Document text
Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)
FM 90-10
Headquarters
Department of Army
Washington, DC, 15 August 1979
FM 90-10
Military Operations
on Urbanized Terrain
(MOUT)
Table of Contents
CHAPTER 1... INTRODUCTION
Urbanization
Characteristics of Urban Warfare
CHAPTER 2... OFFENSE
How the Enemy Defends
Planning the Attack
The Offensive Battle
Corps
Division
Brigade
Battalion Task Force
CHAPTER 3... DEFENSE. How the Enemy Attacks
Planning the Defense
The Defensive Battle
Corps
Division
Brigade
Battalion Task Force
CHAPTER 4... COMBAT SUPPORT
Field Artillery
Engineer
Army Aviation
Tactical Air
Air Defense
Military Police
Chemical
Communications
CHAPTER 5... COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Support Organization
Logistical Functions
Noncombatants
Civil Affairs Operations
Refugee Control
APPENDIX A... Urban Terrain Analysis
APPENDIX B... Weapons Effects And Employment
APPENDIX C... How To Select And Prepare Defensive Positions In Built Up Areas
APPENDIX D... Employment Of Obstacles And Mines In Built Up Areas
APPENDIX E... Demolitions. APPENDIX F... Armored Forces In Built Up Area
APPENDIX G... How To Attack And Clear Building
APPENDIX H... References And International Agreements.
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Tactical doctrine stresses that urban combat operations are conducted only when required and
that built-up areas are isolated and bypassed rather than risking a costly, time-consuming
operation in this difficult environment. Adherence to these precepts, though valid, is becoming
increasingly difficult as urban sprawl changes the face of the battlefield. The acronym MOUT
(Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain) classifies those military actions planned and
conducted on a terrain complex where manmade construction impacts on the tactical options
available to commanders. Commanders must treat the elements of urban sprawl as terrain and
know how this terrain affects the capabilities of their units and weapons. They must understand
the advantages and disadvantages urbanization offers and its effects on tactical operations.
Urban combat operations may be conducted in order to capitalize on the strategic or tactical
advantages which possession or control of a particular urban area gives or to deny these
advantages to the enemy.
Major urban areas represent the power and wealth of a particular country in the form of
industrial bases, transportation complexes, economic institutions, and political and cultural
centers. The denial or capture of these centers may yield decisive psychological advantages that
frequently determine the success or failure of the larger conflict. Villages and small towns will
often be caught up in the battle because of their proximity to major avenues of approach or
because they are astride lines of communications that are vital to sustaining ground combat
operations.
During offensive operations, commanders must seek to achieve a favorable mobility differential
over the defender, to retain momentum, and to avoid a protracted and costly urban battle.
Built-up areas are obstacles to maneuver; hence, isolation and bypass, which neutralize their
value to the defender, are the goals of urban offensive operations.
Conversely, the defender must seek to integrate the elements of urban sprawl into his defensive
scheme to slow, block, or canalize the attacker and enhance weapon effectiveness.
The attack or defense of a built-up area should be undertaken only when significant tactical or
strategic advantage accrues through its seizure or control.
Urbanization is a complex, multifaceted process influenced by many factors including a nation's
cultural development, its economic resources, and its industrial capacity. Although its form
varies from region to region, urbanization is characterized by a general pattern of changes in
land usage and the spread of manmade features across natural terrain.
Tactical terrain analysis has traditionally considered some elements of the urban environment
such as the allocation of land to agriculture or forestry and the distribution of railway or road
networks. However, the focus has been on natural terrain elements. In Europe and other
urbanized areas of the world, increased awareness of the effects of manmade features on the
overall tactical scheme is necessary. How urban terrain elements impact on operations is an
important consideration in determining our tactical options.
For the small-unit tactical commander, the physical layout of a buildup area and structural
characteristics of its buildings are critical planning considerations. Appendix A provides a
detailed discussion of these factors and the combat characteristics of various types of built-up
areas for offensive and defensive operations. For commanders at battalion level and above, the
size of a built-up area, the support network of lines of communication, and the urban pattern
formed by a complex of built-up areas assume added importance.
BUILT-UP AREAS
The following discussion uses the central European setting to describe these aspects of urbanizatioi
With minor modifications, it is applicable to other urban areas throughout the world.
A built-up area is a concentration of structures, facilities, and population which form the economic
and cultural focus for the surrounding area. There are four categories:
Large Cities
(Population Greater than 100,000.)
Most typical of the urbanization process is the increasing number of large and still- growing large
cities. In Europe, other than the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), there are approximate
375 cities with populations in excess of 100,000. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has 49
cities with populations exceeding 100,000 and 4 cities of over 1 million. Large cities frequently forn
the core of a larger, densely populated urban complex consisting of the city, its suburban areas, am
small towns. Such complexes have the appearance of a single, large, and continuous city containing
millions of people and occupying vast areas of land. The illustration on the following page depicts
major complexes that exist in FRG. The Rhine-Ruhr complex stretches west to Aachen and south t
Bonn and contains over 12.5 million people concentrated in 13,000 square kilometers. The Rhine-
Main complex includes Frankfurt Darmstadt, Mainz, Mannheim, and Karlsruhe; it contains over f
million people in 7,000 square kilometers. To the southeast, greater Stuttgart (2 million people in
3,000 square kilometers) will soon merge with Rhine-Main. These urban centers encompass 10
percent of FRG's total land area and approximately one-half of its total population.
Towns and Small Cities
(3,000 - 100,000.)
Within the FRG there are approximately 235 small cities/towns with populations from 3,000 -
100,000. In many cases these areas are located along major lines of communications and situated
in river valleys. Similar to larger cities, these areas are continuing to expand and will eventually
form new combinations or merge with existing ones.
Villages.
(Less than 3,000.)
In the FRG there are approximately 21,000 built-up areas with populations of less than 3,000. In
most cases these villages are agriculturally oriented and are usually distributed among the more
open cultivated areas of Germany. In the average brigade sector in the FRG there are 25 of these
villages. The average distance between them is only 3.5 kilometers.
Strip Areas
These built-up areas generally form connecting links between villages and towns. They are also
found along lines of communications leading to larger complexes. Although the size and population
of strip areas vary, they normally assume a long thin linear pattern.
Major Urban Complexes
HAMBURG
Bf«£MEN
HANNOVER
DAHMSTAOT
STUTTGART
AUGSBURG
Figure 1-3. Major Urban Complexes.
BUILDING AND STREET PATTERNS
The physical layout of built-up areas is of tactical significance. Five basic building and street pattei
which impact on fire support and maneuver schemes recur throughout western Europe. Appendix
provides a detailed analysis of the tactical implications of each pattern. For ease of reference, they
have been identified by form and assigned a letter designation. The following table briefly
summarizes the general characteristics of each pattern.
TYPE GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
A. Dense, Random Construction Typical old inner city
construction with narrow winding streets radiating in an
irregular manner from a central area. Found within cities,
towns, and villages. Buildings are located close together
and frequently along the edge of roadways.
B. Closed-orderly Block Common to central areas of towns
and cities. Wider streets forming generally rectangular
patterns with buildings frequently forming a continuous fron
along a block. Inner block courtyards are common.
C. Dispersed Residential Area Normally contiguous to Type B
areas. Consists of row houses or single dwellings with yards
gardens, trees, and fences. Street pattern is normally
rectangular or curving.
D. High-rise Area Typical of modern construction in
larger towns or cities. Consists of multi apartments,
separated large open areas and one-story buildings.
Wide streets are laid out in rectangular patterns.
E. Industrial /Transportation Older complexes may be found
within Type A and B areas. New construction normally
consists of low, flat-roofed factory and warehouse
buildings . Generally located on or along the major rail
and highway routes of the urban complex.
LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOC)
A vast network of modern highways, all-weather roads, railroads, and canals connect the FRG's
built-up areas. These LOCs permit rapid access to virtually all areas in western Europe. Areas
formerly considered to be terrain-restrictive for movement can now be rapidly traversed. Modern
four-lane highways, capable of accommodating thousands of heavy vehicles, crisscross NATO-
Europe. Frequently, these highways bypass the larger cities, or at least avoid the congested centers
most built-up areas. There is a limitation, however, inherent in these lines of communication. They
are often built across terrain that is relatively impracticable for vehicular traffic movement, and ai
heavily dependent on a system of bridges, ramps, and overpasses. If these systems can be destroyed
the LOCs may then become virtually useless and an obstacle in themselves.
URBAN PATTERNS
The combination of built-up areas, lines of communication, and natural terrain results in the formation of
basic urban patterns that impact on tactical operations.
Hub Phenomenon
Central to any urban pattern is the hub or built-up area. Although it may vary in size from village to major
urban complex, the effects of a hub remain constant. For the defender, the hub may serve as the pivot or
anchor of his defense or as an element of a defense in depth. As shown, the hub is an obstacle which
blocks the attacker's advance. Where adjacent natural terrain permits, a hub will normally be bypassed.
Figure 1-6. Hub Phenomenon.
This requires a change in direction of advance and may reduce offensive momentum and cohesion. As the
attacker slides off the leading edge of the hub and begins his bypass operation, his vulnerability to flank
attacks and ambushes along the new axis of advance increases.
Where adjacent natural terrain is unsuitable for mounted operations, the hub may be developed as
a defensive strongpoint. The decision to attack will require significant forces and could result in time
consuming, intensive close combat in the built-up area.
Satellite Pattern
This is a common pattern with its central hub and relatively dependent, dispersed, smaller built-up areas.
It is typical of the village-town-small city pattern found within a brigade or perhaps division sector. Lines
of communication tend to focus on the central hub, with most taking the form of farm and forest or
secondary roads. Seldom will more than one major communications route pass through the central hub of
the satellite pattern. The natural terrain and cultivated portions throughout the area are relatively
homogeneous. Operations on urbanized terrain find built-in mutual support in this pattern. Outlying or
satellite urban centers support the principal urban area at the hub by providing:
Re supply and evacuation routes for the defender.
Reinforcement routes for the defender; avenues of approach for the attacker.
Mutually supporting battle positions for the defender.
Multiple exit links from the hub for the attacker.
Satellite Pattern
Figure 1-7. Satellite Pattern.
Network Pattern
Similar in initial appearance to the satellite pattern, the network is vastly more complex and diverse. It
represents the interlocking of the primary hubs of subordinate satellite patterns and most often occurs at
division or higher levels. Formed primarily of towns and cities, its elements are more self-sufficient and
less supportive of each other, although a dominant hub may exist. Major lines of communication within a
network are more extensive than in a satellite pattern and take a rectangular rather than convergent form.
The natural terrain within a network may be more varied than that contained in a single satellite array.
The tactical effects on offensive operations are: to cause delay, in that attacking units must fight their way
through a maze of manmade features that provide defensive obstacles; and, to make bypass difficult
because natural contiguous terrain frequently is impracticable for mounted operations (e.g., steep slopes,
rivers, and heavily forested areas). This pattern provides depth to the defense.
Network Pattern
Figure 1-8. Network Pattern
Linear Pattern
A sub-element of the basic geometric patterns, the linear array may form one ray of the satellite pattern or
be found along connecting links between the hubs of a network. Most frequently, the linear array results
from the stringing of minor hubs along a confined natural terrain corridor such as an-elongated valley
approach. It may also occur along the banks of a water course or manmade communications route. To the
defender, this pattern facilitates the development of a series of strong defensive positions in depth. To the
attacker, it presents a series of decision points, delaying his canalized forces and requiring repetitive
deliberate attacks. This pattern is frequently found within a battalion zone of responsibility, although it
may extend in width and depth throughout a brigade area.
Segment or Pie Slice Pattern
This pattern may occur as a subset of either the satellite of network patterns or within a major hub. It is
characterized by the splitting of an urban area by dominant natural terrain such as a river or by manmade
features such as roads, railways, and canals. When such a division of other patterns occurs, it may
influence the assignment of boundaries and other control measures or attack objectives. It may also bear
directly on the organization of the terrain and task organizations. This pattern may be detected on urban
terrain at any level of command.
PATTERN EFFECTS
In addition to the basic blocking action which may be caused by the hub phenomenon, other effects can
be associated with these patterns.
The Funnel-Fan Effect
This effect normally occurs at battalion or brigade level when a hub is located between terrain features
that are unsuitable for mounted operations. Passage of units into the area results in the concentration of
forces, a loss of momentum, and canalization. Beyond the hub, forces are required to spread or fan out
before full combat power can again be developed. In each case this effect favors defense and hinders
offense. It causes an accordion action in units moving through the hub, with increased difficulties in
command and control and reduced operating effectiveness. A similar effect on maneuver takes place
when the attacker must penetrate an urban network on a narrow front between hubs.
The Funnel Effect
Funnelling or concentration and canalization of forces may occur without the immediate fanning. Again,
this effect most frequently occurs at battalion or brigade level when a linear pattern is encountered. It
favors the defender by limiting the number of maneuver elements that may be applied against a series of
hubs that must be confronted in succession. Greater reliance must be placed by the attacker on indirect
and long-range weapon systems. At the same time, it reduces maneuver options available to the defender
and routes available for his combat service support elements.
Segment or Pie Slice Pattern
Figure l-9a . Segment or Pie Slice Pattern
Funnel-Fan Effect
Figure l-9b Funnel-Fan Effects
TACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Urbanization is gradually changing the face of the battlefield. Traditional avenues of approach are being
blocked and narrowed by manmade features. Urban areas are growing along lines of communications and
expanding across the adjacent terrain. This trend is resulting in the concentration of built-up areas and
road networks along natural corridors bounded by forests, slopes, marshes, and bodies of water.
The following example illustrates an effect of this process on military operations on urbanized terrain:
The Meiningen Corridor is a broad, high-speed approach permitting armor forces some freedom to
maneuver. Throughout the corridor, however, there are a number of villages and towns flanked by
restrictive terrain. To the defender, this corridor offers an in-depth system of instant battle positions in the
succession of villages spaced from 2 to 4 kilometers apart. Mutual support can be achieved throughout
this corridor by integrating village battle positions with adjacent natural terrain obstacles and positions.
To an attacker, the corridor's urban features represent a series of manmade obstacles. Advancing forces
that attempt to bypass individual villages and towns are susceptible to flank attacks. The attacker may be
required to conduct frequent combined arms attacks which greatly reduce offensive momentum and
increase battle losses.
CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN WARFARE
Some general characteristics of military operations on urbanized terrain apply to both offensive and
defensive, operations. Although they are discussed in subsequent chapters, they are presented here in
capsule form because of their importance to an understanding of urban warfare.
The decision to attack or defend an urban complex can result in massive damage and destruction.
Constraints on flrepower to insure minimum collateral damage within its built-up areas can be expected.
Combat operations may be hampered by the presence of civilians in the battle area. Concern for their
safety can seriously restrict the combat options open to the commander. The necessity to provide life
support and other essential services to civilians can siphon off a substantial amount of military resources
and manpower. A hostile population may also impose a serious security problem. Success may well be
measured by how we accomplish our mission while minimizing destruction of buildings and alienation of
the population. On the urban battlefield, advantages and disadvantages in the areas of mobility, cover, and
observation tend to even out for attacker and defender. Initially, however, the defender has a significant
tactical advantage over the attacker because of his knowledge of the terrain.
Unlike deserts, forests, and jungles which confront the commander with a limited variety of fairly
uniform, recurring terrain features, the urban battlefield is composed of an ever-changing mix of natural
and manmade features. Frequently, commanders of larger forces will have units fighting on open terrain,
on terrain within built-up areas, and on a complex where these two distinct terrain forms merge.
Urban sprawl expands the scope of the commander's terrain analysis and influences the organization and
positioning of forces, weapons employment, and maneuver. The dominant role of armor and mechanized
infantry on open terrain is balanced by the requirement to fight in that portion of the urban environment
which favors the employment of infantry supported by other arms. Manmade features dispersed in
varying densities provide increased cover and concealment while frequently restricting observation and
fields of fire. These features are also obstacles to maneuver and are to be avoided by an attacker and used
by the defender.
Urbanized terrain normally offers numerous avenues of approach for mounted maneuver well forward of
and leading to urban areas. In the proximity of its built-up areas, however, such routes generally become
convergent and restrictive. Bypass may be blocked by urban sprawl and the nature of adjacent natural
terrain. Avenues of approach within built-up areas are determined by street patterns, building
arrangements, open areas, and underground systems. Mounted forces are restricted to streets, alleys, and
open areas between buildings. Dismounted forces maximize available cover by moving through buildings
and underground systems, along edges of streets, and over roofs .Fighting within a built-up area is
characterized by a three-dimensional battle. In addition to fighting the enemy at street level, fighting may al
be conducted on roofs and in the upper stories of buildings and below street level in sewer systems, subways
and other underground structures. Assets and resources may be required to deny, retain, secure, or monitoi
each dimension. It cannot be assumed that the enemy is not there.
Weapons employment and target-acquisition ranges are greatly reduced by urban features. On the
approaches to urban areas, visibility frequently extends to less than 1200 meters. Within built-up areas,
targets will generally be exposed for brief periods, frequently at ranges of less than 100 meters. These
limitations induce close, violent combat between opposing forces, placing great reliance on automatic
weapons, rocket launchers, hand grenades, and hand-emplaced high explosives.
Urban features also increase the difficulty of maintaining effective communications. Tactical radios, the
backbone of command and control networks, will be extremely range-limited within built-up areas.
Operating from, within, or through urban areas isolates and separates units. Frequently, operations are
reduced to a series of small-unit battles. Greater dependence is placed on the individual soldier's and
small-unit leader's initiative, skill, and fortitude.
In possibly no other form of combat are the pressures of battle more intense. Continuous close combat,
high casualties, the fleeting nature of targets, and flres from a frequently unseen enemy produce severe
psychological strain and physical fatigue particularly among small-unit leaders and soldiers.
In combination, the general characteristics of urban warfare make it more difficult to apply basic tactical
fundamentals and maintain control. Military operations on urbanized terrain require detailed planning thai
provides for decentralized execution.
SUMMARY
Urbanization impacts on military operations by adding the element of urban sprawl to the existing terrain
complex. It does not change basic tactical doctrine, but requires that commanders understand how these
elements may affect the capabilities of their units and weapons.
Built-up areas must be treated as terrain factors during the planning for and conduct of all military
operations on urbanized terrain. Those providing tactical or strategic advantages to a defender will be
integrated into his overall defensive scheme. Regardless of their size or configuration, built-up areas are
obstacles to maneuver along the lines of communication or route of advance for at least one portion of an
attacking force. Their value as an obstacle should be neutralized by isolation and bypass whenever
feasible. Built-up areas should be attacked only when no other alternative is available.
CHAPTER 2
Offense
Man made features on the urbanized battlefield influence olTensive operations at each level of command.
To the battlefield commander, a single built-up area may be the dominant terrain feature in his assigned
zone of responsibility and may limit alternative courses of action and dictate the nature of combat to be
waged. To the brigade and higher commanders, the elements of urban sprawl are factors to be evaluated
throughout the decision process.
Units operating on urbanized terrain may conduct or participate in a movement to contact, an exploitation
or pursuit, and hasty and deliberate attacks. Although urbanization affects all offensive operations, its
greatest influence is felt during the attack.
This chapter summarizes Threat force doctrine for the defense of built-up areas, describes US planning
considerations for urban offensive operations, and provides examples of how the offensive battle may be
conducted.
HOW THE ENEMY DEFENDS
This section describes why and where the enemy defends and examines those aspects of his defense that
are different from our own. It covers the organization, planning, and conduct of the defense to include his
use of the combined arms in the defense. The enemy recognizes the political and military importance of
the urbanization phenomenon. Threat commanders realize the importance of not only defending built-up
areas, but also of incorporating them into the overall defensive plan. The enemy always attempts to
establish his defense well forward of an urban area in order to engage and defeat the attacker on the
approaches to and flanks of the built-up area.
The enemy reverts to the conduct of defense within a built-up area only when:
Attacking forces break through defenses organized on the approaches and threaten the built-up
area proper.
The built-up area has especially great political, strategic, or economic importance.
It is necessary to defend a built-up area which is a seaport or other critical communication/transportation
complex.
ORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSE
The categories of built-up areas contained in Threat literature differ slightly from those described in
chapter 1 and provide guidelines for the organization of his defense. Smaller towns and villages of rural
areas are incorporated into his defense as strong points in accordance with standard defensive doctrine. It
is only for those operations conducted in the more populated urban- areas that modified techniques are
described. The following figure shows how the Threat classifies built-up areas by population and estimated
perimeter.
Classification of Built Up Areas
POPULATION SIZE ESTIMATED CLASSIFICATION PERIMETER
100,000+ Large 25 kms
50,000 to 100,000 Average 15 kms to 25 kms
> 50, 000 Small 15 kms
In order to provide commanders sufficient room to maneuver, urban areas are normally included as part
of a larger defensive zone. The tactics and weapon systems used are dependent on the characteristics of
the central built-up area and the terrain adjacent to it. The key defensive concept is to draw the attacking
force into preplanned kill zones and destroy them.
The task of defending an urban area is normally allocated to a motorized rifle division (MRD). The MRD
deliberate defense is organized with a security zone and a main defensive belt. Mutually supporting
strong points are echelon in depth. Natural and manmade obstacles, as well as the smaller built-up areas
are incorporated in the defense to impede the advance of the attacking forces and to canalize them.
The figure on the following page illustrates the basic organization of the terrain when the defense of a
built-up area is required. The specific frontages and depths of the defending forces are determined by the
complexity of the urban terrain, the enemy, and the forces and fire support available to the defender.
Security Zone
The role of the security zone is not changed on the urban battlefield. Forces are organized to halt or delay
the attacker and cause him to deploy early. A motorized rifle division will normally employ its
second-echelon motorized rifle regiment (MRR) in this zone which may extend up to 30 km forward of
the main defensive belt. The task of deceiving the attacker as to the location of the main defenses is aided
by the restrictive nature of the urban terrain and the presence of small built-up areas which may be
integrated into the defensive scheme. The battle in the security zone is fought by motorized rifle
companies reinforced with AT weapons, artillery, tanks, and engineers.
Main Defensive Belt
This zone, which may extend up to 15 km in depth, is the backbone of the defense. It is normally
organized in two echelons with the built-up area located within the second echelon.
Forces in the first echelon will normally consist of two MRRs deployed across a zone 20 to 30 km wide.
Each MRR will deploy security elements forward of this zone to slow and canalize the attack force. The
mission of the first echelon is to defeat the attack forward of the built-up area. A strongpoint defense
integrating urban features and frequent local counterattacks is employed to destroy or repulse the
attacker. The first-echelon MRRs will have designated secondary positions on the flanks of and within
the built-up areas.
MRD DELIBERATE DEFENSE
Figure 2-3. MRD DELIBERATE DEFENSE
Following withdrawal of forces from the security zone, the second echelon MRR will prepare defensive
positions within the built-up area for itself and the first-echelon MRRs. The medium tank regiment will
be retained under division control and deployed primarily on the flanks of the built-up area. Elements of
this regiment will normally be used to reinforce the first-echelon MRR on the main avenue of approach,
ff it is necessary to defend within the built-up area, only a small portion of the available force is used to
hold its central area. The MRRs of the division establish their defensive positions on the approaches to
the built-up area whenever possible. Since it is unlikely that lengthy preparation time for such operations
will be available, the initial defense may be organized based on a detailed map study with only limited
personal reconnaissance at the lower levels of command. The layout of the built-up area, the type of
structures available, the time of the year, and the climate are important considerations in the planning of
the defense. The defensive battle in the main defensive belt is a combined arms battle fought by the motoriz«
rifle battalion.
COMBINED ARMS UN THE DEFENSE OF A BUILT-UP ARE)
Motorized Rifle Battalion (MRB)
Enemy doctrine for the defense of built-up areas emphasizes the importance of the combined arms
concept. Motorized rifle units provide the basic element of his urban combat force structure.
The enemy MRR is the most effective unit for combat in the built-up area because of its inherent
mobility, armor protection, and rapid capability to adapt buildings and other structures for defense or as
shelters against the effects of nuclear weapons. It coordinates closely with units from other arms, some of
which will attach elements, and others of which will be placed in will be reinforced by other branches
depending on the requirements and conditions expected in various parts of the built-up area.
As a rule the MRB defends as part of the larger, regimental-size unit. It may defend on a main or a
secondary avenue of approach and/or be in the first or second echelon or in the reserve.
ff the attack penetrates, the MRB must inflict maximum losses, stop further forward movement, and
create favorable conditions for the second echelon or regimental reserve to counterattack.
A MRB on the main avenue of approach and in the first echelon:
Receives the main attack of attacking forces.
Inflicts decisive damage on the assaulting forces to prevent a breakthrough by tanks and infantry.
.■■■■■ ^■;.■ 1 ' «; ;;•■■. ly. i^fif'i'i'i
Figure 2-4. Secondary Avenue of Approach
The MRB in the first echelon covers a narrower front and receives greater reinforcements than one in the
second echelon. It will be supported by most of the artillery of the next higher command.
A MRB in the second echelon or on a secondary avenue of approach:
Prevents flanking/rear maneuvers.
Holds defended sites and prevents further advances by an attacker that has penetrated the built-up
area.
Conducts counterattacks to restore positions of the battalions in the first echelon.
MRB defenses are generally organized in two echelons to provide greater depth and reserves. Company
Strong points are prepared for perimeter defense and constitute the basis of the battalion defensive
position. The reserve is located in a separate strong-point. Ambush locations are established in the gaps
between strong points. Numerous firing positions for mortars, artillery, and antitank weapons are
designated. The rear service area is selected to capitalize on the cover and concealment afforded by the
built up area. Dummy strong points are constructed to deceive the attacker. Positions for securing and
defending entrances/exits to underground structures and routes of communications are established.
Combat security positions are prepared in front of the defensive position of a first-echelon battalion.
The Reserve:
Reinforces/replaces battalions in the first echelon.
Covers breaches caused by enemy nuclear weapons.
Holds sites deep within the defensive positions whose retention is vital to the overall defense.
Extinguishes or contains fires that endanger friendly forces or limit their operations.
Conducts rear area security and defeats air-landed forces that are inserted in the rear.
Battalion Defensive Area
mmi^a^mmmm
Figure 2-5. Battalion Defensive Area
Within a built-up area, a company may defend with mutually supporting fires several buildings prepared
for perimeter defense. Each platoon defends one or two buildings within a company strongpoint or a
floor of a large building that is defended by a company.
Strong points constitute the basis of each defensive position. They are usually prepared in solidly
constructed buildings located at intersections, entrances to public squares and parks, or adjacent to
bridges, and with observation and prepared fields of fire appropriate to the weapons available. Fires are
coordinated between strong points. They offer personnel protection against weapons of mass destruction.
Communication trenches are prepared within strong-points. In addition, ambushes are set up in the gaps
between positions, and wooden structures or other buildings which hinder fields of fire are razed.
Fire planning for infantry weapons requires a combination of flanking, interlocking, and layered fires of
all types. Weapons are emplaced to provide fires on the approaches to a defensive area, on the flanks,
and in the battalion rear. Fires are tied in with artificial and natural obstacles to cover open areas
completely.
Particular attention is paid to antitank fire planning within the built-up area. The enemy recognizes that
there will be limited opportunities to place elTective fires on the tanks within the city; therefore, weapon
positions are carefully selected. Ambushes are prepared along main avenues of armor advance.
Tanks are routinely attached to a MRB for employment in ambushes or to reinforce antitank
defenses. They may operate as "roving guns" or be positioned in strongpoints; and, they may be
used in ambushes where they are employed primarily against attacking tanks and along expected
routes of the main attack.
Artillery carries out most of its missions by firing by direct lay. Artillery units are regularly
attached to maneuver companies and platoons.
Mortars of all caliber's, with their high-angle fires, ease of transportability, and high rate of fire, are
considered to be highly effective in built-up areas.
Chemical defense elements may be attached to the MRB. They perform radiological and chemical
reconnaissance in order to detect the effects of NBC weapons employed by the attacker and to
determine the degree and limits of contamination.
Smoke agents are used extensively to conceal the maneuver of men and weapon systems between
Strong points, defensive areas, and separate buildings that do not have concealed or underground
routes between them. Also they deny the attacker observation and aimed fires.
Nuclear weapons may be used against the attacker's nuclear delivery means and concentrations of
forces on the approaches to the city, or against troops who attempt to encircle or bypass the
built-up area, or against an attacker who has seized part or all of a built-up area if there are not
other weapons available to destroy him.
Engineers attached to the MRB perform standard engineer tasks.
Party-Political Work.
The enemy views this as critical to fulfilling the assigned combat mission, the creation of a successful
defense, and the regaining of the initiative. Political indoctrination is achieved by timely explanation to
personnel of the mission and procedures for its accomplishment. Indoctrination of soldiers, NCOs, and
officers in patriotism, courage, and tenacity in defending the built-up area is basic to the party-political
efforts.
All fighting men are told that no one has the right to leave the defended location without a specific order
to do so. Party members are distributed throughout the fighting units. There must be an "active member"
in every separate group of fighting men. He conducts party-political indoctrination and provides the
example in combat. Based on the commander's guidance and decision, the Deputy Commander for
Political Affairs plans the party-political support for the combat missions. The underlying assumptions to
this plan are:
Every defended building must be a fortress inaccessible to the attacker.
The force which possesses the stronger moral qualities (e.g., coldness, endurance, and
resourcefulness) and knows procedures for fighting in a city will win.
BASIC DEFENSIVE CONSIDERATIONS
The enemy's defense of a built-up area is centrally controlled by the commander, preferably from a
command observation post from which he can view the area and communicate with his forces. All
available means of reconnaissance are used to determine where the attacker will strike and the location of
his main effort. Once this is determined, maximum firepower is continually massed on the approaching
attacker.
Dummy positions and alternate strong points are also used along the attacker's avenues of approach. Gaps
created in the defense are immediately covered by massive fires of all types. During an attacker's artillery
preparation, combat equipment and forces are kept in standby readiness in protected positions. When the
preparation is lifted, the forces move forward and occupy primary defensive positions from which to
repulse the attack.
Company strong points constitute the basic element of the built-up area defensive structure. Companies
may also occupy a salient on an open flank or behind one of the companies in the first echelon.
Every effort is made during the defense to separate infantry from tanks so that tanks may be attacked and
destroyed at short ranges by antitank weapons. Antitank ambushes are prepared at each level.
Counterattacks are habitually launched to regain lost positions before the attacker has the opportunity to
prepare hasty defenses.
PLANNING THE ATTACK
This section describes urban offensive operations and provides detailed considerations to be applied by
US commanders during planning. Readers must understand how the enemy defends and be familiar with
US offensive planning as discussed in organizational How-to-Fight manuals.
The attack of a built-up area, regardless of its size and the level of command involved, should be
considered only as the last resort, and only when major advantage accrues to the attacker through its
seizure or control.
Attacks against built-up areas may be launched to:
Gain a Critical Objective. Selected built-up areas will be attacked to gain a critical objective or to
deny an advantage to the enemy. The objective may be:
A vital bridge.
Transportation facilities that are required to sustain future combat operations.
Strategic industrial or vital communications facilities.
Rupture the Defense. The enemy will frequently prepare built-up areas as strong points to gain
favorable defensive advantages. The elimination of selected strong points may be required in order
to break through his defensive system.
Facilitate Future Operations. Built-up areas will frequently preclude bypass. Commanders will
have to overcome those obstacles that restrict or control their avenues of approach in order to
continue the attack.
Deal the enemy a decisive psychological blow.
Attacks against built-up areas will be avoided when:
The area is not required to support future operations.
Bypassing is tactically feasible.
The built-up area has been declared an "open city" to preclude civilian casualties or to
preserve cultural or historical facilities.
Sufficient combat forces are not available to seize and systematically clear the built-up area.
Offensive operations must be tailored to the urban environment based on a detailed analysis of each
urban terrain setting, its types of built-up areas, and existing structural forms. The following general
considerations apply to the four basic categories of built-up areas described in chapter 1.
Large Cities
(Population greater than 100,000)
The decision to attack a large city or major urban complex normally may be made at levels above corps,
based primarily on political and strategic considerations. Such vast areas are difficult to defend or attack
in their entirety. The battle will proceed from the attack of smaller built-up areas leading to the central
complex and will involve major forces. It will evolve as a series of coordinated combat-in-cities actions
fought at small-unit level. Elements of the attack force may be required to conduct the whole range of
military operations: attack-defense-retrograde during the battle.
Towns and Small Cities
(3,000-100,000)
The decision to attack a town or small city will normally be made by corps or division commanders. The
allocation of major forces and significant time are required to secure such objectives. Civilian casualties
and significant collateral damage to structures usually accompany urban operations, requiring
commanders to consider the political and psychological consequences before attacking. A hasty attack by
heavy, mobile forces against weak points on the flanks or rear of the town or small city is preferred.
Where well-established defenses exist, a deliberate attack may be required.
Villages
(3,000 or less)
Team and task force commanders operating over urbanized terrain will frequently encounter villages that
inhibit speed and restrict maneuver along their avenues of approach. These small built-up areas may be
prepared by the enemy as strong points and integrated into his defensive scheme. If it is necessary to
destroy resistance within a particular village, division/brigade commanders must bring overwhelming
force to bear on the strongpoint and suppress mutually supporting positions. Adequate forces must be
employed to carry the assault quickly with the objective of securing the whole village in the confusion of
the initial assault. House-to-house fighting may be required but is costly in casualties and time. Night
attacks may be required to gain entry into the village if it is not possible to suppress or obscure the
defenders' weapons, or if concealed routes to the village are not available.
strip Areas
Defended strip developments must not be permitted to slow the momentum of team and task force
attacks. Although their length and density vary, they are not easily bypassed, and therefore the alternative
of not attacking seldom exists. Strip areas should normally be penetrated at their narrowest point by a
fast-moving armor-heavy force supported by suppressive fires and smoke obscuration.
ff the enemy does not withdraw after the penetration, these areas must be cleared by follow-on forces.
Strip area: Suppreaa, Obscure, Penetrate
K FA/MTfl
Figure 2-9. Strip area: Suppress, Obscure, Penetrate.
FUNDAMENTALS OF THE OFFENSE
The six fundamentals of the offense, contained in FM 100-5, Operations, and associated with specific
organizational tasks and techniques in the How-to- Fight series of manuals, are applicable to offensive
operations on urbanized terrain. Commanders must understand urban characteristics, the advantages and
disadvantages they offer, and how they impact on mobility and weapons effectiveness.
See the Battlefield
No environment other than jungles or woods provides the degree of concealment found on the urbanized
battlefield. The limited depth the battalion and company commanders can see is further reduced. On
natural terrain adjacent to built-up areas, observation seldom extends beyond the 1200m range. On the
approaches to and within built-up areas, observation may be limited to one block, or one building, or one
room. Reconnaissance elements, frequently operating on foot and using infiltration techniques, are more
important than ever. Not only do they find the enemy, but they also provide valuable reaction time and
maneuver space.
Masking effects of the terrain and concealment offered by built-up areas make it easier for the enemy to
hide his command and control elements, as well as combat support and combat service support units. The
effectiveness of ground surveillance, infrared, -and visual/optical target-acquisition devices is reduced.
Aerial photos may provide great detail and display every abnormality or alteration to the terrain. They
are blind, however, to what is located within individual buildings. Increased emphasis must be placed on
electromagnetic devices and the use of long-range air and ground reconnaissance. The armored cavalry
squadron is particularly well suited for the task of finding the enemy, identifying weakness, and
providing detailed terrain information.
Although the advantage of knowing the terrain lies initially with the defender, this advantage can be
reduced through aggressive reconnaissance at each level of command. The same factors which provide
concealment to the enemy also enable ground reconnaissance to be extended. Knowledge of how the
enemy normally defends on urbanized terrain and the effects that the terrain has on his weapons and
mobility guide the commander's efforts to see the battlefield.
Concentrate Overwhelming Combat Power
Mobility restrictions imposed by urbanized terrain make it difficult to concentrate ground maneuver
forces quickly. Commanders must seek to achieve concentration on terrain which avoids built-up areas.
When bypass is not possible and the attack of a built-up area is required, deception as well as mass
becomes critical.
Although the defender has the planning advantage, the same mobility restriction limits his ability to
reinforce or shift forces. The urban terrain also offers the attacker enhanced concealment during
maneuver.
Limited - objective attacks, which fix defenses or cause the enemy to dissipate forces by early reaction,
contribute to concentration. Concentration should be provided for during the planning phase, by
allocating added combat support, particularly engineer and field artillery, to the main effort. During the
attack, field and air defense artillery, as well as attack helicopters from corps and offensive air support,
provide flexible, responsive elements of combat power which may be massed with less regard to mobility
restrictions. OPSEC with its various sub-elements is critical on urban terrain which by its nature spreads
defenses and makes it difficult for the defender to identify the attacker's main effort.
Suppress Enemy Defensive Fires
The urbanized battlefield provides the defender increased, readily available cover as well as concealment
for weapon systems at all levels. Its obstacle characteristics may also increase the attacker's vulnerability
by canalizing mounted maneuvers. At the same time, the terrain frequently offers the attacker
concealment for dismounted maneuver and denies the defender long-range observation or fields of fire.
The attacker is most vulnerable to enemy fires during the initial phase of securing a foothold in a built-up
area. Defensive weapons, operating from the protection of structures that provide mutual support with
prepared fields of fire, must be suppressed or destroyed.
At battalion and company level, there is an increased requirement for direct, rather than indirect, fire
suppression. With reduced engagement ranges, this requirement may be satisfied in part by organic
weapons. The use of field artillery in the direct fire role may be required to suppress gunners in hardened
positions. Extensive use of smoke also may be required to conceal movement. The intensity of close
combat and reduced direct fire ranges within built-up areas will require continuing suppressive fires and
smoke obscuration. Increased dependence must be placed on the coordinated use of electronic support
measures and electronic countermeasures to locate enemy emitters and to suppress and jam these
acquisition and control devices. Where effective suppression by fires or electronic means cannot be
accomplished, night/limited visibility operations may be required to reduce the defender's advantages.
Shock, Overwhelm, and Destroy the Enemy
Division lead elements must possess the combat power to attack as soon as a weakness is found or
created. Enemy defenses well forward of built-up areas must be ruptured and penetrated if bypass is to be
achieved. Commanders should seek to conduct a hasty attack, simultaneously enveloping the defender's
fianks and rear. However, the size of a large urban complex or the extent of enemy defenses may deny
the option of conducting a hasty attack. A deliberate attack breaking through a prepared defensive
position is costly and usually results in heavy casualties and a protracted battle which forward-looking
planning seeks to avoid.
Once the momentum of the attack has been gained, commanders must maintain that momentum until the
defense has lost its cohesion. Enemy resistance is bypassed or destroyed by fires to preclude heavy
casualties and loss of momentum. Stalled attacking forces maintain pressure by fires, while reserves
bypass the resistance and continue the attack. The attacker must cause events to happen faster than the
defender can react to them. The enemy must be denied the opportunity to consolidate defenses and must
be destroyed or isolated before he can occupy built-up areas.
Attack the Enemy Rear
Enemy defenses will usually consist of strong points and obstacles arrayed laterally and in depth over the
most likely avenues of approach. After disrupting the initial urban defenses, the attacker must secure
critical objectives and seek to drive into the enemy rear to find and destroy his control headquarters,
combat support, and combat service support units. The attack and isolation of forward defenses disrupt
combat service support functions. It also demands that the defender employ his combat support elements,
thus aiding the attacker in locating and destroying them. At battalion and company level, infantry forces,
infiltrating by stealth or under conditions of limited visibility, should be employed to attack key
command, control, and support installations. The division commander should consider utilizing air mobile
assets and heavy reconnaissance elements to conduct rear area operations throughout the attack to find
and destroy the enemy command and control facilities. The splintering of the defense, along with the
disruption of command and control and destruction of support capabilities, will cause the defense to
collapse.
Provide Continuous Mobile Support
Although urban battles are viewed predominantly as small-unit, combined arms actions, continuous
combat support and combat service support are required. Tanks and artillery provide the infantry with
destructive firepower to defeat prepared defenses. Combat engineers breach obstacles to enhance
mobility. Field artillery, attack helicopters, and offensive air support disrupt the enemy command and
control network and destroy his support units. Air defense artillery helps protect the entire force. Forward
replenishment of supplies and contact maintenance teams help sustain momentum. Military police
provide vital traffic control and area security in the division rear. Electronic warfare and intelligence
units obtain information about the enemy needed by commanders. Communications units provide for its
timely dissemination.
Chapters 4 and 5 provide details pertaining to combat and combat service support.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
Attack planning on the urbanized battlefield follows the general process described in organizational
How-to-Fight manuals. The following specific considerations take on added importance during the
analysis of the situation and development of the commander's concept for the attack. The offensive may
take the form of either a hasty or deliberate attack.
Hasty Attack
A hasty attack is conducted when the enemy has not established strong defensive positions and attacking
forces can exploit maneuver to overwhelm the defense. Three tasks are essential to its success:
Locate a weak spot or gap in enemy defenses.
Fix forward enemy elements.
Rapidly move through or around the gap or weak spot to be exploited.
Because a hasty attack is conducted to capitalize on opportunities as they present themselves,
commanders should not expect to execute these tasks in the same order on all occasions. For example,
advanced elements of the task force may be engaged with forward enemy elements when it becomes
apparent that a weak point exists in their defenses. In another instance, a reconnaissance force may
discover the location of a gap and subsequently be ordered to seize it to prevent enemy reinforcement. In
any case, however, speed is essential; for if momentum is lost, the hasty attack will fail.
An urban area is an obstacle to tactical maneuver, and in that respect the hasty attack in MOUT is
conducted somewhat differently than in open terrain. The congestion and incomplete intelligence
characteristic of urban fighting will frequently require the attack to move through, rather than around, the
fixing force. Techniques of control and coordination become extremely important to prevent unnecessary
congestion at the edge of the urban area. In addition, commanders must insure that only those troops and
resources necessary are committed to the fixing force, with the balance of combat power committed to
the main effort of the hasty attack.
On-order, follow-on missions should be assigned to forces making a hasty attack so that, once the attack
objective is secured, the force is prepared to respond to any contingency.
Deliberate Attack
A deliberate attack is necessary when enemy defenses are extensively prepared, when the urban obstacle
is extremely large or severely congested, or when the advantage of surprise has been lost. It may be
divided into three basic phases: isolation, assault, and clearance. Although not necessarily sequential in
their execution or totally interdependent, the use of these implied phases facilitates the identification of
specific tasks to be accomplished, the allocation of resources, and the preparation of plans.
Phase I is designed to isolate the objective by controlling avenues of approach into and out of the built-up
area. Armor-heavy forces, supported by ATGM and field artillery, are well-suited to the task of isolating
the built-up area from reinforcement and re-supply by securing dominating terrain and utilizing direct and
indirect fires. This phase does not involve combat in cities, although some units may be required to
eliminate defenses.
The battle to isolate a built-up area is fought on the natural terrain adjacent to it. Where the terrain
precludes ground maneuver to isolate the objective, long-range surveillance and fires, attack helicopters,
and offensive air support may be required. Failure to isolate the built-up area effectively before the
assault begins, may require, in the long run, more casualties and time to secure the complex. The
psychological impact that isolation causes on defending forces, coupled with the fact that the enemy must
now decide if he wants to expend resources to reinforce or conduct a breakout, adds to the confusion of
battle and makes complete isolation an important consideration.
Phase II consists of an assault to rupture the defenses and secure a foothold on the perimeter of the
built-up area from which attacks to clear the area may be launched. An envelopment, assaulting
defensive weaknesses on the flanks or rear of the built-up area, is preferred; however, a penetration may
be required. The following basic actions are included in Phase II:
Fix the Defense. Balanced forces representative of the major organization are used to fix the
enemy defense and draw his attention away from the main attack. Feints are highly effective as
diversionary supporting attacks. The force should be provided adequate assets to portray
convincingly the main attack and to continue the attack on order if the feint penetrates the
defensive system. Other limited-objective or deception operations may be conducted to fix the
enemy when sufficient assets to conduct a feint are not available. Additionally, the enemy can be
fixed by fires.
Conduct the Assault. Mobility, shock action, and massed firepower are required to secure a
foothold and rupture established defenses. During a penetration or envelopment, assault forces are
task-organized with armor, infantry, and engineers to rupture the defense effectively.
Over watching direct fires, along with indirect suppression and obscuration, help the attacker
secure a foothold in the built-up area. Once within the highly restrictive urban terrain, the role of
the infantry becomes dominant.
Regardless of the form of maneuver used, mobility and suppression are required to maintain the
momentum of the assault forces. Small-unit, combat-in-cities actions may be required to dislodge
defenders and consolidate the foothold area.
Phase III is predominantly a clearance action which may consist of a systematic building-by-building,
block-by-block advance through the entire area; or it may be a rapid advance through a lightly defended
section to secure a critical objective, with a subsequent detailed clearance of the area by a follow-on unit.
This phase is characterized by decentralized, small-unit actions, and it requires detailed planning to offset
the difficulties of control.
Frequent commitment and reconstitution of reserves, particularly at TF/Co team level, is common during
this phase since strongpoint defenses are repeatedly encountered. Reserves should parallel the
composition of the main attack to facilitate commitment where necessary. The reserve must be mobile
and prepared to react immediately to various contingencies.
During a hasty attack of a built-up area by units in contact or moving to contact, there may be no clear
distinction between these phases. All actions may be accomplished by elements of covering or
reconnaissance forces or by leading brigades with Phases I and II conducted concurrently and followed
immediately by Phase III. If a hasty attack of a well-defended built-up area fails or is not possible, a
deliberate attack sacrificing momentum and requiring detailed planning and the allocation of major
resources will be necessary. During a deliberate attack, the phases will normally be accomplished
sequentially.
Urban Information Requirements
In addition to knowing where the enemy is and in what strength, commanders must also know how he
usually defends a built-up area and the approaches to it. Specific terrain information is required to
maximize weapon effectiveness in this special environment and to minimize the effects of unfavorable
terrain characteristics on maneuver and control. The following additional information is required:
Natural terrain adjacent to a built-up area that supports the enemy's defense, or that which will
provide attacking forces with over watching positions.
Cover and concealed routes to the built-up area and to objectives within the built-up area.
Critical objectives within the built-up area that provide decisive tactical advantages.
Tactical characteristics of the buildup area and its structures.
Information about the population will frequently assist in determining where to attack, what firepower
restrictions may be imposed, and what areas within the urban complex must be avoided to minimize
destruction of life-support facilities and civilian casualties.
Typical Attack Zones by Type Built-up Areas. (Meters)
A) Portrayed are typical zone widths for elements of
150-200 a main attack in various types of built-up areas
described briefly in Chapters 1 .
B) 200-300 The highly restrictive nature of the urban terrai
reduces mobility, observation, and fields of fire, and
complicates all command and control functions. These
factors, coupled with the need to concentrate combat
power, necessitate reducing the width of attack zones
assigned to units.
C) 300-400 Within an urban area, typical widths will be
significantly less than those experienced on open
terrain. During the attack^ a company team will seldom
be assigned a zone greater than one to two blocks In width
D) This will vary based on enemy defense and type
300-500 of built-up area.
E) Actual zone dimensions can only be determined by
detailed analysis of the urban terrain complex as
described In appendix A.
Limited Visibility Operations
Limited visibility and night attacks are essential elements of the offense within an urbanized area. As
described in other How-to-Fight manuals, such operations may be conducted to achieve surprise or
exploit earlier success. On the urban battlefield, they are most frequently required to rupture strong
defenses, minimize enemy mutual support, and maintain momentum. Difficulties with command and
control, navigation, coordination of fires, and identification of friendly forces are compounded on
urbanized terrain. Other problems are:
Restrictive terrain increases opportunities for elements of a unit to become lost or separated.
Limited avenues of approach, rubble and other obstacles decrease the chances for a large unit to
achieve surprise.
At brigade and division level, limited visibility conditions are exploited to cover the movement of major
units and supplies. Battalion task forces use limited visibility conditions to extend reconnaissance and
infiltration or to attack occupied objectives. Typical night or limited visibility operations at unit levels
within a built-up area include:
Attacks across an open area to seize a strongpoint or building.
Ambush patrols to engage infiltrators.
Raids or night combat patrols to achieve a limited objective.
Reconnaissance patrols to develop intelligence.
Control Measures
The coordination and control of forces and fires is greatly complicated by the restrictive nature of the
urban environment. It is facilitated, however, by a detailed plan with explicit control measures for
decentralized execution at the lowest level. The control measures most frequently used within a built-up
area are:
Objectives. While dominant features that provide observation or physical control over access
routes through or around the built-up area remain important, additional consideration must be
given to its facilities and manmade objects. Communication networks, whether vehicular, rail,
nautical, or telephonic/telegraphic, play an increasingly significant role.
Initial objectives to gain a foothold are usually located on the outer edge of the built-up area; and,
when occupied, they provide concealment and cover for the attacking forces.
Team/company-size objectives are generally one to two blocks in depth. Their exact size is determined by th
nature of the built-up area. An intermediate objective may be assigned by any commander when its seizure
is essential to the accomplishment of the mission. When an enemy cannot be bypassed, the assignment of
intermediate objectives will frequently be required. When feasible, final objectives are located on the exit si(
or beyond the built-up area.
Phase Lines. Phase lines are routinely employed to regulate the advance of attacking forces. They
may also be used in lieu of objectives. Principal streets, rivers, and trolley and railroad lines which
are easily identified are appropriate for use as phase lines.
Boundaries. At brigade level and below, boundaries are habitually used to control fires and
designate areas of responsibility. They are normally established in alleys or within a block of
buildings to insure that both sides of a street are included in the zone of one unit.
Checkpoints and Contact Points. Street corners, buildings, railway crossings, bridges, or other
easily identifiable features may be designated as checkpoints or contact points. These points
facilitate reporting locations and may identify specific points where the commander desires units
to make physical contact.
Security
Threat forces emphasize spoiling attacks and infiltration of the flanks and rear of attacking forces.
Frequently the enemy will position individuals and small units in concealed locations to perform
stay-behind missions. Built-up areas provide the defender excellent cover and concealment while
limiting the attacker's observation. The requirement to maintain the continuity of the attack results in
bypassing isolated pockets of resistance which further complicates security problems. It is necessary to
increase overall security precautions for attacking forces while operating in highly restrictive areas. Also,
it is essential to provide security forces to escort combat service support and combat support units and to
monitor, patrol, and guard possible infiltration routes. Additionally, measures must be taken to guard
against sabotage, guerrilla warfare, and intelligence-gathering by a hostile population.
Attachments
Frequently, company teams, platoons, and squads will be isolated and will have to fight for extended
periods with what resources they have. In order to reduce reaction time, maintain flexibility, and
overcome communications difficulties, it may be necessary to attach combat support and combat service
support elements to a task force, a team, and sometimes to platoons, thus permitting decentralized
execution at the lowest level.
THE OFFENSIVE BATTLE
This section provides examples of how the offensive battle may be conducted on urbanized terrain. Each
example is designed to illustrate specific tactical considerations from the perspective of differing
command levels. The examples flow from the basic corps situation and should be studied in the sequence
presented as part of the overall scheme of maneuver.
GENERAL SITUATION
An attempted penetration of the 10th (US) Corps sector has been blunted well forward in the main battle
area with heavy losses inflicted on the attacking first echelon units. Prisoners and captured documents
indicate that the corps is opposed by a combined arms army consisting of four divisions.
Elements in contact, identified as units of two motorized rifle regiments, are preparing hasty defensive
positions in depth. Aerial reconnaissance has detected defensive positions being prepared in a broad band
40 to 80 kilometers north of the present line of contact and the rearward movement of combat
formations. Intelligence indicates that:
The two first-echelon divisions are at less than 80% effectiveness and are being withdrawn through.
The second echelon elements of the second-echelon divisions are preparing a main defensive belt.
The stalled attack was a supporting attack for the enemy general offensive.
SPECIAL SITUATION
Corps Hasty Attack
The 10th (US) Corps commander has been directed to initiate offensive actions as soon as possible. His
planning for the offense is directed at the basic requirement of rupturing the enemy's hastily prepared
defensive belts. His plan must also provide for the passage of sufficient forces into the rear area to
destroy the enemy and create an exploitable situation once the rupture has been accomplished.
In analyzing the terrain, the commander focused on those natural and manmade features that would aiTect
the maneuver of brigade-size and larger units or provide tactical objectives. Of primary interest to him
are major terrain compartments, communications networks, and built-up areas. Each of these features can
impact on his tactical options.
As shown, the terrain complex in the corps zone consists of a rural-urban mix. On the eastern boundary,
rolling foothills reach an elevation of 230 meters and limit access into the corps zone to one minor
avenue of approach along a hard-surface road and secondary rail line. An unimproved dirt and gravel
road net is available, but permits only limited north-south movement by tracked and wheeled vehicles.
To the west, the Herz Mountains, which rise to elevations in excess of 600 meters, represent a major
obstacle to lateral maneuver. Within this basin, the central complex consists of two basic compartments
tied to land use and urban development.
10th {US) Corps Zone of Action
Figure 2-18 10th (US) Corps Zone of Action
The eastern compartments encompass a growing commercial and light industrial complex with numerous
villages and small towns. A network of secondary and improved hard-surface roads is available for the
movement of heavy wheeled vehicles. Cross-country mobility is restricted. Visibility is limited by
terrain, hedgerows, and wood lots to an average of 1200 - 1500 meters. Long-range observation may be
obtained from isolated dominating hills.
The western compartment is an agricultural belt supplying both the local region and the northern
industrial complexes. Scattered small villages predominate throughout the area. Cross-country mobility
for tracked vehicles is excellent during this season; however, wheeled vehicle movement is restricted to
the secondary rural roads.
These two distinct compartments come together along a major north-south rail and road network which
joins the LIMSPACHPUR communications corridor at the town of LETZ and continues north into the
region's principal industrial complex. Rural and secondary road nets from both the east and the west
converge on the small towns which stretch along this route. Light industrial complexes sit beside modern
high-rise developments throughout the region.
LETZ, with a peacetime population of close to 40,000, is a major transportation hub and an obstacle to
corps-level maneuver. It must be secured with major facilities intact in order to sustain the corps
offensive to the north.
North of LETZ, the terrain assumes a more uniform nature with rolling farmland, interrupted by small
villages and scattered stands of woods, giving way to a broad corridor through forested foothills. No
dominant terrain features exist in this area other than the man-made lines of communication to the north.
Cross-country mobility is excellent.
Based upon the corps commander's knowledge of the enemy and the analysis of the terrain, he derived
the following conclusions:
Retention intact of both the LIMSPACH-PUTS rail line and the town of LETZ, with its transportation
modes, is important to the enemy if he is to sustain his defense and resume the attack. In any case, it is
highly probable that he will attempt to retain LETZ as long as possible and destroy its critical facilities
only if necessary. To do this, the enemy will have to deny any major penetration bypassing the town to
the north, as well as local isolation of the defenders in the built up areas. The location of defensive works
currently being constructed indicates that both the town and the rail line will be encompassed in the 2d
echelon of his main defensive belt (MDB). The identification of two MRRs in the security zone indicates
that up to two MRDs deployed laterally across the corps zone may be assigned responsibility for
establishing the MDB. Given the enemy's normal tactics, LETZ will most likely be included entirely
within the sector of one MRD, with a second MRD deployed westward toward the Herz Mountains. The
development of a second defensive belt north of LETZ will require significant time and effort since no
major terrain feature is available.
Commander's Actions
A review of the status of corps units shows that the armored cavalry squadron and elements of one
division sustained significant losses during the conduct of the active defense. In addition, the equivalent
of one attack helicopter company was rendered ineffective.
Although logistical support available to the corps remains adequate, no additional maneuver resources
are available. The corps commander reallocated elements of the 32d Mech Division to his other units to
replace losses and retained its remaining mech-heavy brigade under corps control.
The distribution of natural land forms and urban features within the corps zone favors conducting the
major effort in the west. For this to succeed, sufficient force must be applied in the central and eastern
regions to fix the defenses and maintain the ability to react to detected defensive weaknesses.
The concept formulated by the corps commander calls for a hasty attack from present positions with two
divisions and a mechanized brigade abreast.
10th {US) Corps Schema of Maneuver
Figure 2-20 10th (US) Corps Scheme of Maneuver
The 23d Armored Division will conduct the main attack in the west, followed in zone by the 25th
Armored Division. The 52d Mech Division will conduct a supporting attack on the east in a zone
centered on LETZ and the major communication network. The 3d Brigade, 32d Mech Division, will
follow in the zone of the 52d Div, and be prepared for attachment to the 52d Div or for commitment to
the west or east. The 312 Sep Mech Brigade will attack along the eastern boundary.
Although the corps commander would prefer to envelop a weak defensive flank, his scheme of maneuver
provides for a penetration to rupture the defenses if required.
His concept of the operation and scheme of maneuver match the operational capabilities of available
forces to the terrain and their designated objectives while offering him the following alternatives:
To attack a weakness if the enemy chooses to concentrate his defenses; and to concentrate forces
for a penetration at the time and place of his choice if the enemy disperses his forces.
The corps commander is aware that speed and momentum are important considerations. To him LETZ is
a critical objective. A successful penetration, if achieved, will enable him to bypass the town with
armored units and may force the enemy to retire from LETZ without the use of follow-on forces. If the
enemy does not withdraw, it will be necessary to clear the town-which could result in costly,
time-consuming fighting. The 52d Mech Division is positioned to accomplish this task without
interrupting the momentum of the main attack.
SPECIAL SITUATION 2
Division Hasty Attack
As part of the corps offensive, the 52d Mech Division is moving north, led by a reconnaissance force
consisting of its armored cavalry squadron and a balanced task force from the reserve, supported by field
artillery and engineers. The division's main body is deployed with two brigades abreast. The reserve
brigade follows in the zone of the western brigade.
The division lead elements, which have been in contact with security forces from the 322d MRR, report
increasing heavier resistance in the form of antitank fires from prepared company-size strong points and
local counterattacks by tanks. Aerial reconnaissance confirms that a defensive network controlling
avenues of approach into the town is being prepared within LETZ and on adjacent terrain. Although the
movement of tank forces to the west has been reported by corps, all indications are that the enemy
intends to defend LETZ.
Trafficability throughout the division zone is excellent for tracked vehicles. A network of secondary
roads is available to support the wheeled vehicles of the division and its combat service support
requirements.
B2d Mechanized Division Movement to Contact
Figure 2-21 52d Mechanized Division Movement to Contact
Commander's Actions
Based on his mission of securing LETZ, the division commander identified two specific tasks. The first
was to isolate the town by securing terrain on its flanks and to its rear. If required, the isolation phase
would be followed by an attack to secure key installations in LETZ and clear it of organized resistance.
In light of the developing situation, the commander had decided to pass his lead brigades through the
security forces and conduct a hasty attack against terrain objectives adjacent to LETZ. He directs:
The balanced 1st Brigade to secure hills 185 and 200 northwest of LETZ and the main highway
leading north from town to block withdrawal from or reinforcement of the town.
The mech-heavy 2d Brigade to secure hill 221 and the wooded area east of LETZ to block
withdrawal from or reinforcement of the town and to link up with the 1st Brigade to the north of
LETZ.
The mech-heavy 3d Brigade to follow in the zone of the 1st Brigade and be prepared to secure hills
150 and 110 west of LETZ.
The ACS to protect the western flank against armor counterattacks.
The FSCOORD to reinforce the fires of the 1st and 2d Brigades DS artillery battalion with two
battalions from the attached FA Brigade and to assign the priority for fires and attack helicopters
to the 1st Brigade.
The division commander's concept provides that the attacking forces avoid the built-up area initially by
targeting them against terrain features which control access to LETZ. It also positions his major elements
for a subsequent attack of the built-up area if required. Even limited success in either brigade sector will
enable the commander to support fully such an attack. He has retained his options as to when and where
to penetrate the urban defenses, if required, and is well disposed to repel an enemy counterattack or
prevent reinforcement.
52d Mechanized Division Attack of Latz
Figure 2-22 52d Mechanized Division Attack of Letz
Options left to the enemy commander are considerably reduced. He does not know if LETZ will be
attacked or bypassed. A stubborn defense on the terrain adjacent to the built-up area would make LETZ
vulnerable to a rapid penetration. A concentration of forces within LETZ could enable the attacker to
rupture his flank defenses and turn his rear. An attempted withdrawal, forfeiting the advantages of
prepared defenses, could be costly if not precisely executed.
SPECIAL SITUATION 3
Brigade Hasty Attack
As the division attack continued against heavy resistance, the corps main attack in the west penetrated
the enemy's main defensive belt. Rather than risk being encircled, enemy defenders are attempting to
withdraw north from the town of Letz. Radio intercepts indicate that a reinforced motorized rifle
battalion has been assigned the mission of covering the withdrawal of the main body and destroying key
facilities within the town.
The division commander issued a frag order directing the 3d Brigade to conduct a hasty attack on Letz to
secure the rail yards and be prepared to clear the town of enemy resistance. The division commander
further advised that the rail yards should be secured quickly before the enemy has an opportunity to
destroy them. The 1st and 2d Brigades are to continue their attacks, maintaining maximum pressure on
enemy forces and completing the isolation of the town by linking up north of Letz.
Intelligence reports indicate that enemy forces are occupying prepared defensive positions on the
outskirts of town and within the town itself. They are reported to be well equipped with medium and
heavy antitank weapons. The main road leading into the town from the south is heavily mined.
3d Brigade lead elements, advancing steadily, secured their initial objective, hills 110 and 150. Prisoners
taken by 3d Brigade elements confirm that the estimated reinforced motorized rifle battalion in Letz has
the mission of covering the withdrawal of main body elements and destroying key installations within the
town.
The limited map coverage of the town itself was supplemented by aerial photos of the central railway
complex and major routes into and through the town. Data compiled from the interrogation of refugees
helped round out a picture of the urban defensive network. A city map, obtained by corps from the
territorial forces, provides locations of key municipal facilities.
Southwestern Letz
Figure 2-23 Southwestern Letz
Commander's Actions
Based on available information about the town and its surroundings, the 3d Brigade commander believes
that the best avenue of approach is from the west. The enemy forces appear to have oriented their defense
to the south, and an attack from the west should strike the enemy on his flank. Terrain along the major
rail and highway system leading into the town from the west provides sufficient room for the attacking
forces to maneuver. Many of the buildings in the western and southwest sector of the town have a low
profile, making them easy to smoke. The establishment of a foothold in the western sector of the town
also opens the most direct route to the railroad yards.
Based on his assessment of the situation, the brigade commander outlined his general concept for the
conduct of the operation.
"The Brigade has basically three tasks. We must establish a foothold in the town of Letz; we must then
secure rail yards; and, finally, we must be prepared to clear the town of enemy resistance. The most
critical task is to secure the rail yards as quickly as possible before enemy forces have an opportunity to
destroy them. 1 recognize that the rail yards are situated deep within the town and that a foothold should
first be established on the edge of the town. But because of the critical and time-sensitive nature of
securing the rail yards, 1 want to insure that the momentum of our attack is maintained throughout both
phases (establishing the foothold and securing the rail yards).
"Highway 85 appears to be the most direct route to the rail yards, and there appears to be sufficient
maneuver room on both sides of the highway for it to serve as our main route of advance. Two
mech-heavy task forces will make a coordinated attack on Letz and establish a foothold two-to- three
blocks deep on the north and south sides of Highway 85. The task force in the southern zone should have
responsibility for Highway 85 and for keeping it open. An alternate route of advance should be identified
in the northern task force zone in the event that Highway 85 cannot be kept open. The third task force is
to follow in the zone of the southern task force.
"At this point, 1 want to keep all options open to me. If little or no enemy resistance is encountered by
either of the lead task forces in the foothold, then we will continue the attack to secure the rail yards, and
the rear area task force will assume its position in the foothold. If the foothold is well-defended, the rear
task force is to be punched through the foothold to secure the rail yards.
3d Brigade Attack of Letz
Figure 2-24 3d Brigade Attack of Letz
"Once the rail yards are secure, a systematic clearance of the town will be conducted and each task force
will be assigned a zone to clear.
"S3, get with division and tell them that I want our DS engineer company attached to us for the duration
of this operation, and 1 want an additional engineer company allocated to us. We also should have
another artillery battalion to reinforce our DS battalion.
"I want to keep one mech platoon in bde reserve to serve as a reaction and security force. Request some
aircraft so that we can air assault the platoon into the city if necessary. The platoon should be capable of
making a rooftop landing."
The division, upon receiving the requests from the brigade S3, approved them and allocated the brigade
six lift aircraft for the possible air assault.
Based on the brigade commander's general concept and guidance, there is no need to change the task
organization, and the brigade remains task organized as follows:
TASK ORGRNIZATIOf: 3D BRIGADE
TF 1-5 TF 1-82
1-5 Arm (-) 1-82 Mech (-)
A/1-81 Mech B/1-5 Arm
B/1-82 Mech (-) 2/C/52 Engr
l/C/52 Engr
TF 1-81
1-81 Mech
A/ 1-5 Arm
D/52 Engr
BDE CaSITRDL
(-) 1 /B/1-82 Mech
1-42 FA (DS)
3-35 FA
(Reinf 1-42FA)
C/52 Engr (-)
2/B/23d CEWI
C/ 1-441 ADA
(Vulc)
Control measures are established in the form oif phase lines, unit
boundaries^ objectives, routes of advance, and c^aarance zones,
'^ G
PL
QUEEN
Major streets are (dentJfieci as routes of advance to enhance
coordination. Route BLUE along IHIgliwav SS is designated as the
primary route of advance for force* securing objective HAWK,
Figure 2-25 3D BRIGADE TASK ORGANIZATION
Clearance
Zones
Figure 2-26 Clearance Zones
TF 1-5 Armor
* Attack at H-hour to secure objective EAGLE.
* Be prepared to continue the attack to secure objective HAWK.
* Be prepared to release one mech-heavy team to TF 1-82 and assist passage of TF 1-82
elements along route GREEN.
* On order, conduct systematic clearance in zone.
•
TF 1-81 Mech
* Attack at H-hour to secure objective FALCON.
* Be prepared to continue the attack to secure objective HAWK.
* Be prepared to release one mech-heavy team to TF 1-82 and assist passage of TF 1-82
elements along route BLUE.
* On order, conduct systematic clearance in zone.
TF 1-82 Mech
* Follow TF 1-81 in zone on route BLUE.
* Be prepared to assume TF 1-81 position on objective FALCON or 1-5 position on
objective EAGLE.
* Be prepared to pass through lead elements and conduct attack to secure objective HAW!
* On order, conduct systematic clearance in zone.
The brigade commander provided the following specific guidance to his commanders and stafl":
"The key to the success of this attack is a rapid advance and close coordination. Report the
crossing of each phase line and the securing of assigned objectives. Do not initiate a systematic
clearance of the foothold areas until objective HAWK is secured.
"At H-5, artillery is to engage known enemy positions with HE and provide smoke to cover the
advance of attacking elements. Artillery fires will be lifted at the discretion of the lead task forces.
Lead elements should attempt to close within 200 meters of enemy positions prior to lifting smoke
in order to reduce the effectiveness of enemy antitank weapons. Caution will be exercised in the
use of HE artillery to avoid unnecessary rubbling, particularly along routes of advance.
"If necessary, the DS artillery battalion is prepared to provide, through coordination with the
brigade FSO, up to two howitzer sections to assist in reducing strong points. The requesting task
force must provide a guide and security for these sections if employed.
"Nuclear weapons will not be used. Non-persistent irritating munitions may be used to assist in
clearing buildings; however, artillery or mortar chemical rounds will not be used without prior
approval from my CP.
"Because of collateral damage restrictions, municipal buildings will not be fired upon unless
developed and used by the enemy as defensive positions. Six tac air sorties have been allocated to
the brigade for the attack. The aircraft are prepared to deliver precision munitions on call.
Remember that collateral damage must be minimized.
"Phase line Dragon is an initial limit of advance for TF 1-5 and TF 1-81.
"Priority of fires will go to TF 1-81 initially, and upon passage of phase line Dragon, priority of
fires will shift to the lead task force. Task forces are not to fire across common boundaries to the
rear of phase line Dragon without prior coordination. Once lead elements have passed forward of
phase line Dragon, the rear task forces may not engage targets forward of phase line Dragon
without prior clearance.
"One platoon from A Company, 1-82 Mech, will be retained under brigade control as a reaction
and security force. The platoon will be prepared to conduct air mobile operations throughout the
zone, and contingencies for the platoon will include rooftop landings. Task forces occupying
positions in the foothold will be prepared to release a company team to reinforce the lead task
force securing objective HAWK.
"Brigade trains will remain in present locations and be prepared to move on 30 minute's notice.
The maintenance collection point will displace along Highway 85 to the vicinity of phase line Lord
once objective FALCON is secured. Brigade supply route is Highway 85.
"Attack elements remain on listening silence prior to initial contact with enemy forces. TF 1-82
will monitor the command nets of TF 1-5 and TF 1-81. Once the foothold is secured,
retransmission sites should be established in elevated positions to reduce FM communication
difficulties anticipated within the built-up area on brigade command and control nets. Try to use
wire communications within the town. Intact civilian communication systems may also be
available to supplement tactical systems.
"CEVs should be positioned well forward to gain maximum effectiveness from their blowdown
capability against enemy strong-points. Engineers will also be positioned well forward to clear
enemy mines and obstacles.
"The brigade TAC CP will be located initially in the proximity of TF 1-81 CP. TF 1-82 will
establish a jump TOC with the brigade headquarters to insure close coordination. TF liaison
personnel will collocate with the brigade main CP initially."
SPECIAL SITUATION 4
Task Force Attack to Secure Foothold
Task force 1-81 has just closed on hill 110 against light enemy resistance. Only a few casualties have
been sustained. The task force commander has been alerted to conduct a hasty attack against the town of
Letz to establish a foothold. He has, in turn, alerted his company team commanders. His present task
organization consists of three mech-heavy company teams.
Enemy forces within Letz in the TF 1-81 zone are estimated to consist of reinforced platoon or a
company minus. Intelligence reports indicate that defenders are well armed with antitank weapons. The
types of antitank weapons which the enemy has available are believed to include wire-guided missiles,
RPG-7s, SPG-9s, and possibly T12s. Their wire-guided missiles require a minimum of 500 meters for the
enemy gunners to gain control of the missiles once they have been fired. Friendly forces should expect
the enemy to employ the antitank weapons from inside buildings and from other well-concealed
positions. The defenders are also reported to have tanks which they will use in the defense.
The terrain between TF 1-81 and the outskirts of town is slightly rolling. There is sufficient relief in the
terrain to provide some cover and concealment from positions in the town; and lightly wooded areas will
provide some additional concealment from direct observation.
Once the initial penetration of the town is made, attacking forces will be able to take advantage of the
cover and concealment provided by buildings. The area within the TF zone in the town is primarily
residential. Many houses have yards and gardens. The houses are spaced far enough apart to allow for
sufficient maneuver room for attacking elements throughout most of the zone. The civilian population
has reportedly moved out of the area into the central part of the city.
Commander's Actions
The task force commander makes an assessment of the situation and briefs his staff on his general
concept of the operation:
"Our tasks are to conduct a rapid advance from our present positions to the town of Letz, penetrate the
enemy defenses of the town in zone, and secure objective FALCON. At this point we must be prepared
either to continue the attack to secure objective HAWK or to assist TF 1-82 with a passage of lines along
route BLUE. After HAWK has been secured, we will then begin a systematic clearance of our assigned
zone.
"During the initial assault, a mech-heavy company team will attack along route BLUE and a mech
company minus will attack along a parallel axis to the south of route BLUE. An armor-heavy company
team will provide over watching direct fire support until advancing elements have closed on the initial
enemy positions. The armor-heavy team will then follow along route BLUE with the mission of keeping
route BLUE open. The scout platoon will screen the TF's southern flank during the attack and while in
position in the foothold.
"If we are ordered to continue the attack to secure objective HAWK, we will proceed on a narrow front
along route BLUE with the pure mech company minus, the mech-heavy team, and the tank-heavy team,
in that order. If substantial resistance is encountered to the point that the lead elements become decisively
engaged, follow-on elements will deploy laterally and maintain the momentum of the attack on alternate
attack routes, if necessary, bypassing enemy pockets of resistance."
Based on the task force commander's concept and guidance, the following task organization is developed,
requiring only minor changes.
TASK ORGANIZATION: TF 1-81 MECH
TEAM BRAVO C COMPANY TEAM TANK TF CONTROL
B/1-81 Mech C/1-81 Mech (-) A/1-5 Armor (-) Scout Platoon
2 /A/1-5 Arm 2/D/52 Engr 3 /C/1-81 Mech Redeyen Sect
l/D/52 Engr 1 TOW Section 1 Redeye Team Hv Mtr Pit
1 TOW Sect 1 Redeye Team D/52 Engr (-)
1 Redeye Team
Command and Control
In order to insure effective command and control during the conduct of the operation, the following control
measures are utilized:
Unit boundaries are established within the foothold area.
An additional phase line is included (PL Jack) to insure that all major streets running laterally
within the task force zone are readily identifiable for reporting procedures.
Buildings are assigned letter and number identifiers. Letters used do not correspond to units
involved in the attack for security reasons. Numbers used are sequentially away from the attacker
to facilitate progress reports during the attack.
Figure 2-29 TF 1-81 Mech Task Organization
Figure 2-30
An additional route of advance, route YELLOW, is established.
Routes of advance are identified.
Company/team objectives are assigned.
The following missions are assigned:
Team B:
* Attack along route BLUE to secure objective OAK.
* Be prepared to assist passage of elements from TF 1-82.
• Be prepared to continue the attack to objective HAWK.
C Company:
• Attack along route YELLOW to secure objective MAPLE.
• Be prepared to continue the attack of objective HAWK.
Team Tank:
* Initially, provide over watching direct fires in support of the attack until lead elements
reach the town and direct the lifting of fires.
* On order, follow Team B along route BLUE.
* Be prepared to assist passage of TF 1-82 elements.
Scout Platoon:
* Screen southern flank.
The task force commander provided the following guidance to his commanders and staff:
"Our mission is to conduct a rapid advance on the town of Letz and secure objectives OAK and
MAPLE. During the advance, expect all elements to make maximum use of available cover and
concealment, and, at the same time, the advance must be conducted swiftly to reduce exposure
time to enemy defenders.
"Although maximum use of smoke will assist in covering our advance on the town, it should be
expected that dust signatures from tracked vehicles and exhaust signatures from some of the tanks,
together with the noise factor, will alert the enemy once the attack is under way. It is, therefore, of
greatest importance, once the attack is started, that elements advance on the town as rapidly as
possible.
"Artillery forward observers should call for fires on known or suspected enemy positions and
should make maximum use of smoke to cover the advance until lead elements have closed to
within a minimum of 500 meters from enemy positions. Smoke should then be shifted and
maintained at no more than 500 meters ahead of lead elements as they advance toward their
objectives.
Although civilians are not supposed to be in the area, care must be exercised when engaging
targets. Yet, there should be no hesitation when engaging known or suspected enemy positions.
Once an area has been cleared of enemy forces, however, I expect absolute respect for the integrity
of civilians and their property.
"Priority of fires will go to team Bravo. FOs will be cautioned about unnecessary rubbling,
especially along routes of advance. If TF 1-82 is passed through us, no targets will be engaged
forward of our positions without prior coordination, once their lead elements have passed ours.
Direct coordination is authorized.
"Our trains will remain at their present location until the foothold is well established, at which time
they will displace forward along route YELLOW.
"Listening silence will be maintained until initial contact with enemy forces is made. I want our
signal people to establish a retransmission site in an elevated position within the foothold area as
soon as possible. Maximum use will be made of wire once we are within the town. We may later
be able to use the civilian communications system to supplement our own.
"My CP will follow Team Bravo. Our liaison officer will collocate with brigade."
SPECIAL SITUATION 5
Task Force Secures Critical Objective
Task force 1-82 had just closed on its initial objective in the vicinity of hill 150 when the TF commander
received the order from brigade for the attack on the town of Letz. In analyzing his mission, he
determined that he would be required to follow TF 1-81 into the foothold area and that he would then
have to be prepared to assume positions in the foothold or pass through the foothold to secure objective
HAWK.
Commander's Actions
Based on the general situation (see situation 4) and after analyzing courses of action available to him, the
TF commander developed the following general concept which he outlined to his staff:
"Our mission is to follow TF 1-81 and be prepared to assume positions in the foothold or to pass
through the foothold to secure objective HAWK. I want the task force organized for maximum
speed and flexibility. In the event that we are ordered to maintain positions in the foothold, I want
the order and manner in which we will deploy clearly defined. If we are ordered to pass through
the foothold, the momentum and flexibility of the attack must be maintained. Enemy pockets of
resistance are to be bypassed. We can police them up after objective HAWK has been secured. I
want to insure that alternate routes of advance to objective HAWK are identified."
"S3, check with brigade and see if we can move along two avenues of advance into the foothold:
along route BLUE behind IF 1-81, and along route GREEN behind TF 1-5. This would put us in a
better position to respond to the various contingencies that we must plan for. If we can use two
routes of advance, want a pure mech company on route BLUE followed by a mech-heavy team
and a tank-heavy team on route GREEN. Have the scout platoon screen forward along both routes
and maintain contact with the brigade lead task forces."
The task force S3 asks brigade if routes of advance, other than route BLUE, can be used by TF 1-82
elements moving into the foothold area and also beyond the foothold area toward objective HAWK.
Brigade approves the use of route GREEN, but wants to be kept closely informed as to which routes are
being used by which elements during the conduct of the operation. Based on task force commander's
general concept of operation and guidance, the task force is organized as follows:
TASK ORGANIZATION
A CCX^ANY TEAM CHARLIE TEAM TANK TF CONTROL
A/1-82 Mech C/1-82 Mech (-) B/1-5 Armor (-) Scout Platoon
1/2 /C/ 52 Engr 2/2/C/52 Engr 1 /C/1-82 Mech 2/C/52Engr
1 TOW Sect 1 /B/1-5 Armor Redeye Sect
1 Redeye Tm 1 TOW Sect Hv Mtr Pit
1 Redeye Tm
i HAWK 1
PL DUKE
PL LORD PL JACK
PL QUEEN
PL
KNIGHT
PL
DRAGON
Figure 2-32 Control Measures
Control Measures
Control measures are established forward of phase line Dragon to provide better command and control
for securing objective HAWK.
An additional phase line, PL Knight, is established; an on-order company/team boundary is established
between PL Dragon and PL Duke; and buildings to and around objective HAWK are numbered. Primary
routes of advance, BLUE and GREEN, are supplemented by alternate routes of advance, YELLOW and
WHITE, to objective HAWK.
PL QUEEN
PI LORD PL JACK
p^ KNIGHT
DRAGON
PL DUKE
Figure 2-33 Routes of Advance
Company/team objectives are identified in the rail yard area and include buildings which are adjacent to
and which dominate the rail yards. Objective boundaries will serve as fire coordination lines.
Figure 2-33 Company/Team Objectives
Task force elements are assigned specific missions:
A/1-82 Mech:
* Follow TF 1-81 Mech into foothold along route BLUE
* Be prepared to assume positions in foothold.
* Be prepared to pass through TF 1-81 and attack along route BLUE to secure objective WIND.
* On order, conduct systematic clearance in zone.
Team Tank:
* Follow A/1-82 Mech into the foothold along route BLUE.
* Be prepared to assume positions in foothold.
* Be prepared to follow A/1-82 along route BLUE to secure objective TACK.
* On order, conduct systematic clearance in zone.
Team CHARLIE:
* Follow TF 1-5 into foothold along route GREEN.
* Be prepared to assume positions in foothold.
* Be prepared to pass through TF 1-5 and attack along route GREEN to secure objective SAIL.
* On order, conduct systematic clearance in zone.
Scout Platoon:
* Screen forward of the TF along routes GREEN and BLUE.
* Be prepared to screen northern or southern flank of foothold area.
The two lead task forces of the brigade have successfully secured the foothold but only after defeating
stiff enemy resistance. Enemy forces are now in the process of falling back to alternate defensive
positions deeper within the city, but have left forces in contact to try to contain the foothold.
The brigade commander issued FRAG orders for TF 1-5 and TF 1-81 to hold their positions in the
foothold and to assist passage of TF 1-82 elements. He orders TF 1-82 to pass through the lead task
forces and continue the attack to secure objective HAWK. The priority of fires is shifted to TF 1-82. He
reminds the commanders of TF 1-5 and TF 1-81 that, upon passage of TF 1-82 lead elements, no targets
are to be engaged forward of phase line DRAGON without prior coordination with TF 1-82. He tells the
brigade 53 to have the reserve platoon prepared to load the aircraft for an air assault into the town on
2-minute notice.
Commander's Actions
The commander TF 1-82 issues FRAG orders to his company/team commanders to pass through the lead
task forces in the foothold area and continue the attack along designated routes of advance to secure
assigned objectives in and around the rail yards. All elements are to report progress by phase lines and
are to report any changes in routes of advance. The scout platoon is to screen the southern fiank.
As the task force continues the attack, lead elements find that enemy forces have rubbled buildings along
route GREEN and that the route is impassable to tracked vehicles. When the commander of team
CHARLIE is advised of this situation, he swings out to route WHITE and continues the advance.
As A/1-82 Mech lead elements near the rail yards, they come under increasingly heavy enemy fire.
Enemy defenders are occupying the hotel and city hall to the southeast of the rail yards. The hotel is
approximately 10 stories high, and the enemy defenders are able to control the surrounding area by fire
from inside the hotel, effectively halting the advance of A/1-82. The commander of A/1-82 reports his
situation to the task force commander who, in turn, requests from brigade that the reserve platoon be air
assaulted to the top of the hotel building. The brigade commander concurs and authorizes the
commitment of the brigade reserve platoon.
The commander of ALPHA/1-82 is advised of the air assault and is told to get into position to lay down a
heavy base of fire against the hotel as the first aircraft approaches the building. ALPHA/1-82 elements
assume covered and concealed positions to the west and southwest of the hotel and lay down a heavy
base of fire with their organic weapons. As the first aircraft lands on top of the building, enemy return
fire from the building starts to diminish and ALPHA/1-82 elements assault the building on the ground.
Enemy forces within the building readily surrender. Task force elements then proceed to secure their
assigned objectives.
SPECIAL SITUATION 6
Systematic Clearance of Built Up Area
The 3d Brigade notifies division headquarters that the rail yards are secure and that a systematic
clearance of the town will begin shortly. The brigade S3 asks the division G3 if any additional units will
be available to the 3d Brigade to assist with clearing operations. The division G3 replies that 1st and 2d
Brigade elements have just been able to link up to the north of Lets, and they will not be available for
clearing operations in the town. The division G3 also advises the 3d Brigade that a civil affairs team and
the personnel from the division G5 office will be reporting to the 3d Brigade CP to advise the brigade
commander on matters pertaining to the civilian population and the local civilian government.
Intelligence reports indicate that several pockets of enemy resistance remain even though enemy forces
are attempting to withdraw completely from the town. It is not expected that they have sufficient force to
attempt a breakthrough operation. Civilians in the area have reported that enemy forces have planted
mines and booby traps throughout the area. Generally speaking, the civilian population has been
extremely cooperative with friendly forces, but they have expressed considerable concern about the
destruction within the town resulting from military operations and have requested that every effort be
made to avoid further destruction.
The brigade commander assigns each task force a sector of the town to clear.
Task Force Clearance Zones
Figure 2-35 Task Force Clearance Zones (previous page)
The brigade commander calls his task force commanders together to brief them on how the clearing
operations are to be conducted.
"A brigade prisoner of war facility will be established in the vicinity of the rail yards and manned
by the military police. All prisoners of war are to be immediately evacuated to the facility.
"The safety of civilians in the area is of great concern to me. During the conduct of the clearing
operations, indiscriminate and random firing is to be avoided. The integrity of civilians and their
property is to be respected.
"Indirect fires are not to be utilized during the clearing operations unless permission to do so is
granted by my CP. Heavy direct fire weapons should only be used as a last resort. Tear agents may
be used against known or suspected enemy positions.
"It can be reasonably expected that mines, booby traps, and unexpended munitions will be
encountered by our troops. They should constantly be alert for these hazards. When feasible, these
items are to be marked and bypassed, initially. If they cannot be bypassed, engineers will assist in
disposing of them. Caution your troops about the hazards of booby traps and unexpended
munitions.
"Your troops should expect enemy soldiers on the roofs of buildings, at ground level, and below
ground level in sewer systems and underground garages. They cannot afford to assume that the
enemy is not there.
"I will retain the platoon I now have in reserve to serve as a security/reaction force throughout the
zone. My CP will be located in the vicinity of the rail yards. I expect my CP to be kept closely
informed concerning your progress during the clearing operations."
The Company Team Battle
This section has provided examples of how units from corps through battalion task force may attack on
the urbanized battlefield. It focused on the factors the commander must consider in developing his
offensive plan in this environment. Details pertaining to the conduct of the company team battle within
the built-up areas of the urbanized battlefield are provided in the appendices to this manual.
SUMMARY
Know the characteristics of urbanized terrain and the advantages and disadvantages it offers both the
attacker and the defender.
Bypass built-up areas when possible in order to maintain attack momentum and lessen casualties.
Attack a built-up area only as the last resort, and only when major advantage accrues through its seizure
or control.
Attack where the enemy is weak-hit his flanks and rear simultaneously.
Rapid, detailed planning by participating commanders is required to allow decentralized execution and
limit command and control problems during the battle.
Employ the combined arms team to provide a mutual shielding of vulnerabilities.
Dissipate the enemy's strength by causing him to react to demonstrations, feints, or ruses.
Concentrate overwhelming combat power to force a quick and violent disruption of the defenses, envelop
the built-up area, and move rapidly to the enemy's rear.
Maneuver over approaches to a built-up area must be obscured by smoke and protected by over watching
fires.
Where possible, reduce strong points with fires only, keep moving, and secure them with follow-on
forces.
Cut lines of communications and defeat the enemy through isolation.
Attack at night to gain surprise or to take objectives whose assault during daylight would be too costly.
Once momentum has been gained, the attack must be continuous until defenses have been splintered.
CHAPTER 3
Defense
Defensive operations on urbanized terrain are conducted in accordance with the fundamentals and
principles contained in FM 100-5, Operations, and the How-to-Fight series of manuals. The general
characteristics of the urban environment described in chapter 1 and appendix A influence the conduct of thi
defense at each command level.
This chapter supplements other doctrinal manuals by describing how the enemy may attack on urbanized
terrain and how the defense is planned, organized, and conducted.
HOW THE ENEMY ATTACKS
This section supplements the threat offensive doctrine sections of other How-to-Fight manuals by
describing how the enemy may attack built-up areas on the urbanized battlefield. It also discusses his
organization for combat and use of the combined arms team in this environment.
Threat force structure and offensive tactics incorporate the concepts of mass, maneuver, and speed. Daily
offensive rates of advance of 60-100 kilometers are expected during nuclear operations, and 30-60
kilometers under conventional conditions. To achieve these significant rates, to maintain offensive
momentum, and to avoid presenting lucrative targets for nuclear weapons, speed and bypass operations are
emphasized in overcoming natural and manmade obstacles.
When it is necessary to attack a built-up area, the following basic concepts govern the deployment of forces
at division level:
A surprise attack from the line of march, based on detailed advanced reconnaissance, is the preferred
form of attack.
Deliberate attacks from positions in contact may be launched if initial operations fail to make
progress.
Day and night attacks are used to maintain constant pressure on the defender.
Smoke, darkness, and limited visibility conditions are exploited to conceal movement.
Command and control is decentralized to the maximum extent possible.
The combined arms team is integrated at motorized rifle company level.
The decision to attack a city or town may be based on tactical, strategic, or political considerations; and it is
normally made at army level or above. Threat forces may attack built-up areas to:
Secure political, industrial, logistical and communications facilities.
Destroy defending forces within a built-up area.
Gain passage through an urban area that cannot be bypassed.
The results of urbanization and its effects on offensive operations are recognized and planned for by Threat
commanders. The following table shows how they classify built-up areas by using population and perimeter
size. Their doctrine stresses that offensive formations attacking across highly developed regions may
encounter at least one large built-up area every 40 to 60 kilometers, with one or two small built-up areas
contained in every 200 to 300 square kilometers of battle area. The numerous small villages and clusters of
structures that restrict and even block avenues of approach are treated as potential strong-points to be
isolated and neutralized or destroyed by lower-level units.
Classification of Built-Up Areas
SIZE ESTIMATED
POPULATION CLASSIFICATION
100,000 Large
50,000 to 100,000 Average
< 50, 000 Small
PERIMETER
25 kms
15 kms to 25 kms
15 kms
SURPRISE ATTACK
A surprise attack envisions a rapid, bold movement from the line of march by a strong advance detachment
to secure an undefended or lightly defended built-up area. It seeks to avoid a costly, protracted
street-by-street, house-to-house battle and permit attacking forces to continue beyond the area without
reducing offensive momentum. The surprise attack seeks to preserve vital facilities such as bridges,
railroads, airfields, key industrial complexes, and utilities.
The following figure illustrates how a motorized rifle division (MRD) might conduct a surprise attack with
a reinforced M battalion (MRB) in the role of the advance detachment. The size of an advance detachment
is determined by the size of the built-up area and expected resistance.
The advance detachment moves rapidly and attempts to avoid contact with defensive forces on the
approaches to the objective. If little or no resistance is encountered, the advance detachment seizes the most
important objectives (buildings) and key streets, splitting the area into isolated pockets of resistance, and
destroys them piecemeal. Hasty defenses are organized to defeat counterattacks by the defending forces or
to destroy defenders attempting to escape through the built-up area.
Airborne or helicopter-landed forces may support the advance detachment by sealing off flanks or the rear
of the objective. These forces may also be employed as the advance detachment around or in the built-up
area. An advance detachment operating outside the range of forward artillery receives intensified
reconnaissance and close air support from high-performance aircraft and helicopter forces.
If the surprise attack fails, the advanced detachment is normally directed to seize a foothold in the outskirts
or to seize an adjacent key terrain feature and wait for the main body to arrive.
SECURE
KEY OBJECTIVE
Figure 3-3a Secure Key Objective
OR
SEIZE A
FOOTHOLD
DEFENDING FORCE
1
Figure 3-3b Seize A Foothold
DELIBERATE ATTACK
A deliberate attack is conducted when the surprise attack has failed or when intelligence indicates a city is
well defended. This attack involves larger forces, requires more detailed planning, and has a greater weight
of artillery, mortar, and rocket fires than a surprise attack. The deliberate attack is characterized by:
Isolation of the objective.
Extensive reconnaissance.
Intense pre-assault bombardment.
Assaults to secure a foothold and key objectives.
Reconnaissance
Advanced reconnaissance activities include the study of large-scale maps, aerial photographs, and
background intelligence reports. These data are updated by tactical intelligence from long-range
reconnaissance patrols, agent reports, and electronic intelligence. Heli-borne and airborne units may
supplement ground reconnaissance and are normally targeted against specific key points in the urban area.
Reconnaissance functions are also frequently conducted by infiltrators disguised as refugees. Infiltrators or
reconnaissance detachments may operate in the objective area for several days before an assault. Active
reconnaissance may include the use of local residents to provide current essential information of the
defender's activities. Raids by reconnaissance teams may be mounted for the purpose of capturing prisoners
and documents. In some cases, raid/reconnaissance teams may be tasked to destroy selected critical
facilities and defending forces prior to a deliberate attack.
Reconnaissance tasks include the determination of:
Defensive dispositions on approaches to objectives.
Covered positions leading to flanks or rear of the objective.
Location and strength of defensive strong points.
Main routes through the built-up area.
Key objectives (buildings) that dominate the area.
Underground passages that can be utilized by assaulting forces.
MRRs Isolating an Objactiva
LLL
1^
2D
ECHELON
OBJECTIVE
-^
m
30 KM
^
Figure 3-4. MRRs Isolating an Objective
• Command post, reserves, weapon positions, and supply locations.
Isolation
The preceding figure depicts first-echelon regiments of a motorized rifle division (MRD) isolating an
objective area in order to deny reinforcement/resupply of defenders and block escape routes. Occasionally,
an intentional exit may be permitted to entice defenders into open terrain where they can be attacked. After
isolating the area, second-echelon forces may conduct a siege operation while first-echelon forces break
contact and continue their advance. If the attacker's timetable permits, siege operations are preferred to
avoid a costly direct assault and destruction of facilities needed to support future operations.
Bombardment
The deliberate attack is normally preceded by howitzer, mortar, rocket, and air bombardment. The intensit
of the preparation is determined by the strength of defensive forces, the type building construction, and the
density of fires required to suppress observation and fires.
First priority of fires is allocated to the main attack to destroy AT weapon positions and strong points on th(
area's edge. Artillery attached to assaulting units normally does not participate in the bombardment, but is
reserved for direct fire employment against strong points on the outskirts and for support within the built-u
area.
Other goals of the bombardment are to destroy or disrupt:
Communications.
Heavy weapon positions.
Command posts.
Tall structures that permit observation.
Troop emplacements.
Threat forces fully appreciate that heavy bombardments may affect their mobility, but consider reduced
mobility an acceptable tradeoff for destruction of defending forces. Incapacitating or nonpersistent lethal
chemical fires may be employed during bombardment to inflict casualties and preclude destruction of key
facilities. Smoke will normally be employed during artillery preparations to suppress the defenders while
threat forces negotiate obstacles on the approaches and within the built-up area.
Assault
Habitually, simultaneous attacks are made on the flanks and rear to capture specific objectives and to
splinter defenses. Frontal assaults are avoided and will be conducted only when an objective cannot be
isolated or flanked.
During or immediately after preparatory fires, engineers move forward under the cover of smoke and high
explosives to neutralize barriers and breach minefields on routes into the city. First-echelon assault groups
attack to secure a foothold 2-3 blocks in depth. After securing the initial foothold and rupturing the outer
defenses, the first echelon may continue to attack, or the second echelon is passed through the foothold and
attacks along designated routes from one objective to another.
The attack within the built-up area is characterized by bold, rapid movements to secure assigned objectives,
Buildings along the route are not routinely searched or secured unless resistance is strong. Bypassed
defenders are left for elimination by following echelons or the reserve. If the leading echelon is stopped or
slowed, the following echelons or reserve may be committed around engaged forces and continue to the
objective.
^*<««
MRB Attack in Built-up Araa
FINAL PLATOON
OBJECTIVES
INTERMEDt^TE
OBJECTIVE
f* INTERMEDIATE
► OBJECTIVES
RESERVE
±±X
m
SCALE (M} b
100
300
600
Figure 3-6 MRB Attack in Built-up Area
Zd Echelon Committod Around Engaged Ist Echvlon
RESERVE
Liaft
1^
SCALE {m I.
100
300
900
Figure 3-7. 2d Echelon Committed Around Engaged 1st Echelon
Detected weaknesses in the defense are exploited by aggressive mounted attacks. Infantry mounted on
tanks, in BMPs, or trucks fire while moving rapidly along streets to assigned objectives. Tactical doctrine
stresses the use of underground routes in the attack. Such routes that cannot be used are blocked or mined
to prevent infiltration into the attacking force's rear.
In the assault of an objective, Threat forces isolate the position by fire or by securing adjacent buildings.
Isolation is stressed to prevent defenders from escaping to a rearward position and to deny reinforcement.
Attached artillery and tanks are habitually used to suppress defensive fires and to breach walls to provide
entrances for assaulting infantry. Assaulting infantry avoid advancing along streets where they would be
exposed to effective defensive fire. They seek surprise by attacking the objective from the flank or rear.
Routes to the objective may consist of available underground passages such as subways, tunnels, and
sewers, or passages blasted through intervening building walls. Once the assault of an objective begins,
supporting fires shift to upper stories and to adjacent buildings. Assaulting infantry aggressively clear, in
sequence, ground floor, basement, stairways, and each ascending floor. Once secured, the position is
immediately prepared to repel counterattacks.
Round-the-clock operations are stressed to maintain uninterrupted momentum of the attack and to reduce
casualties. Night operations against built-up areas are conducted to:
Bypass outlying villages being used as battle positions.
Seize initial objectives on the edge of the built-up area when there is a requirement to attack across
open ground.
Attack across open areas (broad streets, parks, between buildings).
Seize strong points that are heavily defended.
Reduce street obstacles that are well protected by mines and covered by fires.
Exploit successes of daylight operations by keeping pressure on the defense.
Reconnaissance units may attempt to infiltrate night objectives to achieve detailed information and to guide
assault forces to their objectives. The difficulty of night navigation in restrictive terrain and in the
proximity of opposing forces requires a simple maneuver plan with close, easily recognized objectives.
Assault groups normally attack in one echelon with units deployed on line. Surprise is achieved by
withholding fire support until after the infantry assault has been detected. Once the attack has been
unmasked, artillery illuminates the objective. Attached tanks and artillery join assault forces and suppress
defensive fires with direct fires.
When surprise cannot be achieved, night assaults may be preceded by direct artillery/tank fires against
strongly defended buildings. Direct support artillery and mortars seal off the objective area to prevent
defenders from withdrawing or being reinforced. Illumination is fired to guide forces, illuminate objectives,
and to dazzle the defender's night vision devices.
After securing assigned objectives and eliminating significant defensive opposition, assault groups
normally establish defensive positions beyond the built-up area and prepare to continue the attack. Detailed
clearance operations are normally passed to following units or to security formations.
ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT
The size and composition of the force allocated to seize a built-up area is determined by the area's size,
shape, type of buildings, street patterns, and strength of defending forces. Attacking forces are not evenly
distributed around the built-up area, but are employed over the most favorable avenues of approach.
Generalized attack zones for motorized rifle units are:
Division 4 to 6 kilometers
Regiment 2 to 3 kilometers
Battalion 400 to 600 meters
Company 200 to 300 meters
The figure below depicts the second-echelon motorized rifle regiments of a motorized rifle division
conducting a deliberate attack. The 1st MRR, designated as the main attack force, is moving with three
motorized rifle battalions (MRBs) in column. This formation is normally employed when defenses are
organized in depth or when the city is configured in an elongated pattern.
The 2d MRR is organized with two MRBs in the first echelon, one MRB (-) in the second echelon, and a
MR company as the reserve. Thi formation is normally employed when defenses are organized on the city's
edge or when attacking a shallow built-up area.
Motorized Rille Regiinar>t« Conducting tha Deliberate Attack
MAIN AHACK
SECONDARY ATTACK
Cl'^ OBJECTIVES
^^^ DEFENSIVE
POSITIONS
1ST ECHELON-' ^///.
2D ECHELON
Figure 3-9 Motorized Rifle Regiments Conducting the Deliberate Attack
Attach Qf Built-up Area bv Reinforced Mclorixad flifle Battalion (Mein Attack)
1ST ECHELON
200—300 M .
2D ECHELON
, 200—300 M
RESERVE
, 200-300 M
J
1^ S*e^
[5iSn2 S
l^ t-> S [m]
SPH
(DIRECT FIRE]
Figure 3-10 . Attack of Built-up Area by Reinforced Motorized Rifl Battalion (Main Attack)
The basic unit in built-up area warfare is the reinforced MRB. The above figure illustrates a type
first-echelon MRB (assault detachment) designated as the main attack force. The battalion is reinforced by
attaching a tank company, a battery of SP artillery for direct fire, one company of engineers, and one NBC
reconnaissance section. An additional artillery battalion is normally placed in direct support for indirect fin
missions in the battalion's zone. Missions normally assigned to a MRB making the main attack in the first
echelon include:
Seize intermediate objective(s) on city's edge.
Attack along primary (main) routes to secure deep objectives and key facilities in zone.
Second-echelon MRBs are also reinforced with tanks, artillery, and engineers. This arrangement provides
for rapid replacement of the first echelon without time-consuming reassignment of units during the battle.
Missions normally assigned a second-echelon MRB include:
Reinforce first echelon.
Be prepared to assume first-echelon mission.
Provide replacements to first-echelon units which have lost combat effectiveness.
Reduce bypassed defense positions.
Reserve MRBs are prepared to:
Pass through either echelon and attack to take advantage of a defensive weakness.
Protect flank.
Conduct fire fighting and debris clearance missions as required.
Motorized rifle companies (MRCs) may be designated as assault groups. MRCs conducting the main attack
are normally reinforced with a tank platoon, an artillery battery, chemical and flame thrower units, and an
engineer platoon. Frequently, MRB antitank gun platoons will be attached to the MRC making the main
attack.
Attachments to the MR company are further attached to platoons, providing each platoon with at least one
tank or artillery weapon and a share of engineers. These attachments allow decentralized/independent
operations by platoons in seizing specific objectives. Frequently, these attachments may be made down to
squad level.
Motorixad Rifiv Platoon Auaulting Slrongpoint
4<^^ 5i^ ^rb* '?-^*'. C?— '
INDIRECT
HE & SMOKE
IMPACT,
[if TANK
OBMP (SAGGER.
GUN, MGJ
ASSAULT ROUTES
PLATOON & SQUAD
ShG-9
122 GUN (SPf
^ SUPPORTING
FIRE DIRECTION
Figure 3-11 Motorized Rifle Platoon Assaulting Strongpoint.
Tanks
Tanks supporting MR companies may be employed as a platoon, in sections, or singly with an MR squad.
Generally, a rifle squad provides close-in security for each tank, relying on the tank for protection and fire
support. Tanks also support the attack by firing on suspected positions, smashing barricades, and engaging
opposing armor.
Artillery
The difficulty of centralized fire control and the decreased effectiveness of indirect fires within built-up
areas is recognized. For these reasons, over 50 percent of the available artillery may be attached and
employed in a direct fire role to create breaches in buildings, walls, and barricades. Within the built-up
area, SP artillery weapons are frequently attached to infantry platoons/squads. The artillery commander
normally collocates with the MRB commander.
Mortars
Mortars cover avenues of enemy troop movements, such as street intersections and alleys. Mortar firing
positions are placed behind walls or inside buildings close to their targets.
Engineers
Engineers are attached to MR platoons and squads with the following missions:
Breach obstacles on approaches to the city.
Clear passages through rubble and barricades.
Destroy individual buildings.
Block or clear underground passages.
Clear or lay mines as required.
Division and Regimental Artillery
Massed fire from heavy batteries of the division and regimental artillery groups is used against large
buildings, strong enemy fortified positions, and in a counter fire role. Other missions for these groups
include interdiction and destruction of enemy supply installations, headquarters, and communication
centers.
BASIC OFFENSIVE CONSIDERATIONS
Threat doctrine stresses the following offensive fundamentals which should be considered when planning
the defense of a built-up area.
Built-up areas not essential to overall success of offensive operations will be bypassed and isolated if
possible. When an attack is required. Threat forces will attempt to secure key built-up areas by a surprise
attack from the march before defenses have been established.
The deliberate attack is characterized by isolating the objective area, conducting an intense pre-assault air
and artillery bombardment, and by multiple assaults on the flanks and rear of the area to be secured.
Combined arms assault groups orient on securing objectives and will bypass and isolate centers of
resistance. Detailed clearance of each building is normally assigned to follow-on units.
MR companies are reinforced with tanks, artillery, antitank guns, and engineers. MR companies are
expected to operate independently. The majority of organic artillery is attached to assaulting units and
employed in a direct fire role.
Underground systems are considered to be key avenues of approach. Tall structures that are likely
observation posts are high-priority artillery targets.
The enemy will accept isolation of attacking units and heavy losses to secure assigned objectives and to
maintain attack momentum.
PLANNING THE DEFENSE
This section describes US defensive doctrine for operations on urbanized terrain and provides detailed
considerations to be applied by commanders during planning. Readers must be familiar with defensive
planning as outlined in organizational How-to-Fight manuals and understand how the enemy attacks.
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
Commanders at each level must decide how best to integrate manmade features into their overall scheme.
In some cases, commanders may be directed to defend a built-up area, a line of communications, or an
industrial complex whose retention provides significant advantage within the framework of the defensive
plan of a higher level commander. The decision to defend such an area may also be made because of
specific tactical advantages accruing to the defender assigned responsibility for an area. In all cases, the
elements of urban sprawl must be analyzed in conjunction with natural terrain in order to determine how t<
enhance weapons effectiveness to slow, block, canalize, and destroy the enemy.
Built-up areas, like forests, hills, or other terrain features, may be incorporated in the plan for the defense o
an urban area in order to:
Control avenues of approach. Avenues of approach in urban areas are frequently interrupted by
built-up areas scattered across the terrain. These built-up areas may provide a portion of the
defensive grid for the combined arms team. In some cases, the location of a built-up area on the
urban terrain complex may effectively deny bypass to major elements of an attacking force. At lower
levels of command, this may favor the use of villages or small towns as strong-points. At the other
extreme, major urban complexes may be so large that they cannot be totally avoided.
Act as a combat multiplier. Built-up areas are obstacles to a mechanized force. Passage through such
areas can be blocked, canalizing enemy forces into open terrain interlaced with anti-armor fires and
reinforced with mines and other obstacles. When urbanization significantly restricts mounted
maneuver or when sufficient mechanized forces are unavailable, the integration of the elements of
urban sprawl into the defense may provide a combat multiplier for the defender.
Conceal forces. Technological advances have significantly improved tactical imagery and sensor
devices. However, when employed against built-up areas, their effectiveness is greatly reduced. In
addition, urban features frequently offer cover and concealment to the defender with a minimum
expenditure of preparation time. Such features may be suitable for use as battle positions within the
overall defensive scheme.
Retain key transportation centers. The requirement to shift and concentrate major combat forces and
supplies rapidly over an extended battle area may demand the retention of the hubs of main road and
railroad networks.
Deny strategic/political objectives. Industrial or economic complexes may be incorporated in the
defense for their strategic value, while political/cultural centers may provide psychological/national
morale advantages.
Built-up areas will normally not be utilized as part of the urban defensive plan when:
Sufficient combat strength is not available for defense.
The built-up area does not support the overall defensive concept.
Terrain adjacent to the built-up area permits the enemy to bypass it.
Structures within the built-up area do not afford adequate protection for the defender.
The complex is dominated by adjacent terrain that offers an attacker significant observed fire
advantages over the defender.
The built-up area is declared an "open city" for humanitarian and political reasons or to protect
valuable structures.
Planners should seek to avoid combat within built-up areas while recognizing that this may not always be
possible. They should also seek to integrate into the overall defensive scheme those built-up areas which
provide the commander defensive advantages.
FUNDAMENTALS OF THE DEFENSE
The fundamentals of the defense do not change on the urban battlefield. To apply them, commanders must
understand the characteristics and components of urban sprawl, the advantages and disadvantages they
offer, and how they impact on the capabilities of units and weapons during the conduct of the defense.
Understand the Enemy
The first part of this chapter supplements Threat data provided in other source documents by describing
how the enemy may attack on urbanized terrain. When planning an urban defense, commanders at each
level must place themselves in the enemy's position, view the battlefield from his perspective, and fit his
concepts, formations, and weapons to the terrain. This estimate enables the defender to narrow the list of
tactical options available to the attacker and identify his most probable courses of action. See the Battlefield
Once the commander has organized the defense to counter the variety of attack options available to the
enemy, he must aggressively seek to learn where the enemy is, how he is organized, which way he is going,
and in what strength.
Although the characteristics of urbanized terrain may complicate the intelligence collection effort, the
advantage lies initially with the defender. Commanders at all levels must know the terrain over which they
will conduct the defense. Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target-acquisition resources must be applied as
far forward as possible along likely avenues of approach to provide data to higher commanders.
Security forces operating from covered and concealed positions in depth complement electronic warfare
support measures and tactical imagery activities by limiting the enemy's ground reconnaissance and
infiltration capabilities.
On the urban battlefield, the attacker must forfeit, at least in part, the advantages of cover and concealment
in order to move and mass; his routes of advance are limited and more clearly defined, enhancing the
defender's target-surveillance capability; and he must use increased communications to coordinate the
concentration of his forces, which reduces his ability to achieve surprise.
The defender must use his knowledge of the terrain and enemy to see the battlefield more accurately than
the enemy, to prevent surprise, and to maximize reaction time for maneuver forces.
Concentrate at the Critical Times and Places
The ability of the defender to concentrate rapidly throughout the battle area may be limited by restrictive
terrain. In order to maintain a favorable mobility differential over the attacker, the commander must use hi
knowledge of the terrain. Routes must be selected, reconnoitered, and prepared for the forward and lateral
movement of forces to be concentrated. The obstacle value of the urban terrain complex must be reinforced
to slow the attacker.
Detailed movement data and explicit traffic control plans are essential. Lines of communication which are
dependent on bridges, overpasses, or tunnels should not be used unless suitable bypasses are available.
Weather or land usage patterns, as well as other manmade features, may limit the mobility of armored and
mechanized forces. Greater reliance must be placed on an initial positioning of forces which accepts risk
zones along the least probable avenues of approach. These zones may be covered primarily by air or
ground screening forces and fires. On urbanized terrain, it is more difficult to recover from an erroneous
decision which concentrates maneuver elements too early or at the wrong place. In this
maneuver-restrictive environment, increased emphasis on the use of artillery and attack helicopters as the
first increments of concentration is required. As the battle progresses, the commander's intimate knowledge
of the terrain is used to maintain the mobility advantage.
Fight as a Combined Arms Team
A detailed analysis of the urban-terrain complex provides the basis for allocating and organizing available
forces to accomplish the defensive mission. Cross- reinforcement of maneuver elements will normally be
required in order to match unit capabilities to the terrain mix. In the more open portions of the urban
environment, armored and mechanized forces may play the dominant role. As the density of manmade
features increases, the employment of mechanized or dismounted infantry, supported by armor and
engineers, becomes increasingly important. If it is necessary to fight within a built-up area, the role of
infantry supported by other arms becomes dominant. Field and air defense artillery, air cavalry, and attack
helicopters are employed throughout the battle area to maximize the combined arms team's effectiveness,
multiply its combat power, and enhance its survivability.
Exploit the Advantages of the Defender
The already significant advantages of the defender become more pronounced on the urbanized battlefield.
A common threat running through the discussion of the application of these fundamentals is the defender's
familiarity with the terrain. Every action by the attacker is made more difficult because he must feel his
way through this complex of manmade and natural terrain features. The defender can prepare the ground i
advance, build and reinforce obstacles, and select firing positions and observation posts, many of which
require improvement only. He can reconnoiter and improve routes between battle positions to shift forces
and to supply them. Mutually supporting positions are often readily available. This pattern of favorable
positions should enable the commander to strike the enemy repeatedly, slowing and disrupting him,
inflicting losses, and making him vulnerable to multiple, violent, local counterattacks. In many areas,
terrain restrictions may enable attacks by fire alone.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
Defensive planning on the urbanized battlefield follows the process described in organizational
How-to-Fight manuals. The basic roles of the covering force, main battle, and rear areas remain unchanged
The following specific considerations assume added importance.
Organization of the Battlefield.
On the urbanized battlefield, the defender fits his forces to the ground by utilizing the terrain to take
maximum advantage of its natural and manmade features. Urban sprawl adds strength to the active defens<
by providing covered and concealed positions and restricting the attacker's mobility and observation.
Dismounted infantry can contribute to this defense by occupying battle positions or strong points around
which the mobile battle is fought. In restrictive urban terrain, dismounted forces may be required in order i
find the enemy, deny him the ability to close without being detected, and then fight the close-in battle.
If the retention of a built-up area is required, the defense may assume the characteristics of a position
defense organized in depth and supported by strong mobile forces.
Covering Force Area (CFA). The urban area defense begins with mobile combined arms covering forces
deployed well forward of the main battle area (MBA).. Company team and task force battle positions are
organize in depth to control approaches to the main battle area, with emphasis placed on using natural and
manmade features which offer cover and concealment or restrict opposing force maneuver. Small villages
and strip areas may be incorporated in the defensive scheme in the same manner as other terrain features.
Increased engineer support is required to reinforce the obstacle nature of the terrain and maintain
withdrawal and attack routes. Mixed caliber artillery contributes to deception in this environment where it
is difficult for the enemy to see the battlefield and assists the CFA commander in maintaining the
continuity of the defense from successive positions. The air defense artillery umbrella must extend over the
CFA to deny the enemy the use of aerial observation and attack assets. Air cavalry and attack helicopters
should be employed throughout the CFA, taking advantage of the terrain which limits detection by ground
surveillance and screens aerial maneuver.
The transfer of the enemy by the covering force must not result in an easing of pressure or allow the enemy
to gain momentum. Once detailed coordination has been accomplished, the restrictive nature of the urban
terrain complex, its obstacles, and readily available defensive positions may facilitate the actual hand off.
Main Battle Area (MBA). The defending commander must be aware of the impact that urbanization of the
terrain within the MBA will have on his ability to defend. Consideration should be given to the restrictive
or compartmentalized areas caused by the urbanization process and to the advantages or disadvantages
which the areas may offer the defender. It is possible that some of these areas may fall within risk areas
which provide the enemy with covered and/or concealed infiltration routes into the MBA. In such cases,
responsibility for risk areas must be clearly delineated between adjacent units. If the urban terrain includes
villages, small towns, and strip areas, it might be advantageous to incorporate these features within
company/team or task force battle positions. Such features can provide excellent cover and concealment to
defending forces and are frequently mutually supportable.
As previously noted, it may become necessary to designate a built-up complex within the MBA as critical
to the defense of the urban area. When this situation arises, it is imperative to initiate the defense of the
urban area as far forward as possible to facilitate the defense of the built-up area and to avoid a protracted
combat-in-cities battle.
The figure below portrays typical defensive sectors for company/team organizations assigned a defend
mission in various types of built-up areas. With less restrictive missions, these typical widths may be
extended. Final sector dimensions are defined based on a detailed analysis as described in appendix A.
Figure 3-17. Typical Company Team Defensive Sectors by Type Built-up Area
A 300-500 Meters
B 400-600 Meters
C 500-800 Meters
D 500-900 Meters
E 700-1100 Meters
Commanders should consider the potential value of urban features as obstacles to attacking forces.
Frequently urban areas sit astride, or otherwise dominate, high-speed avenues of approach into and througl
the MBA. If urban areas cannot be bypassed easily, they may reduce the momentum of the enemy's attack
and his ability to maneuver. In these instances, the defending commander must be prepared to capitalize on
the situation. Conversely, the defending commander must also appreciate the limitations which urban areas
can place on his own ability to maneuver, particularly during active defense operations.
A primary concern to commanders defending a built-up area is to avoid becoming isolated by enemy
forces. In planning the defense, the commander can normally make two assumptions concerning this
matter. The first assumption is that although the built-up area may not occupy terrain which is dominant, h
normally has dominant terrain adjacent to it on at least one side. The second assumption is that, doctrinally
the enemy will attempt to bypass and isolate a built-up area by securing the adjacent dominant terrain
before the built-up area itself is directly attacked. Therefore, the defending commander must integrate
surrounding dominant terrain into his defensive scheme in order to preclude being bypassed and isolated.
Should the defense of an urban area develop to the point that operations within the built-up area itself are
required, the defending commander must consider the nature of the built-up area and the characteristics
which are unique to fighting there. The nature of the built-up area includes such aspects as the size of the
area, the type of construction used for buildings, the density of the buildings, and the street pattern or layou
of the built-up area. These aspects may vary considerably from one part of the built-up area to another, but
each will impact in some way on the manner in which the defense of the area is conducted.
Built-up areas generally degrade command and control by reducing the capability of direct observation of
subordinate units and by interfering with radio communication. Zones of responsibility are compressed intc
relatively small areas with shorter unit frontages.
Maneuver room is restricted, placing a greater reliance on infantry-heavy forces. Fields of fire and
observation are also reduced, leading to violent, independent small-unit actions at close quarters. The battle
within a built-up area can be expected to be multidimensional. It may be fought simultaneously above the
ground, on roof tops, in buildings, at street level, and below the ground in sewers and subway systems.
Rear Area. The functions and organization of the division rear area are not significantly changed in an
urban environment. Within larger urban areas, mobility may be restricted by damage to and along lines of
communication from air or artillery attacks. Detailed traffic control may be required to maintain the
forward and rearward flow of combat service support elements. Additionally, the ever present threat of
attack by small elements infiltrating through the MBA or from air assault forces increases. Internal security
and self-defense responsibilities expand because of the limited availability of and reduced mobility of
reserves.
When the MBA defense is organized around brigade battle areas, security during logistical movements and
for combat support units located outside these battle areas becomes increasingly critical. If brigade support
areas are located behind battle areas, additional coordination may be required to establish priority for
security and movement between the various brigade, division, and corps support elements.
Limited Visibility Operations
The defender on the urban battlefield must be prepared to counter enemy attacks launched at night or undt
other conditions of limited visibility. Within built-up areas, the attacker may use such conditions to attempt
to extend his reconnaissance, infiltrate friendly positions, cross open areas, or secure limited objectives. To
help defend against such operations, the following basic measures may be employed:
Shift defensive positions and crew-served weapons to alternate positions just before dark to reduce
chances for surprise and to deceive the enemy as to their exact location. A squad or fire team can
often be shifted to an adjacent building and provide the same cover on an avenue of approach.
Occupy or patrol open areas between units which are covered by observed fire during daylight.
Employ radar, remote sensors, and night observation devices on the best night avenues of approach.
Use nuisance mines, noisemaking devices, tangle foot tactical wire, and LPs on secondary avenues
of approach for early warning.
Place LPs for security outside of buildings being used as strong points or battle positions.
Plan illumination over the entire sector, integrating artillery/mortar flares, trip flares, and
hand-projected flares.
Command and Control
Urban warfare places a heavy strain on the command and control apparatus. Command of subordinate unii
and the control of fires is complicated by restrictive terrain, the proximity of opposing forces, reduced
communications capabilities, and the numerous small, isolated battles that may be fought simultaneously
throughout the urban complex.
The primary control measures used are battle areas, battle positions, and sectors. Phase lines, checkpoints,
and restrictive fire control measures may also be used to simplify reporting and control.
Timely and accurate situation reports are more critical to the commander in this environment. Distances
between forces on the urban battlefield are reduced; an unreported breakthrough may splinter defensive
cohesion and seriously jeopardize the entire defense. Commanders must constantly be informed of critical
actions to enable rapid assessment and reaction. Commanders should be located well forward and within
FM (secure) ranges of committed forces.
An in-depth, well-thought-out concept of defense provides the latitude for repositioning uncommitted units
and quickly integrating them into the defense.
Achievement of an integrated, flexible, and responsible command and control system will require:
A detailed, but simple, centralized concept for conducting the defense. Subordinate units will be
given restrictive missions and finite control measures where necessary.
Although told exactly what to do- how to accomplish assigned tasks will be left to subordinate units
(decentralized execution).
Decentralized execution may require attachment of combat support and combat service support
assets.
Commanders insure accomplishment of assigned tasks in an orderly fashion by establishing priorities
and deadlines.
THE DEFENSIVE BATTLE
This section provides examples of how units from corps through battalion task force may defend on an
urbanized battlefield. The urbanized terrain offers certain benefits and problems for the defender to
consider in developing his defensive plan. A keen awareness of the urban environment and how it can
affect the battle is stressed for all levels of command. In order to reduce the amount of repetitive general
information, each special situation flows from the preceding material. Therefore, they should be read in
sequence. General planning considerations and procedures described in detail in organizational
How-to-Fight manuals are not repeated here.
GENERAL SITUATION
Strategic intelligence sources indicate that enemy units are preparing to initiate offensive operations. All
available information points to the fact that an attack crossing the international boundary on a wide front is
imminent. The commander, 10th (US) Corps, along with other allied commanders has bee directed to
implement standing defense plans immediately.
The mission of the lOth (US) Corps is to establish covering forces along the international boundary and
defend in sector.
This Corps is a forward-deployed organization consisting of the following major combat units:
23d Armored Division
52d Mechanized Division
203d Armored Cav Regt
312th Mech Inf Bde (Sep)
The 10th (US) Corps is opposed by the 6th and 8th Combined Arms Armies. It is estimated that their
combined first-echelon forces will consist of three motorized rifle and two tank divisions, with three
motorized rifle and one tank division in the second echelon. The front's second echelon includes a tank
army and mobilizing combined arms army element.
It is estimated that the enemy will attempt to penetrate the corps defenses on a narrow front once beyond
the border region in order to pass second-echelon forces into the corps rear area. Although the enemy may
be required to secure selected urban areas for use as logistical bases to support the offensive drive, it can be
expected that flrst-echelon forces will attempt to bypass urban areas and leave the attack of those built-up
areas to second-echelon forces.
SPECIAL SITUATION 1
Corps Defense Plan
During the development of the corps defense plan, specific consideration was given to land use patterns,
major lines of communication, and physical terrain forms. Each of these elements impacts upon defensive
operations, and, when properly utilized, may offer signiflcant advantages by adding to the combat power of
the defender.
The following flgure portrays the primary terrain features and lines of communication within the corps
sector. The border area consists of a 5-10 kilometer-deep band of heavily forested rolling foothills cut by
narrow valleys. The main crossing points for motorized forces are along Route 4 and the four regional
highways.
10lh (US) Corps PQ-fensiv6 Sector
Figure 3-21 10th (US) Corps Defensive Sector
South of the foothills lies the broad, gently rolling Blue River Plains. No significant natural obstacles to
maneuver exist except the Blue River itself which is ford-able at selected crossing sites. The defense in this
area requires armor-heavy forces and must be conducted from battle positions arrayed in depth on the best
available terrain.
In order to cross the Blue River and carry his attack to the south, the enemy will be required to displace anc
reposition combat support units, particularly field artillery and short-range air defense systems.
South of the Blue River, the countryside begins to climb toward the White and Thorn Mountains. The
generally rolling, compartmentalized terrain favors the defender. In the west, the Alda Valley is a natural
corridor leading through the hill country and into the upper Karf Plains.
Southwest of the valley and along the corps western boundary, the White Mountains are a major obstacle tc
maneuver above battalion level. In the east, the regional road net provides access through the Thorn
Mountains to the southern plains area.
National Route 4, connecting Karf and Alda and continuing north through the Alda Valley to the border, is
the principal line of communications in the corps sector.
The Blue River Plains, Upper Karf Plains, and the Ness Foothills encompass approximately 55 percent of
the land area and are primarily agricultural regions with limited industrial development. Almost 30 percent
of the corps area is forested, with wood production centered in the White and Thorn Mountain regions.
Approximately 10 percent of the land area in the corps sector is allocated to urban/industrial uses.
Numerous small villages are found throughout the sector, with an average density of 8-9 villages per 100
square kilometers. This density increases to as high as 12 villages per 100 square kilometers along the
central Blue River Plains, Alda Valley, and National Routes 4 and 6. The mountain regions and border area
are sparsely settled.
Urban areas of particular interest to the corps commander are the two regional towns of Alda and Ness. In
the west, Alda, with a population of approximately 80,000, sits astride the most likely high-speed avenue of
approach into the corps sector. It includes large areas of urban sprawl radiating from the town along
road nets leading north and south and toward the foothills of the White and Thorn Mountains. Alda and its
adjacent terrain constitute a significant obstacle which would be extremely difficult for major forces to
bypass. Integrating the built-up area of Alda into the corps plan for defense in depth offers significant
tactical advantage.
Ness, in the east, is slightly larger than Alda and represents another primary communications hub along an
avenue of approach. However, its nonrestrictive adjacent terrain would easily enable an attacker to bypass
the town with first-echelon forces. The last major obstacle to southerly movement in this area is located
north of Ness in the Thorn Mountain passes. Based on these considerations, Ness is considered to be of
minimal value to the corps defense.
To the south is Karf, a major urban complex with a total population well in excess of one million. Because
of its large size and lack of readily exploitable resources, Harf is not considered to be an immediate tactical
objective and would probably be bypassed.
The figure on the next page portrays the major avenues of approach identified during the analysis of terraii
The corps commander's concept provides for the conduct of an active defense in sector with the covering
force battle fought north of the Blue River by the on-line divisions. Although the Blue River is fordable at
selected sites throughout its length, its steep banks and paralleling flood plains will restrict and slow
attacking units. The excellent defensive terrain in the area will facilitate the handoff of the enemy to the
brigades in the main battle area.
Figure 3-23 Major Avenues of Approach
To assist in the conduct of the covering force and main battle area operation, the following corps assets
have been allocated to the forward divisions.
The figure on the next page depicts the basic organization of the terrain for the corps defensive battle.
The majority of the corps combat and combat support units are garrisoned within the corps sector.
Preplanned initial position areas and movement routes of all units have been reconnoitered by key
personnel at platoon level and above. Total movement and preparation time varies from less than 12 hours
for forward maneuver elements to approximately 3 days for selected corps combat service support units. It
is anticipated that all units will be in position and operational prior to the initiation of the attack.
The selection of battle positions and areas is based upon a detailed analysis of Threat capabilities, doctrine,
and the terrain in the corps sector. Forces are fitted to the best available terrain in order to service the
anticipated target array. In many cases, the cover, concealment, and fields of fire offered by small built-up
areas provide significant tactical advantages in the development of the overall defensive network. The
retention of such areas is not of significance to the corps. Alda, however, because of its location along the
major line of communications in the corps sector and its relationship to adjacent dominating terrain, is
critical to the corps defense and must be retained.
The basic goals embodied in the corps plan are to defeat attacking first-echelon armies as far forward as
possible in the corps sector, to gain time for reinforcements to arrive, and to create favorable conditions for
initiating offensive actions.
SPECIAL SITUATION 2
Division Defense Plan
The mission of the 23d Armored Division includes three basic tasks. The division must conduct covering
force operations north of the Blue River, defend in sector, and retain the town of Alda. To assist the
division, the corps commander allocated additional maneuver, field artillery, and engineer units to the
division and placed an attack helicopter company OPCON to it.
As shown in the figure3-27, the sector of the 23d Armored Division consists of three basic geographic
regions (i.e., the Blue River Plains area, the uplands of the White and Thorn Mountains, and the Upper Kar
Plains). Superimposed upon and influencing the tactical characteristics of each of these subdivisions are
urban terrain features. Division planning for the conduct of the defense must consider the entire terrain
package before allocating forces for the accomplishment of its basic tasks.
I0ih (US) Corps Delensive Battle
Figure 3-25. 10th (US) Corps Defensive Battle
The Blue River Plains area is a broad agricultural belt bounded on the north and south by uplands and splil
into two segments by the Blue River, a natural obstacle.
In the north, a band of heavily forested, sparsely populated, rolling hills extends along the international
border. This area is cut by numerous small valleys which provide avenues of approach leading into the
plains. Maneuver by, formations larger than battalion size is restricted to the main communication routes
where the national and regional highways cross the border.
While the terrain characteristics along the border favor the defender, this advantage is neutralized, at least
in part, by the ability of the enemy to apply massive, preplanned fire support at any point and time under
the protection of a fully coordinated air defense umbrella.
Between the border uplands and the Blue River, the gently rolling countryside offers only minor changes in
relief with low ridge lines and isolated knolls rising 10-30 meters above the surrounding plains. Tributaries
of the Blue River flow from north to south through shallow valleys cut into the plains.
Dotting this northern plains area are numerous small, relatively self- sufficient villages surrounded by
garden plots, small, dense wood lots, and agricultural tracts divided by hedgerows and irrigation systems.
The rural, fair-weather road net will support light vehicular traffic, and off-the-road mobility for
mechanized forces is excellent throughout most of the year. Although multiple avenues of approach
penetrate this entire network, maneuver formations may frequently be split or diverted by the requirement
to bypass built-up areas.
Observation and fields of fire from these villages and low ridges throughout the area are excellent, and in
many cases extend beyond 2000 meters. Single family dwellings ringing the rural villages frequently
provide easily prepared fighting positions suitable for use during the flow of the active defense.
The density of built-up areas increases along the hard-surface, all- weather road net converging in the small
regional towns. These roads, which will support heavy vehicular and mechanized traffic, can easily be cut
by demolitions, thus reinforcing the obstacle value of the built-up areas.
The combination of natural terrain and manmade features in the northern plains area favors the employme
of armor-heavy forces, fighting from battle positions arrayed laterally and in depth. The small built-up
areas should be integrated where possible in the defense as obstacles to derive full value from the cover and
concealment they afford.
South of the river, the plains rapidly give way to rolling hills and ridgelines dominating valleys that carry
run-off from the mountains to the river. In this area, the central portion of the division sector is traversed b;
the Alda Valley, a broad, heavily wooded natural corridor which gradually narrows as it passes through the
mountain area and onto the Upper Karf Plains. To the south and west of the valley, the foothills of the
White Mountains severely restrict the mobility of mechanized forces. In the eastern portion of the sector,
gently rolling foothills and small valleys form terrain compartments which complicate coordinated
large-scale maneuver.
Throughout this southern portion of the plains area, built-up areas are concentrated along the major
Road nets. When coupled with the canalizing effect of the increasingly restrictive terrain, this array of
manmade features provides balanced forces the opportunity to confront the attacker repeatedly with
obstacles and mutually supporting defensive positions in depth. In order to cross the Blue River, he will be
required to displace his combat support and combat service support units from initial positions north of the
border, thus increasing their vulnerability.
The largest commercial/industrial centers on the plains are located along the Blue River in the small towns
that have grown at the sites where the national and regional road nets cross. The river is the only major
obstacle to maneuver on the plains. Its steep banks and associated flood plains limit tactical crossings to
selected fording sites or to existing bridges unless extensive engineering effort is expended. Most fording
sites are located in the vicinity of rural built-up areas.
The White and Thorn Mountain ranges rise to elevations in excess of 300 meters, separating the northern
division sector from the Upper Karf Plains. Heavily forested mountains form another natural obstacle.
23d Armorsd Division Defensive Sector
-r^-^7:-— .f.--j i.'>'^_,
■■'^?B*^-"' '"*'ir'TltM« ■ 'T^^^^'-^'jiwj.- ■ ■ ■ . .. ^ j^ I 1^—--—- ■
Figure 3-27 23d Armored Division Defensive Sector
They are sparsely populated with isolated communities supporting the forest industry. Few hard-surface,
all-weather roads exist, and off-the- road trafficability for any type of vehicle is poor. The small villages
block and further restrict maneuver by sitting astride the intersections of the inferior road nets and natural
terrain corridors.
The Upper Karf area consists of a broad irregular plain cut and interlaced by streams and small valleys.
Local relief is extremely varied with isolated hills standing up to 75 meters above adjacent flatlands.
Primarily an agricultural area, it offers excellent cross-country mobility. Its rural road net converges on
small towns which are tied together by the regional highway system. Like the Blue River Plains, this area
favors the employment of tank-heavy forces.
The following figure portrays the major avenues of approach leading to the Upper Karf Plains.
Major Avenues of Approach
Figure 3-28 Major Avenues of Approach
During his analysis of the urban characteristics of the terrain, the division commander focuses his attention
primarily on the regional towns along the main avenues of approach in the sector. Unlike the smaller
villages, which may play an important role as obstacles and fighting positions during the flow of the battle
but seldom warrant retention, the larger built-up areas may provide significant advantages to the defender,
ff the enemy cannot bypass and must fight through these towns, his momentum will suffer. Such delay will
contribute to the overall mission of gaining time for reinforcements to arrive and will increase target
time on columns backed up by these bottlenecks.
The location of the town in relation to the adjacent terrain and probable enemy avenues of approach, its
size, physical layout, the structural characteristics of its buildings, its commercial and industrial assets, and
its population are basic considerations involved in this analysis.
Bergdorf and Oberdorf, on the principal crossing sites over Blue River, and Reft, located north of ALDA
on Route 4, warrant special consideration.
Forces defending either of the river towns could effectively control the railroad and highway bridge
networks during the withdrawal of the covering force and deny these crossings to enemy lead elements
once the bridges are destroyed.
The terrain in the vicinity of Bergdorf favors an initial defense along the river with the integration of the
town in a battle position. The newer industrial and commercial area on the north bank of the river is a
significant obstacle suitable for defense by mechanized forces. In spite of the current stay-in-place policy,
some civilians will have to be evacuated from likely areas of intense combat. National authorities in each
town will be required to designate prepared shelters for such contingencies.
Oberdorf in the eastern portion of the sector offers few advantages to the defender.
Smaller than Bergdorf, its newer construction has spread north and south from the river along the regional
roadnet. Agricultural processing plants and storage areas north of the river provide some concealment, but
little or no cover. The older town center sits astride crossings over the river, limiting maneuver and fields of
fire. The town can easily be bypassed and isolated by using other fording sites along the river. The best
defensive terrain controlling crossing sites in this area is located on the foothills south of the river.
Reft is located south of Bergdorf where the valley begins to narrow for its climb through the Alda Gap. It is
nestled in the low foothills controlling the major avenue of approach along Route 4. If the division is to
retain ALDA without getting involved in a major city battle, the attack must be stopped in the vicinity of
Reft and its associated terrain complex.
The figure below portrays the organization of the terrain for the defense.
23d Armored Division Defensive Battie
Figure 3-29 23d Armored Division Defensive Battle
The division commander's concept calls for the conduct of covering force operations north of the Blue
River under division control. Forces allocated to the covering force battle include the l-203d Armd Cav
Sqdn, TF 2-135, and the divisional Cav Sqdn, all of which are garrisoned in the border area. In addition, thi
2d and 3d Brigades are tasked to provide one armor-heavy task force to the covering force. Fire support is
provided by the three battalions of the 71st FA Brigade, the divisional general support FA battalion, and a
Vulcan battery. Engineer support is provided by the 502d Engineer Battalion augmented by one divisional
engineer company.
It is anticipated that the hand off of enemy elements to the brigades in the main battle area will take place ii
the vicinity of RL Red.
Each brigade has been assigned battle areas fitted to the terrain along the primary avenues of approach in
the division sector.
Maneuver elements allocated to the brigades for the conduct of the defense include:
1st Bde 2d Bde 3d Bde
1 Mech Bn 2 Meet Bn 2 Mech Bn
1 Armor Bn 3Armor Bn 2 Armor Bn
Upon completion of covering force operations, the corps maneuver elements will be positioned under
brigade control in positions that add depth to the defense. This will insure that forces are in place to block
routes converging on Alda as the brigades shift south into the excellent defensive terrain along the valley
corridor and foothold regions.
The division commander emphasized the following factors:
"The priority for engineering effort will be to counter mobility operations in the 2d Brigade sector with
obstacles established in depth and covered by long-range fires and ATGM. The obstacle value of the Blue
River must be reinforced. Its bridges should be retained as long as possible, but destroyed as the fight shifts
into the MBA. Major obstacles can also be created along National Route 4, which is heavily dependent on
elevated spans and its tunnel network, and along road nets passing through built-up areas.
"The numerous small built-up areas throughout the sector are obstacles which offer easily prepared
defensive positions controlling much of the trafficable terrain. They can frequently be incorporated in batth
positions or used as bases of fire to support limited objective, low-level counterattacks.
"South of RL Green, the nature of the terrain and increased urbanization will tend to compartmentalize tht
attacker and cause him either to mass and slow his advance or to break up his formations along minor
avenues of approach. In the 2d Brigade area. Reft and its adjacent terrain represent a major obstacle which
must be retained as long as possible.
"If it is necessary to fight to retain Ada, success will depend mainly on our ability to control the dominating
terrain adjacent to the town. It is anticipated that the enemy will attempt to bypass Alda on the west along
the narrow corridor between the town and foothills. Any attempt to pass through Alda itself would destroy
the momentum of his first-echelon forces. The positioning of the corps reserve and the nature of the terrain
in the 3d Brigade sector make it doubtful that he could effect a bypass east of Alda.
"Refugee control and infiltration may be major problems in the Alda area. PSYOP teams and
territorial forces operating in the Division planning for the defense provides sufficient forces and
control measures for the accomplishment of each major task. The defense is continuous in nature and
conducted in depth throughout the sector, town will be under the operational control of the 2d
Brigade to insure that their planning provides for the organization of civilian control areas
corresponding to the tactical defense sectors."
SPECIAL SITUATION 3
Brigade Defense Plan
The defensive mission of the 2d Brigade, 23d Armored Division, includes several tasks. The brigade must
provide one tank-heavy task force to the covering force, assist elements of the covering force in a rearward
passage of lines in the vicinity of RL Red, defend in its assigned battle area, and retain the city of Alda.
Intelligence sources indicate that Alda is an initial enemy objective and that the enemy must secure the city
to serve as a logistics base in support of further operations.
Urbanization within the brigade battle area is moderately dense and consists of numerous small villages,
strip areas, and towns in addition to the city of Alda. New growth, in the form of light industrial centers and
modem residential areas, can be found in most of the villages and small towns. The city of Alda includes
large new areas built on its outskirts. Several of these built-up areas, when considered in conjunction with
other terrain features in the valley, will have an impact on military operations.
Six of the small towns are prominent enough to be considered of some importance to the defense. The
brigade commander and his staff evaluated them based on two primary criteria. The first is the obstacle
effect which they may have against enemy forces. The second criterion is based on how well they lend
themselves to being defended.
Bergdorf. Sits astride the most likely high-speed avenue of approach leading into the brigade area and
controls bridges over the Blue River. Dominant terrain features on the east and west sides of the town and
south of the river enhance the defense of the town. The town cannot be easily bypassed.
Aal. Sits astride the second most likely avenue of approach into the brigade area. It controls bridges over
the Blue River; however, surrounding terrain does not lend itself to the defense of Aal proper. Good
defensive terrain which controls routes out of Aal are located to the south and southwest of the town.
Kant. Sits astride the most dangerous avenue of approach. It can be bypassed without great difficulty unless
significant engineer effort is dedicated to the emplacement of counter mobility obstacles.
Reft. Sits astride the most dangerous avenue of approach. Terrain on east and west side of Reft precludes
easy bypass and enhances the defensive potential of the area.
Lerl. Sits astride the most dangerous avenue of approach but can be easily bypassed.
Barg. Sits astride a less threatening avenue of approach and offers some defensive value.
In order to avoid a protracted battle within Alda, brigade planning for the defense seeks to defeat the attach
as far forward in its assigned battle area as possible.
Terrain forward of the brigade battle area is primarily an open and rolling agricultural zone. In the northei
portion of the battle area, the Blue River runs across the brigade battle area, with bridges located at the
towns of Bergdorf and Aal. The river is fordable with difficulty between these towns except at a developed
crossing site midway between them. To the west of Bergdorf and to the east of Aal, the river banks are too
steep to provide suitable crossing sites. The low hill masses along the south side of the river provide
excellent observation and long-range fields of fire to the north. Avenues of approach in this portion of the
battle area are limited to the corridors passing through these hills.
South of this area, the Alda Valley narrows and becomes increasingly restrictive as it climbs toward Alda
and the pass through the southern mountains. Trafficability throughout the brigade battle area is
fair-to-good along primary and secondary all-weather roads. There are also several loose-surface roads
throughout the area which can support limited numbers of tracked vehicles except during periods of
excessive precipitation.
The brigade commander is primarily concerned with those avenues of approach which can support at least
an enemy battalion-size force. The following figure depicts the most likely avenues of approach forward of
and within the brigade battle area identified during the analysis of the terrain.
The most threatening avenue of approach into the area passes through Bergdorf along Route 4. The second
most likely avenue of approach is through Aal. Forces along this route can turn to the southwest toward
Kant or continue south along the high ground of the valley
Major Avenues of Approach
Figure 3-32. Major Avenues of Approach.
Once committed to this southerly route, any subsequent change in direction would be extremely
difficult. A minor avenue of approach also passes along the western foothills leading to Alda. South of
Barg this route becomes highly restrictive for armor and for maneuver above company level.
Having analyzed his mission, the enemy, the terrain, and the courses of action available to him, the brigade
commander briefs his staff on his general concept for the defense within the assigned battle area.
"The Blue River which runs across our area is a natural obstacle to attacking enemy forces and will serve as
a good point for the covering force to complete its handoff of the battle to the main battle area forces. The
town of Bergdorf sits astride the major high-speed avenue of approach into the Alda Valley and also
controls bridges over the Blue River.
"For these reasons we should make maximum use of Bergdorf in our defensive planning. I also want to
insure that other built-up areas which enhance our defensive capabilities are used to our fullest advantage.
Those towns and villages which are astride likely avenues of approach and serve as obstacles to enemy
forces must be fully developed to slow or halt the advancing enemy elements. They must be denied the
opportunity to gain momentum south of the initial defensive positions.
"The terrain forces the main avenues of approach to converge in the vicinity of the town of Kant.
Counter mobility obstacles will be required in the town and east of it. Field artillery, attack helicopter, and
close air support will play an important role in this area. If this is properly planned and coordinated, we wil
gain additional time to service targets. We should make every effort to halt the enemy advance forward of
Reft. If we permit the enemy to penetrate beyond this point, we will have an extremely difficult time
retaining Alda.
"In planning this operation I want to establish a battalion-size battle area in the northeast section of our
brigade battle area. The task force assigned to this battle area will have the responsibility of preventing an
enemy penetration through its assigned area. Task force battle positions should be established along the
Blue River, keying on the primary avenue of approach through Bergdorf and covering potential crossing
sites on the river. Insure that optimum use is made of dominant terrain along the south side of the river.
"Additional task force battle positions are to be planned and prepared in depth throughout our battle area
where they can most effectively influence the battle. One task force reinforced with engineers will occupy a
battle area encompassing the town of Reft with the mission of retaining the town and halting the enemy
advance north of that town. If the enemy is successful in penetrating to that point, I want at least two other
task force positions prepared to support the defense in and around Reft. Task force battle positions and tasl
force sectors within the city of Alda must also be identified early to insure that civil affairs, national
authority, and ground tactical planning are fully coordinated. Even with a stay-in-place policy, evacuation
of personnel from the northern and western portions may be necessary.
"Upon completion of the covering force battle, our task force and TF 2-135 will pass to our control. We
will also pick up additional engineer assets in the form of the 502d Engr Bn (Corps) (-), reinforcing fire
from two battalions of the 71st FA Bde, and OPCON of an attack helicopter company.
"Position the attack helicopter company in an assembly area in the vicinity of Bergdorf with priority for
employment to the TF in that area. Upon passage of RL Green, priority will shift to the TF defending the
Reft area. Priority for fire support will pass in the same manner."
"Our TAC CP will locate well forward with an initial position in the vicinity of Bergdorf."
ad BRIGADE TASK ORGANIZATION
TF Mt
TF 1-12
TF M3
TF 1-92
TF 1-93
1-1! Arm (-)
1-12 Arm (-)
1-13 Arm {-)
1 -92 Mech (-)
1-93 Mech {-}
A/1-92 Mech
B/1-92 Mech
A/1-93 M$ch
A/1-11 Arm
A/1-13 Arm
1/B/23d Eng
1 GSR TM
1 GSR TM
B/1-12 Arm
D/23 Arm (-)
2 GSR TM
1 GSR TM
2 GSR TM
1 REMS TM
1 REM TM
TF 2-135
Bde Control
2-T36 Mech(-)
2/8/23d CeWI TF 502 (DS)
A/M8 Arm
1 51 FA (DS) 502d Engr Bn (Corps) {-)
2 GSR TM
2/61 1th FA (Rein1 V51 FA) B/23d Engr (-) (OPCON)
1 REMS
2-71 FA {Reinf 1-51 FA) A/116 AH Bn {OPCON)
2/A/1-440 ADA
Figure 3-34a 2d Brigade Task Organization
2d Brigade Defensive Battle
Figure 3-34 2d Brigade Defensive Battle
Missions assigned for the defensive battle with the brigade battle area are as follows:
1-11 Armor:
* Occupy and define BP 1 .
* Prepare the bridges over the Blue River In Bergdorf for destruction.
* Prepare BP 4.
* Reconnolter BP 6, 9, and 12.
1-12 Armor:
* Upon release from the covering force defend BP 5.
* Prepare BP 10.
* Reconnolter BP 12.
1-13 Armor:
* Occupy and defend BA Rose.
* Prepare the bridges over the Blue River In Alda for destruction.
* Be prepared to occupy BPs 10 and 13.
1-92 Mech:
* Occupy and defend BP 2.
* Prepare BP 8.
* Reconnolter BP 13.
1-93 Mech:
* Occupy and defend BA Gold.
* Prepare BP 11 .
2-135 Mech:
* Upon release from the covering force occupy and defend BP 3.
* Prepare BP 7.
* Reconnolter BP 6, 9, and 11 .
A/115 AH:
* Upon release from the covering force occupy an assembly area vicinity of Bl
3 with priority of employment to TF 1-11.
* Be prepared to occupy an assembly area vicinity of BA Gold.
* Upon passage RL Green, priority of employment will be to TF 1-93.
•
SPECIAL SITUATION 4
Battalion Task Force Defense Plan
Task force 1-93 has been assigned the mission of defending from Battle Area Gold and retaining the small
town of Reft. As the order was issued, the 2d Brigade commander emphasized the importance of BA Gold
to the overall brigade defensive plan once south of RL Green.
"Your battle area contains the best defensive terrain along the valley approach to Alda. Its rolling, wooded
nature provides repeated opportunities to confront the attacker from planned defensive positions. In most
cases, concealed routes will be available to assist in repositioning forces in depth. The retention of Reft is
essential. If we can stop the enemy on the favorable terrain north of the town, we can avoid a protracted
and costly battle for Ada and the pass to the southern plains area."
"To strengthen the overall defense, I will position task forces in BPs 7 and 8. If the attacker tries to redirect
his efforts to the east to avoid you, he will be confronted not only by defenders in BP 8 but also by the
forces in BA Rose. If he shifts to the west, forces in BP 7 and the rugged terrain along the western slopes
will effectively stop him. Either move will expose a vulnerable flank to you."
"Once we are south of RL Green, you will have priority for fire support and for the employment of the
attack helicopter company OPCON to the brigade.
"I want to destroy enough attacking forces north of the town to allow for the initiation of limited
counterattacks. Be prepared to receive the attachment of a tank-heavy company team from TF 1-12 for sucl
use in your battle area. I don't feel it is necessary to develop a strong-point in the town since the terrain on
its flanks can be readily tied into the built-up area defenses. Make sure the forces in the town organize
positions in depth. They must be prepared to defeat mounted or dismounted attacks and hold the town with
only limited reinforcement initially."
Task force 1-93 consists of two mechanized companies and one tank company. In addition to the priorities
for fires established by the brigade commander, an engineer company and a Vulcan platoon are attached fo
the defense. The task force maneuver units will be uncommitted prior to the enemy's crossing of RL Green.
The initial defensive battle fought along the Blue River will provide adequate time for the organization of
the task force battle area.
Task force planning for the defense is based on a detailed analysis of the terrain and personal
reconnaissance of the area by key personnel. As indicated, the terrain in
2d Brigade Ds^nafve South of PL Gr«n
Figure 3-36 2d Brigade Defensive South of PL Green
the northern portion of BA Gold is a gently-rolling, wooded valley paralleling the communications
network. Successive platoon and company positions are available in depth throughout this area.
Closer to Reft, wooded hills lead eastward to the shoulder of the Alda Valley. A mixture of small wood
lots, orchards, and open fields used for grazing and garden crops are pieced together in a patchwork patten
Fair-weather, loose-surface roads lace the area and allow for the maneuver or repositioning of light
wheeled or tracked vehicles. The repeated pattern of open fields and tree lines provides excellent fields of
fire from concealed positions for anti-tank and direct fire weapons.
The western portion of the battle area contains a long, low hill mass overlooking Route 4 and the valley
approaches from the north. Lightly wooded along their base, the hills rise to form a gentle rolling ridge
leading from Reft and Route 4 to the west.
Reft is a small industrial and agricultural center that has almost doubled in size over the past decade. Its
current peacetime population is approximately 10,500. The town's depth along a north-south axis is
approximately 2500 meters. Its width in the central region is slightly more than one kilometer.
Figure 3-37 The Town of Reft
The old part of the town has retained its village characteristics with narrow winding streets and closely
packed buildings. The newer growth extends in all directions from the central core. To the west, there is an
industrial complex consisting of small factories and low warehouses. A fuel storage facility occupies the
area between the rail lines and the new Route 4. The major highway system bypasses Reft on the west, with
interchanges located north and south of the town. Ringing the remaining portion of the town is a new
residential area with individual and multiple family dwellings laid out in a rectangular pattern. The few
high-rise buildings in the town are located along its northern fringe.
In planning for the defense of this critical area, the task force commander stressed the following basic
factors.
The town is a major obstacle. Its growth over the past years has effectively blocked the narrow
terrain corridor leading to the south and the Alda Pass through the White/Thorn Mountain complex.
The terrain adjacent to the town is well suited for the organization of a strong defense supporting that
established within the built-up area.
The configuration of the Alda Valley forces the main avenues of approach to converge north of the
town.
The town cannot be easily bypassed.
Forces within the task force battle area can be re-deployed along pre-selected routes.
Any attempt to penetrate the defense of the built-up area will be costly in manpower as well as time
and will cause the attack to lose momentum.
Based on his analysis of the overall situation, the task force commander outlined his basic concept for the
defense of the battle area:
"The terrain consists of three basic compartments which merge on the outskirts of the town along the
central valley. Long-range fields of fire are available from the low hills which overlook the valley floor
from the east and the west, and to a lesser degree from the town itself. I want a mech-heavy team weighted
with the preponderance of our TOWs defending in the western portion of the valley. A balanced team with
a couple of additional TOW sections should be able to take care of more restrictive eastern portions of the
area. The remaining mech company, reinforced with a tank platoon, should be assigned responsibility for
the town and its approaches."
The commander task organized his forces as follows:
TASK ORGANIZATION: TF 1-93
TEAM A TEAM B TEAM TANK TF CONTROL
A/ 1-93 Mech (-) B/1-93 Mech A/ 1-1 3 Armor (-) Scout Pit
l-A/1-13 Armor 2 /A/ 1-13 Ar 3-A/1-93 Mech Hvy Mort Pit
4 TOW Sec 2-D/23 Engr 2 TOW 2 GSR TM
1 REMS TM
Redeye Tm Redeye Tm Redeye Tm Redeye Sec (-
D/23d Engr (■
The following depicts the basic organization of BA Gold.
Team A will be deployed in the west with its tank platoons operating along the valley corridor west of
Route 4. Forward positions will be located to insure maximum coverage of the valley approaches with
other positions in depth.
Team B will defend forward of and, if necessary, in the town of Reft.
Team Tank will defend in the east on the restrictive terrain which blocks the minor routes bypassing the
town and favors a defense with mobile direct-fire weapons and light antitank weapons positioned in depth.
The scout platoon will screen the risk area between BA Gold and task force battle position 8. South of RL
Nail, the platoon will be prepared to occupy positions along the east flank or assemble in the vicinity of
Reft as the TF reserve.
TF 1-93 Defanm of BA Gold
Figure TF 1-93 Defense of BA Gold
The task force commander provided the following specific guidance:
"Priority for engineer effort will be given to the development of obstacles to support our long-range
ATGMs and tanks. Close-in obstacles, defensive wire, and mines are the responsibility of each platoon
with technical advice from the engineers, if required. The brigade engineers will emplace counter mobility
obstacles along the valley north of the battle-area. I want these closely coordinated to insure they support
our initial positions."
"Within the battle area, each weapon position must be selected to take advantage of natural obstacles.
Where none exists, obstacles must be developed in order to slow the enemy and provide maximum target
servicing time. I want high-speed avenues of approach interrupted at frequent intervals where the obstacles
can be integrated with mines or natural obstacles and covered by long-range fires. Prepare the Route 4
overpass north of town for destruction on order.
"Position the ground surveillance radar and remote sensors to give as much advanced warning as possible
and to serve as eyes for our indirect fire weapons if the attacker uses smoke to cover his advance.
"Develop a fire plan which integrates the fires of team and task force mortars with field artillery. Priority oi
fires will be to the scout platoon initially. Plan suppressive fires and smoke throughout the defensive area to
increase the effectiveness of our direct fire systems. On order, shift the priority of fires to Team B. If the
battle draws into the town, use artillery on the flanks and concentrate on the use of our organic mortars in
Reft.
"Upon the brigade's passage of RL Green, priority for the employment of its attack helicopter company ant
fire support will pass to us. Coordinate with the helicopter company as soon as possible. It can occupy
assembly area 7, southwest of BP 6. 1 am most concerned with the areas immediately north of our TOW
fans for each battle position.
"Plan close air support missions at likely points of concentration beyond our range and look specifically at
the requirement for precision-guided munitions at key points within Reft.
"Coordination of the fires of our organic antitank weapons and tank fires must be accomplished at each
level. This requires not only the careful selection of positions for each weapon, but also designation of
specific areas of responsibility for each weapon.
The figure below portrays the task force plan for the organization of the defense in the critical southern
portion of Battle Area Gold. Within Reft, the task force commander has established a clearly defined
defensive sector for Team B. Teams A and
Figure 3-40 TF 1-93 Defense South of PL Hamme
Tank will defend from battle positions selected to defeat enemy attempts to bypass the town. South of RL
Hammer units may become decisively engaged as the attack threatens the outskirts of the built-up area. RL
Blue will be used to coordinate the positioning of forces within and on the flanks of Reft for the defense of
the town. During this phase of the battle, the scout platoon will be positioned west of the town and along
the Route 4 communications line as the task force reserve. Planning also provides for the initiation of local
counterattacks from the west by elements of Team A or by a tank-heavy team from TF 1-12, if attached.
The figure below depicts the basic organization of Reft for the defense. Control measures, to include report
lines and platoon sectors, are used to control the battle. In addition, key buildings and principal
thoroughfares will be assigned numeric designations.
^^■mmn^BVMaBMMB
Team B DefenM of Rsft
30 +
31--
\
35-f
B —
Figure 3-41 Team B Defense of Reft
The task force commander provided the following additional guidance:
"Team B may experience some FM communications problems, particularly if they withdraw toward the
central section of the town. In any case, I want maximum use made of wire during this portion of the
defense. Use radio as a backup, and only if absolutely necessary.
"At the northern limits of Reft, the open terrain and dispersed buildings allow for the deployment of
dismounted infantry supported by their carriers, tanks, and TOWs. If we are forced to fight in the central
part of the town, its narrow streets and densely packed buildings may limit our ability to maneuver or
position the carriers. In this case, consideration should be given to dismounting weapons in order to
emplace them where they can best support ground operations.
"Although there is no requirement to strongpoint the town, have Team B prestock rations, water, and
ammunition in prepared platoon positions in depth throughout t
…[truncated]