Indiana ALPR cameras
Indiana (IN) has 4,396 mapped ALPR cameras — 4,145 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).
Smart Cities & Surveillance — WEF, Contracts, FOIA
Primary sources on smart-city surveillance — WEF publications, municipal vendor contracts, FOIA'd procurement records, and the ALPR / Flock Safety source record (EFF, ACLU, 404 Media, court filings, state laws — filter to case alpr-flock). Mirrored locally so the record survives link rot. For the live camera map and explainer, see the License-Plate Surveillance page.
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Louisiana ALPR cameras
Louisiana (LA) has 2,906 mapped ALPR cameras — 2,336 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).
Kansas ALPR cameras
Kansas (KS) has 2,821 mapped ALPR cameras — 1,599 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).
Arizona ALPR cameras
Arizona (AZ) has 2,737 mapped ALPR cameras — 2,264 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).
Colorado ALPR cameras
Colorado (CO) has 2,694 mapped ALPR cameras — 2,289 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).
Pennsylvania ALPR cameras
Pennsylvania (PA) has 2,164 mapped ALPR cameras — 616 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).
Missouri ALPR cameras
Missouri (MO) has 1,478 mapped ALPR cameras — 1,307 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).
Jenoptik — vendor profile
European-rooted traffic-enforcement and tolling ALPR (VECTOR cameras) — speed/red-light/average-speed enforcement. National shared plate database: NO — fixed roadway enforcement.
Axon Fusus (real-time crime center) — vendor profile
A cloud 'real-time crime center' platform Axon acquired in 2024 (~$240M) that fuses ALPR hits, gunshot-detection alerts, body/in-car cameras, drones, dispatch data and public AND private security cameras into one map; its 'Core' device pulls privately-owned camera feeds into the police network for live access. Captures plates, faces-on-video and the real-time location of anyone in view of an enrolled camera. National shared plate database: NO — not one database but a network: EFF documents Fusus in 250+ agencies with 200,000+ enrolled cameras.
Clearview AI (facial recognition) — vendor profile
Built a face-search engine by scraping billions of photos from social media and public sites without consent (company has claimed 10B+, later 60B+ faceprints). Police upload a face photo and get matching images plus source links — biometric faceprints tied to online identities. Used by ICE and the FBI (see abuses); restricted by an Illinois biometric-privacy settlement (see lawsuits). National shared plate database: YES — a single scraped biometric database of billions of faceprints, searchable by law enforcement.
SoundThinking / ShotSpotter (acoustic gunshot detection) — vendor profile
Places microphones on poles and buildings across a coverage area; acoustic sensors plus human review classify sounds as gunfire and dispatch police to precise coordinates. Captures ambient audio and the location of suspected gunfire, and its output has been used as investigative evidence. Deployed in 160+ US cities historically — though many have dropped it (see abuses). National shared plate database: NO — a per-city sensor network, not a national database.
Fog Data Science — Fog Reveal (location-data broker) — vendor profile
A point-and-click web app that lets police search commercial smartphone-location data pulled from mobile advertising IDs across 700+ apps — draw an area to see every device that was there, or track one device's 'pattern of life' — often with no warrant, for roughly $6,000–$9,000/yr. An EFF/Associated Press investigation confirmed contracts or trials with at least 18 state and local agencies; records showed some agencies did not believe Carpenter v. U.S. required a warrant for app-derived location data. National shared plate database: YES (effectively) — Fog claimed access to 250M+ US devices and 15B location signals/day from the ad-tech marketplace.
BLIP Systems — BlipTrack (Bluetooth/Wi-Fi MAC sensors) — vendor profile
Danish vendor whose sensors record the Wi-Fi/Bluetooth MAC address of passing devices, then encrypt and time-stamp them to measure travel and dwell times. Documented at Schiphol, JFK, Dublin, Copenhagen and Brussels airports and on road networks in Stockholm and Auckland. Marketed as anonymized traffic analytics, not identity tracking. National shared plate database: NO — the vendor states MAC IDs are hashed for aggregate traffic-flow analytics.
A Texas cop searched 83,000 cameras for a woman who had an abortion
An official at the Johnson County, TX Sheriff's Office ran two Flock searches for a woman who had a self-managed medication abortion (April–May 2025). The second reached 6,809 networks / 83,345 cameras nationwide — including states that protect abortion. The audit-log reason field read, verbatim, 'had an abortion, search for female.' The sheriff publicly called it a welfare check; court records later showed deputies had opened a 'death investigation of a non-viable fetus' and consulted the DA about charging her the same day as the search. Source: 404 Media / EFF. Date: May–Oct 2025.
ICE, CBP, Secret Service and the Navy got in through a side door
Local and state police ran 4,000+ Flock lookups for immigration purposes — reason fields literally reading 'ICE,' 'ICE WARRANT,' 'illegal immigration' — even though Flock has no ICE contract (records via Danville, IL). CBP separately had direct backend access to 80,000+ cameras through an undisclosed pilot; the Secret Service and Navy/NCIS also had access, and some departments did not know their data was being shared. Source: 404 Media (Koebler & Cox). Date: May–Oct 2025.
89% of Chicago ShotSpotter alerts found no gun crime; the city dropped it
A MacArthur Justice Center study of Chicago Police data (Jul 2019–Apr 2021) found 89% of ShotSpotter deployments turned up no gun crime and 86% led to no report of any crime — 40,000+ dead-end deployments, concentrated in Black and Latino neighborhoods; Chicago's Inspector General independently found the system rarely produced evidence of a gun crime. Chicago — long the flagship city — decommissioned ShotSpotter on Sept 22, 2024 after the mayor declined to renew, part of a wave that also included Dayton, Atlanta, San Antonio, Seattle and Buffalo. SoundThinking disputes the study's methodology and cites a 97% accuracy figure it has not substantiated in a peer-reviewed study. Source: MacArthur Justice Center / Chicago OIG / NPR. Date: 2021–2024.
Institute for Justice — Plate Privacy Project
Litigates ALPR dragnets as Fourth Amendment violations (Norfolk; San Jose) and compiles the running tallies of wrongful stops and officer stalking.
S.T.O.P. (Surveillance Technology Oversight Project)
Founded 2019 by Albert Fox Cahn; argues federal intelligence-sharing has let ICE 'sidestep sanctuary laws and co-opt local police databases and surveillance tools, including license plate readers.'
Sen. Wyden & Rep. Krishnamoorthi
Opened Congressional investigations and urged the FTC to act. Sen. Wyden: 'I now believe that abuses of your product are not only likely but inevitable.'
Chatrie v. United States (SCOTUS) (U.S. Supreme Court — June 29, 2026 (6–3))
A geofence-warrant case (not ALPR), but the Court held such a search implicates the Fourth Amendment and rejected the government's 'small slice of a big database' argument — reasoning that undercuts the Norfolk district-court rationale and strengthens Schmidt's appeal.