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Concerning the so-called clerical error concerning People's 55
introduced at trial, Wolfer testified that he had handed over four
test fired bullets to the Grand Jury Grand Jury 55! and had kept
three test fired bullets what Wolfer described as three bullets in
better condition than the other four!, and had put these three
bullets in a unmarked coin envelope and placed the envelope in his
desk drawer and locked it. Wolfer felt that for security reasons
these three test bullets should be placed in his custody in an
unmarked envelope until the trial. Wolfer stated in September 1975
that these three bullets remained in his custody until they were
offered into evidence at trial. In the weeks preceding his 1969
trial testimony, Wolfer put the wrong serial number, from the sub-
sequently destroyed second gun, on the coin envelope when he asked
someone, whom Wolfer does not recall, the serial number of the
particular Sirhan weapon. -
On the other hand, the four test fired bullets introduced
before the Grand Jury on June 7, 1958, ehich were also in an
envelope, had the correct Sirhan gun serial number 3725!. These
four Grand Jury bullets, 5B, were found by the 1975 ballistics
experts to have no distinguishing differences from the three test
fired bullets introduced at trial, Exhibit 55.
' Throughout the cross examination of wolfer, Judge Wenke
emphasized that the purpose of the examination was the
identification of exhibits, which would assist the seven ballistics
experts in their own test and examination. Wenke stressed that the
manner and procedure of Dewayne wolfer, in his examination in 1968,
was not at issue. wenke stated that the police personnel with whom
Wolfer consulted and the reason for this consultation and
examination was not to be a part of the ballistics examination
procedings. However, the judge ruled that the experts should have
information on the particular tests that Wolfer had conducted if
these tests would be of any aid to the experts themselves.
Wolfer stated that he had put his initials D.W. in very small
markings on the test fired bullets in 1963, but due to the
deterioration and oxidation, he could find them in 1975 only with
the assistance of a magnifying glass. Furthermore, Wolfer stated
that he had no record or written notes to determine the rifling
pitch, the markings or scarsor indentations concerning the lands
and grooves of the barrel, or the projection and pitch of the bullet
from the barrel. Heifer stated that he could not tell if the barrel
revolver itself was in the same condition in September 1975 as it
was in 1968. '
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Holfer stated *"t one of the factors t t made the actual
identification of thim ennedy death bullet, P¬05u;'S H8, impossible
was that the bullet had flattened out as it fragmented in the brain.
As such, the bullet exploded in a fragmented and enlarged manner,
causing it to look larger and flat. It was this particular problem,
as reported_in Robert Houghton's book Special ynit §enator!, that
first gave criminalist William Harper a feeflngwthatlthere were
possible discrepancies in the ballistics evidence. In the book
Special Unit Senator, Houghton had mistakenly described this death
Bullet as beThg*TT2'inches in diameter when in reality it should
have been described as .12 millimeters in diameter. Harper felt
that the transcription in the book stating .12 inches meant that a
bullet of that size would be too large to have come from a .22
caliber revolver, and it was this statement that first gave Harper
his interest in re-examining the ballistics evidence. It was de-
termined, however, that Houghton's reference in the book concerned
very enlarged photographs of the fragment from Peoples H8, thus
causing the misconception of the actual diameter of the bullet.
Even defense counsel, Grant Cooper, had commented at trial on the
large nature of the bullet fragment in the photograph, People's
N9!, of the bullet, People's H8!, and had been assured by prose-
cution attorneys that the fragment had been blown up several
hundred times to account for the seemingly large diameter of the
fragment.
Additionally, while under cross examination by the several
lawyers, Heifer essentially repeated the same testimony he had
earlier given before the Grand Jury in 1968 and before the trial
court in 1969, explaining the nature of ballistics and firearms
identification. Since the purpose of this hearing was to serve as a
guideline for the seven ballistics experts being assembled, Wolfer
described how he had earlier reached the conclusion that the Sirhan
gun and "no other gun in the world" had fired the evidence bullets.
Before the Grand Jury in 1968, Wolfer had testified that in
order to read the markings on a bullet fired from a particular gun,
and in order to determine which particular gun fired the bullet, it
was necessary to check the specific barrel or rifling of the gun or
revolver. This was because there are imperfections that scratch
the bullet as the bullet crosses the imperfections within the
barrel of the gun or revolver. Additionally, testified Wolfer,
these imperfections produce in the bullet a series of valleys and
ridges called lands and grooves. when a comparison test is made by
taking an evidence bullet and a test bullet placed under a
comparison microscope two microscopes_with one eye piece!, it is
possible to identify the particular lands and grooves and markings
on the bullets. It is through this test mechanism that one can
identify whether certain bullets have been fired from a certain
barrel of a gun or revolver.
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Wolfer also testified before the Grand Jury that the gold
plating on the copper alloy bullets fired by Sirhan and also used by
wolfer for his own test fired bullets in 1968, was significant
because this particular gold plating prevented the leading of the
barrel by a bullet, which would tear the bullet if it did not have
the particular gold plating. This plating kept the bullet from
being unstable ix: flight. This was the nature of the mini-mag
ammunition used by Sirhan and Wolfer.
wolfer testified at the September 1975 hearing as he had pre-
viously given statements to the press and to critics!, that he was
unable to use the Sirhan weapon for sound tests-and muzzle tests.
Holfer stated that when he applied to use the Sirhan weapon for
additional tests, he was told by representatives of the District
Attorney's Office that the weapon was under the custody of the
Grand Jury. And until the District Attorney's Office had a court
order approved by Sirhan's new counsel, they would be unable to
obtain the Sirhan weapon for additional tests.
In answer to the question why the eighth test fired bullet was
never found, Wolfer replied that the particular bullet could not be
found in the water tank where he had fired the Sirhan weapon to
obtain the bullets eventually identified as Grand Jury SB and Trial
Exhibit 55!.
In discussing ceiling panels, Wclfer stated that he had found
holes that had been made by fragments of fired bullets from
Sirhan's weapon. These fragments had exploded, being hollow point
mini-mag ammunition, and had split as they penetrated the ceiling
tiles. wolfer could not recall who else had looked at the holes in
the ceiling tiles, or who else had _participated in the x-ray
analysis of the now destroyed ceiling tiles. Wolfer had removed
the ceiling panels to the crime lab, but did not recall what other
tests were made on the ceiling tiles. Wolfer did state that the
ceiling panels in their entirety were three separate panels that
reflected three bullet holes, the result of two bullets fired, one
bullet entering and then ricocheting out, a second bullet entering
and lost "somewhere in the inner space."
Additionally, Wolfer stated in addition to booking the ceiling
panels, the L.A.P.D. had booked into the Property Division of the
Criminalistics Laboratory two boards from a door frame. These
boards containing circled holes were examined, and according to
Wolfer, no bullets or fragments were found in the wood. These
boards were the center divider pantry-door frames, the object of
much notoriety in several photographs of circled holes that
appeared lfl periodicals for several years. These photos again
surfaced in November and December 1975 as part of petitioner
Schrade's motion for additional ballistics and trajectory tests.
Again, in June 1976, pursuant to the Freedom of Information
Act, the FBI released 803 pages of its file on the Robert Kennedy
assassination. On page H8 of the FBI report dated June 9, 1968, FBI
photographer, Grinner, stated in his signed report page H8! that
there were "four reported bullet holes in the area of the two
swinging doors. Photographs of the swinging doors taken by Grinner
to substantiate his one page report were included in the file.
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However, no other reference is made to these "reported four
bullet holes" in the other 802 pages-of the FBI files. Special
Counsel Kranz although no longer a deputy District Attorney at the
time! and District Attorney's Office investigators, interviewed FBI
investigators who had conducted the 1968 assassination
investigation, including Chief Deputy LaJeunesse in June and July
1976. No ballistics evidence or other references to Greiner's one
page report were found to substantiate the report of photographer
Greiner.
Additionally, District Attorney Van de Kamp thoroughly
reviewed the 803 pages of the FBI report, and found no evidence to
suggest that either four bullets had been fired into the circled
and much photographed swinging doors, or that four bullets had been
found in the vicinity of the swinging doors.
Concerning the sound and muzzle tests, Wolfer took hogs ears,
closely approximating human tissue, for the purpose of powder
pattern tests. Using the second .22 caliber revolver obtained from
L.A.P.D. Property Division on June 11, 1968, he fired shots at
given distances at approximate angles obtained from the autopsy
report until he had a similar diameter circle which gave a
tatooing, or powder particle effect, to determine the particular
distance of the muzzle from the wound. It was from these tests that
Wolfer determined the close range effect of the muzzle to the
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Concerning the various circled holes in the pantry, parti-
cularly the circles on the wooden frames that had been removed,
Wolfer replied that the police had circled every hole within the
kitchen area as a matter of course. All holes and all possible
indentations were examined, and Wolfer _repeated that the only
bullets found were the seven that have previously been described
with their pathways and trajectories. Wolfer described that the
police procedure had been to probe each of the holes looking for any
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any shells or bullets had been found in any of the particular holes
circled in the kitchen area and the pantry area. During the
investigation of the crime scene and during trajectory studies by
the L.A.P.D., all ceiling panels and areas of wood that were
determined to have possible bullets or bullet holes were seized and
taken from the pantry for further analysis. However, the final
analysis by wolfer and the L.A.P.D. was that only eight bullets had
been fired at the crime scene and that Sirhan had fired all eight
bullets. Seven of these bullets were recovered, the eigth "lost
somewhere in the ceiling inner space." ]_
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1375 B92g/istics and Firearms EXhi92#L Tests
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pourt_Qgde£ils§ued:to*§even Ballistics Experts
On September 18, 1975, Superior Court Judge Robert wenke
signed an 11-page court order calling for the retesting and
examination of the ballistics and firearms exhibits. Included in
the exhibits to_be tested were the Sirhan weapon, and the evidence
bullets and Wolfer test fired bullets, including the autopsy
reports, and the packages containing Senator Kennedy's clothing.
The principal questions that the panel of seven independent
firearms experts were asked to answer were:
1. Is the condition of the exhibits at the present time
such that a reliable firearms identification can now be made? ~
2. If the exhibits are no longer in a condition which
permits a reliable firearms identification, what accounts for that
conclusion?
3. If a firearms identification can now be made, does such
an examination confirm the original identification made at the
trial of Sirhan2
U. Do the exhibits in any way support a conclusion that a
second weapon was fired at the time of the assassination?
Included in this fourth question were the following questions:
a. Do all the bullets recovered after the
assassination have the same number of cannelures?
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after the assassination consistent with the proposition
that each bullet was fired from the same gun? _
The test procedures provided that each expert was to perform
his own individual classical bullet comparison identification using
a comparison microscope with a stereomicroscope. Finally, very
detailed procedures were provided for in the court order which
outlined the analysis of the various bullets and the procedures to
be followed. Other more sophisticated and elaborate tests, such as
micro measurements of the bullets, trace metal analysis, and powder
residue examination, and the test firing of the Sirhan weapon were
also provided for in the court order, if so agreed upon by the
experts.
Qne important provision that would later become a subject
during cross examination of the experts in November was a section
of the court order, on page two, that provided that if the experts
determined that additional exhibits in the clerk's custody required
examination, they could seek a court order that such items be pro-
duced. However, during their 15-day examination, the experts never
requested any other exhibits which might have gone to the issue of
trajectories,,bullet pathways, and so-called missing bullets.
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Also, the courtKcrder provided that the tee of the complete
testing procedure as outlined in the order was adopted to arrive at
as definitive a scientific determination as possible and to fore-
close the necessity of similar scientific examinations in the
future. This provision was also a significant point during cross
examination of the experts, with all seven experts later admitting
during cross examination that any additional tests would be either
unnecessary or inconclusive. In the Joint report issued by the
experts after the test and examination, no additional test
procedures were recommended.
Revise 211 stasis and 1>isPvie-i
The potential refiring of the Sirhan weapon received
nationwide publicity, with underlying ramifications that perhaps a
major conspiracy was about to be unfolded, and dramatic new dis-
coveries which might lead to the disclosure of a second gun. Lost
in this battle of words and accusations was the sevenyear overture
to the ballistics examination. The orchestration of events,
issues, allegations, suspicions, media happenings, and the
resulting merger of myth and reality that surrounded political as-
sassinations and conspiracy theories were all about to be
crystallized in the ballistics tests and examination. In reality,
this particular hearing had, for its foundation, the bare
essentials that there had only been a few legitimate discrepancies
and mistakes which justified the accusation that there were unex-
plained problems in the Sirhan case.
Basically and specifically, the underground press, the two gun
advocates, and the national media had focused on a few problems
that had been dramatized into various scenarios exaggerated on es-
sentially the same theme. There had been the mismarked envelope,
and the fact that the scientific evidence admitted before the trial
court did not actually reflect that the Sirhan weapon fired the
particular evidence bullets in People's 55. Additionally, two
criminalists, William Harper and Herbert MacDonell, had expressed
reservations, based primarily on photographs, and not through
traditional examination through a classical comparison microscope,
that People's Exhibit H7 and SH did not match up, thus suggesting
that two guns fired the two bullets. Additionally, MacDonell had
advanced the theory that the cannelures on these two bullets were
different, which also suggested two guns. Neither Harper, nor
Lowell Bradford, ever raised the cannelure issue._ Additionally,
Harper had admitted that he still felt that there was "more work to
do" and was not really sure that, without a comparison microscope,
his examination was that valid. Finally, the fact that the
conviction of Sirhan had been upheld by every appellate court in
California and by the U.S. Supreme Court, and the fact that all of
the most recent allegations regarding two guns, cannelures, mis-
marked envelopes, a possible security guard shooting his gun,
additional "bullet holes," doorframes, AP photographs, and the
like, had all been raised in a writ filed with the State Supreme
Court in_January, 19?5, by Sirhan's attorney and promptly denied by
the State Supreme Court in February, 1975» further emphasized that
there was very,little, if any, evidence to suggest any possibility
of a second gun.
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Nevertheless, due to the magnitude of the crime of the murder
of Senator Kennedy, and the consuming public interest in the case,
it was necessary that a thorough and complete ballistics
examination be held. This was particularly evident after Assistant
Police Chief Gates told of the destruction of ceiling panels and x-
ray analysis reports. Additionally, the woeful lack of evidence
reports and documentation concerning previous ballistics
examination and trajectory studies, which had become evident during
the examination of Dewayne Wolfer, made the forthcoming ballistics
examination of the exhibits by the seven experts an event of
crucial importance.
Robert,Kennedy had been a major political figure, and his
political assassination had worldwide impact. There were growing
fears that the unexplaned destruction of potential evidence, and
the lack of documentation, were part' of massive coverups and
conspiracies that could concievably involve the highest level of
government officials. This was despite the fact that several
people had actually seen Sirhan shoot Senator Kennedy and had so
testified at trial. Additionally, no other witness had come
forward and stated conclusively and substantially that a second
person within the pantry had actually fired a gun.
Tenlqgiglxaminatigq, and Testionigef ,B><,hi}zitS
Amidst the accusations that the Los Angeles Police Department
and the Les Angeles District Attorney's Office had deliberately,
intentionally, and knowingly suppressed facts and evidence relating
to the assassination of Senator Kennedy, inherent in- this
accusation was the charge that a security guard, Thane Cesar, had
fired his weapon, injuring or killing Senator Kennedy, the act
being witnessed by KNXT news runner Donald Schulman and covered up
by a monumental conspiracy involving the destruction of evidence,
including ceiling panels, door frames, etc.!, in this atmosphere
seven independent, carefully selected ballistics experts assembled
in late September, 1975, to begin their testing and examination of
the exhibits and to respond to the court order of September 18th.
Due to all the varying circumstances surrounding ballistics
examination, and the nature and integrity of the exhibits to be
examined, there was strong probability that the seven experts would
reach inconclusive findings concerning a positive matchup and
identification of the evidence bullets and test fired bullets to
the Sirhan weapon. But such a finding of inconclusiveness, or
inability to positively link the fired bullets with the Sirhan
weapon, would not in itself have meant or indicated more than one
gun had fired the bullets. That was the reason why the court order
had been phrased to ask the significant question, "Do the exhibits
in any way support a conclusion that a second weapon was fired at
the time of the assassination?" This one particular question was
perhaps the central point to the entire court order, the wording
of the order having been negotiated for five weeks by the more than
13 lawyers representing the various parties involved!.
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It must be emphasized that the seven experts themselves
modified the original court order concerning test procedures. They
felt that the court order was too restructive in that the original
Wenke order gave specific legal guidelines. The seven experts
agreed unanimously, through their spokesman and coordinator,
Patrick Garland, that they would proceed with the test procedures
according to their own manner of professional expertise. They
followed the directives of the Wenke court order completely and
impartially, and with exacting thoroughness. All the experts worked
for well over a ten-day period, from 8:00 a.m. until 10:00 p.m.
every night, relaxing only for meals and sleep. Their examination
was conducted in jury panel rooms adjacent to Department 3 of Los
Angeles Superior Court in the County Courthouse.
During the ten-day examination procedure, the experts examined
23 special exhibits that had been requested in the original CBS and
Schrade petitions filed in August 1975 for examination, inspection,
and testing of exhibits. Additionally, Balliscan photographs from
the Baxter Hard 197M Hearings were made available to the experts.
The transcript of the September 1975 examination of Dewayne Wolfer
relative to documents and records pertaining to his 1968 exa-
mination were also made available to the experts. One of the
ballistics experts, Charles Morton, took microphotographs of the
bullets for bullet comparisons. These photographs, numbered H3 in
total, were comparisons of several of the original 1968 evidence
bullets, 1968 Holfer test fired bullets, and the experts 1975 test
fired bullets.
As part of a subsequent court order during the actual ten day
test and examination procedure, the seven experts requested
permission to examine all photographs and negatives of the exhibits
that had previously been made by William Harper in 1970 and under
the direction of Thomas Noguchi in 197M for the Baxter Ward
Hearings. Buring a subsequent court examination of the procedures
used by the ballistics experts, it was revealed that there were no
documents or records supplied by the County Clerk's Office, or the
Coroner's Office, or the Supervisor's Office, that could actually
identify the number of photographs taken, or a positive identi-
fication of the particular photographs given to the seven experts.
It was revealed during this October, 1975, court examination that
Balliscan camera photographs had been taken of several bullets for
the 19TH hearings, that each photograph represented two rotations
of the Balliscan camera. It was admitted by representatives of the
County Clerk's Office and of the Coroner's Office on cross exa-
mination that the Balliscan camera technique used in the 19TH
hearings was a fine focused camera, but subject to the problem of
continuous balance to obtain an exact identification photograph.
The slightest "wibble-wobble" of the camera would have the effect
of having a miniscule differentiation in focus. It was admitted by
the Coroner's Office representatives that it was not possible to
totally eliminate the effect of a "wibble~wobble" from photographs
taken by the Balliscan camera, the very photographs used in
previous.hearings, and supplied to the experts in 1975 as assis-
tance in their identification of the several exhibits.
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Essentially, the greater the "wibble-wobble" effect of the
camera, the more potential of an out of focus photograph.
Additionally, it was admitted on cross examination by a repre-
sentative of the County Coroner's Office, that he could not
positively identify in 19?5, looking at the photographs given the
experts, whether those photographs reflected the particular
exhibits that had been photographed in 1979 for the Ward hearings.
It also was admitted that even though prints of Bullet H7 and Bullet
SH were made for the 197R hearings, the representative from the
County Clerk's Office could not recall if other prints had been
taken of the other bullets in question. Deputy District Attorney
Bozanich felt that the possibility of supplying photographs to the
1975 ballistics experts of Bullets H7 and SH, without any other
photographs of the other evidence bullets and Wolfer test fired
bullets, could have the effect of prejudicing the experts in their
conclusions reached during their examination. In this sense,
Bozanich argued that a neutral scientific inquiry, the very
objective outlined in the Wenke court order, would be lessened by a
failure to include all photographs that had been previously taken
and used as part of the escalating controversy concerning the
bullets and exhibits. This was certainly not done, as only a very
limited number of photographs concerning a very limited number of
bullets were supplied to the experts.
Dallistic Experts Opinioni No Second Gun
On October 6, 1975, after a ten day thorough examination and
test procedure in response to the court order of Judge Wenke and
after test-firing the Sirhan weapon and obtaining eight test
bullets on September 26, the examiners, working independently,
submitted their comprehensive joint report and conclusions. The
seven examiners found that there was "no substantive or
demonstrable evidence to indicate that more than one gun was used
to fire any of the bullets examined." It must be emphasized that
the term "any of the bullets examined" meant, as specified in the
original petitions filed in August, 1975, and incorporated in the
attorneys agreement and court order for examination by the
experts, all evidence bullets obtained from Senator Kennedy and the
victims bodies, two spent bullets found on the front seat of
Sirhan's car the day following the assassination containing wood
fragments, the spent bullet removed from the glove compartment of
Sirhan's car, and the expended bullet nemoved from Sirhan's pocket
at Rampart Division hours after the shooting. Additionally, the
term "any of the bullets examined" also included the seven
recovered 1968 Wolfer test fired bullets, and the eight recovered
1975 test fired bullets."
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_ Cannelures '
Additionally, the seven experts specifically answered two
troublesome questions that had surfaced in the past several years,
the Herbert MacDonel1 allegation concerning cannelures and the
William Harper allegation concerning rifling angles. The experts
found that People's Exhibit H7, the Kennedy wound bullet, had two
cannelures. Thus the number of cannelures on People's R7 were the
same as the number of cannelures on People's 54. The same number of
cannelures, two, were found on all other bullets examined. These
two cannelures on all bullets reflected the same make of
ammunition, CCI .22 caliber long rifle, copper coated, hollow point
bullets.
I
Rifling Angles
Secondly, the.seven experts found that preliminary rifling
angle measurements did not disclose any significant differences in
rifling angles between Exhibits R7 and SN. In subsequent cross
examination of the several experts, only Professor Turner of
Michigan State University felt that he would like to pursue the
study of rifling angles as an academic inquiry. All other experts
felt that the matter had been settled, and thus the original
questions raised by criminalist Harper concerning rifling angles
appeared to have been settled. Additionally, after the test
results were revealed in early October, and prior to cross
examination of the several experts in November, the several
attorneys submitted a letter to William Harper, signed by their
spokesman, Assistant Chief Deputy County Counsel Robert Lynch,
asking Mr. Harper to submit any questions that he might have
concerning the experts examinations and findings. His questions
Harper's! would be asked the several experts by Judge Wenke.
Inherent in this request of Harper was that opportunity was being
given to Harper to submit his comments and suggestions concerning
the area of rifling angles, and what subsequent investigations
Harper felt the experts should pursue concerning the subject of
rifling angles. Harper, in a transcribed statement before attorney
Robert Lynch, made a very short statement, and said he did not wish
to make any further inquiry into the matter of rifling angles at
that time.
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Eailukfé to Link Bulletsgto Sirhén! Gun _
Additionally, the comprehensive Joint report of the experts
filed on October 6, stated that it could not be concluded that the
three identifiable evidence bullets, exhibits B7, 52, and SH the
Kennedy, Goldstein, and weisel'bullets! were fired from the Sirhan
revolver. The reason for this, stated the experts, was that there
were insufficient corresponding individual characteristics on the
bullets to make an identification. This was because of the poor
reproductability of striations left on the evidence bullets and the
consecutively fired test bullets. And this poor reproduction of
striations, concluded the experts, could be attributed to the
following factors:
a! barrel fouling leading!;
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impact damage and distortion;
cylinder alignment;
possible loss of fine detail over intervening years.
No Additional Te§;§_§ecpmmehded
Finally, the experts concluded their joint report by stating
that they made no recommendations for additional types of testing
of the physical evidence in the case. This final statement of the
experts was to become a point of controversy in the subsequent
cross examination of the experts. The essence of their conclusion
was that, with the exception of Ralph Turner, who wished to pursue
the rifling angle issue from an academic standpoint, none of the
experts felt, and so later testified during cross examination, that
any additional tests or procedures' would be conclusive. All
experts felt that after ten days exhaustive testing and
examination, they had reached a point of diminishing returns, and
with respect to the emphatic sentences in the original court order
that gave the experts the right to seek further court order for
additional exhibits to be produced if such exhibits would be
helpful, and the court directive that the experts were to arrive at
as "definitive, scientific determination as possible and foreclose
the necessity of similar scientific examination in the future,"!
the experts felt that they had satisfied the court directive.
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§eaction of Critics
Following Joint*§eport*Issued by Panel Experts
f October, 1973 .
The issuance of the comprehensive Joint report filed by the
seven ballistics experts received nationwide publicity that there
was no evidence of a second gun being fired in the pantry. At that
time, most of the parties involved, and their respective counsel,
seemed satisfied that the issue had been concluded. However, upon
lengthy studies of the working papers of the ballistics experts,
some of the original advocates of the two-gun theory began to
express their doubts in public. Dr. Robert Jolling, the president
of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, held a press con-
ference with Paul Schrade, Allard Lowenstein, Attorney Mel Levine,
and other critics, and stated that the media had jumped the gun in
emphasizing that there had been no second gun. To Jolling,
Lowenstein and Schrade, in particular, they felt the ballistics
panel had not concluded that only one gun, and no other gun was
fired in the pantry. Jolling, satisfied that the cannelure
question had been finally answered, asked that further research be
done concerning the issue of rifling angles of the gun barrel.
Jolling was particularly critical of L.A.P.D. criminalist Dewayne
Wolfer, and felt that Wolfer had committed mistakes during his 1968
analysis and examination. Specifically, at the September hearing,
Wolfer had identified a photomicrograph taken on June 6, 1968, as
consisting of two separate negatives representing the Kennedy
bullet Exhibit HT and a test bullet. These negatives were, in fact,
as verified by the seven experts, the Kennedy bullet, Exhibit H7,
and the Goldstein bullet, Exhibit 52. Additionally, Jolling recom-
mended that additional tests be conducted in an area beyond
traditional ballistics and firearms examination. Jolling felt that
no definite conclusions had been reached, and there was still a
need fcr:
photo-grametric reconstruction of the scene;
a determination of the minimum and maximum number of
bullets fired within the pantry;
R. a test firing into comparable ceiling panels suspended
below like concrete material similiar to that found at the
Ambassador Hotel so as to scientifically determine the ricochet
potential of .22 caliber hollow-point, copper coated, mini-mag
ammunition. '
- 68 _a re-examination of the bullet pathways; eO
O
O
< '92
'92_1 Ko!
Admitting that there was no substantive evidence to date to
suggest that a second gun was involved, Jolling still felt such
conclusion neither excluded nor included the possibility" of a
second gun. Jolling admitted that there had been similar class
characteristics found in the Kennedy, Weisel, and Goldstein
bullets, and that these bullets were identified and matched to each
other. Jolling ignored the fact that five of the seven experts were
able to link these three particular bullets as being fired from the
same gun. Jolling also ignored the fact that the other two experts
did not express any opinion contrary to that expressed by the other
five experts. These two experts stated they could not make a 100$
positive determination matching these three bullets with having
come from the same gun.
Special Counsel Kranz made an appointment that very week with
Allard Lowenstein, one of the most severe critics and advocates of
the two-gun theory. Lowenstein expressed his interest in pursuing
the rifling angle theory, and a fear that there may have been sub-
stitution of bullets during the preceding years prior to the 1975
ballistics tests. Lowenstein also felt that there existed the
possibility that identifiable gouge marks had been put on the
bullets as part of a conspiracy to perpetuate the "coverup."
Lowenstein had no evidence to substantiate this charge. Lowenstein
also suggested that the recommendation inthe joint report that the
experts make "no recommendation for additional tests" actually
meant that the experts were waiting for additional instructions
from the court to conduct additional tests. Lowenstein seemed to
ignore the very specific directive in the September 18th court
order instructing the experts to request any and all exhibits that
they felt necessary to conduct their experiments, and the fact that
other more sophisticated tests, such as micromeasurement of the
bullets, trace metal analysis, and powder residue composition
analysis had been provided for in the court order. Finally, a
directive of the court stated in paragraph 2 of page 2 was that the
procedure outlined and given to the ballistics experts had been
adopted to "arrive at as definitive a scientific determination as
possible and to foreclose the necessity of similar scientific
examinations in the future."
In later cross examination of the experts, all experts stated
positively and clearly that they felt they had reached a point of
diminishing returns to conduct any future tests. This was due to
the nature of the exhibits, and the lack of thorough identifying
marks which foreclosed the usefulness of any additional tests.
Additionally, all the experts stated that they felt there was no
need to recommend any additional tests and this had been the intent
of the final paragraph in their joint report filed with the court
October 7, 1975.
-at
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=--.' 924' -
Lowenstein also expressed his concern that Holfer may never
have actually test fired the Sirhan weapon and may never have
matched up the bullets. Technically, Wolfer had testified that he
had only taken one of the seven test fired bullets recovered from
the water tank in 1968 and matched it with the evidence bullets.
when asked by Kranz if Lowenstein agreed that three of the seven
experts positively matched up the three victim bullets with one
gun, and two more did so by inference, Lowenstein replied in the
affirmative. Finally, Lowenstein expressed his opinion that the
photographs taken by Lystrup for the Baxter Ward Hearings in 197M
would show that the gouge marks were not present at the time of the
photographs, and therefore, such gouge marks must have been sub-
stituted on the various bullets after May, 197R. However, this
appears to be contradicted by a close analysis of the
photomicrograph taken by Dewayne Wolfer in 1968, which shows the
identifying characteristic of the so-called gouge mark.
Additionally, the Harper- photographs taken in 1970, on close
examination, also reveal the so-called gouge mark.
In the several days following the release of the Joint report
of the ballistics experts, Special Counsel Kranz met with several
of the critics and two-gun advocates. In essence, their position
could be simply stated that there had been no proof that a second
gun had not been used. Stated in another way, the experts had not,
by stating there was no evidence of a second gun, positively stated
that only one gun had been fired. In support of their attempt to
ask the experts to prove a negative, the critics had cited the fact
that the victim bullets had not in themselves been identified as
being fired from the Sirhan gun and "no other gun in the world."
Additionally, the critics felt that Exhibit 55 the three test
bullets entered as exhibits at the trial! and Grand Jury SB the
four Wolfer test-fired bullets! had not actually been matched spe-
cifically with each other or identified with other evidence bullets
taken from the victims at the crime scene. Additionally, Lowell
Bradford issued a press release stating "the firearms evidence does
not in and of itself establish a basis for a two-gun proposition;
likewise, this same proposition, on the basis of other evidence is
not precluded either." The other evidence suggested by Bradford:
a! "witness statements_that another gun was being fired in
the Ambassador; M
b! bullet pathways contradictory to the direction from
which Sirhan was firing; W
c! suspicion or speculation that more than eight bullets
had been fired."
Special Counsel Kranz met with Ted Charach in the days
following the release of the Joint report and Charach was convinced
that the experts had totally contradicted Dewayne Wolfer. Charach
felt that Wolfer had never actually fired the Sirhan weapon in the
test firing, even though all the experts were able to identify
similar.gross characteristics on all of the bullets, including the
Heifer test-fired bullets. Charach was critical of Wolfer for
having testfired copper coated bullets, since the cooper had been
easily destroyed and the bullets had not been easily identified.
However, Sirhan himself had fired copper coated bullets at the
particular crime, and it can be assumed that Wolfer was trying to
get an analysis from similar ammunition.
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Critic Lillian Castellano, always a believer that the bullets
found in the glove compartment of Sirhan's automobile near the
Ambassador Hotel had been removed from wood paneling inside the
pantry and placed in Sirhan's car, was interested in pursuing the
fact that People's Exhibit 38 the bullets found in the Sirhan car!
had been found to have some wood samplings on the bullets. These
bullets were also examined by the examiners, and found to have
similar characteristics as all other bulletsr The wood samplings
were not identified as to their origin. The bullet found in the
pocket of Sirhan at the time of his arrest was identified as being a
federal manufactured bullet with one cannelure, a bullet of
different manufacture from the bullets found in the Ambassador
Hotel.
Journalist John Newhall had asked that a question concerning
People's H8 be resolved, the fact that several of the experts had
only been able to identify three of four cannelures on the bullet
that actually murdered the Senator. However, upon closer inves-
tigation, it was determined that all-examined bullets had four
cannelures, two knurled, and two grooved cannelures. Since this
bullet, People's U8, had been heavily fragmented on contact within
the brain, it was only possible to identify three cannelures. Upon
careful microscopic examination, the other experts agreed that
there had been four cannelures, but that only three were visible on
People's U3 due to the fragmentation.
Cgoss Examination of the Experts
Aside from the remaining skeptics and critics, most of the
other parties and counsel involved in the petitions before the
court seemed willing to let the matter rest, and were indifferent,
if not actually opposed, to any further court hearings and re-
examinations of the ballistics experts. However, as provided in
the original court order signed by Judge Wenke, and as constantly
stressed by the District Attorney's Office as a mandatory part of
any fair and judicious court hearing, cross examination of the
experts was necessary. District Attorney Van de Kamp instructed
Special Counsel Kranz to petition the court so that the seven
experts could be recalled for thorough cross examination. Van de
Kamp stated that he could understand why many felt the matter was
closed since the experts had agreed in essence that only one gun
fired the ballets, and since many of the parties to the case and
other concerned people had presumably lost interest in pursuing the
issue. Van de Kamp stated that before the matter was closed, "I
think it's important that those witnesses are tested in a
traditional adversarial setting. The pursuit of the truth is the
goal of the court. And it is the goal of the District Attorney's
Office also."
The District Attorney's Office became the petitioner before
the court and requested that the seven experts be recalled for
thorough cross examination. Additionally, the District Attorney's
Office requested the postponement of any cross examination of the
experts until petitioner Paul Schrade was able to obtain new
counsel, namely Allard Lowenstein and Vincent Bugliosi.
-T1...
FF4'* -7 7 W 777 e'%---,_,
92,___, 92../
"Additional Tests"
During the lengthy and thorough cross examination, the several
experts stated that they felt nothing further could be added by any
further analysis or sophisticated tests, especially lead and gun
powder examination. A neutron activation analysis, as so often
requested by some of the critics, would in the opinion of Courtland
Cunningham, be of limited value due to the condition of the several
bullets. Additionally, several of the experts felt that since
there were minute differences in the dimensions among the
manufacturers of .22 caliber barrels, any bore diameter and rifling
analysis, and any micromeasurements of the bullets, might be
conclusive only as to differences in barrels. They argued that
since there was always a slight difference in the manufacturing of
ammunition, a neutron activation of _the lead would not be
conclusive as to any identification. This was because neutron
activation dealt with the tiniest of fragments.
In the matter of chemical tests, the experts felt that these
would be inferior to any neutron activition test. A trace metal
analysis of the bullet lead could be of value in certain cases, but
in the case at hand, the experts felt that in dealing with the type
of hollow point explosive mini-mag ammunition, it would not be
useful.
The panel did not positively rule out the possibility of a
second gun. But they all felt that they had never been asked to
make an examination as to the number of shots fired, the number of
bullet holes, or trajectory studies. The experts seemed reluctant
to even discuss these issues on cross examinations. Several did
state that given particular-new evidence and factual situations
where such studies could be positively made, they might be inclined
to see the need for further tests. But the opinion of most of the
experts was that nothing of a conclusive nature could be
established by further testing. Essentially, additional tests
would not solve the question of which bullets had caused which
holes, and would not in any way answer any of the more elaborate
trajectory requests to determine if there had been more bullets
fired. -
Petitioner Schrade's attorneys argued in favor of neutron
activation tests to determine the metallic constituencies of
bullets since each batch of lead contained a certain alloy. They
argued that if the particular lead bullet did not match up, and had
a different form of element, there would be a reasonable inference
of a second gun. However, the experts felt that even if the
metallic constituencies of the several bullets did not match up,
there was no real relevancy to this due to the fact that several of
the bullets coming from Cascade copper-coated brand might have
different metallic constituency in their alloy. Finally, the
experts stated there was a limit to a test since it never really
would determine whether the Sirhan gun had fired the bullets. It
would only be an analysis to determine what type of ammunition had
been used. The experts concluded such a test would never actually
link the bullet to the Sirhan weapon because the bullets would
always have some form of different constituency. A neutron
activation test would be helpful only in cases where the actual
weapon had been lost or destroyed.
-12-43
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92; 92w
December 1QI§ Petit __ N_For an Crderpto Compel themfestimony4 6? HTtne§ses,**
To Examine PuolicRecords
ghd,Cohdu§t'?Urther SEientif1cTestsion by Paul Schrade
After the final cross examination of the seven ballistics
experts, petitioner Schrade, through his new attorneys Allard
Lowenstein and Vincent Bugliosi, petitioned Judge Wenke for the
opportunity to have the testimony of several peroipient witnesses,
namely L.A.P.D. Officers Robert Rozzi, and Sgt. Charles Wright and
witness Angelo DiPierro, given in court as to the possibility that
they had seen "apparent bullet holes" in the Ambassador pantry on
the night in question. Additionally, Schrade's new petition
requested the court for:
! an exterior ballistics examination to determine the
flisht path of the bullets from the moment they left the muzzle
until they reached their ultimate place of rest, and
! a spectographic and neutron activation analysis of
recovered bullets to determine their metallic constituency.the
the Inherent in the new petition filed by Paul Schrade was
argument that percipient witness testimony the witnesses being
police officers and Angelo DePierro! would establish that thereL92__the
had
been "apparent bullet holes" in the kitchen pantry, which would
indicate more than eight bullets were fired. Additionally, an
Associated Press photograph of the police officers pointing toward
a hole, and a photograph of two circled holes on the center wall
divider, two swinging doors! were attached as exhibits in the
petition calling for new tests. Petitioner Schrade suggested in
his December, 1975, request for further tests that the prev
ballistics examinations had only narrowed but not removed the
of doubt. Schrade and his attorneys agreed that the ques
concerning cannelures had now been settled, and they admitted
the striations and bore impressions on People's B7 did match
according to five of the experts, with People's 52 and 5H. Bu
Schrade and his attorneys, a central underlying question s
remained and this question was whether all of the victim bul
had been fired from the Sirhangun. They emphasized that not on
the seven ballistics experts had positively and conclusi
connected any of the victim bullets with the Sirhan
Petitioner Schrade stated that the firearms examination had
"conclusively inconclusive on the issue of a second gun."
The statements of the two officers, and the other percipiousarea
tion
that
HP,
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gun.
been
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92. 92¢ _
Arguments against any further examination were made before
Judge wenke by Deputy District Attorneys Bozanich and Kranz and
Deputy Attorney General Russell Iungerich. These arguments
essentially stated that the original requests, as filed in the
August petitions of Paul Schrade and CBS, had been followed, and
that the court lacked juridsiction to move into an area of
independent investigation. Furthermore, since the court only had
jurisdiction over exhibits filed with the trial court and under the
jurisdiction of the Los Angeles Superior Court and County Clerk's
Office, it was argued that the request in the new.petition filed by
Schrade and his attorneys concerned matters not under the
jurisdiction of the trial court. Moreover, the ballistics panels
testimony, both in working papers and on cross examination,
revealed that the seven experts had been thoroughly satisfied that
they had exhausted every possible ballistics examination and test
procedure to answer the original questions requested by petitioners
Schrade and CBS. Therefore, any pursuit of the hearings and ex-
amination would be frivolous, and contrary to the original purpose
of the court order for testing and examination of the exhibits.
Additionally, Deputy Attorney General Iungerich charged that
petitioner Schrade wanted to ,use the court as a "roving
commission," and Iungerich felt that the objective of the new
petition was to create doubt and not eliminate it. Finally, stated
Iungerich, "Some individuals have demonstrated an insatiable
appetite to pursue a red herring at taxpayers expense when any
rational human being would concede this hearing had gotten to the
bottom of it. There is no doubt that Sirhan acted alone."
Deputy District Attorney Bozanich argued that any and all
allegations concerning the Sirhan prosecution should always be
presented, and decided, within the judicial process. While
cautioning petitioner Schrade on the question of jurisdiction,
Bozanich argued that judicial authority, as to jurisdiction over
the subject matter, was not contingent upon the desires of the
prospective litigants to be in or out of court. Eozanich stated
that both the court and counsel of record had an obligation to
consider the existence of or lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter raised by the particular litigation. And since the original
Schrade petition had been an examination of exhibits within the
custody of the Superior Court a request made pursuant to the
contention that the exhibits within the custody of the court, in
and of themselves, suggested or established that two guns had been
used at the scene of the assassination of Senator Kennedy!
therefore, the Superior Court had jurisdiction over the Discovery
proceeding recently concluded. However, concluded Bozanich, the
fact that the District Attorney and other counsel of record agreed
to the principle of testing, examination and inspection of exhibits
within the jurisdiction of the court, could not in and of itself
confer jurisdiction on exhibits not under the custody of the
Superior Court. Therefore, to introduce testimony concerning new
areas of trajectory and ballistics would go into an area of
jurisdiction that neither the District Attorney's Office, nor
counsel of record, nor the court itself could confer. "Simply
stated," said Bozanich, "the new Schrade petition filed in December
°°mDletely avoided the question of jurisdiction."
-11}-
a . ~* _--9-,:n_|n-l=Ia|92a|»4--_s*_, , -_i 7. _.4...- __
92..- , 92..
Finally, it was argued that since Schrade had already filed a
civil personal injury action against Sirhan and others, this would
be the appropriate forum for considering new petitions. Such a
request for new discovery procedures of the police officers and
other witnesses would fall within the normal and ordinary course of
that litigation.
On February 5, 1976, Judge Henke ruled on the new petition
filed by Paul Schrade and ordered that Schrade's petition to compel
the testimony of the peroipient witnesses, examine public records,
and conduct further scientific tests be denied. The Judge reasoned
that the entire six month proceeding had been most unusual.
However, stated Wenke, it was never contemplated that the court
would make a decision in the conventional sense, such as a finding
of guilt or innocence or an award of damages. Rather, reasoned the
judge, it had been a Discovery proceeding wherein the petitioners
had sought to elicit certain information. Wenke cautioned that
there had been a misconception throughout the entire proceeding
about the court's role in the matter. It had been reported that the
court was conducting an investigation. Wenke strongly stated that
this was and is not the fact.
"This court," stated Wenke, "has taken the position that there
is a legitimate public interest in the subject matter of the
proceedings. It recognized that the physical evidence is under the
control of the court and that any examination of same would have to
be conducted under the court's supervision so as to insure the
integrity of the exhibits. The panel reports were incident to the
examination and, accordingly, it appeared to be appropriate for the
court to oversee the oral presentation of same."
But wenke cautioned that the new petition filed by petitioner
Schrade sought something far different. If granted, stated wenke,
the court would then be undertaking an active investigation.
Investigations are conducted by police, District Attorneys, Grand
Juries, and other agencies, but not by courts. It is true that
where a possible contempt of court is involved, that courts on
occasion undertake investigations on their own initiative.
However, what petitioner seeks does not fall within that limited
exception."Wenke then concluded that_petitioner Schrade has filed a civil
action arising out of the events involved. And since California
law is liberal respecting a litigant's right to discovery, the
petitioner has the opportunity to call witnesses and secure their
testimony under oath, and to obtain copies of certain documents,
and request neutron activation and spectograph tests of certain
exhibits. Concerning the necessity of obtaining a court order for
any neutron activation and spectograph tests, Wenke stated that the
court was of the opinion that the probability that the results of
such tests would be helpful was very slight. Therefore, the court
declined to proceed with the petition for neutron activation and
spectographic tests. However, concluded Wenke, if the petitioner
diligently pursued his right to discovery in his civil action, the
court would be willing to reconsider its position as to further
testing. The court then denied petitioner Schrade's motion for
further tests and his motion to examine witnesses.
-75-
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_ _ * - 7 -- -- -- S--_ __ _ _ _ ___;*.. I
, ! !
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OPINION5? ES L2 N D 5 Fl? '11? 9 SN
COMM|:.NTAP.Y BY KRANZ ON FIRST SECTION AND CONSPIRACY THEORIES
ANALYSIS
INVESTIGATIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS
5
3
3K I
92.. --
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5
In light of the fact that the assassination of Robert Kennedy
was one of several tragic political murders and shootings that have
occured in this country in the past decade, and in light of
continued acts of terrorism and intrigue linking various intel-
ligence agencies with acts of violence throughout the world, it is
understandable that every conceivable theory about the murders of
President John Kennedy and Senator Robert Kennedy has arisen.
Additionally, both men were brothers, committed to a political
philosophy and governmental policy that can be described as liberal
and progressive. It is also understandable that both men, through
their charismatic personalities and emotional following, generated
considerable distrust, suspicion, and hostility among many people.
Furthermore, the tragic occurance in Dallas, the fact that Lee
Harvey Oswald never stood trial, the rather strange deaths of a
Dallas police officer, and Jack Ruby, and the subsequent
revelations concerning American foreign policy and American
intelligence agencies during the Administration of President
Kennedy, all have added a cloud of. distrust and suspicion
concerning death of President Kennedy. It. is therefore under-
standable that a strong degree of suspicion exists that similar
unresolved questions concerning the death of the President's
brother, Senator Robert Kennedy, remain to be answered.
However, it is the opinion of Special Counsel Kranz that there
is no evidence of any nature, either scientific, circumstantial, or
inferential to suggest that the defendant, Sirhan Sirhan, did not
act alone. He was the one assassin, who carried one gun, with eight
bullets fired from his revolver. Sirhan was observed shooting by
several eyewitnesses, and stood trial and was found guilty by a
Jury, with the decision upheld by all the appellate courts of
California and the United States Supreme Court. A subsequent
ballistics hearing scientifically linked up all bullets to only one
weapon, thus underscoring eyewitnesses and other evidence. This is
a marked difference from the situation in Dallas where the alleged
perpetrator of the assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, never stood
trial and many questions still supposedly remain open.
In an era of media sensationalism, where the merger of myth
and reality contributes to an instantaneous feedback of the bizarre
to the public consciousness, it should be emphasized that all leads
and investigations concerning possible conspiracies involving
Sirhan were followed by every intelligence agency and law
enforcement agency working on the ease. None of these inves-
tigations ever, in any way, suggested that Sirhan was involved in a
conspiracy, or working with others in the assassination of Senator
Kennedy. Despite the fact that the subject matter of conspiracy
and political assassinations has become a new form of enter-
tainment, both in the tabloid press and in media talk shows, this
so-called assassination fever must be kept in the right per-
spective. ,
-1-.
<< r
In the opinion cu Special Counsel Kranz, despite the inadequate
ballistics evidence in the Sirhan case, the L.A.P.D., and other law
enforcement agencies, including the F.B.I. and the District
Attorney's Office, did an excellent and thorough investigation of
whether Sirhan was part cf a conspiracy. .
Over 6,000 witnesses were interviewed from the moment of the
shooting up until the final date of this report. Additionally, it
is the District Attorney's Office policy that, as in all cases
under its jurisdiction, any new sufficient, significant and
reasonable evidence that will contradict the fact that Sirhan acted
alone, will be diligently followed and pursued. It should be
stated that there have been separate investigations and reviews of
the Sirhan evidence, and interviews with several eyewitnesses and
now n with n1|::>:n:>rl an-irinnna wnaandina nnn'=nirah'in<:_ Qlmnf. EVPPVye.-SQ.-5 "Ava: r4A.;92.r:92.r92-I 92-IUJ-92l92.¢Il92nf92r l92wDEll92nIbll° 92p92-roll-Irv-4.0 us-a;~,-1, ya-.--aw-v --w-4|
year in succession since the shooting in W968. Many of the more
sensational personalities and aspects of this case will be reviewed
at this time. Additionally, Special Counsel Kranz will offer his
personal analysis and conclusions concerning the several public
agency investigations and court hearings relative to the Sirhan
case.
It is Special Counsel Kranz's opinion that law enforcement
agencies conducted thorough and excellent investigations and
interviews concerning the subject of possible conspiracy, and the
personal history and background of defendant Sirhan. It should be
emphasized that at the conclusion of the trial and conviction of
Sirhan in May 1969, facts in the case, particularly the defendant's
own statements and admission of guilt both before and during trial,
seemed to indicate defendant Sirhan was the one gunman, acting
alone, and was justly convicted of first degree murder. At that
time, no question had arisen in either the public media or even the
underground press alleging any nature of conspiracy or cover-up,
other than a few unrelated charges concerning a lady in a "polka dot
dress", and the appearance of rather bizarre characters with "new
leads on Sirhan's background and activities during the days prior
to the shooting of Senator Kennedy." These allegations will be
discussed in later sections of this report.!
It was not until 1971, when encouraged by the accusations made
by attorney Barbara Blehr, the complaint filed by Godfrey Isaac and
Ted Charach, and the resulting Civil Service Commission Inquiry
into the procedures conducted by criminalist Dewayne Wolfer, that
public interest in the Robert i ennedy_assassination became morepronounced. '
The underground press, particularly the L.A. Free Press, and
other periodicals, had seized upon the allegations in Mrs. EIehr's
letter, the "findings" of criminalist William Harper, and the
apparent mistakes of Dewayne wolfer, and in a continuing chorus,
called for a re-opening of the Sirhan case. Some of the more
frequently heard charges were that there had been a plot, either
left-wing or right-wing oriented, business or- mafia supported,
Q.I.A. - F.B.I. - Pentagon planned, and related to Zionist, Third
World, or occult forces all intent upon the assassination of Robert
Kennedy. New charges of conspiracy and cover-up were heard,
particularly in light of supposed eyewitnesses and participants who
had been present in the pantry on the evening in question.
- 2--
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I
eihane Eugene Cesar,éPon Sghulman, Ted_Qharach
One of the most persistent stories that emerged in 1971, and
has been in vogue for several years, was that a witness, never
called to testify at trial, had stated minutes after the pantry
shooting that he had seen a security guard fire a gun at the time
Senator Kennedy was shot. Moreover, this statement by Donald
Schulman KNXT-TV Newsrunner on duty at the Ambassador June H,
1968! had been taped by a news service, published in several news-
papers, and by 1971, was incorporated in a film, "The Second Gun_:
Who Killed Robert _Kennedy", made by investigative reporter Ted
ChErach} "The echoing accusation was made that the security guard,
Thane Eugene Cesar, Ace Guard Service employee hired along with
seven other guards by the Ambassador Hotel for security the evening
of June M! had shot his weapon, and that bullets from Cesar's gun,
and not Sirhan's, had actually struck and killed Kennedy.
The discovery of the mismarked bullet evidence by wolfer the
fact that bullets from the Sirhan weapon had not been legally con-
nected to the weapon at trial!, and the fact that the bullet that
actually killed Kennedy, People's H8, was so damaged and fragmented
that it was impossible to ever scientifically link the murder
bullet to any weapon, all added fuel to the growing controversy.
During the past eight years, Schulman has been interviewed by
the press and by representatives from various law enforcement
agencies, concerning contradictory statements he made during the
minutes Following the shooting of Senator Kennedy. There is some
confusion as to Schulman's exact physical location, in or out of
the pantry, at the time Sirhan started firing.
In an interview with Special Counsel Kranz in October 1975,
Schulman recalled that he had been behind Kennedy at the time of the
shooting. within minutes after Schulman was able to leave the
pantry, he was approached by his friend, Continental News Service
reporter Jeff Brent. Shoving a tape recorder at Schulman, Brant
asked Schulman what had happened. Schulman responded:
"I was standing behind Kennedy as he was taking his assigned
route into the kitchen. A caucasian gentleman stepped out and
fired. Robert Kennedy was hit all three times. Mr. Kennedy sunk to
the floor and the security guard fired back."
Minutes later, Schulman was interviewed by KNKT-TV Newswoman
Ruth Ashton Taylor, the interview was broadcast later on KNXT's
coverage of the Ambassador Hotel events, Jerry Dunphy anchorman!.
BQIH ASHTON TAYLOR: "Our messenger, Don Schulman, was in
the Embassy Room'when the accident - the tragedy took place.
And Don, I think you were quite close to Senator Kennedy.
What did you see?"
DON SCHULMAN: Well, I was standing behind him, directly
behind 51m. I saw a man pull out a gun. It looked like he pulled
it out from his pocket and shot three times. I saw all three shots
hit the Senator. Then I saw the Senator fall and he was picked up
and carried away. _
_ 3 _
L if
"I saw the - also saw the security men pull out their weapons.
After then it was very, very fuzzy.
"Next thing that I knew there were several shots fired and I
saw a woman with blood coming from her temple; also a man was shot
in the leg. And I saw the security police grab someone. From there
it was very fuzzy. The crowd was very panicky and running in all
different directions. There were people sobbing all over the place
and many people had to be carried out."
Sehulman, in subsequent interviews in the next several years,
never again stated that he saw a security guard fire. Schulman told
Kranz that immediately following the shooting in the pantry, he was
tremendously confused, and although he did see Kennedy hit three
times, he could never possitiyely identify the gun which he saw
shooting as being held by Sirhan. Schulman told Kranz that his
words, in 1968 immediately following the shooting, were confused,
but that he was not confused by what he saw. He saw a security
guard with a weapon drawn, but never saw the guard fire.
Schulman was interviewed on August 9, 1968,_ by Sergeant
0'Steen of the L.A.P.D. and Schulman stated in that interview that
he had been outside the kitchen when he heard noises like fire-
crackers, and that he did not see the actual shooting by the suspect
Sirhan due to the crowd. No mention was made of the security guard
in this interview.
However, in a July 23, 1971, interview conducted by Deputy
District Attorney Richard Hecht, Schulman stated he was in the
pantry about 12 feet from Senator Kennedy when the shots were
fired. His recollection of that evening was poor but he definitely
recalled seeing certain things; the Senator hit, a guard with a gun
in his hand, and a woman bleeding from the head. Schulman did not
recall Paul Schrade being shot and falling. Additionally, Shulman
stated he never knew how many actual shots were fired overall. He
Just knew that Kennedy was shot three times. when asked if he
actually saw the hits of the bullets or whether he was using the
reference of blood, Schulman replied he was using a "reference to
seeing blood," but could not tell where the wounds were located.
In 1971, prior to Baxter Ward's campaign for Supervisor, ward
was working as a news reporter and television personality on KHJ
News, on Channel 9. On July 6,~19?1, Ward interviewed Don Sohulman
on the 4:00 p.m. news.
BAXTER WARD: "Yesterday on our news we ran part one of an
interview with Don Schulman who three-years ago, on the night
Kennedy was killed, was working as a film runner for television
station KNXT. He was asked by that station to put himself near the
pantry doors in case they needed him to suddenly perform some task
on their behalf, running file or sake some arrangements for the
film crew. He said that from that position he was capable of
observing Senator Kennedy, and had his eyes on the Senator at all
times. And he was prepared to contradict the official theory that
no other guns were drawn in the pantry other than that drawn by
Sirhan. He said he saw security guards, at least one, perhaps more,
draw their weapons as well. And he still maintains that story three
years after the assassination. Today we continue this visit withPon Schulman and he explains how his story was received by the
ll.'DhI'l
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MR. SCHULMéH: "I saw the security guards draw their weapons
out and I assumed that they were security guards because - well, as
I said, it was an assumption, they would be the ones with weapons.
1-h ir~ unanrmq but T did nnf nap - T qr-nu fhn Senator hit but I v--e. --_--rw-rwj --v - _--- --'1' --'-7 _ '_" v--- :--a.----- ----i --4
I did not see anyone shoot him. I was interviewed by the L;A.P.D.
as was everyone else connected with CBS and I told them my story and
what I had seen and they at that time disagreed with me on seeing
other weapons. And I told them I was positive I seen other weapons
and they then filled out the report, thanking me very much and said
they had enough witnesses and I probably would not be called."
Schulman told Kranz that since Ruth Ashton Taylor had asked
different questions than had Brent, Schulman had given different
responses. However, Schulman emphasized to Kranz that it was his
intention to give the same answer. And Schulman states that he told
Ruth Ashton Taylor what he had originally meant to tell Jeff Brent
during all the chaos and confusion, and that was that "Kennedy had
been hit three times, he had seen an arm fire, he had seen the
security guards with guns, but he had never seen a security guard
fire and hit Robert Kennedy." Schulman did see someone in front of
him Schulman! pull out a gun and shoot Kennedy three times. From
the position where Schulman was, and the fact that security guard
Cesar was to the right and rear of Kennedy, the only person with an
arm extended toward the front of Kennedy, with a gun, that Schulman
could possibly have seen, was Sirhan. Schulman admitted in several
interviews that everything occured so quickly and that the sounds
and flashes occured simultaneously and that all he really
positively remembered were the blood splotohes on Senator Kennedy,
whom he saw fall. He did recall seeing that the security guard had
his gun drawn. The gun was drawn, pointing down to the floor, and
never in the position aimed or pointed at any person within the
pantry. Schulman is positive about this.
Schulman told Kranz that the intent that he wished to convey,
both to Brent and to Taylor, as he did in all interviews, was that
"the Senator was hit all three times."
Schulman told Kranz that his friend Jeff Brent later gave him
a copy of the original tape recording he had made with Brent during
the minutes following the shooting. Investigator Ted Charach later
borrowed this tape while telling Schulman that he was doing a do-
cumentary on the assassination. Schulman stated that Charach held
the tape for over two years, this tape having been given to Charach
by Schulman three months after the assassination. Schulman states
that he had heard the original tape recording which he had made to
Brent, and that he had never reacted in any manner to his original
statement of a guard firing. Schulman stated in his 1971 interview
with Deputy District Attorney Sid Trapp, "I didn't catch it either,
and it was only until after I gave the tape to Ted Charach that
Charach came back and pointed out the wording to me." Schulman
stated that he explained to Charach that all he said was that he had
seen a guard pull out a gun and that everything had happened so
Quickly. Schulman states that he had played the tape several times
for his friends and no one had caught the meaning of his original
statement to Brent that "the guard shot Kennedy."
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The District Attorney's Office did not call Schulman as either
a witness before the Grand Jury or before the trial since he could
not positively identify defendant Sirhan as having fired a_weapon
striking either Senator Kennedy or any of the injured victims.
Schulman states that he stood in back of Paul Schrade and did_see
the arm with the gun lunging toward the Senator, coming in the
direction of Senator Kennedy, thus accounting for the viewpoint in
which he saw the gun approaching Kennedy in the direction of
Kennedy, Schrade, and himself. He states that he saw the security
guard, presumably Thane Cesar, with his gun out and pointed toward
the ground, only after Kennedy was lying on the ground injured. He
remembers the security guard as being in back of Robert Kennedy.
Actually, there had been two security guards who displayed
guns in the pantry. The first was Thane Eugene Cesar who states he
fell to the floor at the time of the shooting and drew his .38
caliber revolver only after regaining his balance. The shooting by
this time had ceased. The only other person displaying a gun inside
the pantry besides Sirhan! was Ace Security Guard Jack Merritt.
Merritt entered the pantry after the shooting. Merritt states that
he was in the hall outside the Embassy Room when informed of the
shooting. when he entered the pantry, a group of men were holding
Sirhan on a metal table and Senator Kennedy was lying on the floor.
Special Counsel Krans interviewed Thane Cesar in late Novemher
1975, in the office of Cesar's attorney John McNicholas in Los
Angeles. Cesar stated to Kranz that he never fired his .38 weapon
on the evening in question. Additionally, Cesar told Kranz that
he, Cesar, volunteered to Los Angeles Police Officers to be taken
to the Rampart Station for questioning since he had "all but been
ignored during the chaos following the shooting of Senator
Kennedy." At the Rampart Station, Cesar states his .38 caliber
revolver was examined but not test fired by the L.A.P.D., nor was it
seized or held as evidence. Cesar elaborated that he had been
waiting in the hall passage way separating the pantry from the
Embassy Room with Jess Unruh and Milton Berle preceding the
entrance of Senator Kennedy into the Embassy Ballroom. Cesar
states that since he did not fire his gun in 1968, he was never
questioned regarding this action either by L.A.P.D. or F.B.I.
officials in the weeks following the shooting of Senator Kennedy.
Cesar was in full uniform of the Ace Guard Service which required
.38 calibers in holsters, and Cesar had been checked out earlier in
the evening by his superiors and determined to be carrying the
regulation .38 caliber weapon.
An accusation had been made in the Isaac-Charach complaint
that Thane Cesar was associated with right-wing movements and
expressed rightwing views and hated the Kennedy family. This was
denied by Cesar in his 1971 interview and again in his interview
with Kranz. Cesar is a registered Democrat who did not agree with
Kennedy's political position and voted for Presidential candidate
George Wallace in 1968. However he did not campaign for Wallace, or
work for the American independent Farty. He contributed $3.00 to a
friend who was active in the Wallace campaign. Additonal investi-
gation of Cesar in the past few years subsequent to the 1971investigation shows that he has not been engaged in any political
act v t es. '
_ 6 _ -
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The fact that Thane Cesar drew his gun was well established in
the original 1968 investigation L.A.P.D. investigation June 11,
1968!. Cesar's original statement- indicates he was escorting
Kennedy at the time of the shooting. Cesar was knocked down,
scrambled to his feet, and drew his gun, while attempting to regain
his balance. Due to the large crowd, Cesar states that he
reholstered his gun.
In his documentary film, "The Second Gun," Ted Charach quotes
Thane Cesar as stating that he Cesar; has pulled his gun out, "I
got knocked down." Charach contends that Cesar told him, Charach!
that he Cesar! actually had pulled his weapon out before he was
knocked down. Cesar had told all other investigating officers,
including his 1968 interviews with the L.A.P.D., the F.B.I., the
District Attorney investigators in 1971, and Special Counsel Kranz
in 1975, that he was knocked down instantaneously at the time that
Sirhan onrushed into Senator Kennedy, and that it was only when he
Cesar! rose from the ground that he was able to pull his gun out.
when asked by Special Counsel Kranz as part of his opening
interview question, "why didn't you fire your gun? You were there
to protect Senator Kennedy." Cesar replied simply and quickly, "I
was a coward." Cesar elaborated that the moment he heard and saw
the weapon fired, his instincts forced him to the ground. It should
be emphasized that Cesar was not a welltrained or regular security
guard, and was only on a moonlighting assignment for the Ace
Security Guard Service. Cesar's regular job at that time, in
1968, was on the assembly line at Lockheed Aircraft.!
Cesar also stated to Kranz that he could have left the
Ambassador as no one seemed interested in interviewing him
following the shooting, and that he, Cesar, actually volunteered to
L.A.P.D. officers the fact that he had been inside the pantry at
the time of the shooting. Cesar was then taken down to the Rampart
Division and interviewed by L.A.P.D. officers. Cesar states, and
the L.A.P.D. orally verifies, but have no documents to sub-
stantiate, the fact that the .38 caliber weapon Cesar had on his
person that night as part of his Ace Guard Service assignment was
examined by an unnamed L.A.P.D. officer, but was not seized or
subsequently test fired. Cesar stated .to Kranz that the
interviewing by the L.A.P.D. hours after the shooting and in sub-
sequent weeks by investigating officers from the 1 AnP.D., and
F.B.I., centered around what he Cesar! had observed in the pantry.
No one asked him any questions concerning the possibility that he
may have fired his .38 weapon. Additionally, no one asked Cesar
about the Shulman statement that a "security guard had fired back."
Additionally, even though the Boston Herald mericag newspaper in
its June 5, 1968, edition had stated that a guardxhad fired," and
the fact that a Paris newspaper France Soir had noted in one of its
June 5, 6, 1968, stories, "in turn, one of Kennedy's body guards
pulled his gun out and fired from the hip like in a western movie,"
Cesar was never questioned concerning these statements that ran in
two newspapers, either by his friends or by investigating police
officers. Cesar told Special Counsel Kranz that the first time he
ever heard the accusation that he had fired a .38 caliber revolver
was when he read the accusation in the Los Angeles Ere; Press oneyear later in 1969. C " C 8 *
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Cesar then recalled that he had, prior to the 1969 publication in
the L, A. Free frees, remembered talking to Ted Charach, who had
introducedfhimsefféas an investigative-rep0rter. Cesar felt that
everything he had told Charach had been exaggerated and bent out of
proportion by Charach, including his views that he had once given
$3.00 to the American Independent Party. Cesar felt that Charach
had _unfairly characterized him as a rightwinger who hated the
Kennedys and hated blacks. Cesar stated that he did not care for
Senator Kennedy's politics but that he Cesar! had nothing against
Senator Kennedy personally. Cesar stated that he had been very
candid with Charach because he thought he had nothing to hide.
Cesar was amazed that Charach had misstated and misused his
statements in the film.
In Charach's film, the original tape made by Don Schulman the
interview given by Schulman immediately following the shooting in
the pantry to Continental News reporter Jeff Brent! is featured in
the film. Additonally, in the film, Charach interviews Schulman to
complement and support Schu1man's earlier tape given on the night
of the assassination. In the Charach movie, Schulman is quoted as
saying, "I did a tape recording with Jeff Brent, and several
people. In fact, I also told him that the guard pulled out a gun
and everyone told me that in the confusion I - I didn't see what I
saw. well, I didn't see everything that happened that night
because of the blinding lights and the people screaming, but the
things I did see I'm sure about, and that is Kennedy being shot
three times. The guard definitely pulled out his gun and fired."
Charach then asked Schulman as part of Charach's interview in his
film "The Second Gun", "Now when you saw Jeff Brent, he is with the
Continental News service, when did he interview you?" Schulman
replied, "Well, right after the assassination attempt and all was
confusion, I fought my way out of the pantry, and I was heading
toward the telephone to call CBS News. Before I picked up the
phone, Jeff Brent grabbed me and asked me right on the spot exactly
what I had seen then, fresh in my mind."
At this point in the film, Charach interjects the actual tape
recording that Schulman had given Charach prior to Charach's making
of the film, the tape recording that Bchulman had made with Brent.
In this particular tape, Schulman is quoted as saying, "I was about
six people behind the Senator. ,1 heard about six or seven shots in
succession, a man stepped out and fired three times at Kennedy, hit
him all three times, and the security guard then fired back."
Schulman relates that this interview was given to Brent
approximately 10 to 15 minutes after the shooting in the pantry.
Again, as part of the interview of Schulman by Charach for
Charach's film, Schulman again states that he saw the guard fire
and he was standing oeninu nennedy. wnat onaracn omitted Irom nis
film, "The Second Gun," is the tape that Schulman gave to Ruth
Ashton TayIor on KNXT several minutes following the first tape
report he gave to Jeff Brent. In the tape given to Taylor, Schulman
rephrases the words that he had seen a security guard fire, and
states that he had seen the Senator hit three times, and saw a
security guard with his gun. In subsequent interviews of Schulman
by L.A.P.D. officers, F.B.I. agents, and District Attorney
investigators, throughout the ensuing years, and in an interview
conducted by Special Counsel Kranz with Schulman in i9T5, schulman
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re-inforces the same story that he had been in the pantry area when
Kennedy was shot. He is not positive that he saw a security guard
fire, but he did remember seeing the Senator hit three times. He
did remember an association of gunshots and seeing flashes,
although he never could positively link the flashes and the arm
doing the shooting with Sirhan because of the blinding lights.
6 In hindsight it seems obvious that the L.A.P.D. should have
seized the .38 weapon that Cesar was carrying on the night in
question. Additionally, the very fact that he had been inside the
pantry, and had held a weapon in his hand during some of the
confusion, and the fact that at least five victims in addition to
the mortally wounded Senator Kennedy were involved in the mass
shooting, should have given92notice to the L.A.P.D. to seize the
weapon if only for precaution's sake. Additionally, it was proved
by the very determined and thorough investigative research
conducted by Ted Charach that Cesar owned a .22 caliber revolver at
the time of the shooting. Cesar was somewhat vague as to when he
had sold the weapon, at first telling investigating officers that
he remembered selling the weapon in the spring of 1968, but when
pressed by Charach and other investigators, admitted that he had
sold the weapon in September, 1968, to a friend in Arkansas. This
weapon, however, was a 9 shot cadet model .22 revolver. Never-
theless, such inconsistencies in the statements of the security
guard, and the fact that he had been carrying a weapon in the
pantry, suggested that good judgment required the L.A.P.D. to at
least inspect and test the weapon beyond a cursory search at the
Rampart Division.
Doubts and suspicions generated by the failure to seize and
inspect a .38 revolver are the very foundation for lingering
suspicions that not all the questions have been answered. Despite
the ballistics report of the experts, Grand Jury and trial
testimony regarding the positioning of the victims, Senator
Kennedy, and the eyewitnesses, the mathematical improbability of
two guns being fired having the same muzzle defects, and the match-
up of the victim bullets all indicating one line of fire from the
Sirhan weapon, it can he expected that continued accusations will
be made by conspiracy buffs, and the misinformed, concerning Thane
Eugene Cesar and his .38 caliber revolver. To this date, it can be
accurately stated that Ted Charach is still convinced that Cesar
fired his .22 caliber revolver, having brought the .22 caliber to
the Ambassador either by design or mistake, and that Cesar's reflex
action, either intentionally or in panic, was such that Cesar has
blotted it from his mind, and that the L.A.P.D. and other inves-
tigative agencies have instigated a massive cover-up of the true
story concerning the second gun. It should be mentioned that the
Los Angeles Police Department reports the same Ted Charach offered
his services to the L.A.P.D. in July, 1968, in order to obtain
employment and to infiltrate "The Jim Garrison Organization" in
behalf of the L.A.P.D.
Q ' ..Q 8
Theodore Charach - Background
Theodore Charach is a free lance news reporter who has
described himself as an investigative documentarian. He was
present at the Ambassador Hotel outside the pantry door when Robert
Kennedy was shot. Interviewed by L.A.P.D. on July 12, 1968,
Charach said he was the agent for a news cameraman who had shot some
film on June 2, 1958, at a Kennedy campaign function at the Coconut
Grove Room at the Ambassador Hotel. Charaoh had said that the film
showed an Arab present during Kennedy's speech. Charach refused to
disclose the name of the cameraman and said the film was to be used
in a documentary. After being told that he could be the subject of
a court order to produce the film, Charach arranged for the film to
be brought to the Los Angeles Police Department, July 22, 1968. The
Police Department reported that the film turned out to be of poor
quality and of no value. Charach reportedly attempted to sell the
film to a representative of Jim Garrison. After realizing that his
film was of little value, Charach offered to work for Special Unit
Senator of the L.A.P.D, saying he already had much time and money
invested in his effort. Charach offered to get himself into the
Garrison Organization and to keep the L.A.P.D. informed. Charach
was advised that the L.A.P.D. would pay only for good, solid,
useable information, and only after the information was received
and evaluated.
Charach enlisted the support of William Harper, the crimi-
nalist, long before the Blehr letter was published. Harper's
affidavit, prepared for Charach, concluded that two .22 caliber
guns were involved in the assassination, and that Senator Kennedy
was killed by one of the shots fired by a second gunman.
1911WAf§idavit of William Harper
In his 1971 affidavit, filed in conjunction with the Barbara
Blehr accusations against Wolfer, and incorporated in the Isaac-
Charach complaint for disclosure of information, Harper made re-
ference to his 1970 examination of the bullets and his photographs
of the same. Harper suggested that there had been two different
firing positions in the pantry. He drew inferences from the
physical evidence to support his theory that two guns had been
fired in the pantry.
Harper's basic premise was that "the position of Sirhan was
located directly in front of the Senator, with Sirhan face to face
with the Senator." However, the 1971 investigation, as well as
trial testimony, showed that this premise was an error. The
testimony at the Grand Jury and trial places Senator Kennedy
looking slightly to his left which accounts for the first bullet
striking the Senator behind the right ear and the bullet traveling
from right to left. The upward angle of the bullet is logical from
the height of the Senator contrasted with the height and position
of Sirhan.
An examination of the coat worn by Senator Kennedy at the time
of the shooting showed that a shot went through the right shoulder
pad of the Senator's coat from back to front. Harper felt this
showed a second firing position. '
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The findings of Mr. Harper, that two guns were being fired in
the pantry, are based on his statements that the rifling angle of
one bullet was 23 minutes greater than that of a second bullet. But
the meaning of "23 minutes of difference" is questionable. Two
factors should be taken into consideration to put this conclusion
of Harper's in proper perspective. The first is an understanding
that a circle is divided into 360°. A degree is comprised of 60
minutes; consequently, the difference as noted by Harper amounts to
approximately 1/3 of a degree. The second factor deals with the
ability of the person making the comparison to place the
bullets in the same identical pogition. Harper's comparison
made after taking a separate 360 photograph of each bullet,
then comparing the photographs of the several bullets. Whentwowas
and
the
difficulty of exactly aligning the two bullets for photographs is
realized, a tiny differenceof 23 minutes loses its importance.
Harper admitted during the 1971 investigation that due to the size
and weight of comparison microscopic camera equipment, he was
unable to use such traditional equipment in his photographing of
the bullets and exhibits. Furthermore, Harper's conclusion of "23
minutes of difference" between two bullets the Kennedy, H7, and
Weisel, SH! was a poor argument when no comparison of "minute dif-
ference" among the other bullets was referred to by Harper.
Singling out only two bullets, and not including the Goldstein
bullet, 52, or the wolfer test bullets, for any rifling angle com-
parison produced a hollow foundation on which to argue two guns.
It is also significant that Harper's affidavit does not quote
one eyewitness as describing Kennedy's position as faceto-face with
Sirhan. Additionally, Harper assumed that shot #5 which the
L.A.P.D. concluded went through Kennedy's shoulder pad back to
front! could not have been the shot which struck victim Paul
Schrade in the forehead since Schrade was behind the Senator and
walking in the same direction as Kennedy. But this conclusion by
Harper again assumes that Kennedy was face-to-face with Sirhan or
facing in an easterly direction. Paul Schrade testified at trial
as follows:
- Schradeilestimony
Question: "As you were walking towards the Senator were
you able to see him?"
égsggri "Yes." l.
Question: "Were you able to see what he was doing at the
time where he was?"
- Answer: "Yes, he was heading toward the area greeting
some people who were in the pantry."
Schrade continued to testify that these people were standing
close to the serving table, and that although Schrade did not know
exactly what the Senator was doing with these people, he, Schrade,
nodded to .Senator Kennedy and that Kennedy was greeting these
people in some way. In answer to the question "had he turned in
this direction?" Schrade answered, "Yes."
on J
Schrade then testified that he again started to walk and then all
hell broke loose. "I heard a cracking like electricity and I saw
some flashes and then all I remember I'was shaking quite violently
as though we were all being elecrocuted." And in response to the
question of how far was he, Schrade, behind Senator Kennedy,
Schrade replied "all I remember I know I was behind him maybe a few
feet, and that. I was conscious of the flashes coming from the
direction I was facing. I was facing toward the Senator." Grant
Cooper, Sirhan defense counsel, stipulated at that time that the
witness, Schrade, indicated the flashes were coming from the east.
Reporter's transcript page 3710.!
In this testimony by Schrade, he indicated that Kennedy turned
when he was greeting some people and that he, Schrade, nodded to
Kennedy about this time. This indicates that Kennedy was facing
somewhat back toward Schrade who was initially walking west to east
about four feet behind Kennedy. Schrade indicated that he was
facing east, toward Kennedy when the flashes came. And the flashes
came from the east. All of Schrade's testimony appears consistent
with that of the other eyewitnesses who put Kennedy in a position
facing northwest at the time of the shooting.
Dewayne Wolfer had concluded in his diagram of bullet
trajectory that the bullet which hit Schrade's forehead first
passed through the right shoulder pad of Kennedy's coat. At this
time, according to Dr. Noguchi's autopsy, Kennedy's arm was
upraised. This upraising lifted the shoulder padding up. And by
this time Shot #H! Kennedy was turning counterclockwise. This
would account for the line of fire to Schrade's forehead, through
the back to front of Kennedy's shoulder pad.
Other eyewitness testimony offered at trial reveals that of
the several witnesses who observed Sirhan shooting, none carefully
observed the sequence of events from the beginning of the firing by
Sirhan to the actual finish.
Nevertheless, all of the witnesses were consistent with
Schrade's observation concerning Kennedy's position vis-a-vis
Sirhan.
Eye i tlf¬§§_ sir? 5.Fl l93Ti'_.
Consider the most percipient eyewitnesses trial testimony:
FRANK BURNS: "seeing Kennedy shaking hands with busboys,
turning to his ieft,"; _-
VALERIE SCHULTE: "Kennedy turned to the left and back to
shake Hands with the kitchen help, turned more than 90 angle,";
BORIS YARD: "heard two explosions that sounded like
firecrackers and saw Kennedy backing up and putting both of his
hands and arms in from of him, while Sirhan appeared to be lunging
at the Senator,";
KARL UECKER: "I felt something moving between the steam table
and my stomach . . . . I heard something like a shot and Kennedy was
falling out of my hand, and I put my hand on Sirhan: wrist and he
fired four to six more shots."; _
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BORIS YARO: "Sirhan lunged at Kennedy, he was stabbing at
Kennedy and pulling the trigger, Kennedy was backing up, he turned
and he twisted and he put his hands up over his face,";
MINASIAN: "I saw an arm extended with a revolver and he had
reached around Uecker."
' All of these eyewitnesses were within eight feet of Kennedy,
and all described at trial his position as being west of north,
walking in an easterly direction, but turning to face the busboys
and kitchen help and shaking their hands. All of these witnesses
put Sirhan's firing position to the right and slightly in front of
Senator Kennedy.
These statements by the several eyewitnesses were consistent
with the autopsy report of Thomas Noguchi and the trajectory study
of Dewayne Wolfer inothat Noguchi concluded that Kennedy's arm had
been raised about 90 when gunshot #2 was inflicted. At that time
Kennedy's arm was moving between the second and third shot fired by
Sirhan. Noguchi stated in his autopsy report that the "pattern of
the wounds were the same, right to left, upward direction, and this
pattern is consistent with the wounds inflicted by shooting in
rapid succession." Noguchi placed the Sirhan weapon one or two
inches from the skin behind the right ear when the first shot was
fired. It must be remembered that Kennedy, according to the
several eyewitnesses, was turning his head and upper part of his
body to shake hands, with the kitchen help, Juan Perez and Jesus
Romero. Additionally, Noguchi and Wolfer both estimated that
Kennedy's arm had been upraised, thus lifting the padding up of his
shoulder coat and accounting for the line of a bullet fire through
the shoulder coat which did not graze the skin of the Senator, but
continued on into Paul Schrade's head. All of these eyewitnesses
seem to make William Harper's contention of two firing positions
not only irrelevant, but impossible. This is particularly true
when it is remembered that Harper himself admitted that he did not
use a comparison microscope to conduct a formal examination, and
admitted that his 1970 study was a "limited examination." It must
be remembered that not-all trial witnesses were asked about muzzle
distance because they were not all in a position to observe all the
details. Each particular witness at trial was asked to describe
what he or she had observed,and when taken in unison, the several
trial witnesses all established that the Senator had turned to face
the busboys at the time Sirhan started firing.
However, it was not until William Harper's December 28, 1970,
affidavit that anyone had every questioned wolfer's identification
of the ballistics evidence. Harper, a consulting criminalist for
35 years, had photographed the Kennedy H7! and Weisel SH! bullets
with the assistance of an engineer for a company that developed the
Hycon Balliscan camera. The camera produces photographs of the
entire circumferences of bullets by rotating them in phases in
front of the lens. The photos can then be placed side by side for
comparison. In this 1970 affidavit, Harper declared that his
examination had failed to disclose any individual characteristics
establishing that the Kennedy and Weisel bullets had been fired
from the same gun. _
13 -.
--%____; ' -.~;_ ___: _ __ .,:.e_ _ _____::__. 11"" _ _ _ ._ --1-i=__ __ _ -__ _,-v_;_____. -- ~, ¢-A---v---
92-! ',a
On June 10, 1971, William Harper was questioned by Deputy
District Attorney Richard Hecht. Harper admitted at this time that
he had conducted a "limited examination? in 1970!, and that he had
only compared the photographs of Exhibit 55, Bullet NT, and Bullet
SH. He did not conduct a formal examination in which he would have
used a comparison microscope. Harper stated that he wanted to
further continue and use the comparison microscope because the
Balliscan pictures taken by Harper were interesting but "were not
conclusive yet." Additionally, Harper stated to Hecht that he was
unable to bring the comparison microscope to the clerkis office
because it was too bulky and he was not able to carry it.
The affidavit, in which Harper drew the conclusion that two
guns were being fired concurrently in the pantry, had been executed
on December 28, 1970. But five months later, Harper, months after
swearing to his conclusion in the affidavit, described his photo-
graphs as not conclusive. And he expressed the desire to conduct
further examination with the comparison microscope.
During further 1970 inquiries into Harper's charges,
criminalists Ray Pinker and Walter Jack Cadman both urged caution
in forming a judgement or opinion on someone's photograph of an
exhibit. Both stressed that they would prefer to see the original
rather than photographic evidence. Pinker specifically stated, "I
would have to examine the original physical evidence, the bullets
themselves, under a comparison microscope, or a wide view stereo
binocular microscope, before making any firm conclusion."
197 Hearings Analyzed
The rather harsh words of District Attorney Joe Busch con-
cerning hearings conducted by Supervisor Ward might seem at first
glace to be the result of an old fashioned political feud between
Joe Busch and Baxter ward. But when the testimony of various Ward
hearing witnesses, particularly Dr. Noguchi, is analyzed, it is
possible to see a different perspective. Specifically, Dr.
Noguchi's testimony before Baxter Ward's hearing as to his autopsy
findings and. opinions represented a twice previously expressed
position and added no new information. Of the sixteen pages of
transcript representing" Dr. Noguchi's testimony ix: May 19TH, a
little less than half was devoted to such previously given
testimony before the Grand Jury in 1968, and the trial jury in 1969.
The balance of Noguchi's testimony before Ward was devoted to three
t d d i th P 1 S h t i l. areas no covere ur ng e eop e v.- r an r a
These three areas dealt with;
a! Noguchi's present identification of the bullet extracted
from Senator Kennedy's neck and submitted as People's H7 at trial,
. r b! Noguchi's present and past position regarding the
utilization of neutron activation analysis to compare the various
bullets introduced into evidence during the Sirhan trial, and
cl Whether or not Noguchi had any knowledge that the
District Attorney was aware of any evidentary conflict regarding
muzzle distance between eyewitnesses and the physical evidence
provided by Hoguchi.
- 18 -
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More importantly, a 197M District Attorney's Office memorandum
analysis of the testimony elicited by Hard at the hearing suggested
that the testimony was designed to project the followingconclusions: ' -
1. That a significant conflict had always existed between
eyewitness accounts and irrefutable physical evidence regarding
muzzle distance, which in itself, suggested the possibility of a
second gun.
2. Prior investigation by law enforcement had failed to
fully utilize the physical evidence in determing the number of guns
involved because exclusive reliance was placed upon the method of
microscopic bullet comparisons even though other methods were known
to be available, such as neutron activation analysis, a process
where the most subtle differences in the chemistry makeup of
material could be found under examination. Dr. Vincent. Guinn
testified at the Baxter Ward hearings that he had offered his
services to Dr. Noguchi for neutron activation immediately
following the assassination of Senator Kennedy, and Dr. Noguchi
replied at the Ward hearings that Dewayne Wolfer had told Noguchi
in 1968 it was not necessary to pursue such an examination.
3. Although the method of microscopic comparison of bullets
was valid in the abstract, the expert used in the investigation
Wolfer! may have erred because other experts Harper, Bradford,
and MacDonell! did not confirm his conclusion.
H. The physical evidence could presently be utilized for
various investigative procedures, including refiring of Sirhan's
gun and/or neutron activation analysis, with the same degree of
reliability in assessing the number of guns involved if such proce-
dures had been employed during the investigation subsequent to
Kennedy's assassination.
The District Attorney's Office memorandum cautioned that the
predetermined conclusion of Ward's hearing was that the District
Attorney and/or the Los Angeles Police Department failed to fully
investigate obvious discrepancies in the theory of the lone
assassin, as manifested by the prosecution's failure to initially
subject the firearms evidence to extensive scrutiny. Furthermore,
the impact of the Ward hearings was that any resistance by autho-
rities against reexamination of the ballistics evidence would also
be suspicious, even though there would be no guarantee of obtaining
a reliable conclusion in a new examination.
Additionally, the Ward hearings reviewed three previously sug-
gested two-gun theories subject of the 1971 investigations! and
focused on a new two-gun theory.
Three so-called two-gun theories had been developed prior to
the Hard hearing.
An alleged conflict between eyewitnesses and the 1.
physical evidence as to whether Sirhan was facing Kennedy or off to
his Qirln at '|'.h4=| +.-In-no n'P fihn ehnntinam---_ w--aw nu we-an-n -1--nu Iv w-nu w--v-w-uu§- .
2. The allegation that Wolfer had actually excluded
Sirhan's gunias being the only gun at the crime scene by using
another gun rather than Sirhan's gun for firing test bullets, and
then concluding that the bullet taken from Kennedy's neck had been
fired from the same gun which yielded the test bullets.
-15-
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1 _ . -
J J
3. The allegations that the firearm evidence alone estab-
lished the possibility of two guns because differences in various
bullets indicated they were not fired from the same gun.
The 197 hearing conducted by" Baxter Ward highlighted the
original three theories of two guns, and also added a fourth theory
of a second gun.
- N. An alleged conflict between eyewitnesses and the
physical evidence as to muzzle distance. -
However, it should be emphasized that the alleged conflicts
between eyewitnesses and physical evidence are actually immaterial
to the number of guns if it is conclusively proved from the firearms
evidence that one gun fired all of the recovered bullets. In this
circumstance, the only material issue would be the identity of the
gunman.
HavPsra T_"{°'C'H9 Ines}:-outlaw1le>§__E§bi 1t "Y .sr1.d_ 5"
Harper st ted that Sirhan's gun fired People's SH and in so
stating this fact, suggested that Sirhans gun could not have fired
People's H7. At the same time, Harper suggested by virtue of the
clerical error made by Dewayne Wolfer at trial, that the actual
evidence introduced at trial showed that the Sirhan weapon did not
fire any of the bullets, including People's SH and HT. However, the
concession made by Harper, that Sirhan did fire some of the bullets
People's 5H to differentiate from People's H7!. was an attempt by
Harper to prove that People's H7 and 5H were fired from different
guns. Therefore, his ultimate conclusion of two guns was far more
important to Harper than the suggestion that a. clerical error
accounted for the second gun serial number H18602 being introduced
as the evidence gun that fired all the bullets. If Harper had
actually contended that wolfer at trial correctly excluded Sirhan's
gun from having fired any of the recovered bullets, in addition to
his Harper's! postulation of two guns firing People's H7 and 5H,
this would have led to a conclusion of three gunmen, Sirhan and two
other gunmen. Harper never alleged three guns. Harper's alle-
gation that Holfer excluded Sirhan's gun at trial was Harper's way
of alleging that wolfer improperly concluded that Sirhan's gun
fired all of the bullets recovered, but in so alleging, Harper
actually stated a contradiction in that Harper stated conclusively
that Sirhan's gun fired the Heisel bullet, People's SH. Harper
never actually conducted a comparison microscopic exmamination of
People's N7 and SH. Due to the size and weight of such apparatus,
Harper was unable to bring a microscopic camera into the County
Clerk's Office. He was only able to take Balliscan photographs of
People's 4? and 5%. Additonelly, no teogun advocate or critic had
ever come forth after conducting a microscopic examination of the
bullet. Furthermore, Harper, MacDonell and Bradford all relied on
photographs of only two bullets, rather than utilizing photographs
of all of the various evidence and test bullets, to form their
conclusions.
' -16-
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6 CT
Lack of Unity_Among H9lfer's Critics
Wolfer's three critics, Harper, Bradford and Macbonell, have
not unanimously expressed the same.conclusion nor underlying rea-
sons, in support their mutual position critical of Holfer's
findings. There is only one common denominator among wolfer's
critics. All three have publicly rendered an opinion, after con-
sidering certain material, which had the minimum effect of raising
a question regarding the accuracy of Wolfer's conclusion.
At Baxter Hards hearing, Bradford expressed the opinion that
the photographs he considered disclosed insufficient evidence of
any specific identification characteristics requisite to a con-
clusion that only one gun was involved. Therefore, in stating "no
positive conclusion," Bradford in effect was saying nothing more
than what any legitimate ballistics expert would have said after
reviewing only photographs, even if those photographs depicted a
number of bullets which had actually been fired from the same gun.
Harper and Hacbonell, however, concluded that two guns fired
the bullets under consideration after alleging that photographs of
such bullets H7 and SH} disclosed differences in certain identi-
fication characteristics. These opinions are obviously critical of
Holfer's conclusion and differ from the position expressed by
Bradford. But both opinions of Harper and MacDone1l were based
upon photographs and not upon recognized and accepted identi-
fication principles of microscopic examination.
' Criteria Esppused,
Including Bifling An~IH§ and Cannelures _ __ , a__, , K -» _ _____ 92._» __ .1 .1 _7 ,__ ,__
Only two criteria had been advanced by any "twogun" advocates
intending to prove that People's H7 and 5H were not fired from the
same gun. These two criteria consist of rifling angles and can-
nelures.
The only criteria ever advanced by Harper was that Balliscan
photographs of People's H7 and 5H disclosed a difference in the
rifling angles of those bullets, and that this difference showed
they could not have been fired by the same gun. The only support
Harper ever obtained for this allegation regarding rifling angles
came from Macbonell. This support was expressed in MacDonell's
affidavit, which was prepared and .presented' at Baxter Ward's
hearing in 19TH. '
However, at Ward's hearing, unlike Harper, both Bradford and
Hacbonell, personally testified, with'Bradford being first to so
testify. During his testimony, Bradford expressly stated that he
could not discern any differences between rifling angles in
photographs of People's HT and 5H. Then, when MacDonell testified,
he stated he had noted a difference. But MacDonell equivocated as
to whether or not any significance should be attached to this
alleged difference in rifling angles. This was obviously a retreat
by Hacbonell from the emphasis he had placed on rifling angles in
his prior affidavit, even though that affidavit, when read
carefully, equivocates, because it establishes that Macbonell made
numerous assumptions regarding the photographs he considered.
-1']-
-;-1-» f -- -
ic if
One of the initial witnesses called by Ward, and presumably
heard by MacDonell during the oneday hearing, described the Bal-
liscan process, including the inherent "tilt factor" of the camera
photography process, which is adjusted only visually rather than
scientifically. Thus, by the time MacDonell testified, he may have
realized that his affidavit, although filled with many articulated
assumptions, had made no provisions for this "tilt factor." Most
firearms experts reject reliance upon rifling angles, and the
alleged differences in rifling angle between People's H7 and SH,
even if assumed to be true as to the original Sirhan firearms evi-
dence, is not an accepted criteria for identification purposes.
Modern Firearms by Calvin Goddard.!
The only other factor which had been suggested as establishing
two guns was based upon the claimed difference in the number of
cannelures depicted by photographs of People's H7 and SH. Only
Herbert MacDonell had expressed that position. Throughout his
investigation in 1970, his interviews in 1971, and his affidavit
filed at the Ward hearing in 1974, Harper had never mentioned
cannelures. And although Bradford was asked general questions by
Hard regarding cannelures, Ward failed to ask Bradford any
questions regarding the significance, if any, to be attached to
cannelures as a criteria to consider in firearms identification.
Additionally, cannelures apparently have absolutely no signi-
ficance in the identification of fired bullets. Firearm identi-
fication research shows that cannelures may or may not be utilized
in coming to conclusions regarding identification of fired bullets.
Holfer has unequivocally stated in an interview with Kranz that
cannelures are totally irrelevant because two consecutive shots
fired from the same gun of the same identical type of bullet,
including cannelures, may lead to significant differences as to
cannelures by the time the bullet leaves the barrel, aside from
further significant changes which may acrue upon impact.
Photographs
Another additional difference among the three critics of
Holfer concerned photographs. .Any expert opinion must be dependent
upon the materials considered. There is significance in the fact
that only Bradford indicated consideration of any photographs
beside photographs of People's R7 and 5 . This occured at Ward's
hearing when Bradford stated that he had looked at Balliscan
photographs, taken at Ward's request, of some of the test bullets
fired by Wolfer. '
It is difficult to understand why Harper and MacDonell concen-
trated their findings solely on photographs of People's H7 and SH.
Photographs of other bullets would undoubtedly have contributed to
their examination, but neither man ever requested photographs of
other bullets. Significantly, of the three experts, only Bradford
was never actually critical of Wolfer's conclusion, and it was
Bradford who did not expressly restrict himself to merely photo-
graphs of People's U7 and 5 .
-18-
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1_92../ -.
Re ring of Sirhan Gun -7 fl t, 7
Another factor consistently urged by the two-gun advocates was
the refiring of Sirhan's gun. Interestingly, the critics had
usually asked for a refiring of the gun without the intermediary
step of rnicrosoopic examination of the bullets in the Clerk's
custody. Examination of these bullets might have resulted in a
conclusion regarding the number of guns and thus eliminated the
need to refire the gun. Such additional steps as refiring the gun
would not have been necessary unless one of two situations existed
after such a microscopic comparison. First, it it was indicated
that all bullets were not fired by the same gun, the refiring of
Sirhan's gun would then be relevant in determining which bullets,
if any, Sirhan had fired. And second, even if microscopic com-
parison of bullets indicated only one gun, a refiring of Sirhan's
gun would be relevant only if there was an issue regarding whether
or not Sirhan's gun was the gun which fired those bullets.
However, few of the critics ever advocated microscopic com-
parison after their photographic comparison. This underscores the
question as to what advantage, if any, was to be obtained by twogun
advocates who asserted that refiring of the Sirhan gun was an
integral aspect of any bullet examination.
The District Attorney'sr Office cautioned in its 19TH
memorandum analysis that any refiring of Sirhan's gun would
probably result in inconclusive findings as to whether the Sirhan
bullet exhibits had been fired from the Sirhan gun. This was
because the firing of the gun would not necessarily produce bullets
with the same individual characteristics as those actually used by
Holfer during the Sirhan investigation. This was partially because
of the existing problem of whether the County Clerk had effectively
preserved the actual bullets compared by Wolfer. Additionally, the
likelihood of inconclusive results was substantial, in that there
was a strong possibility that a refiring of the gun would produce
sufficient differences in striations among the bullets to conclude
that the Sirhan bullet exhibits were not fired by the Sirhan gun.
The istrict Attorneyls Uffice was concerned that the Hard
hearings, in proposing the re-firing of the Sirhan gun, would not
clarify the issue, but might-possibly create perpetual controversy
regarding the number of guns. 1
lntegrity_of the Physical Evidence
The preservation of the integrity of the physical evidence was
considered important. The very-nature of ballistics evidence is
such that certain precautions are absolutely necessary. lt is well
known in law enforcement circles that the identifying features of
aoftlead bullets can be virtually erased by rubbing them with
fingers or by dropping them on a hard surface. Merely running a
cleaning brush through the bore of a gun can destroy the features ofthe bore, which, in turn, will have a direct affect on any testiring. " ~
. _ig_-
____i____.._-._.,.-_.i....._--i ... ... .. ..~ _.,. . ....-... -- he --H
1-»1 3Lt, in
It was for this reason that the Grand Jury conducted its
investigation, and a court order was obtained directing the_County
Clerk to preserve the evidence and not to allow persons other than
the attorneys, or their representatives, to view evidence. At
trial, the evidence was secured in a locked cabinet controlled by
the Court Clerk assigned to the case. At the termination of the
case, a conference was held in the chambers of the Presiding Judge
where security procedures were outlined.
A court order from Judge Walker was obtained which directed
the clerk to show the exhibits to attorneys of record only, and only
when notice had been given to the other side. This was to insure
both that a representative of the other side would be present at any
viewing of the evidence, and to insure that the integrity of the
exhibits would be preserved. However, no member of the District
Attorney's staff was ever given notice by the County Clerk's Office
until May 1971, that exhibits in the Sirhan case had been examined
by unauthorized persons for almost a year. Many of the people
examining the exhibits during 1970 and 1971 did not have proper
authority under previous court orders for access to the Sirhan
exhibits.
1915 - Proposed Iests
By 1975, new criticism of the Sirhan case involved several law
enforcement agencies. Previous two-gun advocates and critics had
been noticeably critical of L.A.P.D. criminalist Dewayne Wolfer,
and the possibility of serious ballistics evidence discrepancy.
But in light of the cloud of suspicion concerning government after
the Watergate scandal, the term "official version" was received
with much skepticism by the public. Additionally, the charge was
repeatedly heard that not only the L.A.P.D., but the Los Angeles
District Attorney's Office in general, and, District Attorney
Joseph Busch in particular, were "stonewalling," covering up, and
preventing the full facts from being released. Yet all the critics
had one demand that was central to their theme: demand that the
Sirhan weapon be test fired. Despite the fact that at the Ward
hearing both criminalist Lowell Bradford and Herbert MacDone1l
testified that a classical microscopic comparison of the evidence
bullets with the test fired bullets. would be a necessary
preliminary step before any determination could be made as to the
need to test fire the gun since if the evidence bullets matched up
with the wolfer test fired bullets, the need to determine a second
gun would be moot!, a growing demand was made that the Sirhan weapon
be refired.
Sirhan's new attorney, Godfrey Isaac, had filed a writ of
Habeas Corpus and a writ of Error Coram Nobis in the State Supreme
Court in January, 1975, alleging every previously cited theory of
two guns including the affidavits of William Harper, Herbert
Macbonell, Vincent Guinn, the autopsy report, and transcripts Of
the 197R Baxter Ward hearings!, but the State Supreme Court turned
down the writ in February 1975. This did not seem to dissuade the
critics that there should be a new complete reinvestigation of the
Robert Kennedy murder.
- 30 _' X
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Possibilitylofilnconclusive Results from etesting
Events in the years prior to the 1975 ballistics tests and
examination suggested the possibility that such ballistics reexa-
mination would be inconclusive. The 1971 Grand Jury investigation
regarding the integrity and utility of the exhibits at least demon-
strated that there had been serious violations of the court orders,
and that there had been sloppy handling by the County Clerk's
office regarding unauthorized access to visit and inspect the
exhibits. Inherent in this problem was the very nature of
ballistics evidence. Absolute precautions are necessary to protect
ballistics and firearms evidence. The fact that the District
Attorney's position asking Judge Wenke to first have a preliminary
inquiry into the clerk's preservation of the exhibits was not
ordered by Judge Wenke gave fears to the District Attorney's Office
that the potential test firing and examination would be
inconclusive or subject to improper or misguided intrepretations.
Deputy Attorney General Russ Iungerich also expressed his concern
that the 1975 test results would only establish whether the bullets
themselves had come from the same gun, and that the actual test
would really not establish anything conclusionary or positive.
Iungerich was afraid that some of the two-gun advocates were in
hopes of receiving a blind opinion from the ballistics experts
which would leave open the question of whether the bullets could
actually be linked to the Sirhan weapon.
' 1<P~=-92£15;_I__*1_'=@:1%.'-iw___9f Belle:
In his role as an investigator as well as Special Counsel,
Kranz interviewed Dewayne wolfer in September 1975. At this
meeting wolfer described many of the procedures that he had used
for his examination of the exhibits, and his trajectory studies.
Wolfer stated that he had determined the entry and exit of bullets
into Senator Kennedy's coat by studies of the autopsy reports, and
the Walker H-acid test conducted on the coat which illustrated the
nitrate pattern. From this nitrate pattern, and from the residue
of powder itself, the distance of the muzzle of the gun from the
cloth of the coat was determined. Additionally, in his interview
with Kranz, Wolfer expressed grave concern about the possibility of
a test firing of the Sirhan weapon in the forthcoming ballistics
examination. _
It was holfers opinion that there was grave danger in light
of the possible tampering of the exhibits and the weapon, and the
possibility that the Grand Jury Report in 1971 may not have
completely authenticated severe mishandling of the exhibits.
Wolfer was afraid that successive bullets fired through the same
weapon would not always be identical in all respects. Holfer
reasoned that due to the mechanism of the fired gun, a rapid suc-
cessive firing of bullets, after a period of oxidation for several
years, might affect the striations of the barrel, particularly the
manner in which the lands within the barrel projected downward and
the grooves within the barrel projected upward spinning the bullet
in flight to produce gyrostration. Wolfer felt that these lands
and grooves striations! could possibly have been modified by any
tampering with the barrel, such as the possibility of a bullet or
lead-pencil being jammed down the barrel of the weapon.
- 21 -
~. ._,! 9 1,!
In his 1969 trial testimony, Wolfer had stated that no two
barrels would ever impart the same impression or striation'on the
projectiles as they, the bullets, passed through them. This_was
because of the different rifling specifications within the barrel.
Holfer told Kranz any potential tampering or mishandling of the gun
barrel could result in an inconclusive finding after additional
test bullets had been fired from the weapon. It was wolfer's
opinion that the projected ballistics re-examination and test
firing was a sham orchestrated only to create and to confuse the
issue that the bullets did not match. Wolfer's concern, and that
shared by several persons within the District Attorney's Office,
was that. the purpose of petitioners claim for potential test
firing always the demand of the critics had been for a test firing
of the weapon! was for the test firing to obtain inconclusive
results due to the lack of striations and identification marks on
the newly fired test bullets. This would also make it impossible to
match the newly test fired bullets with the original evidence
bullets due to the passage of time. Additionally, Wolfer expressed
his reservations about any cleaning of the barrel prior to firing
because of the possibility that a cleaning might also affect the
particular striations, or lack of striations, in the gun barrel.
Special Counsel Kranz was of the opinion that the criminalist had
legitimate concern about the proposed test firing of the weapon,
but due to the several mistakes and inconsistencies in the past,
and the recently admitted destruction of ceiling panels and x-ray
analysis documents, any attempt to halt the test firing, parti-
cularly in light of the District Attorney joining in the motion at
the August 1H, 1975, Hearing, would have resulted in a justifiable
accusation of "cover-up."
Cross Examination of Wolfer
The cross examination of Dewayne Holfer by all counsel prior
to ballistic tests and_ examination by the panel experts was
lengthy. But several questions remained unanswered. who else
besides criminalist Wolfer had looked at the ceiling panel holes
and examined the ceiling panels themselves? Furthermore, who had
participated in the x-rays and analysis of the ceiling panels and
wood samplings? .
Additionally, Wolfer could not recall if he had made the tests
and measurements concerning micromeasurements, spectrographic, and
cannelure examinations. Moreover, Wolfer could not recall whether
he had weighed the particular bullets. There were no records to
indicate that this process had been done.
Holfer's log was not complete in specifying the time sequence
when he received all of the particular evidence bullets, parti-
cularly the Weisel and Goldstein bullets which Wolfer felt were,
along with the Kennedy neck bullet, People's H7, the only well
defined bullets. On cross examination, Attorney Godfrey Isaac
pointed out that Holfer could not properly identify in his log
sheet the items to which he referred on June 13, 1968. Holfer felt
that there was a possibility that due to different *L.A.P.D.
property identification number systems in the various divisions,
-. 22-
D
3E"!~,_! mg p!
one at Rampart Division and one at Central Division, that this
could account for the difference in numbering identification pro-
cedures. Essentially, there could be different booking numbers for
different properties coming from Rampart and Central divisions, and
therefore, this would account for different numbering systems on
Holfer's log sheets.
' During the court examination, Wolfer repeatedly stated that he
could not recall or could not remember whether he had performed
certain examinations or had prepared written documents due to the
fact that seven years had elapsed. Wolfer repeatedly qualified his
answers with the statement, "he could not remember." But it was
obvious that Wolfer could not produce in 1975 any hand written
notes or written documents, which he understandably would have
wanted to use to refresh his own recollection at the 1969 trial from
his prior examination and tests conducted in 1968. Therefore,
there is a strong assumption that Wolfer did not have any written
documents or notes, either to be of help for his own recollection at
trial in 1969, or to document the examinations and tests that he
conducted in 1968. Conversely, it is apparent that the prosecution
team, of Lynn Compton, Dave Fitts, and John Howard, all deputy
district attorneys, never instructed Wolfer as to what particular
documents or records to bring to trial for any necessary testimony
regarding examinations and tests conducted by Holfer. It appears
that the only progress report in the SUS ten-volume summary is the
page and a half submitted by Officers Sartuchi and McDevitt in
response to the subpoena of documents relating to the tests
performed by wolfer.
In light of the inability of Holfer or other L.A.P.D.
officials to produce substantial written documents, analyzed
evidence reports or pertinent information regarding Wolfer's 1968
ballistics tests, his log report and laboratory work, it must be
concluded that Wolfer is responsible for the sketchy and insuf-
ficient analysis, or if extensive reports and documents were
prepared, Wolfer was negligent in permitting such reports and
documents to be destroyed.
During the examination hearing of Wolfer, the Los Angeles City
Attorneys Special Counsel, Dion Morrow representing the City of
Los Angeles and its Police Department during the examination of
Holfer! was taken by surprise, as was Deputy District Attorney
Bozanich, that there had been x-rays made of the ceiling panel, and
one spectrographic photograph taken by Wolfer. It appears that
even in discussion between the L.A.P.D. Crime Laboratory and the
District Attorney's Office prior to the trial, the reports of these
x-rays and photographs were not given to the prosecution team. The
explanation by the L.A.P.D. that these photographs and analysis
tproved nothing", reflects on the lack of judgement by the L.A.F.D.
in fully co-operating with prosecuting office. Even though it was
anticipated that defense counsels argument would center on
diminished capacity' at trial, the fact that the actual murder
bullet, People's H8, had been so badly damaged and fragmented and
could not be linked with the murder weapon necessitated a much more
thorough, definitive, and complete documentation of ballistics,
firearms and~trajectory studies. The failure to do so reflects on
the entire prosecution. . i u
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, D! 7
Additionally, the fact that the ceiling panels and x-ray
analysis of the tiles were never introduced as evidence at trial,
is no justification for their destruction. These items had been
marked for identification at trial but were never used. This fact
alone, aside from the fact that the Sirhan appeal had not even been
initiated, should have prevented their destruction.
Holfer's testimony at trial and at the Grand Jury, that a
bullet taken from the base of Kennedy's neck N7! and bullets taken
from victims Weisel and Goldstein H and 52! were fired from
Sirhan's gun and "no other gun in the world," should have forced
Wolfer and the entire prosecution team to have a complete record
and documentation of this evidence.
92
Analysis of Panel Experts
Joint an3lndividualij§pofts
' Although some of thgnxperts wrote in their working papers and
testified that they wexeedgse to a positive identification of the
bullets with the Sirhan weapon, none of the experts were as
emphatic as Dewayne Wolfer at trial who stated the evidence bullets
had come from the Sirhan weapon and no other gun in the world.
However, in subsequent court examination of the experts, it was
revealed that all criminalists and firearms experts have different
thresholds of identification when conducting tests of ballistics
exhibits. It was for this reason that Deputy District Attorney
Bozanich had advocated a more comprehensive test procedure to
determine the threshold as objectively as possible. Other counsel
had argued against this test procedure, and the court was also
opposed to it.! Additionally, several of the experts stated that
the term "inconclusiveluwhen applied to firearms examination of
fired bullets or expended cartridge cases, indicated that the
particular examiner is not able to arrive at a definite opinion by
his own standard! as to whether or not two bullets or cartridge
cases were fired from the same gun. As Ralph Turner stated,
"inconclusive is not to be interpreted as inferring that a parti-
cular bullet or cartridge case was or was not fired from a
particular gun." It should be-emphasized, that in the petition of
CBS filed before the court in August, prior to the examination by
the experts, Lowell Bradford, one of- the experts subsequently
selected by the attorneys, admitted that identification of conse-
cutively fired .22 caliber bullets occurs on the average less than
20$ of the time. It was apparent, during cross examination, that
all the seven experts had different levels of identification, and
although none of the experts would give their specific scale of
reference or spectrum of identification standards used, many, if
not all, made the statement frequently that they were 99$ sure, or
"only a step away", or that additional time to conclude microscopic
examination "may have given them the opportunity to actually and
unequivocally link the particular three evidence bullets with the
Sirhan weapon."
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! /Interestingly,92 bne of the -most persisteht advocates of a
thorough re-examination of the exhibits and subsequent test firing
of the weapon, Lowell Bradford, was most positive in his conclusion
that there was no evidence of a second gun. Although he stated in
his working papers that the question of a second gun was still open,
due to the inability of the experts to positively and unequivocally
link the bullets with the Sirhan weapon, "the weight of findings
reached by the examiners was against any evidence of a second gun."
This was because the similarities of gross and individual charac-
teristics on the bullets H7, 52, and SH, and the uniformity of class
characteristics found in all other bullets, ruled against the
possibility of a second gun. Additionally, Lowell Bradford
appeared on the Walter Cronkite National CBS News on the day the
experts findings were released, October 6, 1975, and stated "the
reason there was no substantive or demonstrable evidence to
indicate more than one gunwas used was because there was no
significant differences in the general characteristic of all the
bullets that were found on the scene.'" In addition to that, stated
Bradford, "specific characteristics on the victim bullets enabled
an identification of all of the victim bullets as being fired from
the same gun."
when asked by CBS news reporter Terry Drinkwater to be more
specific, Bradford illustrated his findings with several of the
photographs used by the experts during their examination procedure.
Bradford stated that, "The photographs show first of all, one of
the victim bullets showing some general rifling characteristics
with distortion. The second picture shows the bullet from the
Kennedy neck, which shows clearly the rifling marks of the gun and
the marks of the cannelures . . . one can see that there are indeed
remains of two cannelures, which controverts the original
statements that there was only one, and this resolves one of the
main questions that was first raised about a second gun." The
pictures referred to by Bradford were pictures identifying bullets
T. 52, and SH, the comparison photographs taken by Morton.!
Bradford also on the Cronkite show made reference to the fact that
similarities between the several bullets in question, N7, 52, and
SH, together with eyewitness observations, several witnesses that
observed Sirhan shooting in the direction of Senator Kennedy!
indicated there was no second gun. . .
92
Sirhan Gun Muzzle_Befect
One of the key factors in helping the experts reach the
conclusion regarding no indication or evidence of a second gun was
that all the experts had discovered through various tests, later
described upon cross examination, and outlined in their individual
working papers, that the Sirhan revolver had possibly been damaged
to such a degree either upon manufacture, or during the subsequent
ownership by several people during the ensuing years!. and that
this damage resulted in a particular indentation and muzzle defect
in the bore of the revolver and left certain indentations and im-
perfections on bullets fired through the bore of the revolver.
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-"'" *-- ---- ~ 7s7' --= __ ;~-- --_- -- --._._ I-t---_-_i¬_......._.-_._,__Z
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Specifically, the experts stated in their papers and upon ex-
amination that the muzzle defects of questionable origin caused
"impressions, indentations, gouge marks, specific charac-
terizations," on bullets fired through the revolver. These
markings occured on specific land impressions of all of. the
bullets.
. Muzzle Defect: Landsgand Grooves
The several photographs taken by Morton of the various
bullets, as well as many of the photographs previously taken by
Harper in, expert Albert Biasotti drew on the blackboard in the
courtroom an illustrative diagram of a particular bullet. Essen-
tially, it was an illustrationof the several examiners arbitrary
designation of comparable land engravings on the surface of all the
bullets studied. The land engravings were numbered consecutively
and clockwise arqgnd the bullet base, beginning %ith land #1 at 12o'clock high or 0 . Land #2 was approximately 60 clockwise up theright, Land #3 approximately EFO to the right, Land #H 180 andexactly opposite Land #1 at 0 , Land #5 2H8 clockwise around the
bullet base, and Land #6 approximately 300 clockwise around the
bullet base. It should be remembered that in prior Grand Jury and
trial testimony, Dewayne Wolfer stated that a particular bullet
picked up lands and grooves as it was fired along the barrel when
projected. The bullet is then scratched by the imperfection in the
barrel, since all barrels have unique imperfections, unique to that
barrel and to no other barrel. The premise agreed upon by all
ballistics and firearms experts is that no two barrels of any two
guns will have and impart the same impressions and scratches on
projectiles that pass through that particular barrel. Specifically,
land impressions or imperfections on each barrel will project down
on the bullet as the bullet is fired, and grooves impressions and
imperfections! will project upward as the bullet spins out of the
barrel, keeping the bullet gyroscopically in flight through the
barrel and on through the pattern of flight of the bullet. Addi-
tionally, the individual characteristics implanted on the
particular bullet fired through a. specific barrel will be the
result of manufacturing defects imparted in the barrel of the gun
or presumably by additional scratches on the barrel of the gun!
that distinguish one gun from another.
Furthermore, each bullet will also-have in its miniscule yet
microscopically signicant way individual characteristics that will
distinguish each bullet from another bullet. It is most important
to emphasize that all of the experts distinguished the difference
between class characteristics of bullets and gross characteristics
of bullets. Class characteristics dealt with the type of caliber,
the number of lands and grooves in each bullet, the twist
direction, the particular width of the land and grooves, the weight
and cannelures of the bullets. All experts found that the class
characteristics of all the bullets examined, the evidence bullets,
the Wolfer fired test bullets, and the 1975 testfired bullets, were
the same. Additionally, a "gross imperfection" was found on all of
these bullets. Specifically, a particularly strong identifying
double furrow gouge was found on every bullet, the 1968 fired
bullets, and the 1975 fired bullets, thus further suggesting to all
the experts that there was no evidence of a second gun.
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individual,Characteristics
However, in the area of individual characteristics on bullets,
the results of barrel defects imparted on the bullets as they are
spun out of the barrel! the experts were unable to reach a positive
conclusion that the bullets were positively linked to the Sirhan
weapon. The experts concluded that there was a lack of sufficient
"individual characteristics" {tiny marks and scratches called
striations! on the bullets to permit a positive identification.
Specifically, the experts stated that markings in the 6th an? 1stlang area of the bullets fired, approximately between 300 and
360 of the bullet base, reflected indentations and defects in the
Sirhan barrel. These defects caused a marked repeatability of
individual characteristic marks on all the bullets fired from the
Sirhan weapon. However, due to the fragmented nature of several of
the bullets, and the inability by all of the experts to make
positive identification of enough sufficient individual charac=
teristic marks on the several bullets, including the key bullets
H7, 52, and SH, a positive identification of these'bullets with the
Sirhan weapon was not possible. Conversely, there was absolutely
no indication from the class of bullets, the gross characteristics
studied, or the individual characteristics on all the bullets
examined, to indicate any evidence of a second gun.
Theoexperts atated in their working papers that the defects at
the 300 to .360 area of the bullet base on the lands area
emphasized that particular indentations and impressions occured due
to the muzzle of the barrel affecting the bullet as it left and
lifted up from the gun. This characteristic was found on all the
bullets.
The experts suggested on cross examination that had
criminalist Wolfer conducted a process known as phase marking,
tiny marks implanted on the bullet base upon examination! and had
additional photomicrographs been taken by Wolfer, and if more
complete written documents relative to Wolfer's examination had
been available, they would have been able to perhaps make a
positive identification of the bullets with the Sirhan weapon.
Many of the experts, Garland, Cunningham, Biasotti, and Berg were
of the conclusion that they were within one step away from linking
the individual characteristics of the bullets to the Sirhan gun.
Such a phase mark process would have defined the individual charac-
teristics of the bullets when they were in a better condition to be
examined in 1968. '
I rirl 1LJVBAJ J-
The experts also stated in their working papers and on exami-
nation that the severe leaded condition of the barrel of the Sirhan
weapon was a factor in possibly lessening the chances of
identifying individual characteristic marks on the 1975 testfired
bullets.
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The leaded condition made it very difficult to determine whether a
particular bullet could be matched up with the revolver on a sub-
sequent test fire. Even though the gross imperfections double
furrow gouge! were found repeated 'on all the 1975 test-fired
bullets, reproduced in a shot for shot basis, the severe leaded
condition of the barrel made it difficult to match up individual
characteristics of the 1975 testfired bullets with any of the 1968
evidence bullets and Wolfer fired bullets. The experts conceded
that the dirty and leaded barrel could possibly change striations
and characteristics on fired bullets. None of the experts could
give any explanation for the leaded barrel, and one, Patrick
Garland, even surmised the possibility that the barrel had been
fired during the time elapsing since 1968 and prior to the 1975
examination and testing. The nature of the leaded barrel uas such
that it severely reduced the chances of identifying the individual
characteristics, or striations, that were formed on fired bullets
.as a result of the manufacturing process of the weapon barrel.
These individual characteristics are a basis for the identification
of the individual marks.
, Search for Individual Specific Characteristics
Even though the Sirhan weapon had identifiable muzzle defects
at the 300 to 360 end of the muzzle in the Land #6 and Land #1
area!, there were definite repeating gross individual charac-
teristics that were far more identifiable than specific individual
characteristics and gave the experts the feeling that there was no
evidence of any nature to suggest another gun had fired any of the
bullets. Even though all the examiners stated that they had
different thresholds of identification before they could make a
positive identification, they felt that the individual lines and
striations of each bullet fired meant a very high percentage in
favor of the fact that all the bullets had been fired from the same
weapon. Inherent in this was the concept of consecutiveness, the
fact that individual characteristics were associated with each
other in a relation to the driving edge of the barrel as the bullets
spun out of the barrel.
In the area of particular gross characteristics, again due to
barrel damage effect, even the 1968 Wolfer test fired bullets
showed indications of particular gross characteristics, which gave
further indication that no second gun had been fired. as an addi-
tional attempt to try to further identify individual charac-
teristics, as well as the gross imperfections, the experts
attempted to reproduce these defects. Casts were made of the
forward end of the barrel, the casts being prepared using duplicast
silicone solution. But the experts concluded that the casts were
not suitable for microscopic examination of the imperfections in
the barrel. Next, a new attempt was made with a mixture of sulphur
and lamp black melted and poured into the muzzle of the Sirhan
revolver to east the front 1/a to 1K2 inch of the barrel. These
casts were examined microscopically, and the experts found that
although some defects of the muzzle were reproduced, cast shrinkage
during cooling-detracted from the quality of the cast. The experts
concluded that orientation of the imperfections from the barrel to
bullets was not possible.
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Evidence Bullets Matched with Same Gun
In their individual working papers, and upon cross
examination, three of the experts, Garland, Cunningham and
Biasotti, positively found that the three crucial evidence bullets,
Kennedy U7!, Goldstein 2!, and Weisel SH!, had Sufficient
individual characteristic marks as well as the heretofore
mentioned gross characteristic marks found on all the bullets! to
make the positive matchup of these three bullets having been fired
by the same gun. This was on the basis of a microscopic comparison
of the individual characteristic marks present on the three
bullets. The three experts were positive that_ repetitive and
sufficient matching individual characteristics were noted on all
three bullets, and stated that these three bullets had been fired
through the same weapon. However, all three experts stated that
there were insufficient matching individual characteristics for a
positive identification to be made with the Sirhan weapon itself.
This was because of several factors, including the severe leaded
condition which was observed in the bore of the Sirhan revolver.
The experts stated, both in their working papers and upon cross
examination, that such leaded condition could cause the wiping of
bullets fired through the revolver, preventing the repetition of
markings necessary in the identification process. Biasotti felt
that the several gross individual characteristics were .in a
constant relationship to each other, showing that not only the
three particular evidence bullets in question, but that all other
bullets examined were "very probably fired by the same gun."
Again, Biasotti stated that the source of the repetitive gross
individual characteristics was attributed to gross imperfections on
the front edge of the lands and grooves at the muzzle crown of the
Sirhan weapon. The microscopic examination and casting of these
imperfections showed that they were irregular ridges of metal which
projected above the surfaces of the lands and grooves in some part
of the muzzle. Biasotti stated that these imperfections were
accidental in origin and were produced after the lands and grooves
were formed in the bore by the swage rifling process and therefore
were true individual characteristics, unique to the gun. However,
Biasotti concluded that the very limited number of individual
characteristics reproduced _by the metal coated bullets were
possibly due to the leaded condition of the bore at the time of
firing, both in 1968 and at the time of the test firing conducted by
the panel in 1975. _'
Patrick Garland echoed the same findings of Biasotti
concerning the leaded condition stating that the lack of sufficient
matching individual characteristics prevented a positive identi-
fication of bullets with the Sirhan weapon, but it was his
conclusion that there were sufficient characteristics on Exhibits
H7. 52, and SH to conclude that the three bullets had been fired
from the same weapon.
-» Finally, Cortland Cunningham also stated that the leaded
barrel caused significant differences in the individual charac-
teristic marks imparted on the test bullets fired from the weapon.
' - 29 -
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To Cunningham, this even precluded the possibility of determining
whether the test bullets, fired in 1975, were fired from the Sirhan
weapon. But Cunningham felt that as a result of microscopic exami-
nation and comparison of the 1975 test bullets, it could be
determined that the previously mentioned gross imperfections on the
other bullets were being reproduced by the barrel of Sirhan's
revolver from shot to shot. This gave credence to the position of
the experts that all bullets examined had the same gross imper-
fections and characteristics, showing no indication of a second
gun. Although the presence of the gross imperfections was not
sufficient to positively identify the bullets with the Sirhan
weapon itself, they showed that the test bullets fired in 1968 and
1975 were fired from the same weapon. Finally, Cunningham reasoned
that although there were not sufficient characteristics and imper-
fections to make a positive identification of bullets H7, 52, and
59 with the Sirhan weapon, the microscopic comparison of the
individual characteristics present on these bullets indicated that
they had been fired from the same weapon.
Two other panel experts, Lowell Bradford and Stanton Berg,
inferentially found that the three evidence bullets, H7, 52, and
53, had been fired from the same gun.
Stanton Berg found that there was a matching of visible class
characteristics the number of lands and grooves, the direction of
twist, the widths of lands, etc.! between all the test-fired
bullets 968 and 1975! and the evidence bullets. But Berg found
that there were not sufficient well defined and distinctive
individual characteristics on both the test bullets and the
evidence bullets to permit a positive determination or conclusion
that all the bullets had been fired from the Sirhan weapon. Addi-
tionally, Berg also commented that changes in the barrel condition
prevented an identification of the Sirhan weapon with the 1975
test-fired bullets. He was referring to the fact that the test
panel was able to match the 1975 test-fired bullets with each other
and yet had great difficulty in matching any of the 1968 test-fired
bullets. But Berg did conclude that there were sufficient well
defined and distinctive individual characteristics in a bullet
taken from Exhibit 55 one of the bullets in the mismarked envelope
introduced at trial in 1969! to conclude that this particular
bullet, the third bullet of the three introduced at trial by
Dewayne Wolfer, had been fired by the Sirhan weapon. Berg felt that
the other two bullets in People's Exhibit 55 at trial could not be
identified because of the lack of sufficient such markings. Again,
Berg felt that this was due to changes in the barrel condition.
Berg also commented that the gross individual characteristics were
found to be the probable result of existing damage at the barrel and
bore muzzle. This was determined by microscopic examination of the
bore directly, and from an examination of the bore casts.
30 ~
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Berg stated that there were a few matching individual
striations on the bullets, but because of the lack of sufficient
well defined and distinctive individual matching characteristics on
4?, 52, and 5U, a positive determination could not be made that the
bullets had been fired from the Sirhan weapon. However, Berg
stated that the markings noted on the Exhibits meaning the
particular sufficiently defined distinctive individual charac-
teristics! showed that a matchup with the Sirhan gun was only a
"step away." Berg stated that H7, 52, and SH had been phased by the
experts with the test bullets a process of orientation of the test
and evidence bullets under a comparison microscope so that apparent
gross individual and other matching markings are noted around the
circumference of both bullets as they are slowly turned in unison
for examination!. This phase process was something that Dewayne
Wolfer either had not done, or if conducted, had failed to record
adequately. Berg felt that this phase mark process of R7, 52, and
5H with the 1975 test-fired bullets showed a stong suggestion of
common origin, although not a positive determination linking the
bullets with the Sirhan weapon. However, Berg was able to
positively identify and link bullets H7 and 52, the Kennedy and
Goldstein bullets, with the same weapon due to the fact that the
bullets were easily phased and that there were sufficient matching
striations noted for determination and identification. Addi-
tionally, Berg was also able to positively link and match bullets
52 and 5", the Goldstein and weisel bullets, with the same weapon,
again due to the fact that the bullets were easily phased and that
there were good matching striations noted. On cross examination,
Berg explained that although bullets N7 and SH were attempted to be
linked and matched with the same weapon, and that a number of
similarities were noted during the phasing process, there were not
enough sufficient, distinctive and well defined matching charac-
teristics found in the two bullets H7 when compared to SH! to
positively link these two bullets with the same weapon.
However, since Berg was able to link bullets N7 and 52 with the
same weapon, and bullets 52 and SN with the same weapon, it follows
logically and inferentially, that bullets H7 and 5H also had suf-
ficient matching characteristics to be matched with the same
weapon. Again, it must be emphasized, the strong and differing
threshold of identification used by the several ballistics experts
in making positive identifications, and the fact that none of the
experts refused to give their own formula for what they considered
a positive identification and an inconclusive identification.
However, the expertise of the panel members, and their ability to
make a positive identification, was never at issue.
Lowell Bradford also inferentially was able to determine that
bullets U7, 52, and 5H had been fired from the same gun. Bradford
felt that H7 matched with 5H, and 52 matched with SH, due to an
identification between these bullets. To Bradford, a deep gouged
'groove was determined to be an individual characteristic.
. - 31 -
K! '<92
Unlike Berg, who positively linked H7 and 52 to the same gun,
Bradford could not link HT and 52 to the same gun due to the lack of
sufficient individual characteristics. But again, inferentially,
the fact that he matched H7 and SH to the same gun, and that he
matched 52 and 5% to the same gun and saw nothing in the way cf
individual or gross characteristics that would suggest a second
gun, demonstrates that Bradford was one of five experts who con-
cluded either directly or indirectly that the three evidence
bullets, Kennedy, Goldstein, and weisel had all been fired from the
same gun.
Panel experts Charles Morton and Ralph Turner were unable to
conclude that these three bullets had been fired from the same gun.
However, it was Turner who stated in his working papers that to him,
a positive identification meant that "he had cbserved a sufficient
number, by his own standards, of rifling impressions and/or
tracings, both gross and microscopic, in certain combinations which
indicated to him Turner! that two or more bullets were fired
through the same gun barrel." Additionally, Turner emphasized that
the term "inconclusive" indicated that he was not able to arrive at
a definite opinion, again by his standards as to whether or not two
bullets or cartridge cases were fired from the same gun. Turner
emphasized that inconclusive was not to be interpreted as inferring
that a particular bullet cr cartridge case was or was nct fired in a
particular gun. In all the bullets examined, Turner was only able
to identify five bullets as coming from the same gun. These were
the third and fourth 1975 test-fired bullets, both lead bullets,
and the seventh and eighth 1975 test-fired bullets, both copper.
It was generally conceded that due to the leaded condition of the
barrel, these last two were the most easily recognizable and iden-
tifiable bullets of all the eight fired bullets in 1975. Turner was
also able to identify the second with the seventh 1975 test-fired
bullet as from the same weapcn. However, Turner did state in his
working papers that evidence bullets U7 and 52, the Kennedy and
Goldstein bullets, had similar gross characteristics, and he
concurred in the findings of the other panel members that there was
no evidence that a second gun had fired any of the bullets.
Charles Morton was also unable to Iink bullets NT, 52 and SH
with the same weapon. However, Morton stated in his working papers
that he had found similarity in these particular bullets,
particularly where there was substantial impact from land and
grccve impressions. This suggested tc Hcrtcn that the three
bullets had been fired from a weapon which produced the same type of
gross irregularities that had been found in some of the land
impressions identified in the Nolfer test-fired bullets and in the
1975 test-fired bullets. Morton stated that his own failure to make
a positive identification of the evidence bullets, H7, S2, and 5R
with the same weapon, could be based on the fact of poor
reproductability of striations left on the bullets fired from the
Iver Johnson .22 caliber weapon, Serial H53725. Additionally,
Hcrtcn felt that impact damage cn all the bullets, including the
evidence bullets H7, 52, and SN meant the loss of some detail, and
that perhaps this loss of detail was due to subsequent handling
4 -32-
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or oxidation of these bullets. Finally, Morton concluded that al-
though the irregularities reproduced on the bullets test-fired by
Wolfer suggested that they may have been fired from the same
weapon, Morton felt that there was insufficient reproducible micro-
scopic details present on these particular Wolfer bullets, and he
was unable to positively link either the bullets fired by wolfer or
the evidence bullets with one weapon. Morton did, however, make
positive identification of several of the 1975 test-fired bullets
with the fact that they had come from one weapon. Morton did
confirm, on cross examination, the findings of the other panel
members that there was no evidence that a second gun had fired any
of the bullets.
It should be emphasized92that several of the experts testified
both in court and in their working papers that the Sirhan weapon had
two muzzle imperfections that were transmitted to test bullets and
found on bullets recovered from Senator Kennedy and victims
Goldstein and weisel. And although there were not enough indi-
vidual characteristics on the victim bullets to permit a positive
identification of linking these bullets with the Sirhan weapon,
five of the experts directly or indirectly linked these three
critical evidence bullets as coming from one weapon. Asked if
there still existed the possibility of a second gun, Stanton Berg
replied on cross examination, "I think it's a very slim possi-
bility. That's all it is." But Berg stated that his fellow experts
were in "surprisingly uniform agreement concerning the individual
and gross characteristics and striations found on the several
bullets. Biasotti stated that a group of repeating consecutive
lines at the same contour on all the bullets was an objective basis
to make his finding that the evidence showed no indication of a
second gun. Additionally, all of the experts stated that there was
no evidence of any inconsistencies, either in the gross or indivi-
dual characteristics and marks on any of the bullets, to show any
evidence of a second gun. All of the experts stated that they had
worked individually on their own individual work sheets, and had
not consulted each other until after the completion of their own
individual reports. It was at that time that they drew up their
joint report where they stated no substantive or demonstrable evi-
dence to indicate more than,one gun was used to fire any of the
bullets examined. . ~
None of the experts could give any clear cut reason for the
leaded condition of the barrel, although several stated that it
could have been the normal result of seven years time lapse since
the gun had been previously fired. Only Garland made the reference
to the fact that there was a possibility that the gun had been fired
during those seven intervening years. The arguments among counsel
concerning the 1971 Grand Jury inquiry into the integrity of the
exhibits was never a part of the testimony or transcripts available
to the experts, and with the possible exception of Lowell Bradford,
it is doubtful that any of the experts had knowledge of the contro-
versy surrounding the Grand Jury investigation. The barrel had
been cleaned prior to the test firing, and in this respect
Cunningham had stated on cross examination that the science of
ballistics was such that after any cleansing process of the barrel,
it would be difficult to identify the consecutive bullets fired.
There was no guarantee that the original marks left on the barrel
indentations would be implanted on the later test-fired bullets.
However, all the experts felt that thege were Jepeatable marks
present on all the bullets around the 300 to 360 land area.
+ ,,r,3?.fW_ -
Although panel expert Ralph Turner made the least number of
positive identifications of any of the panel experts, he stated
emphatically on cross examination as a prelude to his testimony
that he would make no changes in his written report, and felt the
only issue on which the panel had been silent was the angle of the
inclination or rifling pitch area. Turner stated that he would
personally pursue the rifling angle question, although he had no
information at that time to submit to the court.
. In answer to a question on cross examination as to why there
had been no matchup of the Hclfer test=fired bullets and the
evidence bullets, Stanton Berg replied that there were several
reasons for this including the poor condition and damage of the
bullets, the lack of defined individual characteristics, and the
fact that much of the surface alloy coating of the bullets was
missing. This occured upon fragmentation of several of the
bullets. Berg did state that the matching individual striations on
several bullets meant that he was only "a step away" from actually
linking the bullets with the Sirhan weapon.
All of the ext! ts were asked nn examination whether thov had -"rer-_ "_-_ __l__ -l _l_l_"_-_-" i"--"-- -"-, l__
been aware of any major disagreements among their colleagues
regarding their individual or joint reports and all of the experts
stated that they were aware of no major disagreements.
Lowell Bradford stated on cross examination, as he had
previously stated in his affidavit incorporated in the CBS
Petition filed in August! that when .22 caliber bullets are fired,
even when they_are in good condition, and the barrel is in good
condition, that it would be less then 20% of the time that these
bullets would be matched up with the weapon. Bradford reasoned
that his inability to match evidence bullet "7 with 52, while
matching 52 with SH, and H7 with SH, was because there was no
identifiable gouge mark, to Bradford's observation, on H7.
Striations on 52 and SH gave Bradford enough identifying charac-
teristics to make the matchup. Bradford felt that there was not
enough of an identifiable gouge on H7, a gouge being to Bradford an
extra deep striation. However, other panel members did identify
that this gouge mark on H7, as it was consistent on all the bullets
examined.
92
Scientific, Circumstantial, and Inferential Evidence
"1'_hait,l§i,Fhan's E'as the Only_Gu_n peg, Zingtheg Panfrii-;,._**
One of the prime arguments raised by several advocates of the
two-gun theory was that the autopsy performed by Dr. Noguchi
establishes that Senator Kennedy was shot three times at point-
blank range, with the fatal bullet entering the Senatoris head from
behind his right ear from a distance of 1 to 3 inches. Several
eyewitnesses mentioned in previous sections of this report have, in
their testimony before the Grand Jury and at trial, failed to place
Sirhan any closer than two feet from Senator Kennedy. Therefore.
the implication is made by the advocates of the two-gun theory,
that a second gunman fired the fatal shot.
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Several of these eyewitnesses have stated that Senator Kennedy
had turned slightly to his left to face busboys, and was in the
process of shaking hands with them at the time that Sirhan ap-
proached Kennedy from the east. One eyewitness, Boris Yaro, has
described Sirhan as lunging toward Kennedy with his gun firing. In
order to accept the possibility of a second assassin, it would be
necessary to accept the fact that a second gunman fired the fatal
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consistent with the autopsy and muzzle distance tests performed by
Dr. Noguchi and Dewayne wolfer.
The various advocates of conspiracy theories and two-gun
theories have often differed in their approaches and themes of two-
gun controversy. Yet, only one person in the pantry has ever been
documented as possessing a second gun that was drawn during the
time following the shooting of Senator Kennedy and the victims by
Sirhan. This other person is, of course, the security guard, Thane
Eugene Cesar, whom by his own statement, and the eyewitness
testimony of other persons present in the pantry, was described as
slightly to the rear and to the right of Senator Kennedy during the
time of the shooting by Sirhan.
i Supposed contradictions between the autopsy report and the
eyewitness testimony are highlighted by the two-gun advocates when
they quote the testimony of Karl Uecker, the assistant maitre d',
who stated while witnessing the shooting, that "There was a
distance of at.least 1% feet between the muzzle of Sirhan's gun and
Kennedy's head." Richard Lubic, an independent television
producer, has also said, "The muzzle of Sirhan's gun was 2 feet to 3
feet away from Kennedy's head." No one has subscribed to or
proposed the concept of an invisible gunman, so the unobserved
second gunman, assuming that he existed, would have had to have
stood immediately and slightly behind Senator Kennedy, giving the
gunman access to the Senator's right temple and armpit area.
Assume for arguenndo's sake that Thane Eugene Cesar had been a
second gunman and he had fired his gun either with premeditation or
aooidently. The Senators body position, and the body position of
other victims, at the time of the shooting, rebut the possibility
that Caesar could have shot the Senator in the right temple and in
the right armpit. Eyewitnesses observed Kennedy in the process of
turning his body toward the busboys,.giving Sirhan an onrushing
view of the right temple and right-area of the shoulder pad and
armpit. But assume that a second gunman stood directly behind and
to the right of Kennedy at the time of the shooting. To have fired
the second gun, it still would have been necessary for him Ceasar!
to have pointed his gun directly to Kennedy's head and fired it. No
one has ever reported such an observation. Even Donald Schulman in
his contradictory statements in 1968 never identified the pathway
or the direction from where a second gun had been allegedly fired by
a Iecurity guard.
Moreover, the ballistics examination and test results
conducted by the ballistics panel in 1975, proved that for a second
gunman to have shot any of bullets H7, 52, or 5" the second gunman
would have had to have shot a weapon with the exact same
imperfections, same muzzle defects, same leaded barrel oonditions=
and same individual and gross characteristics as the weapon used by
Sirhan. Additionally, this second gunman would have had to use the
same type ammunition, firing at approximately the exact same moment
as the Sirhan weapon was being fired. -
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. Discount for a umment the actual physical location of the
several victims and Senator Kennedy in the pantry at the time of the
shooting by Sirhan, and assume for the sake of argument.that a
second gun was fired. Presumably, the second gunman's bullets
would never have been recovered, or assuming for the sake of
argument, that these bullets had been lost in the innerspace or
hidden as part of a coverup. The fact remains that the seven
ballistics experts unanimously agreed that all the bullets
recovered from Senator Kennedy, victims Goldstein and Weisel, the
seven test-fired 1968 bullets wolfer bullets!, and the 1975 test-
fired bullets all had an identifying double furrow gouge on each
bullet. Additionally, several gross imperfections were discovered
on each victim bullet, and on the 1968 and 1975 test-fired bullets.
These imperfections were traced by the experts to damaged spots in
the Sirhan gun muzzle which marked each bullet with a gouge at the
bottom of the land impressions. And although the experts were
unable to make a 100% positive matchup of all the bullets with the
Sirhan weapon itself, several of them were 99$ sure, and one step
away, and all experts positively stated that there was no evidence
of any nature of a second gun firing these bullets.
Therefore, for a second gunman to possibly have fired at least
one of the victim bullets, H7, 52, or SH, this second gun bullet
would subsequently have to match up with the other gross charac-
teristics on all the test-fired bullets fired_by wolfer with the
Sirhan weapon following the assassination. And this same second
gun bullet would subsequently have to match up with all the 1975
test-fired bullets. For this unlikely matchup to occur, the
second gun would have had to have been an identically damaged .22
caliber Iver Johnson, cadet model, firing the very same copper
coated, mini mag, hollow tip ammunition at the very same moment
Sirhan was firing.
It must be emphasized that the bullet that actually murdered
Senator Kennedy, People's H8, fragmented upon impact in the brain,
and was in such damaged condition that neither Dewayne wolfer in
1968, nor any subsequent criminalist, including the 1975 Panel ex-
perts, was ever able to positively link the murder bullet to the
Sirhan weapon.! _ _
But when one considers the chain of ownership of the Sirhan
revolver, having been originally purchased in 1965 and subsequently
sold to several owners before being _purchased by the Sirhan
brothers in January, 1968, and the repeated firings by Sirhan on
several rifle ranges during his term of bwnership, the possibility
of a second identical gun, with the same damaged characteristics,
is beyond mathematical probability. '
' Furthermore, recognizing that the experts were unable to
positively and conclusively link up the victim bullets with the
Sirhan weapon for reasons previously stated in their working papers
and on cross examination, the facts remain that five ofthe seven
experts found that three crucial victim bullets, the Kennedy,
Goldstein, and Weisel bullets, had been fired from the same gun. It
should be remembered that although there is some contradiction and
differences of'opinion among eyewitnesses as to the distance that
the Sirhan muzzle barrel was from the head of Senator Kennedy, no
' - 36 -
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one has ever contradicted the physical location of Senator Kennedy,
the victims, and all the witnesses within the pantry at the time of
the shooting by Sirhan. In this respect, Grand Jury and trial
testimony show that Senator Kennedy was walking from the west to
the east in the pantry, although at the time of the shooting he had
turned to his left to shake hands with the busboys, or had just
concluded shaking hands. Sirhan was approaching Kennedy from the
east to the west at the time of the shooting. Victim Goldstein was
approximately eight feet behind Senator Kennedy, and victim Weisel
was approximately twenty-seven feet behind Senator Kennedy near the
pantry entrance. Therefore, Kennedy, Goldstein, and Weisel were
all directly in Sirhan's line of fire as Sirhan came firing from the
east to the west.
Assume for the sake of argument that the second gunman was
standing directly behind Senator Kennedy and slightly to the right.
The three bullets recovered from Kennedy, Goldstein, and Weisel,
People's "7, 52, and SN! all were identified by five of the seven
experts as having come from one gun, and the other two experts
testified under oath that they found no evidence that these three
bullets had come from a second gun. Therefore, assuming a second
gunman, he would necessarily have had to have fired into a north-
west-north position to hit Senator Kennedy from the right, rear,
and then conversely and almost simultaneously, this second gunman
would have had to have made a substantial turn to his left and have
fired directly behind the Senator, into a western direction,
striking victims Goldstein and Weisel. Additionally, such a feat
would have to have been accomplished without anyone of the 70 to 90
people present in the pantry seeing such a rare display of
marksmanship. It should also be pointed out that the other victims
injured, Paul Schrade, Elizabeth Evans, and Irwin Stroll, had
bullets removed from their bodies that were badly fragmented and
damaged and positive identification was impossible. Nevertheless,
the seven experts stated that these fragments all had similar gross
characteristics which did not indicate any evidence that a second
gun had fired these fragmented bullets. This analysis also applied
to the fatal bullet that actually murdered the Senator, People's
R8, also badly damaged and fragmented. It should be emphasized
that the other victims, Schrade, Evans, and Stroll were all
directly behind Senator Kennedy at various distances ranging from
Schrade, approximately eight feet behind Kennedy, to Stroll
approximately twenty feet, and Evans about twentyfive feet behind
Senator Kennedy. All were in the direct line of fire of Sirhan who
moved in an easterly to a westerly direction as he fired.
The autopsy report, and later muzzle distance tests and tra-
Jectory tests, also indicated that the bullets that struck Senator
Kennedy behind the right ear and twice beneath the right arm
traveled into the Senator's body right to left and upward. Again,
the eyewitness accounts, particularly Karl Uecker, emphatically
' -37-
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stated that as Sirhan got off his first shots, the grapling and
wrestlin" with Sirhan began immediately, and Sirhan's arm holding
the gun was forced down. Trial transcripts reveal that Sirhan
continued to fire in a rather disjointed and uncontrolable manner.
This accounts for much of the upward direction of the shots._ The
right side, particularly the right temple of Senator Kennedy, was
exposed as he was turning to his left and Sirhan approached him from
the east. Five of the ballistics experts have positively matched
up three victim bullets, U7, 52, and SN, as having been fired from
the same gun. These facts and the exact physical location of the
victims and Senator Kennedy who were hit with these three bullets!
is persuasive and forceful scientific and inferential evidence that
Sirhan fired these three bullets.
In the days following therelease of the panelis joint report,
the critics seemed to concentrate their attacks on the procedures
of Dewayne Wolfer, rather than the findings and conclusions of the
ballistics panel. The purpose of the ballistics test had been to
test the validity of cannelure and rifling angle allegations. It
was not to te:i-ft:}acc:racy of the results of Wolfer, or the manner
or procedure c;?:ned by Wolfer. Judge Wenke stated repeatedly
during the September examination, that it was not the province of
the court hearing to satisfy all the critics with different
theories regarding the Sirnan assassination of Robert Kennedy.
The main purpose of the ballistics hearing, according to Judge
Henke, was essentially a discovery procedure, to answer the
original petitioners in this case, Paul Schrade and CBS, and
through the intervention of the Board of Supervisors, the County
Counsel's Office! inquiries whether, based on the evidence and ex-
hibits within the court's custody, there was any indication of a
second gunman in the pantry on the night in question. g
The affidavits of Lowell Bradford, William Harper, Herbert
Macbonell and Robert Jolling requesting certain test procedures and
ballistics examination all had been incorporated in the petitions
and affidavits filed by petitioners Paul Schrade, CBS, and the
Board of Supervisors. Every one of the procedures, requests,
tests, and instructions, concerning testing, examination and
inspection of exhibits were followed to the letter. This can be
verified by an analysis of the petitions filed before the court in
Auust, 1975, and an examination and comparison of the court order
signed by Judge Wenke on September 18, 1975, incorporating the very
same requests for certain test procedures, inspection, and examie
nation of exhibits. Furthermore, the-lengthy negotiations among
all counsel representing the various parties resulted in essen-
tially the very same test procedures originally requested in the
August petition, being incorporated in the September order signed
by Judge Wenke.
Every request concerning test procedures, inspection, and exa-
mination of exhibits that had any relevance to the original August
petitions filed by CBS, and Paul Schrade, was incorporated in the
court order, Finally, the seven panel hehhers always had the right
to independently petiton the court for an opportunity to observe,
examine and test other exhibits that had been mentioned in the very
lengthy cross'examination of Dewayne Holfer. They always had the
right to conduct further and more sophisticated tests as outlined
in the court order. None of the seven experts ever chose to
exercise this perogative.
33
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Other Investigations
§oncerning Conspiraciesg Bullets; Coveggup;*"" " * Condu*c 1;fé_E.:t5_y_K_ran§ _
' One of the most frequently heard criticisms of the L.A.P.D.
conspiracy investigations was that the officers and investigators
had pressured witnesses to comply and conform their answers to a
pre-determined result, that is, one assassin, one gun. However,
none of the people interviewed by Special Counsel Kranz, including
Thane Cesar and Don Schulman, ever stated that the L.A.P.D. or any
other law enforcement agency investigators, ever pressured them, or
attempted to obtain a preidetermined or pre-arranged answer.
Additionally, the accusations that certain witnesses had been
pressured into conforming their statements to the theory of one gun
and one assassin, were almost always stated by the critics and
advocates of the two-gun theory, who when asked to produce specific
instances and persons who could verify such form. of pressure,
failed to do so.
¥@?E,§h§l§i5h§lBQl%@§§ Fired
One area of concern to the advocates of more than eight
bullets was that one cartridge had been removed from the glove
compartment of Sirhan's car. Unlike the hollow point mini mag
ammunition of the evidence bullets the bullets found in the
Ambassador pantry and on the front seat of Sirhan's car!, this was a
solid point, western brand cartridge. This bullet was never intro-
duced by the prosecution at trial. However, this bullet has been
the subject of allegations by certain critics, particularly Mrs.
Lillian Castallano, that this bullet and the two spent bullets
found on Sirhan's car seat might possibly have been removed by the
L.A.P.D. from Ambassador wood panels, and placed in the glove com-
partment of Sirhan's car as part of the overall cover-up and
conspiracy. Special Counsel Kranz has found absolutely nothing
that supports such a theory. It must be remembered that Sirhan had
spent the day of the assassination, and three days previous to the
assassination, on the rifle range shooting several hundred rounds
of bullets from his revolver. Immediately following the conviction
of Sirhan in 1969, the ceiling panels and wood samplings that had
been removed from the kitchen were destroyed by the L.A.P.D. In the
course of the last several years, allegations had been made that
more than eight bullets were fired, and that certain photographs
established that more than eight bullets had been fired. Addi-
tionally, witness statements produced by petitioner Schrade's
attorneys after the ballistics examination disclosed that two Los
Angeles policemen, Rozzi and Wright, had apparently observed
"bullet holes" in the area of the crime scene several hours after
the shooting in the pantry on June 5, 1968. In statements filed
before Judge Wenke, officers Rozzi and Wright described a hole in a
door frame - approximately 18 inches from ground level.
Additionally, in another statement filed with the court, Mr. Angelo
DePierro, Ambassador Hotel employee at the time of the shooting,
-39-.
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and a witness to the actual shooting, described another hole in a
door frame approximately 5'-9" from the ground as "a bullet hole,
or looking like a bullet hole." Additionally, Coroner Thomas
Noguchi, and witness Martin Petrusky, also an employee of the
Ambassador Hotel on the night of the shooting, made statements to
the fact. that there had been several holes, and that these
apparently looked like bullet holes in a center divider of the
doorway in the pantry. These holes had been circled. .
. AS§2E§ §EE5L§TE§$, P,h§"P°3FapP '
On June 5, 1968, an Associated Press wire photograph ran
nationwide showing two Los Angeles policemen later identified as
Officers Rozzi and wright! kneeling and pointing to a hole in a door
Trame near where Senator Kennedy was shot. The policemen were not
identified in the photograph, and were inspecting a hole, with the
caption "Police technician inspecting a bullet hole with bullet
still in the wood" printed underneath the photo that ran nation-
wide.
Pursuant s investigation, Special Counsel Kranz
interviewed both L.A.P.D. Officers Rozzi and Wright in separate
interviews in November, 1975. Rozzi and Wright had been on routine
squad car patrol the evening of the assassination in separate squad
cars, and had immediately reported to the Ambassador Hotel upon
dispatch alert of the shooting. Both officers were then assigned
duties in the Ambassador Hotel parking lot, checking license plates
of all vehicles leaving the premises. Several hours later, both
officers were asked to stand security watch within the kitchen
area, keeping spectators away from the crime scene. At
approximately 6:00 or 7:00 a.m. on June 5th, Associated Press
photographer Wally Fong took pictures of Wright and Rozzi pointing
to the hole. Both officers stated that at that time, in 1968, that
the hole looked like a bullet hole, but had no indication that a
bullet was inside the wood, and never saw a bullet inside the wood,
and never made any reference to any of the investigative officers
and criminalists present in the hotel that there was a.bullet
inside the wood. Additionally, neither officer ever made any
statement to any of the reporters, press, or photographers in the
kitchen that this was a bullet hole or a bullet. The officers went
off duty approximately 8:00 a.m., June 5, and never returned to the
Ambassador or the kitchen area, and never inquired with any member
of the L.A.P.D. as to the particular hole into which they were
pointing. Both officers stated that they had been asked by several
members of the press and photographers to point at the particular
hole so that the press, who had Just recently been permitted back
into the pantry for photographs about 6:30 a.m., could be given an
opportunity to take photographs of the kitchen pantry area.
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