The Global Risks Report 2024
Page 73 of 122 · WEF_The_Global_Risks_Report_2024.pdf
Technology-enabled proliferation of illicit activities
in new markets and geographies could have numerous implications at a state, company and individual level. Alongside cybersecurity concerns, it could expose businesses to a range of heightened risks, from reputational threats and regulatory scrutiny relating to financial flows and supply chains to impacts on the long-term viability and success of legitimate markets. In more extreme scenarios, geographic expansion of these criminal syndicates could also lead to political violence that challenges the power of governments, mirroring recent developments throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, such as in Haiti.
120 A rise in
“ungoverned” spaces will also likely be seen in the growth of armed and radicalized groups and disenchanted youths in many cities throughout the developed world, threatening public safety and security.
The next global shock? BOX 2.10
Global fentanyl epidemic
Enforcement of the Taliban’s ban and the near
eradication of poppy production in Afghanistan could have widespread implications for the global drug trade.
121 Historically accounting for around
80% of opium production, Afghanistan’s rapid shortfall in supply could be largely met through synthetic drugs. Fentanyl, for example, offers significant advantages to crime groups: it is less labour-intensive, requires smaller volumes of precursor materials and offers a lower cost revenue stream. Some experts consulted referenced early signs of on-shored production in industrialized economies, enabled by “crime as a service” construction of illicit laboratories. Concerningly, however, fentanyl is far more potent than natural opium, with severe health implications if it were to penetrate markets more broadly. It is the leading cause of death in young adults in the United States, with overdose deaths attributable to fentanyl use reaching almost 110,000 in 2022 – although the United States and China recently reached a deal to limit the export of pre-cursor chemicals.
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Randy Laybourne,
Unsplash
State-enabled criminality
Growing state fragility will strengthen the ease and
attractiveness of these parallel economies for a broader set of actors, either because of reduced state capacity to respond or, in some cases, blurring of the lines between criminals and the state. Indeed, the state itself could support or become susceptible to organized crime over the next decade.
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Fueled by fragility, more widespread corruption could create a vicious cycle whereby states are unable to rebuild the resilience to effectively counter organized crime and could instead be captured by criminal networks. For example, corruption could effectively lead to control of transportation hubs, law enforcement and parts of the public sector by organized crime groups.
124 This in turn would undermine the rule
of law, distort competition and weaken economic growth further, eroding both societal trust and enforcement capacities. Figure 2.30
125 depicts
this symbiotic relationship, whereby criminality is generally found hand-in-hand with fragile states that have higher levels of conflict and corruption.
State “sponsorship” of illicit activities may also
become more common (Box 2.11). In cyberspace, for example, commodified products (including ransomware) and services-for-hire (such as money laundering) are now easily accessible for less technically competent actors.
126 This includes
Global Risks Report 2024
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