
painted equipment, camouflage nets (LCSS), radar-absorbing paint (RAP), radar¬
absorbing material (RAM), false operating surfaces (FOSs), vegetation, expedient paint,
decoys, and battlefield by-products (construction materials, dirt). (Appendix E lists man¬
made CCD materials that are available through the supply system.)
PATTERN PAINT
3-62. Pattern-painted vehicles blend well with the background and can hide from optical
sensors better than those painted a solid, subdued color. Pattern-painted equipment
enhances antidetection by reducing shape, shadow, and color signatures. Improved paints
also help avoid detection by reducing a target's reflectance levels in the visible and IR
portions of the EM spectrum. The result is a vehicle or an item of equipment that blends
better with its background when viewed by threat sensors. While a patterned paint
scheme is most effective in static positions, it also tends to disrupt aim points on a
moving target. (See Appendix E for a list of available paints.)
CAMOUFLAGE NETS
3-63. The LCSS is the standard Army camouflage net currently available, and it can be
ordered through normal unit supply channels (see Appendix E) . The LCSS reduces a
vehicle's visual and radar signatures. Stainless steel fibers in the LCSS material absorb
some of the radar signal and reflect most of the remaining signal in all directions. The
result is a small percentage of signal return to the radar for detection. The radar-scattering
capabilities of the LCSS are effective only if there is at least 2 feet of space between the
LCSS and the camouflaged equipment and if the LCSS completely covers the equipment.
Do not place a radar-scattering net over a radar antenna because it interferes with
transmission. The LCSS is also available in a radar-transparent model.
3-64. The three different LCSS color patterns are desert, woodland, and arctic. Each side
of each LCSS has a slightly different pattern to allow for seasonal variations. The LCSS
uses modular construction that allows the coverage of various sizes of equipment.
( Appendix C discusses the required components and the instructions for assembling
LCSS structures for different sizes of equipment.)
VEGETATION
3-65. Use branches and vines to temporarily conceal vehicles, equipment, and personnel.
Attach vegetation to equipment with camouflage foliage brackets, spring clips, or
expedient means (such as plastic tie-wraps). Use other foliage to complete the
camouflage or to supplement natural-growing vegetation. Also use cut foliage to augment
other artificial CCD materials, such as branches placed on an LCSS to break up its
outline. Be careful when placing green vegetation since the underside of leaves presents a
lighter tone in photographs. Replace cut foliage often because it wilts and changes color
rapidly. During training exercises, ensure that cutting vegetation and foliage does not
adversely effect the natural environment (coordinate with local authorities).
Living Vegetation
3-66. Living vegetation can be obtained in most environments, and its color and texture
make it a good blending agent. However, foliage requires careful maintenance to keep the
material fresh and in good condition. If branches are not placed in their proper growing
positions, they may reveal friendly positions to enemy observers. Cutting large amounts
of branches can also reveal friendly positions, so cut all vegetation away from target
areas.
3-67. Living vegetation presents a chlorophyll response at certain NIR wavelengths. As
cut vegetation wilts, it loses color and its NIR-blending properties, which are related to
the chlorophyll response. Replace cut vegetation regularly because over time it becomes
a detection cue rather than an effective concealment technique.
Dead Vegetation
3-68. Use dead vegetation (dried grass, hay, straw, branches) for texturing. It provides
good blending qualities if the surrounding background vegetation is also dead. Dead
vegetation is usually readily available and requires little maintenance; however, it is
flammable. Due to the absence of chlorophyll response, dead vegetation offers little CCD
against NIR sensors and hyperspectral sensors operating in the IR regions.
Foliage Selection
3-69. When selecting foliage for CCD, consider the following:
• Coniferous vegetation is preferred to deciduous vegetation since it maintains a
valid chlorophyll response longer after being cut.
• Foliage cut during periods of high humidity (at night, during a rainstorm, or when
there is fog or heavy dew) will wilt more slowly.
• Foliage with leaves that feel tough to the fingers and branches with large leaves
are preferred because they stay fresher longer.
• Branches that grow in direct sunlight are tougher and will stay fresher longer.
• Branches that are free of disease and insects will not wilt as rapidly.
CHLOROPHYLL RESPONSE
3-70. Standard-issue camouflage materials (LCSS) are designed to exhibit an artificial
chlorophyll response at selected NIR wavelengths. Nonstandard materials (sheets, tarps)
are not likely to exhibit a chlorophyll response and will not blend well with standard
CCD material or natural vegetation. Use nonstandard materials only as CCD treatments
against visual threat sensors, not against NIR or hyperspectral threat sensors.
EXPEDIENT PAINT
CAUTION
Expedient paint containing motor oil should
be used with extreme caution.
3-71. Use earth, sand, and gravel to change or add color, provide a coarse texture,
simulate cleared spots or blast marks, and create shapes and shadows. Mud makes an
excellent field expedient for toning down bright, shiny objects (glass, bayonets, watches).
Add clay (in mud form) of various colors to crankcase oil to produce a field-expedient
paint. Table 3-2 provides instructions on how to mix soil-based expedient paints. Use
surface soils to mimic natural surface color and reflectivity.
Table 3-2. Expedient paints
Paint Materials
Mixing
Color
Finish
Earth, GI soap,
water, soot,
paraffin
Mix soot with paraffin, add to solution of 8
gal water and 2 bars soap, and stir in earth.
Dark gray
Flat,
lusterless
Oil, clay, water,
gasoline, earth
Mix 2 gal water with 1 gal oil and to gal
clay, add earth, and thin with gasoline or
water.
Depends
on earth
colors
Glossy on
metal,
otherwise dull
Oil, clay, GI
soap, water,
earth
Mix 1 bars soap with 3 gal water, add 1 gal
oil, stir in 1 gal clay, and add earth for color.
Depends
on earth
colors
Glossy on
metal,
otherwise dull
NOTE: Use canned milk or powdered eggs to increase the binding properties of field-
expedient paints.
RADAR-ABSORBING MATERIAL
3-72. RAM was designed for placement on valuable military equipment. It absorbs radar
signals that are transmitted in selected threat wave bands and reduces the perceived radar
cross section (RCS) of the treated equipment. RAM is expensive relative to other CCD
equipment and is not yet widely available. RAP offers the same RCS reduction benefits
as RAM, and it is also expensive.
BATTLEFIELD BY-PRODUCTS
3-73. Battlefield by-products (construction materials, dirt) can be used to formulate
expedient CCD countermeasures. For example, use plywood and two-by-fours to erect
expedient target decoys or use dirt to construct concealment berms.
DECOYS
3-74. Decoys are among the most effective of all CCD tools. The proper use of decoys
provides alternate targets against which an enemy will expend ammunition, possibly
revealing its position in the process. Decoys also enhance friendly survivability and
deceive an enemy about the number and location of friendly weapons, troops, and
equipment.
Employment Rationale
3-75. Decoys are used to attract an enemy's attention for a variety of tactical purposes.
Their main use is to draw enemy fire away from high-value targets (HVTs). Decoys are
generally expendable, and they—
• Can be elaborate or simple. Their design depends on several factors, such as the
target to be decoyed, a unit's tactical situation, available resources, and the time
available to a unit for CCD employment.
• Can be preconstructed or made from field-expedient materials. Except for
selected types, preconstructed decoys are not widely available (see Appendix E) .
A typical Army unit can construct effective, realistic decoys to replicate its key
equipment and features through imaginative planning and a working knowledge
of the EM signatures emitted by the unit.
3-76. Proper decoy employment serves a number of tactical purposes, to include—
• Increasing the survivability of key unit equipment and personnel.
• Deceiving the enemy about the strength, disposition, and intentions of friendly
forces.
• Replacing friendly equipment removed from the forward line of own troops
(FLOT).
• Drawing enemy fire, which reveals its positions.
• Encouraging the enemy to expend munitions on relatively low-value targets
(decoys).
Employment Considerations
3-77. The two most important factors regarding decoy employment are location and
fidelity (realism):
• Location. Logically placing decoys will greatly enhance their plausibility.
Decoys are usually placed near enough to the real target to convince an enemy
that it has found the target. However, a decoy must be far enough away to prevent
collateral damage to the real target when the decoy draws enemy fire. Proper
spacing between a decoy and a target depends on the size of the target, the
expected enemy target-acquisition sensors, and the type of munitions directed
against the target.
• Fidelity. Decoys must be constructed according to a friendly unit's SOP and must
include target features that an enemy recognizes. The most effective decoys are
those that closely resemble the real target in terms of EM signatures. Completely
replicating the signatures of some targets, particularly large and complex targets,
can be very difficult. Therefore, decoy construction should address the EM
spectral region in which the real target is most vulnerable. The seven recognition
factors that allow enemy sensors to detect a target are conversely important for
decoys. When evaluating a decoy's fidelity, it should be recognizable in the same
ways as the real target, only more so. Try to make the decoy slightly more
conspicuous than the real target.
Chapter 4
Offensive Operations
CCD countermeasures implemented during an offensive operation deceive the enemy or
prevent it from discovering friendly locations, actions, and intentions. Successful CCD
contributes to achieving surprise and reduces subsequent personnel and equipment losses.
PREPARATIONS
4-1. The main CCD concern in preparing for offensive operations is to mask tactical unit
deployment. While CCD is the primary means of masking these activities, deceptive
operations frequently achieve the same goals.
SIGNATURES
4-2. Offensive operations create signatures that are detectable to an enemy. Analyzing
these signatures may alert an enemy to the nature of an offensive operation (such as
planning and location). Commanders at all levels should monitor operation signatures and
strive to conceal them from enemy surveillance. These signatures include—
• Increasing scouting and recon activity.
• Preparing traffic routes.
• Moving supplies and ammunition forward.
• Breaching obstacles.
• Preparing and occupying AAs (engineer function).
• Preparing and occupying forward artillery positions.
• Increasing radio communications.
ASSEMBLY AREAS
4-3. Prepare AAs during limited visibility. They should then suppress the signatures that
their preparations produced and remove any indications of their activities upon mission
completion.
4-4. Designate Aas on terrain with natural screens and a developed network of roads and
paths. Thick forests and small towns and villages often provide the best locations. If
natural screens are unavailable, use spotty sectors of the terrain or previously occupied
locations. Place equipment on spots of matching color, and take maximum advantage of
artificial CCD materials.
4-5. Designate concealed routes for movement into and out of an area. Mask noise by
practicing good noise discipline. For instance, armor movements can be muffled by the
thunder of artillery fire, the noise of low-flying aircraft, or the transmission of sounds
from broadcast sets.
4-6. Position vehicles to take full advantage of the terrain's natural concealment
properties, and cover the vehicles with camouflage nets. Apply paint and cut vegetation
to vehicles to enhance CCD at AAs and during battle. (When using vegetation for this
type of CCD treatment, do not cut it from areas close to vehicles.) Aas are particularly
vulnerable to aerial detection. Strictly enforce track, movement, and radio discipline.
Remove tracks by covering or sweeping them with branches.
4-7. While at an AA, personnel should apply individual CCD. Applying stick paint and
cut vegetation enhances CCD during all phases of an operation.
DECOYS
4-8. An enemy may interpret decoy construction as an effort to reinforce a defensive
position. Laying false minefields and building bunkers and positions can conceal actual
offensive preparations and give the enemy the impression that defenses are being
improved. If necessary, conduct engineer preparation activities on a wide front so that the
area and direction of the main attack are not revealed.
MOVEMENT
4-9. Move troops, ammunition, supplies, and engineer breaching equipment forward at
night or during limited visibility. Although an enemy's use of radar and IR aerial recon
hinders operations at night, darkness remains a significant concealment tool. Select routes
that take full advantage of the terrain's screening properties. Commanders must
understand how to combine darkness and the terrain's concealing properties to conceal
troop and supply movements.
4-10. When conducting a march, convoy commanders must strictly enforce blackout
requirements and the order of march. Guidelines concerning lighting, march orders, and
other requirements are usually published in SOPs or operation orders (OPORDs).
Required lighting conditions vary depending on the type of movement (convoy versus
single vehicle) and a unit's location (forward edge of the battle area [FEBA], division
area, corps rear area). Inspect each vehicle's blackout devices for proper operation.
4-11. Enemy aerial recon usually focuses on open and barely passable route sectors.
When on a march, vehicles should pass these types of sectors at the highest possible
speeds. If prolonged delays result from encountering an unexpected obstacle, halt the
column and disperse into the nearest natural screens. If a vehicle breaks down during a
movement, push it off the road and conceal it.
4-12. When conducting a march during good visibility, consider movement by infiltration
(single or small groups of vehicles released at different intervals). Movement in stages,
from one natural screen to the next, will further minimize possible detection. Use smoke
screens at critical crossings and choke points.
4-13. During brief stops, quickly disperse vehicles under tree crowns or other
concealment along the sides of the road. Strictly enforce CCD discipline. Watch for glare
from vehicle windshields, headlights, or reflectors; and remedy the situation if it does
occur. Try to control troop movement on the road or in other open areas. Conduct recon
to select areas for long halts. The recon party should select areas that are large enough to
allow sufficient CCD and dispersion. The quartering party should predetermine vehicle
placement, develop a vehicle circulation plan, and guide vehicles into suitable and
concealed locations. The first priority, however, is to move vehicles off the road as
quickly as possible, even at the expense of initial dispersion. Use camouflage nets and
natural vegetation to enhance concealment, and carefully conceal dug-in positions.
4-14. Traffic controllers have a crucial role in enforcing convoy CCD. Commanders
should issue precise instructions for traffic controllers to stop passing vehicles and have
the drivers correct the slightest violation of CCD discipline. Convoy commanders are
responsible for the convoy's CCD discipline.
4-15. Pass through friendly obstacles at night, in fog, or under other conditions of poor
visibility. Also use smoke screens because these conditions will not protect against many
types of threat sensors. Lay smoke on a wide front, several times before actually
executing the passage of lines. Doing this helps deceive an enemy about the time and
place of an attack. Conceal lanes through obstacles from the enemy's view.
DECEPTIVE OPERATIONS
4-16. Conduct demonstrations and feints to confuse an enemy about the actual location of
the main attack. Such deceptive operations are effective only if prior recon activities were
conducted on a wide front, thereby preventing the enemy from pinpointing the likely
main-attack area.
BATTLE
4-17. Units should adapt to the terrain during a battle. Deploying behind natural
vegetation, terrain features, or man-made structures maximizes concealment from enemy
observation. Make optimum use of concealed routes, hollows, gullies, and other terrain
features that are dead-space areas to enemy observation and firing positions. A trade-off,
however, usually exists in terms of a slower rate of movement when using these types of
routes.
4-18. Movement techniques emphasizing fire and maneuver help prevent enemy
observation and targeting. Avoid dusty terrain because clouds of dust will alert an enemy
to the presence of friendly units. However, if the enemy is aware of a unit's presence, dust
can be an effective means of obscuring the unit's intentions in the same way as smoke.
When natural cover and concealment are unavailable or impractical, the coordinated
employment of smoke, suppressive fires, speed, and natural limited-visibility conditions
minimize exposure and avoid enemy fire sacks. However, offensive operations under
these conditions present unique training and C“ challenges.
4-19. Breaching operations require concealing the unit that is conducting the breach. Use
conditions of poor visibility, and plan the use of smoke and suppressive fires to screen
breaching operations.
4-20. Deliberate river crossings are uniquely difficult and potentially hazardous. Plan the
coordinated use of terrain masking, smoke, decoys, and deceptive operations to ensure
successful crossings (see FM 90-13 ).
Chapter 5
Defensive Operations
Successful defensive operations require strong emphasis on OPSEC. Proper OPSEC
denies an enemy information about a friendly force's defensive preparations. Particularly
important is the counterrecon battle, where defensive forces seek to blind an enemy by
eliminating its recon forces. The winner of this preliminary battle is often the winner of
the main battle. CCD, by virtue of its inherent role in counterefforts, plays an important
role in both battles.
PREPARATIONS
5-1. The purpose of CCD during defensive preparations is to mask key or sensitive
activities. Successful CCD of these activities leads to an enemy force that is blinded or
deceived and therefore more easily influenced to attack where the defender wants (at the
strengths of the defense). These key activities include—
• Preparing reserve and counterattack forces' locations.
• Preparing survivability positions and constructing obstacles (minefields, tank
ditches).
• Establishing critical C" nodes.
SIGNATURES
5-2. A number of signatures may indicate the intentions of friendly defensive
preparations, and an enemy analyzes these signatures to determine the defensive plan.
Specific signatures that could reveal defensive plans include—
• Working on survivability positions.
• Emplacing minefields and other obstacles.
• Moving different types of combat materiel into prepared positions.
• Preparing routes and facilities.
• Constructing strongpoints or hardened artillery positions.
COUNTERATTACK AND RESERVE FORCES
5-3. Due to the similarity of missions, the concerns for concealing counterattack and
reserve forces are similar to those of maneuver forces engaged in offensive operations.
Chapter 4 discusses considerations about AAs, troop and supply movements, passages of
lines, and deception operations. This information is also useful as a guide when planning
CCD for a counterattack.
Planning
5-4. Proper planning is essential to avoid threat detection and prevent successful enemy
analysis of the engineer efforts that are integral to defensive preparations. Engineer
equipment creates significant signatures, so minimize its use to a level that is
commensurate with available time and manpower. Disperse engineer equipment that is
not required at the job site. Complete as much work as possible without using heavy
equipment, and allow heavy equipment on site only when necessary. Engineers should
minimize their time on site by conducting thorough, extensive planning and preparation.
Additional signatures include—
• Supplies, personnel, and vehicles arriving to and departing from the unit area.
• Survivability positions being constructed.
• Smoke and heat emitting from kitchens, fires, or stoves.
• Communications facilities being operated.
• Educational and training exercises being conducted.
Movement
5-5. Reserve forces should move along preplanned, concealed routes. They should also
move and occupy selected locations at night or during other conditions of limited
visibility. Quartering parties should preselect individual positions and guide vehicles and
personnel to assigned locations. Light, noise, and track discipline are essential; but they
are difficult to control during this phase. The quartering party should also develop a
traffic-flow plan that minimizes vehicle and troop movement to and from the unit area.
5-6. Arriving units should immediately begin to conceal their positions. Commanders
should detail the priorities for CCD in the OPORD, based on their assessment of which
signatures present the greatest opportunity for threat detection.
Assembly Areas
5-7. While AA CCD actions are similar to those of counterattack and reserve positions,
the latter positions are more likely to be occupied longer. Therefore, CCD needs are more
extensive and extended for counterattack and reserve forces. In fact, their CCD
operations are often indistinguishable from those of support units.
5-8. Counterattack and reserve forces awaiting employment should capitalize on the time
available to conduct rehearsals. While essential, these activities are prone to detection by
an enemy's sensors so observe CCD discipline at all times and locations.
Placement and Dispersal
5-9. Site selection is crucial when concealing engineer effort. Proper placement and
dispersal of equipment and operations are essential. Use natural screens (terrain
masking); however, urban areas often provide the best concealment for counterattack and
reserve forces. (Chapter 7 discusses placement and dispersal in more detail.) When using
forests as natural screens, carefully consider factors such as the height and density of
vegetation, the amount and darkness of shadows cast by the screen, and the
appropriateness of the particular screen for the season. The condition and quality of
natural screens have a decisive effect on the capability to conceal units. Commanders
should evaluate natural screens during engineer recon missions and conduct the missions
on a timely, extensive basis.
5-10. The probability of detection increases considerably when survivability positions are
prepared. Detection is easier due to the increased size of the targets to be concealed, the
contrasting upturned soil, and the difficulty of concealing survivability effort. Despite
these considerations, the enhanced protection afforded by survivability positions usually
dictates their use. To minimize the probability of detection, employ a combination of
natural screens and overhead nets to conceal construction sites.
CAMOUFLAGE NETS
5-11. Use camouflage nets (LCSS) to conceal vehicles, tents, shelters, and equipment.
Use vegetation to further disrupt the outline of the target rather than completely hide it.
Ensure that vegetation is not removed from a single location, because it could leave a
signature for threat detection. Gather vegetation sparingly from as many remote areas as
possible. This technique allows the immediate area to remain relatively undisturbed.
STOVES AND FIRES
5-12. Strictly control the use of stoves and fires because they produce visual and thermal
signatures detectable to threat sensors. If fires are necessary, permit them only during
daylight hours and place them in dead ground or under dense foliage. Use nets and other
expedient thermal screens to dissipate rising heat and reduce the fire's thermal signature.
COMMUNICATIONS
5-13. Monitor communications to prevent enemy intelligence teams from identifying unit
locations. (FM 24-33 addresses techniques for reducing the threat to friendly
communications.)
CCD DISCIPLINE
5-14. Strict CCD discipline allows the continued concealment of a unit's position. The
longer a unit stays in one location, the harder it is for it to maintain CCD discipline.
Extended encampments require constant command attention to CCD discipline. The
evacuation of an area also requires CCD discipline to ensure that evidence (trash, vehicle
tracks) is not left for enemy detection.
SURVIVABILITY POSITIONS AND OBSTACLES
5-15. Survivability positions include fighting positions, protective positions (shelters),
and trench-work connections. Such positions are usually constructed of earth and logs but
may also be composed of man-made building materials such as concrete.
PLACEMENT
5-16. Properly occupying positions and placing obstacles are critical CCD considerations.
When possible, place obstacles and occupy positions out of the direct view of threat
forces (such as a reverse-slope defense), at night, or under conditions of limited visibility.
BACKGROUNDS
5-17. Select backgrounds that do not silhouette positions and obstacles or provide color
contrast. Use shadows to hinder an enemy's detection efforts. If possible, place positions
and obstacles under overhead cover, trees, or bushes or in any other dark area of the
terrain. This technique prevents the dismption of terrain lines and hinders aerial
detection. CCD efforts, however, should not hinder the integration of obstacles with fires.
5-18. When using the terrain's natural concealment properties, avoid isolated features that
draw the enemy's attention. Do not construct positions directly on or near other clearly
defined terrain features (tree lines, hedge rows, hill crests). Offsetting positions into tree
lines or below hill crests avoids silhouetting against the background and also counters
enemy fire.
NATURAL MATERIALS
5-19. Use natural materials to supplement artificial materials. Before constructing
positions and obstacles, remove and save natural materials (turf, leaves, humus) for use in
restoring the terrain's natural appearance for deception purposes. During excavation,
collect spoil in carrying devices for careful disposal. When preparing survivability
positions and obstacles—
• Avoid disturbing the natural look of surroundings. Use camouflage nets and
natural vegetation to further distort the outline of a position, to hide the bottom of
an open position or trench, and to mask spoil used as a parapet. To further avoid
detection, replace natural materials regularly or when they wilt or change color.
• Consider the effect of backblasts from rocket launchers, missile systems, and
antitank weapons. Construct a concealed open space to the position's rear to
accommodate backblasts. A backblast area should not contain material that will
readily bum or generate large dust signatures.
• Use natural materials to help conceal machine-gun emplacements. Machine guns
are priority targets, and concealing them is an essential combat task. Although
CCD is important, placement is the primary factor in concealing machine guns.
• Place mortars in defilade positions. Proper placement, coupled with the use of
artificial and natural CCD materials, provides the maximum possible
concealment. Also consider removable overhead concealment.
• Use decoy positions and phony obstacles to draw enemy attention away from
actual survivability positions and traces of obstacle preparation. Decoys serve the
additional function of drawing enemy fire, allowing easier targeting of an enemy's
weapons systems.
BATTLE
5-20. CCD during the defensive battle is essentially the same as for the offensive battle.
While a majority of the battle is normally fought from prepared, concealed positions,
defensive forces still maneuver to prevent enemy breakthroughs or to counterattack.
When maneuvering, units should—
• Adapt to the terrain.
• Make optimum use of concealed routes.
• Preselect and improve concealed routes to provide defensive forces with a
maneuver advantage.
• Plan smoke operations to provide additional concealment for maneuvering forces.
Chapter 6
High-Value Targets
The purpose of threat doctrine is for enemy forces to locate, target, and destroy deep
targets, thereby degrading friendly capabilities while adding offensive momentum to
attacking enemy forces. Enemy commanders focus their most sophisticated sensors in
search of HVTs. By attacking these targets, enemy forces hope to deny adequate C 2 ,
combat support, or resupply operations to forward friendly forces throughout the
battlespace. Therefore, properly employing CCD at key fixed installations, such as
command posts (CPs) and Army aviation sites (AASs), is essential to survival on a
battlefield. HVTs fall into two general classifications—fixed installations (Section ID and
relocatable units (Section III ). For information on camouflaging medical facilities, see
Appendix F .
SECTION I — CCD PLANNING
PLANS
6-1. No single solution exists for enhancing the survivability of HVTs with CCD (except
for large-area smoke screens). The characteristics of many such targets are unique and
require the creative application of CCD principles and techniques. Therefore, the CCD
planning process presented in this section is not intended to impose a regimen that must
be followed at all costs. Rather, it suggests a logical sequence that has proven successful
over time. In fact, the steps outlined below often lead to creative CCD solutions simply
because they allow designers to consider the many options, benefits, and pitfalls of CCD
employment. No CCD plan is wrong if it achieves the intended signature-management
goals and does not impair mission accomplishment.
6-2. Each commander should develop his unit's CCD plan based on an awareness, if not a
comprehensive assessment, of the detectable EM signatures emitted by HVTs under his
command. He should evaluate these signatures by considering the enemy's expected
RSTA capabilities (airborne and ground-based), knowledge of the target area, and
weapons-on-target capability.
OBJECTIVE
6-3. A CCD plan increases target survivability within the limits of available resources.
The design procedure must systematically determine which features of a given target are
conspicuous, why those features are conspicuous, and how CCD principles and
techniques can best eliminate or reduce target signatures. CCD should decrease the
effectiveness of enemy attacks by interfering with its target-acquisition process, which in
turn increases target survivability.
PLANNING PROCESS
6-4. The steps outlined below provide guidance for designing CCD plans for HVTs. The
detailed planning approach is applicable in any situation where CCD employment is
necessary, but more so when the plans include HVTs.
Step 1. Identify the threat. Identify the principal threat sensors, weapon-delivery
platforms, and likely directions of attack.
Step 2. Identify critical facilities. Identify critical HVTs. Include those that are critical
from an operational standpoint and those that may provide reference points (cues) for
an attack on more lucrative targets.
Step 3. Evaluate facilities. Once the critical HVTs are identified, focus efforts on
identifying the target features that might be conspicuous to an enemy RSTA.
Consider multispectral (visual, thermal, NIR, radar) signatures in this assessment. The
seven recognition factors ( Chapter 3 ) are an excellent framework for conducting this
assessment. Include a review of area maps, site plans, photographs, and aerial images
of the target area.
Step 4. Quantify signatures. Quantify the multispectral signatures that are emitted by
high-value facilities. Base the quantification on actual surveys of critical facilities,
using facsimiles of threat sensors when possible. Specify the EM wavelengths in
which targets are most vulnerable, and develop signature-management priorities.
Step 5. Establish CCD goals. Establish specific CCD goals for HVTs. These goals
should indicate the signature reduction (or increase) desired and the resources
available for CCD implementation. Base these goals on the results of steps 1 through
4. Change the CCD goals as the planning process develops and reiterate them
accordingly.
Step 6. Select materials and techniques. Select CCD materials and techniques that
best accomplish signature-management goals within logistical, maintenance, and
resource constraints. Expedient, off-the-shelf materials and battlefield by-products are
not identified in this manual, but they are always optional CCD materials.
Step 7. Organize the plan. Develop a CCD plan that matches goals with available
materials, time and manpower constraints, and operational considerations. If the goals
are unobtainable, repeat steps 5 and 6 until a manageable plan is developed.
Step 8. Execute the plan. Once a feasible CCD plan is developed, execute it. Store
temporary or expedient materials inconspicuously. Conduct deployment training on a
schedule that denies enemy intelligence teams the opportunity to identify the
countermeasures or develop methods to defeat the CCD.
Step 9. Evaluate the CCD. The final step in the CCD planning process is to evaluate
the deployed CCD materials and techniques. Important questions to ask in this
evaluation include the following:
• Does CCD increase the survivability of HVTs?
• Does deployed CCD meet the signature-management goals outlined in the
plan?
• Is deployed CCD operationally compatible with the treated target(s)?
• Are CCD materials and techniques maintainable within manpower and
resource constraints?
SECTION II — FIXED INSTALLATIONS
CONCEPT
6-5. Fixed installations (base camps, AASs, CPs, warehouses, roadways, pipelines,
railways, and other lines-of-communication [LOC] facilities) provide scarce, nearly
irreplaceable functional support to ground maneuver forces. The threat to these facilities
is both ground-based and aerial. The CCD techniques for the two attack types do not
necessarily change, but the defender must be aware of the overall implications of his
CCD plan.
GROUND ATTACKS
6-6. Ground attacks against fixed installations (enemy offensives, terrorist attacks, and
enemy special-force incursions) require constant operational awareness by the defenders.
While most CCD techniques are conceptually designed to defend against an aerial attack,
these same techniques can affect the target-acquisition capabilities of an enemy's ground
forces to the benefit of the defender. SCSPP, LCSS, and natural vegetation provide CCD
against a ground attack.
6-7. CCD discipline (light, noise, spoil) involves prudent operational procedures that
friendly troops should observe in any tactical situation, particularly in the presence of
hostile ground forces. (See Chapter 5 for more information.)
AERIAL ATTACKS
6-8. Fixed installations are susceptible to aerial attacks because of their long residence
time and immobility. However, fighter-bomber and helicopter aircrews face unique
target-acquisition problems due to the relatively short time available to locate, identify,
and lock onto targets. Fighter-bombers typically travel at high speeds, even during
weapons delivery. This means attacking aircrews have limited search time once they
reach the target area. Helicopters travel at slower speeds but generally encounter similar
time-on-target limitations. Because of lower flying altitudes and slower speeds,
helicopters are more vulnerable to ground defenses. In either case, proper CCD can
increase aircrew search time, thereby reducing available time to identify, designate, and
attack an HVT. The longer an aircrew is forced to search for a target in a defended area,
the more vulnerable the aircraft becomes to counterattack.
ENEMY INTELLIGENCE
6-9. The location and configuration of most fixed installations are usually well known.
CCD techniques that protect against sophisticated surveillance sensor systems,
particularly satellite-based systems, can be costly in terms of manpower, materials, and
time. Steps can be taken to reduce an enemy's detection of relocatable targets. Fixed
installations are difficult to conceal from RSTA sensors due to the relatively long
residence time of fixed installations versus relocatable targets. Unless the construction
process for a given fixed installation was conducted secretly, defenders can safely assume
that enemy RSTA sensors have previously detected and catalogued its location.
Defenders can further assume that attacking forces have intelligence data leading them to
the general area of the fixed installation. CCD design efforts, therefore, should focus on
the multispectral defeat or impairment of the enemy's local target-acquisition process.
CCD TECHNIQUES
6-10. Selected CCD techniques should capitalize on terrain features that are favorable to
the defender and on the short time available to attacking aircrews for target acquisition.
Use artificial and natural means to camouflage the installation. Where time and resources
allow, deploy alternative targets (decoys) to draw the attention of the attacking aircrews
away from the fixed installation.
6-11. Comprehensive CCD designs and techniques for fixed installations can be costly,
yet field tests have shown that simple, expedient techniques can be effective. HVTs are
usually supplied with artificial CCD materials. If they are not, soldiers increase the
survivability of an installation by using CCD principles.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
6-12. While standard CCD materials are designed to enhance fixed-installation
survivability, they have practical limitations that are not easily overcome. Materials
applied directly to a fixed installation may achieve the signature-management goals
stated in the CCD plan. However, if other features of the target scene are not treated
accordingly, the target may be well hidden but remain completely vulnerable.
6-13. For example, three weapons-storage-area (WSA) igloos are in a row. The middle
igloo is treated with CCD materials while the other two are not. The middle igloo will
still be vulnerable. The enemy knows that three igloos exist and will probably locate the
middle one no matter how well the CCD plan is designed. However, if all three igloos are
treated with CCD materials and three decoy igloos are placed away from them, the
treated igloos' survivability will increase.
6-14. Furthermore, if a man-made object (traffic surface) or a natural feature (tree line) is
close to the igloos, attacking forces will use these cues to proceed to the target area even
if all three igloos are treated with CCD materials. Remember, an HVT is part of an
overall target scene and an attacker must interpret the scene. Do not make his task easy.
CCD plans that treat only the target and ignore other cues (man-made or natural) within
the target scene are insufficient.
COMMAND POSTS
6-15. C“ systems provide military leaders with the capability to make timely decisions,
communicate the decisions to subordinate units, and monitor the execution of the
decisions. CPs contain vital C~ systems.
SIGNATURES
6-16. Since World War II, the size and complexity of CPs have increased dramatically.
Their signatures have correspondingly increased from a physical and communications
perspective (more types of antennas and transmission modes at a wider range of
frequencies). As a result, the enemy can use several conspicuous signatures to detect and
target CPs for attack. Therefore, CPs require excellent CCD to survive on the battlefield.
Lines of Communication
6-17. CPs are usually located near converging LOC, such as road or rail junctions, and
often require new access and egress routes. Consider the following regarding CCD and
CPs:
• Vehicle traffic. When evaluating EM signatures that CPs emit, consider
concentrations of vehicles, signs of heavy traffic (characteristic wear and track
marks), and air traffic. Park vehicles and aircraft a significant distance from CPs.
• Antennas. Antennas and their electronic emissions and numerous support towers
are common to most CPs. Paint antennas and support equipment with
nonconductive green, black, or brown paint if the surfaces are shiny. If tactically
feasible, use remote antennas to reduce the vulnerability of the radio system to
collateral damage.
• Security emplacements. Security measures (barbwire, barriers, security and
dismount points, and other types of emplacements) can indicate CP operations.
Barbwire exhibits a measurable RCS at radar frequencies. Ensure that barbwire
and concertina wire follow natural terrain lines and are concealed as much as
possible.
Equipment
6-18. Power generators and other heat sources produce signatures that an enemy's
surveillance and target-acquisition sensors can detect. Place heat-producing equipment
and other thermal sources in defilade positions, within structures, or under natural cover.
Heat diffusers, which tone down and vent vehicle exhaust away from threat direction, are
an expedient means of thermal-signature reduction.
Defensive Positions
6-19. Defensive positions (berms, revetments, fighting positions) for protection against
direct- and indirect-fire attackers typically create scarred earth signatures and detectable
patterns due to earth excavation.
CCD
6-20. CCD improves OPSEC and increases survivability by minimizing the observable
size and EM signatures of CPs. CP CCD requires recon, planning, discipline, security,
and maintenance. Carefully controlled traffic plans decrease the possibility of disturbing
natural cover and creating new, observable paths. Decoys are a highly effective means of
confusing the enemy's target-acquisition process, particularly against airborne sensors.
Against ground threats, the same general rules of CCD discipline apply; however, recon
and heightened security patrols enhance CCD efforts against ground attack.
SITES
6-21. CP sites, which could move every 24 hours, are still occupied for a longer period
than AAs. CP site selection is crucial, therefore units should—
• Consider the needs of supporting an extended occupation while minimizing
changes to natural terrain patterns. When constructing defensive positions,
minimize earth scarring as much as possible. If scarred earth is unavoidable, cut
vegetation, toned-down agents (paint), and camouflage nets help conceal scarred
areas.
• Use existing LOC (roads, trails, streams). If a site requires construction of roads
or paths, make maximum use of natural concealment and existing terrain. The
fewer new lines required, the better the CP blends, leaving natural features
relatively unchanged.
• Never locate a CP at a road junction. Road junctions are high-priority targets for
enemy forces and are easily detectable.
• Locate a CP in an existing civilian structure, if possible, which simplifies hiding
military activity. However, choose a structure in an area where a sufficient
number of buildings with similar EM signatures can mask its location.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES
6-22. By strictly complying with proper radio, telephone, and digital communications
procedures, the opportunities for an enemy to detect friendly telecommunications
activities are minimized. Consider the following:
• Place antennas in locations using natural supports when possible (trees for
dipoles). As a rule of thumb, place antennas a minimum of one wavelength away
from surrounding structures or other antennas. NOTE: One wavelength is 40
meters (typically) for low frequencies and 1 meter for very high frequencies
(VHFs).
• Move antennas as often as possible within operational constraints.
• Use directional antennas when possible. If using nondirectional antennas, employ
proper terrain-masking techniques to defeat the threat's radio direction-finding
efforts.
• Use existing telephone lines as much as possible. Newly laid wire is a readily
observable signature that can reveal a CP's location. Communications wire and
cable should follow natural terrain lines and be concealed in the best way
possible.
CCD DISCCIPLINE
6-23. Maintain CCD discipline after occupying a site. Establish and use designated foot
paths to, from, and within a CP's area. If a unit occupies a site for more than 24 hours,
consider periodically rerouting foot paths to avoid detectable patterns. Conceal security
and dismount points and other individual emplacements, and make paths to the CP
inconspicuous. Enforce proper disposal procedures for trash and spoil. Rigidly enforce
light and noise discipline. Enhance the realism of a decoy CP by making it appear
operational. Allow CCD discipline to be lax in the decoy CP, thus making it a more
conspicuous target than the real CP.
SUPPLY AND WATER POINTS
6-24. Supply and water points provide logistical support—the backbone of sustained
combat operations. As these targets are relatively immobile and the object of an enemy's
most sophisticated sensors, using CCD is one of the most effective means to improve
their survivability.
OPERATIONS
6-25. Many CCD methods associated with AAs and CPs also apply to supply and water
points, but with additional requirements. Large amounts of equipment and supplies are
quickly brought into tactical areas and delivered to supply points located as close to the
FLOT as possible. Supplies must be unloaded and concealed quickly, while supply points
remain open and accessible for distribution. Under these conditions, multiple supply
points are generally easier to camouflage than single, large ones. Decoy supply and water
points can also confuse a threat's targeting efforts.
CCD
6-26. Take maximum advantage of natural cover and concealment. Configure logistics
layouts to conform with the local ground pattern. Creativity can play a role in this effort.
The following guidance enhances concealment of these operations:
• Avoid establishing regular (square or rectangular) perimeter shapes for an area.
• Select locations where concealed access and egress routes are already established
and easily controlled.
• Use roads with existing overhead concealment if you need new access roads.
Conceal access over short, open areas with overhead nets.
• Control movement into and out of the supply area.
• Mix and disperse supply-point stocks to the maximum extent possible. This not
only avoids a pattern of stockpile shapes but also avoids easy destruction of one
entire commodity.
• Space stocks irregularly (in length and depth) to avoid recognizable patterns.
Stack supplies as low as possible to avoid shadows. Dig supplies in if resources
allow. In digging operations, disperse the spoil so as not to produce large piles of
earth.
• Cover stocks with nets and other materials that blend with background patterns
and signatures. Flattops (large, horizontal CCD nets) are effective for concealing
supply-point activities when resources allow their construction and when supply
points are not too large. Dunnage from supply points provides excellent material
for expedient decoys.
TRAFFIC CONTROL
6-27. Ensure that vehicles cause minimal changes to the natural terrain as a result of
movement into, within, and out of the area. Provide concealment and control of vehicles
waiting to draw supplies. Rigidly practice and enforce CCD discipline and OPSEC.
Debris control could be a problem and requires constant attention.
WATER POINTS
6-28. CCD for water points include the following additional considerations:
• Spillage. Water spillage can have positive and negative effects on a unit's CCD
posture. Standing pools of water reflect light that is visible to observers. Pools can
also act as forward scatterers of radar waves, resulting in conspicuous black-hole
returns on radar screens. Therefore, minimize water spillage and provide adequate
drainage for runoff. On the other hand, dispersed water can be used to reduce the
thermal signatures of large, horizontal surfaces. However, use this technique
sparingly and in such a way that pools do not form.
• Equipment. Use adequate natural and artificial concealment for personnel,
storage tanks, and specialized pumping and purification equipment. Conceal
water-point equipment to eliminate shine from damp surfaces. Conceal shine by
placing canvas covers on bladders, using camouflage nets, and placing foliage on
and around bladders. This also distorts the normal shape of the bladders.
• Scheduling. Enhance CCD discipline at water points by establishing and strictly
enforcing a supply schedule for units. The lack of or violation of a supply
schedule produces a concentration of waiting vehicles that is difficult to conceal.
ARMY AVIATION SITES
6-29. AASs are among the most important of all battlefield HVTs. AASs are typically
comprised of several parts that make up the whole, including tactical assembly areas
(TAAs), aviation maintenance areas (AMAs), forward operating bases (FOBs), and
forward arming and refueling points (FARPs). The positioning of AAS elements with
respect to each other is dynamic and often depends on the existing tactical situation. In
the following discussion, an AAS will be defined as a TAA, an AMA, and a FARP
collocated in the same area. While these elements are not always collocated, the CCD
techniques for individual elements will not greatly differ based on positioning. Untreated
AASs are detectable in most threat sensor wavelengths.
• TAA. A TAA is typically a parking area for helicopters. Helicopters are highly
conspicuous targets because of their awkward shape, distinctive thermal
signatures, and large RCS. An enemy expends a lot of time and energy attempting
to locate TAAs. Once it finds them, the enemy aggressively directs offensive
operations against them.
• AMA. The most conspicuous features of an AMA are the large transportable
maintenance shelters. These shelters are highly visible and indicate the presence
of helicopters to an enemy. AMAs occupy large areas to allow for ground
handling of aircraft. Traffic patterns around AMAs are also strong visual cues to
the enemy. Maintenance assets, including aviation shop sets, have
characteristically distinct multispectral cues.
• FARP. A FARP provides POF and ammunition support to AASs and other
tactical units. A FARP consists of fuel bladders, heavy expanded mobility tactical
trucks (HEMTTs), fueling apparatus, and bulk ammunition. Due to safety
requirements, FARP elements are dispersed as much as possible within terrain
and operational constraints. Each element is detectable with multispectral radar.
In a FARP—
■ Fuel bladders contain petroleum liquids whose thermal mass is a strong IR
cue relative to the background. Bladders are often bermed, which means
that visible earth scarring is necessary to construct the berm.
■ Farge HEMTTs are conspicuous in all wavelengths.
■ Fueling areas are generally arranged in such a way that the fueling
apparatus (hoses, pumps) are arranged linearly in an open area for safe and
easy access. The linear deployment of these hoses is a strong visual cue,
and their dark color usually contrasts with the background. The dark hoses
experience solar loading, and the POL liquids within the hoses can provide
a thermal cue.
Equipment. Palletized ammunition and support equipment accompany AASs.
Such equipment is often stacked in regular, detectable patterns.
Aircraft. Aircraft create large dust plumes when deployed to unpaved areas. Such
plumes are distinct visual cues and indicate the presence of rotary aircraft to an
enemy.
■ Parked aircraft. Camouflage nets, berms, stacked equipment, and
revetments can effectively conceal parked aircraft. Vertical screens
constructed from camouflage nets help conceal parked aircraft,
particularly against ground-based threats. However, CCD techniques for
rapid-response aircraft must not impair operational requirements, meaning
that obtrusive, permanent CCD techniques are generally not an option.
Also, foreign object damage (FOD) is a critical concern for all aviation
assets. CCD for parked aircraft depends on the expected ground time
between flights. The commanding officer must approve all aircraft CCD
techniques before implementation.
■ Aircraft refueling. Aircraft refueling positions, particularly fuel hoses,
should be dispersed and arrayed in a nonlinear configuration. The hoses
can be concealed at periodic locations with cut vegetation or a light
earth/sod covering to reduce visual and thermal signatures.
Defensive positions. Constructing defensive positions can create detectable areas
of scarred earth.
CCD. AASs are extremely valuable targets; therefore, try to prevent their initial
detection by an enemy.
Vehicles. Large vehicles can be effectively concealed with camouflage nets. Also,
properly placing these vehicles to use terrain features and indigenous vegetation
increases their survivability. Expedient vehicle decoys provide an enemy with
alternate targets, and proper CCD discipline is essential.
Dunnage. Quickly conceal all dunnage (packing materials) to minimize the
evidence of AASs.
Dust. To avoid dust, park aircraft in grassy areas or where the earth is hard-
packed. If such areas are unavailable, disperse water on the area to minimize dust
plumes. However, water-soaked earth can also be an IR detection cue so use this
option sparingly and, if possible, at night. Several chemical dust palliatives are
available that provide excellent dust control for aviation areas.
Construction. When constructing defensive positions, minimize disturbances to
the surrounding area. Cover scarred earth with cut vegetation, camouflage nets, or
toned-down agents.
SECTION III — RELOCATABLE UNITS
MOBILITY AND CCD
6-30. Examples of valuable relocatable units include TOCs, tactical-missile-defense
(TMD) units (Patriot batteries), refuel-on-the-move (ROM) sites, and FARPs. These units
are critical to offensive and defensive operations, and their protection should receive a
high priority.
6-31. Mobility and CCD enhance the survivability of relocatable units. A CCD plan must
include the techniques for units to deploy rapidly and conduct mobile operations
continuously. The CCD techniques available to mobile units are basically the same as for
fixed installations, and the principles of CCD still apply. However, the mission of
relocatable units differs from that of fixed installations so CCD execution also differs.
6-32. Relocatable units spend from a few hours to several weeks in the same location,
depending on their tactical situation. CCD techniques must be planned accordingly. If a
unit is at a location for a few hours, it should employ expedient CCD techniques. If a unit
is at a location for several days, it should employ robust CCD plans. The resources a unit
expends on CCD execution must be weighed against the length of time that it remains in
the same location. As CCD plans increase in complexity, subsequent assembly and
teardown times also increase. Commanders must ensure that the unit's manpower and
resources dedicated to CCD execution are equal to the tactical mobility requirements.
BUILT-IN CAPABILITIES
6-33. CCD should be built into systems to the maximum extent possible. Supplemental
CCD is usually necessary and should be designed to enhance the built-in CCD. Apply the
same rules for avoiding detection and the same considerations regarding the seven
recognition factors that are discussed in Chapter 3 . The CCD planning process outlined at
the beginning of this chapter also applies.
Chapter 7
Special Environments
The fundamentals of CCD do not change between environments. The seven rules for
avoiding detection and the seven recognition factors that are listed in Chapter 3 and the
three CCD principles—preventing detection, improving survivability, and improving
deception capabilities—still apply. However, the guidelines for their application change.
Different environments require thoughtful, creative, and unique CCD techniques. This
chapter discusses different CCD techniques that have proven effective in three special
environments—desert, snow-covered areas, and urban terrain.
DESERT
7-1. The color of desert terrain varies from pink to blue, depending on the minerals in the
soil and the time of the day. No color or combination of colors matches all deserts.
Patches of uniform color in the desert are usually 10 times larger than those in wooded
areas. These conditions have led to the development of a neutral, monotone tan as the
best desert CCD paint color.
TOPOGRAPHY
7-2. Although desert terrain may appear featureless, it is not completely flat. In some
ways, desert terrain resembles unplowed fields; barren, rocky areas; grasslands; and
steppes.
SHADOWS
7-3. The closer a target is to the ground, the smaller its shadow; and a small shadow is
easier to conceal from aerial observation. The proper draping of CCD nets will alter or
disrupt the regular, sharp-edged shadows of military targets and allow target shadows to
appear more like natural shadows. When supplemented by artificial materials, natural
shadows cast by folds of the ground can be used for CCD purposes. The best solution to
the shadow problem in desert terrain is to dig in and use overhead concealment or cover.
Otherwise, park vehicles in a way that minimizes their broadside exposure to the sun.
PLACEMENT
7-4. Proper placement and shadow disruption remain effective techniques. Place assets in
gullies, washes, wadis, and ravines to reduce their shadows and silhouettes and to take
advantage of terrain masking. More dispersion is necessary in desert terrain than in
wooded areas. Move assets as the sun changes position to keep equipment in shadows.
TERRAIN MOTTLING
7-5. Use terrain mottling when the ground offers little opportunity for concealment. This
technique involves scarring the earth with bulldozers, which creates darker areas on
which to place equipment for better blending with the background. Ensure that the
mottled areas are irregularly shaped and at least twice the size of the target you are
concealing. Place the target off center in the mottled area and drape it with camouflage
nets. When employing the scarring technique, dig two to three times as many scars as
pieces of equipment being concealed. Doing this prevents the mere presence of mottled
areas from giving away a unit's location.
MOVEMENT DISCIPLINE
7-6. Movement discipline is especially important in the desert. Desert terrain is uniform
and fragile, making it easily disturbed by vehicle tracks. Vehicle movement also produces
dust and diesel plumes that are easily detectable in the desert. When movement is
necessary, move along the shortest route and on the hardest ground. Shine is a
particularly acute desert problem due to the long, uninterrupted hours of sunlight. To deal
with this problem, remove all reflective surfaces or cover them with burlap. Use matte
CCD paint or expedient paints (see Table 3-2 ) to dull the gloss of a vehicle's finish.
Shade optical devices (binoculars, gun sights) when using them.
NOISE SND LIGHT DISCIPLINE
7-7. Noise and light discipline is particularly important in desert terrain since sound and
light can be detected at greater distances on clear desert nights. The techniques for
reducing these signatures remain the same as for other environments. Be aware that
thermal sensors, while not as effective during the day, have an ideal operating
environment during cold desert nights. Starting all vehicle and equipment engines
simultaneously is a technique that can be used to confuse enemy acoustical surveillance
efforts.
SNOW-COVERED AREAS
7-8. When the main background is white, apply white paint or whitewash over the
permanent CCD paint pattern. The amount of painting should be based on the percentage
of snow coverage on the ground:
• If the snow covers less than 15 percent of the background, do not change the CCD
paint pattern.
• If the snow cover is 15 to 85 percent, substitute white for green in the CCD paint
pattern.
• If the snow cover is more than 85 percent, paint the vehicles and equipment
completely white.
PLACEMENT
7-9. A blanket of snow often eliminates much of the ground pattern, causing natural
textures and colors to disappear. Blending under these conditions is difficult. However,
snow-covered terrain is rarely completely white so use the dark features of the landscape.
Place equipment in roadways, in streambeds, under trees, under bushes, in shadows, and
in ground folds. Standard BDUs and personal equipment contrast with the snow
background, so use CCD to reduce these easily recognized signatures.
MOVEMENT
7-10. Concealing tracks is a major problem in snow-covered environments. Movement
should follow wind-swept drift lines, which cast shadows, as much as possible. Vehicle
drivers should avoid sharp turns and follow existing track marks. Wipe out short lengths
of track marks by trampling them with snowshoes or by brushing them out.
THERMAL SIGNATURES
7-11. Snow-covered environments provide excellent conditions for a threat's thermal and
UV sensors. Terrain masking is the best solution to counter both types of sensors. Use
arctic LCSS and winter camouflage paint to provide UV blending, and use smoke to
create near-whiteout conditions.
URBAN TERRAIN
7-12. Urbanization is reducing the amount of open, natural terrain throughout the world.
Therefore, modern military units must be able to apply effective urban CCD. Many of the
CCD techniques used in natural terrain are effective in urban areas.
PLANNING
7-13. Planning for operations in urban areas presents unique difficulties. Tactical maps do
not show man-made features in enough detail to support tactical operations. Therefore,
they must be supplemented with aerial photographs and local city maps. Local
government and military organizations are key sources of information that can support
tactical and CCD operations. They can provide diagrams of underground facilities, large-
scale city maps, and/or civil-defense or air-raid shelter locations.
SELECTING S SITE
7-14. The physical characteristics of urban areas enhance CCD efforts. The dense
physical structure of these areas generates clutter (an abundance of EM signatures in a
given area) that increases the difficulty of identifying specific targets. Urban clutter
greatly reduces the effectiveness of a threat's surveillance sensors, particularly in the IR
and radar wavelengths. Urban terrain, therefore, provides an excellent background for
concealing CPs, reserves, combat-service-support (CSS) complexes, or combat forces.
The inherent clutter in urban terrain generally makes visual cues the most important
consideration in an urban CCD plan.
7-15. The regular pattern of urban terrain; the diverse colors and contrast; and the large,
enclosed structures offer enhanced concealment opportunities. Established, hardened road
surfaces effectively mask vehicle tracks. Depending on the nature of the operation,
numerous civilian personnel and vehicles may be present and may serve as clutter. This
confuses an enemy's ability to distinguish between military targets and the civilian
population. Underground structures (sewers, subways) are excellent means of concealing
movement and HVTs.
7-16. When augmented by artificial means, man-made structures provide symmetrical
shapes that provide ready-made CCD. The CCD for fighting positions is especially
important because of the reduced identification and engagement ranges (100 meters or
less) typical of urban fighting. Limit or conceal movement and shine. These signatures
provide the best opportunity for successful threat surveillance in urban terrain. Careful
placement of equipment and fighting positions remains important to provide visual CCD
and avoid detection by contrast (thermal sensors detecting personnel and equipment
silhouetted against colder buildings or other large, flat surfaces).
ESTABLISHING FIGHTING POSITIONS
7-17. The fundamental CCD rule is to maintain the natural look of an area as much as
possible. Buildings with large, thick walls and few narrow windows provide the best
concealment. When selecting a position inside a building, soldiers should—
• Avoid lighted areas around windows.
• Stand in shadows when observing or firing weapons through windows.
• Select positions with covered and concealed access and egress routes (breaches in
buildings, underground systems, trenches).
• Develop decoy positions to enhance CCD operations.
PLACING VEHICLES
7-18. Hide vehicles in large structures, if possible, and use local materials to help blend
vehicles with the background environment. Paint vehicles and equipment a solid, dull,
dark color. If you cannot do this, use expedient paints to subdue the lighter, sand-colored
portions of the SCSPP. When placing vehicles outdoors, use shadows for concealment.
Move vehicles during limited visibility or screen them with smoke.
Appendix A
Metric Conversion Chart
This appendix complies with current Army directives which state that the metric system
will be incorporated into all new publications. Table A-l is a conversion chart.
Table A-l. Metric conversion chart
US Units
Multiplied By
Metric Units
Cubic feet
0.0283
Cubic meters
Feet
0.3048
Meters
Gallons
3.7854
Liters
Inches
2.54
Centimeters
Inches
0.0254
Meters
Inches
25.4001
Millimeters
Miles, statute
1.6093
Kilometers
Miles, statute
0.9144
Yards
Ounces
28.349
Grams
Pounds
0.454
Kilograms
Tons, short
0.9072
Tons, metric
Square feet
0.093
Square meters
Metric Units
Multiplied By
US Units
Centimeters
0.3937
Inches
Cubic meters
35.3144
Cubic feet
Cubic meters
1.3079
Cubic yards
Grams
0.035
Ounces
Kilograms
2.205
Pounds
Kilometers
0.62137
Miles, statute
Kilometers
1,093.6
Yards
Liters
0.264
Gallons
Meters
3.2808
Feet
Meters
39.37
Inches
Meters
1.0936
Yards
Millimeters
0.03937
Inches
Square meters
10.764
Square feet
Tons, metric
2,204.6
Pounds
Appendix B
Guidelines for Tactical Standing Operating Procedures
TACSOPs are critical to battlefield success. All commanders should establish
camouflage guidelines in their TACSOPs and ensure that their soldiers are familiar with
them. TACSOPs provide guidelines that help reduce the time required to perform routine
tasks. Commanders can achieve these ends by defining the responsibilities, identifying
the expected tasks, and providing supervisors with a memory aid when planning or
inspecting. TACSOPs, coupled with battle drills {Appendix C) , provide units with
guidance on how to execute anticipated battlefield tasks. CCD employment is a task that
should be routine for all units.
CONTENT
B-l. The following CCD considerations may be included in a unit TACSOP:
• A review of CCD fundamentals.
• Rules of unit CCD discipline.
• Memory aids for supervisors, which should include an inspection checklist
( Figure B-l ) and a chart of an enemy's sensor systems with possible
countermeas ure s.
• Guidelines on CCD discipline to provide uniformity among all subunits.
• The different CCD postures.
• Procedures for blackout, the quartering party, unit movement, and the deployment
area.
• Appropriate CCD postures in OPORDs for different missions.
CCD Inspection Checklist
1. Command Emphasis,
a. The commander—
(1) Establishes CCD goals.
(2) Executes CCD plans.
(3) Inspects frequently doe CCD deficiencies.
(4) Conducts follow-up inspection of CCD deficiencies.
(5) Integrates CCD into training exercises,
b. The unit—
(1) Intregrates CCD into its TACSOP.
(2) Follows the TACSOP.
2. Discipline.
a. The unit—
(1) Observes noise disciplene.
(2) Observes light discipline with respect to smoking, fires, and lights.
(3) Conceals highly visible equipment.
(4) Covers shiny surfaces.
(5) Keeps exposed activity to a minimum.
(6) Uses cut vegetation properly.
(7) Uses and conceals dismount points properly.
b. Soldiers—
(1) Wear the correct uniform.
(2) Control litter and spoil.
3. Techniques. The unit—
a. Places and disperses vehicles and equipment.
b. Disperses the CP.
c. Employs camoulfage nets (LCSS)
d. Uses (or minimizes) shadows.
e. Minimizes movement.
f. Hides operations and equipment.
g. Blends operations and equipment with backgrounds.
h. Employs pattern-painting techniques.
i. Employs decoys.
j. Integrates smoke operations with unit movement.
k. Practices individual CCD on—
(1) Helmet.
(2) Face.
(3) Weapon.
(4) Other Equipment.
l. Employs CCD on fighting positions by—
(1) Eliminating or minimizing target silhouettes.
(2) Practicing spoil control.
(3) Eliminating or minimizing regular or geometric shapes and layouts.
(4) Maintaining overhead concealment.
(5) Practicing dust control.
m. Employs CCD on tactical vehicles by—
(1) Minimizing and concealing track marks.
(2) Minimizing or eliminating the shine on vehicles and equipment.
(3) Reducing or using shadows to the unit's advantage.
(4) Enploying camouflage nets (LCSS).
(5) Painting vehicles to match their surroundings.
(6) Dispersing vehicles and equipment.
(7) Concealing vehicles and supply routes.
(8) Controlling litter and spoil.
(9) Storing and concealing ammunition.
n. Employs CCD on AAs by—
(1) Facilitating mission planning for access and egress concealment.
(2) Marking guideposts for route junctions.
(3) Ensuring that tum-ins are not widened by improper use.
(4) Dispersing dismount, mess, and maintenance areas.
(5) Dispersing the CP.
(6) Maintaining CCD by—
(a) Inspecting CCD frequently.
(b) Controlling litter and garbage.
(c) Observing blackout procedures.
(7) Observing evaluation procedures by—
(a) Policing the area
(b) Covering or eliminating tracks.
(c) Preventing traffic congestion.
(d) Concealing spoil.
o. Employs CCD on the CP by—
(1) Ensuring that LOC are not converged.
(2) Dispersing vehicles.
(3) Ensuring that tum-ins are not widened through improper use.
(4) Ensuring that protective barriers follow terrain features.
(5) Concealing defensive weapons.
(6) Ensuring that existing poles are used for LOC.
(7) Digging in the CP (when in open areas).
(8) Maintaining camouflage nets (LCSS).
(9) Using civilian buildings properly by—
(a) Controlling access and egress.
(b) Observing blackout procedures.
(c) Avoiding obvious locations.
p. Employs CCD on supply points by—
(1) Dispersing operations.
(2) Concealing access and egress routes.
(3) Using the track plan.
(4) Providing concealed loading areas.
(5) Developing and implementing a schedule for the units being serviced,
q. Enploys CCD on water points by—
(1) Concealing access and egress routes.
(2) Ensuring that the track plan is used.
(3) Controlling spillage.
(4) Controlling shine and reflections.
(5) Developing and implementing a schedule for the units being serviced.
Figure B-l. Sample CCD checklist
COMMANDERS' RESPONSIBILITIES
B-2. Commanders must ensure that each soldier has the required quantities
of serviceable BDUs and that these uniforms are properly maintained to
protect their IR screening properties. Based on unit requirements, supply
personnel forecast, request, and store adequate quantities of expendable
CCD supplies (paint, makeup, repair kits). Commanders ensure that
authorized quantities of CCD screens (LCSS) and support systems (to
include repair kits and spare parts) are on hand and continually maintained
in a clean, serviceable condition.
FRATRICIDE
B-3. Since warfare often results in the loss of life from fratricide, the unit
TACSOP should include a way to reduce fratricide. Commanders should
consider ways for friendly and allied units to identify each other on the
battlefield. Fratricide compels commanders to consider the effect CCD
and deception operations have on the necessity of being recognized by
friendly troops.
Appendix C
Camouflage Requirements and Procedures
This appendix provides information on the LCSS and describes how to erect it. Also
included is a figure for determining the amount of modules needed to camouflage the
various vehicles in the Army's inventory. This appendix also includes a sample battle
drill that can be used to train soldiers.
LIGHTWEIGHT CAMOUFLAGE SCREEN SYSTEM
C-l. The LCSS is a modular system consisting of a hexagon screen, a diamond-shaped
screen, a support system, and a repair kit. You can join any number of screens to cover a
designated target or area ( Figure C-l ). Use Figure C-2 to determine the number of
modules needed for camouflaging a given area. Measure the vehicle or use Table C-l to
determine the vehicle's dimensions.
One Module
Two Modules
NOTE: Diamond and hexagon screens may be used
separately.
Three Modules
Four Modules
Five Modules and One
Diamond
CAUTION
The minimum required space
between the LOSS and the object
to be camouflaged is 2 feet.
Stagger poles to
disrupt straight
lines.
Lower the canvas flap
to hide the shadow
inside the truck.
Install stakes to
hold the screen
taut.
Cover lights with
brush, and cover the
windshield with a tarp.
Break recognizable
shadows with brush.
Figure C-l. LCSS modular system.
<2 Vehicle dimensions:
| | h = height
I il w = width
Meters 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55
B
NOTE: This chart is normally reliable for vehicles of regular configuration. Vehicles
of irregular configuration, such as artillery pieces or cranes, may require additional
modules.
Figure C-2. Module determination chart.
Table C-l. Vehicle dimensions
Nomenclature
Height
Width
Lengt
No. of
(feet)
(feet)
h
Module
(feet)
s
AVLB
17
13
37
5
C7 loader, scoop, 2-ton, w/o cage
9
9
25
2
D7 dozer, with blade
10
12
19
2
M106A1 carrier, mortar, 107-mm
7
10
16
2
M109A3 howitzer, 155-mm (SP)
11
12
30
3
M113A2 carrier, personnel
7
9
16
2
M113A3 carrier, personnel
7
9
19
2
M125A1 carrier, mortar, 81-mm
7
9
16
2
Ml49 trailer, water, 400-gal
6
7
7
1
Ml72 trailer, low-bed, 25-ton
6
10
35
2
M1A1 tank, with mine roller
10
12
40
3
M1A1(2) tank, combat, 105- and 120-mm
10
12
28
3
M2 fighting vehicle, infantry
10
11
22
2
M2 TOW vehicle, improved
11
9
15
2
M3 fighting vehicle, cavalry
10
11
22
2
M35A2 truck, cargo, 2-ton
9
8
23
2
M520 truck, cargo, 8-ton
11
9
32
3
M548 carrier, cargo, 6-ton
10
9
21
2
M54A2 truck, cargo, 5-ton
10
8
26
2
M553 truck, wrecker, 10-ton
11
9
33
3
M559 truck, fuel, 2,500-gal
11
9
33
3
M577A1 carrier, CP
9
9
19
2
M559 truck, fuel, 2,500-gal
M577A1 carrier, CP
M578 vehicle, recovery, light
11
10
21
2
M60A3 tank, combat, 105-mm
11
12
27
3
M713 truck, ambulance, -ton
7
6
12
2
M728 vehicle, combat engineer
11
12
29
3
M792 truck, ambulance, 1-ton
8
7
19
2
M816 truck, wrecker, 5-ton
10
8
30
3
M880 truck, cargo, 1-ton
8
7
19
2
M88A1 vehicle, recovery, medium
10
11
27
3
M9 vehicle, ACE
9
13
21
2
M920 truck, tractor, 20-ton
12
11
27
3
M930 truck, dump, 5-ton
9
8
24
2
M977 truck, cargo, HEMTT
9
8
34
3
M978 truck, tanker, HEMTT
9
8
34
3
M992 ammo carrier (FAAS-V)
11
11
23
3
M998, HMMWV, carrier, personnel
6
7
15
2
MLRS
9
10
23
2
MT250 crane, hydraulic, 25-ton
10
8
45
3
RT crane, boom, 20-ton
14
11
44
4
NOTES:
1. See Appendix E for a list of LCSS national stock numbers (NSNs) and ordering
information.
2. See TM 5-1080-200-13&P for more information on maintenance, erection, and
characteristics of the LCSS.
CAPABILITIES
C-2. The LCSS protects targets in four different ways. It—
• Casts patterned shadows that break up the characteristic outlines of a target.
• Scatters radar returns (except when radar-transparent nets are used).
• Traps target heat and allows it to disperse.
• Simulates color and shadow patterns that are commonly found in a particular
region.
ERECTING PROCEDURES
C-3. To erect camouflage nets effectively—
• Keep the net structure as small as possible.
• Maintain the net a minimum of 2 feet from the camouflaged target's surface. This
prevents the net from assuming the same shape and thermal signature as the target
it is meant to conceal.
• Ensure that the lines between support poles are gently sloped so that the net
blends into its background. Sloping the net over the target also minimizes sharp
edges, which are more easily detectable to the human eye.
• Extend the net completely to the ground to prevent creating unnatural shadows
that are easily detected. This ensures that the net effectively disrupts the target's
shape and actually absorbs and scatters radar energy.
• Extend the net all the way around the target to ensure complete protection from
enemy sensors.
SUPPLEMENTAL CAMOUFLAGE
C-4. Camouflage nets are often employed in conjunction with supplemental camouflage
because nets alone do not make a target invisible to a threat's multispectral sensors. Use
other CCD techniques to achieve effective concealment. Cover or remove all of the
target's reflective surfaces (mirrors, windshields, lights). Also ensure that the target's
shadow is disrupted or disguised. Use native vegetation, because placing a target in dense
foliage provides natural concealment and a smoother transition between the edges of the
camouflage net and the target's background. Cover exposed edges of the net with dirt or
cut vegetation to enhance the transition.
VEHICLE CAMOUFLAGE
C-5. Measure the vehicle or determine its dimensions from Table C-l . Use the following
equations and Figure C-2 to determine the number of modules needed to camouflage a
vehicle.
Equation 1 : A = 2h + w + 5 feet
Equation 2: B = 2h + L + 5 feet
where —
h = height, in feet
w = width, in feet
L = length, in feet
Step 1. Determine the vehicle's dimensions (measure or use Table C-l) . For the M2
fighting vehicle, the height is 10 feet, the width is 11 feet, and the length is 22 feet.
Step 2. Use the above equations and the measurements from Step 1 to determine the
total dimensions.
A = 2(10) + 11 + 5 = 36 feet
B = 2(10) + 22 + 5 = 47feet
Step 3. Determine the number of modules needed (use Figure C-2 ). Since A equals
36 and B equals 47, two modules of camouflage are required to cover the M2 fighting
vehicle.
TRAINING
C-6. Units should develop and practice battle drills that cover the requirements and
procedures for erecting nets over assigned equipment. Table C-2 shows a sample battle
drill.
Table C-2. Sample battle drill
Standards:
• Complete camouflage net setup drills within 20 minutes.
• Complete camouflage net teardown drills within 15 minutes.
Personnel Required: Three crew members.
Equipment Required: Two modules or the following items:
• Nets, hexagonal, 2 each.
• Nets, diamond, 2 each.
• Pole sections, 24 each.
• Stakes, 36 each.
• Lanyards, 6 each.
• Spreaders, 12 each.
Stowage Location: The camouflage net is strapped to the right side of the trim vane.
Setup Drill:
• The gunner and the assistant gunner remove the camouflage net from the trim vane and
place it on top of the M2.
• The driver removes poles and stakes from the bag and places them around the vehicle.
• The gunner and the assistant gunner remove the vehicle's antenna, position the net on
top of the vehicle, and roll the net off the sides of the vehicle.
• The driver stakes the net around the vehicle.
• The driver and the assistant gunner assemble plies and spreaders and then erect the net.
• The gunner inspects the camouflage from a distance.
• The crew adjusts the camouflage as necessary.
Teardown Drill:
• The driver and the assistant gunner take down and disassemble plies and spreaders.
• The gunner and the assistant gunner unstake the net and roll it to the top of the M2.
• The gunner and the assistant gunner complete rolling the net on top of the vehicle and
replace the vehicle's antenna.
• The driver stores the net on the trim vane.
• The gunner and the assistant gunner store poles, spreaders, and stakes on the trim vane.
NOTES:
1. Preassemble the nets before placing them on the M2.
2. Supplement camouflage nets by properly placing vehicles and using natural
vegetation.
Appendix D
Individual Camouflage, Concealment, and Decoys
Each soldier is responsible for camouflaging himself, his equipment, and his position.
CCD reduces the probability of an enemy placing aimed fire on a soldier.
MATERIALS
D-l. Use natural and artificial materials for CCD. Natural CCD includes defilade, grass,
bushes, trees, and shadows. Artificial CCD for soldiers includes BDUs, camouflage nets,
skin paint, and natural materials removed from their original positions. To be effective,
artificial CCD must blend with the natural background.
DISCIPLINE
D-2. Noise, movement, and light discipline contribute to individual CCD:
• Noise discipline muffles and eliminates sounds made by soldiers and their
equipment.
• Movement discipline minimizes movement within and between positions and
limits movement to routes that cannot be readily observed by an enemy.
• Light discipline controls the use of lights at night. Avoid open fires, do not smoke
tobacco in the open, and do not walk around with a lit flashlight.
DISPERSAL
D-3. Dispersal is the deliberate deployment of soldiers and equipment over a wide area. It
is a key individual survival technique. Dispersal creates a smaller target mass for enemy
sensors and weapons systems. Therefore, it reduces casualties and losses in the event of
an attack and also makes enemy detection efforts more difficult.
CONSIDERATIONS
D-4. Every soldier should have a detailed understanding of the recognition factors
described in Chapter 3 . While all of these factors remain important when applying
individual CCD, the following factors are critical:
• Movement. Movement draws attention, whether it involves vehicles on the road
or individuals walking around positions. The naked eye, IR, and radar sensors can
detect movement. Minimize movement while in the open and remember that
darkness does not prevent observation by an enemy equipped with modern
sensors. When movement is necessary, slow, smooth movement attracts less
attention than quick, irregular movement.
• Shape. Use CCD materials to break up the shapes and shadows of positions and
equipment. Stay in the shadows whenever possible, especially when moving,
because shadows can visually mask objects. When conducting operations close to
an enemy, disguise or distort helmet and body shapes with artificial CCD
materials because an enemy can easily recognize them at close range.
• Shine and light. Shine can also attract attention. Pay particular attention to light
reflecting from smooth or polished surfaces (mess kits, mirrors, eyeglasses,
watches, windshields, starched uniforms). Plastic map cases, dust goggles worn
on top of a helmet, and clear plastic garbage bags also reflect light. Cover these
items or remove them from exposed areas. Vehicle headlights, taillights, and
safety reflectors not only reflect light but also reflect laser energy used in weapon
systems. Cover this equipment when the vehicle is not in operation.
Red filters on vehicle dome lights and flashlights, while designed to protect a
soldier's night vision, are extremely sensitive to detection by NVDs. A tank's red
dome light, reflecting off the walls and out through the sight and vision blocks,
can be seen with a starlight scope from 4 kilometers. Red-lensed flashlights and lit
cigarettes and pipes are equally observable. To reduce the chances of detection,
replace red filters with blue-green filters and practice strict light discipline. Use
measures to prevent shine at night because moonlight and starlight can be
reflected as easily as sunlight.
• Color. The contrast of skin, uniforms, and equipment with the background helps
an enemy detect OPFOR. Individual CCD should blend with the surroundings; or
at a minimum, objects must not contrast with the background. Ideally, blend
colors with the background or hide objects with contrasting colors.
EMPLOYMENT
D-5. Study nearby terrain and vegetation before applying CCD to soldiers, equipment, or
the fighting position. During recon, analyze the terrain in lieu of the CCD considerations
listed above and then choose CCD materials that best blend with the area. Change CCD
as required when moving from one area to another.
SKIN
D-6. Exposed skin reflects light and may draw attention. Even very dark skin, because of
natural oils, will reflect light. CCD paint sticks cover these oils and help blend skin with
the background. Avoid using oils or insect repellent to soften the paint stick because
doing so makes skin shiny and defeats the purpose of CCD paint. Soldiers applying CCD
paint should work in pairs and help each other. Self-application may leave gaps, such as
behind ears. Use the following technique:
• Paint high, shiny areas (forehead, cheekbones, nose, ears, chin) with a dark color.
• Paint low, shadow areas with a light color.
• Paint exposed skin (back of neck, arms, hands) with an irregular pattern.
D-7. When CCD paint sticks are unavailable, use field expedients such as burnt cork,
bark, charcoal, lampblack, or mud. Mud contains bacteria, some of which is harmful and
may cause disease or infection, so consider mud as the last resource for individual CCD
field-expedient paint.
UNIFORMS
D-8. BDUs have a CCD pattern but often require additional CCD, especially in
operations occurring very close to the enemy. Attach leaves, grass, small branches, or
pieces of LCSS to uniforms and helmets. These items help distort the shape of a soldier,
and they blend with the natural background. BDUs provide visual and NIR CCD. Do not
starch BDUs because starching counters the IR properties of the dyes. Replace
excessively faded and worn BDUs because they lose their CCD effectiveness as they
wear.
EQUIPMENT
D-9. Inspect personal equipment to ensure that shiny items are covered or removed. Take
corrective action on items that rattle or make other noises when moved or worn. Soldiers
assigned equipment, such as vehicles or generators, should be knowledgeable of their
appropriate camouflage techniques (see Chapters 3 , 4, and 5).
INDIVIDUAL FIGHTING POSITIONS
NOTE: Review the procedures for camouflaging positions in Chapter 5 , which
include considerations for camouflaging individual positions.
D-10. While building a fighting position, camouflage it and carefully dispose of earth
spoil. Remember that too much CCD material applied to a position can actually have a
reverse effect and disclose the position to the enemy. Obtain CCD materials from a
dispersed area to avoid drawing attention to the position by the stripped area around it.
D-ll. Camouflage a position as it is being built. To avoid disclosing a fighting position,
never—
• Leave shiny or light-colored objects exposed.
• Remove shirts while in the open.
• Use fires.
• Leave tracks or other signs of movement.
• Look up when aircraft fly overhead. (One of the most obvious features on aerial
photographs is the upturned faces of soldiers.)
D-12. When CCD is complete, inspect the position from an enemy's viewpoint. Check
CCD periodically to see that it stays natural-looking and conceals the position. When
CCD materials become ineffective, change or improve them.
Appendix E
Standard Camouflage Materials
Table E-l lists standard camouflage items available to the soldier. Items on this list are
ordered through normal unit-procurement channels:
• A complete list of Department of Defense (DOD) stock materials is available from the
Defense Logistics Service Center (DLSC), Battle Creek, Michigan, Defense Switched
Network (DSN) 932-4725 or commercial (616) 961-4725.
• A complete list of Army materials is available from the Army Materiel Command
(AMC), Logistics Support Activity, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, DSN 645-0782 or
commercial (205) 955-0782.
Table E-l. Camouflage items
Item
NSN
Mil No.
Remarks
Camo enamel, black
8010-00-111-8356
NA
5 gal
Camo enamel, black
8010-00-111-8005
NA
1 gal
Camo enamel, sand
8010-00-111-8336
NA
5 gal
Camo enamel, sand
8010-00-111-7988
NA
1 gal
Camo screen, ultralite,
asphalt/concrete
1080-01-338-4468
PN8811616
9
CVU-165/G
Camo screen, ultralite, green/tan
1080-01-338-4471
PN8811600
3
CVU-166/G
Camo screen, ultralite,
snow/partial snow
1080-01-338-4469
PN8811617
0
CVU-164/G
Camo support set, ultralite (A-
frame)
1080-01-338-4472
PN8811615
4
MTU-96/G
Connector plug, w/o gen-test
5935-01-050-6586
MS3456W1
6S-1P
Use 5935-00-431-4935
Connector, receptacle, electrical
CCK-77/E
1370-01-171-1336
293E663P4
04
1.4G class/div, 49 ea
Control, remote smoke gen,
MXK-856/E32
1080-01-338-7051
PN8811551
0
For SG-18-02
Decoy target, bailey bridge
1080-00-650-1098
None
Decoy target, how, 105-mm
1080-00-570-6519
PN EB 306D4904-IT08
Decoy units, inflating, radar,
AN/SLQ-49
5865-01-266-3840
Passive radar freq
respondent
Decoy, aircraft, ground (F-16)
1080-01-301-8273
PN160002
Only 25 produced
Decoy, close combat, M1A1
tank
1080-01-242-7251
PN13277E9
830
None
Decoy, close combat, M60A3
tank
1080-01-242-7250
PN3228E19
79
None
Decoy, runway (FOS)
1080-01-338-5201
PN8811610
0
50 x 1,000 ft
Diesel fuel, DF-1
9140-00-286-5288
VV-F-800D
Smoke/obsc-alt
Diesel fuel, DF-2
9140-00-286-5296
VV-F-800D
Smoke/obsc-alt
Diesel fuel, DF-2
9140-00-286-5297
VV-F-800D
Smoke/obsc-alt
Drum, S&S, 55-gal
8110-00-292-9783
NA
18-gauge steel, painted
Drum, S&S, 55-gal
8110-00-597-2353
NA
16-gauge steel, painted
Explosive, airburst projectile
launch atk
1055-01-175-4002
PN 102575
Smoky flak, FMK-25
Federal standard colors 595-B
7690-01-162-2210
NA
2-ft x 10-in fan deck of
color
Gen set, smoke, mech. Ml57
1040-01-206-0147
None
Gen, signal radio freq
6625-00-937-4029
NA
SM-422/GRC
Gen, smoke, mech, A/E32U-13
1040-01-338-8839
PN8811546 SG . 18 . 02
Gen, smoke, mech, M3A
1040-00-587-3618
None
Gen, smoke, mech, M3A4
1040-01-143-9506 ]
Indiv camo cover, 3-color
woodland
8415-01-280-3098 *
Indiv camo cover, 6-color desert
8415-01-280-5234 *
Indiv camo cover, snow
8415-01-282-3160 *
Launcher rckt, l-bay launcher,
LMU-23E
1055-01-131-7857 l
Launcher rckt, 4-bay launcher,
OMU-24E
1055-01-144-0864 l
LCSS support set, desert
1080-00-623-7295 ]
LCSS support set, snow
1080-00-556-4954 ]
LCSS support set, woodland
1080-00-108-1173 ]
LCSS support set, woodland
1080-00-108-1173 ]
LCSS, desert, radar-scattering
1080-00-103-1211 ]
LCSS, desert, radar-scattering
1080-01-266-1825 [
LCSS, desert, radar-scattering
1080-01-266-1828 [
LCSS, desert, radar-transparent
1080-00-103-1217 [
LCSS, snow, radar-scattering
1080-00-103-1233 ]
IL-C-
358
IL-C-
358
IL-C-
358
PN1335AS
PNE31-15-2000
8 oz, 5- x 8-ft coverage
8 oz, 5- x 8-ft coverage
8 oz, 5- x 8-ft coverage
Smoky SAM
Smoky SAM
Can use 1080-01-253-
0522
Same as 1080-01-179-
6024
Same as 1080-01-179-
6025
first
PN13226E1357
Can use 1080-01-266-
1826
LCSS, snow, radar-scattering
1080-00-103-1234
PN13226E1355
LCSS, snow, radar-scattering
1080-01-266-1823
LCSS, snow, radar-scattering
1080-01-266-1826
LCSS, woodland, radar¬
scattering
1080-00-103-1246
LCSS, woodland, radar¬
scattering
1080-00-103-1322
LCSS, woodland, radar¬
scattering
1080-01-266-1824
LCSS, woodland, radar¬
scattering
1080-01-266-1827
Lead acid btry, 24V, BB-297U
6140-00-059-3528
Mounting kit, smoke gen, M284
1040-01-249-0272
Net, multipurpose, olive-green
mesh
8465-00-889-3771
Paint, temp, tan
8010-01-326-8078
Paint, temp, tan
8010-01-326-8079
Paint, temp, white
8010-01-129-5444
Pump inflating, manual, smoky
flak
4320-00-822-9036
Reflector, radar, Coast Guard
buoy marker
2050-01-225-2779
Simulator, atomic explosion,
M142
1370-00-474-0270
PN13228E5
928
PN13228E5
931
PN13228E5
929
PN13228E5
932
MS75047-1
120768
Can use 1080-01-266-
1826
Can use 1080-00-103-
1233
Can use 1080-01-266-
1827
PN13226E1356
Can use 1080-01-266-
1827
Use 1080-01-266-1824
first
For SG 18-02 w/o gen
For Ml57 gen
108- x 60-in coverage
Fed-std-595B 33446
Fed-std-595B 33446
None
Need 1 ea TO 11A-1-
46
1 cu ft, 10-lb,
aluminum
PM8864243
Simulator, projectile airburst,
PJU-7/E
1370-01-180-5856
PN 102549 1.1G class/div, 48 ea
Simulator, projectile airburst,
PJU-7A/E
1370-01-279-9505
PN8387310
1.3G class/div, 48 ea
Smoke pot, 30-lb, HC, M5
1365-00-598-5207
MIL-S-
13183
PH E36-1-18, 17 min
Smoke pot, floating, HC
1365-00-939-6599
MIL-S-
51235
W/M208/M209 fuse
Smoke pot, floating, HC, M4A2
1365-00-598-5220
w/M207a fuse, 12 min
Smokey SAM rocket, GTR-18A
1340-01-130-6282
DL1335AS
100
Firing cartridge and
rocket
Support poles, camo net, ultralite
1080-01-338-4470
PN8811615
3
MTU-99/G, 2
poles/battens
Tool, special purpose, smoky
flak
5120-01-176-2188
PN 103320
Need 1 ea
Trailer, ground-handling, MHU-
141/M "
1740-01-031-5868
5,500-lb cap, for SG-
18-02
Valve adapter assy, smoky flak
1055-01-216-4803
PN8523971
-10
Need 1 each
Valve, pneumatic tank, smoky
flak
4820-00-427-5047
GV500RK2
Need 1 ea
Wrench, bung
5120-00-045-5055
2- x -in plugs
Appendix F
The Geneva Emblem and Camouflage of Medical Facilities
This appendix implements STANAG 2931 .
STANAG 2931 covers procedures for using the Geneva emblem and camouflaging
medical facilities. This STANAG requires signatories to display the Geneva emblem (red
cross) on medical facilities to help identify and protect the sick and wounded. All
signatories, however, are allowed to display the Geneva emblem according to their
national regulations and procedures. STANAG 2931 also defines medical facilities as
medical units, medical vehicles, and medical aircraft on the ground. A tactical
commander may order the camouflage of medical facilities, including the Geneva
emblem, when the failure to do so will endanger or compromise tactical operations. Such
an order is considered temporary and must be rescinded as soon as the tactical situation
permits. The camouflage of large, fixed medical facilities is not envisaged under the
guidelines of STANAG 2931 .
Glossary
AA
AAR
AAS
ACE
AFJPAM
AFV
alt
AM
AMA
AMC
ammo
AO
assy
atk
ATTN
AVFB
backgrou
nd
assembly area
after-action review
Army aviation site
armored combat earthmover, M9
Air Force joint pamphlet
armored fighting vehicle
alternate
amplitude modulation
aviation maintenance area
Army Materiel Command
ammunition
area of operation
assembly
attack
attention
armored vehicle-launched bridge
The features in a target area that surround the target.
BDU battle-dress uniform
blending A CCD technique that causes a target to appear as part of the background. Many
target characteristics must be considered when attempting a blending treatment,
including target size and shape, regular patterns in the target scene, and rough or
smooth target contours.
btry battery
C command and control
C W command and control warfare. The integrated use of PSYOP, military deception,
OPSEC, EW, and physical destruction supported by intelligence to deny
2
information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary C“capabilities while
protecting friendly (^capabilities against such actions.
C command, control, and communications
C CM command, control, and communications countermeasure. The integrated use of
OPSEC, military deception, jamming, and physical destruction supported by
intelligence to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary
^capabilities while protecting friendly ^capabilities against such actions.
camo camouflage. The use of natural or artificial materials on personnel, objects, and
tactical positions to confuse, mislead, or evade the enemy.
camoufla Part of a system designed to blend a target with its surroundings and conceal the
ge net identity of critical assets (aircraft, fixed targets, vehicles, personnel) where natural
cover and/or concealment might be absent or inadequate.
camoufla Standard DOD set consisting of a hexagon-shaped net (673.6 sq ft), a diamond-
ge net set shaped net (224.5 sq ft), and a net repair kit.
camoufla A plastic or aluminum disc or paddle that is supported by a lightweight pole and
ge net used to support camouflage nets above the ground, buildings, or vehicles.
spreader
cap capacity
CB counterbattery
CCD camouflage, concealment, and decoys. Methods and resources to prevent
adversary observation or surveillance; confuse, mislead, or evade the adversary;
or induce the adversary to act in a manner prejudicial to his interests.
CCD A combination of CCD equipment and techniques applied to a selected target
treatmen and/or its background to reduce or delay target acquisition.
t
chaff Material consisting of thin, narrow, metallic strips of various lengths and
frequency responses used as artificial clouds to scatter radar signals.
clutter EM radiation from sources around the target that tend to hinder target detection.
CM countermortar
counterm Any technique intended to confuse or mislead hostile sensors.
easure
COMSE communications security
C
concealm The protection from observation or surveillance.
ent
conspicui A term peculiar to the CCD community that denotes the perceived difference of
ty one feature in a scene as compared to other features in the scene.
corner An object that reflects multiple signals from smooth surfaces mounted mutually
reflector perpendicular and produces a radar return of greater magnitude than expected
from the size of the object the reflector conceals.
counterre All measures taken to prevent hostile observation of a force, an area, or a place.
connaissa
nee
counters All measures, active or passive, taken to counteract hostile surveillance.
urveillan
ce
cover Any natural or artificial protection from enemy observation and fire.
covered Any route that offers protection against enemy observation or fire.
approach
CP command post
CSS combat service support
cu cubic
DA Department of the Army
DC District of Columbia
deceive Any action that causes the enemy to believe the false or purposely causes the
enemy to make incorrect conclusions based on false evidence.
deception Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or
falsification of evidence, inducing him to react in a manner prejudicial to his
interests.
decoy An imitation in any sense of a person, an object, or a phenomenon that is intended
to deceive enemy surveillance devices or mislead enemy evaluation.
detection The discovery of an existence or presence.
disguise Any alteration of identity cues for items, signals, or systems sufficient to cause
misidentification by the enemy.
dispersal Relocation of forces for the purpose of increasing survivability.
disrupt Any action intended to interrupt the shape or outline of an object or an individual,
making it less recognizable.
div division
DLSC Defense Logistics Service Center
DOD Department of Defense
DSN Defense Switched Network
ea each
ECCM electronic counter-countermeasure. Any action involving effective use of the EM
spectrum by friendly forces, despite the enemy's use of EW.
ECM electronic countermeasure. Any action involving prevention or reduction of an
enemy's effective use of the EM spectrum. ECMs include electronic jamming and
electronic deception.
electronic The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons
s security information of value that, when analyzed, might alert the enemy to the intentions
of friendly forces (for example, a signal security provided by encryption
equipment).
EM electromagnetic
EM electromagnetic spectrum. The range of frequencies from zero to infinity where
spectrum energy is transferred by electric and magnetic waves. EM waves at the lower end
of this spectrum (low-frequency navigation aids and AM and shortwave radio
services) are refracted back to earth by the ionosphere to frequencies as high as 50
MHz. At frequencies above 50 MHz, propagation is generally limited to LOS.
These frequencies are used by TV, FM radio, and land-mobile and point-to-point
communication services. They extend on to parts of the EM spectrum generally
termed as radar, IR, visible light, UV light, and cosmic rays.
EW electronic warfare. Any military action involving the use of EM energy to
determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the EM spectrum; action
which retains friendly use of the EM spectrum.
FAAS-V field artillery ammunition support vehicle
FARP forward arming and refueling point
FEBA forward edge of the battle area
fed federal
FLIRS Forward-Looking Infrared System. An imaging IR sensor used to acquire a
target's heat signature.
FLOT forward line of own troops
FM field manual
FM frequency modulation
FOB forward operating base
FOD foreign object damage
fog oil Petroleum compounds of selected molecular weight and composition to facilitate
the formation of smoke by atomization, vaporization, and subsequent
recondensation.
FOS false operating surface. A simulated horizontal construction placed to represent
operating surfaces such as runways, taxiways, parking pads, and access roads.
freq frequency
ft foot, feet
gal gallon(s)
gen generator
GHz gigahertz
GI government issue
GSR ground-surveillance radar
hardenin The construction of a facility to provide protection against the effects of
g conventional or nuclear explosions. The facility may also be equipped to provide
protection against chemical or biological attacks. Construction usually involves
reinforced concrete placement and/or burying the structure.
HC hydrogen chloride
HEMTT heavy expanded mobility tactical truck
hiding The choice of a position or materials to obstruct direct observation.
HMMW high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
V
how howitzer
HQ headquarters
HTF how to fight
HUD heads-up display
HVT high-value target
hyperspe Refers to a sensor or data with many bands extending over a range of the EM
ctral spectrum.
imaging An electronic or optical process for recording or displaying a scene generated by a
radar radar sensor.
in inch(es)
indiv individual
intervisib The condition of the atmosphere that allows soldiers the ability to see from one
ility point to another. This condition may be altered or interrupted by weather, smoke,
dust, or debris.
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield. A systematic approach to analyzing the
enemy, weather, and terrain in a specific geographic area. It integrates enemy
doctrine with the weather and terrain conditions as they relate to the mission and
the specific battlefield environment. IPB provides the framework for determining
and evaluating enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action.
IR infrared
IR smoke It produces obscuration in one or more of the transparent IR spectral bands
screen between 0.7 and 14 microns. In most cases, an effective IR smoke screen is also
an effective visual smoke screen. However, effective visual smoke screens are not
necessarily effective IR smoke screens.
JCCD Joint Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception
JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
JT&E Joint Test and Evaluation
lb pound(s)
LCSS Lightweight Camouflage Screen System
LLTV low-light television
LOC lines of communication
LOS line of sight
low Paint used to lower the apparent temperature of a target (or nearby scene features),
emissivit thus making the hot target less conspicuous to a thermal target-acquisition sensor,
y paint Using a paint that has too low an emissivity (less than 0.6) causes the target to
become more visually conspicuous (or shiny).
maskirov The battlefield doctrine of the former Soviet Union.
ka
MCRP Marine Corps reference publication
MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication
mech mechanized
METT- mission, enemy, terrain, weather, troops, time available, and civilian
TC considerations
MHz megahertz
mil military
min minute(s)
MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System
mm millimeter(s)
MOUT military operations on urbanized terrain
movemen The methods used by a unit to travel from one point to another (traveling,
t traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch) are considered movement
technique techniques. The likelihood of enemy contact determines which technique is used,
s
MTI moving-target indicator
multispec Refers to a sensor or data in two or more regions of the EM spectrum.
tral
NA not applicable
NBC nuclear, biological, chemical
NCO noncommissioned officer
NIR near infrared
No. number
NSN national stock number. A 13-digit number assigned to each item of supply
purchased, stocked, or distributed within the federal government.
NVD night-vision device
NWP Navy warfighting publication
obsc obscurant. Suspended particulates or entrained liquid droplets that can absorb
and/or scatter EM radiation in various parts of the EM spectrum (visual, IR,
radar).
obscurati The effects of weather, battlefield dust, and debris; the use of smoke munitions to
on hamper observation and target acquisition; and the concealment of activities or
movement.
OPFOR opposing forces
OPORD operation order
OPSEC operations security. The process of denying adversaries information about friendly
capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting signatures
associated with planning for and conducting military operations and other
activities. It includes countersurveillance and physical, signal, and information
security.
oz ounce(s)
POL
PSYOP
pub
radar
radar
camoufla
ge
radar
clutter
radar
imagery
radio
detection
radio
direction¬
finding
radio fix
radio
range¬
finding
RAM
petroleum, oils, and lubricants
psychological operations
publication
A device that uses EM waves to provide information on the range, the azimuth, or
the elevation of objects.
Any radar-absorbing or -reflecting material that changes the radar-echoing
properties of an object's surface.
Unwanted signals, echoes, or images displayed by a radar unit that interfere with
the observation of desired signals.
The picture produced on a radar screen by recording the EM waves reflected from
a given target surface.
The detection of a radio's presence by intercepting its signals without precise
determination of its position.
The act of determining the azimuth to a radio transmitter, from a specific location,
using signal-detecting equipment.
The location of a radio transmitter determined by simultaneously using two
direction-finding devices stationed at different locations and plotting the results on
a map. The intersection of the two azimuths indicates the transmitter's location.
The act of determining the distance to a radio transmitter. This technique involves
using electronic equipment to intercept and measure a transmitter's emissions and
then translating this information into a distance.
radar-absorbing material. Material that absorbs and dissipates incident radar
energy as contrasted to radar-scattering material, which reflects the incident
energy in a different direction.
RAP radar-absorbing paint. A coating that can absorb incident radar energy.
RATEL radiotelephone operator
O
rckt rocket
RCS radar cross section. The size of a conducting square, metal plate that would return
the same signal to a radar sensor as a target, provided that the radar energy
received at the target is reradiated equally in all directions.
recon reconnaissance. An exploratory survey of a particular area or airspace by visual,
aural, electronic, photographic, IR, or other means. It may imply a physical visit
to the area.
redundan The use of multiple systems with similar perceived functional capabilities to
cy provide higher system survivability.
relocatab A military asset that normally stays in place for a short period of time relative to a
le asset fixed asset.
reverse- A position on the ground that is not exposed to direct fire or observation; for
slope example, a slope that descends away from the enemy.
position
revetmen A barrier used to protect assets against attack.
t
ROM refuel on the move
RSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
RT rough terrain
S&S supply and service
SAM surface-to-air missile
SCSPP standard camouflage screening paint pattern
Scud A surface-to-surface missile.
signature Detectable indications that forces are occupying or operating in an area.
Signatures can be EM (visible, IR, NIR, radar) or mechanical (acoustic, seismic).
Common detectable EM signatures include visible vehicle tracks, thermal flames,
and radar signal returns. Common mechanical signatures include radio noise,
humans conversing, and seismic ground waves produced by tanks and heavy
vehicles.
SLAR side-looking airborne radar
smk smoke. An artificially produced aerosol of solid, liquid, or vapor deposited in the
atmosphere that inhibits the passage of visible light or other forms of EM
radiation.
smky smoky
smoke A machine that produces large volumes of smoke to support hasty or deliberate
generator operations for screening, protecting, and/or sustaining airfields, ports, staging
areas, and bridge crossings. Present smoke generators vaporize liquid aerosol
materials such as fog oil, diesel fuel, and polyethylene glycol. These generators
consist of a heat source to vaporize the liquid aerosol material and an apparatus
for the production of airflow to efficiently disseminate the smoke vapor into the
atmosphere where it disperses and condenses.
smoke An expendable bucket- or pot-like munition that produces dense smoke by
pot burning combustible material.
smoke Smoke generated to deceive or confuse an enemy as to the activities of tactical
screen elements.
SOP standing operating procedure
SP self-propelled
sq square
STANAG standardization agreement
std standard
surveilla A systematic observation of airspace or surface areas by visual, aural, electronic,
nee photographic, IR, or other means.
survivabi Activities involving the development and construction of fighting and protective
lity positions (earth berms, defilade positions, overhead protection, camouflage) that
operation reduce the effectiveness of enemy detection systems,
s
TAA tactical assembly area
TACSOP tactical standing operating procedure
target The process involving the detection and identification of hostile operations and
acquisitio equipment for subsequent engagement.
n
target The view of a target area that includes both the target and its surroundings.
scene
temp temporary
terrain The process of examining a geographic area to determine what effects its natural
analysis and man-made features may have on military operations.
terrain A camouflage technique normally used in desert terrain. It involves scarring the
mottling earth with heavy equipment to expose patches of bare ground. Equipment and
supplies are placed on the bare patches to avoid detection by aerial
reconnaissance.
thermal The difference in radiance (as usually measured in the 8-to-14 micron band)
contrast between two features of a scene; for example, a target and its background.
thermal A temporary situation, in the morning or evening, when the target and background
crossover temperatures become equal.
thermal The ratio of the emissive power of a surface to that of a black body. The
emissivit emissivity is 1 for a black body and 0.9 for most natural and man-made materials,
y The apparent temperature of a target can be reduced by reducing its real
temperature and/or lowering its emissivity. Unfortunately, as the thermal
emissivity is lowered, its reflectivity in the visual portion of the spectrum
increases, thus making the target more conspicuous to a visual sensor. A typical
compromise is 0.7, which lowers the apparent target temperature but does not
make it too shiny in the visible spectrum.
TM technical manual
TMD tactical missile defense
tone The process of blending a target or other high-value asset with the background by
down reducing its brightness characteristics using nets or coatings. The recommended
reflectance of a target as compared with the surrounding scene is 10 percent or
less.
TOW tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided
TRADO United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
C
TV television
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
US United States
USAES United States Army Engineer School
UV ultraviolet
V volt
VHF very high frequency
w/ with
w/o without
WSA weapons storage area
jo. micron(s)
Bibliography
DA
FM
FM
FM
FM
FM
FM
FM
FM
FM
FM
August 1979.
FM 90-13. River-Crossing Operations {MCWP 3-17.1). 26 January 1998.
FM 90-19. Multiserx’ice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Camouflage, Concealment, and
Decoy (CCD) Employment in Command and Control Warfare (C 2 W) {MCRP 3-36.4A, NWP 3-
58.1.1 TP, AFJPAM 10-223). 4 April 1997.
Joint Pub 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 23 March
1994.
Joint Pub 3-13.1. Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C W). 7 February 1996.
STANAG 2931 (Edition 1). Camouflage of the Red Cross and Red Crescent on Land in Tactical
Operations. 18 October 1984.
TM 5-1080-200-13&P. Operator's, Organizational and Direct Support Maintenance Manual,
Including Repair Parts and Special Tools for Lightweight Camouflage Screen Systems and
Support Systems. 29 January 1987.
Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms. 1 February 1974.
3-50. Smoke Operations. 4 December 1990.
3-100. Chemical Operations Principles and Fundamentals {MCWP 3-3.7.1). 8 May 1996.
5-34. Engineer Field Data. To be published within 6 months.
5-103. Survivability. 10 June 1985.
21-10. Field Hygiene and Sanitation. 22 November 1988.
21-26. Map Reading and Land Navigation. 7 May 1993.
24-33. Communications Techniques: Electronic Counter-Countermeasures. 17 July 1990.
34-1. Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations. 27 September 1994.
34-3. Intelligence Analysis. 15 March 1990.
90-10 (HTF). Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) (How to Fight). 15
FM 20-3
30 AUGUST 1999
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
Official:
JU
^JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
9916606
ERIC K. SHINSEKI
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U. S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in
accordance with the initial distribution number 114825, requirements for FM 20-3.
PIN: 045158-000