Document text
Rev.O1-31-2003!SW
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: ROUTINE Date: O2/17/2004
T0: Records Management Atmn Recorif4 t. Center UnitA/UC i
Frmm CounterterrorismIraq/Syria ' Uni om 4383
Contact: SSA -1
Approved By:
Drafted By: asjr
Case ID #: S! l5EHQl448534 S! 3l5EHQ-l448534lA
S 3l5EHQ-l4485341B315E-HQ1448534-302
315E-HQl448534BC
315E-HQl448534CE
315EHQ-l448534ELA
3l5E~HQl448534ELl
3l5EHQl448534EL1A
3l5EHQ-1448534-ELlB
3l5EHQl448534LAB
3l5EHQl448534NCDEELASSIFIED BY ugghaw 55334
DE 1.1 5-05-3959
Title: }:s DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ
Swumsis: ZEQ Opening of subfiles for captioned matter. AD
authority to restrict subfile 302.::Isq1:: Clas ' ' By: 11109, 110 /c1e~e
Reason " .
c assify On: X1 ~i_9292be
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To: Records Management From: Counterterrorism
Re: B{ 315EHQ-1448534, O2/17/2004
Dennlsz 1B{: The captioned investigation was opened to captureintelligence and evidence as it relates to the national securityinvestigation targeting Saddam Hussein. This EC establishes thesubfile system for capturing information regarding Hussein. The
following subfiles will be established:
lA Will be a repository for all contemporaneous notesand items which will need to be retained that are not evidentiary
in nature.
lB will document FDl92 bulky records and will be a
repository for evidentiary material.
302 - will be a repository for FD302s, inserts andclassified LHM's which document interviews conducted of captioned
subject and additional High Value Detainees.
BC will be a repository for background information on
captioned subject and his closest associates.
CE will be used maintain all records regarding
expenditures of case funds in captioned matter.
ELA - will be used to maintain all documents regardingthe administration of electronic surveillance in captioned
matter.
ELl - will document all original elsur logs developed
or maintained in captioned matter.
LAB will be a repository for all laboratory requests,
reports and findings in captioned matter.
NC will be a repository for all pertinent newpaperclippings deemed of significant value that they will add to the
overall progression of the investigation.
This EC also documents the fact that due to thesensitive nature of the interviews of captioned subject, and therequest of the Department of Justice, Office of the DeputyAttorney General [noted in immediate EC from Counterterrorism toGeneral Counsel, dated O2/O6/2004] the 302 subfile will berestricted in the Automated Case Management System ACS!. Access
will be granted to the following individuals:
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wlk
Records Management From: Counterterrorismj§¢: 315E-HQ1448534, O2/17/2004
UC
UC
SSA George PiroSSA
SSA
SSA
SSA
IA
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To: e ords Management From: Counterterrorism
Re: ! 315E-HQ1448534, O2/17/2004
LEAD s!:
Set Lead 1: Action!
RECORDS MANAGEMENT
AT WASHINGTON, DC
EK RMD will ensure the aforementioned subfiles willbe opened and that access to sub 302 will remain restricted to
the above mentioned personnel.
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MK
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U.S. Department of Justice
.":ll I I Federal Bureau of Invesngatlon
In
HRWW* ° ° Baghdad Operations Center
N February 7, 2004
Interview Session Number: l
Interview Conducted by: SSA
ISSA Arabic/English Translation:
>¥§ Saddam Hussein High Value Detainee #1! wasinterviewed on February 7, 2004 at a military detention facilityat Baghdad International Airport BIAP!, Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein
provided the following information:
>¬Q Hussein stated he has served the Iraqi people for a
very long time. He considers his greatest accomplishments to bethe social programs for the citizens of Iraq and improvements inother sectors of the economy including enhancements to education,
the health care system, industry, agriculture, and other areas
that generally enhanced the way of life for Iraqis.
:?§i In 1968, Iraqi people "barely had anything." Food
was scarce, both in rural villages as well as in cities.Farmland was neglected and agricultural methods were primitive.The Iraqi economy depended entirely on oil production, with mostbeing exported from Iraq by foreign companies and not controlledby the government. As the country of Iraq manufactured very fewproducts, most goods had to be imported. The health care system
was "primitive" and the mortality rate was very high,particularly among the poor. The infant mortality rate was veryhigh, estimated at 40-50 percent, with many deaths occurringduring pregnancy or delivery. The literacy rate was aroundtwentyseven percent, with those classified as "literate" often
not capable of true proficiency in either skill. Roads werealmost nonexistent in rural areas and "very bad" in the cities
of Iraq. Limited educational opportunities existed at the
university level, even in Baghdad. Many cities had no collegewhatsoever. Generally, only wealthy individuals could afford to
send their children to a university.
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!%§ Hussein improved all of the areas previouslydiscussed. He considers this his greatest accomplishment and
"service" to the Iraqi people.
:PS§ In response to a question
mistakes, Hussein agreed that all humans
God is free of error. He noted that the
and it appeared he had read reports from
interviews. Hussein stated, "Perhaps, aI"egarding Hussein's own
make mistakes, and only
interviewer was "smart"
Hussein's previous
conversation between two
such educated people will not be useful or successful." If onesays he is perfect, he is saying he is like God. Hussein addedthat not all of his efforts were viewed as successful in somepeople's eyes. Hussein compared this evaluation of himself byothers and the existence of differing viewpoints to his own viewsabout the American system of government, of which he is "notconvinced." He pointed out that approximately 30 million peoplelive in poverty in America, but US residents do not consider thisa "crime." Hussein stated he would never accept that for Iraq.When prompted by the interviewer a second time regardingHussein's own mistakes, he asked, "Do you think I would tell myenemy if I made a mistake?" Hussein said that he would notidentify mistakes he had made to an enemy, like America. Hepointed out that he does not consider the interviewer an enemy,nor the American people, but the American system of government.
}S3 Hussein stated it is not only important what peoplesay or think about him now but what they think in the future, 500or 1000 years from now. The most important thing, however, iswhat God thinks. If God believes something, He will convince thepeople to believe. If God does not agree, it does not matterwhat the people think. Hussein added that a "traitor" provided
information which led to his
location and as an Iraqi, he
forces. The grandchildren of
accountable and tell this tocapture. As a "guest" at the
should not have been given up to US
this "traitor" will hold him
future generations.
>§! In the future, Hussein believes he will be knownfor fairness and as having "faced oppression." Ultimately, whatthe Iraqis think will be up to them. Hussein stated Iraqis wouldnot compare leaders of the preIslamic era to the Islamic era.
:tS{:Hussein believes Iraqi citizens were able toexercise their rights to selfgovern as guaranteed by the interim
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Constitution in 1990. This occurred because the people had a
leader and a government to lead them.
>§d Hussein believes Iraq "will not die." Iraq is a
great nation now, as it has been at times throughout history.Nations generally "go to the top" only once. Iraq, however, has
been there many times, before and after Islam. Iraq is the only
nation like this in the history of the world. This "gift" was
given to the Iraqi people by God. When Iraqi people fall, theyrise again. Hussein believes the Iraqi people will take matters
into their own hands," rule themselves, and, with God, decide
what is right. Hussein hopes that Iraq will advance in all
areas, financial, religious, etc. He added that, as a
humanitarian, he hoped the same for the American people.
:}Si Hussein was quoted a passage from the book "Zabibah
and the King, commonly attributed as his writing, where the
deputies shout, "Long live Zabibah. Long live the people. Long
live the army." The deputies do not, however, shout "Long live
the king." Hussein was asked whether the Iraqi people will
forget or fail to shout for him, to which he replied no. He
said, "It's in God's hands." Hussein emphasized the king is not
the main subject of the book, rather the people. He stated God
comes first, then the people. Hussein added Jesus Christ was
considered "from the people" as Mary was of the people and Christ
lived among the people. Being faithful is a cherished thing in
life, being a traitor is the worst thing. Hussein stated, "God
wanted to tell us don't be surprised when people are traitors toyou." Hussein ended this portion of the discussion by saying "aprisoner can not do anything for the people." He said he still
has to have faith in God and repeated "It's in God's hands."
:}§I Hussein stated the National Progressive Front, a
political party, first existed as the National Front from 1970-
1974. The National Front consisted of the Kurdistan Democratic
Party KDP!, the Communist Party, and the Baath Party.
Political parties express differences in Iraq as occurs in other
countries. Some groups, including the Kurds, did not believe in
socialism along the same ideological lines as the Baath. In
1991, the National Progressive Front never actually came into
being because of failure to pass the Constitution which was due
to the first Gulf War.
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Baghdad Operations Center
:%§3 Hussein considered any individual who was faithfulto Iraq, and to the people, to be a part of the Baath. TheBa'ath takes responsibility for successes and mistakes. In 1989and again in 2002, Hussein attempted, unsuccessfully, to convincehis "colleagues" of the need for multiple political parties inIraq. In Hussein's opinion, one party was not good for Iraq.Hussein stated, "Life does not accept only one idea. It acceptsonly one God." Hussein continued saying that a political systemsimilar to America's, with multiple parties, would cause "toomuch commotion" for the Iraqi people and they would have to beforced to accept it. Hussein said, "I wish there were partiesother than the Baath. Differences, from family through thepeople to the government, are good. Hussein ended this portionof the discussion by stating, "Currently, the only politicalparties existing in Iraq are the ones with the weapons."
g:}§i Hussein was quoted another passage from "Zabibahand the ing" which states, "I'm a great leader. You must obeyme. Not only that, you must love me." He was then asked whethera leader can obtain greatness through his achievements for hispeople or demand greatness through fear. Hussein responded thatfear will not make a ruler and will not make people love a ruler.Love comes through communication. The "author" of this book iscomparing this King to past kings. He did not want to emphasizeor advocate the idea of the monarchy to the people as the"author" does not approve of this form of government. Thus, the
King died and Zabibah lived, as a symbol of the people.
>¥§ Hussein believes people will love him more after he
passes away than they do now. People are resisting theoccupation of Iraq, now and before, under the "banners" ofHussein. Now, however, Hussein is not in power and is in prison.
Eé! Hussein stated people love someone for what they
have done. During his Presidency and before, he accomplishedmuch for Iraq. He concluded a peace agreement with Barzani theKurds! in the north in 1970. Hussein nationalized the Iraqi oilindustry in 1972. He supported the 1973 war against Israel inEgypt and Syria. Iraq survived eight years of war with Iran from1980-1988 and the first Gulf War shortly thereafter. Iraq livedthrough 13-14 years of a boycott. Hussein asked whether theboycott still existed, and was told no. Despite all thehardships and issues endured by Iraq, one hundred percent of the
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people voted for Hussein in the last elections. In Hussein's
opinion, they still supported their leader.
m?=;¢>ci
SE X1
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
gR W* ° * ° Baghdad Operations CenterkN° February 8, 2004
Interview Session Number: 2Interview Conducted by: SSA|Georoe L_ giro I
SSA
Arabic/English Translation:
>é! Saddam Hussein High Value Detainee #1! was
interviewed on February 8, 2004 at a military detention facility
at Baghdad International Airport BIAP!, Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein
provided the following information:
IP51 Hussein stated the farm where he was captured in
December, 2003 was the same location he stayed in 1959 after
fleeing Baghdad upon participating in a failed assassination
attempt on then Iraqi President Qassem.
:5! Hussein was asked whether the decision to go to war
against Iran in September, 1980 was based on threats from Iran or
whether the war was a means of reclaiming Arab/Iraqi territory,
specifically the ShattalArab Waterway. Hussein stated, "We
consider the war as having started on September 4, not September
22, as the Iranians state." Hussein then provided an example of
a farmer who is your neighbor next door. Hussein prefers to use
farming/rural examples as they have special meaning to him. One
day, the neighbor's son beats up your son. The next day, the
neighbor's son bothers your cows. Subsequently, the neighbor's
son damages your farmland by disturbing the irrigation system.
If all these things have occurred, eventually, after enough
incidents, you approach your neighbor, tell him each
transgression by event and ask him to stop. Usually, a warning
or approach to the neighbor is enough to stop this behavior.
With Iran, however, this approach by Iraq did not work. Iran, in
Hussein's opinion, was in violation of the 1975 "Algiers
Agreement" concerning the waterway. Furthermore, Iran was also
deemed to have interfered in Iraqi politics, also a violation of
the treaty. In Hussein's opinion, this left Iraq no choice but
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to fight. Thereafter, Iraq fought the war and sacrificed so that
interference by Iran in Iraq would end.
;!é% Hussein provided some thoughts about the mindset ofthe Irani n eadership, specifically Ayatollah Khomeini, and the
Iranian decision to fight the war. when Khomeini came to power
in 1979, he had two things which "interfered" with his mind.
One, he was a religious fanatic who thought all leaders were like
the Shah of Iran, a person easily toppled. Khomeini thought
since he removed the Shah so easily he could do the same
elsewhere including Iraq. Second, Khomeini had a "complex" about
leaving/being kicked out of Iraq previously in the late 1970s.
Khomeini, exiled from Iran, had been a "guest" of Iraq who was
"given shelter" in Najaf. While there, he began speaking out
against the Shah and the Iranian government. Khomeini, in
Hussein's opinion, was not respecting the written agreement
Algiers Agreement! between Iraq and Iran and was interfering in
internal Iranian affairs. The Iraqi government informed Khomeini
of their position. They also told him "you are our guest, no one
can ask you to leave or for you to be handed over." The Shah
had, in fact, tried to get Hussein to turn over Khomeini to Iran.
In Arab culture, one can not "give up" a guest.
§$ Khomeini refused to cease his activities against
the Shah and the Iranian government. Khomeini stated that if his
practices were against Iraqi policy, he would leave. Thereafter,he attempted to depart to Kuwait but was refused entry. Iraq
allowed him to return for three or four days and complied with
his request for assistance in traveling to another country.
Khomeini then traveled to Paris, France.
E81 Hussein stated he does not regret Iraq's treatment
of Khomeini. When asked whether Khomeini ignored the gratitude
of Iraq upon return from Kuwait, a step which could have resultedin Iraq's refusal to admit him and subsequent transfer to Iran,
Hussein stated, "No. It would not have changed the situation.
The people did not want the Shah." Khomeini became a symbol for
the people of Iran after departing Iraq because of his age andbecause he had been "kicked out" of Iran. Hussein only stated
"maybe" when questioned whether Ayatollah Sayyid Mohammad Sadr, aprominent Shia cleric executed in Iraq in l980, may have beensuch a symbol. Hussein added he himself was a symbol as one
could find pictures of Hussein inside houses and elsewhere in
Iraq.
E'%<
Baghdad Qperations Center
}§3 Khomeini believed the Shia population in southern
Iraq would follow him, especially during the war with Iraq. But,
according to Hussein, "They did not welcome him." In fact, the
Shia remained loyal to Iraq and fought the Iranians.
:H§! Hussein acknowledged that the Iranian military in
1980 was weak and "lacked leadership" as most of the highranking
officers had been removed upon change of the Iranian leadership
from the Shah to Khomeini. This, however, did not impact on the
decision to engage in war with Iran at that moment. Hussein
stated, "If the Shah's army still existed, we would have defeated
them in the first month." Under Khomeini, despite lacking
leadership, the Iranian military, including the army and the
Revolutionary Guard, "advanced in thousands against Iraqi
forces. The Iraqi army fought bravely, especially at the
borders.
j!§$ Hussein was asked whether assassination attempts
against Iraqi government officials prior to the conflict.
allegedly at the hands of Iranianbacked groups, including
Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and Minister of Culture and
Information Latif Nayyif Jasim, affected the decision to go to
war with Iran. Hussein stated there were "540 assaults" on Iraq
by Iran before the war. 249 of these "assaults" included air
incursions or raids. Iraq presented this information to the
United Nations. Iran blocked the ShattalArab Waterway and sank
Iraqi and foreign ships. Before September 29, 1980, Iran bombed
Iraqi oil refineries in Basra and other cities in southern Iraq.
The assassination attempts against Aziz and Jasim, and others,
were among the many incidents leading up to war with Iran.
:}Sf:When asked the objective of the war, Hussein
replied, "Ask Iran. They began the war. I have explained all
the reasons for the war before." Upon repeating the question,
Hussein stated the objective was "to have Iran not interfere in
our internal affairs." Hussein repeated some information
previously provided including the fact that he believed Iran
violated the treaty of 1975 Algiers Agreement!. Iran occupied
the entire ShattalArab Waterway, while the agreement stated
their right to only half. Iran did not respond to diplomatic
communications regarding these facts.
!B1 Hussein stated Iraqi forces initially succeeded and
occupied cities and territory in southern Iran just across the
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Baghdad Operations Centermg
border including areas in and near Muhamra, Ahwaz, and Dosful.
Iraqi forces did not push further into Iran because the immediate
objective was to stop artillery attacks from Iran which emanated
from areas near the
13§:After
pushed back and the
When questioned whyborder.
approximately two years, Iraqi forces were
war became defensive for Hussein's military.
the war became defensive for Iraq, Hussein
stated that "one can not plan for the Iraqi army the same as for
the American army." From a military viewpoint, plans are made
according to capability. The military agrees that when supply
routes are lengthened, problems arise. Hussein stated, "The
soldier of today is
ago."
things
world"not the same as the soldier of 100 years
They are part of a "universal group" hearing and seeing
on the television and radio. The soldier is "part of the
and is "affected" by this. If ordered to counterattack,
the "winning" soldier will push to the objective and beyond.
Hussein agreed thatthe later Iraqi offensive stage of the war in
l98687 saw many successes, including the capture of three-
fourths of Iranian tanks and half of the art;llery and armored
personnel carriers.
:R§£:Hussein discussed further the reasoning behind not
advancing further into Iran. He repeated that Iraq had recovered
enough territory, removing the threat of Iranian artillery, in
the early years of the war. Hussein said, If we went deep
inside Iran, they would think we wanted something else." He»
added, We did not face a regular army, which is easier to plan
against." Hussein further stated that for many Iraqi soldiers,
this was their first combat experience. Mary were "pumped up"
especially with theearly successes into Iranian territory.
Within a few days, however, many soldiers thought "Why am I
here?" As confirmed to Hussein by the Iraqi military leaders,
many soldiers preferred to defend the borders and remain in Iraq.
Withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Iranian territory should have
occurred before this change in mentality took place. Some
military commanders wanted to remain, others wanted to withdraw.
After two years of war, some Iraqi military leaders felt Iran had
"learned its lesson" and recommended withdrawal. Hussein
respected information from the military commanders and ordered
withdrawal of Iraqi forces.
Ii Hussein stated, normally, defensive operations are
not "good from a tactical standpoint nor are they good for the
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soldiers morale. Hussein said, "If a soldier does not see
logic, he will not perform as well or be obedient. If he accepts
the task at hand as logical, he will be obedient. A soldier must
be convinced, otherwise discipline is a problem." Hussein
commented about the present mental state of American soldiers in
Iraq. He said, If you asked the American soldier, who came to
Iraq to find weapons of mass destruction, but none could be
found, and who came to remove the leaders of the Hussein
dictatorship, who are all in jail now, but are replaced with
other dictators, whether he wanted to stay or go, he would say
go." .
:}§3 When asked whether the use of chemical weapons by
Iraq against Iran during the defensive period of the war occurred
only through necessity, i.e., Iraq would have lost the war
without such use, Hussein responded, "I do not have an answer for
that. I am not going to answer." When asked whether he thought
Iraq was going to lose the war with Iran, particularly after 1982
and during the 1984 86 time frame, Hussein responded, "No. Not
for a second. I said this on television. I said this in five
letters I sent to Iran." In the letters, Hussein outlined the
strengths of the Iraqi military. Hussein stated some Iraqi
commanders did not like the fact that this type of information
was included in letters to Iran. Iranian leaders thought Hussein
was lying, while Iraqis believed him. Returning to Iraqi
chemical weapons use, Hussein stated, "I will not be cornered or
caught on some technicality. It will not do you any good. The
United States has paid dearly for its mistakes here in Iraq and
throughout the world and will continue to pay for its mistakes
all over the world."
:>§i Hussein stated Iran did not "get the message" after
1982 when Iraq pulled back to its borders. He stated, "If you do
not break their heads, they will not understand."
>§i Hussein stated Iraq "did not owe much money" after
the war with Iran. Iraq had received aid from Arab countries,
which Hussein believed to be aid and not loans. After the war,
however, these countries "changed their minds" and demanded
repayment. Some countries viewed Iraq as a military threat.
Iran was not viewed as a military threat, as its forces were
devastated by the war. Hussein laughed at this point.
he
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Baghdad Operations Center
!S1 Hussein stated Iraq agreed to a United Nations
resolution on September 28, 1980 calling for a cessation of
hostilities with Iran. Iran, however, did not agree to this
resolution. Hussein added that Iraq also agreed to UN Resolution
598 in 1987 calling for an end to the war. Iran, again, did not
agree to this resolution. Iraq, in fact, attempted numerous
times throughout the war to engage Iran in discussion in order to
stop the fighting. Hussein stated "we did this when we did not
have to" for the good of the people and for humanity. Iran only
accepted terms of a cease fire in 1988 "after they lost the war."
}§1 Regarding UN findings about Iraq's use of chemical
weapons during the IranIraq War, Hussein stated, "History is
written and will not change. No one can stop history from being
written." Hussein pointed out that Iran used chemical weapons
first, at Muhamra which is Khoramshahar in Iran!, in
September/October, 1981. When asked whether Iraq had to use
chemical weapons for defensive reasons, Hussein responded, "I am
not going to answer, no matter how you put the question."
1&3 Hussein stated, "I will discuss everything unless
it hurts my people, my friends, or the army." Hussein gave
details of an incident in 1964 involving Ahmad Hasan AlBakr,
General Secretary of the Ba'ath Party. Bakr and Hussein, who was
chief of the military branch of the Ba'ath at that time, were
arrested for plotting a coup against then Iraqi President Aref.
Hussein stated he admitted full responsibility for the plot and
could not have provided information against anyone else.
:>§i Hussein stated, "It is not fair for someone in
charge to blame others. If someone says Saddam told me to do it,
that is not a problem for me and does not hurt me."
m
6
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U.S. Department of Justice
f*Q§
K . . ._{>"' Federal Bureau of Investlgatlon
@R W3 e ° Baghdad Operations Center
HEN February IO, 2004
Interview Session Number: 3Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro I
SSA
Arabic/English Translation:
>%§:Saddam Hussein High Value Detainee #1! was
interviewed on February 10, 2004 at a military detention facility
at Baghdad International Airport BIAP!, Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein
provided the following information:
:}§i Hussein provided his comments regarding the
Palestinian situation. Any attempt to understand the roots of
the problems surrounding the Palestinian issue should be made
from the viewpoint of an Arab, and not just as a Palestinian.
The problem is not only a Palestinian one but also an Arab one.
In the 1960s, many revolutions occurred in Arab countries with
the uprisings generally taking place as the result of the
dissatisfaction of the people with the rulers of those times.
Part of the reason leaders were removed was their failure to
address the Palestinian issue adequately or ignoring it
altogether. Any solution to the problem should be based on
fairness and international law. International law, and its
application, created the problem in 1948 upon formation of the
separate Jewish state of Israel from lands previously claimed by
the Palestinians. A solution, from foreigners and those
"internal" to the issue, must be presented in that scope.
Everyone has been looking for a solution. However, Hussein
stated, "A solution that does not convince the majority of
Palestinians will not be successful." The foundation of any such
solution, and the final outcome, must be the establishment of a
separate state of Palestine.
Ei Deriv . -3
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Baghdad Operations Center
}§; When questioned about a speech he once gave
regarding the 1968 revolution in Iraq, Hussein agreed that he
commented in the speech "we did not revolt against a person, we
revolted against the system of government." He further agreed
that he stated the revolution was undertaken "to move Iraqi
people, the country, the Arab world as a whole, and the
Palestinians forward." Hussein added the Ba'ath Party was the
only political party that demonstrated against the Iraqi
government in 1967.
>§} Regarding the Six-Day ArabIsraeli War in 1967,
Hussein stated that Arabs had hoped that lands lost in 1948 would
be won back. Hussein stated, "We were sad when that did not
happen." Although expectations were low for success, the news
was especially disheartening when details were provided about the
rapid defeat of the Egyptian and Syrian military forces. People
of the Arab world became "sad and depressed" and developed a
feeling of revolution.
!éQ Even though the 1967 war was lost, Hussein still
respected Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser after the war.
In Hussein's opinion, Nasser "could represent the Arabs to the
world while others were "weak." At that time, Nasser was the
only ruler with a close relationship to the "Arab masses."
Despite losing the war, Nasser did not lose the respect of the
people. The hopes of the people, however, were greater than the
result Nasser could deliver. Losing the war showed the limits of
the capabilities of Nasser and the Egyptian military forces.
Hussein pointed out that the war also exposed internal issues in
the Egyptian leadership. Abdul Hakim Ammer, head of the Egyptian
military, would not permit Nassers "interference" in military
matters "even though Nasser was head of the country." When
Nasser later resigned, millions of Egyptians protested for him
to resume his duties as President. Hussein opined that it seemed
"Nasser depended on international politics rather than
preparation of his military and people" leading up to the war.
When he died in 1970, citizens "cried for him."
] Regarding the 1973 ArabIsraeli War, Egyptian
President Sadat, who served as Vice President under Nasser,
"could not bring back the hopes of the Arabs " Sadat seemed not
to have a specific cause or aim and was unable to do anything
about 1948 and the "rape of Palestine." Because Sadat was not a
man of cause," Egyptian soldiers were not "motivated" by him.
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Baghdad Operations Center
Similarly, the people of Egypt were not motivated. In fact,
during this time, Egyptians mocked their own soldiers making
jokes about the military saying they did not fight in 1967.
Sadat did, however, through his own personality, make the United
States and Israel believe he could win a war with Israel.
:P§i when questioned about Sadat's ability to ultimately
do more for his people than Nasser, particularly with respect to
bringing peace and reclaiming territory, Hussein stated Nasser's
effect was "nominal." Hussein added, "If you tell Iraqis Kuwait
will be a part of Iraq, they will be happy. The Arab nation,
from poor to wealthy individuals, is one nation with the same
language, common borders, and the same aims. There is one Arab
world, from the "simple person to the lawmakers and thinkers."
The strength of any person in a "family" comes from cooperation
with and love of each other in the "family." If a member of the
"family" does not understand this, he will be weak and fall."
Sadat was not faithful to "family" matters. Prior to the 1967
war, the West Bank and Jerusalem were under control of Jordan
while Gaza was under control of Egypt. Sadat's peace agreement
with the Israelis failed to return the territories to the
rightful owners, the Palestinians. Thus, Sadat was a "traitor to
the cause." Israel only willingly returned the Sinai Peninsula
as it was a "military burden" and was an easy "political move."
>81 Sadat lost honor as a result of agreements made
with Israel. Additionally, the Egyptian economy worsened
significantly under his leadership. In contrast, Egypt's economy
flourished under Nasser with its markets opened to all Arab
countries.
3%§:Hussein stated, "Being at peace is not easy."
Peace without a cause will create a change in balance. Regarding
a comment made to a British journalist approximately two years
ago, Hussein did not mean peace could be achieved by losing faith
and prestige. On the contrary, any peace should be negotiated to
a "favorable position of power."
jxsj Hussein stated Iraq fought in the 1973 war on two
fronts, with its air forces contributing in Egypt and Syria and
ground forces fighting in Syria. when asked whether Iraq could
have done more, Hussein responded, "What more could we have done?
We sent all of our military to fight under Egyptian and Syrian
command." Prior to the war, Egypt had sent then Vice President
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Mubarak to Iraq to request aircraft and pilots for use in
attacking Israeli surfaceto-air missiles sites. Iraq provided
the aircraft though they were already fighting the Kurds in the
north. The Syrians requested Iraq's assistance just after start
of the war saying Israel would occupy Syria without Iraq's help.
}§; Regarding the reported failure of the Syrian
military to "openly welcome" Iraqi forces in 1973, Hussein
stated, "No one is as generous as Iraqis." Hussein was further
asked for his comments regarding the failure/refusal of the
Syrian military to provide Iraqi forces with maps, communications
equipment, and other assistance needed to fight the war together.
Hussein replied, "A loser does not know where his head and feet
are. It was a difficult situation, to come together like this."
Hussein postulated, Perhaps the Syrians did not have maps."
Iraqi officers were accustomed to different treatment in their
own military ranks.
>81 Iraq has always accepted Palestinian refugees into
the country, during Hussein's time and previously. These
influxes of refugees include after 1948 upon formation of Israel,
after September, 1970 Black September in Jordan!, and in 1991
after the first Gulf War. Hussein stated, "we welcomed them,
gave them jobs, and gave them the right to own land and a house.
The latter policy regarding homes was in contradiction with the
doctrine of the Arab League which did not permit Palestinians to
own residences. In Hussein's opinion, Arab League members
assumed that Palestinians would not leave if they owned their own
residences. Hussein did not agree with this policy for
"humanitarian reasons." When presented by Hussein, the Iraqi
leadership agreed with this position. For Palestinians in Iraq,
this helped life be normal."
C32 Hussein acknowledged that Iraqi government builtand/or rente homes for Palestinians from Iraqi landlords.
Hussein stated, "we were concerned about everybody in Iraq. We
would not have let them live on the streets. Things such as
food, work, and a home are needed for the sake of pride."
Hussein stated some people accused Iraq of trying to remove the
Palestinians. Hussein added, on the contrary. we "could not kick
a guest out."
§ Hussein does not remember whether the Iraqi
government paid all or a portion of rent, for all or a certain
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amount of time, for the Palestinian housing in Iraq. Hussein has
no knowledge of home owners suing the government for unpaid rent,
particularly in the early to mid-1990s, and losing such a case to
the government. Hussein stated, "If we promised to pay, we would
have done it. If the case was lost, the government must not have
promised to pay." Hussein denied there was a law permitting the
government to "rent" homes without actually paying rent to the
landlord. He said, "That's not true. There was no such law.
That's rape or jungle law." Hussein asked to see the law on
paper.
:P§£ Hussein provided comments about the 1974 Rabat
Summit where it is reported that the Iraqi government gave up its
belief in an "armed struggle" for Palestine and accepted a
"phased strategy." Hussein stated this was the first conference
he had ever attended. Usually, the Iraqi Minister of Foreign
Affairs attended on behalf of the government. At the summit, the
Palestine Liberation Organization PLO! presented a general
strategy asking Jordan for the West Bank as a homeland.
Previously, the West Bank and Jerusalem were under control of
Jordan and its ruler King Hussein. Hussein stated, "We approved
this after a speech by King Hussein." In Hussein's opinion, King
Hussein did not object to the plan "but seem unconvinced." Also
at this time, Iraq agreed that the PLO would be the only legal
representative of Palestine.
:I§§:Hussein acknowledged that Palestinian groups,
including AlFatah, had offices in Baghdad. In 1978, however,
AlFatah closed its offices and reportedly distributed leaflets.
Hussein does not know the details of the message on the leaflets
but heard it was negative towards the Iraqi government. The
relationship between the Iraqi government and AlFatah "was not
good." Regarding the objectives of other Palestinianorganizations, which seemed to differ from those of the PLO and
Iraq, Hussein stated friction between individuals or groups
regarding the same matter often results in differing ideas being
put forth. According to Hussein, the Palestinians needed
"central control." The individuals comprising the leadership of
the various Palestinian groups were not on the same page." As
for the Iraqis, the leadership met and decided not to interfere
in the internal affairs of the PLO. Hussein stated it was
decided that Iraq would "help as we can." The Palestinians were
told, however, the limitations of the Iraqi government.
Thereafter, direction regarding Iraqi assistance to Palestinians,
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and limitations, was provided to all Iraqi government sectors.
Hussein described relations with the the PLO during the period
1978-2003 as "good."
:R§3 Hussein stated representatives of the Palestine
Liberation Front PLF! and Abu Nidal Organization ANO! were
present in Iraq at times. Hussein stated, "We accepted them as
guests." They were directed not to conduct activities against
Iraq and to refrain from terrorism. PLF and ANO members were
told not to interfere in the internal affairs of the PLO. At one
point, the ANO was warned to cease terrorist activities.
!&Q Hussein acknowledged the presence of Mohamed
Abbas, aka Abu Abbas, in Iraq at some point. Hussein did not
admit to specifically assisting Abbas. He stated, "If we
accepted someone as a guest, we must help them. A guest cannot,
however, demand what he wants for breakfast, lunch, and dinner."
Hussein reiterated that Iraq considered the PLO as the official
political organization for Palestine and all other groups were
secondary.
:IS{ Hussein was told the details of a videotaped
meeting which took place approximately two years ago between
Abbas and Tahir Jalil Habbush, Director of the Iraqi Intelligence
Service. At the meeting, Abbas requested Iraqi assistance,
including money, training, weapons, and transportation, to carry
out missions to attack Israel. Hussein was told the videotape
was seen by the interviewer. Hussein was questioned as to
whether these actions planned against Israel constituted a
legitimate defense of Palestine or terrorism, thereby exceeding
the normal assistance provided to a guest. Hussein asked, "What
did the Iraqi government do? If you have the recording, you
know." Hussein stated that his position is one where attempts
are made to regain all Arab lands, including those "raped and
taken." He stated this is neither a secret nor is it something
which brings shame. Hussein added, If Habbush and Abbas met,
that's something else. We call for a military struggle to regain
Arab lands. The principles are the same as that which we have
talked about before." Hussein continued, "If Abbas asked for
these things, it does not mean we gave them to him. If Abbas
carried out any attacks in Israel, that means we helped him. If
he did not, we did not help him." when told Abbas carried out
attacks in Israel, Hussein replied, "Those occurred before asking
us for assistance. That was their choice." Hussein stated, "At
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any time, we have the ability and the right to help in the
struggle. I'm not talking about Abbas, I'm talking about
organizations in Palestine. Outsiders are not serious." Hussein
asked for the answer provided by Habbush to Abbas. The
interviewer told Hussein money was provided to Abbas, but not as
much as requested. Hussein stated, "This is intelligence work.
We have been open about Palestine."
RBI Hussein was questioned whether assistance to Abbas
would help achieve the goals of Palestinians or whether it would
work against such aims. Hussein stated since he was a "young
struggler" in the Baath Party, he believed any organization
should fight from the inside, not the outside. Per Hussein, any
attempts from.the outside are just "talk" and "not serious."
Hussein suggested further details regarding Abbas could be
obtained from Habbush or from further review of the videotape of
the meeting between the two.
:?§i Regarding whether the Director of the IIS would
meet without the approval of the Iraqi leadership to discuss such
a matter with Abbas, Hussein replied, "Does the American Director
of Intelligence call President Bush every time before meeting
someone?" Hussein agreed that the President, in both the United
States and Iraq, sets policy for all branches of government.
Hussein stated, although Abbas reportedly asked the Iraqi IIS
Director for 1-2 million dollars according to the interviewer, he
would not have given him even "$10,000." Hussein added, "Any
Palestinian who wanted to train and to go fight for Palestine, I
said train him. Money and weapons are different from training."
Because of sanctions against Iraq, the government could not offer
as much assistance as previously provided. Hussein stated, "If
the IIS had the ability, it is not wrong as long as the struggle
is on the inside."
:?§i Hussein was questioned whether Iraq's stated
position of recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of
Palestine conflicted with support provided to other groups and
individuals including Abbas. Hussein responded, "I didn't say I
helped Abbas. Don't put words in my mouth." Hussein added, "I
think the questions should be in the context of a dialogue, not
an interrogation " Hussein continued saying, "If the IIS helped
Abbas, and he fought for Palestine, that is not wrong. If a
person says he wants to struggle against Israel, and that person
is not officially representing Palestinians, there is no conflict
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with Iraqi policy." Hussein said any such person who stated he
wanted to "negotiate" would not be supported by Iraq as that is
the role of Arafat and the PLO.
Is At the end of interview, Hussein was asked about
his movements when hostilities began in March, 2003. Hussein
stated he remained in Baghdad until April l0 or ll, 2003,
whereupon it appeared the city was about to fall. Prior to his
departure from Baghdad, he held a final meeting with the senior
Iraqi leadership and told them "we will struggle in secret."
Thereafter, he departed Baghdad and began gradually "dispersing"
his bodyguards, telling them they had completed their duty, so as
not to draw attention.
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.'-""2..>-< ;f¬a.
2 [ xi.92 _ _:-§§§;___U_,,_f:' Federal Bureau of Invest1gat1on
@R¢WJ ° "° Baghdad Operations Center
="°» February 13, 2004
Interview Session Number: 4
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
ssA|I I
>§§ Saddam Hussein High Value Detainee #1! wasinterviewed on February 13, 2004 at a military detention facilityat Baghdad International Airport BIAP!, Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein
provided the following information:Arabic/English Translationz
!Si The lead interviewer began the discussion byexplaining that today's session would be a general dialogueregarding the United Nations UN! and various resolutions
concerning Iraq as passed by the UN.
I8{ Hussein said, "Let me ask a direct question. I
want to ask where, from the beginning of this interview processuntil now, has the information been going? For our relationshipto remain clear, I want to know." The interviewer told Hussein
that he is a representative of the US Government, and thatreports from these interviews are no doubt being reviewed by many
US government officials. Although the interviewer denied anypersonal knowledge, these individuals may include the President
of the United States. Hussein stated that he would have no
reservations if others were "brought into" the process and that
he "does not mind" if the information is published.
I83 When questioned whether Hussein had ever used"doubles" or those resembling him as has been often discussed in
books and other publications, he laughed and stated, "This is
movie magic, not reality." Hussein added that it is very
difficult for someone to impersonate another individual.
>{! When questioned whether others in the Iraqigovernment, including his son Uday, had used "doubles" as has
been described in a book by an Iraqi man, Hussein denied anyinformation regarding these reports. He stated, "I think my sons
would not do this." Hussein added they might have considered
such a tactic during war, but not in peace. He never saw
DECLASSIFIED BY UC/hat-I 60324UN U5 Clo 2009
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"doubles" for either of his sons, during times of war or peace.
Hussein asked rhetorically, Do not think I am getting upset when
you mention my sons. I still think about them and the fact that
they were martyred. They will be examples to everyone throughout
the world." Both of his sons fought in the war against Iran in
the 1980s, before "arriving at the normal age." They, and one
other individual, are the only ones known to Hussein as having
fought while "underage."
E81 During the Iran-Iraq War in the battle for the
liberation of the AlFaw Peninsula in l987, Hussein and all of
his immediate male relatives fought. This was an important and
decisive battle, a fact which was communicated by Hussein to all
Iraqis. Hussein stated, "When I believe in principles, I believe
in them fully, not partially, not gradually, but completely."
Hussein added that God creates us, and only he decides when he is
going to take us. Hussein ended this portion of the interview
saying, "If you decide to publish a book, be sure to write it in
English as well as Arabic."
QH Upon revisiting the issue whether Hussein ever used
"doubles," he replied, No, of course not."
:PS1 The interview then turned to a discussion ofv
Hussein's view/opinions visa-vis the UN in the 1990s, beginning
with UN Resolution 687. As relayed by the interviewer, UNR 687
called for Iraq to, among other things, declare the existence, if
any, or to destroy, chemical and biological weapons, and agree to
make no further attempts to manufacture or acquire such weapons.
The resolution also called for Iraq to reaffirm its compliance
with the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty. UNR 687 also detailed
steps which Iraq had to undertake in order to have UN sanctions
against the country lifted. Specifically, the interviewer asked
about Hussein's decisions and the rationale for these decisions
with respect to UNR 687.
}S3 Hussein stated UNR 661, not UNR 687, is the first
resolution in the 1990s concerning Iraq which would eventually
contribute to tensions and lead to the most recent war with the
United States. The interviewer confirmed his familiarity with
this resolution, but stated UNR 687 would be the starting point
for this discussion.
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>{§ Hussein acknowledged Iraq accepted UNR 687.
Hussein further acknowledged Iraq made a mistake by destroying
some weapons without UN supervision. When questioned as to
whether Iraq also made a mistake regarding failure to provide
complete disclosure, initially and throughout the process,
Hussein responded, "That's a very good question." UNR 687 was
not written according to the "UN way." It followed UNR 661,
issued before the first Gulf War, and similar to UNR 661, was
supported by the United States. Hussein stated, The United
States started the cause and others followed. 661 was agreed
upon by all parties while 687 was not."
E83 After the first Gulf War began, the US President
eventually requested a meeting in the Gulf on a ship, similar to
the meeting held at the end of World War II between the United
States and Japan, in order to discuss a ceasefire agreement.
Iraq refused such a meeting. Ultimately, Iraq met with leaders
of other countries in a location "at the borders." Iraq agreed
to a ceasefire and withdrew its armies. Thereafter, UNR 687 was
passed. Hussein reiterated that UNR 687 was approved at the
insistence of the United States. According to Hussein, "no such
decision" existed before in the history of the UN.
}§ When the first Gulf War began, Iraqi military
forces were "away from the borders." There were those who wanted
to "rape" Iraq in war, since they could not do that in peace.
>§ The Iraqi government wrote letters to the UN
affirming compliance with UNR 687. Iraq did not agree with the
resolution but agreed to implement it so that "people would not
get hurt "
I51 In Hussein's view, UN inspectors wanted all
expenses, including their accommodations, travel, and other costs
paid for by Iraq. Instead of waiting for the inspectors and
bearing these expenses, Iraq commenced destruction of the
weapons. Iraq did not hide these weapons. UN inspectors later
requested documentation of the destruction of the weapons and
visited various places taking samples for review. Hussein
stated, "If it is presumed that we were mistaken in the
percentage of weapons that we say we destroyed, then how many
mistakes were made by the United States according to UNR 687."
These "mistakes" include occupying Iraq, implementation of the
"No Fly Zones" over northern and southern Iraq, and the bombing
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of Iraq which took place from the first Gulf War to the most
recent one. Hussein questioned why the UN implemented UNR 687 in
such a harsh manner against Iraq, while other UN resolutions,
including those against Israel, were not enforced. Hussein ended
this portion of the discussion saying, "If we were to bring a
professor from a college in the United States to Iraq, he would
agree with my observations regarding UNR 687, with the exception
of the issue of the sovereignty of another country Kuwait!."
>81 During a lengthy dialogue with the interviewer
regarding UNR 687, Hussein made several statements. He
acknowledged UNR 687 passed and Iraq agreed to deal with it."
Regarding destruction of weapons, Hussein stated, "We destroyed
them. We told you, with documents. That's it." when questioned
about Iraqi restrictions placed on locations visited by UN
inspectors, Hussein replied, "What places?" The interviewer told
Hussein numerous locations including the Ministry of Agriculture,
to which Hussein replied, "By God, if I had such weapons, I would
have used them in the fight against the United States." The
interviewer pointed out that most accused persons who are
innocent agree to a full and complete examination of the details
of the accusation. Once cleared, the accused party would then
provide evidence of any mistreatment during the investigation.
Hussein stated, "This is not a question, it is a dialogue.
Good."
Cgf Hussein opined that the United States used
prohibited weapons in Vietnam. He asked whether America would
accept Iraqis inspecting the White House for such weapons.
Hussein stated any such search would likely find nothing. He
added, "A country that accepts being violated will bring dishonor
to its people." Negotiation is the normal method of resolution
of any disagreement particularly among nations. Negotiation isthe "way of the UN.;
when emphasized to Hussein that the international
community greed that Iraq had not complied with UNR 687, he
responded that Iraq believed there was something wrong with "the
international way." The United States convinced the world of its
position regarding Iraq. Regarding further discussion, Hussein
commented, "I must prepare an answer in my mind, so that it does
not come in pieces. Let's leave the past where it is, not that
we agree, but to maximize our time."
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Hussein comented that in the most recent war with
Iraq, the United States only ally was Britain. All other major
countries, including France, China, Russia, and Germany, were
against the war. The United States was "looking for a reason to
do something." Now, the United States is here and did not find
any weapons of mass destruction. Hussein pointed out to the
interviewer that decisions were made by the Iraqi leadership and
not just by Hussein. Iraqi leaders made decisions which gave the
United States an "opening" and the reasons for the most recent
war.
:R§£ Hussein remarked that, at times, people told Jesus
Christ, the Prophet Muhammad, Moses, David, and all other
prophets to give up their beliefs, teachings, and principles to
save their own lives. Hussein stated, "If a man gives up his
principles, his life has no value. In the case of the prophets,
they would have been ignoring the orders of God." Hussein added,
"If Iraq had given up its principles, we would have been
worthless." Hussein stated that he was elected by the people,
and not "brought in by some other country or companies." Thus,
he was required to comply with the principles of the people.
>¥£! The interviewer stressed to Hussein that Iraq's
actions led to the implementation of UN sanctions. The Iraqi
leadership's actions, and in some cases failure to act, compelled
the UN to continue the sanctions. Hussein responded, "This is
your opinion. I answered. He continued saying that it is
difficult to give up "your nationality, your country, and your
traditions." Hussein pointed out that perhaps the interviewer
and another American might think differently on the subject of
Iraq.
:}§1 Hussein said, "If I wanted to be a politician, I
could. But, I do not like politicians or politics." When noted
to Hussein that some people would state he played politics with
the UN, Hussein stated, "We abided totally by all UN decisions."
The United States should be blamed, not the UN. Hussein stated,
"We are among the few remaining cavaliers."
>§< Upon any examination of blame, the interviewer
pointed out one must first look at the origins of the discord
between Iraq and the world, the invasion of Kuwait. Hussein
responded, "America had a plan with Kuwait to attack Iraq. We
had a copy of the plan in our hands. If I had the prohibited!
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weapons, would I have let United States forces stay in Kuwait
without attacking? I wish the United States did not have the
intention to attack Iraq."
IS; when questioned whether the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait, which led to war with the United States, also
precipitated the sanctions against Iraq, Hussein asked, "I ask
you as an American, when did the United States stop shipments of
grain to Iraq? In 1989. When did the
European countries to boycott sales of
Iraq? In 1989. The United States was
an intention pushed by Zionism and the
elections in the United States." ThisUnited States contact
technological equipment to
planning to destroy Iraq,
effect of Zionism on
US "plan" was also
influenced by countries located near Iraq, particularly Israel,
which viewed Iraq as a dangerous military threat upon conclusion
of the IranIraq War. Hussein stated
much."
Regarding Kuwait and theI believe this very
war, Hussein stated, "It
is difficult to avoid someone who is armed and standing outside
your house unless you come out and shoot." As Iraq is a small
country, it was difficult to stop the United States no matter
what steps were taken.
>§! Leading up to the most recent war, the United
States provided much "history" to the world regarding Iraq.
Hussein stated, "It was difficult for me, or any honorable
person, not to attempt to stop the United States from entering
Iraq."
>éRegarding providing his personal observations
versus his opinions as President of Iraq, Hussein stated, "There
is nothing I consider personal. I cannot forget my capacity as
President. This is what I know and am convinced of. Thus, it is
difficult to answer from a personal viewpoint. I cannot forget
my role and principles for one second, and forget what I was."
:H§! At the end of the interview, Hussein was again
asked about his movements after the beginning of the war in
March, 2003. Hussein stated he was not in the Dora neighborhood
of Baghdad on March 19, 2003 when it was bombed by coalition
forces. Hussein added that he was notin this neighborhood in
the ten days before this attack or at any time throughout the
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war. Hussein believes that coalition forces targeted this
location because they mistakenly believed he was present.
Q6 Regarding his method of movement before the fall ofBaghdad in April, 2003, Hussein stated that success in movementof persons or equipment during war time required knowledge of
enemy capabilities as well as "our own capabilities." The
persons closest to Hussein Murafiqeen! would direct him to "movethis way or that way." when asked whether Hussein normally
traveled in a Black Mercedes before the war, he stated, "Perhaps.We had all colors of Mercedes." Regarding whether he normally
traveled in a long motorcade, Hussein stated, "I'll leave this
for history.
;'m%E;r=¢zE
SE X1
U.S. Department of Justice
$7 in " DE
Federal Bureau of Investigation
@R WJ ° ° Baghdad Operations Center*"'° °: February 15, 2004
DEELASSIFIED BY ucfhaw 50324
um U5-U6-2009Interview Session Number: 5
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
SSAArabic/English Translation: I i
}§i Saddam Hussein High Value Detainee #1! wasinterviewed on February 15, 2004 at a military detention facilityat Baghdad International Airport BIAP!, Baghdad, Iraq. Husseinprovided the following information:
Dé! Prior to any questions being asked, Hussein statedthat he wanted to ask a question. He then asked what kind of
changes have taken place in the world, i.e., with China andRussia, and in international politics. The interviewer relatedthat there has not been a lot of significant changes, thatefforts are underway to rebuild Iraq and this includes supportfrom Russia and China, and that things are moving forward
rapidly.
>%6 Hussein then explained that since he has been inprison for one or two months, he does not have a picture of whatis happening. He indicated that he had intended to ask theinterviewer this question two days earlier. Hussein discussed amovie he saw, based on a book, A Tale of Two Cities, which he hadread long ago, in which a British man imprisoned in a French jailis likewise out of touch with what is happening in the outside
world. According to Hussein, the author of this book wascritical of French authorities for this treatment. Hussein notedthat nothing had changed since that time. The interviewer
responded that "Over time, some things have changed; others havenot."
:2§; The interviewer informed Hussein that today'ssession would be a dialogue about the 1968 takeover by the Ba'athParty, in particular trying to distinguish fact from legend.Hussein responded by stating in effect that in 1968, Iraq wasliving in a primitive way and could only advance itself seriouslyby understanding two concepts. The first was to recognize thatthe country had historical precedence for change as demonstrated
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Baghdad Operations Center
in previous ages. The second concept involved the recognition
that Iraq could learn by examining the way the rest of the world
operated. Accordingly, Hussein and others traveled to other Arab
countries. In comparing themselves with other locales, they
discovered that Cairo and Damascus were far more advanced than
Baghdad. Hussein had many friends who traveled to Damascus who
believed that Iraq could reach the level of development in
Damascus, but they could not imagine reaching the level of
development of Cairo.
QQ Iraq's manufacturing ability at the time waslimited to making blankets and to operating a canning factory in
Karbala which needed to import its materials. Aside from these,
there were only a few other simple attempts at manufacturing in
other fields. However, Iraq was motivated and had the energy to
advance itself. Early efforts resulted in mistakes, but these
were corrected. As they progressed, they continued to send
people to countries around them in order to gain experience.
Among the countries which Hussein and others visited were the
Soviet Union, France, Spain, Iran, Turkey and all the Arab
countries. In all of these, Hussein believed that the Soviet
Union was the
of its people
sides betweenclosest match to Iraq in terms of the social life
However, this did not mean that Hussein took
the East and the West. Hussein stated that while
looking at the ways in which others live, we "don't forget we are
Arabs and Iraqis and that Iraqis have their own way of co-
existing and relating with other Arabs." Hussein added, "Looking
at our aims to develop, we tried going for development in all
aspects including, political, economic, technological and
industrial."
:R§£:Concerning the Ba'ath Party takeover, Hussein
acknowledged that they had help from the military who were
members of the party. He also acknowledged that Colonel Ibrahim
Abd AlRahman Da'ud and Colonel Abd AlRazzaq Nayif, nonBa'ath
members of the military, helped with the takeover. He added that
the two had not played an important role in allowing the takeover
to be undertaken without resistance or bloodshed.
:¥§3 Hussein stated that the decision not to have
bloodshed was done at his request, that it was his belief that
"we had to forget the past and not have more bloodshed." He
claimed that this matter was discussed at a meeting at the homeof the Minister of Health, Dr. Mustafa. A few members disagreed
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with Hussein, especially party members who had been tortured by
the previous regime and wanted revenge. A dialogue ensued andHussein said that he, too, had been tortured. Eventually, an
agreement was made that there would be no bloodshed. As evidence
that this decision was honored, Hussein pointed out that the
Ba'athists did not harm President Abdul Rahman Aref, but just
expelled him. Additionally, he advised that his party made adecision to release prisoners from all parties including
nationalists and communists. Concerning Colonel Da'ud and
Colonel Nayif, Hussein related that they chose not to harm them
either, but simply to expel them.
:§3 When asked about Colonel Da'ud's role in themilitary, Hussein stated that it was Abu Haitham Ahmad Hassan
AlBakr! who had a stronger voice than Da'ud, who had no real
voice.
I?S1 Hussein advised the Presidential protection, theRepublican Guard, consisted of three divisions: Armored,
Infantry and Special Forces. ColonelDa'ud's responsibility wasnot to clash or fight with the Armored Division. This was hisonly role. Hussein said, "We controlled the Armored Division; Icommanded a tank and fired on the Presidential Palace." He said,"Practically, we could have done without both Da'ud and Nayif."
!§3 Hussein stated, "We got news in the afternoonbefore the attack that Nayif was offering to join the revolution.
Apparently, Da'ud had told him
told Da'ud to keep our plans a
members wanted to postpone our
revolution, we discovered that
among themselves and that theyplans.about our plans even though we had
secret. As a result, several
At the first stage of the
Nayif and Da'ud had been planning
had been contacting other officersoutside our line of communication. So, we took removed them on31 July. It was me who led the operation."
>§i According to Hussein, Da'ud was sent to Jordan on amilitary assignment. Hussein added, "We could have taken himanytime. I went to Nayif with a gun;
weapon. With one gun, I took all the
staff." Since Da'ud was serving with
Hussein sent Ba'ath members to arrest
Baghdad. "However, he said that Da'ud
knife in our back."I didn't have an automatic
weapons from Nayif and his
a military corp in Jordan,
him and bring him back to
and Nayif "were like a
qwa
Ecsasw
Baghdad Operations Center
>¥¬! Contrary to popular accounts of Nayif's arrest,Hussein advised that Nayif was not invited to lunch at PresidentAlBakr's house. The arrest actually took place at the
Presidential Palace. According to Hussein, "We had lunch at thePresidential Palace everyday during the thirteen days after therevolution because decisions had to be made. We were always inthe Palace as was President AlBakr. Others attended when meals
were served. When Nayif arrived, I pulled a gun on him. Hecarried a gun too. It was like a movie. I put Barzan Ibrahim
Hasan, my half brother, in the room to guard Nayif. When I
arrested Nayif, he said, I have four children, so I told him
that his children would be taken care of. I told him to sitthere and then I asked him where he wanted to go for an
assignment as an ambassador." At first, Nayif said he wanted togo to Lebanon. Because Hussein considered Lebanon to be a place
where conspiracies are made, he told Nayif to choose anotherlocation. Nayif then asked to go to Algeria, but Hussein denied
this request because Algeria was having their own revolution.Then, Nayif asked to go to Morocco, and Hussein agreed. Husseintook Nayif to the airport in a car and sat beside him. OtherBa'ath members were in the car as well. Hussein told Nayif, "WhenI promise something, I do it. We promised that nothing would
happen to President Aref and nothing happened. Friends know Ikeep my word." Hussein told Nayif that "he would be in a safeplace, that no one would hurt him, but that he would have to
obey."
:R§; Hussein laughed as he recalled the story aboutNayif and wanted to relate to the interviewer additional details.He remembered telling Nayif, "When the guards salute, you saluteback. If you try to think about doing something, remember I amnext to you." He told Nayif, "When you go as an ambassador, actlike one. We'll notice if you are planning something or not."Hussein recalled that at the time of Nayif's departure, they thenew Ba'ath Party! failed to ask Moroccan officials for permissionbefore dispatching Nayif as ambassador. At the time, Hussein andothers were young student revolutionaries and did not know aboutsuch things.
>Si As Nayif boarded the plane for Morocco at theRasheed Camp military airport!, Hussein returned Nayif's gun tohim. Hussein described the scene as being, "just like a movie."
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Baghdad Qperations Center
>§< Hussein was asked why, if Nayif represented apotential threat to the Ba'ath Party, he was appointed as
ambassador. Hussein repeated that they did not want bloodshedanymore. He stated that during the 1959 coup, Ba'ath Partymembers were tied to cars and dragged through the streets untildeath. Virgins were hanged on electric poles. There was killingin the streets. When the Ba'ath Party came to power in 1963,
people were executed out of revenge. Hussein reiterated that itwas his opinion at the time that they needed to forget about the
past and prohibit revenge. Hussein stated, "As part of thisthinking, we started our arrests of Da'ud and Nayif and went on.Da'ud wanted to be the Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, so we sent him
there."
:?§3 In the early 1960s, there was a lot of violence
against Ba'athists by the communists. Hussein maintained thatwhen the Ba'athists subsequently took control, however, they didnot do to the communists or others what the communists had doneto them, at least not to the same extent. He advised that they
took the communists to court and acknowledged that some approximately five or six ! were executed. He advised that they
released communists, Nasserites, Kurds and members of the MuslimBrotherhood who had been previously imprisoned.
15$ Hussein acknowledged that Nayif was killed on hisdoorstep in London and that following this, thirteen Iraqi
diplomats were expelled from the country. When Hussein was toldthat some people believe that Nayif was executed by members ofthe Iraqi Security Service, Hussein answered, "God killed Nayif.Nayif started acting in a way against the country. He gave hisword that he wouldn't act against his country. He went to Iran,then met Barzani in Northern Iraq, and according to information,he met with Moshe Dayan Israeli Defense Minister!. These wereall considered bad acts. As to who killed him, that's somethingelse. Only God knows." When Hussein was asked if he knew whokilled Nayif, Hussein answered, "I told you, God knows." Pressedfurther, Hussein said, "I told you in a very clear way." As to
Da'ud's fate, Hussein stated, "maybe he's still alive, but hewasn't treasonous. There was nothing recorded against him."When asked what the Iraqi government's action was regarding
Nayif, Hussein stated, "I am not sure, but I think we warned him.I cannot remember." Hussein was then asked if Nayif could havebeen arrested, imprisoned and punished, instead of executed, andthat some people believe that an order was given to execute him.
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Baghdad Operations Center
Hussein replied, "What people think is something else, but I gave
you my answer."
>85 Hussein acknowledged that after the revolutionother key figures such as Salih Mahdi Ammash and Hardan Al-Tikriti were removed. Asked if they were removed because theywere viewed by the Ba'ath Party as a threat, Hussein answeredthat compared with coups elsewhere in the world, fewer officialswere removed from the government. Hussein stated, although
positions may change, relationships do not. As an example,Ammash's daughter became a member of the leadership. His halfbrother, Barzan, was a revolutionary who rode in the same tank asHussein which fired on the main gate of the Presidential Palaceon the 17th of July. He took many positions but never moved upagain. Hussein pointed out that other revolutionaries "ran outof gas," and fewer were able to serve for a long time.
>KQ Hussein was asked about Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri andTariq Aziz. Hussein described Aziz as being an old-time comrade,
very respected in the party, but he was not one of therevolutionaries. Hussein said, "I am talking about seventypersons who went into the Presidential palaces." Husseinidentified Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri and Taha Yasin Ramadan as havingbeen in the revolution from the beginning until now. He saidthey had struggled, but that they continue in leadership to this
day.
:>%§3 Hussein brought up the subject of Sa'dun Shakir whohe claimed to be his lifelong friend. Shakir helped Saddam
escape from prison. He stated, "Shakir was waiting for me in thecar when we fled, actually, we didn't flee; we had an agreementwith the guards". Hussein stated, "Shakir was the driver. He'svery dear to me". .He added, "When he had nothing more to give,we kept our friendship and love and then we went on from there.It happens. The right people are picked at the right time."
>E§:Asked about his comment that some revolutionariesrun out of gas and that few are able to serve the revolution foran extended period of time, Hussein replied that there were onlyabout six or seven such individuals. When pointed out that somemay consider that he, Hussein, may have "run out of gas," Husseinlaughed and said, "I don't get upset at questions that go for thetruth. First, I wasn't in the government from the beginning. Ifyou were talking about me as President, then no one was saying I
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Baghdad Qperations CenterF¥li
had run out of gas. I only started in 1979. Before that, there
was someone above me.The two individuals within the leadershipthat could have told Hussein he no longer benefited the Party
were Hardan Al-Tikriti and Salih Ammash.
;>é% Considering the time since Hussein was in the tankthat fire o the palace through his assumption of leadership inthe RCC and his presidency, Hussein was asked, "Your service hasbeen one of the longest; Is it coincidence?" Hussein replied,"They could have said that. This subject is more deep than thedetails that you give. A leader is not made in a factory in
Europe. Leadership is developed gradually. This was doneunderground." Hussein's opinion at the time was that AlBakrshould be the President. Hussein stated that he was elected asDeputy Chairman of the Party before the revolution. Husseinsaid, "I don't like the government, but I like to be in theParty. Notice my speeches, I never say the government; I alwayssay the Party."
jf Hussein advised that he considers himself to be arevolutionary, not a politician. In both 1968 and 1974, he askedthe Party to allow him to be excused from his official position.
However, the Party refused his request.
>< Hussein was asked about Hardan Al-Tikriti beingkilled in Kuwait and was told that people blamed the Iraqi
Security Service. Hussein said that Hardan had not been sent toKuwait, that he thought Hardan had been appointed as an
ambassador somewhere else, perhaps Spain. In any event, Husseindenied knowing the reason why Hardan was killed nor did heacknowledge that the Security Service killed him.
yé Husseinin different parts of
these leaders posed a
purposeful, or did he
saying, "The questionwas asked about Iraqi leaders being killed
the world. The interviewer asked whether
threat, was it merely a coincidence, was it
find it strange? Hussein replied by
should be asked of the Kuwaitis."
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U.S. Department of Justice:7? ' {$13.
sriblz
Federal Bureau of Investigation
'? M*H "R Baghdad Operations CenterH N° February 16, 2004
DECLASSIFIED BY ucfbaw 60324
ON 05-20-2009
Interview Session Number: 6
Interview Conducted by: SSA Geor e
SSAArabic/English Translation:
I8¥ Saddam Hussein High Value Detainee #1! wasinterviewed on February 16, 2004 at a military detention facilityat Baghdad International Airport BIAP!, Baghdad, Iraq. Husseinprovided the following information:
gi At the beginning of the interview, Hussein wasinformed t at today's dialogue would be a continuation ofyesterday's discussion regarding the years following the 1968revolution and about prominent members of the Ba'ath Party.
:D§§: The interviewer mentioned to Hussein that heunderstood that the attempted coup in 1973 was undertaken by aprotege of Hussein, Nadhim Kazzar, Director of the Ba'ath Party'sSecurity Service and a Shi'a from the city of AlAmarah- Husseinrelated that at the time, the Party did not know which memberswere Sunni or Shi'a Muslims or Christians. As an example, hepointed out that it was not until later that he learned that oneof the Party's leaders, Tariq Aziz, was a Christian. The Partywas successful because it related to the people, and, thus, nodistinction was made on members based on their religion orethnicity.
IXSI Hussein related that among the Party's leadershipbetween 1958-63, very few members were Sunni. The SecretaryGeneral was Shi'a from the city of AlNasiriyah. Hussein claimedthat when he attempted to assassinate President Qassem in 1959,he knew nothing about the Sunnis and Shi'as. In 1963, with theexception of two or three Party members, almost all members ofthe Ba'ath Party were Shi'as. After the revolution, people beganinquiring which members were Sunni and which were Shi'a. At thetime, it was difficult to know because they were all mixedtogether. However, by 1968, nearly all Party members wereSunnis. Because the Party had previously operated secretlknew or cared about ones religion. However, after the
EcserzxiThis document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of theFBI and 1S loaned to your agency; it and its contents are HOE CO be dlStIibL1ted outside your agency.y, fewb6
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Baghdad Qperations Center
revolution, people in the government began talking morefrequently about this issue. Many were concerned that promotionsand demotions were being decided on the basis on one's sect orreligious affiliation. Hussein stated, "You would be surprisedto know that the Secretary General of the Party in 1964 was
Kurdish."
gES{: Hussein was asked about a perception that NadhimKazzar wa Hussein's "righthand man" and that at one time, hewas considered a threat to take over President Bakr's regime.Hussein refuted this characterization by saying that he was nothis right hand man in the government and that each person hastheir own duties and responsibilities. He said that althoughKazzar was neither a revolutionary nor among the seventyindividuals who took over the Presidential Palace, he was a goodParty member and a tough individual while he was in prison.
:E§i Kazzar was not convinced that the military wouldbe good for the Ba'ath Party. He was influenced by the thoughtsof Party members who split and believed in a communist socialistphilosophy. Kazzar considered the military members of the Partyto be oldfashioned and a burden. Despite his perspective,however, Kazzar decided to remain with the Party. Hussein had noinformation whether Kazzar had met with officials in Iran. Herelated that when Kazzar's coup failed, Kazzar fled to Iran butwas arrested before he arrived at the border. Hussein said hedid not want to talk "bad" about Kazzar. He said that whenKazzar "arrested" the Minister of Defense Hammad Shihab andMinister of Interior Sa'dun Ghaydan, it was done easily and didnot require a big plan.
While discussing Kazzar, Hussein digressed andcharacterized this period as being the best time for Iraq because"we nationalized oil, settled oil disputes with the oil companiesand invested money in Thoura City," which was later renamed,Saddam City.
::>¬{Z According to Hussein, the psychology of the Ba'athParty was to recruit young individuals at the beginning of theirschooling such as when they were in elementary and secondaryschool. The Party seldom recruited members from colleges. Theirphilosophy was that they wanted a person they could mold to"grow" into the Party. In the 1950's and 1960's, the Partyaccepted primarily young people and only a few older individuals.
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Baghdad Qgerations Center
Some Party members such as Kazzar questioned the allegiance ofnewer officers to the Ba'ath Party.
Bf Wthe interviewer mentioned to Hussein that manypeople believed Kazzar's plan to kill Bakr went awry after Kazzarlearned that President Bakr's plane had been delayed and thenincorrectly assumed that his plot had been exposed. Theinterviewer continued stating that Kazzar then kidnappedMinisters Shihab and Ghaydan as hostages and fled to the borderof Iran where he was captured by Hussein. Hussein responded bysaying, "Your information is not specific. According to myinformation, President Bakr's plane was not delayed, and hisguards were awaiting his arrival." Hussein waited at the airportfor Bakr and after Bakr arrived, he accompanied him to thePresidential Palace where the two drank tea together. Husseinlater excused himself so that Bakr could visit with his family.Hussein was then driven by his staff through Baghdad. As theywere driving, they heard an announcement on the police radio thata coup had been attempted by Ministers Shihab and Ghaydan.Because of the importance of this matter, Hussein pushed hisdriver to the side and proceeded to drive the car himself to hisresidence which was located near the President's residence. Nearthe gate of his residence, Hussein used a telephone to call Bakr,who asked where Hussein was located because he had something veryimportant to relate. Hussein answered that he was nearby, andthat he had heard the news. Hussein met with Bakr at hisresidence. Bakr told Hussein that Ministers Shihab and Ghaydanhad attempted a coup, saying that he had tried calling MinisterShihab, but received no answer. Hussein advised Bakr that he hadan "intuition" about Kazzar and believed it was Kazzar who hadattempted the coup, not the two Ministers. Hussein subsequentlyasked Bakr to call the Military Division and prepare to go afterKazzar and "to hit him before he crossed the border into Iran."
::¥§¥::Near the borders of Iran were tribes where Husseinand Sa'dun Shakir used to go hunting. After the revolution,Hussein had given these tribes many rifles. An announcement wasput out on the radio to arrest Kazzar and inform the nearestBa'ath Party unit. Members of a tribe who became aware of thisthrough the radio, saw Kazzar's caravan, surrounded it anddetained him. Special Operations helicopters were thendispatched to pick up Kazzar and return him to Baghdad.
3
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Baghdad Qperations Center
>§5 After Bakr obtained a clear picture of what hadoccurred, he started crying, picked up his belongings and wentfrom his palace to his residence. According to Hussein, Bakrsaid that he did not want to be President. Bakr told Hussein hewanted Hussein to remain in the government so he could "slipout." Hussein claimed to have made a similar statement to Bakrabout also wanting to leave the government.
Zsii Following this, Hussein told people not to botherBakr and to let him stay at home. Hussein then began arrestingthe alleged conspirators of this coup. He called Bakr to informhim that some of the conspirators were members of the Ba'athParty leadership. Hussein then began organizing a meetingbetween himself, Bakr and leaders of the Ba'ath Party Central andNational Committees.
:E: Hussein was asked how he knew that Kazzar would befleeing to Iran. He answered that when the announcement went outon the radio to look for Kazzar, people started calling insightings of him. Gradually, it was those periodic sightingsthat led him to believe that Kazzar was heading towards Iran.
:RS£ Hussein was asked if Kazzar called President Bakr,and he said, "No." Hussein said that apparently Kazzar's vehiclehad become stuck in the mud. When he solicited the assistance oflocal farmers, they called for help. It was around this timethat Kazzar shot Ministers Shihab and Gaydan. Shihab survived bypretending that he was dead.
:R§i Hussein was questioned whether Kazzar had calledPresident Bakr to negotiate the release of the hostages, and atthe same time selected Abd AlKhaliq AlSamarra'i's residence asa place to meet. Hussein denied this, stating that there wasannouncement on the emergency radio band that a coup had beenattempted and that all party members should meet at Abd AlKhaliqAlSamarra'i's residence. Hussein did not know why this house waschosen as the meeting location, but suspected that the Partymembers were being called to one location to be arrested. Whenasked whether Samarrai was implicated in the coup simply becauseof the meeting, Hussein answered that a "committee" took care ofthis. Hussein does not remember who headed the "committee,"including whether it was Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri. Hussein stated,"I do not want to make a mistake on the details regardingsomething which I am not one hundred percent sure." Hussein
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Baghdad Operations Center
acknowledged that Samarra'i had been a Ba'ath member since 1968.When asked if Samarra'i spoke out on issues, Hussein said, "TheBa'ath Party talked freely. This is only a media interpretationthat people could not talk." Hussein stated that there aremembers of the Party still available, and he suggested that theinterviewers talk to them. Hussein was asked if he was surprisedby the allegations against Samarra'i. He responded, "When wegive someone in the Party something to do, we trust them. Theseand other things happen in a revolution."
ahk Hussein then stated, "Whether I am the firstperson or the second person, all the questions come back to me.I am not afraid of taking responsibility in front of the law orthe people. You have to put blame not just on the leadership,but also on the people who conspired such as Samarra'i." Husseinadded, "I want you to understand clearly about the situation.Yesterday, we talked about the fact that Nayif and Hardan werekilled overseas. Ibrahim Daud was not killed. If the Iraqigovernment is being accused of all this, why did they not killDaud?"
I81 Hussein stated, "As I recall, Bakr ruled until1979 but was not called a dictator, but after I ruled, they ~called me a dictator." Hussein then asked, "After 1979, who waskilled or assassinated inside or outside of Iraq? Who wasexecuted from the Ministries or out of the leadership after
l979?"
!8 Following these questions, the interviewer saidthat these are unanswered questions which needed to be clarifiedfor the sake of history. Hussein said, "It's not enough to askme. You should ask other leaders. I advise you to talk toothers." Hussein said he was not worried about answering
questions.
:E§I The interviewer told Hussein that he Hussein! wasanswering the questions for the same reasons they were beingasked, for the sake of history. Hussein replied, "Sometimes, yousee me upset because some things are dark. During this period,we had good and bad times. We laughed and joked. Samarra'iserved, and we made jokes with him. He made mistakes. We movedon. I hope you will be just in what history you the
interviewers! write."
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Baghdad Qperations Center
>81! The interviewer told Hussein, "Fortunate1y orunfortunately, I will have a major impact on your history. "
Hussein agreed and replied, "Nobody can say I have no bias.People think what they want. Everyone has his own opinions.People are not a computer. We all have flesh and blood."
%
@217./inf
lLS.DeparnnentofJusce
Federal Bureau of Investigation.»_-L!--.
M ,;ii.-92 W
"-15:1 1*!-".___4__.
In Reply, Please Refer to
_ Baghdad Operations Center Flle N0.
February 18, 2004
DECLASSIFIED BY uc/haw 6032.4
UH U5-2U-2009
Interview Session Number; 7Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
ssA| |Arabic/English Translation: | l
QQ Saddam Hussein High Value Detainee #1! wasinterviewed on February 18, 2004 at a military detention facilityat Baghdad International Airport BIAP!, Baghdad, Iraq. Husseinprovided the following information:
!S3 Prior to the start of interview, Hussein wasinformed this session would be a continuation of the two previousdiscussions. Topics to be covered would include a discussion ofSa'dun Shakir, among others.
>@§ Hussein acknowledged that Shakir was an example ofsomeone in the Ba'ath Party the Party! who had "served out hisabilities." Nevertheless, Shakir was someone with whom Husseinmaintained contact after his departure from service to the Party.
X83 Hussein first met Shakir in the Taji Prison nearBaghdad. Both Hussein and Shakir had been sentenced to prisonupon change of the Iraqi government in late 1963 when a coup ledby Abd AlSalem Aref overthrew the Ba'ath government. During1965 or 1966, Hussein and Shakir were transferred to Prison # 1also near Baghdad. At some point, Shakir was released butcontinued visiting Hussein in prison. During this time, theirfriendship continued and developed more. Eventually, Hussein andAbd Al-Karim AlShaykh1i escaped from prison with the assistanceof Shakir, who served as their driver during the escape.
>§ After escaping from prison, Shakir was still amember of the Party and served in that capacity. During thisperiod, Hussein continued friendly relations with him. Hedescribed Shakir as a very trusted person whom Hussein consideredas a friend to him and to his children. Shakir was one of theoriginal seventy "revolutionaries" of 1968.
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This document contains neither recommendatio s nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of theFBI and 1S loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
4'92L/' ,L.
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Baghdad Operations Center
15$ When questioned regarding positions held in theParty by Shakir, Hussein commented that, like any other leader,Shakir would accept any assignment. Hussein does not rememberany of these assignments and stated this was not important. Hewas a friend and that is what is important. Hussein suggestedthat the interviewer should ask Shakir in order to confirm thisinformation.
:*¬! Regarding whether Shakir was Director of the IraqiIntelligence Service IIS!, Hussein replied it is wellknown thathe was the IIS Director. The interviewer opined that it isgenerally accepted that someone in charge of an organization suchas an intelligence service should have certain qualifications andabilities prior to appointment to such a position. Husseinreplied, "We were all young revolutionaries." As such, they didnot have the necessary experience and learned "on the job."Hussein added that regarding management matters, they learnedfrom the Party. Hussein stated leading people is the mostdifficult thing in life. Whoever can lead people in the Party,and the masses, will be effective in their jobs. Husseincontinued saying Party members "gave it a try" with somesucceeding and some failing. Party members continued in theirpositions until the responsibilities of their work overcame theirindividual abilities. At this point, they were replaced.Regarding Party members with a military background, Hussein notedthis military experience was limited and did not necessarilytranslate into something useful for governmental affairs.
C§; Hussein acknowledged Shakir served as IIS Directorat an important time of the revolution. He noted, however, thatthe entire history of a revolution is important. Perhaps, Shakirdid not serve at the most critical time. Hussein added,"Difficulties become larger when the job becomes larger."
§:The interview then turned to a discussion ofShaykhli. Hussein acknowledged Shaykhli was a fellowrevolutionary and a friend. Hussein and Shaykhli participated inthe assassination attempt against Iraqi President Qassem in 1959.Each escaped Iraq and fled to Damascus, Syria. There, Husseinand Shaykhli's friendship and brotherhood continued and grewstronger. After Syria, their friendship continued upon moving to Cairo together.
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Baghdad Operations Center
!S§ After the first Ba'ath revolution of 1963, Husseinand Shaykhli returned to Iraq together. Upon return, Husseinworked with farmers and Shaykhli worked investigations at theQasr Al-Nihayya The Palace of the End!. Later, Shaykhli was
appointed military attache to Lebanon.
§{! Upon overthrow of the Ba'ath government by Aref inlate 1963, Hussein and Shaykhli went "underground" together.They remained "underground" until the July, 1968 revolution inIraq and the resumption of power by the Ba'ath Party.Thereafter, Hussein and Shaykhli served in the Party leadershiptogether until 1971.
151 Hussein commented that Shaykhli had a very goodmind but did not concentrate and focus on the job at hand.According to Hussein, Shaykhli liked to "live and entertainhimself." Hussein told Shaykhli how the Party perceived him.Later, the majority of Party leadership voted to remove Shaykhlifrom his position. He was later murdered in Baghdad in 1980.
>§ The interviewer pointed out that Hussein hadomitted some details of his relationship with Shaykhli includingthe fact that the two of them had served in prison at the sametime after the 1963 overthrow of the Ba'ath government, becomingfriends. As is commonly understood, the interviewer also notedShaykhli once saved Hussein's life. Hussein responded, "In whatsense?" The interviewer then relayed the details of an incidentduring the "underground" years of the Ba'ath between 1963 and1968. According to the story, Hussein was at Shaykhli'sapartment late one night. Hussein decided to leave theapartment and spend the night at a location where weapons for theParty were stored. However, Shaykhli convinced Hussein to remainat his place. Later, the same night, the weapons storagelocation was raided by the police. Some believe Hussein mighthave been killed, or at a minimum, arrested if he had been at the
location.
:H§l Hussein acknowledged this story is true and that hewas with Shaykhli at this time. However, he stated the policecould not have captured or killed him. With Shaykhli driving,Hussein went to the weapons location the next morning. Uponarrival, a policeman at the location put the barrel of hismachine gun in Hussein's side as he rang the bell of the house.Simultaneously, Shaykhli sped away from the location in the car.
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Baghdad Operations Center
Hussein explain
react different
>§!A
someone who wou
policeman did not recognize him.
anything and asked whether this
Hussein was not
police in Iraq
seriously threa
"know each othe
the law permits
continued his s
his machine gun
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place his hands
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decided to fire
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moved, a second
the policeman's
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arrested by theed that although Shaykhli was a brave man, peoplely in different situations.
t that time, Hussein was not widely known and wasld not have been recognized. As such, the
Hussein pretended not to know
was "Mohammed's" residence.
being shot or killed as thedo not kill someone easily, unless their life istened. Additionally, people in Iraq generallyr" and there are many tribal influences. Even ifsuch conduct, tribes will seek revenge. Husseintory saying he surprised the policeman by pushingaside and pulling a pistol which he Hussein! hadhis shirt. Hussein ordered the policeman toon Hussein's car, which had been previously leftand was likely the reason the house wasssein did not want to kill the officer, buta round in the air over the policeman's head.tioned, however, and Hussein "reloaded." He tolde would fire one round over his head, and if heround into his body. He then fired a round overhead and the officer "became like a dog." Accurred as some of Hussein's "comrades" had beenpolice inside the house. These "comrades" heardconcerned about
all the activity outside and told the police their comrade Saddamhad arrived with a big group and would kill the policemen.
Simultaneously,
to the house wi
the "comrades"
saved from Huss
without bloodsh
saying there arone of the men in the car with Shaykhli returnedth a machine gun. The police then acquiesced toin the house asking them for their help and to beein and his men. Thereafter, the standoff endeded. Hussein ended this portion of the discussione many stories from the "underground" period, allof them like "scenes in the movies."
>§H
similar to Huss
that time. Husussein was told that Shaykhli was described,ein, as a prominent and popular Party member atsein responded there is no need and it is notimportant to compare one person to another. Each person isdifferent, one
>¢¬>H
Minister until
by the leadershis not better than the other.
ussein acknowledged Shaykhli served as Foreign1971, whereupon he was removed from this positionip. Hussein stated that removal of any individual
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Baghdad Operations Center
from a position requires a decision by the leadership. Not all
may agree on the removal, but a majority was required. In
Hussein's opinion, Shaykhli could have continued his service to
the Party and the government. At that time, Hussein believed
Shaykhli could have been "criticized" and given the chance to
correct his behavior. Shaykhli would never have been elected as
a Party member without the support of Hussein. Because of
Shaykhli's lack of concentration on his work and failure to
accept criticism, the Party leadership was "not convinced" of him
and decided on his removal.
:?§i Regarding whether Shaykhli was viewed as apotential successor to President Bakr, Hussein did not agree andsaid this statement was too strong. Hussein commented that it
appeared as if the interviewer was implying that he removed those
from leadership viewed as a threat to Hussein's position of
leadership. From the underground days, Hussein was already incharge. While in prison, the Ba'ath leadership sent a letter
notifying Hussein of their recommendation that he become a member
of the Ba'ath Party Central Committee. Hussein answered the
letter, "What good am I in prison?" He asked the Party to find
someone else, however, they did not listen to his opinion.
Thereafter, Bakr and Hussein served as two members of the Central
Committee, a body considered above the Regional Committee and all
other Party components. Bakr served as Secretary General andHussein served as Deputy Secretary General while "underground."
>¬Q Hussein commented that it is embarrassing to talkabout one's own positions. His status in the Party was known,even before the revolution. All those appointed to Party
positions, dead or alive today, deserved these appointments.Basically, it came down to who was elected. Hussein stated, "Itis difficult to talk about myself." Within the Party, members donot like to talk about themselves. Hussein had recommended that
members not talk about themselves.
!¤ The interviewer pointed out that it is commonlybelieved, both inside and outside Iraq, that Hussein's potentialrivals in the Party were eliminated during the period between the1968 revolution and Hussein's ascendancy to the Presidency in1979. Hussein denied that those on the inside of Iraq would say
or believe such information. He agreed that this information
could have come from outside Iraq. According to Hussein, this
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conclusion is the opinion of these people and not necessarily afact.
:T§3 Regardless of the information, Hussein stated anyexamination of this idea needs to be conducted logically.Hussein stated there are many examples in history throughout the
world of similar ascensions to power after a revolution. InEgypt, Nasser and Sadat were the only individuals who "stayed"with the revolution, with Nasser eventually becoming leader ofthe country. In France, a single soldier, Napoleon, became theleader of the country after the French Revolution when othersgave up. American history is also full of examples of thisphenomenon. In Hussein's opinion, these are the "revolutionary
ways."
!§3 According to Hussein, previous uprisings, such asthe French Revolution, were tragedies when compared to the timesin which we now live. Revolutions are a new step in government,
not a "liberal way" where someone is chosen and groomed to be aleader. Revolutions come from the people.
}§! The 1968 revolution in Iraq included seventy"revolutionaries." Very few of them continued in governmentand/or Party service after the revolution. Some were appointed
to positions and performed well, some did not. All of them didnot have the ability to lead and be professional. Some continuedin service while others dropped out over time. Hussein statedthey all were servants of the people.
}Q! When questioned whether he believed Nasser became adictator, Hussein replied that he did not agree. Upon respondingto a request from the interviewer to define dictatorship, Husseinstated this is a form of government where one person rules alone,without a parliament, council, or committee. Hussein did notagree with the characterization that Nasser's government fit thisdefinition. Hussein stated Nasser had a parliament. However, aparliament is not possible at the beginning of a revolution.Normally, a revolutionary council is first established and islater followed by a parliament or people's committee. Husseindoes not like comparing Iraq and its 1968 revolution to Nasser
and Egypt. Nasser was a military person who did not have apolitical party. In Iraq, the Ba'ath had a Party ranging fromthe cells in villages all the way to the leadership as well as a
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parliament elected by the people. The leadership of the Partyand the Revolutionary Command Council RCC! discussed everything.
:}Si when asked whether Hussein and Shaykhli remainedfriends after Shaykhli's departure from Party service, Husseinstated his friends were among those with whom he met regularly inthe leadership. He did not have any friends outside of the Partyand the leadership. A true friendship has "obligations."
Hussein considered Shakir as the person closest to him after the1968 revolution. Whenever Hussein needed to discuss something,he would send for Shakir and they would have lunch together and
talk. After Shakir left government service, Hussein does notremember how many times they met. Hussein stated Shaykhli "keptup good relations" with his sons Qusay and Uday. RegardingShaykhli and the period of time after his departure from
government service, Hussein's feelings of friendship remained thesame, but the two did not spend the same amount of time together.
Due to the demands of work, Hussein did not have time to
associate with those outside of work, the Party, or the
leadership. -
:?§3 When questioned whether he had special feelingsabout Shaykhli, who was shot and killed in Baghdad in 1980,Hussein stated, "Yes." Regarding whether Shaykhli's killer s!
were captured, Hussein responded, "I don't think so." An
investigation took place, but the crime was not solved. Husseinstated that not all crimes committed are ultimately solved. Headded that other crimes, including those committed against hiscousins and those involving the deaths of various Iraqi
dignitaries and ministers, remain unsolved. Hussein noted thatnot all crimes are solved elsewhere in the world, such as in
America, France, or Italy. When questioned whether it wasunusual for a crime involving the murder of a former governmentminister, a former revolutionary, and a former friend of thePresident of Iraq to go unsolved, Hussein retorted, "What do youwant to say. Why are you going around the subject?" There areothers who were close to Hussein in the leadership who were
targets of assassination attempts, including Tariq Aziz, UdayHussein, and others. These crimes remain unsolved as well. It
happens in Iraq, just as it happens elsewhere in the world.
>§3 Hussein ended the session acknowledging thepossibility that some people may say Shaykhli was killed by theIraqi government. He added that some people might say anything.
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Logically, those who would say this are probably the same people
who said Shaykhli could have become President.
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In Reply, Please Refer to
Baghdad Operations Center File No.
February 20, 2004
DEELASSIFIED BY ucfhaw 60324
UN 05-20-2009
Interview Session Number: 8 4
Interview Conducted by; SSA George L. Piro
SSAI ssAi Arabic/English Translation:
:h§£ Saddam Hussein High Value Detainee #1! wasinterviewed on February 20, 2004 at a military detention facilityat Baghdad International Airport BIAP!, Baghdad, Iraq. Husseinprovided the following information:
!Bq:Prior to the start of interview, Hussein wasinformed this session would be a continuation of the three
previous discussions, focusing on Hussein's ascendancy to the
Presidency.
E61 Beginning in 1973, Iraqi President Bakr beganhaving health problems including issues with his heart. Despitethese problems, Bakr performed his duties as best as he could.Periodically, Bakr told Hussein that he should retire and that hecould no longer fulfill his duties as President. Hussein is
unaware whether Bakr made such comments to others within the
Ba'ath Party Party! leadership. Hussein stated Bakr felt "closeto Hussein."
!%I Around this time, Hussein seriously consideredleaving the government but remaining in the Party. His mainreason for wanting to leave government was linked to the
overthrow of the Ba'ath government in 1963. Hussein believedthis overthrow occurred because the Party leadership concentratedon the government and forgot about the Party. Hussein did notlike the "power" and his position in the government. When hejoined the revolution of 1968, his intention was not to stay ingovernment. Hussein had planned to stay involved only within thecells of the Party at the lower levels. At that time, hebelieved it would be a "shame" to serve in the government. Untilthis day, Hussein still does not like government. He likes thepeople and the Party, but believes it is difficult for the
government to judge fairly. Hussein observed individuals he
Esq-17+?
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Baghdad Operations Center
described as "kind and gentle" before serving in the governmentwho subsequently became the opposite after their appointments to
government positions.
:?§3 After the 1968 revolution, a governingRevolutionary Command Council RCC! was formed. However, theannouncement of the RCC was not made until one year later in1969. The members of the RCC, with the exception of the militarymembers, were not and "did not want to be known." For this
reason, the announcement of the RCC was delayed. Hussein was"forced" to take a leadership position in the RCC. Party membersasked Hussein whether he wanted the revolution to fail, implyingit would without his participation, and that it was his
responsibility to be a Party leader.
:}S§ Hussein wanted Bakr to remain as President for aslong as possible, describing him as a "nice person." In 1979,however, Bakr contacted Hussein and asked him to meet in Bakr'soffice in the Presidential Palace. At this meeting, Bakr toldHussein he no longer wanted nor felt able to serve as President.Bakr implored Hussein to assume his duties, telling Hussein if hedid not accept the "normal method" of appointment as President,he would use the radio to make an announcement that Hussein wasnow President. Hussein told Bakr that this means of announcing asuccessor would not be good for the country, the people, or theParty. Outsiders, or foreigners, especially would have thoughtsomething was wrong within Iraq. Thereafter, Tariq Aziz wasasked to prepare an announcement regarding the change ofleadership. A meeting of the RCC was convened in July, 1979.Hussein is unsure whether he or Bakr called the meeting.
j At the meeting, Bakr explained to the RCC membersthat he had wanted to step down since 1973. He further explainedto the members that Hussein was ready to assume the Presidency.Hussein described the meeting as being "like a family gathering."There were many emotions present including sadness. The transferof the Presidency to Hussein was conducted according to theConstitution. Hussein stated a vote was taken, but he does notremember whether it was by secret ballot or by raising hands. Hewas designated Secretary General of the Party and President of
Iraq.
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!§i When asked whether Hussein observed any changes in
himself upon assuming the Presidency, he responded, "No." He
stated he became "stronger and closer to the people."
:?S1 When asked what Hussein believed would have
happened to himself if he had been allowed to leave government,
Hussein replied that he would have been a regular person,
possibly a farmer. He would, however, have continued as a Party
member and continued attending meetings of the Party.
>§i The interviewer noted his own personal opinion that
it would be difficult to imagine Hussein as a farmer. Hussein
stated he was afraid to become a public figure. He stated that
his situation changed as did his obligations, becoming almost
personal. Hussein observed that while he served as President,
thousands of people viewed themselves as being close to him.
Until 1995, people did not elect him, rather Hussein stated, "The
revolution brought me." After 1995 and 2002, the people did, in
fact, vote for and elect Hussein. After the elections, his
relationship with the people became stronger, and Hussein now
felt an obligation to those who had voted for him. Hussein was
not only obligated to the people by law, but also to the people
"in front of God."
:%§! Hussein was questioned whether, at the meetingwhere Bakr announced his resignation, the entire RCC supported
his becoming President. Hussein responded there was nothing or
no one against him to become the leader. Morally and out of
respect for Bakr, some members asked Bakr to stay. Bakr,
however, did not allow their wishes to influence his final
decision. Hussein viewed Bakr's decision as final because he,
himself, could not convince Bakr to remain as President.
gki The interviewer noted reports which stated there
was at least one outspoken person at the meeting who questioned
Bakr's retirement and stated that Hussein's selection should be
unanimous, Muhie Abd AlHussein Mashhadi. Hussein stated this
information is not correct. There was discussion about Bakr's
resignation but no talk about the process for selecting Hussein.
Others offered to assume some of Bakr's duties so that he might
be able to remain as President. He did not accept these offers
however. At that time, Hussein was Deputy Secretary General of
the Party and Vice President of Iraq. As such, he was next in
line to become President, a fact which could not have been
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questioned. Additionally, the Constitution specifically stated
any selection of the President had to be made by a majority, not
unanimous, vote. Some members talked about the possibility of
postponing Bakr's resignation. Hussein stated there are former
RCC members still alive who can be questioned regarding this
matter. The interviewer stated several former RCC members
generally agree on the details provided by Hussein about this
event. However, some former RCC members also provided
information indicating Mashhadi voiced his opposition to Bakr's
resignation and Hussein's selection as President at the
referenced RCC meeting. Hussein replied that he had told the
interviewer all the details known to him.
:}¬1 The interviewer stated a plot against Hussein was
discovered shortly after Hussein assumed the Presidency. An
infamous meeting took place on July 22, 1979 whereupon the
details of the plot were revealed to senior members of the Party.
The interviewer added that the meeting was recorded on videotape,
viewed by the interviewer. Hussein stated this matter was not a
secret and the video was given to all Party members. Hussein
does not remember whether themeeting was opened with comments byTaha Yasin Ramadan. He acknowledged that Mashhadi was brought
before the assembly, admitted his participation in a plot against
Hussein involving the Syrian government, and named some of the
others who participated in the plot. Hussein's reaction and
feelings were the same as anyone who had been betrayed by friends
in the Party and the government, sadness and a feeling of being
"back-stabbed." This was especially true because the plot
involved Arabs outside the government and country. Hussein
described these actions as treason and the participants as
traitors.
!@§ Regarding when Hussein became
responded, "At that time." The interviewer
Mashhadi was arrested a few days before the
approximately July 15, after Hussein becameaware of the plot, he
pointed out that
meeting,
President. Husseinstated he became President July 17. The interviewer responded
that July 17 was the official
assumed the Presidency almost
g!S5 The interviewer
plot was iscovered. Hussein
He added that the informationdate, although Hussein had actually
one week prior.
questioned Hussein as to how the
asked, "Did you hear the video?"
on the video should be enough. The
interviewer noted the video did not provide details about how the
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plot was discovered. Hussein responded, "These are secrets of
the country." He emphasized that he still considered these
details secret despite the fact that the event occurred almost 25
years ago.
:?§; The interviewer then steered the discussion to the
video which was not a state secret. The interviewer noted the
video depicted several present and future members of the senior
leadership. Among those shown were Tariq Aziz and Ali Hasan Al-
Majid, who was seen standing and shouting. The video names
approximately sixtysix individuals as participants in the plot,
including Adnan Hussein, Deputy Prime Minister, and Ghanim Abd
AlJalil, Director of the Office of the President. Hussein
stated Adnan was the Minister of Planning and Secretary of the
Committee for Oil and Agreements. Hussein acknowledged that
Adnan may have already been appointed as Deputy Prime Minister
after Hussein assumed the Presidency and before this meeting.
Hussein acknowledged that a total of five RCC members, and none
of the original seventy revolutionaries, were implicated in the
plot. Hussein denied that any of the conspirators, including
Adnan and Ghanim, were his friends. _People who worked in the
government were not his friends. Hussein stated Adnan and Ghanim
were "not close to me." Like others, they were appointed to
government positions. Some "made it" while some did not. Whenpointed out to Hussein that the interviewer saw Hussein crying in
the video when Ghanim's name was announced, Hussein responded
that, as a human being, he still had feelings. As the head of
his office, Hussein saw Ghanim every day delivering various
papers. All of the members of the plot were in the leadership.
Hussein remarked that treason makes you feel "sorrowful." When
noted by the interviewer that one might say Hussein had been
betrayed by his closest colleagues, Hussein responded the most
important thing is that they were in the government and were with
Hussein in the Party.
IXS! Hussein acknowledged that over sixty people were
implicated, although not all were convicted. Hussein further
acknowledged that the names of the "conspirators" were announced
by Mashhadi or read by Hussein from a list at the meeting. Asthe names were announced, the person named was asked to stand up,
and, one by one, was escorted from the hall by the Himaya.
é$§! Thereafter, a tribunal was held to adjudicate the
matter an to decide punishment. Hussein stated he does not
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remember the exact number or identities of persons who were found
guilty and were executed or imprisoned, or who escaped, or who
were found innocent and were released. He acknowledged that the
entire matter, including executions, was concluded within
approximately sixteen days, or by August 8, 1979. Husseinbelieves the amount of time used during the process was "morethan enough" for an unbiased and impartial trial. Although hebelieves this was enough time to be fair, Hussein acknowledged
there might not have been adequate time to "go deep into things."When asked to clarify this statement, Hussein responded there may
have been other conspirators who were not identified. Hussein
does not know whether there were other participants, but he
reiterated that the information available and the time utilized
for the investigation were enough to convict those who were
identified. He commented that the law says it is better for oneguilty person to go free than for many innocent people to go to
jail without being guilty.
!$! Hussein stated he does not know the specificresults of the investigation. This matter was decided by a courtand the sentences were carried out thereafter. When questioned
about Abd AlKhaliq Al-Samarra'i's involvement and how it was
possible for someone already in prison to be a part of such aplot, Hussein responded, "Ask those who did the investigation."When asked to provide the names of the investigators, Hussein
stated he does not remember. The interviewer noted that Barzan
Al-Tikriti, having just been named Director of the Iraqi
Intelligence Service IIS!, headed the investigation. Hussein
replied that there must have been a committee, but he denied
knowledge of the composition of any such committee. He further
denied knowing anyone who might know the composition of this
committee.
Z§$:Regarding the involvement of the RCC in thisinvestigation, Hussein first denied knowledge of any details. Heobserved that if the matter was decided by tribunal, there must
have been an official committee. The interviewer reminded
Hussein of a speech he gave on August 8, 1979, wherein he stated
that the RCC, formerly numbering twentyone, now included sixteenmembers due to the implication of five RCC members in the plot.
Hussein continued in the speech saying, of the sixteen RCC
members, three conducted the investigation and seven formed thetribunal which heard the facts and decided the punishment. In
the speech, Hussein added that this was the first time in the
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history of revolutionary movements and human struggle that overhalf of the supreme leadership of a nation took part in such amatter. Hussein responded to the interviewer, "Good, very good."According to the Constitution, members of the RCC must be triedby other RCC members, not by a tribunal outside of the RCC. Whenquestioned regarding the fairness or neutrality of the RCCconducting a trial of its own members, Hussein replied thatfairness existed within the individuals of the RCC. The plot wasnot against them, it was against Hussein. Additionally, theConstitution, which dictated procedure, existed well before theplot.
>31 when questioned regarding previous statements hemade saying the plot was against the Party, Hussein replied, "Idid not say that. I said it was against Saddam." Theconspirators plotted with another country Syria! to preventHussein from coming to power. while it is true Hussein was headof the Party, the plot was against him individually. Husseinbelieves there were individuals who did not want him in powerbecause he would not be "easy to control." With another personas President, who had conspired with the five members of the RCCand the other country, others would have been able to controlIraq. Hussein acknowledged that a tentative agreement regardingunification of Syria and Iraq was being worked on at the time,specifically through Tariq Aziz. However, the plot ended thatdiscussion/agreement as "anything based on plotting has novalue." When questioned what the other country hoped to gain,Hussein responded, "Ask them. We did not ask them."
:}¬5 Hussein denied knowledge of any reward being paidto the individual s! who discovered the plot. When questioned asto the reason for videotaping the meeting on July 22, Husseinstated the video was made in order to inform the Party of whathad occurred. He confirmed that, as seen in the video, therewere many emotions present, including sadness. The interviewerpointed out that fear appeared to be the most noticeable emotion,first from audience members, and then from those who were namedand shouted their innocence upon being ordered to stand. Husseinacknowledged that he, himself, ordered at least one of the namedindividuals to leave the hall.
:}§3 The interviewer noted three things in the videowhich seemed to stand out, including Hussein smoking a cigar, theexpression on Tariq Aziz' face, and Ali Hasan Al-Majid shouting
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about Al-Samarra'i and his belief that conspiracies wouldcontinue as long as AlSamarra'i was alive. Hussein respondedthat he knows the meaning behind each example provided by theinterviewer. He stated that he rarely smokes unless the "timesare difficult." Hussein questioned the expression of Aziz,whether it was a happy or sad one. The interviewer respondedthat Aziz appeared scared. Hussein stated this "reading" by theinterviewer was not correct, "we were all scared." Regarding AliHasan, Hussein asked the interviewer whether he was implying Al-Samarra'i was executed simply because of the words of Ali Hasan.
:}S§ Hussein stated copies of the video of the July 22,1979 meeting were sent to Iraqi ambassadors in other countries.The videos were to be used by embassy officials to presentinformation to Iraqis living outside of the country concerningevents occurring within Iraq. Hussein denied knowledge ofwhether the video was shown to leaders of other countries.Hussein remarked, if it was shown to such persons, that wouldhave been "a good thing, not a bad thing." Perhaps the videowould have been shown to other leaders because another Arab
country was involved in the plot. Regarding whether the videowas made and distributed to demonstrate that Hussein was incharge of Iraq, Hussein responded that the interviewer had seenthe video and "this is your opinion, you have the right."
:R§{ The interviewer provided comments reportedly madeby Hussein around the time of the plot wherein he said, "With ourParty methods, there is no chance for any one who disagrees withus to jump on a couple of tanks and overthrow us." Husseinstated he does not remember making such a comment, but believedhe could explain as these words were a part of his thinking.This message was directed at not only the other country with whomthe conspirators were plotting but also to all Party members.
!£j Hussein was questioned about the sincerity of hisreported previous statements to Bakr in the 1960s and 1970swherein he expressed a desire to leave the government. Hussein
responded by saying that after 1974, he believed he had a moralobligation to the Iraqi people. After many discussions withPresident Bakr, Hussein acknowledged it was "his fate." Fromthis time forward, he decided he would accept such an appointmentand planned for the Presidency.
Emmi8
@1411
U.S. Department of Justice _lIf:'fi'%i!;'.-'.5_
@"'?§l:3@Qm - _ , Federal Bureau of Investngatlon
mRWWJ ° @"° Baghdad Operations Center ° February 24, 2004
Interview Session Number: 9
Interview Conducted by: SSA Georqg Lu Biro
SSAArabic/English Translation: |'b6
bv
:?§; Saddam Hussein High Value Detainee #1! wasinterviewed on February 24, 2004 at a military detention facilityat Baghdad International Airport BIAP!, Baghdad, Iraqprovided the following information:
:PS£ Prior to the start of interview, Husseininformed this session would be a continuation of the d. Hussein
was
iscussionof the history of Iraq. In particular, today's conversationwould cover events leading up to the Iraqi invasion ofKuwait.
jib Hussein stated that after the war with Iran from1980-88, Iraq was trying to rebuild. Hussein likenedsituation with Kuwait as similar to when two individuathe
ls fight,the fight ends, and the two parties go their separate ways.Thereafter, one of the previous disputing parties is bothered bysomeone else who also wants to fight. Then, there is no choicebut to fight again.
:2§;:According to Hussein, Khomeini and Iran would haveoccupied all of the Arab world if it had not been forsuch, Iraq expected the Arab world to support them durIraq. As
ing andafter the war. However, Iraq saw the opposite regarding support,especially from Kuwait. At the end of the war as Iraqrebuilding process, the price of oil was approximatelybarrel. In Hussein's opinion, Iraq could not possiblyits infrastructure and economy with oil prices at thisKuwait was especially at fault regarding these low oil
>X§3 In an effort to solve the situation andeconomic recovery, Iraq sent Dr. Hammadi, Iraqi Ministbegan the
$7 per
rebuild
level.
prices.
stimulate
er ofForeign Affairs, to Kuwait. Hammadi, and the Iraqi leadership'sconclusion after the meeting was that the oil price sinot just the responsibility/work of the Kuwaitis. Ira
DEELAEEIFIED BY ucrhaw 50324are us-11-2009
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Baghdad Qperations Center
some other entity, some larger power was behind this "conspiracy.
:?§i Iraq also sent government officials to Saudi Arabiato convince the Saudis to pressure Kuwait. In addition, theSaudi Minister of Oil came to Iraq and held talks about oilprices, the Iraqi economy, and the actions of Kuwait. Husseinclaimed that a Kuwaiti official said, "We'll make the economy inIraq so bad, one would be able to sleep with an Iraqi woman forten dinars." Hussein told the Saudis that if Kuwait did not stopinterfering in Iraqi affairs, he would make the Kuwaiti dinarworth ten fils.
:?§3 Hussein stated that when Kuwait was faced with thefacts regarding "stealing" Iraqi oil using the practice of slantdrilling, they admitted to'having taken "only two and a halfbillion barrels " They stated this fact as if it was notsignificant.
;?§[éR§garding the problems with Kuwait, Iraq sentdelegates o ther Gulf countries which Hussein does notremember. These delegates explained the Kuwaiti situation andthe Iraqi situation. The other countries promised to correct oilprices at the next meeting of the Organization of PetroleumExporting Countries OPEC!. ~
I81 At the next OPEC meeting, a decision was made tofix the oil price at $16-17 per barrel, as remembered by Hussein.Kuwait concurred with this decision. Thereafter, the KuwaitiMinister of Oil or Minister of Foreign Affairs stated Kuwaitwould not abide by the OPEC decision.
;¥§;:Eggarding loan debts owed to Gulf countries as aresult of support received during the Iran-Iraq War, Husseinstated these were not loans and were supposed to be free aid fromthese countries. The countries had originally used the word"loan" as a formality only to disguise the purpose of the fundsfrom Iran. When Iraq was informed the money was actually fromloans, Iraq held discussions with these countries, includingKuwait, in order to resolve these debts. Because the money hadbeen "registered as loans" to Iraq, Iraq could not secure loansfrom other countries in order to rebuild.
:D§£ Hussein stated that twice he discussed a change inoil prices to $25 per barrel. Once, when the price per barrel
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reached $50, Hussein dictated a letter to Tariq Aziz, which wassent to the Thoura Newspaper. In the letter, he told the oil-producing countries that they should not take advantage of theindustrialized nations. Hussein asked them to reduce the priceper barrel to $25. He commented that this was strange at thetime as Iraq had oil and could use the money. When the pricedropped to $7 per barrel in 1989-90, Hussein called for anincrease to $24-25 per barrel. In Hussein's opinion, this pricewould not burden the consumer or hurt the producer.
>§; Regarding the kind of message Kuwait's action orlack of action sent to Iraq, Hussein stated "this confirmed ourinformation" that there was an "conspiracy" against Iraq, theIraqi leadership, and Iraq's economy. In Hussein's opinion, thevisit of US General Schwarzkopf to Kuwait also provided furtherconfirmation. His visit included "sand planning" or wartimepreparations for the invasion of Iraq confirming what Hussein andthe leadership already believed. Previous to this event,Kuwait's relationship with the United States and Great Britainwas well known. When noted to Hussein that the US militaryvisits many countries throughout the world conducting exerciseswhich are not indicators of a "conspiracy", Hussein asked, "Inwhat other country did Schwarzkopf do 'sand planning likeKuwait?" Hussein further questioned which other countriesSchwarzkopf conducted negotiations with in order to enter fordefensive purposes. Hussein acknowledged that he understands theexistence and nature of exercises conducted by the United Statesin Egypt and Jordan. However, when exercises or planning castIraq as the enemy and include ways to defend Kuwait or attackIraq, this is a different situation than the other exercises.
E81 Hussein discussed the perception in the Westregarding Iraq in the months leading up to the war in Kuwait.After Iraq's defeat of Iran, the media discussed Iraq as amilitary threat to the region. Iraq, however, was not "withinSoviet circles" and was attempting to rebuild its economy. Iraqwas also starting to build its relations with United States.
]S§:Soon, the United States made Iraq its enemy throughthree means or for three reasons. First, the "Zionist" power andinfluence in the United States dictates foreign policy. Anycountry viewed as a threat to Israel, such as Iraq, becomes atarget of the "conspiracy." Hussein offered proof of thisposition stating Israel issued an official statement saying that
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any peace agreement with Arab countries must include Iraq.Hussein claims Israel is not hoping for peace, only that othercountries abide by their wishes. Israel used its influence overthe West against Nasser in Egypt similar to its position vis-a-vis Iraq. This "Zionist" influence extends throughout the UnitedStates to include elections. Secondly, there were formerly twosuperpowers in the world, the United States and the Soviet Union.According to Hussein, the world's existence then was "better thannow" as it was easier for two powers to agree rather than attemptto get many to agree. Each of the two superpowers attempted toget other countries to side with them, forging a balance of powerin the world. With the collapse of this balance, however, theUnited States was left alone as the sole superpower. The UnitedStates is now viewed as attempting to dictate its will to therest of the world including Iraq. When countries do not agreewith United States, such as Iraq, they become enemies. The thirdreason the United States made Iraq its enemy is for economicpurposes. Certain entities within the United States, includingweapons manufacturers and elements in the military, favor war dueto the financial profit which can be reaped. This is true forcompanies selling everything from carpets to tanks in support ofa war. Hussein added that America discovered the war inAfghanistan was not enough to sustain the profit making of themilitary-industrial complex of America. Thus, the war began withIraq. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, all of theseinternal and external reasons combined to compel the UnitedStates to make Iraq its enemy. .
>&Q Prior to the invasion of Kuwait, Hussein statedthere was a meeting of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council RCC! in which a discussion of the matter took place. The Iraqileadership of the RCC had hoped the Saudis would "interfere" andhave a solution. The Deputy Chairman of the RCC had traveled toSaudi Arabia to solicit their assistance but returned withoutsuccess. Thereafter, the matter could only be discussed anddecided upon in favor of military action. Hussein acknowledgedthe possibility that one or more RCC members opposed or votedagainst the invasion, but he does not specifically remember anysuch opposition. He does not remember if a majority or all ofthe RCC members agreed on military action. Hussein stated, "Iwas against attacking if a solution could be found." The lastattempt at reaching a solution occurred during the previouslyreferenced visit to Saudi Arabia in which the Deputy Chairman ofthe RCC met with the brother of Kuwaiti leader Sheikh Sabah.
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bé! The final decision to invade Kuwait was made inorder to "defend by attacking." Hussein further justified theinvasion based upon historical facts. He stated history dictatesthat Kuwait is a part of Iraq.
:?§i Hussein stated the objective of the invasion was"the one announced." That is, Kuwaitis were to rule themselvesand would decide what kind of relations they would have withIraq. As for the Kuwaiti leaders, Hussein stated they were"conspirators" against Iraq, Kuwait, and all Arab countries.These leaders kept conspiring even after they left Kuwait uponinvasion by Iraq. They were controlled by the United States.
:}§1 Because of the country's "conspiracy" with theUnited States, Kuwait did not expect the "blow to them." Husseinstated Kuwait deserved "ten blows." Kuwait was not as strongmilitarily as Iran. Kuwait's lack of defensive positions is notindicative of the absence of plans with the United States. Theplans discussed during the previously referenced "sand planning"may have been offensive in nature, not defensive. The reasonsfor Iraq's invasion existed, with or without the presence ofAmerican forces. As they did in the most recent war, the UnitedStates "created" the reasons to fight Iraq in Kuwait in 1991.Hussein denied creating this "conspiracy" as a justification forthe invasion of Kuwait. He claimed documents discovered by Iraqin Kuwait prove the existence of the Kuwaiti "conspiracy" withthe United States.
Eki Hussein remarked, "We can discuss this for days."The United States and twentyeight other countries took sevenmonths to mobilize forces for the war in 1991. This mobilizationoccurred because of the power of Iraq and perceived militarythreat it posed. This threat motivated US politicians to supportaction against Iraq. In addition, the financial interests ofcompanies that could profit from a war also motivated support foraction against Iraq. The preemptive strike by Iraq into Kuwaitwas conducted so that defensive lines could not be completed.Hussein reiterated the lack of American forces in Kuwait does notmean there was not a "conspiracy."
:}§i Hussein restated that the goal of the invasion ofKuwait was to allow Kuwaitis the right to "decide the way theywanted to deal with Iraq." Hussein denied that the declarationof Kuwait as the 19th Province of Iraq contradicts his previous
~'¢'>
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statement. According to Hussein, a Kuwaiti government wasestablished after the invasion and included a prime minister andvarious other ministers. Hussein denied that Iraqi RCC memberAli Hasan Al-Majid was appointed Governor of Kuwait. He addedthat the Kuwaiti cabinet decided to "join the Iraqis." Whenquestioned whether the Kuwaitis were given a choice, Husseinasked whether Iraqis were given the choice to voice their opinionregarding the recent war against Iraq. He continued that Iraq'sacts with respect to Kuwait were more logical than the UnitedStates position on Iraq in the most recent war. Hussein statedthe designation of Kuwait as the 19th Province was "deserved andlogical." In 1961 or 1962, then Iraqi President Qassem wanted tomake Kuwait a district of Iraq. '
>§; Hussein emphasized that he has already explainedwhy no other actions were taken to avoid the invasion as well asthe reasons Kuwait was designated the 19th Province. Thepolitical solutions forthis matter were completely removed whenAmerica attacked. Hussein claimed Iraq "would have gone theother way" if the United States had not attacked. With politicalsolutions
withdrawn
likely to
"laughing stock" of the
especially reluctant to
the 19th Province. The
was not to withdraw and
that Iraqi forces wouldexhausted, two options remained. Iraq could havefrom Kuwait, with attacks against their forces notstop during the withdrawal. Iraq would have been the
world. Iraqi forces would have beenfight if Kuwait had not been declared asother solution, and the appropriate one,to declare Kuwait as the 19th Province sofight with greater vigor.
@7a 6 .
SEC X1
U.S. Department of Justice%7§§%'7 2 92}%- mg Federal Bureau of Investigation
WR mP k ° Baghdad Operations Center N° February 27, 2004
Interview Session Number: 10
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. P119
SSA
SSAArabic/English Translation: I i
>§§! Saddam Hussein High Value Detainee #1! wasinterviewed February 27, 2004 at a military detention facility at
Baghdad International Airport BIAP!, Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein
provided the following information:
>K¬! Prior to the start of interview, Hussein wasinformed this session would be a continuation of the previousdiscussion regarding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In particular,today's conversation would begin with a discussion of UnitedNations Resolution UNR! 662 which did not recognize Iraq's
annexation of Kuwait; _
6 CK! Regarding the Iraqi government's reaction to UNR662, Hussein stated, "Nothing happened." According to Hussein,when the United States decided to attack Iraq, this action madethe annexation of Kuwait the only solution. At that point, there
was no political solution. Hussein reiterated comments from a
previous interview wherein he stated Iraqi soldiers would nothave fought appropriately or "have taken care of Kuwait" were it
not annexed and made part of Iraq. He again emphasized that theactions of the United States "forced our hand "
!Si When noted to Hussein that UNR 662 was issued in1990, long before any US or coalition forces militaryaction, Hussein stated that military forces opposing Iraq werealready in Saudi Arabia at that time. This, coupled with variousdecisions and announcements made by the United States, indicateda prelude to a US attack against Iraq.
I81 Hussein noted that the UN seemed only to "watch"the Iran-Iraq War for eight years, without concern. Only nearthe end of the conflict, when Iraq had overcome Iranian forces,did the UN propose and Iran accept a cease fire agreement. In
jEGREF7¢JZ1:This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of theFBI and 15 loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.August,
I.IECLASE1IFIEII BY 1.1C,-IJETJ l:'~III324
UN EI9-ll-ZDDE!196
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Hussein's opinion, the UN "was not honorable" during the Iran-Iraq War. During the war between the two countries, some of themajor countries wanted to see "the power drained" from Iran andIraq. He added that the UN "interferes with everybody." Husseinbelieves that Iraq's membership in the UN should have precludedits invasion in 1991 and its present occupation.
:>§i Hussein questioned whether legitimate efforts weremade by the UN or individual countries to prevent the conflictwith Kuwait or to set the terms of withdrawal after invasion. Hedenied there was any "initiative" from other countries. Husseinstated the Soviet Union proposed one plan for withdrawal whichIraq accepted. However, the UN did not accept this proposal.Egypt, in Hussein's opinion, "did nothing."
:¥§§ The initiative concerning any plan for withdrawalfrom Kuwait came from Iraq. On August 12, 1990, Iraq proposed asolution for "everybody in the area." This plan includedenforcement of previous UN decisions regarding lands occupied byIsrael. Hussein questioned why the UN did not attack Israel forfailing to observe resolutions. Hussein stated that the"mistakes" of Israel are not considered by the UN. RegardingIraqi mistakes, however, the UN is always concerned.
!S§ During Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, Hussein deniedknowledge of the commission of atrocities by the Iraqi military.These atrocities include the punishment, including executions, ofKuwaiti individuals who prayed on their roofs, who failed to hangpictures of Hussein, who displayed pictures of the previousKuwaiti royal family, or who wrote antiIraqi graffiti. Husseinstated, "This is the first time I have ever heard this." Headded, of the mentioned punishable offenses, he particularly doesnot believe two of them were designated as crimes. First, theIraqi government did not force Iraqis to display pictures ofHussein, therefore, the government would not have forced Kuwaitisto do this. In Iraq, citizens voluntarily chose to displayHussein's picture in their homes. Second, neither Iraqis, norKuwaitis are prohibited from praying anywhere, including theirroofs. According to Hussein, the other reportedly punishableoffenses are on the "conscience of whoever said this" and that
person is "a liar."
!Ei Hussein acknowledged two, possibly three, incidentswhere Iraqi soldiers were executed in Kuwait. In one incident,
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Baghdad Op_qrations Center
an Iraqi soldier was executed for committing burglary during theoccupation of Kuwait. In another incident, an Iraqi LieutenantColonel was executed, and his body hung on public display for 48hours, for assaulting a female in Kuwait. This individual's body
was left in public for all Iraqi officers and soldiers to see inorder to emphasize the rules. A third incident resulting in an
execution may have occurred, but Hussein does not remember the
details.
:?§; Hussein denied knowledge of the number of Kuwaitiskilled, military or civilian, during combat operations or duringthe alleged atrocities previously mentioned. Hussein stated, "Itwas war time." He added that Iraq is a Third World country which
signed the Geneva Convention. The United States is an advanced
country which supposedly would not make the same mistakes as aThird World country. Hussein questioned the statistics regardingthe numbers of Iraqi civilians killed, abuses committed against
Iraqis, or Iraqi prisoners tortured by United States forces.
1%§:Regarding the igniting of oil wells in Kuwait bywithdrawing Iraqi forces and the subsequent environmentaldisaster deemed one of the worst in history, Hussein asked, "Morethan Chernobyl?" He requested to know the number of people whodied in Kuwait because of the smoke created by the fires.
Hussein denied that Iraqi forces ignited the oil wells. Heacknowledged that Iraqi forces burned "oil in trenches" as theywere retreating. The resulting smoke blocked target acquisitionby coalition aircraft and prevented additional troops from dying.Hussein acknowledged that he was told that "a few" oil wells wereignited. He stated that even if he were shown pictures or videosof these events, he would not believe Iraqi forces committed
them. He maintained that these forms of media are easy to
manipulate and fabricate. Hussein stated his belief that itwould not be a crime for the Iraqi military to burn oil in order
to prevent planes from attacking them. If such an event tookplace, this would have been an act of a desperate person who had
no weapons remaining with which to defend himself. When
questioned if he was offered proof to show that the 150 oil wellfires in Kuwait were an act of sabotage by the Iraqi military andnot an act of defense, Hussein stated he would provide a response
at that time.
§${ Regarding the previously discussed execution ofIraqi soldiers in Kuwait, Hussein stated that the information
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about these matters may have been provided to him verbally or in
writing. In all likelihood, a trial occurred prior to the
executions. Hussein opined that without this severe and
immediate action, more crimes, possibly hundreds, might have
occurred in Kuwait.
:P§£ Hussein stated that Ali Hasan AlMajid was a member
of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council RCC! during the
occupation of Kuwait. AlMajid's role during the occupation was
to "arrange and organize everything" in Kuwait. The decision
granting AlMajid this authority was made at an official meeting
of the RCC. Al-Majid was the senior Iraqi official in Kuwait.
gs; Regarding other Iraqi officials assigned duties inKuwait, Hu s in stated there were many of them ranging from
traffic policemen to high government officials. Hussein stated
he has no additional information regarding others with
responsibilities in Kuwait and provided no additional names of
such Iraqi officials. Hussein added that the Iraqi government
attempted to provide all services, particularly the critical
ones, such as electricity, to Kuwaiti citizens.
jf When questioned regarding the ongoing Kuwaiti
resistance during the Iraqi occupation and efforts by the Iraqi
Intelligence Service IIS! to stop it, Hussein stated, "I do not
have an answer with these details." When again asked, Hussein
replied that he had given his answer and "I am not a person who
gives away his friends."
}§i Hussein was asked, as the exPresident of Iraq,
about Iraqi policy regarding treatment of POWs. Hussein replied,
"I am not the exPresident of Iraq. I am still the President of
Iraq." He added that he still respects the will of the people
their support of him as President!. He continued saying that
Iraq respects the Geneva Convention and that they had asked other
countries to do the same. Hussein commented that in his
speeches, he asked each soldier to respect the Geneva Convention
and to remember and abide by the soldier's "religious
principles."
]B¢:Hussein denied giving orders to mistreat, abuse, or
torture US POWs. According to Hussein, such a proclamation would
have affected his reputation in front of the people and was,
therefore, unacceptable. Others may state that Hussein issued
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such orders so that they might absolve themselves of
responsibility. If these individuals say such things, Hussein
will accept responsibility as commander and admit these
accusations as long as such an admission will not dishonor him.
He reiterated he would not have given such orders because of what
religion teaches. Hussein provided a saying, "There is a well of
water in Paradise. If one feeds an orphan or a prisoner, he will
drink from the well." Hussein stated the proof of his beliefs is
in his speeches. He made this assertion despite previously
stating actions, not words, are what matters. Hussein remarked
that his speeches as President are important.
:P§; Regarding the credible information that Iraq
removed the Kuwaiti leadership from their country, reportedly
with the agreement of the Kuwaiti citizens, only to have the
Kuwaiti people welcome them back, Hussein opined that leaders
Kuwaitis! who accept foreign occupation the United States! of
their own country can be forcibly expelled. According to
Hussein, the Kuwaiti leaders were not "from the people." On the
contrary, they were originally brought in by the British.
Hussein stated that he knew how the citizens of Kuwait felt
before the invasion and after occupation by Iraqi forces. If
Kuwaiti citizens accepted the former leadership after Iraqi
occupation, Hussein stated that he respected their decision.
QQ Hussein reiterated a belief provided in a previous
interview that whoever "conspires against a brother" must be
kicked out Kuwait, in this case!. Regarding the tradition or
understanding that Arab nations should not take up arms against
one another, Hussein stated that he concurred with this belief
and that he affirmed so publicly in a speech long before the
invasion of Kuwait. Other Arab nations, however, including
Kuwait, refused to abide by this principle. Saudi Arabia
confiscated land from Yemen. Syria continues to occupy territory
in Lebanon. Egypt has confiscated land from Sudan and has acted
aggressively towards Libya.
I81 Returning to the subject of American POWs, Hussein
again denied knowledge of torture or abuse as documented through
medical examinations upon their repatriation. Hussein questioned
whether such findings were made by Americans or by an independent
investigative body. Hussein restated that any bad treatment is
not acceptable whether against an Iraqi citizen or against thecitizen of another country. He denied that information regarding
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abuse and torture of US POWs
leadership.
!8I In the contextwas presented to the Iraqi
of the discussion regarding
allegations of mistreatment of US POWs by Iraq, the interviewer
stated, "Both the US Government, the UN, and the Red Cross had
made these allegations known
probably would not go to the
were not addressed by anyone
Hussein replied, "What I wasto the Iraqi Government. These
attention of the President, but they
within the Iraqi leadership."
made aware of was that there was an
American prisoner, not a prisoner, excuse me, but an American
person. I think an officer. It was said his plane was hit above
the western desert and he parachuted and the Americans were
looking for him. They showed me the paperwork and I told them to
facilitate the mission and to tell them they are welcome. Let
them keep the information so they will not say that we reviewed
it. Let them keep the information with them. As for the people
that are searching, let them come here and tell us where is that
pilot, I mean they do the searching."
}{ Hussein does not remember the pilot's name,
including whether it was Speicher. He told Iraqi officials to
allow the Americans to search for this individual. Hussein
stated Iraqi officials "helped" in the search for information
regarding the missing pilot's whereabouts.
nes
6
lLS.DeparunentofJusce%§%s. '
vi;--' Federal Bureau of Investigation'1-.;;'§§§_;;.1'
WRWWP ° "° Baghdad Operations Center N March 3, 2004
DECLASSIFIED BY ucbaw S0324
0N 05-20-2009
Interview Session Number: 11
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
ssA|Arabic/English Translation: I
>§! Saddam Hussein High Value Detainee #1! wasinterviewed March 3, 2004 at a military detention facility at
Baghdad International Airport BIAP!, Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein
provided the following information:
Qi Prior to the start of interview, Hussein wasinformed this session would be a continuation of the previous
discussions regarding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
>*S! Hussein stated that he devised the plan for theIraqi invasion of Kuwait. Because the geography of Kuwait is
essentially open land, neither specific tactical planning norspecial assets was needed to effect the operation. Any personwith basic military knowledge could have put together an
effective invasion plan.
>£Q The invasion of Kuwait was accomplished within twoand a half hours, equivalent to that previously estimated.
Hussein stated it should have taken no more than one hour. Hebelieves it should have occurred more quickly than originally
estimated due to support for the invasion from the Kuwaiti
people. Hussein reiterated a previous statement to the
interviewers that Iraq was asked by the Kuwaiti people to invadetheir country in order to remove the Kuwaiti leadership. When
asked to clarify how the Kuwaiti citizens communicated theirdesires to the Iraqi government prior to the invasion, Husseinstated some, not all, Kuwaitis felt this way. He added, "We felt
they were asking."
:}Si Regarding the assault on the coastal city of Khafjiand who designed this attack, Hussein stated, "Me." He addedthat he would not shift the blame to his friends. Hussein stated
that military planning was easy after eight years of war withIran from 1980 to 1988. Any military operation requires1b6
lb7C
A SE§RBT¢I§i
This document contains neither recommendati s nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of theFBI and LS loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
{ <>92
@m1@
Baghdad Operations Center
knowledge of the geography of the area and knowledge of the
weapons and the capabilities of the enemy as well as ones own
capabilities. Other important factors include the training,
logistical support, and morale of the troops. With such
knowledge, the military operation against Khafji was simple toplan. The land was open, similar to southern Iraq, and provided
no "complications." The only concern was enemy air power
capability.
>4! When questioned whether the purpose of the assault
on Khafji was to force the coalition forces into a ground war,
Hussein replied that military experts knew that any ground attackagainst the Iraqi Army was a difficult task. He opined that two
million troops would have been needed to fight the Iraqi ground
forces. Aircraft, however, could be used to strike Iraqi forcesand thereafter return to base. The preliminary information
available to Iraq indicated that coalition ground forces were in
the vicinity of Khafji. For this reason, Iraqi forces decided to
attack the location and to "force a fight." Hussein stated thatit seemed that coalition forces withdrew upon attack by Iraqi
forces. Thereafter, Iraqi ground forces remained in the area.As time passed, Iraq lost soldiers, ammunition, and equipment.
Many Iraqi soldiers died as the result of repeated coalition air
assaults without ever seeing the enemy approaching over land.
C5§ Hussein denied that Iraqi forces were defeated at
Khafji, forcing them to withdraw. Hussein stated Iraq did not
intend to occupy the city. Iraqi ground forces went to thelocation to fight with coalition ground forces. Upon
encountering little to no ground resistance, Iraqi forceswithdrew on the second day, of their own choosing. Hussein notedthat it seemed coalition forces were not aware of the Iraqi
withdrawal for a few days. Hussein acknowledged that coalition
forces had air supremacy.
!81 Regarding whether one of the Iraqi objectives ofthe assault on Khafji was to capture American prisoners of war
POWs!, Hussein stated one of the principles of war is to kill or
capture the enemy. After fourteen days of coalition bombardmentof Iraqi forces, Iraq wanted to force casualties upon coalition
forces. However, Iraq preferred to capture coalition personnel.
In Hussein's opinion, this would have had a "lot of effect" onthe enemy. Hussein acknowledged that the assault on Khafji maynot have been effective and may have shown coalition forces
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Iraq's strengths. This may have led to prolonged coalition air
strikes and a delay in the ground war.
!§3 Hussein believes Iraqi forces should have conducted
their ground assault even earlier. The operation was delayed an
additional week, creating an opportunity for the coalition to
conduct additional air strikes which weakened the Iraqi ground
forces. Hussein denied that there was a plan to capture American
POWs as a method of trying to prevent continued coalition air
attacks.
>§! Hussein stated that he, and no one else in the
Iraqi government or leadership, gave the orders to fire SCUDmissiles at Israel. He stated, "Everything that happened to uswas because of Israel " Hussein added that all the "bad things"
for Arabs came as the result of Israeli actions. He opined that
Israel "pushes" US politicians and "fills them with hatred."Israel first attacked Iraq in 1981 destroying the country's only
nuclear reactor. As far as Iraq was concerned, the war with
Israel was "still on." During the conflict in 1991, Hussein
reasoned that the United States would stop the war if Israel was
"hurt." He also wanted to punish the country that he considered
as the source of all the problems. Hussein denied that one of
his reasons for striking Israel with SCUD missiles was to cause
Israeli retaliation, a collapse of the coalition, and withdrawalof Arab support for the coalition. According to Hussein, the
Arab countries which supported the coalition had been "shamed."
Thus, any withdrawal of their support against Iraq was
inconsequential.
!¤ Hussein stated there were two reasons for the warin 1991, oil and Israel. He added that Kuwait would not have
considered doing anything against Iraq unless "pushed' by anothercountry the United States!. when the interviewer pointed out toHussein that historians believe Iraq acted first, Hussein repliedthat this was the result of Kuwait's actions! and not the reason
for the war!.
>%s Hussein denied that Iraqi forces withdrew fromKuwait following their defeat. He insisted Iraqi forces withdrewas the result of an official proclamation. This cease fire,
including the Iraqi withdrawal, was negotiated by the Russiansand accepted by Iraq. Coalition air attacks against Iraqi groundforces occurred while troops were retreating under official
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orders from the Iraqi leadership. Hussein denied that Iraqiforces would have been eliminated if they had not withdrawn.
>81 Hussein stated an Iraqi plan of withdrawal existed
as early as August 12, 1990. However, Iraq found no government
in the international community nor in the Arab world which would
agree to negotiate the terms of this plan. The President of
France expressed support for the plan, but subsequently withdrew
this support after receiving pressure from the United States.
Thereafter, Iraqi accepted the previously discussed Russianinitiative. Hussein denied that the plan was accepted because of
huge Iraqi military losses.
:R§£ The interview then turned to a discussion of a
letter dated February 19, 1991 from Hussein Kamil, in the name of
Iraqi President Hussein, to Ali Hasan AlMajid. The letterstated, in part, that the Iraqi military should remove any andall property from Kuwait which will aid in the rebuilding of
Iraq. Hussein stated the normal method of conveying directions
from the President would be via letters from the Presidential
Diwan. Kamil was not a secretary, but was simply one of the
Iraqi Ministers. Kamil was "known for his way of doing things."
Upon being read the letter by the translator, Hussein askedwhether the document referred to items used by the Iraqi militaryin Kuwait or to things from Kuwait itself. He added that he
never instructed the Iraqi military to remove items, either their
own equipment or Kuwaiti items. Hussein opined that the letter
may refer to equipment in Kuwait that was utilized by the variousIraqi Ministers for critical services such as electricity, water,
transportation, and telephone service. He stated the letter wasdated nine days before the cease fire. Hussein denied that theletter referred to Kuwaiti property. He stated it was simply aletter from one minister subordinate to another minister, askingfor the return of materials taken to Kuwait by Iraqi forces.
Hussein stated that he did not issue the letter. He asked what
items or materials were taken from Kuwait after this letter was
published.
jkgl When questioned whether members of the Iraqileadership were allowed to issue letters in the name of the
President without his knowledge, Hussein stated, "There are badelements everywhere. He Hussein Kamil! is dead now. Husseindenied knowledge of whether other members of the Iraqi leadershipacted on authority of the President without actually having power
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delegated to them by Hussein. Hussein acknowledged that the
referenced letter was not conveyed in an official manner. He
reiterated that the official method of issuance of such a letter,
upon orders from Hussein, would have been to send a communication
from the Presidential Diwan to Ali Hasan A1-Majid, in this case.
This letter would have specifically enumerated the powers to be
delegated to a particular individual, in this case, Hussein
Kamil.
ig-rfiai
SE X1
U.S. Department of Justice553%ax *3air»;
"1 , Federal Bureau of Investigation ¬x¢$
In Reply, Please Refer toBaghdad Operations Center File No.
March 5, 2004
DECLASSIFIED BY U.C1'lJ&I|I 60324
UH U5-ZU-ZUU9
12
SSA
SSA
SSA
LS lInterview Session Number:
Interview Conducted by: It Bias: I
Arabic/English Translation:
Z51 Saddam Hussein High Value Detainee #1! wasinterviewed March 5, 2004 at a military detention facility at
Baghdad International Airport BIAP!, Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein
provided the following information:
E81 Prior to the start of interview, Hussein wasinformed t is session would be a continuation of the previous
discussions regarding Kuwait.
!8§ Hussein acknowledged that Iraqi Foreign MinisterTariq Aziz met with US Secretary of State James Baker in Geneva,Switzerland in January, 1991. From the perspective of the Iraqileadership, the goal of this meeting was to exploit any chance
for peace regarding the situation with Kuwait. When the
opportunity was made available to discuss this matter with an
American representative, Iraq decided to pursue this avenue. TheIraqi leadership believed that any results from this meetingwould "carry weight" in the international community.
!S§ According to Hussein, Baker provided no solutions
for the Kuwaiti situation. Instead, Baker dictated to Aziz
certain steps that the United States wanted Iraq to accomplishfirst. Baker added, "Otherwise, we'll take you back to the pre-industrial age." Aziz told Baker that the accomplishment ofthese steps would not be possible.
>§3 Hussein stated that the Kuwaiti issue needed tohave been placed inside the framework of international law. Thismatter should not have been reduced to one in which the strongside United States! dictated to the weak side Iraq! the termsof the agreement. Iraq sought a format which did not portray itas defeated, but rather one showing respect for the Iraqi
military and its people.
nrx/klb6
1b7C
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of theFBI and LS loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
"Z' I
SEC 1
Baghdad Operations Center
Q Hussein stated, "We had a desire for peace." In adocument dated August 12, 1990, Iraq expressed this desirethrough its first proposal. As stated in a previous interview,this proposal was not accepted by any member of the internationalcommunity. Iraq wanted a guarantee of no further aggressiondirected against them and an end to the embargo against Iraq.
:}§i Without existing in the framework of internationallaw, Hussein reiterated that Iraq would have appeared as defeatedwith respect to the IraqKuwait issue. Hussein considered thereferenced Iraqi proposal for a peaceful solution regardingKuwait as legitimate. As with any proposal, not all parts willbe accepted. The Iraqi solution was never discussed, however.
Hussein questioned whether the issue regarding Kuwait was moreimportant than the Palestinian issue. He opined that Kuwait wasdeemed more important by the United States and the international
community because Iraq was the opposing entity and because of theexistence of oil in Kuwait. As stated in a previous interview,Hussein implied that Kuwait had "been taken" from Iraq. He addedthat the world did not "assemble and stop" when Yemen was
reunited after many years of separation.
:?§3 Continuing the discussion of the Iraqi proposal ofAugust 12, 1990, Hussein questioned why it was considered unusualfor Iraq to have asked that United Nations UN! resolutions beenforced with respect to lands previously seized by Israel andSyria. If these resolutions had been enforced, Iraqis would havebelieved that international law was being applied fairly to Iraqin 1991. Hussein stated that no one notified Iraq that certainparagraphs or sections of the Iraqi proposal needed to be changedor deleted. He stated that Iraq had seriously explored several
avenues to achieve peace.
}S§ Asked whether Iraqi leaders were surprised at thenumber of Iraqi prisoners of war POWs!, estimated at 86,743,
captured by coalition forces during the 1991 war, Husseinreplied, "No. This is war." According to Hussein, the IraqiPOWs were not captured in the classic sense. There were manyfactors leading to their capture including their loss of
communications and transportation, a lack of food and a sense ofdisorientation. Because of these factors, many Iraqi soldierstraveled to Saudi Arabia for safe haven where they were picked upby coalition forces. In contrast, Hussein stated that the effect
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of the attacks against Iraq in 2003 was much greater than that in1991. Despite this, fewer Iraqi POWs were captured in 2003 andhe attributed this to different factors which existed in 1991.
§Q Hussein denied that the Iraqi leadership wasdisappointed with the large number of Iraqi POWs in 1991.Hussein stated, "Nothing would shake our determination." Headvised that war has fortunes and misfortunes and that this isGod's will. Hussein denied that the large number of Iraqiscaptured by coalition forces influenced Iraq's ability tocontinue fighting. He claimed that the number of POWs indicatesneither the stage nor the outcome of a war. He stated that Iraqhad won the war against Iran despite Iran's capture of more POWs.
In Hussein's opinion, the capture of POWs in any amount does notnecessarily affect one's will to fight, nor does it necessarilyforce certain military decisions. Hussein acknowledged thatIraqi POWs were released by coalition forces in 1991 and allowedto return home after the cease fire agreement was signed.
:D§ Hussein was questioned about the 45 coalition POWsand the purpose of the apparent compulsory appearance of twoBritish pilot POWs on Iraqi television. The interviewer notedthat the pilots appeared to have been physically abused and thatthe featuring of them on television was a violation of the GenevaConvention. Hussein stated that the POWs, especially the pilots,would likely have provided different details about their capture.Some would say they were captured by farmers or villagers whileothers would say by a "group of people." These Iraqis might havecelebrated the capture of the coalition combatants by hitting andpushing them around. The Iraqi military was not always incontrol or aware of circumstances regarding captured individualsbecause communications between military units had been knockedout by coalition forces.
}§! Regarding coalition POWs captured in 1991, Husseindenied knowledge of any abuse of them by those serving in theIraqi military or the Iraqi government. However, he clarifiedthis statement by saying that he did not deny that others mayhave "behaved in a bad manner" and that he was speaking onlyabout his personal knowledge of the matter. Hussein added thathe would provide such information if he were aware of it. Hestated that he subscribes to a document much older than theGeneva Convention, the Koran. The Koran and Arab traditionbelieve that it is "noble" to treat a prisoner well. Hussein
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believes that the principles enunciated in the Geneva Conventionshould be respected by the entire world regardless of one'scircumstances or nationality.
:?§; Regarding reports that all coalition POWs weretortured while in Iraqi custody, Hussein neither confirmed nordenied these reports. Instead, he stated this information is "onthe conscience" of those who reported it and those who conductedthe investigation. Hussein explained that leaders command by"communication instruments." Lower level commanders lead by"vision or voice." Without proper communication instruments,each entity behaves according to "how it sees things." Husseinreiterated that Iraqi communications systems were inoperativeduring the 1991 war. Accordingly, he speculated that somereported acts of physical abuse, such as the burning of a POW'shair, might have been the acts of a "simpleton." When it waspointed out that the abuse of coalition forces could reasonablylead one to believe this was a widespread practice conducted bythe entire Iraqi military, Hussein replied, "I answered."
!81 Hussein maintained that he does not question theaccounts of abuse of coalition Pows and that he has no personalinformation to either confirm or deny these allegations.However, from a practical perspective, he does not doubt that theIraqi people, after being attacked by coalition pilots, mighthave abused pilots especially if they had participated in their
capture.
@19414 .
U.S. Department of Justice%¬%&92:. 1;? ll
Federal Bureau of Investigation'~::%§2;.-.-'
WR WP ° k ° Baghdad Operations CenterF"°N°~ March 11, 2004
DEELASSIFIED BY ucibsw 6U324
ON U5-20-ZDDQ
Interview Session Number: 13
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
SSA
Arabic/English Translation: LSI |
}¤ Saddam Hussein High Value Detainee #1! wasinterviewed March ll, 2004 at a military detention facility atBaghdad International Airport BIAP!, Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein Vprovided the following information:
:?§3 Prior to the start of interview, Hussein wasinformed this session would be a continuation of the previous
discussions regarding Kuwait.
!81 Regarding information from the Kuwaiti governmentindicating that the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait
caused $180 billion in damages to the country, Hussein asked forthe source of this information. When told the source was Kuwait,
Hussein asked which neutral and legal entity questioned Kuwait
regarding the basis of their conclusion. He opined that "no one"asked Kuwait for the details of their investigation of this
matter. Hussein again questioned the existence of evidence
supporting these Kuwaiti assertions.
:}Sf Hussein reiterated information provided in a
interview stating, "Kuwait is Iraqi." According to
Kuwait was "stolen" from Iraq by a British resolution.
that if Kuwait had not been a country with oil, it wouldnot have been "stolen." Hussein stated that the arrogance of theKuwaiti rulers made them "stupid" and ignited the war. Hefurther stated that he understands that the United States,located across the Atlantic Ocean, would want Iraq to be poor.
However, he cannot understand how Kuwait would want to exist next
to a "hungry country."previous
Hussein,
He added
>%i Hussein emphasized that he is not saying thatKuwait did not have the right to make these statements. He again
questioned the identity of the neutral entity which examined thismatter and whether it was discussed with Iraq. Hussein suggested
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that something similar to a court
the details from both sides and t
this did not happen.
!§3 Hussein stated that
American officials said all Iraqi
including monies owed to Kuwait.
proved any amount reportedly owed
and was a "political" matter. He
driven by the United States and n
Kuwait, or any other entity.
:*§§ The interviewer tol
asked for compensation for the da
invasion and occupation. Kuwait
of 605 prisoners of war POWs!.
been returned. Hussein stated th
and are missing as characterized
that many "stories and novels hav
similar to the matter of Iraqi we
The Kuwaiti POW accusations have
however, similar to the WMD rumor
individuals often become "missing
examples the one coalition indivi
first Gulf War and the thousands
from the war between the two coun
Hussein stated that Kuwait knows
knowledge that 605 Kuwaitis were
than combat after the Iraqi invas
:?§i Hussein acknowledge
Governor of Kuwait during the Ira
reported directly to the Iraqi Mi
held by Ali Hasan Al-Majid at tha
Governor were set forth in Iraqi
not remember whether AlNuman was
of the Revolutionary Command Coun
Constitution sets forth the autho
President who is also the Chairma
appointments such as those given
military, judges, and general dir
"republican" directive. Hussein
does not prevent the President fr
consideration of appointment andshould have been formed to hear
o decide this matter. However,
just prior to the latest war,
debts would be forgiven
In Hussein's opinion, this
to Kuwait was not a legal debt
added that this policy was
ot the United Nations UN!,
d Hussein that Kuwait never
mages suffered during the Iraqi
did, however, ask for the return
To date, these POWs have not
ese Kuwaitis were not "captives"
by a UN resolution. He stated
e been woven" around this issue,
apons of mass destruction WMD!.
been proven to be false,
s. Hussein stated that
" during a war. He provided as
dual still missing from the
of Iraqis and Iranians missing
tries. As for the 605 Kuwaitis,
their fate. Hussein denied
captured in circumstances other
ion of Kuwait.
d that Aziz Saleh AlNuman was
qi occupation. As such, he
nister of Interior, a position
t time. AlNuman's duties as
provincial laws. Hussein does
appointed by him or by decree
cil RCC!. In Iraq, the
rity of the RCC and the
n of the RCC. Some governmental
to high-ranking officers in the
ectors are based on a
explained that the Iraqi system
om submitting a name for
requesting subsequent feedback
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from the RCC. Decisions in Iraq are signed by the President. Itis his prerogative to consult or not to consult anyone. Hussein
stated "his style" was to always consult with others when thetime came to make a decision. Governors were assigned based on a
"republican" or Presidential directive. Hussein does not
remember if he discussed the appointment of AlNuman with the
RCC.
P§§ When questioned regarding Iraq's usage of Kuwaitis,Japanese, and westerners as human shields during the first Gulf
War including the positioning of them at key sites such as
communications centers and military positions, Hussein deniedthat such individuals were taken to Iraqi military positions. Headded that the Iraqi government did not, however, preventindividuals from volunteering as human shields to protectfacilities such as communications centers. When questioned
whether such volunteers existed in 1991, Hussein replied, "I do
not remember."
Z§; The translator read to Hussein an Iraqi governmentcommunication from Qusay Hussein concerning the usage of Kuwaitiprisoners as human shields. Hussein stated that he has no
information about this letter. When noted to Hussein that thedocument was recovered by American forces from an Iraqi
government building and is deemed legitimate, Hussein stated, "I
answered." He asked whether the captives discussed in thiscommunication were ever questioned about being held in Iraqicaptivity or being used as human shields. Hussein stated that
Iraq released all the Kuwaiti captives. Upon being told thedocument was dated March 14, 2003, Hussein stated, "It is a
forgery. It is impossible." He suggested that the communicationshould be examined closely to determine authenticity and that he
had thought it was dated 1991. Hussein stated that if the dateof the document is 2003, it is a forgery. He added that Iraq didnot have captives at that time. Hussein stated that Qusay was
not the type of person to "make up things " He reiterated that
experts in the United States and in Iraq should scrutinize this
document for authenticity.
:a§; Regarding chemical weapons and why Iraq did not usethem in the first Gulf War, Hussein replied that he had been
asked this question previously and had answered. When noted tohim that the interviewer had not previously asked this question,Hussein replied that he believed it was strange that the
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interviewer or anyone else would ask this question, not just atthis point but at any time. He stated that it is not Iraqi
policy to use chemical weapons against coalition forces. Hussein
commented that this was a discussion of history, not unrealistic
hypotheticals. He asked how Iraq would have been described if it
had used chemical weapons. Hussein replied to his own question,
"We would have been called stupid." According to Hussein,
chemical weapons, and their use, were never discussed by Iraqi
officials before or during the 1991 war.
>S3 As stated during a previous interview, Hussein
acknowledged a meeting in January, 1991 just before the warbetween US Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi ForeignMinister Tariq Aziz. Hussein remembers a statement by Baker to
"take Iraq back to the preindustrial age." He stated that Iraq
would not be intimidated by threats, however, especially when
coming from someone in "a strong position." Hussein denied
knowledge that part of this discussion concerned the position of
the United States regarding Iraq's possible use of chemical
weapons should hostilities occur. According to Hussein, "We
decided the right thing to do." He stated that the use of
chemical weapons did not "cross our mind "
:}Si Hussein stated that Sultan Hashem, Iraqi Ministerof Defense, and Saleh, Second Corps Commander, represented Iraq
at the cease fire talks during the first Gulf War. Their
positions and viewpoints were the same as those of the Iraqi
leadership, to secure a cease fire and to start the withdrawal of
foreign forces from Iraq. Hussein stated Iraq had no goal ofcontinuing the war and desired a cease fire.
:P5¥:When questioned about other items discussed by Iraq
at the 1991 cease fire talks, Hussein stated that he does not
remember any additional Iraqi requests other than the withdrawalof foreign forces from their territory. In Hussein's opinion,
the fighting would have continued without this withdrawal.
Hussein denied knowledge that Iraq asked for, and received,
permission to continue flying helicopters. He further deniedknowledge of the purpose of such an Iraqi request.
Q
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U.S. Department of Justice
75>? Federal Bureau of Invesngatxon
In Reply, Please Refer to
FHeNuBaghdad Operations Center
March 13, 2004
DECLJLSSIFIED BY l.1Cf'lJ&l-I 60324
UN D5-21-2009
Interview Session Number: 14Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
221* HArabic/English Translation:
>§3 Saddam Hussein High Value Detainee #1! wasinterviewed March 13, 2004 at a military detention facility atBaghdad International Airport BIAP!, Baghdad, Iraq. Husseinprovided the following information:
QQ After the cease fire of 1991, Hussein stated thegoal of the Iraqi leadership was the rebuilding of theinfrastructure of Iraq destroyed during the war. This includedreconstituting agricultural and economic programs. Husseinstated that Iraq rebuilt "almost everything" and started newprograms in the areas of agriculture, education, and health.However, Iraq's efforts were hampered by the embargo,particularly affecting the health and education sectors.
!S§ When noted to Hussein that several changes weremade in the Iraqi government around this time including theappointment of individuals to new positions, Hussein stated,"This is natural." In his opinion, such changes are a "regular"occurrence not only in Iraq but also in countries such as theUnited States. One such appointee, Abid Hamid Mahmoud, becameHussein's personal secretary at this time replacing the previoussecretary who had been appointed as Iraqi Minister of Education.Hussein referred to Mahmoud as a "senior companion of mine" whohad served as a member of the President's protective detail inthe Himaya and Murafiqeen. Another individual, Tariq Aziz, wasnamed as Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister. Hussein described Aziz asone of the early Revolutionary Command Council RCC! members. InHussein's opinion, Aziz "did not gain anything" with thisappointment. Hussein stated that he told the Iraqi leadership ifhe Hussein! was to also have the title as Iraqi prime minister,he would need assistance from others. Thus, Aziz and Taha YasinRamadan were named as deputy prime ministers.
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:?§; Hussein explained that the
secretary include arranging the schedulethe person is working. A secretary musthis duties. Hussein selected Mahmoud asbecause he was "suitable for the positio1'1duties of a personal
of the person for whom
be precise in executing
his personal secretary
." He added that this was his own choice and not a matter of historical significance.Hussein reiterated that Mahmoud had served in the Himaya andMurafiqeen, and that both organizations were composed ofHussein's relatives. At the beginning of the Revolution, onlyone of his relatives served in an Iraqi government politicalposition. At that time, Hussein's relatives had limitededucation and primarily served in the Iraqi army and othermilitary services.
:?§3 Hussein pointed out that members of his protectivedetail did not necessarily dictate the details of his movements.He claimed that at times, he taught them ways to improve theirperformance and be more successful. He recalled joking with themthat he could perform their job better. He felt it was veryimportant that detail members not to be "rough" when Hussein"mingled" with the people. In his opinion, the detail would havefailed in its mission if it "isolated" him from the masses. Itwas also important that the detail be able to alter their dutiesand behavior to accommodate Hussein's nature. As furtherevidence of his teaching abilities, Hussein stated that ifrequested, he could provide advice regarding the writer'sinterviewing duties. When asked to expound on this statement,Hussein stated, "A doctor does not chase people asking them whatis wrong. They come to him." .
XHQ Hussein stated the most important thing is to lookat one's position, whether executing or planning, to determinehow to perform duties. A person executing orders must be preciseand quick. One who supervises must allow those under him toexercise initiative. The "margin for initiative" differs betweencivilian and military situations. Hussein stated, "The eyes inthe field are different than those at headquarters." Often,
the "field eyes" are more accurate in understanding a particularsituation than headquarters components.
}EQ Regarding character traits he seeks insubordinates, Hussein stated, "A human being in not likemerchandise." One may think an individual is suitable for aposition only to later discover that he does not possess the
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desirable traits. According to Hussein, a particular situationmay require the selection of a particular individual even though,under other circumstances, this individual may not be consideredthe best choice. This is particularly true in the context ofselecting the right person for military operations.
Hussein explained that the selection or dismissal ofindividuals for particular military or governmental positionsoften involves consideration of the perception of one's family ortribe. Another factor to consider is the strength of the Iraqipsyche and sense of "individuality." Although a particularsituation may necessitate the removal of an Iraqi from hisposition, a leader must consider how this individual's removalmay be perceived. For example, relatives of an individualremoved from office may question the individual's character.Some will ask "again and again" why the individual was dismissed.Others may ask, "Was he a coward?" These questions may even beasked when an individual decides to retire under normalcircumstances. The families of such individuals may feel"tainted." Under some circumstances, such actions may causefamilies to hate the government. Hussein explained that inhaving to consider these feelings and attitudes, military andgovernmental leaders were often limited in making personnelchanges, even if they were deemed necessary.
QQ When asked about the commonly reported uprisingswhich occurred in southern Iraq after the war in 1991, Husseinclaimed that he had not heard of such uprisings. When it waspointed out that many interviews and reports had documented theuprisings, Hussein asked, "Have we not discussed this matter?"He stated, however, that within a day of the cease fire of 1991,"some elements" had initiated sabotage operations in the southernIraq cities of Basra, Nasiriyyah, and Amarah. Later, thisactivity spread to the northern cities of Suleimaniyyah, Erbil,and Kirkuk. Hussein stated that the groups conducting theseoperations were "pushed by Iran," and that Iraq captured 68Iranian intelligence officers who were later exchanged for Iraqiprisoners.
CB1 At the time of the uprisings, most bridges in Iraqhad already been destroyed. Electricity did not exist. Waterservice was sporadic, and food supplies were minimal. In theaftermath of the war, these factors contributed to general unrestin the country. Hussein stated the "elements" participating in
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the uprisings were a mixture of thieves, rebels, and "those fromIran." The latter group included individuals from Iraniangovernment services, Iraqis of Iranian origin, and Iraqis who had"escaped" to Iran. Their nationalities were difficult todetermine with any degree of certainty because many hadintentionally destroyed their citizenship documents.
!8I Hussein stated that after deciding to reassertgovernment control of the country, the Iraqi leadershipconsidered the southern area of Iraq to be a high priority. Itwas in this area where Iraqi forces encountered and foughtprimarily Iranians. After order was restored in southern Iraq,government forces focused on the northern region where Iraqiforces met little or no resistance. The fighting in northern andsouthern Iraq lasted approximately two months. Hussein stated,"God made us victorious." Thereafter, according to Hussein, Irancontinued to insert groups of ten to fifteen people into Iraq toconduct operations against the government. However, theseindividuals were, for the most part, thwarted by members of thelocal population. Ultimately, following an agreement betweenIran and Iraq, these hostile operations ceased.
:?§i Hussein characterized the uprisings in 1991 asinsurgent activity conducted by "outlaws and thieves." He didnot consider the insurgents to be revolutionaries. When askedwhat factors allowed these disturbances, Hussein answered thatit was support from Iran, weakness of the Iraqi government afterthe war, and possibly assistance from coalition forces. He notedthat all government institutions including the police and themilitary had been weakened as a result of the war. Gradually,however, the Iraqi military grew in strength, and they wereeventually able to overcome these rebels. According to Hussein,the Iraqi military's "blade got longer and longer." Heacknowledged, however, that the weakened state of the Iraqimilitary had been the main factor which provided the opportunityfor this lawlessness in the first place.
I83 Hussein believed the goal of the insurgent activitywas to control Iraq. In his opinion, this tactic was utilized in1991 after Iran had been unable to accomplish this goal throughits previous war with Iraq. Iran had wanted to control all or atleast a part of Iraq, particularly the southern portion. It wasHussein's belief that Iran also wanted to extend its power toeastern Saudi Arabia and into the entire Gulf region.
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;§3 The RCC gave the Iraqi provincial governors controlof the military during the uprisings in order to protect thepeople and the state and to re-establish security and a "normallife." The people and the nation were threatened by widespreadkillings, theft, arson, and general destruction, all of which hadto be brought under control. Hussein denied knowledge of themethods used by the governors and the military to reassertcontrol. Hussein stated, "They were given the authority, andthey carried it out." At the time, he did not ask for details ofthe operation, but he did request and receive status reportsregarding the progress of operations.
Zsi Regarding limitations placed on the Iraqi militaryby the leadership during this time period, Hussein asked, "Whatdo you mean by limits?" Hussein denied that the GenevaConvention applied to this situation, claiming it only applied towars. Hussein claimed that with respect to internal conflict,the Geneva Convention applied only to situations when anoccupying power is another country. He claimed that the GenevaConvention was applicable to attempted coups or internal unrestinvolving crimes such as burning and looting.
33% The interviewer pointed out to Hussein thatinternationa law does not permit the targeting of civilians evenwhen the location of a military objective is populated bycivilians and that certain laws of humanity always apply. Whenasked again what restrictions were placed on the Iraqi militaryduring the 1991 uprisings, Hussein replied that an Iraqi, whethercivilian or military, knows what is acceptable as humanebehavior, and there is no need for someone to have to tell themhow to behave.
Zkf Hussein stated, "I am responsible for what Idecide." He added that he is not responsible for how an Iraqiacts. Hussein claimed that if an Iraqi wanted to use him Hussein! as the justification for his actions, he would acceptthat assertion so long as it does not harm Hussein's reputation.In Hussein's opinion, a leader is responsible for the actions ofa subordinate if he becomes aware of that subordinate'stransgressions and confronts him about the wrongfulness of hisactions. He stated that each individual is judged based on hisown law and constitution.
gv?-71:7.
U.S. Department of Justice .*!:%:55*5':'<.is/1-~ w W . . '1i.§,_.n.,/.;:.~" Federal Bureau of lnvesnganon
WR WJ ° ° Baghdad Operations Center° °"°' March 16, 2004
Interview Session Number: 15
Interview Conducted by: SSA
SSAArabic/English Translation: LS
!£Q Saddam Hussein High Value Detainee #1! wasinterviewed March 16, 2004 at a military detention facility atBaghdad International Airport BIAP!, Baghdad, Iraq. Husseinprovided the following information:
i Prior to the start of the interview, Hussein wasadvised that today's discussion would be a continuation of theprevious conversation regarding the disturbances or uprisings insouthern Iraq in 1991 after the Gulf War.
D§< Hussein stated that he was made aware of thedetails regarding the situation in southern Iraq in the samefashion as any leader of a country. ~Whenever faced with asituation, the Iraqi leadership assembled and consulted "quickly"about the best manner in which to confront an issue.
:h§i Hussein stated that, initially, those who carriedout acts during the uprisings in southern Iraq were among "thosewho had crossed the border from Iran." Others from Iraqcommitted similar acts, while some were not involved at all inthe incidents. According to Hussein, if the Iraqi governmentresponse to these actions had been slow and weak, someindividuals might have shown sympathy and assisted theparticipants in the uprisings. Without such a response, theymight have acted out of fear thinking that those who caused thedisturbances would ultimately rise to power in the Iraqigovernment. In addition, other individuals Hussein described as"greedy thieves and robbers" might have participated in theuprisings.
:?§§ Hussein asserted that it was the duty of the Iraqigovernment to confront the individuals participating in theuprisings. Hussein stated that although the "arms of theauthorities had been severed" by the 1991 war, the Iraqi
lmzcm-+¢z1;Th1S document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of theFBI and lS loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.b6
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Baghdad Operations Center
government "picked them up and struck the enemy." He added thatthose who would not be deterred by words would be deterred byweapons. The Iraqi leadership ordered the army to assemble asmany forces as possible in order to confront "treachery" and thedisturbances. Hussein acknowledged that incidents of looting bycertain individuals "got mixed in" with the actions of thoseparticipating in the uprisings.
:R Regarding the decision to place certain individualsin charge of areas in southern Iraq during this time period andtheir assigned roles, Hussein replied, "I said our decision wasto confront and defeat the enemy." The participants in theuprisings were to be "put in their place," if not by word, thenby weapon. Hussein stated that a lengthy discussion of thismatter was not required. The individuals who had crossed theborder from Iran were members of the Dawa Party. They wereassisted by additional Iranian forces. Together, theseindividuals killed, burned, looted, and committed other crimes.According to Hussein, one does not need to ask what actionsshould be taken when faced with such a situation. Procedure,however, dictated that the Iraqi leadership meet to discuss thematter. All members of the leadership held the same opinionregarding the Iraqi government response required to the deal withthe situation.
I8 When asked how information was communicated to himregarding events occurring in southern Iraq and regardingsubsequent responses by Iraqi government forces, Hussein asked,"With Iraq being so small, is it possible we wouldn't know whatwas going on?" He added that the entire population of southernIraq began migrating to Baghdad during this time period. .Information from one of the Iraqi commanders in the south, AliHasan AlMajid, was "cut off" and was not reaching the Iraqileadership. Soon after, it became clear to the leadership thatAlMajid was "resisting" in Basra. _
18f When asked whether reports were true that AlMajidwas actually trapped in Basra at this time, Hussein responded,"In the past, Iraqis did not respect law and authority." Whencalled to military service, Iraqis generally failed to respond.When called for "questioning," Iraqis also generally failed torespond. According to Hussein, national rule was a relativelynew concept during this time period. Even though most Iraqiswere Arab, they were not accustomed to being ruled by an Arab,
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King Faisal at that time. He was "installed" into power by theBritish. The disregard for law was particularly prevalent inrural areas at that time.
I81 Hussein then provided details of a story about anindividual named Madhi Ubaid and his son who was wanted by thegovernment. As the result of a police operation, Ubaid wascaptured and interrogated regarding the whereabouts of his son.Ubaid responded, "I have no son." The police asked, "Are youMadhi?" Ubaid replied, "No, I'm Fadhi." The police slapped himand told Ubaid "You are Madhi." Thereafter, Ubaid stated, "Ifthe government says I'm Madhi, I'm Madhi." Hussein ended thediscussion of AlMajid's situation in Basra stating, "You heardwhat you heard. I heard what I heard."
:H§! Hussein stated that the threat to the Iraqigovernment in 1991 existed in both northern and southern Iraq.An uprising was even attempted in Baghdad. Hussein opined thatthose "sitting on the fence" joined in the uprisings upon seeingpolice stations and government offices attacked with noresistance by the authorities. As the Iraqi governmentreasserted control, the "enemy" went to a new area or reinforcedin an old one. According to Hussein, the Iraqi military strengthgrew over time and "the circle started tightening around the
enemy."
:!Si Hussein noted that the previous period oflawlessness he discussed, during Madhi's time, was in the 1920s.He added that the attitude of the Iraqis changed completelyduring the last 35 years under the Ba'ath Party. In Hussein'sopinion, with a political party present throughout Iraq, theIraqi people believed in the government agenda, had faith intheir leadership, and were more disciplined than ever before.This led to an improvement in the situation in Iraq, particularlyin the economy. According to Hussein, no "poor person" existedin Iraq in the 1980s. Widows, orphans, and the elderly were"taken care of and secure." Commercial products were relativelyinexpensive. This Iraqi lifestyle diminished, however, aroundthe midpoint of the Iran-Iraq War and later after the 1991 GulfWar. Hussein stated, "An embargo is an embargo." After thedownturn in the economy, employees, and Iraqi citizens ingeneral, were less disciplined. However, their allegiance didnot change.
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Q Hussein acknowledged that Iraq was on its way tobecoming economically strong in the early 1980s. He added thatall the positive things in Iraq had been created by theleadership. Hussein further acknowledged that the economicsituation deteriorated dramatically in the 1980s. Hussein agreedthat the decline in the Iraqi economy at that time and thesubsequent 1991 Gulf War which led to embargos and United Nations UN! inspections lessened the economic strength of the country.He acknowledged that this decline was felt by the Iraqi people,especially among those in rural areas and among lower incomeindividuals such as those living in southern Iraq. Hussein addedthat the central and northern areas of Iraq were also affected.
:>§1 Hussein acknowledged that, as a general rule, thepressures of poverty can greatly strain a society possiblyleading to revolution. However, he provided several examples ofsituations involving revolutions in Iraq and other countries inthe Arab world which did not stem from economic conditions.Hussein stated that acts of insurgency without a political goal,such as those which occurred in 1991, are not revolutions.
!&Q The interviewer noted to Hussein that variousneutral nongovernmental and humanitarian organizations conductedinvestigations of the actions of the Iraqi military during theuprisings of 1991. One such investigation conducted by HumanRights Watch HRW!, a neutral nonprofit organization notassociated with any government, provided details about Iraqimilitary actions. The interviewer read Hussein a summary of anHRW interview of a resident of Basra who witnessed one such eventin 1991. According to the witness, he saw a column of Iraqitanks approaching Basra. The lead tank had three children tiedto its front being forced to act as human shields. Whenquestioned regarding his knowledge of such actions of the Iraqimilitary in 1991, Hussein replied that even though he believesthis information does not deserve a reply, he would answer forthe benefit of the interviewer. Hussein stated, "It's a lie."He added that, in Iraq, each child has a father, a mother, andfamily. Iraq "does not have orphans walking the streets."Regarding these three children, Hussein asked, "Who were theirparents?" He questioned why the interviewer would accept that atank commander would act so irresponsibly. Hussein further askedwhy the tactic of using children as human shields would have beenconsidered effective against those who were already killing,looting, and burning. He added that a story about using children
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in this manner may have been fabricated by westerners. Husseinreiterated that the story did not deserve an answer from him and"the lie is clear."
S£EE§T7¥§i:
U.S. Department of Justice g¬%§aw/ ~-92m
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@R WJ"° ° Baghdad Operations Center N March 19, 2004
DECLASSIFIED BY ucfbaw 60324
UN U5-21-2009
Interview Session Number: 16Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro b6
SSA b7C Arabic/English Translation: LS
ZS; Saddam Hussein High Value Detainee #1! wasinterviewed March 19, 2004 at a military detention facility atBaghdad International Airport BIAP!, Baghdad, Iraq. Husseinprovided the following information:
!$Q Prior to the start o
…[truncated]