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FM 1-26
WAR DEPARTMENT
ARMY AIR FORCES
FIELD MANUAL
^ BESINSS OF AIRDROMES
Di88emination$0ffyf8trictet /waiter.— The information contained in restricted
documents and the essential characteristics of restricted material may be given
to any person knowM^Jbe . in the^service of the- United States and to persona
of undoubted Joyall& #JKPjQs£r£tioA " hie are .cooperating in Government work,
but will not be communicated to the public or to the press except by authorized
military public relations agencies. <See also par. 186, AR 380-5, 28 Sep 1942.)
UNCLASSIFIED
REGRADED BY AUTHORITY
-) °^E.Q. 10501. _
EM 1-26
C 1
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
. Changes
■> No. 1
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington 25, D. C, 15 April 1944.
FM 1-26, 20 January 1944, is changed as follows :
■ 29. Chemical Warfare Service Units (Superseded). — o.
There are several types of supply and service units of the
Chemical Warfare Service assigned to duty with the Army Air
• Forces. These units, when assigned or attached to airdrome
'.installations, have the primary mission of supply, maintenance,
and/or technical operations pertinent to tactical use of chemi-
cal munitions from aircraft. These units are, however, provided
with basic arms to include rifles, carbines, submachine guns,
and machine guns for purposes of defense.
6. When defensive measures require defense against chemical
attack, particularly when contamination results from enemy use
of persistent agents, the Chemical Warfare Service units are
available to supervise and assist the trained decontamination
crews from base units and to render technical assistance in
dealing with major decontamination problems.
I A. G. 300.7 (1 Apr 44).]
By order of the Secretary of War :
Official :
J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.
Distribution :
As prescribed in paragraph 9a, FM 21-6; R and HI (3) ;
B 1 (6).
For explanation of symbols see FM 21-6.
G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.
579701° — 44 — AGO 184
FM 1-26
ARMY AIR FORCES
FIELD MANUAL
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
Dissemination of restricted matter. — The information contained in restricted
documents and the essential characteristics of restricted material may be given
to any person known to be in the service of the United States and to persons
of undoubted loyalty and discretion who are cooperating in Government work,
but will not be communicated to the public or to the press except by authorized
military public relations agencies. (See also par. 186, AR 380-5, 28 Sep 1942.)
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1944
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington 25, D. C, 20 January 1944.
PM 1-26, Army Air Forces Field Manual, Defense of Air-
dromes, is published for the information and guidance of
all concerned.
[A. G. 300. T (11 Dec 43).]
By order of the Secretary of War:
G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.
Official :
J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.
Distribution:
R and HI (3) ; Bn 1 (6).
(For explanation of symbols see FM 21-6.)
ni
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paragraphs Page
Chapter 1. General 1-5 1
Chapter 2. Forms of attack on airdromes.
Section I. General 6 5
II. Sabotage 7 5
III. Ground attack 8-9 6
IV. Aerial bombardment and strafing. _ 10-12 7
V. Airborne attack 13-19 9
VI. Chemical attack 20-22 17
Chapter 3. Troops for defense of airdromes.
Section I. Factors influencing assignment of «
troops for defense 23 19'
II. Troops available for defense 24-30 21
Chapter 4. Defense against sabotage 31-34 25
Chapter 5. Active defense.
Section I. General 35 27
II. Organization of the ground 36^44 28
III. Antiaircraft defense 45-51 40
IV. Personnel 52-54 45
V. Employment of the defense 55-62 47
Chapter 6. Passive defense.
Section I. Dispersion 63-67 57
II. Cover 68-71 59
III. Camouflage 72-73 61
IV. Obstacles 74-77 62
V. Alarm systems 78-81 64
VI. Damage control 82-84 65
VII. Protection against chemicals 85-97 66
VIII. Demolition 98-99 71
Chapter 7. Plans and training.
Section I. General 100-104 73
II. Content of plans for local ground
defense 105-108 74
III. Training 109 81
Index ± 83
v
FM 1-26
1-2
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
CHAPTER I
. GENERAL
■ 1. Scope. — This manual is a guide for airdrome com-
manders, airdrome defense officers, and personnel available
for the defense of airdromes. It treats of the local defense
of forward-area airdromes, exclusive of counteraction by air-
craft, by the personnel, armament, and equipment under the
command of the airdrome commander, but much of its sub-
ject matter is applicable to the defense problems of any air-
drome. It is also intended to serve as a training aid for units
designed or assigned for the defense of airdromes. It pre-
sents an analysis of the forms of attack to which airdromes
may be subjected and of the means and measures which may
be taken to defeat such attacks or to minimize their effect.
■ 2. Essential Considerations. — a. Airdromes are established
for the purpose of securing and maintaining air power.
b. The strategic importance of airdromes makes them
primary targets for attack. They are subject to sabotage
and, depending on their location and the military situation,
to attack from the sea, ground, or air. Military employment
of the airplane has introduced new methods of destroying
installations and personnel by bombing and strafing and of
capturing the airdrome itself by airborne attack. The inher-
ent flexibility of air power permits enemy capabilities in a
particular theater to change rapidly and frequently.
c. A defense must be prepared to meet hostile action
against our airdromes with the view of defeating it in the
early stages of operation. Careful attention must be given
to all details of both active and passive defense within the
capabilities of means made available. When the location
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ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
and lay-out of an airdrome are being decided, matters
affecting its defense must be given full consideratien.
d. The means made available for the defense of an air-
drome depend upon the probable forms of attack to which
it may be subjected, the effect that its loss or neutralization
will have on military or naval operations, and resources of
the theater commander.
e. Enemy capabilities have important bearing on the prep-
arations for defense of an airdrome. The most accurate
information possible must be obtained concerning the fol-
lowing: the enemy's air power; the number of his bases
available and their distances from the airdromes to be de-
fended; the number of his carriers; the distance of the air-
drome from his naval bases whether or not he has local
naval superiority, whether or not he has local air superiority;
and the situation of the ground forces.
H 3. Definitions. — a. Airdrome. — An airdrome is a landing
field at which military facilities for shelter, supply, and re-
pair of aircraft have been provided (AR 95-35). For the
purposes of this manual, "airdrome" is considered a generic
term for all military landing fields.
b. Security. — Security is the all around protection of the
command. It is obtained through effective measures to
prevent surprise and interference by the enemy, to insure
secrecy for plans and movements, and to retain freedom of
action. It involves special measures against espionage, sabo-
tage, subversive activities, attack by hostile aviation (in-
cluding airborne troops), attack by chemical agents, and
attack by ground forces.
c. Local defense. — Local defense is the active and passive
defense of an airdrome provided by its commander with the
personnel, armament, and equipment under his command.
The object of local defense is to enable friendly aircraft to
continue to operate from the airdrome, to protect aircraft
on the ground, installations, and personnel, and to deny
the use of the airdrome to the enemy.
2
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
3-4
d. Local ground defense. — Local ground defense is the local
defense of the airdrome against ground forces or airborne
troops. Specifically it excludes counteraction by aircraft
or by the Are of antiaircraft artillery against aircraft. Its
object is to deny to the enemy the area encompassing all
vital buildings, installations, landing fields and dispersal
areas, and adjacent terrain from which he could render
the airdrome inoperative by aimed small-arms Are.
■ 4. Responsibility. — a. Responsibility for the security of
an airdrome rests with the local airdrome commander.
He is directly responsible for the local defense against sab-
otage, espionage, and attack by organized enemy forces to
the extent of the resources under his command. (See FM
100-15.) His responsibility will not be construed, however,
as relieving the commanders of his subordinate units of the
responsibility of preparing and executing plans for the local
security of their organizations and installations. All such
plans must conform to the general plan in effect for the
security of the airdrome.
b. The defense of an airdrome is also an integral part of
the defense of the entire area in which it is located. Theater
and defense commanders will allocate local ground defense
forces, in excess of available air force units, to the extent
necessary for the minimum initial defense of the air base.
Such forces, in accordance with the decision of higher com-
manders, may be dispersed to various airdromes, partially
dispersed, or held in reserve. (See FM 100-15.)
c. In a general battle which develops in an area, respon-
sibility for the defense of the airdrome and all other in-
stallations and areas in the vicinity may pass to the local
ground force commander who represents the theater or
territorial commander. This commander has the final re-
sponsibility for the defense of his entire area and must
make such dispositions as are dictated by his estimate of
the situation, in which all the factors that govern the prose-
cution of operation at hand will be considered.
565796°— 44 2
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ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
■ 5. Command. — The airdrome commander commands all
units assigned for the local defense of the airdrome and
is responsible for their training and operation. (See FM
100-15.) He normally appoints as defense officer the com-
mander of one of his local ground or antiaircraft defense
units and requires him to assume immediate command of
all units available, primarily for defense, and to assume
in his name immediate responsibility for the training and
operation of all troops used in the defense. The airdrome
commander will ordinarily discharge his responsibility for
the safeguarding of military property and for the prevention
of sabotage, espionage, and the compromise of classified in-
formation and materiel principally through an intelligence
officer (S-2).
4
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
6-7
CHAPTER 2
FORMS OF ATTACK ON AIRDROMES
Section I
General
Sabotage
Ground attack
Aerial bombardment and strafing.
Paragraphs
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
6
7
8-9
Airborne attack.
Chemical attack.
10-12
13-19
20-22
Section I
GENERAL
■ 6. Forms of Attack. — All airdromes are liable to sabotage
and subversive action, and all within the range of enemy
action are liable to external attack. Attacks may occur at
any time, singly or repeatedly, for the purpose of neutraliza-
tion, destruction, or occupation of the airdrome by the en-
emy to secure a point of departure for further ground or air
operations. Attack will normally be characterized by speed
and surprise, with means or organization designed to accom-
plish specific tasks. It is to be expected that the enemy will
employ aircraft with demolition, fragmentation, and incen-
diary bombs, machine guns, automatic cannon, and chem-
icals; and airborne or ground forces, with armored vehicles,
either singly or in combination. If the mission of the enemy
is neutralization or destruction, it is to be expected that he
will employ chemicals of a persistent or lethal type. Attacks
may be classified as sabotage, ground attack, aerial bombard-
ment, airborne attack, and chemical attack.
■ 7. Forms of Sabotage. — Sabotage is the destruction of
property or disruption of facilities by stealth or by methods
Section II
SABOTAGE
5
7-8 ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
Figure 1. — Sabotage.
designed to suggest accident. Typical forms are damage to
tools and shop machinery, hidden damage to airoraft to
cause failure in flight, contamination of gasoline and oil
supplies, disruption of the power system, and widespread
and utter destruction by explosives. Methods of sabotage
vary widely and are suggested by the habits of personnel and
the arrangement of installations as well as by the immedi-
ate object of the saboteur. Probably the most effective
instrument is fire, especially if it results in the detonation
of explosives.
Section III
GROUND ATTACK
B 8. Overland Raids. — The most probable ground attack on
ah airdrome is by mechanized raiding column. Strong hos-
tile armored forces may be encountered 50 . to 100 miles
behind the general front of the field armies. Overland
6
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
8-11
raids may come after wide flanking movements or from
troops which have assembled after successful infiltration.
Such action is probable when the situation at the front
is fluid or confused. Attacks may come with little warn-
ing and will be rapidly pushed home with a large volume
of automatic small-arms fire and light-cannon fire.
■ 9. General Advance.— The defense of the airdrome against
a general hostile advance is the defense of a fixed position
or a terrain feature by conventional methods, a responsi-
bility of the territorial commander.
Section IV
AERIAL BOMBARDMENT AND STRAFING
■ 10. General. — The most common form of attack on air-
dromes is aerial bombardment. Various missiles may be
employed — demolition bombs, fragmentation bombs, incen-
diary bombs, chemical filled bombs, and chemical spray.
Strafing by aircraft weapons is a certain component of
low-flying attack. The attacks may come from any altitude
and from any direction. Harassing attacks may be made to
slow down operations or interrupt normal use of the field.
Attacks in force, intensive or sustained, may be made to
destroy aircraft on the ground, airdrome facilities and in-
stallations, fuel reserves, bomb dumps, routes of communi-
cation, and personnel, or to neutralize the airdrome through
destruction of the runways.
■ 11. Harassing Attack. — Harassing attacks are character-
ized by surprise, deception, and hit-and-run tactics. The
familiar types are minimum altitude bombing and machine-
gun and cannon fire by fighter aircraft. The favorite tar-
gets are grounded planes. Not only is the airdrome strafed
but often the surrounding terrain is thoroughly covered,
usually with incendiary bullets. It is likely that extensive
attacks will be preceded by careful reconnaissance and
planning.
7
8
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
12-14
■ 12. Attack in Force. — Attacks in force are conducted in
such strength that their successful completion will bring
to an end or seriously weaken the operational use of the
airdrome. They may vary from a single intense raid by
several flights to sustained high and minimum altitude bom-
Oardment and strafing concentrated within a few hours or
successfully repeated for many days. A steady flow of air-
craft to the attacked area may be expected, with one or
two nights coming over the target in rapid succession. Re-
connaissance planes will obtain target information, weather
data, and probably pictures before the attack and during the
progress of a sustained assault. Such attacks may be the
beginning of an attempt by the enemy to seize the airdrome
for his own use. If so, he is likely to spare the runways as
much as possible so that he may land troop carriers when
resistance has been sufficiently reduced.
Section V
AIRBORNE ATTACK
■ 13. General. — a. Airborne attack culminates in assault
by troops landed by parachute or from airplanes or gliders
on or near the objective. Its salient characteristic is the
speed with which it can develop. Its normal development
is as follows: extensive reconnaissance, intense preliminary
bombardment and strafing, landing of parachute troops and
perhaps glider troops, reinforcement from troop carrier
planes, either on or off the airdrome. But any or all phases
of the attack may occur simultaneously.
b. If an airdrome within reach of enemy aircraft is lo-
cated in a strategically important area or if one becomes
important because of a large-scale offensive, such an attack
must be considered probable.
■ 14. Reconnaissance. — Preparations for airborne attack are
normally characterized by great care and thoroughness.
The area of the objective will be subjected to extensive and
detailed preliminary reconnaissance to determine the extent
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14-17
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
and dispositions of troops and to obtain complete and ac-
curate weather information. Reports of secret agents and
enemy sympathizers concerning defense installations and
military forces in the vicinity and concerning the probable
attitude of the civilian population will probably be avail-
able to the enemy. During the period of preliminary recon-
naissance light bombing and strafing attacks to bring about
disclosure of defensive gun positions will probably be ex-
perienced. Close observation will normally be continued
throughout the attack.
■ 15. Fifth-Column Activity.— Prior to the attack, in-
creased activity by enemy sympathizers may be expected.
■ 16. Preliminary Bombardment. — a. Airborne attack on a
defended area such as an airdrome will usually be preceded
by intense aerial bombardment to destroy defenses which
might interfere with subsequent operations. High-altitude
bombing will normally be followed by low-level bombing and
strafing. All grounded aircraft, antiaircraft artillery, and
ground defense installations will be targets of special im-
portance. Antimorale attacks may also be made in which
the enemy strafes or bombs indiscriminately. The bom-
bardment and strafing will be continued during the landing
of airborne troops. It will ■ be lifted from only the actual
landing places.
b. Aerial bombardment may not precede operation of para-
chute and air-landing troops when they are employed on
missions requiring surprise.
■ 17. Parachute Troops. — a. Parachute troops will normally
be employed for the first landing of an airborne attack to
seize key points or to destroy definite objectives such as
antiaircraft batteries, headquarters, defense positions, and
communications systems in preparation for the arrival of
air-landing troops. Other functions are to harass and to
create diversions and, when they are dropped in small num-
bers over large areas, to destroy bridges and generally in-
10
565796°— 44 3
11
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ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
terrupt transportation, to prevent communications, to dis-
close targets with signals for bombardment, to cause con-
fusion and panic, and to make contact with enemy sym-
pathizers.
b. Most of the equipment of parachute troops is usually
dropped in containers bearing colored markings or attached
to colored parachutes to indicate the section to which they
belong. This equipment may include machine guns, mor-
Figure 4. — Equipment container (German).
tars, antitank guns, mountain guns, infantry guns, flame
throwers, tools, spare parts for the defenders' motor trans-
port, bicycles, motorcycles, and even light cars. Additional
equipment and food is dropped on signal.
c. To drop the members of a unit within a small area
for quick assembly the carrier planes will approach in for-
mation. The jump will be made from an altitude of 200 to
500 feet so that the descent will require about 20 seconds.
12
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
17
It is possible to land a company within an area 250 by 600
yards so that they can be assembled with weapons 10 to 15
minutes after the first man jumps. The troops may first be
13
17-19
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
landed widely scattered over the locality to confuse, harass,
and dissipate the defender's forces. They will not ordinarily
be dropped in the midst of defending troops* who can quickly
dispose of them before they can free themselves of their
harness and assemble, but will normally be dropped in depth
around the airdrome or area selected for attack.
d. The first task of parachute troops will be to collect
and assemble weapons and munitions dropped separately by
parachute and to form their units. Once assembled they
become light infantry with high fire power but limited mo-
bility. This Are power can be sustained, however, only by
the early reception of supplementary ammunition.
■ 18. Glider Troops. — a. Glider troops are normally em-
ployed in support of parachute trops, although they may be
used for the first landing. Their tactical missions will nor-
mally include the silencing of antiaircraft guns covering the
line of approach of troop carriers, the seizure of positions
from which they can provide covering fire for the landing
of other airborne troops, the provision of storm troops capa-
ble of concentrated Are power for the capture of key points,
and the disrupting of communications. Objectives of the
individual units may be planned as part of a company mis-
sion which fits into a detailed plan of attack.
b. Gliders can land where other aircraft cannot — in any
area where 25 to 50 yards of reasonably flat surface is avail-
able.
c. On landing, the glider troops deplane as rapidly as pos-
sible. Reserve ammunition and equipment are left in the
glider. If attacked on landing, glider troops quickly take
up defensive positions.
■ 19. Air-Landing Troops. — With the landing of troops car-
rier planes the fight for the airdrome passes into its third
phase. The air-landing troops constitute the main attack-
ing force. Their mission will be to reinforce the parachute
troops and consolidate their gains, to attack the more heavily
defended positions, and to destroy or drive out completely the
14
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
19
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ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
19-22
will notTae essential, as roads or smooth ground will suffice for
landings. Crash landings may be attempted on terrain
unsuitable for normal landings.
Section VI
CHEMICAL ATTACK
■ 20. General. — The use of airplanes to project chemicals
brings to the airdrome an ever present danger of- chemical
attack. Cruising radius and capacity are the chief limits on
swift-striking chemical attacks.
■ 21. Objectives of Aerial Chemical Attacks. — Chemical at-
tacks from the air may be made to attain any of several
objectives.
a. To inflict casualties on personnel.
b. To render airdromes unfit for use through neutraliza-
tion or contamination of airplanes on the ground, hangars,
and facilities for maintenance, administration, housing, and
storage of material and supplies, by means of persistent
vesicant agents.
c. To harass personnel by using lacrimators or toxic smokes
to cause them to mask and thus lower their efficiency.
d. To cover with smoke to prevent effective defense of the
airdrome.
e. To destroy various airdrome installations by means of
incendiaries.
/. To affect morale.
■ 22. Types of Aerial Chemical Attack. — An attack with
chemical agents may be made with persistent gas, nonper-
sistent gas or toxic smoke, screening smoke, or incendiaries.
These may be employed in impact bombs, airburst bombs, or
spray. The most probable attack is one in which persistent
chemicals are employed, almost certainly with high explosives
and possibly with incendiaries. Both air-burst and impact
bombs will be dropped on the airdrome and around it to keep
the landing area under gas concentration as long as possible.
17
22
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
Defense is difficult, as personnel and material must be pro-
tected against chemicals and, at the same time, against other
weapons of attack.
/
18
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES 23 [
CHAPTER 3
TROOPS FOR DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
Paragraphs
Section I. Factors influencing assignment of troops for de-
fense 23
II. Troops available for defense 24-30
Section I
FACTORS INFLUENCING ASSIGNMENT OF TROOPS
FOR DEFENSE
■ 23. Limiting Considerations. — The size and composition
of the garrison of any particular airdrome is primarily de-
pendent upon the number of troops available in the theater
and the decision of the theater commander to allocate such
troops for the defense of air force installations.
a. The assignment of defense units is dependent upon the
resources of the theater commander. It may not be pos-
sible to provide at every airdrome the complement of troops,
armament, and equipment needed for defense against all
contingencies. Economy of force forbids the dispersion of
large numbers of men and weapons for the defense of many
fixed and limited areas. It is not expected that all air-
dromes, unsupported, resist indefinitely an aggressive enemy
determined to capture them. If for several hours the de-
fenders can prevent him seizing their field and bringing in
large airborne reinforcements, they have performed their
mission. Area reserves must, however, be capable of arriv-
ing within a very short time to convert the defense from a
local problem to one of greater magnitude.
t>. The assignment of defense units is influenced by the
range of enemy action. In respect to their location, air-
dromes may be classified as follows :
(1) Airdromes which will probably be free from external
attack. Their principal defense requirement is interior
guard.
565196°— 44 4 19
23
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
(2) Airdromes which may be subject to occasional long-
range attacks by bombers. Their principal ground defense
will be passive defense.
(3) Airdromes which may be subject to frequent bombing
and strafing attacks by aircraft but yet which are not within
range of serious attack by airborne troops. Their defenders
will rely principally upon antiaircraft fire and passive
measures.
(4) Airdromes which may be subject to frequent bombing
and strafing attack by aircraft and are within the range of
attack by airborne troops or by ground forces. Their defense
requires troops to provide antiaircraft and local ground
defense. •
c. The size of an airdrome garrison is also determined by
the strategic and tactical situations in the area. Attacks on
area airdromes will be conditioned by the nature and success
of friendly and enemy operations. The possession of air
superiority and its degree are factors of great influence. The
number, location, and operations of troops in the vicinity
are matters which may be fundamental in determining the
extent of the local ground defenses. Likewise, the strategic
value of an airdrome may be the reason for the presence of
ground forces in the vicinity and the key to their disposi-
tions. In relation to the extent of friendly forces in the area
and their disposition, there are four types of problems in
local defense for airdromes —
(1) Those of airdromes which are completely isolated, such
as island airdromes, but which are important. Here, in a
sense, the area and the airdrome are the same, the strategic
value of the surrounding area deriving from the presence
of the airdrome. As no reinforcements are possible, a regi-
ment or a larger force may be present for defense, and the
command of the airdrome, to the extent of its defense,
subordinate to the command of the defense forces.
(2) Those of airdromes in an area defense which are im-
portant but which can rely on area troops for resistance
20
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
23-24
against all-out attacks. Their need is for sufficient local
defense to repel nuisance attacks and delay surprise thrusts.
(3) Those of advanced airdromes in areas where the situ-
ation is fluid and area troops cannot be diverted to defend
them. Although these fields are important, they must de-
fend themselves with the resources under local command.
(4) Those of airdromes in areas without area troops but
not important enough or near enough to the enemy to be
threatened by major action. Their ground defense requires
only interior guard.
d. A requirement for adequate antiaircraft protection exists
at all airdromes within reach of enemy aviation. This can-
not be neglected, for air attack against any airdrome will be
more frequent and must be considered more likely than any
other form of attack.
Section n
TROOPS AVAILABLE FOR DEFENSE
■ 24. General.— There are several types of units which may
be available to the airdrome commander for defensive pur-
poses; airdrome and squadron personnel, ground force units
assigned for local ground defense, aviation engineers, anti-
aircraft artillery assigned or attached, chemical warfare
service detachments, and military police (aviation) com-
panies. Nearby reserves of theater forces may also be avail-
able for support. A forward-area airdrome might have the
following forces available to defend it:
a. Personnel from two fighter squadrons based at the air-
dromes, plus airdrome operational personnel and quarter-
master and ordnance personnel.
b. A small infantry unit assigned for local defense.
c. One company of aviation engineers.
d. One or more antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons
batteries.
e. One chemical warfare service platoon.
/. One infantry unit in reserve at some distance.
21
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ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
■ 25. Airdrome and Squadron Personnel. — An airdrome will
have available for defensive purposes at least its own assigned
squadron personnel and that of any squadrons which use it as
a base, that is, air force personnel connected with adminis-
tration or operation of facilities, quartermaster and ord-
nance personnel, and ground crews, pilots, and flight crews
off duty. Although primarily occupied with other duties,
they are trained in the use of infantry weapons. They are
normally employed in close-in defense and in forming sup-
porting parties. If no other forces are available, they must
also be used for counterattacking disorganized parachute
troops.
■ 26. Assigned Infantry. — o. If available, infantry assigned
for the purpose forms the principal element in the local
ground defense.
b. The mission of such units is, with the assistance of
all other available local forces, to meet airborne attack during
and shortly after landing, to hold the airdrome against any
form of attack until the arrival of reinforcements, and to
remove by counterattack any threat to the defended area.
A part of the unit is used to establish the fixed defenses
of the airdrome and to provide local security for dispersed
aircraft and installations. The remainder is organized as
one or more striking forces as the situation requires.
■ 27. Aviation Engineers. — a. Aviation engineer units are
especially organized, equipped, and trained to meet the needs
of the Army Air Forces for engineer work in a theater of
operations. They are assigned to air forces and air task
forces as required. In general, their organization is similar
to that of combat and service units, but the battalion, con-
sisting of battalion headquarters, three lettered companies,
and a medical section, is the usual field operating unit. Sep-
arate engineer aviation companies are organized as required
for particular missions, being identical with the lettered
companies of the battalion. Company armament includes
caliber .50 machine guns and an antitank gun.
22
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
27-28
b. Aviation engineers have the general engineer mission
of facilitating the advance of friendly forces and hindering
the advance of the enemy, usually by engineer construction
but at times by taking part in combat. Their most important
tasks are to construct advanced airdromes, to camouflage
them, to maintain them under enemy bombing, and to assist
in their defense. (See TM 5-255.) They have important
technical duties connected in general with the organization
of the ground and the building of protective structures. In-
cluded are camouflage, construction of defensive positions,
construction of weapons emplacements, establishment of
barriers for antimechanized defense and obstructions for
preventing the landing of airborne troops, and demolition of
the airdrome if capture becomes inevitable. These tasks are
planned and executed under engineer control in accordance
with defense plans of the airdrome commander.
■ 28. Antiaircraft Artillery Units. — a. The major antiair-
craft artillery units are the brigade, the group, the battalion,
and the battery. Most likely to be assigned or attached to
the local defense of an airdrome are automatic weapons
batteries. Antiaircraft guns (as opposed to automatic
weapons) will probably be at such distances from the air-
drome that they cannot be closely integrated into the local
defense system; moreover they usually belong to the area,
defense rather than to the local defense. Normally, it is
to be anticipated that airdromes in active theaters will be
provided, as a minimum, with one automatic weapons
battery equipped with eight 40 -mm antiaircraft guns and
eight multiple-machine-gun mounts.
b. Antiaircraft artillery has the primary mission of firing
against enemy aircraft and the secondary mission of firing
against ground targets. It will frequently be sited to per-
form the duel mission. If the ground attack should develop
to the point that the enemy- can no longer employ his air-
craft without danger to his own troops, the antiaircraft guns
become fully available for use against ground targets.
23
29-30
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
■ 29. Chemical Warfare Service Units. — a. There are several
types of supply and service units of the Chemical Warfare
Service. The decontamination section of a chemical com-
posite company is ordinarily used for defense of an airdrome.
b. The mission of the decontamination unit is to deal with
major contamination problems.
■ 30. Military Police. — The military police company
(aviation) is a flexible organization, capable under the cur-
rent Table of Organization of expansion to meet the specifiic
military police need at any airdrome. Personnel are armed
with pistols, rifles, shotguns, and submachine guns. Basic
equipment includes motorcycles and trucks.
24
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
31-32
CHAPTER 4
DEFENSE AGAINST SABOTAGE
■ 31. Continuity of Menace. — It can never be assumed that
any area is free from the menace of the saboteur. He is
as likely to be found in the combat zone as in the zone of the
interior. He is likely to appear in peace as well as in war.
He may be an enemy agent or a disaffected individual of
friendly nationality.
■ 32. Vigilance. — a. Defense against sabotage is a matter of
efficient interior guard. Stationary watchmen or roving
guards who avoid routine movements are more effective than
sentries who follow a set method of walking post. A system
of checks on the guard and general protective system should
be a part of the plan. Inspections by individuals not known
to the guards may reveal laxity or other defects. An officer
should be detailed to make a study on ways and means of
sabotage in the area and to report his conclusions to the
commanding officer.
b. There should be a continuous survey of personnel who
have access to the area. Means of identification should be
provided for persons not in uniform, and special passes
should be required for entrance into restricted areas. The
duty of examining credentials should be assigned to superior
guards. If the loyalty or mental balance of an individual is
doubted, he should be especially watched and denied ap-
proach to sensitive areas until a true estimate of him has
been obtained. Aid in forming such estimates should be
sought from other agencies. On most fields aircraft will
be the most valuable military equipment. Unidentified in-
dividuals must not be allowed in their vicinity except under
constant surveillance. If there is the slightest possibility of
any unknown individual having access to baggage, preflight
checks should be routine.
25
33-34
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
■ 33. Material Obstacles. — a. The work of the saboteur is i
greatly impeded by the use of wiring or fencing to restrict i
entrance and exit so that personnel can be subjected to in-
spection, and to isolate the more sensitive and vital instal-
lations, such as power plants or gasoline supply points. When
sufficient wire is not available for these purposes, a system of
signs and printed orders designed to control movement will
greatly assist guards, as attention can be concentrated on any
individual who disregards them.
b. In areas where it is possible to employ it, lighting
lessens the possibility of sabotage at night. Guards should
be provided with flashlights.
■ 34. Reference. — A discussion of methods of sabotage and
protective measures is available in TM 19-225.
26
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
35
CHAPTER V
ACTIVE DEFENSE
Section I. General
Paragraphs
35
H. Organization of the ground-.
HI. Antiaircraft defense
IV. Personnel
V. Employment of the defense.
36-44
45-51
52-54
55-63
Section I
GENERAL
■ 35. Basic Principles. — a. The local ground defense of an
airdrome is a relatively static defense of the runways or land-
ing areas and vital airdrome installations, and a mobile de-
fense of possible areas for the landing of airborne troops in
the vicinity. The static defenses are located to cover the
landing strips with heavy fire and to deny important avenues
of approach. The location of the striking forces is dictated
by the extent and location of other areas suitable for hostile
landings and the routes of communication to them. Fixed
defended localities are prepared for the mobile striking
parties to occupy in the event that enemy forces are able to
organize in large groups. These defended localities are
located on key terrain points from which delaying action can
be effected.
b. Antiaircraft artillery protection of forward area air-
dromes is of the utmost importance and must be considered
both in planning airdrome installations and in planning the
ground defense.
c. All planes should be put in the air as quickly as possible
upon the approach of an enemy. They are parked to avoid
unnecessary taxyingy and crews are informed of the order of
take-off. If simultaneous take-offs are possible, the direction
of each plane is indicated by reference to markers on the field
or features of the more distant landscape. A standing oper-
565796°— 14 5 27
35-37
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
ating procedure designed to reduce last minute instructions
to a minimum should be adopted and rehearsed. If attack
is imminent, planes are periodically warmed up by ground
crews or pilots.
Section II
ORGANIZATION OP THE GROUND
■ 36. Area of Defense. — The area to be defended is deter-
mined only after a careful estimate of the situation in which
the terrain and. the available forces are the dominant con-
siderations. In most situations the maximum practicable
objective is the security of- adjacent terrain from which the
airdrome can be rendered inoperative by aimed small-arms
fire.
■ 37. Principles of Organization. — a. Sector defense. — Nor-
mally the local ground defense of an airdrome is a sector
defense in depth. 'The area to be defended is subdivided by
establishing sectors with a commander and troops designated
for the defense of each. Sectors extend from a central point ^
on the airdrome outward and provide ciit-of-pie divisions of
the area to be defended (see fig. 9) .
b. Defense in depth. — Defense in depth is secured by a sys-
tem of centers of resistance, gun positions, obstacles, road,
blocks, and fox holes planned for the delivery of covering
Are upon important objectives and terrain. The inner de-
fense positions should give mutual support. Outlying areas
in the sectors are patrolled and defended by the sector de-
fense forces. Reinforcement is provided for by mobile strik-
ing forces and by reserves formed from airdrome personnel.
c. All-around defense. — Whenever possible, defense posi-
tions are prepared for all-around defense.
d. Alternate positions. — In order to defeat enemy air recon-
naissance alternate positions for weapons and men are dug
so that the defense is flexible and elements can be shifted
without loss of effectiveness.
28
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
37-38
SCALE IN YARDS
i
!p
Figure 9. — Sector defense.
e. Safety. — Plans of Are and movement must be prepared
and executed so that friendly elements do not fire into each
other. Such plans are particularly important in airdrome
defense because airborne attacks may come from so many
directions that friendly fire will be difficult to control.
■ 38. Reconnaissance. — a. Before other than emergency
dispositions are made, a thorough reconnaissance of the
29
38-39
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
terrain surrounding the airdrome should be undertaken.
Detailed consideration should be given to the possibilities of
attack under various conditions of time and weather. The
defense' commander should not be satisfied with initial
dispositions dictated by obvious features of the terrain, but
should plan such additional or alternate positions as will
permit him to make best use of his forces when conditions
change with the wind, the weather, the time, and the customs
of the enemy.
b. Each place airborne troops can land must be determined,
but shifts in the wind or changes in its velocity increase or
decrease the natural hazard of an area for an enemy land-
ing. Under certain conditions landings may be impossible
in a given area. For dropping parachute troops with the
minimum of casualties from the descent a fairly clear area
200 by 500 yards is required. Such a minimum space can
not be used if the wind should be blowing perpendicular to
its long axis, and the defense will consequently give it less
attention than when the wind is blowing parallel to the
long axis. Dispositions should constantly be shifted ac-
cording to such changing circumstances. The direction and
velocity of the wind and the state of the weather are im-
portant considerations in the plan for defense against any
form of aerial attack. High winds may increase the hazard
of dropping sufficiently to prevent the use of parachute
troops altogether. On the other hand, high winds reduce
the distance required for airplane landings and augment
the number ot potential landing sites. Low clouds and
limited visibility may prevent the coordinated arrival of
elements over the landing area and cut down the rate at
which troops and supplies can be landed. The time of
initiating and conducting operations will be determined
largely by the weather forecast.
c. The enemy's .customs of attack should be considered in
making dispositions.
■ 39. Types of Defense Positions. — a. Centers of resist-
ance. — (1) Key elements in the organization of the ground
30
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
39
are strong centers of resistance. Each is provided with a
supply of weapons, ammunition, food, and water and is
capable of withstanding a short siege.
(2) The principal mission of the inner centers of resistance
is to deny the landing strips and adjacent open areas to the
,39
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
enemy. They are sited, preferably clear of the field, to cover
the whole of the landing ground by fire of automatic or
other weapons against parachute troops or aircraft attempt-
ing to land troops and to fire outwards if enemy troops pene-
trate the outer defenses. Some landing grounds can be
adequately covered by one or two such centers of resistance;
others may require four or five.
6
■
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• % • * X /
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„ ^ ALTERNATE
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Figure 11. — Road block.
(3) The mission of the outer centers of resistance is to
cover tactical features and approaches and broadly to serve
as bases for the mobile defense. They are sited well clear
of the airdrome. They may or may not be able to bring
fire to bear on the airdrome itself. Some positions are for
striking forces or reserves to occupy for delaying action in
the event enemy forces succeed in organizing groups too
strong to counterattack and will ordinarily be left unmanned
32
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
39-40
or manned by a skeleton garrison. In conjunction with the
major centers of resistance a number of small protected posts
sited in the vicinity of the airdrome will be of value to
counter the effect of parachute troops dropped over a wide
area or to serve as a screen in the face of infiltrating attack.
A tendency towards wide dispersion must, however. be curbed,
as the enemy has the initiative and can concentrate superior
forces at the point he chooses. Road blocks are placed to
cut off easy routes of access.
b. Supplementary positions. — Well-camouflaged fox holes
must be provided for airdrome personnel immediately ad-
jacent to their places of occupation to compose a last line of
defense for installations and grounded aircraft. Concealed
positions are prepared clear of the target area for parties of
backers-up ready to fight among the installations. Rallying
points should be designated on or near the airdrome to which
isolated parties or individuals will move if overtaken by air-
borne attack while away from their units. Rallying points
in the field, either prearranged or designated as needed, may
be required. For these a system of visual or other signals is
necessary. Field supply points are established in the. de-
fended area. Sufficient dispersion to insure rapid supply of
units is necessary. Inflammable items should be stored
separately. Observation posts with good communication are
vital.
c. Command posts. — Command posts should be sited,
preferably within a center of resistance, away from target
areas. They should include splinterproof cover to contain
telephone switchboards, map tables, shelter for runners and
other necessary personnel, and limited sleeping accomoda-
tions. Alternate command posts must be provided.
■ 40. Fortifications. — a. General. — Fortifications will be, in
general, field works — fox holes, open emplacements, splinter-
proof cover, all well concealed and camouflaged. Elaborate
fortifications of regular outline and raised parapets are
targets for enemy action because of their regularity and
33
40
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
obviousness on the aerial photograph. Fortifications must
be sited with careful consideration to security from bom-
bardment and the provision of all around supporting fire and
covering fire for obstacles, tank barriers, and areas and ap-
proaches of strategic value. Alternate positions and dum-
mies to attract fire are of great value. Field fortifications
are covered in FM 5-15.
b. Fox holes. — Both the fox hole and the trench with some
splinterproof overhead cover have their merits and uses, but
the fox hole will be of most general value. All earth dug
out must be removed from the site. If it is necessary to
build up the fox hole, care must be taken that the work
blends with the background so that when a man comes up to
fire his head will not be silhouetted. A number of alterna-
tives, must be dug. Dummies can be put inside those not in
use. A light lid with a covering of camouflage to match the
surrounding ground should be fitted over each.
. c. Pill boxes. — Pill boxes are of value for machine guns
firing on fixed lines against troops on the ground, but they
must be completely camouflaged and earthed up as much
as possible. If possible, they should be proof against a
direct hit by at least the equivalent of a 3-inch mortar.
d. Obstacles. — Tactical wiring is of great value and should
be used in places where natural or other features give con-
cealment from the air. It should follow vegetation, tracks,
ditches, and the edges of broken ground. Under no cir-
cumstances must it be circular. The combat posts should
be very completely and thoroughly protected with wiring
adapted to suit the ground. Those which are manned by
troops whose mission it is to sally out to attack landing air-
borne troops or other troops must be wired so as not to delay
exit. If wiring interferes with concealment, other protec-
tive devices, such as antipersonnel mines, must be substituted.
In areas subject to mechanized ground attack antitank
obstacles, primarily antitank mines, must be tied in with
the defense. Construction of obstacles is covered in FM 5-30.
34
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
41
■ 41. Weapons. — a. Machine guns. — (1) Machine guns are
the basic weapons used in defense against parachutists, ah>
borne infantry, and ground troops. In a large measure their
location will outline the defense plan. For defense against
airborne attack the entire landing field and, to the extent
possible, surrounding areas suitable for the landing of air-
borne troops should be covered by machine-gun Are.
(2) The principles of distributing and siting machine
guns for the defense of an area are covered in field manuals
on infantry tactics (see FM 7-15, 7-20, and 7-40). The
principle of distribution in depth should be emphasized
even more than ordinarily in the defense of an airdrome
because of the greater probability of airborne attack. Guns
should be located in irregular mutually supporting groups
with the view of eliminating as much dead space as possible.
To make them effective at night, coordinated fires should be
planned, final protective lines determined, range cards pre-
pared, and firing stakes set out. In siting guns particular
attention should be paid to stone or brick buildings within
the area. If the number of guns permits, they should be
sited in pairs, but in any event each emplacement should be
prepared for all-around fire and all-around protection and
should be fought as a little isolated center of resistance,
since maneuver during attack may become impossible. The
preparation of alternate and supplementary emplacements
should not be neglected on this account.
(3) As most attacks on an airdrome will be preceded by
bombardment, the area will be liberally pocked with craters,
which wirl form convenient defiladed areas for enemy troops
to escape flat-trajectory Are. Mortars may be supplemented
by machine guns placed in position on high ground or build-
ings to deliver plunging fire upon defiladed positions.
(4) As many heavy machine-gun positions as possible
should be prepared to permit the engagement of hostile air-
craft. Suitable machine-gun targets are strafers, transport
planes which have leveled off to discharge parachutists,
565796° — 44 6
35
41
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
gliders, fighter or bombardment planes protecting transports,
and transports or gliders on the ground.
b. Mortars. — (1) Mortar fires are for the most part fires
against personnel to cover dead spaces in the bands of
machine-gun Are and defiladed areas where hostile forces
might assemble for attack. Their positions must be within
effective range and must afford observation of the targets and
friendly troops from observation posts. As attacking forces,
even parachutists, will be certain to have mortars in their
armament, they are essential weapons for the defense of an
airdrome subject to any form of infantry attack. They
should be kept mobile.
(2) . The 60-mm mortar is a highly mobile piece with a
useful range of about 1,000 yards. The effective radius of
burst of the high-explosive projectile is about 15 yards; cas-
ualty producing fragments carry much farther. It should
not be located more than 500 yards behind friendly troops.
Its low relief permits it to utilize the cover afforded by minor
terrain features such as bomb craters, ditches, hillocks, or
small rises.
(3) The 81-mm mortar combines mobility, and power in
greater degree than any other supporting weapon. Its
projectiles have an explosive effect comparable to that of
75-mm projectiles. Its useful range is about 2,000 yards and
its distance behind the farthest friendly troops should not
exceed 800 yards.
(4) The principles of the employment of mortars are
covered in PM 7-15, 7-20, and 7-40.
c. Antitank weapons. — (1) Direct-fire, high velocity anti-
tank weapons are needed in the ground defense of forward
airdromes. They are also effective against any observed
targets such as machine guns, antitank guns, or landed air-
craft. Antitank guns employ direct Are and engage only
visible targets. Such characteristics indicate employment
in close proximity to the troops or areas to be defended.
Whenever possible, gun positions are selected in terrain
which is unfavorable for tank operation but from which
36
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
41
effective flanking Are may be delivered against favorable
avenues of approach. In covering a road the gun should be
sited to fire on a stretch where detour is restricted by ditches,
banks, heavy woods, or similar obstructions. One well-
placed antitank weapon can temporarily stop or delay a large
mechanized force.
(2) The antitank rocket launcher is an electrically oper-
ated shoulder weapon weighing about 15 pounds and having
a maximum firing rate of eight rounds per minute. Pri-
marily, it is used to fire upon hostile armored vehicles which
come within effective range. The rocket will penetrate 3V2
inches, or approximately 90-mm, of armor plate. Although
normally considered an antitank weapon, it has other tacti-
cal uses, including the following:
(a) To increase the fire power of close-support weapons.
(b) To provide close-in defense of crew-served weapons.
(c) To deliver harassing fire against concentrations of
personnel.
(d) To protect mine fields, road blocks, and wire entangle-
ments.
(e) To protect observation and command posts.
(3) Antitank protection can also be provided by the guns
of the antiaircraft artillery defense, the 40-mm gun being an
excellent antitank weapon. When possible, without material
interference with their primary mission, these guns should
be sited for a secondary mission against mechanized vehicles.
(4) The principles of the employment of antitank guns are
covered in FM 7-20, 7-35, and 7-40.
d. Field artillery. — The actual assignment of a battery or
other unit of field artillery to the local defense of an air-
drome is the exception rather than the rule. The successful
employment of field artillery in such a defense role demands
the retention of full mobility. Field artillery should be
disposed to cover the landing ground and so sited that it
can Are on it over open sights from positions at some distance,
possibly 1,500 to 2,000 yards, depending on the country.
Possible approaches for mechanized ground forces should be
37
.41-43
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
carefully targeted. An important mission is bringing fire
to bear on areas near the airdrome on which the enemy may
be attempting to land transport, planes. Even if landings
have been successfully made, accurate fire can destroy enemy
infantry in assembly positions forming for. attack. Timed
artillery fire is effective over troops digging, in under cover
of their automatic weapons.
e. Antiaircraft artillery.—See paragraphs 45 to 51, in-
clusive.
■ 42. Local Security. — The danger of airborne attack in-
creases the need for all-around and independent defense of
units. Gun crews should be armed with rifles and supple-
mented with riflemen to provide for their own immediate
defense. Light machine guns should be assigned to the
local protection of antiaircraft and artillery pieces. All posts
and detachments should be supplied with reserves of am-
munition, food, and water.
■ 43. Mobile Defense. — a. Striking forces. — Striking forces
must be available to attack parachute troops and air-landing
troops at the earliest possible moment, to counterattack hos-
tile forces, and to come to the relief of parts of the static de-
fense if they are in danger of being overrun. They should be
assigned to covered and concealed positions off the airdrome
where they will not be exposed to the preliminary bombard-
ment. They must be located near probable places of com-
mitment, as during attack the enemy can be expected to
strafe thoroughly all troop movements. They should be sup-
plied with such transportation and weapons as will give
them mobility and high fire power. They should be pro-
vided with entrenched positions into which they can with-
draw for delaying action if the enemy succeeds in organiz-
ing concentrations too strong for them to attack. Normally
they are an integral part of the sector defense to which
they are assigned.
5. Reserve striking force. — A mobile striking force must be
held in reserve for employment against enemy concentra-
38
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
' 43-44
tions which are too strong for the sector forces. It must
be concealed off the airdrome. It is provided with such
armor, troop carriers, scout cars, and mobile guns as are
available. It is normally under the immediate control of
the defense commander.
c. Armored vehicles. — To reinforce threatened points and
to break up concentrations of hostile troops, armored
vehicles, preferably tanks, should be available. Because of
the cross-country mobility of tanks and armored half-tracks,
their high fire power, and, in the case of tanks, their adapt- -
ability to crushing tactics and the protection they afford
personnel, a few of them can be of decisive value.
■ 44. Communications. — a. General. — The importance of
adequate communications cannot be overstressed. During
the crucial moments of the defense of an airdrome time is
so short and the situation so fluid that there can be no delay
in executing the proper actions. All detached posts must
be in touch with the command post. Telephone may be used
for all fixed installations, but radio is essential for units
used as striking forces.
b. Alternate means of communication. — Visual or audible
signals may become the only means of communication avail-
able for the command. A system of such signals should be
carefully thought out and learned. The institution of a
simple code for likely battle orders and information helps to
overcome the complications of training the number of
signalers required.
c. Radio jamming. — During an attack the enemy may
attempt to jam the radio communication of the defense by
transmitting blurring signals on defense frequencies. Prep-
arations and instructions issued in advance will help main-
tain confidence and morale when jamming is attempted.
Such precautions may include —
(1) Preparation of a scheme for changes in frequency •
when jamming is encountered.
(2) Transmissal of messages on several frequencies.
39
'44-48
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
(3) Authentication of incoming messages. (It is likely
that the enemy will intersperse jamming with false
messages.)
Section III
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE
■ 45. References. — The details of antiaircraft artillery de-
fense are found in FM 4-100, 4-102, 4-104, and 4-106.
■ 46. General. — Air forces normally have antiaircraft artil-
lery assigned or attached for the protection of operational
airdromes. The antiaircraft artillery defense of an airdrome
may include both guns and automatic weapons, but the local
defense of forward-area airdromes consists ordinarily of
automatic weapons. The antiaircraft artillery commander
coordinates his fields of fire, emplacements, camouflage dis-
cipline, and communications with other airdrome defense
troops and with the airdrome commander. It is particularly
important that plans be prepared for the movement of
friendly aircraft in the vicinity of the airdrome, for inter-
communication between aircraft in flight and elements of
the antiaircraft defense, and for recognition of aircraft.
■ 47. Mission. — The mission of antiaircraft artillery em-
ployed in airdrome defense is threefold —
' a. To defend the airdrome and its installations against air
attack by destroying enemy aircraft, causing them to aban-
don their mission, or disturbing their actions to such an
extent that they miss the target.
b. To defend the airdrome against attack by airborne troops
by Are action prior to the landing.
c. To assist airdrome defense units by antimechanized Are
and supporting fires on ground objectives.
■ 48. Defense of Forward-Area Airdromes. — a. General. — ■
Defense must be sited in depth so that attacks on the perim-
eter of the airdrome will not necessarily eliminate the anti-
aircraft defenses. Weapons must be sited to bring maximum
40
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
48
fire on all enemy aircraft, whether attacking simultaneously
or in succession, before hostile acts are committed. Each
defense must be constructed to meet the prevailing or indi-
cated types of hostile action. Actual field disposition of fire
units is adjusted to meet local conditions.
b. Employment of automatic weapons. — (1) Targets. —
Primary targets of automatic weapons are hostile low-flying
aircraft — low-altitude bombers, dive bombers, strafers, troop
carriers, and gliders. Automatic weapons also have a sec-
ondary mission in antimechanized defense and the pro-
vision of supporting fire against ground and water-borne
targets.
(2) Range. — The effective slant range of the 40-mm gun is
taken as 1,500 yards.
(3) Dispositions.— As a rule, an automatic weapons defense
will be provided to combat only low-altitude horizontal flight
bombardment attack and ground strafing against the air-
drome itself. Additional fire units are disposed to extend
the defense in depth and to reinforce the defense, particu-
larly along the more probable avenues of approach. For de-
fense against horizontal flight attack, automatic weapons
are placed at or near the bomb release line corresponding to
the altitude of the attack. Against dive bombardments, units
are sited, as near the objective as possible, although not so
close that attacks on the object will put the guns out of
action or blind them by dust and debris from the explosives.
This indicates that guns sited for. defense against dire bom-
bardment attacks should be located 300 to. 500 yards away
from the objective.
(4) Coordination of fire.— Coordination of fire must be
achieved. The dead areas of the guns are coordinated so
that all avenues of approach will be covered by gun fire.
To insure efficient engagement of all targets, normal and
contingent zones of fire are specified for each firing unit.
Fire direction is exercised by the fire unit commander sub-
ject to general directions from higher authority concerning
such matters as withholding fire and priorities of targets
41
48
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
and specific orders to : coordinate with friendly air force
operations. '
(5) Examples. — (a) Fighter strip defended by one platoon
of automatic weapons.— The four fire units are emplaced on
'■ A
S1°PS
FUEL STORAGE
V
r . i — i —i
O Soo 1000 1500
Figure 12. — Sliort strip defended by one platoon of automatic
weapons.
the central axis of the strip, one at each end, and the other
units 500 to 800 yards out. (See fig. 12.) '
(b) Fighter strip defended by one battery of automatic
weapons. — The defense is formed by adding to the four-unit
defense shown in figure 12. The additional four units are set
42
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
48
out approximately 500 yards to each flank of the outermost
guns'. (See fig. 13.)
(c) Bomber strip defended by 12 automatic weapons fire
units and two 90-mm gun batteries.
1. Automatic weapons. — The length of a 7,000-foot
strip will cause the automatic weapons to be out
r i 1 t
C SOO ' IOOO ISffO
yMDS
Fkjube 13. — Short strip defended by one battery of automatic
weapons.
of supporting distance of each other if the method
. of emplacing used in (a) and (b) above is em-
ployed. The fire units are arranged in a ring
500 to 800 feet from the perimeter of the landing
strip. (See fig. 14.) Dead areas are coordinated
43
48-49
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
as shown so that an adjacent gun covers the dead
area of each gun.
2. Gun batteries. — At altitudes above 2,500 feet the ap-
proach most favorable to the bombers is perpen-
dicular to the strip. The gun batteries are placed
2,500 to 3,000 yards out from the center of the strip
perpendicular to its length. (See fig. 14.)
Shops
iooo .
1 i 1 n
500 1500
)AHOS.
Piguke 14. — Antiaircraft artillery defense of a bomber strip.
■ 49. Restrictions. — a. The following are 'some of the re-
strictions that might be imposed on fire:
(1) Any unit may fire, unless specifically restricted.
(2) Fire units not specifically prohibited from firing may
fire on any airplane entering their field of fire unless it is
definitely identified or recognized as friendly.
(3) Fire units may take under fire any airplane entering
their fields of fire except those flying in definite channels of
approach or definitely identified or recognized as friendly.
44
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
49-52
(4) Any airplane committing a hostile act may be taken
under Are.
: &. All personnel must be thoroughly trained in visual
recognition.
c. Restrictions on opening Are will be placed in effect by
the airdrome commander. Control is exercised through the
antiaircraft artillery commander. Restrictions imposed on
Are are normally the minimum consistent with coordination
of the air defense and to insure the safety of friendly aircraft.
■ 50. Local Air Guards. — All fire units must be protected by
local air guards. (See par. 79.) Guards must be provided
with means of communication for transmitting warning of
approaching planes.
■ 51. Small-Arms Fire Against Aircraft. — a. Properly de-
livered small-arms fire is an effective method of- counter-
attacking low-flying airplanes. Its effectiveness depends
upon the training of personnel and upon their constant
alertness. The result of small- arms fire upon aircraft is
not to be measured only by the count of planes actually
brought down. Damage to radio, mechanical, and electrical
systems is frequently inflicted by rifle and machine-gun
bullets which, though it may not prevent the plane from
returning to its base, necessitates extensive repair. Damage
caused by the passage of a bullet through a wing or control
surface requires repair work that may prevent at least one
operational flight. There is also an important effect upon
the morale of troops employing their weapons against low-
flying aircraft.
b. PM 21-45, 23-5, 23-6, 23-7, and 23-10 explain the tech-
nique of directing small-arms fire against aircraft.
Section IV
PERSONNEL
■ 52. General. — a. All troops stationed at an airdrome will
be considered available for its defense when needed. The
45
52-54
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
order of availability will be the following: ground defense
troops; aviation engineer troops; chemical warfare service
decontamination troops and other service troops; Army Air
Forces troops whose mission is administration or operation,
maintenance, and repair of aircraft; and other troops within
supporting distance. All personnel should have some defense
duty assigned and be drilled in its performance. All per-
sonnel not actually engaged, at the moment in the main-
tenance or operation of aircraft must be prepared to engage
in the fire fight.
b. All personnel must keep gas masks, weapons, and am-
munition close at hand. When the alarm sounds they will
report to previously designated assembly areas, armed and
read for combat.
■ 53. Fixed Defenses. — In general, armed airdrome personnel
should man less vital static defenses in order to free garrison
troops for mobile operations. Such posts can be left par-
tially manned or unoccupied until the ground defense is
placed on the alert. It is necessary, however, to have cer-
tain defensive positions manned continually. Antiaircraft
weapons must always be ready to fire, as must, to a lesser
extent, antitank weapons on likely routes of approach and
machine-gun posts in vital areas. For all such assignments,
no reliance initially should be placed upon men who have a
full-time job that will demand their presence at another
part of the airdrome. Airborne attacks develop too rapidly
to permit them to man posts at any distance. Available air-
drome personnel can be employed to reinforce centers of
resistance. Dispersed personnel should be employed to create
small islands of resistance near their place of employment.
This practice will establish a series of garrisoned points
to form a defensive zone that will limit the movements of
enemy troops who break through or land on the airdrome
itself in order to attack special installations.
■ 54. Striking Forces and Reserves. — a. Striking forces
should be composed of troops especially trained for ground
46
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES 54-56
defense. Enemy airborne units may be expected to consist
of troops who have received special training. Defensive units
sent against them should consist of troops of corresponding
caliber.
b.. A .final reserve can be formed from air force troops
who have formed at assembly points at locations where the
larger numbers of air force personnel are occupied.
Section V
EMPLOYMENT OP THE DEFENSE
■ 55. General'. — Successful defensive tactics are based on
adequate security measures and proper use of fire and
maneuver. A proper evaluation of the terrain and an esti-
mate of the situation are of first priority. Based on these,
the defense is planned in accordance with established in-
fantry and antiaircraft tactics.
■ 56. Minimizing Effects on Bombardment. — a. Before an
attempt at airborne or ground attack, bombardment and
strafing will normally be directed at defense and opera-
tional installations, at the outlined perimeter of the field
and along the edges of surrounding woods, at housing areas,
and at any location that suggests a remunerative target.
Special defense forces can survive only by keeping under
cover in concealed locations in the vicinity of the airdrome
but not on it or its perimeter or in any place the enemy
may be anticipated to suspect and bomb because of its
aptness for concealment.
b. During the initial bombardment machine guns and
other guns sited for ground defense normally remain con-
cealed and reserve their fire for their primary targets. Like-
wise under certain conditions some of the antiaircraft weap-
ons may remain silent. Preliminary bombing or strafing
runs are often made with small force to provoke the defense
into revealing dispositions.
47
57-61
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
■ 57. Alertness.— Alertness is the first essential of defensive
operations. At all times, even during the height of a bom-
bardment, some men must be on the lookout to guard
against surprise.
■ 58. Observation System. — For proper employment of the--
defense it is essential the defense commander have a spotting
system for accurately identifying danger points. The sys-
tem should include observation posts and patrols. (See
par. 79.)
■ 59. Patrolling Outlying Areas. — It is ordinarily not
within the resources of the defenders to place combat
groups at all possible landing places for airborne troops.
The more distant of the probable landing areas should be
patrolled.
■ 60. Immobilization of Motor Vehicles. — Plans should be
made for quick immobilization of all vehicles which can-
not be kept from falling into enemy hands. Immobiliza-
tion can be surely attained only by the removal of some
major part or by wrecking. The same part must be taken
from all vehicles to prevent the use of parts from some
vehicles to make others operative. The attackers, even
parachute troops, may be expected to come provided with
various sizes of spark plugs, gaskets, hose joints and clips,
distributor parts, wire, batteries, nuts and bolts, flexible
tubing for gasoline and oil lines, hacksaws, screw drivers,
hammers, chisels, spanners, and adjustable wrenches. The
quickest method of destruction is by rifle and machine-gun
fire on vital parts, including tires. The most satisfactory
method, when time permits, is by the use of explosives.
■ 61. Principles of Action Against Airborne Troops. — a.
Nature of action. — The nature of the action against air-
borne troops is such that once a defense unit is committed,
its commander must act largely upon his initiative. The
combat will normally develop into a series of independent
48
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
61
action to capture or destroy small groups of attackers before
they can organize.
b. Advantages of the attack. — Airborne troops, particularly
parachute troops, have a definite advantage over the de-
fender in that the area selected for landing may be anywhere
within a wide range 'and that the actual location and time
of the landing can be kept secret until the descent is begun.
Several landings can be made simultaneously to place the
defense at the further disadvantage of uncertainty as to
where the main effort of the attack is to«be made. Under the
threat of reinforcing immediate successes, the attacker can
force the defense to disperse its forces or perhaps tempt it
to improper use of them. In effect, the defense must guard
against the sudden advent of the Are power and holding
power of hostile infantry within its own lines.
c. Advantages of the defense. — (1) Until they are organ-
ized on the ground, airborne troops are dispersed and lightly
armed infantrymen hampered by the necessity of freeing
themselves from parachutes, gliders, or transports and of
collecting and assembling weapons or unloading them. Dur-
ing the first few minutes after their arrival they can be
destroyed by a fraction of the number of defenders.
(2) For about 30 seconds before the jump, a transport plane
loaded with parachute troops levels off at a low altitude
and flies a straight course toward the landing area. As it
takes about 10 seconds for a squad and its equipment to be
discharged, the transport is flying slowly along a straight
course for a total period of about 40 seconds, an easy target.
Parachutists are practically helpless during their descent and
in the period immediately following their landing when they
must collapse their parachutes and get out of their harness.
Materiel containers must then be located and unpacked and
the squads or larger units must assemble. As the landing
pattern of a squad is large, its average length being about
400 yards, assembly takes an appreciable period of time.
(3) Gliders are extremely vulnerable if they come low over
hostile troops. As their flight is very slow, the troops they
49
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
61
carry can be destroyed before the landing. Fire directed
at the forward part may reach the pilot and cause the glider
to crash. Landings on bad ground, even if the glider is-
not smashed, may temporarily shock or stun the troops.
d. Employment of heavy weapons. — The necessity for rapid
entry into action against airborne troops dictates that heavy
weapons be located in firing positions. Artillery is normally
limited to direct fire. Its primary targets are gliders or
transport planes halted or moving slowly on the ground.
e. Time of opening fire. — Time of opening Are is controlled
to conceal the locations of weapons and organizations until
they can be employed with best effect. Outguards open fire
on transport planes and parachutists as soon as they are
within range and maintain intensive fire. The reserve ele-
ments in concealed areas hold their fire until they are com-
mitted to action or are directly in the path of descending
troops. Heavy weapons normally open fire on appropriate
targets of opportunity as they arrive within suitable range.
Some antiaircraft weapons may remain silent to deal with
the main attack when it develops. When transport planes
come in for a landing, the defender must be ready with fire-
power and the maximum possible surprise, to inflict heavy
casualties on the initial landing party.
/. Counterattack. — (1). Regardless of antiaircraft fire, in
any airborne attack of force some troops must be expected
to effect a landing. The defender must attack and destroy~-
them before they can assemble and develop an effective force.
Landing fields and other vulnerable areas can best be pro-
tected by fast-moving hard-hitting striking forces equipped
with automatic weapons capable of high-angle fire, light
cannon, armored vehicles, and transportation which can de-
stroy the attacker before he completes his landing or organ-
izes on the ground. Later counterattacks should be under-
taken only with strong fire support and by the methods
which would be necessary against any other ground force.
The character of action by the airdrome defenders, however,
51
61
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
must be offensive, and time is the element of greatest
importance. '
(2) Parachute troops must be attacked immediately. If-
parachutists land close by, it is essential that the personnel
of even small defense posts sally put. to attack them with
automatic weapons, grenades, rifles, and bayonets. A small,
^determined force can cope with several times its number
of parachutists if it attacks ; the instant they hit the ground.
For 30 seconds after landing parachute troops are quite
helpless, for 2 minutes they are more or less helpless, and
for the 3 to 5 minutes it requires for them to begin organ-
izing and digging in they are very vulnerable. If they are
not destroyed during this time, reserves must be com-
mitted in sufficient force to isolate or destroy them before
they can organize into larger units and move on vital areas
for completion of their mission or before they ean be re-
inforced. It must be expected that forces moving to the
counterattack will be strafed by the enemy's supporting
aviation. Troops constantly need to take advantage of cover
to minimize the effects of the fire of the enemy's aircraft.
Successful counterattacks may be turned into failure if the
attackers do not find cover before being counterattacked in
their turn by hostile aircraft.
, (3) Armored vehicles are of the utmost value in' the
counterattack. They should be concealed in relatively safe
positions during the preliminary bombardment and brought
into action during the critical stage of the ground action
which may subsequently develop. They must be regarded
as striking units and must not be employed in a static role
in lieu of fixed defense posts to cover any predetermined
areas or any particular approaches. Their primary mission
is offensive action to cause as many casualties, as much
damage to equipment, and as much confusion among landed
troops as possible. They must not be allotted such tasks as
carrying messages or hunting down parachute troops dis-
persed individually over the countryside. After delivering
their attacks they should be withdrawn and held in reserve
52
61
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
to meet further threats. , Because of their speed, armor, fire
power and weight, tanks are especially valuable for attack-
ing parachute troops as they land. While parachutists are
struggling with their harness, tanks should cruise among
them, crushing them and their equipment. Half-tracks
should not come close enough to be the targets for hand
grenades. Their loads of troops should get out and attack
as skirmishers or dig in for holding fire. Scout cars may
be used to screen the movement of a striking force to a
threatened area. Rifle troops should follow closely behind
armored vehicles. These troops should, if possible, be moved
by truck close to the area of initial employment. Personnel
carriers may be used to transport small combat groups to the
attack of enemy positions.
(4) Some members of a counterattacking force must be
detailed to collect or destroy arms containers and their
contents or, in haste, to hide their distinctively colored para-
chutes. All personnel should give special- attention to any
parachutes of a color in a minority, as they may mark
weapons, officers, rallying points, etc. If there is any wind,
arms containers may be dragged down wind by their para-
chutes. Movement in this direction will insure early con-
tact with parachutists and facilitate the capture of their
equipment. Every effort should be made to confuse sup-
porting aircraft by firing captured Very pistols and laying
out captured signal strips and flags. Patrols should be
sent out to capture supplies dropped at later periods or to
cover them with fire, but striking forces and reserves should
not be weakened during the attack on the airdromes to
supply details to mop up small isolated groups of para-
chutists who may have dug in. These elements should be
disposed of in detail later.
g. Feints. — A parachute attack will probably be accom*
panied by feints. Dummies may be dropped at one place
and the troops for the attack at another. It must there-
fore be quickly determined in every instance whether dum-
54
DEFENSE OP AIRDROMES
61
mies or troops are being dropped. Dummies hit the ground
hard and bounce. If there is even a slight wind, they are
pulled along lifelessly by the parachute. The difference
most visible from a distance is the absence of efforts like
those made by parachutists to control their descent. Unless
the terrain is free of obstacles, genuine parachutists will be
observed maneuvering their parachutes to land in a favorable
place by twisting their bodies and pulling their shroud lines
as they near the ground.
h. Interference with communications. — The success of an
airborne attack depends largely upon radio and visual com-
munications. In the early stages of the operation the reports
received at enemy headquarters from reconnaissance air-
craft are the basis . for determining detail of subsequent
operations. In the later stages information must be had
from units on the ground by means of radio or visual signals.
It may be possible to jam the enemy's radio traffic with good
results, and his visual signals can be copied and repeated to
his confusion.
i. Plans for action. — The details of the execution of a
general plan of action against airborne troops (see par. 105
and 106) cannot be evolved until actual dropping or landing
has begun and it becomes possible for the defenders to
discern the enemy's intentions. Each unit commander, how-
ever, should attempt to anticipate the various forms the
attack might take in the area assigned to him and prepare
a plan for each imagined possibility. Any plans given to the
troops should be simple and flexible and not tied down un-
alterably to geographic localities, as it cannot be foreseen
where the enemy will drop his troops or land his gliders or
that he will succeed in placing them where he wants to place
them. The important factor is that his troops are extremely
vulnerable immediately after landing; consequently, it is the
aim of the defense to conserve its strength until the enemy is
on the ground and then to attack vigorously no matter how
badly it may appear to be outnumbered. Each commander
must visualize exactly what he is going to do in each con-
55
61-62
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
tingency during the few critical minutes most favorable to
his success. Counterattacks should be rehearsed by troops
assigned to the sector.
■ 62. Delaying Action. — It is probable that the forces avail-
able for the local defense of the airdrome will be consistent
with the battle situation in the area. The local ground
defense is normally a delaying action fought to hold the
airdrome or to deny its use to the enemy until supporting
forces in the area can come up.
56
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
63-64
CHAPTER 6
PASSIVE DEFENSE
Paragraphs
Section I. Dispersion
63-67
68-71
72-73
74-77
78-81
82-84
85-97
98-99
II. Cover
III. Camouflage
IV. Obstacles
V. Alarm systems -_.
VI. Damage control
VII. Protection against chemicals.
VIII. Demolition.
Section I
DISPERSION
■ 63. General.-— Dispersion is an essential measure in the
passive defense of an airdrome. Normally there should be
nothing in the landing area but those planes which are on
the alert.
■ 64. Aircraft. — It is of the utmost importance to avoid the
grouping of aircraft on the ground. Planes not in revet-
ments should be in groups of three planes, each plane at least
150 yards from the next and each group at least 200 yards
from any plane or other group. Revetments should be 150
feet apart in similar groups. Airplanes, revetted or un-
revetted, must not be parked along straight lines nor in
continuation of the runways or other natural bombing or
strafing runs. Fighter aircraft are kept near the down-wind
ends of the runways, ready to take off with a minimum loss
of time in the event of an attack. Special precautions should
be taken at night to disperse planes which are not on the
night alert. If planes are not to be flown, they are moved
off the field. Bombardment and reconnaissance planes are
dispersed at some distance from the airdrome. A mile is
not excessive if it facilitates concealment. Extent of dis-
persal depends, however, not only on local terrain but also
on the requirements for protecting the aircraft from sabotage
57
64-67
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
or from possible airborne action. Parked planes at airdromes
within range of enemy lighters must not be dispersed so
widely that they are not under the cover of antiaircraft fire.
■ 65. Installations and Housing. — Technical and operational
installations are located near the landing area, but a formal-
ized arrangement should be avoided. Only the control tower
need be in the immediate vicinity of the runways. Base
operations should be off the edge of the field and away from
conspicuous features Of the runways or prominent land-
marks. It should have no standard location with respect
to other airdrome features or similar installations at other
airdromes. The engineering maintenance area should be as
far removed from the landing area as conditions permit.
Thorough reconnaissance of the area should be undertaken
to find suitable areas for the housing of personnel. The
fullest possible use should be made of existing structures,
and new ones should be designed and sited to conform to
those normally found in the region.
■ 66. Storage. — Fixed servicing and supply facilities are not
built at field airdromes. Gasoline, ammunition, bombs, and
other supplies are delivered to aircraft at dispersed locations
from dispersed stores. Armament and. fuel supply points
should be well away from the airdrome and isolated from
all other equipment, materiel, or dispersal areas. Stores of
gasoline in drums should be at least 150 feet apart, if given
a protective earth traverse on all sides. Without such pro-
tection storage piles should be spaced at 200 yards. Ammu-
nition, bombs, pyrotechnic, and chemical stores should
be dispersed under the direction of ordnance personnel or
in accordance with the standard safety distances given the
Ordnance Safety Manual.
■ 67. Reference. — See TM 5-255 for specific distances and
details of dispersion.
58
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
68-70
Section n
COVER
■ 68. Personnel. — At all Installations such as headquarters,
supply points, engineering maintenance, aircraft dispersal
areas, and defense positions, and in all housing areas or any
place habitually occupied, air raid shelters must be provided
for personnel. The special trench, braced to resist earth
shock, is the simplest protection and one of the best. The
trace of these trenches is either a chevron or an L to permit
occupants to take shelter in a leg which is perpendicular to
the direction of flight of a strafing plane. If it is not possible
to dig trenches because of the soil, effective protection against
heavy machine-gun fire can be had by setting up oil drums
filled with sand. For aircraft combat crews, overhead cover,
sufficient at least to withstand splinters, must be provided
if they are to secure the rest to perform their subsequent
missions without undue loss of men and material. Dugouts
can be made to serve.
■ 69. Aircraft. — Revetments provide supplementary protec-
tion for dispersed aircraft. They reduce damage from bomb
fragments but do not prevent effective strafing. They draw
fire if they are not wall concealed, and they are extremely
hard to camouflage. The commander of the airdrome should
determine whether or not they are to be constructed. A
War Department order prohibits their construction in the
continental United States without specific authority. Elabo-
rate revetments are seldom constructed. Good ones can be
constructed quickly by throwing up -U -shaped embankments
of earth high enough to hide a plane from horizontal view.
Their openings should face in different directions. Sand bags
filled with the spoil from other works can be used for their
construction. Sunken revetments are inadvisable.
■ 70. Stores and Equipment. — Normally, all storage at field
airdromes will be above ground in dispersed revetments. For
59
70-71
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
bombs and other supplies which are not affected by the
weather, open storage in revetted traverses is ample. The
quantity of supplies on hand at advanced field airdromes
does not normally justify attempting to give them protection
against small-arms fire or bombs. If warehouses are built,
they should be theater of operations type. All storage facili-
ties should be carefully camouflaged. Machine tools should
Figure 17. — Bomb storage in revetment.
be protected by surrounding walls of concrete or sandbags.
If they are in trailers, the parked vehicles should be revetted
with earth or sandbags at semipermanent establishments.
Under special conditions it may be necessary to construct
theater of operations type of buildings to house the power
tools.
■ 71. Reference. — See TM 5-255 for details of method and
construction of cover.
60
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
72
Section III
CAMOUFLAGE
■ 72. General.- — Camouflage is any and every means of con-
cealing, disguising, or obscuring the airdrome or its installa-
tions, planes, materiel, and personnel so that the enemy finds
it difficult to recognize or identify his target. .The extreme
importance of taking adequate camouflage measures cannot
be overstressed. Continuous and effective efforts for dis-
guise or concealment are vital to the defense of an airdrome.
Camouflage discipline must be thorough and rigorously ob-
served. Troops and installations unsatisfactorily camou-
flaged are not likely to survive for local defense or for any
other mission. The more successful the deception, the less
the airdrome will look like an airdrome, the less attention it
will draw from the enemy. The more effective the camou-
flage, the more installations and the more personnel will en-
dure for attack and defense. Although camouflage officers of
the aviation engineers are available for technical advice and
the planning of large-scale projects, camouflage is the job of
all personnel, who must be indoctrinated with the necessity
of constant effort and vigilance and made to understand
the underlying principles of good camouflage as well as the
means and methods of achieving it. What hundreds have
labored to do, one can carelessly or thoughtlessly undo. Good
camouflage in the field does not of necessity demand elaborate
prefabricated materials nor specially schooled direction and
labor. Time spent in careful planning and common sense
employed in the use of existing local cover and concealment
and local materials, supplemented if necessary with simple
artificial devices, will result in good camouflage, while no
amount of special equipment will take the place of thought-
ful planning and good camouflage discipline. If it is real-
ized what will give a position away to the enemy, much equip-
ment and labor will not "be needed to disguise it. If it is
not realized what will give a position away, all the equipment
in a base supply depot will not suffice.
61
73-75
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
■ 73. References. — Detailed information and instructions re-
lating to camouflage can be found in PM 5-20 and in TM
5-255, 5-266, and 5-267 and its supplements.
Section IV
OBSTACLES
■ 74. General. — Obstacles of all types have become increas-
ingly important. They are used at airdromes for three
general purposes: to prevent the safe landing of enemy air-
craft; to impede the advance of mechanized vehicles; and
to hinder the attack of foot elements. Temporary obstruc-
tions for landing areas, antimechanized obstacles, and
Darriers for close-in all-around defense are of extremely
limited value unless they are covered by fire.
■ 75. Obstruction of Landing Areas. — a. Obstacles to pre-
vent the landing of aircraft are called obstructions. Plans
may call for obstructing all landing areas in the vicinity of
the airdrome, including those on which gliders or planes
might be successfully crash landed. Reconnaissance of ad-
jacent areas not used by friendly air forces must be under-
taken to determine the obstruction necessary and the feasi-
bility of placing it. Such locations should be blocked with
permanent rather than temporary obstructions. They are
spaced so that a landing plane will strike at least two in a run
of 100 yards. Since airborne troops will be used to clear
landing areas, the obstructions must be difficult to remove.
b. The best obstruction is a ditch or trench. A series of
shallow trenches about 3 feet wide and 6 feet long dug at
50-foot intervals is effective. If time permits, the spoil should
be removed so that it will not be available for filling. A
variation is a series of hummocks of earth irregularly spotted
at 50-foot intervals and made by excavating at a distance of
10 to 12 feet around a point and throwing the spoil to the
center. Another method of obstruction consists of checker-
boards of double furrows spaced to form 100-yard squares.
Rows of posts are effective but require considerable time to
62
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
75-77
place. Various other obstructions afford a measure of
security. Large and heavy objects such as concrete pipes,
concrete blocks, useless vehicles, rock-filled drums, steel tetra-
hedrons, or cut trees will suffice. Roads which might be used
for the landing of air transports can be blocked by putting
obstacles along the shoulders high enough to catch the wings
or by stretching cables across the road high enough to permit
the passage of vehicles.
c. The successful temporary obstruction of operational
fields and runways is difficult. About the only quickly placed
temporary obstructions are motor vehicles which can be
driven on and parked or objects which can be hastily towed
into position. The unused portion of landing grounds in
operation should not be permanently blocked, as night land-
ings of friendly planes, without lights and under various
weather conditions, are in themselves sufficiently hazardous
without further complications.
■ 76. Antimechanized Obstacles. — Concealed or camouflaged
obstacles should be used on all approaches to the airdrome
which are not needed for its defense. Even though a ground
mechanized threat does not exist, protection should be pro-
vided against tanks light enough to be transported by air.
(See FM 5-30 concerning location and construction.)
■ 77. Barriers Against Personnel. — At airdromes where the
situation indicates possibility of attack by airborne or ground
troops, all positions which are to be defended should be given
as complete wire protection as will not interfere with con-
cealment. The order of erecting available wire should be
around gun emplacements near the outskirts of the defense,
around gun emplacements within the defended area, around
other defense positions, and across access to more dangerous
avenues of approach and defiladed areas. Defense wiring
should be carefully planned to prevent disclosure of posi-
tions. Symmetrical or circular outlines are normally
avoided. The construction of common types of protective
wiring is shown in FM 5-15.
63
78-80
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
Section V
ALARM SYSTEMS
■ 78. Local Alarm System. — An effective local alarm system
is essential. Normally every airdrome will be included in
an Aircraft Warning Service (see PM 1-25) established by
higher authority which will notify the local airdrome com-
mander of the approach of hostile aircraft. Warning will
also be received from the Antiaircraft Artillery Intelligence
Service (see FM 4-106) . A local alarm system of sentinels
and observation posts, adequate communications, and warn-
ing signals, is, however, necessary to supplement outside
warning services and to alert personnel upon hostile ap-
proach.
■ 79. Sentinels and . Observation Posts. — Sentinels should
be posted and observation posts maintained at strategic
points outside the airdrome to give the alarm for approach-
ing hostile aircraft, to warn of chemical attack, and to act
as spotters in case of airborne or ground attack. Personnel
at these posts should be trained in the recognition of air-
craft. All areas likely to be attacked by airborne or ground
troops must be kept under continuous observation. Spotters
must be on the alert for parachute or air-landing troops
and be prepared to guide friendly troops to their landing
places. Provision must be made for the immediate verifica-
tion of reports of the dropping of parachute troops. In
friendly territory maximum advantage should be taken of
the services of civil organizations which can be formed and
trained to report attacks by parachute troops, air-landing
troops, or mechanized forces. An AAAIS, if present, will
provide the basis for an observation system.
■ 80. Communications. — The observation system is compar-
atively useless without unfailing communications. Tele-
phone, radio, and improvised signals must be ready for
immediate report of impending attack. The time for warn-
64
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
80-82
ing is often so short that vehicles or runners will not suffice.
Complete dependence cannot be placed on any one method
of communication (see par. 44b). The signal system must
also provide for the rapid communication of warning to
higher headquarters or to the nearest agency of the Aircraft
Warning Service.
■ 81. Warning Signals. — A set of signals, both audible and
visual, must be devised for warning personnel. The system
should be based on a general alarm signal, preferably a siren
or special horn, to alert the command. This signal can be
followed by another general signal which will send all per-
sonnel to battle stations. Special signals are needed. If the
hostile mission is one of aerial bombardment only, as much of
personnel as possible will take cover, but to resist airborne
attack or ground attack local ground defense plans must be
put into operation. Special signals, such as the striking of a
steel triangle or the sounding of a klaxon horn or combina-
tions of signals, must be available for gas attack. Means to
give information or orders may be required. Local signal
codes are extremely useful and not difficult to improvise. A
loud speaker system has many advantages.
Section VI
DAMAGE CONTROL
■ 82. General.— Provision must be made for emergency
damage control. Fires must be controlled and incendiaries
dealt with immediately. Communications must be main-
tained. Decontamination of installations essential to the
defense may be necessary. Damage to vital installations
must be given emergency repair if it is required that the
airdrome continue to operate under attack. If friendly planes
are in the air or are to be put into the air, one runway must
be kept in condition for use. Speedy repairs depend largely
on advance preparations and training and the use of equip-
ment rather than hand labor. (See TM 5-255.)
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ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
■ 83. Plans and Coordination. — Detailed plans and effective
coordination are required. A damage control officer should
be appointed to assist the defense officer by directing all re-
pair activities. Details must be organized to control and
repair damage as it occurs. Fire plans and efficient fire-
fighting squads must be ready. Details must also be organ-
ized for the maintenance of communications and the repair
of runways. Damage control details will normally be organ-
ized from appropriate service troops available, augmented if
necessary by specially trained Army Air Forces personnel.
During an attack only the minimum repair details will be
exempted from the general defense and will be at emergency
stations. Additional personnel, if required, will be obtained
from the fighting personnel under control of the defense
officer.
■ 84. Repairs After Attack. — All service personnel who can
be spared will be released by unit commanders to work under
the general supervision of the damage control officer. To
survey the extent of damage and to establish priority of work,
a hasty reconnaissance should be undertaken immediately.
Section VII
PROTECTION AGAINST CHEMICALS
■ 85. General. — All personnel must be trained and condi-
tioned so that they will be able to carry out their duties
promptly and efficiently during a chemical attack. Chemical
defense plans must be based on what the enemy can do, not
on what it is thought he will do.
■ 86. Gas Discipline. — Gas discipline is essential. All per-
sonnel should feel that the security of the command depends
upon the orderly and prompt execution of the protective
. procedures in which they have been drilled.
■ 87. Protection by Dispersion. — Dispersion of aircraft and
airdrome facilities, installations, and equipment is a primary
j means of defense against chemical attack.
66
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
88-90
■ 88. Protection by Gasproofing. — Materiel and installations
necessary to the functioning of the airdrome must be pro-
tected against chemicals. The communications center and.
the operations and control centers should be gasproof. Al-
though it is neither necessary nor feasible to provide gas-
proof protection for all installations at an airdrome, every
structure which is protected against bombing can be gas-
proofed. Those structures which are to be protected against
gas must also be at least blastproof and splinterproof. (See
FM 21-40 and TM 5-310.)
■ 89. Runways and Landing Areas. — Chemical agents do
relatively little direct damage to runways or landing .areas,
although mustard type agents will contaminate the grass on
turfed fields. The greatest difficulty will result from the use
of persistent gas to delay repair of damage caused by high
explosives. The contamination of a large area of a runway
or landing ground will, however, interfere with its use by air-
craft. Neutralization of the chemicals by prompt decontami-
nation is the primary defensive measure. For bomb craters
or for small areas satisfactory results can be had from the
^^ ^^^^djj.rd d p | m Jlstg , Jfy /, yi g anna ra h l a hnf. fnr lnrcrpr aw«! surVi
as runways, a motor-driven unit is required. No special
measures against incendiaries are necessary other than to
keep grass and brush cut back from dispersed aircraft and
buildings.
■ 90. Protection of Aircraft. — If possible, aircraft should be
protected from contact with liquid chemicals, but revetments
which are proof against chemicals in liquid form will not
ordinarily be provided. Overhead cover for large bombard-
ment planes is not normally practicable. Except for the
largest planes, however, protection against overhead and
drifting sprays should be provided. Covers of impermeable
material for cockpit, engine, and propellers are effective and
should be employed, when available, to protect planes not
being used or serviced.
R7
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ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
■ 91. Explosives and Inflammable Stores. — Explosives and
inflammables are not appreciably affected by chemicals ex-
cept when the liquid comes in contact with metallic con-
tainers. Storage^ of gasoline and other fuels underground
adequately protects them from chemical contamination as
well as from incendiaries under ordinary conditions. Maga-
zines and similar buildings used for storing explosives give
sufficient protection. Bombs, munitions, gasoline, oil, and
equipment stored in the open should be protected by gas-
proof tarpaulins.
■ 92. Facilities for Repair and Maintenance. — The protec-
tion of facilities for repair and maintenance will vary with
the degree of exposure of the airdrome and the time, per-
sonnel, and materials which are available for construction.
If bombproof repair shops are built, they should also be
gasproofed. Easily damaged equipment, such as parachutes
and bomb sights, should be kept in blastproof, fire-resistant
gasproof storage.
■ 93. Protection of Personnel. — a. General. — Personnel
should be required to have gas masks available at all times
and, since attack by persistent chemicals is one of the best
means for neutralizing an airdrome, should be provided with
clothing impregnated for protection. Each man should have
a designated place to go during chemical attack, and should
be drilled to go immediately to his place without confusion.'
With only those exceptions necessitated by the defense plan,
these places should provide overhead and vertical protection
against chemical spray.
b. Gas alarm system. — The "alert" signal announcing the
probable approach of hostile planes should be the signal
for waking sleeping personnel, closing gasproof shelters, and
covering airplanes, trucks, food supplies, and water. The
"gas alarm," however, should not be given until it is neces-
sary for men to mask. Alarms should be located over the
airdrome to relay the warning from any one part of the field
to all others. The main alarm should be located at the
68
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
93
93-94
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
operations office, and auxiliary alarms should be placed where
men are habitually at work.
c. Gas sentries. — Gas sentries should be posted at or near
all gas alarms, gasproof shelters, working parties, and sleep-
ing men. Guards stationed at the headquarters of various
units and at important installations should also be trained
in the duties of gas sentries.
d. Shelters. — Gasproof shelter can normally be provided
only for those installations that must be kept in operation
during the attack. Installations seriously impaired in op-
erating efficiency when personnel is masked should be given
priority. One or two bombproof gasproof shelters may be
placed at each end of the landing area, one at the operations
office, and one at the first aid station or at any other im-
portant installation. Personnel engaged in activities re-
quiring a number of men should at a minimum be provided
with overhead cover adequate to protect them from spray
and with vertical cover, such as that afforded by imperme-
able paulins, which can be shifted as the wind changes. Im-
pervious covers should be liberally provided for fox holes.
e. First aid. — The medical service should provide a special
organization for the prophylaxis and treatment of gas cases.
/. Warning signs. — Warning signs should be promptly
posted at all contaminated areas. Vigilance is required to
prevent contamination from contact with objects, structures,
and ground splashed with vesicants. The first to move after
the attack must be the decontamination squads, which must
prepare and mark off paths before activities can be resumed
safely.
g. Decontamination stations. — Men contaminated by liquid
chemicals must be required to report at once to a decon-
tamination station. Assembly points can be designated in
distant areas so that contaminated men may be transported
by truck.
■ 94. Protection of Defense Installations. — Few defense in-
stallations can be protected against chemicals. Antiaircraft
70
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
94-98
guns cannot be given protective cover and still function. At
such installations protective clothing must be worn. Other
weapons may be given cover overhead against spray, but some
men at each gun should wear masks and protective clothing
at all times when attack is possible. Frequent changes of
shifts are necessary to reduce fatigue caused by wearing
such clothing.
■ 95. Chemical Warfare Defense Center. — Separate storage
should be given to materials and equipment used for decon-
tamination. Decontamination squads should assemble at the
storage point upon the "alert" signal.
■ 96. Plans. — For every airdrome an integrated chemical
defense plan is required. Because of the technicality of the
defense measures and the specialized training necessary,
Chemical Warfare Service troops should be available for its
execution.
■ 97. References.— See FM 21-40 and TM 5-310.
Section VIII
DEMOLITION
■ 98. General. — a. If an airdrome is liable to capture and if
its possession intact would be of material advantage to the
enemy, plans for its defense must include measures to pre-
vent or delay its use by him. The complete demolition of
an airdrome, however, is a major operation which requires
time and a large amount of explosives. Although instal-
lations and equipment present no unusual problem, the de-
struction of landing areas is difficult. Lack of time may
prevent complete demolition. The following list suggests
priorities and personnel for demolition:
(1) Runways and taxiways — aviation engineers.
(2) Remainder of landing area— aviation engineers.
(3) Routes of communication to the airdrome — engineers.
(4) Construction equipment at the airdrome — aviation
engineers.
71 '
98-99
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
(5) Technical buildings — air force ground troops with
engineer help.
(6) Supplies of gasoline, oil, and bombs — air force ground
troops.
(7) Motor vehicles and unserviceable aircraft — air force
ground troops.
(8) Housing — air force ground troops with engineer help.
b. Accomplishment of the complete list of demolitions
would so effectively destroy the airdrome as to deny its use to
the enemy without an entire rebuilding.
■ 99. Methods. — The methods of carrying out demolition
must be decided on the location, as they will largely depend
on the time available and the type of constructions. Paved
runways present the most difficult problem. They may be
cratered by means of explosives or torn up by mechanical
grubbers. Bangalore torpedoes may be placed when the
occasion arises in holes under the runways made by hori-
zontal drills, or in culverts constructed at a depth of about
30 inches when the runway was built. To .crater a runway
effectively will require rows of charges placed across the run-
way at 5-yard intervals every 100 yards, a task requiring
much time, trained personnel, and a large amount of explo-
sive. Grassed landing areas can be destroyed with moderate
effectiveness by bulldozing or plowing 20-foot bands across
them every 50 yards. Wet weather operation may be im-
peded or prevented if patches of the turf are killed by spray-
ing heavily with engine oil. Booby traps planted in dam-
aged areas, underneath soil and tied to obstructions, will
slow reconstruction. The standard demolition procedures
described in FM 5-25 may be applied to installations and
facilities. If it appears that a well-camouflaged field will
fall into enemy hands without complete or effective demoli-
tion, it should be marked for subsequent bombing by some
readily discernible sign which will be difficult to remove.
Such a mark may be made by plowing, burning, or staining
the runways portion with a cross approximately 100 yards
across.
72
DEFENSE OP AIRDROMES
100-103
CHAPTER 7
PLANS AND TRAINING
Section I. General.
II. Content of plans for local ground defense
III. Training
Paragraphs
.__ 100-104
— _ 105-108
109
Section I
GENERAL
■ 100. Responsibility. — The commanding officer of an air-
drome will make and announce a plan for its defense. He
may delegate the' preparation of the basic plan and the co-
ordination of the plans of specialists (chemical, ordnance,
etc.) to a defense officer.
■ 101. Reconnaissance and Surveys. — To prepare effective
plans, the commanding officer and other personnel must
reconnoiter carefully the airdrome, the surrounding areas,
and routes of movement in the vicinity. A survey must be
made of the facilities, installations, and equipment im-
mediately available, and one of the locality and its inhabit-
ants to determine what facilities and installations are avail-
able to supplement them.
■ 102. Inspections and Tests. — The commanding officer will
provide for the instruction of all personnel in their essential
duties under the defense plans. He will conduct inspections
to insure that the continuous security measures are effective
and will prescribe alerts by day and by night to test the
effectiveness of the various alert plans and the operational
efficiency of the personnel involved.
■ 103. Standing Operating Procedure. — Each unit of the de-
fense will establish appropriate and effective procedure
adapted to operating conditions and conforming to that
established by the airdrome commander. Standing Operat-
73
103-105
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
ing Procedure will be devised to expedite those features of
operations which permit definite or standardized execution
without loss of effectiveness.
■ 104. Liaison With Supporting Units. — Defense plans
should be coordinated with those of all theater reserves which
may be dispatched to assist the local defense. Such prospec-
tive reinforcements should be familiar with the organization
of the ground before they are called in. Range cards, for
example, may be made for field artillery whether the guns are
in the local defense or with supporting units.
Section II
CONTENT OP PLANS FOR LOCAL GROUND DEFENSE
■ 105. General. — All defense plans should contemplate the
immediate defense of the airdrome by means of only existing
facilities, fortifications, weapons, and troops and with little
or no warning. In drawing them up the principles outlined
in FM 101-5 for the preparation of combat orders should be
observed. Each unit should have definite, concise instruc-
tions concerning the responsibilities and duties of its per-
sonnel for each anticipated major contingency. Uniformity
of the parts of the plan is desirable to facilitate coordination
and understanding by personnel transferring or changing
duties within the command. If it is within the capabilities
of the enemy to execute any form of attack or sabotage, a
plan to defeat such attack will be made as soon as the in-
stallation exists. Initially, and in mobile situations, the plan
may be quickly conceived and announced orally. In static
situations, it will be deliberately prepared and written. The
amount of detail contained in a plan varies inversely with
the experience and state of training of the troops who are to
execute it. Whatever their form and extent, such plans
cover the following points:
a. Observation, alarm, and communication system.
b. Day and night recognition signals for friendly aircraft.
c. Camouflage and dispersion.
74
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
105-106
d. Organization of the ground — areas to be defended,
weapon emplacements, fields of fire, obstacles, and obstruc-
tions.
e. Assignment of personnel to assembly areas for combat
or for shelter.
/. Immobilization of vehicles not used by the defenders.
g. Damage control.
h. Defense against chemical attack.
i. Liaison with reserves and all possible supporting forces.
j. Emergency evacuation of aircraft.
k. Demolitions to prevent seizure and use of the airdrome
by hostile forces.
■ 106. Planning. — a. The capabilities of the enemy will be
evaluated and the defense prepared accordingly.
b. Friendly troops in the area will be contacted with a view
to forming a coordinated defense.
c. Care will be taken, in assigning the various units to the
different forces, that units working or living in a sector are
assigned where possible to forces operating in that sector.
d. All personnel (including transients) at a station will be
accounted for in the plan. Provision will be made for the
final use, if necessary, of ail troops in the active defense of the
station.
e. A mobile striking force or forces will be provided for.
/. A reserve force will be provided for, prepared to exploit
any success or to intervene at any threatened point.
g. Care will be taken to specifically designate commanders
for the sectors, the striking forces, the reserve, and other
echelons of the defense force.
h. Each force will prepare the sector allotted to it for op-
erations.
i. Most of the plan can and should be shown on an oper-
ations map.
j. Specialist officers, when available, will be required to
prepare those parts of the plan, particularly annexes, per-
taining to their specialties.
75
106
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
k. Whenever feasible, the plan will be supported by a com-
plete and concise statement of the situation for the benefit
of personnel who might be required to carry out its provisions
without having had an opportunity to make thorough inves-
tigation and reconnaissance of the conditions involved. A
list indicative of the considerations to be covered follows.
It is to be taken as a guide and not as a complete catalog of
all the factors which may exist in any given situation.
(1) Strategic location. (Is the area within range of hostile
attack?)
(2) Surrounding terrain and features of military impor-
tance. (Is the surrounding area open, or is cover available
to permit surveillance or the approach of hostile forces with-
out detection?)
(3) Location with respect to civilian population. (This
item might be favorable or unfavorable. Information should
be included concerning any useful industrial or public devel-
opments and any potential hazards from local hostility.)
(4) Roads and railroads. (Does the surrounding road net
facilitate the advance of hostile ground forces or undetected
surveillance by enemy sympathizers or hostile agents?)
(5) Location with respect to reinforcements. (Include
type and size of reinforcements, availability, communications
facilities, distance, and time intervals involved.)
(6) Area and boundaries. (Do the size and shape of the
airdrome and the locations of its boundaries favor the
defense?)
(7) Location of vital installations. (What are the loca-
tions of the water system, bomb sight storage, supply points,
hangars, motor pool, communications center, etc., and what
are their capabilities for defense?)
(8) Isolated installations. (What installations are located
at a distance from other installations and what provision is
made for their defense?)
(9) Type of construction. (What is the spacing for pro-
tection against Are?)
76
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES 107
■ 107. Outline Model of a Plan. — An outline model of a
deliberately conceived written plan for the defense of a
forward-area airdrome follows: It is to be used only as
a guide for form and content. As no two installations are
exactly alike, the situation and solution presented here should
not be blindly applied. In addition to one fighter squadron,
the presence of one infantry battalion and one battery of
automatic weapons antiaircraft artillery is assumed.
DEFENSE PLAN
(Name of station)
(Date of issue)
ASSIGNMENT OP TROOPS
(As assignments will change because of transfer of units, etc., they
are shown on a separate page of the plan so that it may easily toe
revised and reissued as necessary to keep it up to date.)
A Force — Co. A, 306th Inf Bn, reinforced by such detachments of
the Heavy Weapons Co. and Antitank Platoon, Hq. Co.,
306th Inf Bn, as may be assigned.
50 men from 795th Fighter Sq.
Commander : Company Commander, Co. A, 306th Inf
Bn.
B Force— Co. B, 306th Inf Bn, reinforced by such detachments of
the Heavy Weapons Co. and the Antitank Platoon, Hq.
Co., 306th Inf Bn, as may be assigned.
50 men from 795th Fighter Sq.
Commander: Company Commander, Co. B, 306th
Inf Bn.
C Force — Co. C, 306th Inf Bn.
12 14 -ton trucks and 12 % -ton trailers from' the Heavy
Weapons Co., 306th Inf Bn.
4 iy 2 -ton trucks from Hqs. Co., 306th Inf Bn.
2 1 y 2 -ton trucks from 795th Fighter Sq.
Commander: Company Commander, Co. C, 306th
Inf Bn.
D Force — Battery A, 425th A. A. A. A. W. Bn.
Commander: Battery Commander, Battery A, 425th
A. A. A. A. W. Bn.
E Force — 100 men from 795th Fighter Sq.
Commander: Adjutant, 795th Fighter Sq.
1. a. Enemy capabilities.
(A brief estimate of the situation to indicate the threats the
plan is designed to defeat.)
77
107
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
b. Supporting troops.
(1) This station is within the Subarea,
Area of the Sector. Subsector Hq is
at . Sector Hq. is
at . Command Hq. is
at .
(2) The ground forces in this area are:
at .
at .
, at .
Since their mission is to defend the Subarea,
including this station, assistance may be expected from them
according to developments in the situation.
(3) In order that the action of all forces opposing an enemy
ground attack may be coordinated, the defense forces of this sta-
tion come under the operational control of
(local area military commander) when
(Cite directive, etc.)
(4) AA units in the vicinity are:
at
, — : at
(5) In the event of an attack on this station the afore-men-
tioned forces may be able to intervene at once, later, or not at all.
The personnel of this station will be prepared to undertake the
defense thereof without outside assistance.
2. Mission.
a. All personnel on this station will be prepared to participate
in the active defense thereof, for the purpose of:
(1) Preventing enemy interference with the operation thereof,
(2) Preventing the enemy from taking the station for his own
use or for the purpose of destroying it,
(3) Permitting, if necessary, an orderly evacuation.
b. Initially, designated personnel are assigned to combat forces,
to damage control duties, and to passive defense duties, while
others will carry on their normal operational duties. However,
the tasks of various individuals and groups will be altered in
accordance with developments in the situation.
3. a. A Force will prepare, and when alerted for ground defense,
defend Sector A (Annex 1), including fixed positions and road
blocks. It will provide striking forces for the sector.
b. B Force will prepare, and when alerted for ground defense,
defend Sector B (Annex 1), including fixed positions and road
blocks. It will provide striking forces for the sector.
c. C Force will constitute a mobile reserve striking force, and will
be prepared to move, when ordered, with all possible speed to ex-
ploit success, counterattack, or reinforce threatened points. The
personnel of D Force will remain in position at •
(Annex 1) .
d. D Force will man its automatic weapons continuously from
30 minutes before daylight until 30 minutes after dark, and at
night for 5 days before and after full moon. Primary targets —
78
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
107
enemy aircraft within range. Additional targets — enemy ground
forces.
e. E Force will constitute a general reserve, prepared, on orders,
to reinforce threatened points. It will assemble, when alerted
for ground defense, at by the most expeditious
means available. The MTO will dispatch trucks
to for use by this force (par. 3g) .
f. Remaining unassigned personnel and transients will man
trenches at their places of occupation or quarters when any as-
signed duties cannot be performed.
g. The MTO will, when the ground defense alert is sounded,
dispatch :
trucks to (par. 3e). Remaining vehicles
will be dispersed and immobilized at
(1) The static defense is made up of prepared positions within
the sectors — centers of resistance, machine-gun posts, and fox
holes sited to cover the landing ground and the approaches to
the airdrome (Annex 1).
(2) OP'S 1, 3, and 5 will be manned at all times. Others will
be manned immediately upon the sounding of any alarm. They
will report all enemy air and ground activity.
(3) Airplanes will be so dispersed as to minimize the effect
of air attack on groups of planes.
(4) All personnel will make full use of camouflage and natural
concealment. Permanent installations will be camouflaged to
break their general outlines and make them less apparent targets.
(5) Warning system:
(a) Air raid. The air raid warning, a rising and falling note,
will be sounded upon the station siren. Upon the sounding of
this warning, D Force (par. 3c) will at once man all its positions,
all OP's (par. 3x(2) ) will be manned, and Damage Control (An-
nex 3) and Passive Defense measures (Annex 6) will be taken.
(b) Ground defense. The warning signal for ground defense
will be . when this alert is signaled, all
provisions of this plan relating to repelling an enemy attack on
the ground will be placed into effect immediately.
(6) Night (special provisions to make the plan effective at
night, when personnel are in quarters) .
(7) Arms (instructions for distribution of hand arms so that
an adequate number will be available when and where needed,
day or night) .
4. a. Supply.
(1) Rations and water (instructions for maintenance of emer-
gency supplies of rations and water) .
(2) Ammunition — the following ammunition will be drawn and
maintained in serviceable condition at all times:
(a) Riflemen — 1 full belt.
(&) Thompson submachine gunners — 3 full clips.
(c) Pistol — 3 full clips.
(d) Machine, guns — 600 rounds.
(e) Mortars — rounds.
(/) 40-mm automatic weapons, antiaircraft — rounds.
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107
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
(g) Reserve ammunition at the rate of three times these amounts
will be stored in sectors by force commanders for immediate, issue.
b. Aid stations. (Annex 1.)
5. a. All defended localities, OP's, and machine-gun positions are
connected to Battle Headquarters by field telephone.
CR = CENTERS OF RESISTANCE
9, = AAAA W
Figure 19. — Principal dispositions for defense of a forward-area
airdrome (par. 107).
80
DEFENSE OF AIRDROMES
107-109
b. (1) Command posts. (Annex 1.)
(2) Battle headquarters. A watch will be maintained at battle
headquarters at all times.
Commanding.
Concur :
(Area commander)
ANNEXES :
No. 1. Operations Map.
No. 2. Signal Communications.
No. 3. Damage Control.
No. 4. Chemical Defense.
No 5. Medical.
No. 6. Passive Defense.
No. 7. Evacuation and Demolitions
■ 108. Revision. — Plans will be reviewed periodically and
whenever the conditions on which they were based have
changed.
Section III
TRAINING
■ 109. General. — Plans alone are not sufficient. Their exe-
cution in an emergency must be insured by an intensive
training program which provides for their frequent rehearsal
and the working out of small problems that will arise from
them. Indoctrination of troops should be so thorough that
they will carry on with correct procedures under their own
initiative.
Exercises can take the general form of- —
o. A map exercise, including an enemy appreciation of the
best way of capturing the airdrome.
b. Exercises with the troops to test out —
(1) Arrangements for command.
(2) Communications.
(3) Fire plan.
(4) Arrangements for relief.
(5) Smooth execution of procedures.
c. The exercises should include attack by airplanes, repre-
sentation of the dropping of parachute troops, and, if possible,
the actual landing of airborne troops. It is essential that
81
109
ARMY AIR FORCES FIELD MANUAL
troops at the various installations be practiced in the bold,
offensive action needed to defeat parachute and air-landing
troops. Small problems which require immediate coordi-
nated action for their solution should be devised and executed
on the ground. There is no reason why the defense of an
airdrome should lack cunning, field craft, and deception.
Troops must be trained by day and by night to take ad-
vantage of every fold in the ground and every bush and
every scrap of cover and drilled in methods of silent ap-
proach. Rehearsals must not become routine.
82
INDEX
Paragraph Page
Active defense 35-62 21
Antiaircraft defense 45-51 40
Employment 55-62 47
Ground defense organization 36-44- 28
Personnel 52-54 45
Aerial attack:
Bombardment and strafing 10-12 7
Chemical 21-22 17
Harassing 11 7
In force 12 9
Airborne attack .__ 13-20 9
Air-landing troops 19 14
Fifth-column activity 15 10
Glider troops 18 14
Parachute troops 17 10
Preliminary bombardment 16 10
Reconnaissance before 14 9
Airborne troops, action against 61 48
Aircraft 69 59
Cover 69 59
Dispersion 64 57
Gas attack protection 90 67
Airdrome and squadron personnel 25 22
Airdrome, definition 3 2
Air guards, local 50 45
Air-landing troops, airborne attack 19 14
Alarm systems 78-81 64
Communications 80 64
Local 78 64
Sentinels and observation posts 79 64
Warning signals 81 65
Alertness in ground defense 57 48
All-around defense, ground 37 28
Alternate positions, ground defense 37 28
Antiaircraft :
Artillery 45-51 40
Units 28 23
Defense 45-51 40
Air guards 50 45
Automatic weapons 48 40
Fire restrictions 49 44
Forward-area airdromes 48 40
Mission 47 40
Small-arms fire 51 45
Antimechanized obstacles 76 63
Antitank weapons 41 35
Armored vehicles 43 33
Artillery units, antiaircraft 28 23
83
INDEX
Paragraph Page
Assigned infantry
Attack on airdromes, forms
Automatic weapons, defense
Aviation engineers
Bangalore torpedoes
Bombardment:
Minimizing effects
Prior to airborne attacks
Camouflage
Centers of ground resistance
Chemical attack:
Chemical warfare:
Defense center
Units
Gas discipline
Objectives
Protection by —
Dispersion
Gasproofing
Protection of —
Aircraft
Defense installations
Explosives and inflammable stores
Personnel
Repair and maintenance facilities
Runways and landing areas
Protection plans
References
Command posts, ground
Commander, airdrome, responsibilities
Communications
Cover
Aircraft
Personnel
Reference
Stores and equipment
Damage control
Officer
Plans and coordination
Repairs after attack
Decontamination stations
Defense :
Active, basic principles
Against sabotage. (See Sabotage, defense
against.)
Antiaircraft. (See Antiaircraft defense.)
Center, chemical warfare ^
Employment.. (See Employment of defense.)
Ground, depth
Installations, protection against gas attack
84
26
22
6-22
5
47
40
27
22
99
72
56
47
16
10
72-73
61
39
30
95
71
29
24
86
66
21
17
87
66
88
67
90
67
94
70
91
68
93
Do
92
68
89
67
96
71
97
71
39
30
4, 5
3, 4
44-80
39
68-71
59
69
59
68
59
71
60
70
59
82-84
65
84
66
83
66
84
66
93
68
35
27
95
71
37
28
94
70
INDEX
Defense — Continued. Paragraph Page
Officer 5 4
Passive. (See Passive defense.)
Plans :
Gas attack 96 71
How to make 106 75
Model :
Content 105 74
Outline 107 77
Preliminary work 100-103 73
Revision 108 81
Positions, ground, types 39 30
Responsibility ^ 4 3
Troops. (See Troops for defense.) '
Definitions 3 2
Delaying action in ground defense 62 56
Demolition " 98, 99 71, 72
Depth defense, ground 37 28
Discipline, gas 86 66
Dispersion :
Gas attack 87 66
Of aircraft 64 57
Of housing 65 58
Of installations 65 58
Of stores 66 58
References 67 58
Employment of defense:
Airborne troops, action 61 48
Alertness 57 48
Bombardment, minimizing effect 56 47
Delaying action 62 56
Motor vehicle immobilization 60 48
Observation system 58 48
Patrol of outlying areas 1 59 48
Engineers, aviation 27 22
Equipment, cover. 70 59
Explosives, protection against gas attack 91 68
Field artillery 41 35
Fifth-column activity prior to airborne attack 14 9
First . aid, gas cases .__ 93 68
Fixed defense personnel, active defense 53 46
Fortifications 40 33
Forward-area airdromes, AA defense 48 40
Fox holes 40 33
Gas:
Alarm system 93 68
Attack, protection against. (See Chemical
attack protection.)
Discipline 86 66
85
INDEX
Gas — Continued. Paragraph Page
Sentries 93 68
Shelters 93 68
Gasprooflng, protection by 88 67
General advance 9 7
Glider troops. (See Airborne attack.)
Ground attack:
General advance 9 7
Overland raids. 8 6
Ground defense 35-44 27
Area 36 28
Communications 44 39
Fortifications 40 33
Local, definition 3 2
Local security 42 38
Mobile 43 38
Principles of organization 37 28
Reconnaissance 38 29
Types of defense positions 39 30
Weapons 41 35
Harassing attack, aerial 11 7
Housing, dispersion 65 58
Immobilization of motor vehicles 60 48
Infantry, assigned 26 . 22
Inflammable stores, protection against" chemical
attack 91 68
Installations, dispersion 65 58
Intelligence officer, responsibility 5 4
Landing area:
Obstructions 75 62
Protection against chemical attack 89 67
Local :
Alarm system 78 64
Defense, definition 3 2
Security 41 35
Machine guns 41 35
Maintenance facilities, protection against chemical
attack 92 68
Mechanized raids 8 6
Military police 30 24
Mission, antiaircraft artillery defense 47 40
Mobile defense 43 38
Mortars 41 35
Motor vehicles, immobilization 60 48
Observation:
Posts 79 64
System for ground defense 58 48
86
INDEX
Paragraph Page
Obstacles 40 33
Against sabotage 33 26
Antimechanized 76 63
Landing area 75 62
Personnel 77 63
Organization for ground defense 37 28
Outlying areas, patrol 59 48
Overland raids 8 6
Parachute troops, airborne attack 17 10
Passive defense:
Alarm systems 78-81 64
Camouflage 72-73 61
Cover 68-71 59
Damage control 82-84 65
Demolition 98, 99 71, 72
Dispersion 63-67 57
Obstacles 74-77 62
Protection against chemical attack 85-97 66
Patrol of outlying areas 59 48
Personnel :
Active defense 52 45
Barriers 77 63
Cover 66 59
Fixed defenses 53 46
Protection against gas attack 93 68
Striking forces and reserves 54 46
Pillboxes 40 33
Plans for defense:
Content 105 74
Inspection and tests 102 73
Liaison 104 74
Operation procedure 103 73
Plan, model outline ' 107 77
Planning 106 75
Reconnaissance 101 73
Responsibility 100' 73
Revision 108 81
Surveys 101 73
Reconnaissance :
Before airborne attack 13 9
Ground defense 38 29
Repairs :
After attack 84 66
Facilities, protection against chemical attack- _ 92 68
Reserves :
Active defense 54 46
Striking force 43 38
Responsibility 4 3
Runways, protection against chemical attack 89 67
87
INDEX
Paragraph Page
Sabotage 7 5
Defense against —
Continuity of menace 31 25
Material obstacles 33 26
Reference 34 26
Vigilance 32 25
Menace, continuity 33 26
Safety, ground defense 37 28
Sector defense, ground 1 37 28
Security:
Definition 3 2
Local 42 38
Sentinels and observation posts 79 64
Signals, warning 81 65
Small-arms fire, defense with 51 45
Squadron personnel 25 22
Stores and equipment:
Cover 70 59
Dispersion 66 58
Strafing 10 7
Striking force, personnel, active defense 54 46
Striking forces 43 38
Supplementary positions, ground defense 39 30
Training for defense 23-30 19
Troops for defense:
Airdrome and squadron personnel 25 22
Antiaircraft artillery units 28 23
Assigned infantry 26 22
Assignment, limiting factors 23 19
Aviation engineers 27 22
Chemical warfare units 29 24
Military police 30 24
Troops available 24 21
Vigilance against sabotage 32 25
Warning:
Signals 81 65
Signs, gas 93 68
Weapons, ground defense 41 35
o
88