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FD-517 Rev. 2-17-97!
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Federal Bureau of Investigation
Prosecutive Report of Investigation Concerning
SADDAM HUSSEIN
IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
Article 11 GENOCIDE
Article l2 CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
Article 13 - WAR CRIMES
ALL II92IF|:!F1I'L!lTI -IIIJ CU}-ITJLII-TED
HERE II-I I 1'5 UIJC Li-L5 IFIEII
DATE I35-ll2D]9 BY 1.10,-"}::aI~.T
Copy to: Regime Crimes Liaison Office
FD-518 Rev. 12-1-95!
Report of: SADDAM HUSSE IN
mm; March 10, 2005
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Narrative of Offense:Ofce: FB IHQ
BACKGROUND
Introduction
From 1980 to 1988, Iraq
was involved in a fullscale
war with its neighbor, Iran.
The IraqIran war was fought
on several fronts, including
the Northern Region of Iraq
which borders Iran. This
region, sometimes called
Kurdistan or the Autonomous
Region, was home to the
Kurds. Two major parties
represented the Kurdish
population: the Kurdistan
Democratic Party KDP!
headed by MASUD ALBARZANI,
the son Of MULLAH MUSTAFA
BARZANI hereinafter MULLAH
BARZANI!, and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan PUK!
headed by JALAL TALABANI
hereinafter TALABANI!. The
Kurds had been seeking
governmental autonomy for
years.
On or about
approximately February 12,
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Forces IAF! initiated a series of military offensives inNorthern Iraq against the Iraqi government. On March 4, 1987,the IAF, with the assistance of Kurdish guerrilla fighters knownas Peshmergas from both PUK and KDP, launched its most alarmingoffensive of the series. Code named Karbala 7, the IAF
penetrated eight miles into Iraqi territory east of Rawanduz.
Indeed, SADDAM HUSSEIN and his officers in the Iraqiregime regularly referred to MULLAH BARZANI, his sons, and theKDP as the "offsprings of treason," and to TALABANI and the PUK
as Iranian agents.
During Operation Iraqi Freedom OIF!, hundreds of Iraqidocuments detailing HUSSEIN and his regime's offensive andretaliatory actions against the Kurds were recovered, andrelevant documents are summarized in this report. This reportalso relies upon Iraqi documents Kurdish Rebel Parties had seizedfrom various Iraqi government offices during the 1991 Uprisinghad given to the Human Rights Watch HRW!. HRW has publishedthose documents in their reports, most notably in Bureaucracy ofRepression, the Iraq Government in its Own Words, February 1994.
The charging proposal detailed in this report alsorelies upon relevant statements and admissions made by various
highlevel Iraqi government officials, including SADDAM HUSSEIN.These statements were made to United States investigators whilein United States custody in Iraq. All interviews were voluntaryin compliance with Geneva Conventions.
Iraq's Governmental Structure ,
According to the Iraqi Constitution in effect prior toHUSSEIN assuming the Presidency in 1979, the RevolutionaryCommand Council RCC! was the supreme lawmaking body in Iraq andwas Iraq's highest authoritative body and was superior to theCabinet. RCC decrees held the full force and effect of nationallaw. Prior to OIF, the RCC was comprised of the following highlevel Baath Party officials: SADDAM HUSSEIN, Chairman; IZZATIBRAHIM ALDURI hereinafter AL-DURI!, ViceChairman; TARIQ AZIZ hereinafter AZIZ!; TAHA YASIN RAMADAN hereinafter RAMADAN!; ALIHASAN AL~MAJID hereinafter ALMAJID!; TAHA MUHYI AL-DIN MARUF hereinafter MARUF!; and MIZBAN KHADR HADI hereinafter HADI!.
Immediately upon his assumption of the Presidency,HUSSEIN successfully eliminated the RCC's power and consolidated
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it into his own hands. AZIZ stated that between 1979 and 1981,
HUSSEIN took other, less dramatic steps to consolidate
governmental power into his own hands. For exampole, until 1979,the RCC held regular meetings and recorded the minutes of thosemeetings. However, after HUSSEIN became President, meetings wereless frequent and were not formally recorded. HUSSEIN told theRCC there would be times when he would not be able to consult
with them and therefore, the RCC had to give him power to make
unilateral decisions, which it did. [TARIQ AZIZ January 30, 2004
interview].
HAMED YOUSEF ALHUMMADI hereinafter ALHUMMADI!,
HUSSEIN's Presidential Secretary, stated that he was responsiblefor assembling and presenting all reports and letters to HUSSEIN,and for preparing and disseminating all reports, letters andorders drafted by HUSSEIN. ALHUMMADI's role as Presidential
Secretary was purely administrative and ALHUMMADI held no
authority whatsoever.
Similarly, the Presidential Diwan performed the samerole for the RCC Secretary; that is, the Presidential Diwanfacilitated correspondence to and from the RCC and was purelyadministrative in role and was without authority. [ALHUMMADI
interview June 2, 2004]
AHMED HUSSEIN KHUDAIYER hereinafter KHUDAIYER!, thePresidential Diwan, stated that as the Secretary of the RCC, theDiwan issued all finalized RCC decisions. KHUDAIYER stated thatmost Iraqis who read the RCC decisions assumed that they were
promulgated after debate and consultation which simply was nottrue. The RCC rarely met as a governing body. Rather, HUSSEIN,the Head of State and therefore the Head of the RCC, assigned alldecisions as a function of his own determination; that is,HUSSEIN made nearly all RCC decisions unilaterally without RCCinput or debate. If meetings occurred at all, only HUSSEIN'sclosest two or three advisors would have been involved. KHUDAIYERgenerally learned of the RCC's "decisions" via a telephone fromSADDAM HUSSEIN or from Presidential Secretary ABID HAMID MAHMUD
ALTIKRITI.
KHUDAIYER forwarded HUSSEIN/RCC's instructions to hislegal section which prepared the ordered document. KHUDAIYER
reviewed the document, inspecting it for typographical errors andformatting, and editing as needed. [KHUDAIYER interview, June 12,
2004]
In early 1987, MOHAMMAD HAMZA ALZUBAYDI hereinafter
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1631-HQl462938
ALZUBAYDI! was the senior Ba'ath Party official in the Northen
Region. ALZUBAYDI admitted during an interview that he failedto control the ongoing Kurdish activity within his jurisdiction.
In approximately March, 1987, HUSSEIN relieved ALZUBAYDI of hisposition in the Northen Region and ordered AL ZUBAYDI back to
Baghdad.
On March 29, 1987, HUSSEIN, through RCC Decree 160,appointed ALMAJID as the RCC and the Ba'ath Party Regional
Command representative who was empowered to implement theirpolicies in the Northern Region which included the Autonomous
Region of Kurdistan. This decree gave ALMAJID control of the
state's civil, military, and security apparatuses in the NorthernRegion, including the Autonomous Region. ALMAJID's authorityand special power far exceeded AL~ZUBAYDI's. AZIZ, a longtimeRCC member, stated that HUSSEIN unilaterally chose ALMAJID anddefined the scope of the authority RCC Decree 160 granted AL
MAJID. AZIZ stated that HUSSEIN successfully seized the RCCs
authority and decision-making ability from its members in theearly 1980s. The RCC did not discuss or vote on the appointment
of ALMAJID. [AZIZ interview, February 2, 2004][RCC Decree 160attached as document XX].
KHUDAIYER examined a photocopy of RCC Decree 160 andrecognized it as the copy of an authentic RCC document in formatand substance. KHUDAIYER did not remember attending any meetingat which the contents of RCC Decree 160 was discussed. Rather, he
recalled receiving the information via handwritten instructions
as usual. He vaguely recalled making a nonsubstantive
correction on the original draft that his legal section had
prepared.
KHUDAIYER stated the difference between ALMAJID's
appointment and ALZUBAYDI's was that ALZUBAYDI received hisposition based on his Ba'ath party status, not a Decree issuedthrough the Presidential Diwan's office. Furthermore, ALZUBAYDI did not enjoy the trust from HUSSEIN that ALMAJID did.When asked to define what he meant by trust, KHUDAIYER explainedthat everyone knew ALMAJID would never do anything againstSADDAM, and that he possessed the ruthlessness needed to quellthe violence. [KHUDAIYER interview, June 12, 2004]
PREANFAL §1987!
On March 10, 1987, the Iraqi Directorate of Military
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l63IHQl462938
Intelligence DMI! submitted a Top Secret and Confidential
intelligence report, Ml/sh3/Q2/5809, to the Army Chief of Staffregarding Kurdish insurgent activity. The report identified thelocation of many of ALBARZANI's bases, the cooperation andmutual assistance between ALBARZANI's group and Iranian forces,and detailed acts of sabotage by ALBARZANI's group. The reportalso noted that previous Iraqi aerial strikes had been
ineffective because of the geography and size of the bases.[attached as document #XX]
The intelligence report was signed by Staff MajorGeneral SABIR ABD AL AZIZ HUSAYN ALDURI hereinafter SABIR!,Director of the Istkhbarat or Iraqi DMI. Copies of the reportwere provided to the Presidential Secretary, the Secretary Bureauof the General Command of the Armed Forces, the RCC Committee of
Northern Affairs, the RCC Deputy Bureau, the Office of theMinistry of Defense, and the Fifth Corps Headquarters.
On March 11, 1987, based on DMI Intelligence Report5809, the Army Chief of Staff, through Staff Major General TAREQHUSSEIN NAJIB hereinafter NAJIB!, the Senior Secretary, directedthe Fifth Corps Headquarters through memo Number 2786 to takemeasures necessary to limit the activities of saboteurs bydestroying their essential bases. Copies of this memo wereprovided to the RCC Committee of Northern Affairs, Office ofMinistry of Defense, and the DMI. [attached as document #XX].
On March I2, 1987, HUSSEIN responded to DMIsIntelligence Report 5809. In a Presidential Memo to the DMI,Number 7/G2/808/K, authored by Presidential Secretary ALHUMMADI,HUSSEIN ordered the DMI and specialists to conduct a joint studyfor the use of "special ammunition" in a direct strike by the air
force, army air assets, or artillery against the bases ofKhomeini Guards and the First Branch of the ALBARZANI Group.HUSSEIN's letter instructed the DMI to do the necessary andnotify the President's office. [attached as document #XX]
SABIR stated that in 1987, the primary role of the DMIin the Northern Region of Iraq was to gather intelligence onIranian forces. A secondary role was gathering intelligence onthe Kurds and determining their relationship with the Iranians.SABIR believed the planning stages for the Anfal campaignoccurred between 1985 and 1987. SABIR acknowledged that "specialammunition" was a term the President and other high level IraqiGovernment Officials, including himself, used to representchemical weapons CW!. [SABIR interview, June 4, 2004].
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ALHUMMADI examined a photocopy of HUSSEIN's memorandum
responding to the DMI, recognized it as a copy of an authenticdocument in format and substance, and verified his signature on
the document as the Presidential Secretary. Because Generals are
not Ministers, they could not correspond directly with HUS SEINbut rather sent correspondence through the Presidential
Secretary's Office. Hence, the DMI submitted the referencMarch 10, 1987 correspondence to Presidential Secretary ALed
HUMMADI. ALHUMMADI, in turn, presented it to HUSSEIN.
HUSSEIN normally wrote his responses or directives onthe margins or bottoms of the incoming correspondence. If the
matter were urgent and time sensitive, ALHUMMADI made a
photocopy of the correspondence with HUSSEIN's original notes onit, filed the original, and sent the photocopy to the author ofthe correspondence. On more routine correspondence, ALHUMMADI
transcribed verbatim HUSSEIN's written
Presidential Secretary Office letter.
this March 12, 1987, letter to the DMI
letter, accepted it and authorized the
"special ammunition." ALHUMMADI then
12, 1987 official response memorandum
ALHUMMADI stated that the phrase "special ammunitionaremarks into a
Such was the case with
HUSSEIN read the DMI
DMI's proposed use of
prepared HUSSEIN's March
nd sent it to the DMI.
meant chemical weapons, and that HUSSEIN's order that the DMI
conduct a study of special ammunition usage, coupled with theorder to, Do the necessary, and notify us , indicated HUSSEINknew of and authorized his military commanders proposed use of
chemical weapons. ALHUMMADI reiterated his certainty that thedocument and his signature were authentic. [ALHUMMADI
interview, June 2, 2004]
The DMI Third Department, or Sh3, was responsible forhandling the Kurdish insurgency. On March 13, 1987, the Directorof the Sh3 responded to HUSSEIN's orders. The Director
recommended the use of the air force to carry out the strikes
because air strikes would be:
> more accurate and effective,
Pachieves the surprise attack objectives, since
using artillery would reveal our intentions,> no doubt, some targets are beyond the artillery
and helicopter ranges. [attached as document #XX]
In the same report, the Sh3 Director also enumerated"the conditions and requirements for directing the [Special]Aerial Assault to inflict the required damage and make it more
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effective:
> Provide the Air Force with detailed and accurate
information about the targets.
> It is necessary to brief the pilots about the
targets descriptions and to make use of the aerial
images.
> Execute the strike at day break or a little later.
> Dedicate the maximum effort more than one
airplane per target! and repeat air strikes withfollow up airplanes, or make it a compound strike
The Special Ammunition, high explosive bombs, and
surface to air missiles! using integrated or
follow up bombing.
> Strike all targets simultaneously with the most
effective effort.
> Use the artillery after a suitable time a few
days! to strike the targets within the range.
[attached as document #XX]
On March 13, 1987, Iraqi Cabinet Minister HASHIM HASSAN
ALAQRAWI hereinafter AL'AQRAWI! stated during a mediainterview, The Iranians are trying to use these people [theKurds] to carry out dirty missions, and since they know thegeography of the area and its ins and outs, the Iranians use them
merely as guides for the Khomeini Guards and the Iranian forces.
On March 18, 1987, the DMI responded to the
Presidential Office through Memo, Number Ml/Sh3/Q2/6414. Thesubject of the memo is, "Use of Special Ammunition" and contains
the following:
1. The following are the available
capabilities to us for the use of the Special
Ammunition directed at Khomeini Guard Bases
and the bases of the saboteurs, ALBARZANI
Group The First Branch.
2. The climate conditions do not permit the
use of the Sarin! agent at the present time
because the target locations are covered with
snow, which causes the agent to dissolve and
transform into a nonpoisonous substance.
The same conditions apply to the Tabun!
agent.
3. We possess adequate Mustard! agent. The
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predicted effect will be a miracle! in these
conditions unless a large, concentrated dose
is received, and that it evaporates slowly in
snow covered areas.
4. We are capable of using the Air Force,
tube launchers, and helicopters at night.
5. We suggest the following:
a. The postponement of the strike against the
Khomeini Guard Bases and the bases of the AL-
BARZANI Group until next June. We prefer
selected target locations outside the range
of the IraqTurkey boundary line. We have
selected targets that are located away from
the probable effect of the forces along the
Turkish border or Turkish villages.
b. Start off with similar plans to execute
limited operations toward the Iranian agents
bases.
6. Please review and inform us of the
assignment... with respect, Walid
On March 19, 1987, in Presidential Memo Number
7/G2/877/K, HUSSEIN approved the DMI's suggestions. [attached as
document #XX]
On March 25, 1987, the DMI concluded its study as
directed by HUSSEIN and reported its finding in report Number
S3/Q2/6885 titled, "Use of Special Ammunition" which SABIR
signed. The report identified the locations of the Iranian
agents bases, and selected targets according to enemy size andtheir effect on the internal security in the Northern Region.
The Report listed suitable and available capabilities of the
"special ammunition" and the launching means. attached as
document #XX!
The report identified Iranian agents bases in theregion of Balisan Basin Balisan villages, Tutemeh, Khatti, andSheikh Wasan! located near the main road between Chuwa'r Qurna
Khalifan, and the region of Qaradagh Basin Tekyah, Belkjar, andSiosenan! "as important to both Iranian agents and enemy
personnel. Their size effected the internal security to theNorthern Region and were far enough from Iraqi forces, makingthem more suitable than other targets, for special ammunition.
Because limited amounts of "special ammunition" were
available to the Iraqis at the time, SABIR described the
following options:
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> Directing a strike to the selected targets during
this period by using two thirds of what is
available of the "special ammunition" Sarinagent!. In addition, one third of what is
available of the "special ammunition" Mustard
agent!, and keeping the rest for emergency
situations in the operating sector.
> Postpone strike until midApril 1987, until there
is enough "special ammunition" available, afterimprovements will be made in the production.
ALHUMMADI examined a photocopy of the above
correspondence sent from the DMI to the Presidential Secretary's
Office. ALHUMMADI recognized it as a copy of the authentic
document in format and substance and would have given it to
Huessin in the normal course of his duties.
On March 29, 1987, ALHUMMADI authored the
Presidential Office's response to SABIR's DMI correspondence
which is numbered Presidential Memo 953/965/K. This memorandumrelayed HUSSEIN's approval for the chemical weapons strike andemphasized that his approval was conditioned upon exploiting the
results of the strike as the purpose is not to simply hurt the
sabatours. HUSSEIN directed SABIR and the DMI to coordinate
with the intended Corps and inform the Presidential Office before
initiating the strike. [attached as document #XX]
ALHUMMADI examined a photocopy of HUSSEIN's March 29,
1987 memorandum. ALHUMMADI stated that it was an accurate copy
of the authentic document in format and substance, and verified
his signature.
ALHUMMADI explained that HUSSEIN himself did not
correspond directly with his officers and advisors; rather,pursuant to normal communication protocol, the PresidentialSecretary's Office issued all of HUSSEINs communications and
orders. Hence, ALHUMMADI communicating HUSSEIN's orders to the
intended recipients. Based upon his daily contact with HUSSEIN,
it was clear to ALHUMMADI that HUSSEIN was, in this series of
communications, approving and authorizing SABIR and the DMI to
begin chemical weapon strikes near Turkey.
On March 31, 1987, SABIR advised the Army Chief of
Staff in Memorandum 7371 that HUSSEIN had ordered a study of the
use of "special ammunition," and made the same suggestions he had
made for HUSSEIN. SABIR, who signed the report, also detailed
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the results of the DMI study and its recommendation of which
bases to strike, and advised that the DMI had Presidential
authority to proceed. [attached as document #XX]
On April 5, 1987, in response to DMI Memorandum 7371,
the Army Chief of Staff, Staff General SAAD ALDIN AZIZ MUSTAFA
hereinafter MUSTAFA!, drafted Memorandum 3656 titled "Using
Special Ammunition" which directed the First Corps and Special
Corps to conduct counteroperations against saboteurs, Iranianagents, and Khomeini Guards by using "special ammunition" againstIranian agents bases in the region of Balisan Basin Balisanvillages, Tutemeh, Khatti, and Sheikh Wasan!, located near the
main road between Chuwar QurnaKhalifan and in Qaradagh Basin
villages Tekyah, Belkjar, and Siosenan!. [attached as document
#XX]
The Army Chief of Staff MUSTAFA instructed the First
Corps to prepare a joint plan to complete the strikes against thefirst group of targets and forward the plan to him by courier for
approval and coordination. MUSTAFA also ordered the preparation
of a plan regarding the second group of targets listed above, to
be presented during a visit to the First Corps Headquarters on
April 9, 1987.
This memo was also sent to the Presidential Office and
advised that the Army Chief of Staff MUSTAFA would inform the
Presidential Office of the plan in detail and would exploit the
results. Additionally, this memo was forwarded to the Operations
Department of the Ministry of Defense. The memo referenced a
previouslyconvened meeting on April 5, 1987, and asked that the
Special Ammunition Group be sent to the First Corps Headquarters
on April 7, 1987 to consult with the Corps and put in place an
executable plan.
SABIR reviewed, in Arabic, the abovedescribed series
of memorandums between HUSSEIN and the various military entities
regarding the use of "special ammunition" in the Northern Region
of Iraq. SABIR admitted that "special ammunition" was a term
used by HUSSEIN and the Iraq Government to mean chemical weapons.
SABIR did not remember each and every document; however, he did
verify his signature on the bottom of several previously
identified documents, and thus concluded they were authentic.
While examining the copies and verifying his signature,
interviewing agents observed the following physical changes in
SABIR; he started to perspire profusely, his facial
characteristics dramatically changed, and his lower lip began to
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l63IHQl462938
uncontrollably quiver. Additionally, SABIR's eyes began to tear
after he described the April 16, 1987, chemical weapons attack on
the villages of Balisan and Sheikh Wasan. SABIR stated that
HUSSEIN's decision to utilize chemical weapons directly caused
the deaths of the men, women, and children in those villages.
The idea of using chemical weapons first arose inapproximately 1986 after the loss of the Faw Peninsula to Iranian
forces which lead the Iraqi government worry that Iraq was losing
the war with Iran. SABIR believed the general consensus was thatIraqi forces needed a small victory to boost their confidence and
commitment to the war with Iran. SABIR's subordinates within the
DMI initially proposed the use of chemical weapons against Iranto provide such a moral and commitment boost. However, the DMI'sprimary mission was to defeat and expel Iranian forces and not to
utilize chemical weapons against the innocent women and children
in the civilian population. SABIR advised that in 1987, the DMI
was responsible for collecting information for target
identification and providing that information to the Iraqi
military. [SABIR interview, June 3, 2004]
SABIR stated that during the Anfal Campaign, the DMI
was responsible for gathering intelligence from within each of
the Corps. The military was responsible for fighting on the
front lines and clearing areas of resistance. The military was
also responsible for removing Kurdish populations from the
Northern Region, and the Governors in each of those areas were
responsible for relocating the displaced Kurds. Each Governorwas responsible for reporting directly to ALMAJID. SABIR did
not know the full extent of ALMAJID's responsibility and advised
that areas outside of AL-MAJID's responsibility would have been
assigned to the military. [SABIR interview, June 3, 2004]
April 16, 1987 Chemical Attack
on Balisan and Sheikh Wasan
During an interview with Le Monde in April 1987, PUKrepresentative NAYWSHIRWAN MUSTAFA AMIN commented that one option
under consideration by the PUK was the severance of Iraq into a
number of small states: Shia, Kurdish and Sunni."
In early April 1987, PUK Peshmergas launched an assault
in the Jafati Valley, overrunning dozens of small Iraqi military
posts and taking hundreds of prisoners. The Jafati Valley was
home to the PUK's national headquarters. The Iraq Government
responded on April 15, 1987 by launching chemical artillery
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l63IHQl462938
shells in the Jafati and Shahrbazar Valleys.
Balisan and 1. 1 .92 s". -c=
Sheikh Wasan lay i/Q'Ehg&sP M 5-lb il. Ind llh
. ../ _ dukul 92.,,; " ' ' " 9"' '.scarcely a mile and a vs» .' y®:mM*mf awwh. ' . ' . fi-" . ncwn mumm mu: _half apart in a steep ,.,m q l* .,_,@a¢as@l J. _ _ X. V, - 8 Rn1~|rIIom0|92 comnlll n _nm<z1a;-cl: 1;, ---------- -,5sided valley south of ~92§q sss; mwm 1y¢*$$@W "m,¢' 1the town o f Rawandu z . w . » ~ N 3 =. _ :_' W _ -WI: '.-The Bal 1 san Val ley was !_ .. 4 °.»-ss 792§,:%'#-'2-*" am -,home to the PUK's Third ;@$s:. ms~¢T Awmyl : "" " Appvuimll boundry " " Am m
~ ,< ' . I ~! w" 55' I .9 -l v .92sm92 .92Regional Command. ;s~ ~sl_ .w§@§;; _ @', ;q*w»_ . M .. ,Balisan was described lgyv §§%;g§3 553$ 3 *@*Wm°w ,ss s slzssbls vlllsss . s .=. . .»~.~.-l ' ~2>>>.r l . | la
=1? '92containing *l:;§s%g§~s rm arwww ,,£;approximately 250 §xs%gg;Q§f§5gNgfs x M *¥f ;?a%§$ ¢%hsssshslds. with ss 6;approximate population §§ ? gfhtsgjs Kg siig. ,3 of 1,750 from the $Y.f..§%$@a§p»l uamw Na pf L_ 1 @Khoshnaw Tribe. The f:f _,jg§§ Q J L@g%$§H §§TM _ .s
village had fourmosques, one primary school and one intermediate school. Sheikh
Wasan was a smaller settlement of approximately 150 homes.
In July 1993, the Human Rights Watch HRW!, a non
governmental organization, published the report, "Genocide In
Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds" which documented the
Iraqi Government's use of chemical weapons against the Kurds
during operations known as the Anfal Campaign in I987 and 1988.
HRW reported that its findings were based on interviews of
survivors, examination of seized Iraqi documents, and examination
of massacre sites.
According to HRW, the following is an account of the
attack on Balisan and Sheikh Wasan:
During the evening hours of April 16,
1987, the villagers of Balisan and Sheikh
Wasan heard the sound of approaching
aircraft. Some villagers stayed in their
homes, while others fled to airraid shelters
when a dozen aircraft came into sight, flying
low over the villages. There were a number
of muffled explosions. Witnesses and
survivors, describing the effects of the
attack to HRW stated, It was all dark,
covered with darkness, we could not see
anything, and were not able to see each
12
l63I-HQ~l462938
other. It was like fog, and then everyone
became blind Some vomited. Faces turned
black; people experienced painful swelling
under the arms, and women under the breasts.
Later, a yellow watery discharge oozed from
the eyes and nose. Many of those who
survived suffered severe vision disturbances,
or total blindness, for up to a month. In
Sheikh Wasan, survivors watched as a woman
staggered blindly, clutching her dead child,
and not realizing the baby was dead. Some
villagers ran into the mountains and died
there. Others, who had been close to the
impact points of the bombs, died where they
stood.
The following morning, ground troops and
proregime Kurdish militia entered Balisan,
looted the villagers deserted homes and
razed them to the ground. Sometime later,
army engineers dynamited and bulldozed Sheikh
Wasan. The surviving
fled during the night
made their way to the
and a few to Shaqlawa
southeast to the town
was a hospital. Theyinhabitants had already
of the attack. Some
city of Suleimaniyeh,
But most headed
of Raiya where there
were helped on their
way by people from neighboring villages,
including Barukawa, Kaniberd, and Tutma,
which had also suffered from the effects of
the windborn gas. The people of Beiro sent
tractordrawn carts to Sheikh Wasan, and 10
of these vehicles, each carrying 50 or 6O
people, left for Raniya. At the complex of
Seruchawa, just outside the town, the
tractors stopped to bury the bodies of 50
people who were already dead. The refugees
who reached Raniya spent one night there.
Local doctors washed their wounds and gave
them eyedrops, but that did nothing to ease
the effect of the gas
The nexton their vision.
morning, agents from Amn
[Directorate of General Security, or DGS] and
possibly from military intelligence arrived
at the hospital. They ordered everyone out
of bed and into a number of waiting vehicles,
13
l63IHQl462938
consisting of 21 passenger vans, pickup
trucks and cars. The villagers were told
these vehicles would take them to the city
Erbil for medical care. However, they were
later warned their medical care was
contingent on them reporting that their
injuries were the result of an attack by
Iranian airplanes.
At about 9:00 that morning, people in
Kurdish dress began to stream into th G
emergency room of the Republic Hospital in
Erbil. Approximately 200 unarmed civilian
men, women and children arrived at th G
hospital. Four were dead on arrival. The
survivors arriving from Ranya told doctors
that they had been attacked with chemical
weapons. Despite their burns, their
blindness, and other, more superficia linjuries, those who had survived the journey
from the Balisan Valley were generally still
able to work, although some were unconscious.
Even with the assistance of doctors who
rushed across from the nearby Maternity and
Pediatric Hospital, the facilities were not
sufficient to deal with a largescale
emergency. There were far from enough beds
to deal with so many victims; many of
patients were laid on the floors, and
occupants of the vans were obliged to
the parking lot while the preliminary
was done and the first treatment carr ithe
the
wait in
triage
ed out.
On examination, the doctors found that the
victims eyes were dried out and glued shut.
Having some rudimentary notion of how to
treat chemicals, the doctors applied eye
drops, washed their burns and administered
injections of atropine, a powerful antidote
to nerve agents.
The doctors had been at work on their
patients for about an hour when HASSAN
NADURI, the head of the local branch office
of Amn, arrived. When NADURI arrived on the
morning of April 4, 1987, every doctor in the
hospital was busy dealing with the emergency.
NADURI was accompanied by two other Amn
14
l63IHQl462938
officers, and, possibly IBRAHIM ZANGANA, the
governor of Erbil, and a second local Baath
Party official, ABDALMON'EM. The Amn
officers questioned the hospital guards,
demanding to know where the new patients were
from and who the doctors were who were
treating them. They then repeated these
questions to the medical staff, and demanded
to know what treatment was being given. As
these questions were answered, NADURI
telephoned the Amn office for instructions.
After hanging up, he ordered that all
treatment cease immediately. He told the
doctors to remove the dressings from the
patients wounds. When the doctors asked
why, NADURI stated that he had received
orders from his superiors to transfer all the
patients to the city's military hospital. At
first, the hospital staff demurred, but the
three Amn officers drew their pistols and
ordered them to stop what they were doing at
once. Otherwise, they would be taken to Amn
headquarters themselves. After a second
telephone call, this time ostensibly to the
military hospital, a number of ambulances or
trucks arrived and took the patients away,
together with those who remained, for a full
hour now, in the three parked vans.
Later that day, the doctors telephoned
the military hospital to check on the
condition of their patients. They had never
arrived there. The doctors never saw any of
the survivors of the Balisan Valley chemical
attack again. They later heard that loaded
military ambulances had been seen driving off
in the direction of Makhmour, to the
southwest of Erbil.
A handful of survivors told Middle East
Watch that the Balisan Valley victims were
taken to a former police station that was now
an Amn detention center, a stark white cement
building in the Arab quarter of the city,
near the Baiz casino. There was a chaotic
scene on arrival, as Amn officers attempted
to sort out detainees by age and sex, and, in
the confusion, several people managed to
15
l63IHQl462938
escape. At least one woman fled leaving her
children behind. Those who remained were
thrown into locked cells, and guarded by
uniformed agents; some dressed all in the
green and others in blue. Here, they were
held for several days without food, blankets
or medical attention.
HAMOUD SA'ID AHMAD, an employee of the
municipal morgue attached to Erbils Republic
Hospital, was summoned on a number of
occasions over the next few days to the Amn
jail in the city's Teirawa quarter and
ordered to pick up bodies to be prepared for
burial. Over a three day period, AHMAD
counted 64 bodies. Arriving to collect them,
AHMAD saw other prisoners wandering around
the in the prison courtyard. Some had clear
fluid oozing from their mouths; others had
dark, burnlike marks on their bodies,
especially the throat and hands. AHMAD saw
men, women, and children in detention,
including several nursing babies in their
mother's arms. The bodies, kept in a
separate cell, bore the same marks. None
showed any signs of gunshot wounds. Most ofthe dead appeared to be children and elderly
people. An Amn official told AHMAD that
they are saboteurs, all saboteurs we attack
with chemical weapons. An ambulance driver
told AHMAD that he recognized one of the dead
as a Republic Hospital employee from Sheikh
Wasan.
Family members waiting outside the jailfor news said that the detainees were being
held as hostages to compel their peshmerga
relatives to surrender. On the last of his
three visits, AHMAD saw two large buses pull
up outside the prison, their windows sealed
with cloth. Later that day, a female
prisoner managed to whisper to him do youknow what the buses were doing here? They
took all the men away, to the south, like the
Barzanis. The men were never seen alive
again.
16
163IHQl462938
After the mass disappearance of the men,
the surviving women and children were taken
out during the night and driven off in the
direction of Khalifan, three hours to the
northeast of Erbil. At a place called Alana,
they were dumped in an open plain on the
banks of the river, and left to fend for
themselves. They were reunited here with the
Balisan Valley villagers who had fled to
Suleimaniyeh.
At Alana, the mother who had escaped
from the Amn jail in Erbil was reunited with
her children. She recognized families from
the villages of Kaniberd, Tutma, Sheikh Wasa,
and Balisan, who told her that many children
had died in place from hunger, thirst, and
exposure.
On the basis of interviews with four
survivors, and with a number of medical and
morgue personnel in Erbil, HRW determined a
rough estimate of the numbers who died as a
result of exposure to chemical weapons.
There were 24 deaths in Balisan as a
direct result of exposure to chemical
weapons; these people were buried in a mass
grave in the village.
There were 103 deaths in Sheikh Wasan,
including approximately 50 buried in a mass
grave in the government complex in Seruchawa.
The dead included:
33 children under the age of four
28 children between the ages of 5-14
9 elderly people aged 60-85
8-9 dead at the hospital at Raniya
4 dead on arrival at the Erbil
Emergency Hospital
64 -142 deaths in the Amn jail in
Erbil.
The deaths in the Amn jail were the
result of untreated injuries sustained in the
chemical bombing, aggravated by starvation
and neglect. The victims included two
' 17
E1631-HQl462938
elderly women identified as SELMA MUSTAFA
HAMID and ADILA SHINKO, and a nineyear old
girl identified as HOWSAT ABDULLAH KHIDR.
The
taken by
presumed
70 to 75.
Balisan,number of adult men and teenage boys
two busloads from the Amn jail and
to be executed later is estimated at
Twenty two are believed to be from
50 from Sheikh Wasan, and four from
nearby villages. Among those that
disappeared were MOHAMMAD IBRAHIM KHIDR, age
18, and MOHSEN IBRAHIM KHIDR, age 12, the two
youngest sons of the Mullah of Balisan.
Allowing for some overlap, the Middle East Watch
calculated that at least 225 and perhaps as many as 400 civiliansfrom the Balisan Valley died as a result of the April 16, 1987Iraqi Air Force's chemical strike on their villages.
[;;::::::::::::::] hereinafter[:::::] also witnessed theApril 16, 87, attack on Balisan. According t§[::::::g]the
Iraqi military attacked the villages of Sheikh asan an Balisan
during the evening hours of April 16, 1987. The aerial attackwas the first night attack conducted by the Iraqi militaryagainst the Kurds. [:::::]believed the Iraqi military used
chemical weapons against the villages at night because the
highest concentration of villagers would be in their homes andthe villages at night; the men who remained in the villages werethe toughest in the valley; and it gave the Iraqi military the
the time of the attack, estimated there were 200 to 300opportunity to attack i¬i:i?;j of the Peshmega front lines. At
civilians and Peshmergas in alisan and approximately 400 in
Sheikh Wasan..
On April 16, 1987,g::::::]who lived in Balisan, w 'the village of Tutma, locate within the Balisan Valley. [:if:if]
saw Iraqi aircraft over the villages of Balisan and Sheikh Wasan.While over the villages, the aircraft conducted dive runs but
did not hear any explosions. Approximately an hour later,heard the sound of helicopters, followed by dull
explosions, and he saw large, high flames coming from the
had been a chemical attack villages and knew that it
later learned through the
earlier from Kirkuk. The
helicopters were involvedPUK that the helicopters had taken off
PUK has estimated that approximately 36
in the attack.
[:::::]immediately began walking to Balisan because his
18196
b7C
l63IHQ1462938
brother,| I was there. The journey took himapproximately an hour. Upon arrival at the village [:::::]saw' ers acting normally and going about their normal routine.learned that his brother had fled the villaif:bffjuse hehad been injured in the attack. After some time, began to
see the effects of the attack on some of the villagers. The most
common symptoms were pain to the eyes and loss of vision. People
began to flee the village as word of the injuries spread
throughout the village.
[::::;]went to the PUK field hos ital in the village ofKhati to searc for his br ther. Becausei;:::::::::::::::] facewas so badly burned,[:::::jdid not initia y recognize hisbrother and found him only after his brother called out uponhearin9g::::::]V0iCe- E:::::::::::::::]face was dark from theburn an appeared sunken, as if dehydrated. All the patients at
the hospital were victims of that evening's chemical attack.
On April 17, 1987, at approximately 6:30 am,[:::::::]heard the sound of artillery approaching the village of Khati.
The Iraqi military had started a ground offensive in the Balisan
Valley. The Iraqi military began clearing the valley one village
at a time. The Iraqi military first fired artiller at thevillage, and then cleared it with tanks. When[::::E]heard the
artillery fire approaching Khati, he knew that village would soon
be the next target.
[%::%:] along with his brother and four other injuredKurds, fle t e valley to hide in a cave in the mountain. [:::::]
identified the others as two civilians from Balisan, a civilianfrom Sheikh Wasan, and a fi hter fromL;::::::lhometown. Whenthey arrived at the cave,[:%:::]saw o er VlC ims from the
chemical attack, captured Iraqi soldiers and civilians hidin[::::::]estimated their number to be approximately 40. [::::::?]
interview, December 15, 2004!.
On April 19, 1987,[:::::]led his brother and theremaining injured to the village of Sheikh Wasan. Although the
Iraqi chemical attacks had concentrated on Sheikh Wasan and
Balisan, the gasses had dissipated from a section of Sheikh Wasanbecause of the topography of the area. As a result,E:::::]and his
group stayed the night of April 19 on that relative y safe side
of the village.
The next morning,[:::::]and his small group traveledfrom Sheikh Wasan to Balisan. He gathered the food he had
previously hidden on April 18, 1987. Although the food had been
19'0
7C
l63IHQl462938
contaminated with chemicals, the group was so hungry that theyhad no choice but to eat it. B nightfall, approximately 10people had gathered around[::::E] Most of the homes in the
village had been burned by the Iraqi troops, but they managed tofind house at the edge of the village to spend the night.[;:;::fnoted that although approximately 2,000 people lived in
a isan, only 10 or 12 people had returned after the attack.
On April 21, 1987,[::;;]intended to travel with hisbrother to lawa to locate me ical supplies. At approximately9:00 aHLE::fffwas still in Balisan when two Iraqi Gazellehelicopters flew over the village.[::::::]recognize hem bysight and knew they carried 20mm machine guns. [:::%:jsoon heard
machine gun bursts as the helicopters traveled northwest from
Balisan. He and another raced to the sound of the guns and found
seven people, five males and two females, shot dead on the
government road northwest of Balisan. One of the woman had been
carrying an infant who had not been shot and was trying to breast
feed from its dead mother.
[:::::]estimated that the total populations of all of
the villages in the Balisan Valley ranged from 400 to 2,000
Balisan!. Most were located within a mile or two of each other.
Although the Iraqi military attacked and burned all 42 villages
in the valley, the Iraqi government forces seemed to concentrate
on the villages of Balisan, Sheikh Wasan, Tutemeh, Balanukawa,
Kanibard, Berawa, and Khati which are all located within three
miles of each other. The chemical attacks were most concentrated
on Balisan and Sheikh Wasan, but other villages not directly
attacked were indirectly affected by the gas as well. It
appeared that Berawa, Khatti, and Kanibard were attacked byartillery or airplanes employing conventional weapons only.[:::::]interview, January 27, 2005].
The following declassified satellite imagery,illustrating Sheikh Wasan on May 27, 1987, depicts the impact
20.136
7C
l63IHQl462938
craters 1n and near the vlllages
The FBI obtalned several audlotapes, consolldated onto __
one CD from Phlllp Trewhltt Unlted Klngdom Llalson on
Transltlonal Justlce, Offlce of Human Rights & Transltlonal
Justlce, Coalltlon Provlslonal Authorlty Baghdad Iraq Thesetapes are referenced 1n the HRW report dated July I993 Appendlx
The ALI HASAN ALMAJID Tapes These tapes contaln
recordlngs of Al Majld durlng Northern Command meetlngs held
between approxlmately 1987 to 1989 Portlons of the tapes were
played for ALMAJID
We sald that at that date we wlll start to
lmplement the deportatlon campalgn And we
dld 1t everywhere, wlth the help of God The
same day they captured Qara Dagh 1n
retallatlon JALAL TALABANI asked me to open
.~_
ya
92 ~."9, .._~¢~*3?
. @%§mI
é;7».
hr,**~~.~r-- _,
v*1av,-, R-<~.'..- _
Q
.l,ZN
H,
Q0 I
-'§s1-;~ I, _,,>~.;;__ it1 ..'~"
l63IHQl462938
a special channel of communication with him. That evening I went
to Suleimaniyeh and hit them with the special ammunition. That
was my answer. I will attack it with chemical weapons. and Iwill kill them all with chemical weapons! Who is going to say
anything? The international community? Fuck them! The
international community and those who listen to them. [Tape 2A
segment marked approximately 21:59 to 26:44]
ALMAJID is presumably referring to the April, 1987chemical attack on the PUK headquarters in the Jafati Valley.
ALMAJID also listened to the following portion of Tape 2B:
I will not attack them with chemicals just
one day, but I will continue to attack them
with chemical weapons for fifteen days.
[Tape 2B]
We will surround them in a small pocket and
attack them with chemical weapons. I will
not attack them with chemicals just one day,
but I will continue to attack them with
chemicals for 15 days.
After listening to Tape A, ALMAJID stated, "This tapehas been altered" and that "this tape is not correct." He
claimed the audiotape had been "assembled" from tapes of two
different meetings; one meeting in the first half of 1988 and the
other in Mosul on March 30, 1991.
ALMAJID admitted that the audiotape A was a recordingof his voice and his words at a meeting with Ba'ath Party Section
officials and Governors of the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan on
April 15, 1987. ALMAJID stated that his statements were
attempts at "psychological warfare" against the enemy in the
beginning of the campaign against the saboteurs in the Northern
Region. His words were meant as a scare tactic similar to what
was later used in Dohuk. In ALMAJID's opinion, the saboteurs
would be "weakened by words." Logistically, they would later be
weakened by their forced separation from the cities. [ALMAJID
interview, April 9, 2004]
ALMAJID said he personally inspected Suleimaniyeh andit had not been hit. He added that he never heard of such an
attack, particularly with chemical weapons. He stated he did notorder a chemical weapons attack on TALABANI and his headquartersin the Jafati Valley near Suleimaniyeh. He claimed he actually
went to Suleimaniyeh to meet with TALABANI, and that the words
22
l63IHQl462938
"and hit them with the special ammunition"
into this tape. The remainder of the tape
tactic ALMAJID used against the saboteurs
According to ALMAJID, when the
control of the cities of Suleimaniyeh, Dohu
in 1991, HUSSEIN tasked ALMAJID with "libe
invited ABD JAWAD THANNOON, Governor of Doh
hereinafter SAID!, Fifth Corps Commander,
Party officials to a "reception" at the Mos
There, ALMAJID gave a speech declaring, "W
Dohuk, I will attack with chemical weapons
attempted to interrupt ALMAJID because
timing of the operation to be revealed. AL
communicate this information to those in Do
illusion" of a chemical weapons attack to b
minds of those controlling Dohuk. ALMAJID
Government was weak in 1991. Thus, he used
"threat" as a "scare tactic" to control the
ALMAJID directed the military to
or cement and attach them to helicopters.
then used the following morning to spread t
to further "illusion" of a chemical weapons
used this "scare tactic" to reduce losses o
side." ALMAJID walked into Dohuk at 9:30
Some Iraqi military members would not enter
thinking that it had been contaminated withhave been inserted
is a threat or scare
in Dohuk.
Iraq Government lost
k, Erbil, and Kirkuk
rating" Dohuk. He
uk, NASIR SAID
and all state and
ul Hotel in Mosul.
hoever has a friend
tomorrow." SAID
he did not want the
MAJID directed him to
huk. He wanted "the
e imprinted in the
stated the Iraq
the chemical weapons
saboteurs in Dohuk.in
procure bags of flour
The helicopters were
he material over Dohuk
attack. ALMAJID
n "our side and their
a.m. the same morning.
the city however,
chemical weapons.
According to ALMAJID, NIZAR ALKHAZRAJI hereinafter
ALKHAZRAJI!, Army Chief of Staff, once tol
or RASOOL MAHMOUD NFI! that ALMAJID order
attack on
"Chemical Ali" because of the events at Doh
During his interview, TARIQ AZIZ
HUSSEIN's decision to deploy chemical weapod ABBAS MAHMOUD NFI!
ed the chemical weapon
Halabja which was not true. ALMAJID is know as
uk and not at Halabja.
confirmed that
ns against the Kurdswas a unilateral one; that is, HUSSEIN did not convene a meetingof the RCC, National Assembly, or any other Iraqi or Ba'ath Party
government entity to discuss the use of chemical weapons in the
April, 1987 attacks. Moreover, HUSSEIN gave no official writtenor verbal notification to these entities that he had authorized,
or that chemical weapons had been used, in the attacks. AZIZ
stated the RCC was "informed" and "it was mentioned." He addedit was "common knowledge" through the media that chemical weaponshad been used. No RCC member protested their use for fear ofreprisals from HUSSEIN and fear that Iraq would lose the war
23
163IHQl462938
without such a drastic step. At the time, the situation was
viewed as dire and "life or death." AZIZ admitted that Iraq and
Iran had each violated provisions of the Geneva Conventions of
1917 and 1948, of which each was a signator, which prohibited the
use of chemical weapons. [AZIZ interview, February 2, 2004].
May 25, 1987 Chemical Attack on the Malakan Valley
Pursuant to the authorization to use chemical weapons
that HUSSEIN had given to the military in the series of
previously identified letters, the Iraqi military attacked theMalakan Valley with chemical weapons on May 25, 1987.
Specifically, based on an April 24, 1987 DMI report, Number
28357, the Secretary General for the Ministry of Defense, Staff
General MAHMOOD SHOKER SHAHEEN, sent letter Number D/A/51/1/10374
to the Headquarters of the Army Chief of Staff. The letter,
dated May 1, 1987, advised that the Deputy to the Minister of
Defense had ordered:
All agents
traditionalsites should be struck with aerial weapons,
and special, and all weapons within range.
Attached as document #XX!
This letter
Chief of Staff, Staff
DMI via letter Number
Please take
provide the
Air Defenseprompted the Senior Secretary of the Army
General TAREQ HUSSEIN MAJEED, to direct the
RAG/1/15787, dated May 2, 1987, to:
the necessary procedure and
Headquarters of the Air Force and
with the Agents sites in order
to destroy them. Attached as document #XX!
On May 3, 1987, the DMI informed the Headquarters of
the Army Chief of Staff via report Number M1/Sh3/Q2/9819 that it
had provided the locations of the Iranian Agents sites to theHeadquarters of the Air Force and Air Defense. The DMI
identified 17 villages by name and by what appears to have beengrid coordinates. Additionally, the DMI suggested ordering a
study on the issue of striking the Iranian Agentss sites withspecial ammunition by the authorized committee SABIR ALDURI
signed the report as the Director of the DMI. Attached as
document #XX!
On May 9, 1987, the Headquarters of the Air Force and
Air Defense notified the Ministry of Defense via letter Number
Shl/QD/690 that based on SABIR's report Number 9819, and Army
24
l63IHQl462938
Chief of Staff letter Number 15787, air strikes were launched
with traditional ammunition by 0! aircrafts, and with special
ammunition by 4! aircrafts against the Agents sites
in the DMIs report, except for Shadlah Alolya, due to
nearness to the troop line. The letter was signed by
General HUMAID SHABAAN, Commander of the Air Force andmentioned
its
Lieutenant
Air
Defense. Attached as document #XX!
On May 12, 1987, the Headquarters of the Air Force and
Air Defense identified for the DMI in letter Number SH/QS/707 the
locations of sites struck by traditional ammunition and those
struck by special ammunition. The ten sites struck by
traditional ammunition on May 4 and May 8, 1987 and listed by
name and grid coordinates were among the 17 sites the DMI had
previously identified in report Number 9819. The sites struck by
special ammunition on May 7, 1987 were identified only by grid
coordinates. The letter was signed by Staff Pilot General HASSAN
KHADER ALHAJ AHMED, the Director of Air Movements. Attached as
document #XX!.
On May 20, 1987, the DMI summarized the strikes
directed at the Iranian Agents sites as reported by the Air
Force and Air Defense in report number M1/Sh3/Q2/11144 addressed
to the Ministry of Defense. The report identified the ten sites
struck with traditional ammunition and further
reported:
2. As for the other targets, which were hit by air
strikes 4! aircrafts using special ammunition
mentioned in the above Air Force and Air Defense
letter!, were groups of Iranian Agents existing North
and East of Gowarta. Attached as document #XX!
A handwritten memorandum, Number 4947 attached as
document #XX!, dated June 11, 1987, from the Director of General
Security of the Erbil Governate to the Security Directorate of
Shaqlawa, provided information about attacks on "saboteurs" thatresulted in their blindness. The document stated, in part:
On 5/27/87, our aircraft attacked the
villages of Malakan, Talinan, Kandor, Bileh
Aliya and Bileh Sufla in the Khalifan
subdistrict, which harbor some saboteurs. As b6
a result of the bombing [:::::::::::::] lost *his eyesight....A number of saboteurs were
killed and about 3O people lost their
eyesight as a result of the bombing,
25:b1 '
l63IHQl462938
including the family of KAMAL HAJI KHIDR
AGHA, the commander of the 12th [PUK]
division.
Temporary blindness is a common side-effect of a
chemical attack. HRW interviewed KAMAL AGHA in March, 1993, who
confirmed that he and his family had been temporarily blinded in
a chemical attack on May 27, 1987.
On May 26, l987,[:::::::::] was part of a Peshmerga
group that arrived in the Malakan Valley. In the late afternoon
of May 26th, 1987,[:::::]witnessed a MIG25 flying slowly over
the Malakan Valley. Approximately five or six miles long, the
Malakan Valley was home to t ' ages of Malakan, Talinan,BilaZohri, and BilaZehri. Ef:fiiibelieved the airplantaking surveillance photographs for an upcoming attack.T:fii:::]
later learned from an Iraqi deserter that it was common for the
Iraqi Air Force to send a MIG~25 to an area that it planned to
attack. The MIG25 would fly to the area of interest to take
pictures of the villages and areas where people lived. The next
day, the area would be attacked with chemical weapons.
As[::::]and his group prepared to depart Malakan
shortly after 6 a.m. on May 27, 1987, Iraqi government forces
attacked the top of the Malakan Valley with chemical weapons. A
spring at the top of the valley which was the villages water
source channeled the heavy chemical gas through the valley and
down towards the villages. Believing the attack was part of a
larger operation that might include an attack on the Balisan
Valley, HASSAN SHUSTANI, the PUK Third Malaband Commander,
ordered his group of Pershmergas to leave immediately for
Balisan. On the way out of Malakan which is on the north side of
the valley, the group had to head down into the valley and
through the gas. However, no one in GOZEH's group was severely
effected by the chemical gases. The villagers in the area were
left to deal with the chemical attack themselves.
[:::::]believed this attack was in retaliation for an
entire Jahsh regiment's Kurdish proregime militia! recent
def 'on and relocation to the Malakan Valley According to
a total of fifteen died from the chemical attack four ofwhom were members of the defected Jahsh regiment. [::::::]
interview, February 3, 2005].
June 6, 1987 Chemical Attack on the Zewa Valley
A handwritten note by the Director of Sh3 DMI! dated
26b6
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l63IHQl462938
June 5, 1987, was attached to the DMI study, Number Sh3/Q2/6885,
which was submitted to the Presidential Secretary for HUSSEIN's
review and information. [Enclosure #8]. The note stated:
Regarding obtaining approval of the Presidency's Office
on the said suggestion, and in paragraph A under item 2
of the attached letter which stipulates postponing the
strike of Khomeini Guards in Barzani's First Division
till June, therefore:
1. On June 4, a study was completed on directing a
severe strike against these quarters and against
Barzani's First Division quarters in Zewa, Barzan,
Katirash, and Lakirash!, and this study was completed
by participants from the General Staff, Planning
Department, Army, Air Force, our Directorate, and the
Chemical Division.
2. Support for the Strike on Zewa Village was obtained
despite of its close proximity to the Turkish border,
but striking the targets listed hereunder were not
supported for the following reasons:
a. Katirash it's too close to the Turskish border.
b. Lakirash its close proximity to our army units in
Jabal Kuwait.
C. Barzan, where the Khomeini Guards are few and
disbursed in the Barzan Basin, does not constitute a
viable target.
In June, 1987, ] hereinafter[:g:::::::]was living at an Iraqi Communist Party ICP! compound in t e Zewa
Valley which is located in the top part of Kurdistan above Dohuk
near Kani Masi. The compound housed the ICP leadership including
HAMID MUSA, aka ABU MUSA, currently a member of the interim Iraqi
Government, SLAYMAN YOUSEF, aka ABU AMIL, head of the military
committee, TOMA TOMAS, aka ABU JAMEEL, head of the Bahdinan area,
and ABU ADEL, political advisor for the Bahdinan area.
The Zewa Valley is surrounded by mountains and was home
to approximately 1,000 Peshmergas from the various Kurdish
parties. The ICP compound was located near two civilian
villages. The valley was protected by doshkas, Russian anti-
aircraft missiles.
On approximately June 5 or 6, 1987, between 6:00 or
7:00 p m., 12 grey Iraqi MIG aircrafts attacked the valley while
most residents were preparing for dinner. The aircraft came in
very low at approximately 1,000 feet. The aircraft circled the
27b6
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l63IHQl462938
valley and conducted two bombing runs which lasted a total of
approximately 1O minutes. There were approximately six to ei htexplosions. One bomb landed approximately 5O feet fromEver on in the compound ran for the bomb shelters AcL;;;;h; to[::::f::i this was the first time the Iraqis attacked with so manyaircraft at such a low altitude and so close to homes andstructures. E:::::::]described the explosions as a dull noiseaccompanied y heavy white smoke. Initially, there was no smell,but then[:::::::]noted a garlicky smell
explosions.associated with the
Initially,[::::::]<iid not notice any injuries exceptfor[:;:::::] NFI!, who sustained a leg injury as a result of theattac . No one in the compound initially realized that theattack had been a chem'cal attack. After approximately one half-r howeve [:::::::jhou , r, heard someone call for the doctor assymptoms of the chemical attack began to appear. [g::::::::]friend, ABU RAZKAR, began vomiting, which alarmed er. He toldher he believed he had inhaled sulfur.
Most people in the compound went to sleep atapproximately 9:00 or 9:30 pm that evening. At that time, it wascommon for eo le to sleep on the roof of the homes. Howeverthat night,| Idecided to sleep inside. At approximately'd ' ht 12 O kmi nig or :3 am,| |was awo en and informed that theattack had been a chemical one. was instructed to go tothe support detachment isnad!.L_WH¬H[:k::::]arrived, she sawhundreds of men, women and children from the compound and nearbyvillages standing around a large bonfire. Most were sufferingfrom some effects of the chemical attacks and were in a greatdeal of pain. [:::::::]stated that no artist could paint, nowriter could write, or no cinematographer could film thesufferin ." Man wer l ' ' f b ' ' t th g e comp aining o a urning pain o e eyesand tearing. [::f::::]also began to experience a burning pain toher eyes. Everyone believed that fire would counter the effectsof chemical attack, hence the large bonfire. Approximately 400to 500 Peshmergas and civilians, to include approximately 50
children, were effected by this attack.
The Peshmerga leadership ordered everyone to evacuatethe area and head to high ground. Peshmergas and civilians fromthe nearby effected villages began to make their way, on foot, tothe top of the mountain through a small
everything behind. By this time, manyblind and were unable to make their way
complained of stomach pains. Many werejourney. [::::::]lmlped a blind man up
Z8foot path, leaving
of the victims were going
up the path. Others
unable to complete the
the foot path, arrivingb6
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l63IHQl462938
to a safe haven at approximately 3:00 am.
It was very cold at the top of the mountain and manysuffered. They had no food, water or blankets. Those whoreached the top were forced to eat berries from nearby trees.The victims went without food for three days until help finallyarrived. Blisters began to appear on everyone's body whichvaried in size based upon the individual's proximity to theexplosions. Those nearer to impact point blistered and sufferedmore. Three days after the attack, ABU EUAD died as a result ofexposure to the chemical weapons. ABU EUAD NFI! was very closeto the point of impact of one of the bombs. On the fifth day,
ABU RAZKAR NFI! died as well.
As a result of the attack, the victims were forciblyremoved from their homes and forced to live in the mountains fora month without shelter. Animals died. Trees in the surroundingarea lost their leaves. It was not until September, 1987, thatvillagers were able to return to Zewa Valley. The valley hadexperienced heavy rain fall, which[:;;:::]believed helped clearthe valley of the chemical r 'due. ome victims were blind for40 da To this day,[;:;::fffstill suffers from her exposure.[:::::ff::]hands still s a e, and she has breathing difficulties.
[::::::]stated that at one point, all the Kurdishparties had joined efforts in resisting Iraqi forces and werereferred to as the United Front. Prior to the attack, theParties were planning a large scale offensive against the Iraqisin the area. The plan developed over a period of time at largeplanning meetings. On the day of the attack, a planning meetinghad been scheduled to take place with representatives from all ofthe Kurdish parties at the Iraqi Communist Party compound. Itwas known that the Peshmer a had been infiltrated by Iraqi spiesor double agents. E:::::::fbelieved the attack was meant tothwart the Kurdish offensive.
DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY AND FORCIBLE DEPORTATION
ALMAJID read a copy of RCC Decree 160, dated March 29,1987, which was written in Arabic and signed by HUSSEIN. AL~MAJID acknowledged that this decree had been issued and thatgranted him authority over all civilian, military and securityagencies in the Northern region. He explained that a Decree isissued at the conclusion of an RCC meeting and details issuesaddressed by the RCC during the meeting. ALMAJID stated thathe received a written copy of Decree #160 at a later time.Immediately after the RCC issued the Decree, he also received
296
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additional written instructions from the Presidential Diwan whichfurther defined his authority. The Presidential Diwan'sinstructions restricted AL-MAJID's authority to villages in theNorthern Region located within five kilometers of provinces and
areas classified as cities, zones, or suburbs.
ALMAJID denied however, having authority over themilitary forces or security services in the region as thesecurity services were never subordinate to anyone in the
government except HUSSEIN. The Security Services, FedayeenSaddam and Saddam's Cubs, answered only to HUSSEIN and took theirinstructions only from HUSSEIN. Pursuant to the additionalinstructions, ALMAJID claimed he only used the powers granted tohim by the Decree for the "collectivization" of the villageswithin the defined parameters in the Northern Region. This"collectivization" consisted of moving Kurdish villagers fromtheir homes to Iraq Government housing complexes. Per the
additional instructions, areas beyond five kilometers fell withinthe control of the military, including cities near the border
between Iraq and Iran.
ALMAJID stated that the Anfal Campaign in Kurdishterritory in 1988 was conducted by the military under the commandOf SULTAN HASHEM AHMAD ALTAI hereinafter HASHEM!. ALMAJID
admitted delegating orders to the Security Services as itpertained to areas within his control, but the Services acted
independently everywhere else, to include their technical work.
During his interview, Presidential Diwan KHUDAIYER wasasked if he ever drafted a followup to RCC Decree 160 which
limited AL-MAJID's authority to a five kilometer radius aroundthe major cities of Northern Iraq. KHUDAIYER stated that he
never published such a Decree. KHUDAIYER was asked whether itwas possible that the limiting instruction could have been givenverbally. KHUDAIYER stated that such an order which contradictsa Decree would be very big and written. The original RCC Decree160 was sent to the Ministry of Interior, to governates and to avariety of receivers. The Chief of Staff, the Military
Intelligence, the Party and the Security Services were allaligned under the details of RCC Decree 160. Therefore, if theoriginal Decree were to be modified, written coordination wouldbe the only way to notify all of these groups who were requiredto abide by the details of the original RCC Decree 160. Tomodify a Decree would require the same legal authority. Doing itverbally would not be lawfully feasible. If such an eventoccurred it would be, legally speaking, unprecedented accordingto KHUDAIYER. _
30
l63IHQl462938
KHUDAIYER was asked what he thought about ALMAJID'sclaim that he received the five kilometer limitation verbally.
KHUDAIYER said that this instruction would only be in a writtenformat. If ALMAJID said it was passed verbally, he was lying.
ALMAJID admitted that he supervised the implementationof the Iraqi Government's plan to control the activities of thePeshmergas whom the government labeled saboteurs. ALMAJIDexplained that "saboteurs" was the term Iraqis used in officialdocuments to describe Kurds who resisted Iraq Government rule,and that TALABANI was the Sheikh of the Saboteurs. ALMAJID
stated that because Iran continuously attempted to establish itspresence and take control of areas like Halabja, the IraqiGovernment devised a plan which created security zones along thenorthern IraqIran border. Mere presence in these areas wasprohibited. The residents of Kurdish farming villages within thetargeted areas were forcefully relocated from their homes to
government complexes known as mujammaat in a process that becameknown as village collectivization. ALMAJID stated that it wasdifficult for the Iraq Government to distinguish Kurds from
Iranians or good individuals from bad ones.
ALMAJID denied knowledge of any executions of Kurds inNorthern Iraq. ALMAJID stated his duties includedcollectivization of Kurdish villagers within the specified fivekilometer boundary into government housing complexes. Accordingto ALMAJID, villages outside the five kilometer radius were
controlled by KHAZRAJI.
ALMAJID stated that most Kurds did not want to movefrom or leave their homes. Those who did were seeking
improvements such as electricity, refrigerators, and schoolteachers. If Kurds refused to be relocated, they were forcedinto vehicles and taken, along with their belongings, togovernment housing complexes. Once the villagers were deported,the villages were leveled to avoid becoming safe havens forsaboteurs. ALMAJID stated that was merely following HUSSEINSorders and that he did not develop this plan himself because itsimplementation cost millions of dinars and required the effortsof all the government's ministries. [ALMAJID interview, March
21, 2004].
ALMAJIDs statements are inconsistent with known factsprovided by former Iraqi regime members and seized Iraqi
memorandums. These memorandum, detailed below, document AL-MAJIDs use of the broad authority delegated to him by Hussein tocommit crimes against humanity and genocide against the Kurdish
31
l63IHQl462938
population.
ALMAJID isolated the Kurdish population by issuingdecrees and administrative orders depriving them of basic rights.ALMAJID signed an Iraqi Ba'ath Party letter dated April 6, 1987,#S Sh/18/2396, which ordered the confiscation of the saboteurs
property:
By the authority vested in us by the RCC
decree #160 of March 29, 1987, we decided toauthorize the chairman of the security
committees in the northern govenorates to
confiscate the real and personal property of
the saboteurs, provided that the their
properties are liquidated within one month of
the date of issuance of the confiscation
decree.
This document is described in the HRW report titled, "Genocidein Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds," dated July,
1993, and referenced on page 13 and in footnote 41 of the Preludeto Anfal section of the report.!
ALMAJID was questioned regarding this letter andadmitted giving this authority to the security committees, butdid not remember the details. He stated that the confiscationdiscussed applied to money as well as real property. ALMAJID
stated the authority for this order was not based on RCC decree#160, but on a separate RCC decree authorizing confiscation offunds and property of individuals who worked against the Iraq
Government as saboteurs, and the confiscation of funds andproperty of individuals in the Da'wa Party. These two categoriesof individuals were considered to be hostile or antiIraq
Government political forces. ALMAJID does not remember thenumber or date of the RCC decree he referenced. [ALMAJID
interview, April 4, 2004].
On April l0, 1987, RADHI HASSAN SALMAN hereinafterSALMAN!, Deputy Secretary of the Northern Bureau Command,suspended the legal rights of residents in villages within the
prohibitedsecurity zone. In Northen Bureau letter Number1/2713, SALMAN wrote:
His excellency has ordered that [legal] cases
of people from the villages prohibited for
security reasons or cases of the saboteurs,
32
l63IHQl462938
regardless of their nature not be heard, and
to freeze the cases that have already been
heard. [attached as document #XX]
When questioned regarding this document, ALMAJIDstated, "I do not remember this." He added that all Northern
Bureau Command orders were issued by him and not by his Deputy.
ALMAJID acknowledged SALMAN was the Deputy Secretary General of
the Northern Bureau Command but asserted that he would not have
tasked SALMAN with issuing such an order and SALMAN did not issueit in ALMAJIDs absence. He stated that all legal cases are
matters for courts of law and not for security committees. AL-
MAJID acknowledged, however, that he issued similar instructions
to the courts in approximately June, 1987 when he directed the
courts not to hear cases and/or to postpone cases involving
individuals from prohibited zones. Villages in these zones werecleared of people, their residences demolished, and the residents
relocated to government housing complexes. ALMAJID reiteratedthat such an order would have been issued only by him and would
have been logically directed to the courts and not to the
security committees. He added security services were not incharge of the courts. When questioned about the authenticity ofthe document and whether he thought it was a forgery, ALMAJID
stated, "I do not know. Maybe." [ALMAJID interview, April 4,
2004].
The government's plan to eliminate the Kurds is furthercorroborated in letter Number 28/573 to the Command of the Iraqi
Fifth Corps, dated April 13, 1987, classified Top Secret and
Confidential, and written by the Special National Defense Forces
General Staff, a proregime Kurdish militia. This document isreferenced on page 4 and in footnote 14 of the HRW report datedJuly, 1993, "Prelude to Anfal section. The letter appeared tobe in response to a verbal order from the Fifth Corps Commanderand detailed the final obligations in winding up {illegible}
procedures for the termination of sabotage in the NorthernRegion, [and] the manner and the priorities of implementing theevacuation and demolition of the securityprohibited villages.
[attached as document #XX].
On May 14, 1987, ALMAJID issued letter Number 106309
regarding the execution of firstdegree relatives of "saboteurs."This document is referenced on pages 13-14 of the HRW reportdated July, 1993, "Prelude to Anfal" section. A handwritten notedated November 20, 1989, from the Security Chief, Interrogating
Officer, Amn Office in Suleimaniyeh, refers to ALMAJIDs letterNumber 106309. The document is referenced on page 13 of the HRW
33
l63IHQl462938
report dated July, 1993, "Prelude to Anfal section. The noteprovides details about an Iraqi citizen who petitioned for
information about his missing parents and brother. It states thebrother was executed July 12, 1987, as "a member of the group ofIranian saboteurs." The note further explains that the parents
were executed May 19, 1987:
in compliance with the order from the
Struggling Comrade ALI HASAN ALMAJID, member
of the Regional Command that was relayed to
us by letter number 106309 of the Security
Directorate of the Autonomous Region, marked
Secret and to be Opened Personally, and
dated May 1, 1987, regarding the liquidation
of firstdegree relatives of criminals.
[attached as document #xx].
A handwritten communication, Number 3324, dated May14, 1987, from the Security Director of the City of Halabja to
Amn Suliemaniyeh regarding the execution of wounded civiliansreferenced cable Number 945 from the Command of the Fifth Army
Corps and dated the previous day. Number 3324 stated, in
pertinent part:
The Commander of the First Army Corps issued
an order as requested by Comrade ALI HASAN
ALMAJID to execute the wounded civilians
after the Party Organization, the Security
and Police Departments and the Intelligence
Center have confirmed their hostility toward
the authorities; to use earth movers and
bulldozers to raze the neighborhood of Kani
Ashqan. [Attached as document #XX].
According to HRW/Middle East Watch MSW! interview of aformer resident, as documented in footnote 44, "Prelude to Anfal section, this action and the reported destruction of some 1,500homes was punishment for an antigovernment demonstration.
ALMAJID issued two significant and brutal directivesthat detailed the regime's intentions regarding the Kurds. AL-MAJID personally signed the first directive, Number 28/3650,dated O6/O3/1987, was issued to the Commanders of the First,
Second, and Fifth Army Corps, the Security Directorate of theAutonomous Region, the DMI, and the Iraqi Intelligence Service IIS!. The directive detailed the protocols for prohibited areasand included orders to kill all humans and animals. Paragraph
34
l63IHQl462938
one states:
It is totally prohibited for any foodstuffs
or persons or machinery to reach the villages
that have been prohibited for security
reasons that are included in the second stage
of collecting the villages. Anyone who so
desires is permitted to return to the
national ranks. It is not allowed for
relatives to contact them except with the
knowledge of the security agencies.
[attached as document #XX].
This directive was repeated word for word in
communications between receiving entities and lower level unitsas, for example, in letter Number 4754, dated June 8, 1987, fromAmn Erbil to all its departments and local offices. Letter
Number 4754 is referenced on page 15 of the HRW report dated
July, 1993, "Prelude to Anfal section.
ALMAJID examined a copy of the letter written in
Arabic. ALMAJID admitted such an order was issued and sent tothe referenced agencies and the military. ALMAJID acknowledged
the authenticity of the copy of this document and confirmed the
authenticity of his signature on the last page. [ALMAJID
interview, March 21, 2004].
The second and most significant directive ALMAJIDissued was SF/4008 on June 2O, 1987. The directive was issued bythe Northern Bureau Command, signed by ALMAJID, and stamped withthe seal of the RCC's Northern Affairs Committee. The directive
was conveyed to the First, Second, and Fifth Corps Command andprovided procedures on how to deal with prohibited villages. The
directive stated:
In view of the fact that the officially
announced deadline for the amalgamation of
these villages expires June 21, 1987, we have
decided that the following action should
taken with effect from June 22, 1987:
1. All the villages in which subversives,
agents of Iran and similar traitors to Iraq
are still to be found shall be regarded as
out of bounds for security reasons;
2. They shall be regarded as operational
zones that are strictly out of bounds to all
persons and animals and in which the troops
35
l63IHQl462938
can open fire at will, without any
restrictions, unless otherwise instructed by
our bureau;
3. Travel to and from these zones, as well
as agricultural, animal husbandry, and
industrial activities shall be prohibited and
carefully monitored by all the competent
agencies within their respective fields of
jurisdiction;
4. The corps commanders shall carry out
random bombardments using artillery,
helicopters, and aircraft at all times of theday or night in order to kill the largest
number of persons present in those prohibited
zones, keeping us informed of the results;
5. All persons captured in those villages
shall be detained and interrogated by the
security services and those between the agesof 15 and 70 shall be executed after any
useful information has been obtained from
them, of which we should be duly notified;
6. Those who surrender to the governmental
or Party authorities shall be interrogated by
the competent agencies for maximum period of
three days, which may be extended to ten days
if necessary, provided that we are notifiedof such cases. If the interrogation requires
a longer period of time, approval must be
obtained from us by telephone or telegraph or
through comrade TAHER ALANI;
7. Everything seized by the advisers and
troops of the National Defense Battalions
shall be retained by them, with the exception
of heavy, mounted and medium weapons. They
can keep the light weapons, notifying us onlyof the number of these weapons. The Corps
commanders shall promptly bring this to theattention of all the advisors, company
commanders and platoon leaders, and shall
provide us with detailed information
concerning their activities in the National
Defense Battalions. [attached as document
#xX] .
ALMAJID examined a copy of this document wri
Arabic ALMAJID admitted issuing the order listed asAccording to ALMAJID, everyone, civilian and military,
36tten in
item two
knew that
l63IHQl462938
no one was allowed in those areas as it was a theater of
operations. Anyone caught in those areas, including women andchildren, was to be killed. ALMAJID denied issuing the orderslisted as items four and five. ALMAJID acknowledged the
authenticity of the copy of this document and confirmed the
authenticity of his signature on the last page. [ALMAJID
interview, March 21, 2004].
When questioned about his orders to execute first-
degree relatives of saboteurs and wounded civilians, ALMAJIDstated he did not issue an order to execute firstdegree
relatives of saboteurs. He admitted, however, that inJuly/August 1987 he did order the "deportation" of first-degree
relatives of saboteurs from prohibited areas. ALMAJID issued
this order to ensure the security of the cities. He was
responsible for the security of the cities and areas within fivekilometers of the cities. Firstdegree relatives included only
the fathers of saboteurs. It did not include the female
relatives such as an individual's mother, sister, or daughter.
ALMAJID reiterated that prohibited areas were those
regions from which the Iraq Government had removed the citizens
and relocated them to government housing complexes. The order
regarding deportation of firstdegree relatives was intended to
force fathers to control the actions of their sons. After the
"gathering of people" into Iraq Government housing complexes, AL-MAJID stated that any acts of sabotage against the government
would result in implementation of this order. ALMAJID wanted
the consequences of the actions of the sons who were saboteurs tobe a "pressuring factor" on their fathers. ALMAJID ordered only
firstdegree relatives be deported from prohibited areas so that
the security committees did not expand the order to include other
relatives. He acknowledged other relatives, including mothers,
sisters, and daughters, could have elected to join relatives whohad been ordered "deported" from prohibited areas.
ALMAJID admitted that Directive 4008 which he issued
effective June 22, 1987, was still in effect at the time of his
issuance of the order regarding firstdegree relatives. AL-
MAJID reiterated that anyone caught in the prohibited areas after
June 22, 1987, including women and children, was to be killed.Directive 4008 was modified in September, 1987 to allow farming
in certain areas. When questioned whether deportation of first-degree relatives to prohibited areas was tantamount to sentencingthem to death because of Directive 4008, ALMAJID stated, "Why
would we deport them to a prohibited area [so that they would bekilled] when we could kill them?" When the interviewer suggested
37
l63IHQl462938
that perhaps this procedure was meant to minimize the "blood onthe hands" of ALMAJID and others, ALMAJID offered no reply.
ALMAJID noted saboteurs and firstdegree relatives
were given one month to decide whether they wanted to stay or
leave. If they decided to remain in government housing
complexes, they were required to pledge not to commit acts of
sabotage against the Iraq Government. [alMAJID interview, April
4, 2004].
AMN repeatedly referred to this Directive 4008
throughout 1988. For example, a letter from Amn Suleimaniyeh,
dated October 29, 1988, referenced the directive as the basis for
"the execution of 19 accused, executed by this directorate
because of their presence in the securityprohibited villages."
This document is referenced on page 15 of the HRW report dated
July, 1993, "Prelude to Anfal" section, and pages 1-2 of "The
Camps" section.
The Iraq Government's plan is further corroborated byALMAJID's own words as he discussed the Iraq Government's
campaigns in the Northern Region in 1987 and 1988. On April 15,
1988, ALMAJID attended a meeting with members of the Northern
Bureau and governors of the Autonomous Region of Iraqi Kurdistan
during which he discussed Kurdish territory and prohibited areas.
According to audiotapes of that meeting, ALMAJID stated, in
pertinent part:
I will prohibit large areas; I will prohibit
any presence in them. ...Now you can't go
from Kirkuk to Erbil any more without an
armored vehicle. All of this basin, from
Koysinjaq to here Kirkuk! ..I'm going to
evacuate it. I will evacuate it as far as
Gweir and Mosul. No human beings except on
the main roads. For five years, I won't
allow any human existence there. ...If we
don't act in this way, the saboteurs'
activities will never end, not for a million
years. ...In the summer, nothing will be
left. [reference audiotape #xx].
On July 22, 1987, TAHER ALANI hereinafter ALANI!,
Secretary of the Northern Affairs Committee, sent letter Number5083 to the First Corps Headquarters, entitled, "Executing
Criminals." The letter stated:
38
l63IHQ1462938
The struggler comrade ALI HASAN ALMAJID, the
head of the Northern Bureau, commented
regarding your mentioned letter. We have no
objection to the cutting of the heads of the
betrayers, but it would be better to send
them to Amn for interrogation, as they may
have useful information prior to their
execution. [attached as document #XX]
On September 8, 1987, the DMI submitted a report NumberM1/Sh3//Q2/19330 to the Northern Bureau Headquarters summarizing
current Kurdish activity. The report stated:
1. At 16OO hours, on September 3, 1987, centralized
artillery strikes using special ammunition! had beenlaunched against three sites of the Iranian Agents
along the DokanBeera Macroon line, which included the
site where the criminal JALAL TALABANI would be
located. Their casualties were two killed and 12
injured from their leadership, in addition to a number
of their saboteurs killed and wounded, and residents of
the neighboring villages of the above mentioned sites.
4. Commentary: After the air strikes with special
ammunition! launched against of the Iranian Agentssites in April 1987, the mentioned group's headquarters
received a number of chemical protective equipment from
the Iranian regime, in addition to the issue of a
special booklet by mentioned group. [attached as
document #XX]
The report was signed by SABIR ALDURI, Director of theDMI, and copies were forwarded to the Presidential Secretary for
HUSSEIN, the headquarters of the Chief of Staff of the Army, theRCC Northern Affairs Committee, Armed Forces Headquarters, and
the Ministry of Defense Diwan.
The April,
mentioned DMI report
against the villages
1987 strikes against1987 air strikes referred to in the above-
are very likely the April 15, 1987 strikes
of Bergalou and Sergalou, and the April 16,
Sheikh Wasan and Balisan.
A cable, reference number 4350, dated September 7,1987, from the Northern Bureau to all regional securitycommittees memorialized the details and instructions regardingthe national census that were issued during a September 6, 1987meeting of senior Ba'ath Party officials which ALMAJID chaired.A second version of this document is letter Number 2/237, dated
39
l63IHQl462938
September 1
a number of
referenced
"Prelude to
national ce
be allowed
census. No
however, "e
family memb9, 1987, from Shaqlawa District Security Committee to
local party and police agencies. These documents are
in footnote 51 of the HRW report dated July, 1993,
Anfal" section. At the meeting, preparations for the
nsus were discussed. "Subversives who repent" were to
to return to the fold right up to the day of the
returnees would be accepted after October 17, 1987,
ven if they surrender their weapons." Furthermore,
ers of "unrepentant saboteurs" could not remain in
governmentcontrolled areas and were to be physically removed andforced to join "saboteur kin" in prohibited areas. Upon
completion of an ALMAJID ordered inventory of cases, "the
families in question should be expelled to the regions where
their subversive relatives are, with the sole exception of males
aged between 12 and 50 inclusive, who should be detained." One
of the documents list the ages as 17 to 50.
According to pages 18-19 of
1993, "Prelude to Anfal Section, the
mass seminars and meetings to discuss
census scheduled for October 17, 1987.the HRW report dated July,
Northern Bureau ordered
the importance of the
Those who failed to
participate in the census without a valid excuse would lose their
Iraqi citizenship and would be regarded as army deserters, and as
such, subject to RCC decree #677, dated August 26, 1987.
Additionally, those not participating in the census were no
longer eligible for government services and food rations as they
would no longer be considered Iraqis. With respect to
identifying ethnicity in the census, individuals could onlychoose one of two options, Arab or Kurd. Furthermore, people
could only be counted if they made themselves available to the
census takers. For anyone living in a prohibited area, this
meant abandoning their home and registering and living as a
resident of a governmentcontrolled town or mujama'a.
On October 18, 1987, the Northern Bureau Command issuedletter Number 1216 to remind all Security Committees and Security
Directorates, in the Governates of the Autonomous Zone and the
Governates of Diyala and Salah AlDin of Directive
signed this letter which is referenced on page 19
58 of the HRW report dated July, 1993, "Prelude to
section.
HRW described the letter, issued the day
census, as a stern memo to all security committees
reminding them that aerial inspection would ensure
4008 of June 20, 1987, was being carried out "to t h4008. ALANI
and footnote
Anfal
after the
in Kurdistan,
that Directive
e letter."Any committee that failed to comply would "bear full
40
l63IHQl462938
responsibility before the Comrade Bureau Chief." ALMAJID signed
this letter.
On January 3, 1988, RCC Decree Number 10, signed by
HUSSEIN, modified some aspects of RCC Decree 677 but retained the
following paragraphs:
Paragraph one: The Party organizations shall
carefully examine the situation of military
deserters and draft dodgers who are captured.
Paragraph two: The death sentence shall be
carried out by the Party organization, after
that examination, on every deserter or draft
dodger who is captured if the duration of his
desertion or draft evasion exceeds one year
or if he had committed the crime of desertion
more than once.[attached as document #XX].
On November 22, 1988, Directive 4008 was againreinforced, this time in report Number Sh.2/17983, by name
illegible!, Deputy Brigadier-General of Security, Director of
Security of Erbil Governate, and addressed to the Directors of
Security Branches. The report reminded the Security Branches
that Northern Bureau Directive SF/4008 was still in effect:
In accordance with the directives of senior
authorities, it has been decided to apply
Paragraph 5 of the message of Northern Bureau
Command, reference 4008 of June 20, 1987, to
anyone present in the prohibited 'noman's
land areas muharram! and the areas banned
for security reasons mahdour!, without
exception. Please be informed, take the
necessary measures, and carry out. Let us
know. [Attached as document #XX].
Muharram referred to the border zones cleared of allpopulation in the late 1970s and denotes the empty land between
two warring forces. Mahdour refers to the vast areas demarcatedduring the 1980s where all human presence was prohibited.
ALMAJID, during a meeting with the Northern Bureau,summarized his actions in the Northern Region. The undated tapewas is in a batch dated January 21 and 22, 1989. ALMAJID
stated, in part:
If you remember, when I was placed in charge
41
l63IHQl462938
of the Northern Bureau, I was also tasked
with additional responsibilities
administration, the relevant special
services, the security and intelligence ones,
the Army, and the civilian wing of the Party,
and the military wing of the Party. These
were my responsibilities, that's all. So, I
was to work as I wished. Therefore, we
started making our own decisions, and in some
instances, even in violation of the
Leadership's instructions. But Comrades,
this was three months ago...
When we made the decision to destroy and
collectivize the villages and draw a dividing
line [i.e., the socalled "red line"] between
us and the saboteurs, the first one to
express his doubts to me and before the
President was TALI'A ALDURI. The first one
who alarmed me was TALI'A ALDURI. To this
day, the impact of TALI'A is evident. He
didn't destroy all the villages that I asked
him to at that time. And this is the
longeststanding member of the Ba'ath Party.
What about the other people then? How were
we to convince them to solve the Kurdish
problem and slaughter the saboteurs?
So we started to show these senior commanders
on TV that [the saboteurs] had surrendered.
Am I supposed to keep them in good shape?
What am I supposed to do with them, these
[people]. Then a message reaches me from
that great man, the father [SADDAM HUSSEIN],
saying take good care of the families of the
saboteurs and this and that. The general
command brings it to me. I put his message
to my head. But take good care of them? No,
I will bury them with bulldozers....
Interviewers played ALMAJID a portion of this
audiotape. ALMAJID acknowledged that the tape contains hiswords and his voice. He admitted that he ordered the destruction
of homes within the prohibited zones after the residents were
removed. ALMAJID admitted that he held a separate meeting and
instructed those under his command that no house was to remain
standing within the prohibited zones. ALMAJID also admittedthat he told his subordinates that he would tour the prohibited
42
l63I-HQ1462938
zones and if his orders were not carried out completely, he would
hold the section commander responsible. [ALMAJID interview,
March 21, 2004].
ALMAJID also admitted that the second segment of the
tape, from approximately 9:55 to 16:06, was his voice and his
words. ALMAJID stated he believed this meeting took place in
April, 1987, rather than in 1988. ALMAJID stated that those
present included the Governors and Ba'ath Party Secretary
Generals of each province of the Autonomous Region of Iraqi
Kurdistan. These provinces included Irbil, Dohuk, Suleimaniyeh,
Kirkuk, and Mosul.
ALMAJID stated that in the audiotape he is speakingabout the "gathering of villages" in the northern Kurdish regionof Iraq. In the audiotape, he explains the difficulty with
moving safely between cities in the north and the numbers of
"martyrs" who suffered at the hands of saboteurs. ALMAJID
encouraged those present to "speed up the process" of gathering
or collectivizing the villages in the north.
An audiotape segment from approximately 3:28 to 4:25was played for ALMAJID and contained the following:
If you remember, when I was placed in charge
of the Northern Bureau, I was also tasked
with additional responsibilities [including]
administration, the relevant Special
Services, the Security and Intelligence ones,
and the Army, and the civilian wing of the
Party, and the military wing of the Party.
These were my responsibilities, that's all.
So, I was to work as I wished. Therefore, we
started making our own decisions and in some
instances, even in violation of the
Leadership's instructions. But Comrades,
this was three months ago.
ALMAJID acknowledged the recording was his voice andhis words and identified the content as a meeting held by AL-MAJID with KHAZRAJI, KAMIL SAJID hereinafter SAJID!, the Army
First Corps Commander, HASHEM, the Commander of the Anfal
Operation, TALI'A ALDURI, outgoing Army Fifth Corps Commander,
YUNIS ZAREB, incoming Army Fifth Corps Commander, and the
Secretary Generals of the Ba'ath Party Sections. ALMAJIDbelieves this meeting took place in late 1988 or early 1989.
43
l63IHQ1462938
audiotape
in charge
and "what
stated he
"securityAL-MAJID stated despite the impression given on the
that he was the official in charge of the meeting and
of the military, he was only responsible for the cities
was in between the cities." Specifically, AL-MAJID
was in charge of the "security of the cities" and the
committees of the cities" during the period he served
as Secretary General of the Northern Bureau Command. He added
that he "had nothing to do with Iranian intelligence." AL-MAJID
reiterated he was only in charge of cities and roads connecting
cities inNorthern Iraq. The Iraqi military was in charge of allother territory within that portion of the country. Within
cities, AL-MAJID commanded military forces, intelligence
services, security services, and all other government agencies.AL-MAJID stated he was in charge of the cities of Suleimaniyeh,
Bazyan, Chamchamal, Koysanjaq, AlRabie, Kirkuk, Alton Kopri,
Erbil, Shaqlawa, Hareer, Zakho, and Khabat. He added that he was
in charge of the provinces of Dokan, Mosul except Aqra!, and
Kirkuk except Qader Karam!.
AL-MAJID again acknowledged his voice and his wordson a segment of the same audiotape beginning approximately at
8:25 and concluding approximately at 9:28. AL-MAJID confirmed
the tape was recorded at the same meeting with KHAZRAJI. AL-
MAJID explained he met with KHAZRAJI because "he had work" and "I
had work." AL-MAJID remembers complaining to KHAZRAJI during
this meeting about the delay by the military in leveling villageswhere residents had already been removed. According to AL-MAJID,
the village buildings needed to be removed as they often served
as sanctuaries for saboteurs. He added that after removal or
"deportation" of villagers, the army was responsible for removing
"what was left."
AL-MAJID acknowledged criticizing TALI'A ALDURI, for
failing to destroy the villages in a timely manner. ALMAJIDs
complaint
KHAZRAJI.
charge of
If he hadplaced the responsibility for handling this matter upon
AL-MAJID stated this audiotape shows he was not in
military forces in Northern Iraq during this period.
been in charge, AL-MAJID would have removed ALDURI and
not just complained to KHAZRAJI. [AL-MAJID interview, April 4,
2004].
ANFAL CAMPAIGN 988L
Anfal is the term used by the Iraq Government to
describe its military campaign against the Kurds. Anfal, meaning
"spoils," referd to the first battle in 624 A.D. between Muslims
and nonMuslims. The Anfal campaign had eight stages of which
44
l63IHQl462938
the first seven were directed at the PUK's territory and the last
at KDP's territory.
The first Anfal targeted PUK strongholds Bergalou and
Sergalou from February 23, 1988, to March 19, 1988. The second
Anfal targeted the Qara Dagh region from March 22, 1988, to April
1, 1988. The third Anfal targeted the hilly plain known as
Germain from April 7, 1988, to April 20, 1988. The fourth Anfal
targeted the Valley of Lesser Zab River from May 3, 1988, to May8, 1988. The fifth Anfal targeted the mountainous region
Northeast of Erbil from May 15,1988 until operations halted on
June 7, 1988. Operations were reinitiated as the sixth and
seventh Anfals in July and August 1988, respectively. On August
26, 1988, the PUK controlled area was declared clean of
saboteurs. The final Anfal targeted the Badinan area and began
on August 25, 1988. On September 6, 1988, the Iraq Government
declared victory by declaring general amnesty for all Kurds.
Anfal 1
SULTAN HASHEM, who at the time was the 1 Corp
Commander, advised the mission of the Anfal Campaign was to
remove the Kurdish population from the Northern area of Iraq, and
either destroy them or make them flee to Iran. HASHEM commanded
three Army Divisions and 100 Battalions in the First Anfal
Campaign which consisted of approximately 80,000 soldiers. Withthe number of military personnel under his leadership and
weaponry at his disposal, HASHEM expected to overpower and defeat
the Kurdish resistance.
HASHEM utilized artillery, armor, infantry, andhelicopters during the First Anfal, which took place from March
1, 1988, until approximately March 20-21, 1988. HASHEM did not
have direct operational control over other air assets Air
Force!, but could request those resources when needed. There
were nine different avenues of attack utilized in the First Anfal
which were designed to allow for the Kurds to flee across the
border to Iran. HASHEM interview, June 1, 2004!.
Anfal 3
| hereinafterage I2 at Ehe time, resided in the village of Kula'oSouthern Germain! with his father,q | his mother,[::::i:::] beand his three younger sisters eleven | ten!, and b7CE:::::] nine!. One morning in April, 1988, raqi pecial Forcesand Jahsh surrounded his village. The villagers were told they
45
163lHQl462938
were being taken to the city where they would then live. The
villagers were loaded into carts pulled by the villagers own
tractors, and were driven away. When the caravan got to the
city, they continued to drive through to a fort in Qoratu where
they were detained for ten days with very little food and water.
People died from starvation, and women w raped and killed.D rin ir e ' E:::::fff] 'u g the d
officials from
Directorate of
From
windows to the
separated frtention at Qoratu, observed Iraqi
military, Military Intelligence Istikhbarat!, and
General Security Amn AL'Am!.
Qoratu they were taken in large trucks with no
Army Camp at Topzawa. At this point, the men were
men and children and were housed in anotherbuilding. [j?%:iEi:%Tcould see the building where his father waskept, but never saw his father again. They stayed in the camp in
Topzawa for approximately thirty days.
While at the camp in Topzawa,[::::::::]stated that the
guards teased the children with food. The guards placed food at
a distance and
and got to thetold the children that whomever ran the fastest
food first could eat it. When the children ran to
the food, the guards kicked it over and spill it.
One early mornin thirty large, windowless trucksarrived at the camp. [::::i%:::] and the others were herded onto
and rode all day with no food and very little water.[EEi:if2ifjstated that three children on his truck between the
ages of approximately six and seven died during the ride. Alsoon the truck was a woman who went into labor. She was foaming at
the mouth from dehydration and[::::::::]was able to sneak her asmall bit of water that was meant for him.
Whenthe trucks stopped, everyone got out and was given
some water. Their hands were then tied behind their backs and
they were blindfolded. They were then forced back into thetrucks. g;:;:::::]mms able to get his hands untied and removed
his blin o d once he was in the truck.
When
last time, thethe trucks stopped for what turned out to be the
back doors were opened. [:::::::::]saw pits which
had been dug into the ground. The dirt that was removed to make
the pits was piled behind each pit. Standing by each pit were
two soldiers, each of whom wore camouflage uniforms and red
berets and was armed with AK47s. There were as many pits as
there were trucks. [::::::::]and the others were forced out of
their truck and fell into a pit where they laid, tired and
starving. No one was screaming or fighting which led[::::::::::]
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l63IHQl462938
to believe that the water they had previously been given had been
drugged. Once the were all in the pits, the soldiers startedshooting them. [::E::::::]looked around and that saw the woman
who had gone into labor while on the truck riddled with bullets
in her head and stomach, E::::::::]stated that her brains were
coming out of her head, and that her stomach was torn apart by
the bullets and he could see the unborn baby.
[:::::::::]mms shot in his left shoulder. At thispoint, he ran toward the soldier who shot him rabbed him by thelegs, and pleaded with him in Kurdish. [:::::::iE] could tell bythe look in the soldier's eyes that he did not want to be doing
what he had been ordered to do. The other soldier became an r
and yelled in Arabic. The angry soldier then threw
back into the pit and began shooting again hittin in
his lower back on his right side. At that point,
played dead.
The shooting finally sto ed an the soldiers gathered
together and talked in Arabic. saw bulldozers
beginning to cover up the holes. was in the ifurthest from the bulldozers and eci ed to escape. [:iif:::::]
saw a young girl who had not been hit by a single bullet and hetold her they needed to escape. She told[::;:;::::]that she was
scared of the soldiers and that she would no eave.
[::::::::] crawled out of the pit and laid on the pileof dirt next to it. He made a space for himself so that his
outline could not be seen by the Toyota Landcruisers that were
patrolling the area with their headlights looking for survivorsand shooting thent [:;;::::::]n@ved from one dirt pile to thenext until he eventua y passed out. By the time he awoke,
everyone had been buried. [::::::::]walked for several hours and
encountered a group of dogs which began barking. The dogs
surrounded him and barked until their owner came outside. The
man spoke Arabic and s unable to understand him,however the man tooEE5é§5555;}¬n and gave him food and water.[;;;;;:;::lstayed with t is man for a night or two, but was then
o own in order to get medical attention for his wounds.[;:::::::;]was taken in by an Iraqi family and stayed with them
or near two years before being reunited with an uncle.[::::::::ijinterview, March 8, 2005].
The following seized documents and statements detailsome of the Iraqi Government's actions during the Anfal campaign.
According to AZIZ and ALDURI, only HUSSEIN could authorize the
use of chemical weapons. As previously demonstrated, HUSSEIN
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l63lHQ1462938
either personally authorized or delegated the power to authorize
the use of chemical weapons.
The April, 1988, monthly report for the Northern
Region, Number 9879, dated May 18, 1988, from Brigadier General
signature illegible!, Deputy Director, General DMI to the
Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector,
referenced special strikes and special ammunition. Paragraph c
of the report states,
After the special strikes against the
villages where the headquarters and bases of
the agents were, their organization
distributed a quantity of medical supplies
against chemical strikes injections and
pills! among the inhabitants of those
villages as well as neighboring villages.
[attached as document #XX]
The report also provided a number of reasons for the
defeat of the agents and/or saboteurs by Iraqi forces including
"the intensity of the artillery bombardment by our forces and the
use of special ammunition led to heavy losses among them."
On April 26, 1988, the Ministry of Defense MoD! issuedletter Number D/A/51 to the Army Chief of Staff Headquarters
entitled, "Procedure." The letter, by Staff Navy General ABED
MOHAMMAD ABDULLAH hereinafter ABDULLAH!, the Secretary General
of the MoD, noted:
The Deputy to the General Commander Minister of
Defense has read the DMI letter, marked Secret, personal and
Immediate, #8368, dated April 23, 1988, and commented as
follows:
1. To create more of a psychological impact
than what has been established, no objection
regarding directing special ammunition
strikes if there is a target which deserves
punishment.
2. It is requested that operations be
renewed, and I believe it is being discussed
now with Comrade ALI HASAN, today April 26,
1988. [attached as document #XX]
On May 12, 1988, the DMI submitted report NumberM5/Sh3/Q2/9540 to the Army Chief of Staff Headquarters
48
l63IHQl462938
summarizing the results of Anfal operations from February 26,
1988, to May lO, 1988. The report detailed casualties sustained
by the sabotage groups, and identified the Iranian agent group,
PUK, as sustaining the heaviest casualties because operations
where focused in their territories. According to the report, an
estimated 1,200 agents were killed or wounded. That estimate
included casualties resulting from Special Strikes. The reportalso listed sites and bases of the sabotage groups, infiltration
routes of the sabotage groups within their territories, and
results of a meeting between representatives of the sabotage
groups in which they agreed to integrate their offices. The
report was signed by ALDURI. [attached as document #XX].
On May 15, 1998, HUSSEIN responded to the DMI via
Office of the President report #9540 which stated, It is
necessary to keep momentum and chasing them, and not allowing
them to reorganize themselves. [attached as document #XX]The report was addressed to the Chief of Staff of the Army, and
signed by Presidential Secretary ALHUMMADI. Copies wereforwarded to the MoD, the Northern Bureau Headquarters, and the
DMI.
The DMI began to document measures the Peshmergas tookto defend against chemical weapons strikes. These Iraqi reports
not only confirm Iraqi's use of chemical weapons, but also
document the measures the Iraqi military took to increase the
effectiveness of its chemical weapons strikes.
On March 7, 1988, the DMI submitted letter
#M5/Sh3/Q2/4797 to the Special Security Organization SSO! whichnoted the instructions Iranian agents leadership gave to
saboteurs when exposed to chemical weapons. [attached as
document #XX]
On April 28, 1988, the Presidential Secretary forwardeda memo from the Military Industrialization Institution MII! to
the DMI regarding the Peshmergas activities, and requesting theDMI's opinion on the subject. The MII had obtained the followinginformation on the net of the 21 Turkish Border Brigade:
2. The Iraqi military units will attack the
site of the First Branch in the next two or
three coming days with chemical weapons.
3. Peshmerga members are attempting to move
closer to Iraqi military units in the zone,
to protect themselves against chemical
attacks. [attached as document #XX]
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l63IHQl462938
On April 30, 1988, the DMI submitted a response#M5/Sh3/Q2/8859 to the Presidential Secretary for presentation to
HUSSEIN which stated:
1. After Anfal operations carried out by our
troops to traditionally! strike the sitesand bases of the sabotage groups, and special
strike the site and bases, the majority of
the sabotage groups in the Northern zone
became aware of these operations, and were
expecting our troops to carry out similar
operations.
2. The sites and bases of the first branchof the Descendants of Treason BARZANI Group
who exist on the Iraqi border zone, are
highly aware of being struck by our troops including the Patriotic Defense Regiments!
with special ammunition as in the Anfal
operations. They have taken some procedures
to deal with that, and they have evacuated
part of the site and some of their bases near
the Turkish territories. We are not sure yet
if the saboteurs have moved closer to our
units in the mentioned zone. [attached as
document #XX]
Anfal 5
On May 22, 1988, the Secretary General for the MoDsubmitted letter #D/A/51/8 entitled, "Results of Anfal Operation"to Army Chief of Staff Headquarters. The letter contained
comments of the Deputy to the Minister of Defense based on a
letter from HUSSEIN:
1. After ending the operations in the Suran
sector, operations should be carried on with
momentum in the Bahdinansector.
2. It is useful to gather intelligence on
the locations of the saboteurs there, and
special strikes should precede our wideaction. Please take the necessary
procedures. [attached as document #XX]
On May 22, 1988, the Senior Secretary to the Army Chiefof Staff, Staff General NABIL ABDULKADER HUSSEIN hereinafter
NABIL HUSSEIN!, submitted memo #R A G/30/6545 to the MoD Diwan
50
l63IHQl462938
entitled, Anfal 5 Operation." The letter stated:
b. Strikes with special ammunition were
launched on May 15, 1988, against sabotage
groups in the Fifth Corps sector....
2. Operations of chasing and destroying
sabotage groups are continuing in the First
Corps and Fifth Corps sectors according to
the plans prepared for this purpose
Operation Anfal!, and Anfal 5 operation will
be carried out in the Fifth Corps sector in
the following phase. [attached as document
#XX]
On June 2, 1988, the Northen office of the DMI
submitted report #Sh3/Q3/1041 to the DMI sh3! entitled, Fifth
Anfal Operation The report included the following:
2. The Iranian agents and other sabotage
groups have made use of lessons learned from
previous battles with our troops during
operations in the First Corps sector Anfal
1,2,3,4!, and they had the time to enable
them to take the following procedure:
e. Completing distribution of chemical
protective masks, individual decontamination
equipment, and training on the use of the
equipment. [attached as document #XX]
On June 10, 1988, the DMI submitted report
#M5/Sh3/Q2/11325 entitled, Anfal Operation to the Army Chief of
Staff Headquarters. The report noted initiation of the fifth
Anfal in which Iraq troops were to hit and destroy sabotage
groups sites and bases in the Fifth Corps sector. The report
also included the following casualty summaries:
a. 8! killed, 2! injured from the
saboteurs and their families as a result of
special strikes.
b. 2! killed and a number of wounded as a
result of our troops activities. [attached
as document #XX]
The report was signed by ALDURI and copies were
forwarded to the Presidential Secretary for HUSSEIN, the MoD
Diwan, the Northen Bureau Headquarters, Secretary General of the
Armed Forces Headquarters, Operations Department, and the Fifth
51
l63IHQl462938
Corps Headquarters.
On June 11, 1988, HUSSEIN responded to the DMI reportvia letter #K/2305 from the Office of the President:
Under no circumstance, we must not permit thesaboteurs to regain their morale, thereforestriking them in sector 45 is imperative. Dothe necessary. [attached as document #XX]
The letter was signed by Presidential Secretary, AL-HUMMADI, and copies were sent to the MoD Diwan and the DMI. Aspreviously documented in this report, ALHUMMADI prepared lettersthat contained HUSSEINs orders.
A cover letter and excerpt of a quarterly report datedJune 27, 1988, from Captain KIFAH ALI HASSAN, Director of theIntelligence Center of Kalar, to the Subdirectorate of the DMI,Eastern Sector, gave details of a chemical attack against theKurds. It stated, in part,
During the month of March 1988, our aircraftbombed the headquarters of the sabotage bandsin the villages of Saywan and Balakajar in achemical strike. This resulted in the deathof 50 saboteurs and the wounding of 20 othersaboteurs. [attached as document #XX]
HRW/MEW interviews indicate that the referenced attackoccurred on March 22, 1988. Local inhabitants stated casualtiesranging from 78 to 87 were almost all civilian. The rebel baseswere located outside of the two villages mentioned in the reportSaywan is referred to as Sayw Senan by the Kurds.
On July 10, 1988, MoD sent letter D/A/51/1/14179,entitled, "Sabotage Groups in Balisan Basin and Alsamaqoleyyatarea" to the Army Chief of Staff. The letter, based on DMIreport #13081 dated July 7, 1988, stated:
1. It is necessary to exhaust them withaerial weapons and antipersonnel weapons
prior to starting the mission.
2. Hold the area, prevent cooperation and
supplies to and from the area.
3. Special ammunition might be needed ifthere is a collection of saboteurs. [attached
as document #XX]
52
l63IHQl462938
On July 12, 1988, Army Chief of Staff Headquartersforward the abovedescribed instructions to the Fifth CorpsHeadquarters via letter #RAG/22/804 and advised them to take thenecessary procedure. [attached as document #XX]
Declassified satellite imagery from the Anfal period,listed as evidence in support of this Prosecutive Report,illustrate impact craters, the use of multiple rocket launchersand towed artillery, as wellq the complete razing of Kurdish
villages.
Final Anfal
Report #16093, dated December 13, 1988, from Branch 3,Section 1, Qadissiyat Saddam operational name for the IranIraqWar! to the General DMI, Branch 3, provided Iraqi sourceinformation and made direct reference to chemical attacksconducted by Iraqi forces in Badinan during the Final Anfal fromAugust 25, 1988, to September 6, 1988. The document stated, inpertinent part:
...six British journalists arrived in thetriangular border region of Iran, Iraq andTurkey to see the saboteurs who had come fromthe above sector via Turkish territory and
interview them about the chemical strike
undertaken by our forces. [attached as
document #XX]
Badinan, the traditional mountainous heartland ofMULLAH BARZANI and his sons, is located in the Dohuk Governatealong the IraqTurkey border. KDP Headquarters was located atZewa Shkan, an abandoned village on the border. BrigadierGeneral ZAREB commanded the Iraqi Fifth Corps which battledagainst the KDP in the Badinan region.
In 1985, the family of| l hereinafter[::::::] was arrested by the Iraqi government and deported fromBa'shiqa to a makeshift house in Maraneh near Sosya!,Kurdistan. All of his family's possessions were seized and soldand his family was forced to leave with nothing more than theclothes on their backs.
[:;:::::]family was just one of several familiesdeported an relocated by the Iraqi Government. The reasons forthe deportations varied: members of their family may have been
53b6
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l63IHQl462938
military deserters or, as with[:::::::]family, they were relatedto members of the political opposition. Although the IraqiGovernment intention was to force those who opposed the regime like[:::::j to surrender, the relocations failed to produce thdesired effect. Instead of succumbing to the pressure,[:::::::f]family and others adapted to their surrounding and simply started
Other members of family were also relocated.Between 1985 and 1987,[:::£;;;;%ggger, his sisterinlaw and herchildren, and finally his sister were all deported. E::::::::]sister was deported because she was accused of providingassistance to the Peshmerga by working as a seamstress.over.
On August 18, 1988, immediately afterthe end of theIranIraq War, the Iraqi government began massing its forces inBadinan. In the following days, word spread from the surroundingvillages that the Iraqi army was on the move.
On August 23, 1988, Iraqi forces attacked Avoke, asmall village on the south side of Gara Mountain near Spindar,with chemical weapons. [:::::]and his family were in Maraneh,about three or four kilometers east of Avoke. Maraneh wassituated at a higher elevation than Avoke,[::::§Fwitnessed theIraqi planes attack Avoke firsthand. He saw the bombs fall andthe smoke rise from the explosions. Although initially black,the smoke dissipated into white and yellow tints as it rose.
[:::::] heard from people who returned from Avoke shortlyafter the attacks that the Iraqi forces had used chemicalweapons. Although most of the residents had fled to caves priorto the attack, the chemical gas killed two villagers and affectednearly everyone. Some had difficulty breathingand most hadblisters on their faces, arms, and genital areas. The gas attackalso killed some sheep and wild turkeys in the area. Even thelandscape was affected. Everything appeared asburned. Although they did not show signs of antrees and leaves appeared dried up.if it had been
actual fire, the
The gas attack spread over a large area. About thirtyminutes after the attack started, the wind, which was blowingfrom the direction of Avoke, carried with it ansmell. In addition, later in the day on Augustthat the tops of the trees near Maraneh took on
appearance as those in Avoke as a r ult of thegas. Some of the people with[::::ffalso began
difficulty breathing.
54unnatural rotten
24/ljlnoticed
the same dried
drifting chemical
to experienceb6
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Once the attack on Avoke began,[::::] saw fixedwinglanes and helicopters continuously overflying the Avoke area.EE:::] saw thousan f troops and tanks advancing from alldirections. [:g::%f:ffamily, along with the others living in ornear Maraneh, ecided to head north to higher elevations and inthe direction of Turkey. They left Maraneh on the night of
August 24, 1988.
On August 25, 1988, Iraqi forces attacked villagesthroughout Badinan with artillery and aircraft, delivering bothconventional and chemical weapons. As Iraqi forces quicklyoccupied most of the routes north,[:::::]and several familiestraveling with him were forced to travel through Zebar in thedirection of Kafia, east of Gara Mountain. The groupoccasionally came under fire from the Iraqi troops, but it seemedthe Iraqis were targeting the general area as opposed to[:::::::::]specific group.
By the time[:::::]reached Kafia, the Iraqi forces wasalready preparing to surround the village. Hundreds of familiesfrom several neighboring villages had already fled to the area, bgand supplies were scarce. Some considered surrendering to the b7QIraqi forces, but both Kurdish collaborators and Iraqi officersadvised against it. E:::::]heard from the families of the Kurdishcollaborators that one Iraqi officer said, I may not kill you,but I don't know what Saddam will do.
Fearing capture,[:::::]and his group retreated to thehigher elevations of the Gara Mountain. They waited there fortwo days, but conditions were harsh and the group had no food orwater. They decided to return to Maraneh and were almost therewhen they heard the amnesty announcement over the radio onSeptember 6, 1988. Even as he announced th amnesty, however,SADDAM HUSSEIN showed no compassion. recalled HUSSEINreferring to them as "insects."
E;:;;]evaluated his situation: in addition to hischildren, e ad to worry about his elderly mother, his pregnantwife who was in her third trimester, and a handicapped nephew.Not seeing any alternative,E:::::] decided that his family stoodthe best chance of surviving if they surrendered. They were torest in Maraneh for two days and then turn themselves over to theIraqi forces. Concerned with the humiliation and tmentshe would suffer at the hands of the Iraqi troops,Efff:iffTwifebegged him to shoot her. In the end, however, because she washis wife and because she was pregnant, he could not bring himselfto do it.
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On September 8, 1988,[:::::]and two others, an Arab andan Assyrian who were also not going to surrender, hid themselvesamong the trees w ' e the families walked in the direction of theIraqi lines. [:::%iiwatched as the Iraqi helicopters trainedtheir guns on the surrendering villagers as the group walkedtoward them. A member of the surrendering party raised his whiteshirt to emphasize that they were, in fact, surrendering.feared the helicopters would shoot them right there; howeverthey herded the villagers down the mountain in the directionKani MasiEl£gg:::]never saw or heard from his mother date of ' 19J7!- ' || |<973!,&!_|97 _,_|987!; daugterskj , infantdau hter 988 ; his sister,and his brother's wife
937!, and son 969!
an icapped!
968! and
1967! __ ,- W
After his 1 4 V -
family i I
surrendered, ;%; L [;::::]and the 92-
wo otherstraveled north 'n92
over the Gara
Mountain. The I i
group was 4 92»gforced to -» .a fk I ttravel very
slowly and ~ ggkwrcautiously dueto the large
number of
Iraqi troops. Normally only a two hour journey, the trip tooktwo days. Many times, they were within an arm's length of Iraqisoldiers, but they managed to avoid capture.W,
A I 8 A t 92-92
On September 12, 1988,[::::]reached the outskirts ofSpindar on the north side of Gara Mountain!. The concentrationof troops in the area forced the group to remain on the hillsoverlooking the village for approximately six days. They
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survived by scavenging provisions and some medicines from homeson the outskirts of the abandoned village that had not yet beenattacked. By the items left behind a single baby sock, a half-filled tea cup, a single shoe!, it appeared that the occupantshad little warning before fleeing.
By the time[:::::]reached Spindar on September I2, thevillage had already been burned. While living on the hillsoverlooking the village,[::::;]and his group watched Iraqibulldozers enter the area eac day and topple structures. Eachnight they would retreat due to the threat of Peshmerga
counterattacks. Sometimes the army would use explosives todestroy the buildings. The destru ' which took six days, wasvery slow and deliberate. In all,Tiiff:]watched them destroytwenty to thirty buildings, and it appeared as if they weretrying to erase any sign that the village existed.
[;::::] others in his group eventually made theirwa to Tur ey. never saw or heard from his family again.[:2i::]interview, Fe ruary 17, 2005].
In addition to providing pictures of his missingfamily members,[;::::Lprovided a list of 193 names and in somecases, photograp s, o Kurds who surrendered to the Iraqi forcesand disappeared. All 193 Kurds, including[;::::::]family, arepresumed dead. [Attached as Enclosure # XX
HRW documented 13 primary sites of chemical attacks inBadinan from which the exact number of deaths is unknown. Page 4of the HRW report, Final Anfal Section, states that 49 villageswere "exposed" to chemical weapons, including those affected bywindborne dispersal.
Eyewitness Account of the Attack
on the Villiage of Kane Balaui
In approximately August 1988,! wasstaying in an Assyrian village, Kane Ba avi, in the Barwari Ballaarea north of Dohuk. She stated that villagers were warned bythe proregime Kurdish militia, Jahsh, that the Iraqi militarywas approaching and they should leave the village. Thevillagers, including[:::::::] knew that when the Iraqi militaryarrived, their villages were going to be destroyed and everyonewould either be arrested or killed, as had been the casethroughout the Anfal campaign. Kurds were told that SADDAMHUSSEIN had said, Let's finish with one, and we'll start thesecond group." The Kurds interpreted this statement to mean once
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the war with Iran had ended, HUSSEIN would divert all of hisattention and military efforts toward the Kurds.
One evening, at approximately 10:00 pm, the people inthe village packed essential items and food on mules and left,walking toward Turkey. More than a thousand men, women,children, the elderly, and their animals, walked all night andhid in the valleys during the day to avoid detection by Iraqiaircraft. The journey took approximately two weeks. Thevillagers ran out of food and were forced to purchase wheat fromTurkish smugglers operating in the mountains.
When the villagers finally arrived at the border, theywere stopped by the Turkish military and were ref d entry intoTurkey. A sympathetic Turkish soldier told[:::::%ifto cross theborder at night. The villagers were forced to remain at theborder until nightfall, at which time they crossed into Turkey.Once inside, they felt safe and slept for the first time in fouror five days. The villagers were out of food and went withoutanything to eat for more than a day, while awaiting Turkishsmugglers. The next day, the villagers spent two days searchingfor water. The villagers stayed in the valley for 10 days.
The conditions were very harsh. The villagers did nothave blankets, tents, beds, food, or clean water and sufferedfrom starvation. During this period,E::g::::]estimated thathundreds of children and elderly peop e ied as a result ofdiarrhea. The deceased were buried in the valley. After 10days, the Red Cross and Red Crescent arrived, set up tents, andprovided minimal medical care. When the Red Cross began to handout bread, people were so hungry, they swarmed them like animals.
The Turkish Government brought approximately 17 trucksto relocate the villagers from the valley. They piled in theback of the trucks and were crammed together like sheep. Thetrucks drove for 36 hours, passing several Kurdish villages alongthe way. The villagers in the trucks begged for food fromKurdish passersby, who threw bread into the trucks to help them.
Finally, the trucks arrived at a refugee camp inSlopia, Turkey, and the villagers were placed in tents. Theywere placed approximately 15 to a tent. Everyone was forced toshare soup and bread and eat without utensils. [:::::::]estimatedthat there were approximately 17,000 refugees at the camp.E::::::]saw people who suffered from severe burns as a result ofa chemical weapons attack, while others had difficulty breathing.Like[:::::::] all had fled their homes as a result of the Iraqi
58b6
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military campaign. Soon after[::::::]arrived, the burn victimswere taken away by the Turkish government.
The refugees began to suffer from severe diarrhea.Hundreds died every day as a result of the sickness. A rumorcirculated around the camp that the Iraqis had poisoned the food.According to[::::g::] the Kurdish Democratic Party KDP! lookedinto the cause an determineE:fhai:ihT bread given to therefugees had been poisoned. interview, January 21,
2005].
The Iraq Government appeared to become more secretiveabout its chemical weapons production after the end of the Iraq-Iran War. Letter #Sh 5/19299, dated December 17, 1988, from theAmn Director of the Governorate of Erbil to all branches,regarding the secrecy of documentation regarding chemical weaponsnotes:
Pursuant to the memorandum from the Honorable
Office of the Presidency, number 4/4/11/44154
of December 4, 1988, a decision has been
taken to give all letters memoranda! which
contain information about the production of
chemical weapons the highest degree of
secrecy. Take all necessary measures, keepthis memorandum to yourself, and sign for its
receipt.
This document is referenced in footnote 20 of the HRW Reportdated July, 1993, "Final Anfal" section.
According to AZIZ, the primary purpose of Anfal was tostop the Kurdish insurgency inside Iraq. Most of the Kurdishpopulation lived in Iraq near the northern border with Iran. Adecision was made to relocate the population, at least asignificant portion, to settlements 100 or more miles insideIraq. This relocation was accomplished in a "harsh manner."Those who conducted the relocation, including ALMAJID and theGovernors of the region, were "idiots." In AZIZ's opinion, theyprobably felt they had to accomplish the task quickly in order tobe viewed by HUSSEIN as successful.
Neither AZIZ nor any other RCC member was informed orasked for an opinion prior to the start of Anfal. No RCC memberprotested the decision once the details became known through themedia. AZIZ stated that at the time, it seemed "justified forthe security of the nation." In retrospect, AZIZ admitted that
59b6
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the Anfal was criminal in nature.
done this" and it was "not his way
interview, February 2, 2004].
AZIZ acknowledged that, in theAZIZ added he "would not have
of doing things." [AZIZ
sense of collectiveresponsibility, he should be held answerable for what thegovernment did in general terms, but the man who holds the fullaccountability is HUSSEIN. Originally, when AZIZ was in the RCC,members received a typed letter with the agenda items for eachmeeting. Once decisions were made, they were typed up and signedby each member. The decisions were not implemented until all theRCC members signed.
In the early 1980s, The An1alCampa1gns. Fohrualy l September 1988
HUSSEIN decreed the
Chairman of the RCC
could decide matters
on behalf of the t
entire RCC. Later, he
decided anything
decreed by the RCC
would become law. In .
addition to these
legal measures which _ ,- 'g4:>su1b {Ila
essentially turned the Q , QRww§> ME $$?7> -. % »' / = Awwi . M. . ;_ _ ~92,> . _ ._, _ » J 7" 930'? a.m.u,..RCC into HUSSEIN'S = . Ar K ? J wig
Q0 __ _ mz Knurmalu A I _ _ QSamaw naianymj »_ _Tpersonal "rubber
stamp," there was the .
chilling effect of the
July, 1979 meeting
where Baath members ;-- -4Arar
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Z Kass 9 1Q Baits;-1! _ mg 00" ,. Nuwa Saiman . - - . - if - -_~ z J. . A' ~ - -. . .-aunt ii .were killed. This 3
made the proposition of disagreeing with HUSSEIN a life or death
matter. [AZIZ interview, May 6, 20
SABIR provided a historical acO4].
count of the events thateventually led to the Anfal Campaign. The IraqIran War wasongoing, and the Iraqi military su
month battle in Basrah. After the
continued to shell Basrah, causing
forces from other battle fronts to
discovered an Iraqi troop shortage
Iraq, particularly in the area ofccessfully concluded a four
battle, the Iranian military
the Iraqi military to draw
defend the city. Iran
in the Northern Region of
Suleimaniyeh. Iran tookadvantage of the situation in the Northern Region and conspiredwith Kurdish opposition groups led
momentum of the war shifted towardby BARZANI and TALABANI. The
Iran, prompting IraqiGovernment officials to develop a new strategy. According to
60
l63IHQl462938
SABIR, President HUSSEIN, ALMAJID, ADNAN KHAIRALLAH hereinafterKHAIRALLAH!, and KHAZRAJI, developed the strategy for theNorthern Region. SABIR stated that his role as Director of theDMI was to gather intelligence and disseminate that intelligenceto highlevel Iraq Government officials consisting of PresidentHUSSEIN, the Minister of Defense, Army Chief of Staff, and thePresidential Secretary. The intelligence was studied by theseofficials and a recommendation for a plan of action was
subsequently implemented.
The deployment of chemical weapons during the AnfalCampaign was at the sole direction of President HUSSEIN. Thechain of communication to utilize chemical weapons during theAnfal Campaign flowed from President HUSSEIN to the PresidentialSecretary and then to the Army Chief of Staff or Minister ofDefense, depending on the delivery method of the chemicalweapons. If the chemical weapons was to be deployed via the AirForce, orders would have been passed through the Minister of
Defense. If the CW
conventional means,
Army Chief of Staff
there was a special
Chemical Disburseme
manufacturing, hous
The Army Chief of S
responsible for the
SABIR stated that a
I Corps of the Iraq
SABIR und
announced purpose a
was to relocate the
provide them adequa
The hidden purpose
Kurds toward the in
and clear the North
led by BARZANI and
going to conspire w
Kurdish villages we
destruction of the
from returning to t
SABIR con
not care about anyb
power. In addition
Iraq, and that he d
him to suffer. [SABwas to be deployed via artillery or other
orders would have been passed through the
to the Corps Commander. SABIR admitted that
division within the Iraqi Army known as thent Division CDD! which was responsible foring, and distributing the chemical weapons.
taff or the Deputy Chief of Staff was
CDD which was located at the Al Bakr Base.
chemical weapons advisor was attached to thei Army during the Anfal Campaign.
erstood that the Anfal Campaign had annd a hidden purpose. The announced purpose
Kurds from the Northern Region of Iraq,
te housing, and improve their quality of life
of the Anfal Campaign was to relocate the
terior of Iraq, away from the border of Iran,ern Region of the opposition groups that were
TALABANI. There was concern the Kurds wereith these opposition groups and this was why
re razed. The Iraq Government believed
Kurdish villages would deter and prevent Kurds
he area.
cluded the interview by stating HUSSEIN didody and would have done anything to stay in, SABIR that stated that HUSSEIN destroyed
oes not want HUSSEIN put to death, but wants
IR interview, June ll, 2004].
61
l63IHQl462938
In welcoming HASSAN ALI ALAMIRIAMIRI!
Bureau
powers
people in the prohibited areas: hereinafter AL-as his successor as Secretary General of the Northernon April 15, 1989, ALMAJID discussed the reduction ofassociated with this position and the disposition of
It will no longer be allowed for a member of
the leadership to have power over
because the exceptional situationthe army,
is over.These powers are not being withdrawn fromComrade Hassan Ali because he is not up tothe task, but because that stage is now
finished.
From June 22 987!, anyone who was arrestedin those areas was to be killed immediately
without any hesitation, according to thedirectives which are still in force.
RCC Decree #272, dated April 23, 1989, amended RCCDecree #160 and ended ALMAJID'S extraordinary powers. Thisdocument is referenced on page 65 of the HRW report dated
February, 1994.
HALABJA
TARIQ AZIZ admitted during an interview that the firstconfirmed use of chemical weapons against a civilian population,anywhere in the world, occurred at Halabja, Iraq, in March, 1988.Although he agreed with speculation that the weapons may havebeen deployed to deter Iranian forces from occupying Halabja, heacknowledged that in fact the city was occupied by Kurds and notIranians. AZIZ stated that he learned moreabout the attackafter watching a film on Halabja produced by the media whichshowed "a few corpses" of men, women, and children who died as aresult of the attack. AZIZ claimed not to know how many peoplewere killed during the attack.
After the attack, HUSSEIN admitted to AZIZ thatchemical weapons had been used at Halabja. At the beginning ofthe IranIraq War, only HUSSEIN held the authority to order theuse of chemical weapons. KHAIRALLAH and KHAZRAJI asked for andreceived this power from HUSSEIN during theearly 1988, HUSSEIN withdrew this authority
KHAIRALLAH told HUSSEIN this would "weaken"ability and his power to act decisively and
HUSSEIN returned the authority to order the
62war. However, in
from them.
the military's
quickly. Thereafte
use of chemicalI1
l63IHQl462938
weapons to KHAIRALLAH and KHAZRAJI, and they used these weaponsat Halabja. According to AZIZ, HUSSEIN did not specificallyorder the chemical weapons attack on Halabja, but was notifiedafterwards. HUSSEIN told AZIZ, "Halabja was not my decision. Itwas in the hands of KHAIRALLAH and KHAZRAJI." At one point
afterwards, HUSSEIN said the chemical weapons attack was not
necessary. HUSSEIN was "bothered" by the attack because of theinternational ramifications and "outcry" from the worldcommunity. AZIZ noted HUSSEIN did not punish, reprimand, orremove either KHAIRALLAH or KHAZRAJI from their positions.Normally, this would have been his response when someone'sactions reflected negatively on him. AZIZ is unsure whether thelack of punitive action by HUSSEIN implied his postevent
approval. [AZIZ interview, February 2, 2004].
According to SABIR, Halabja fell under Iranian controland the city of Suleimaniyeh was being threatened. SABIR and hisDeputy, WAFIQ AL SAMARAI phonetic!, were traveling to theSuleimaniyeh area to check on their military positions when anintelligence officer advised them of the chemical weapons attackon Halabja. Once he learned of the attack, SABIR traveled to thecity of Kirkuk and met with KHAZRAJI. During this meeting,KHAZRAJI told SABIR that KHAIRALLAH, who was in Kirkuk withKHAZRAJI, had just received orders from President HUSSEIN tolaunch a chemical weapons attack on Halabja. Once KHAIRALLAHreceived the orders, he telephoned the Commander of the AirForce, HAMEED SHA'ABIN ALTIKRITI hereinafter ALTIKRITI!, andordered him to launch the chemical weapons attack on Halabja.SABIR advised that the Air Force planes that conducted the CWattack on Halabja were from the Al Bakr Base. SABIR learned fromthe other detainees that detainee HAMID RAJA SHALAH AL-TIKRITIwas the Air Force Squadron Commander stationed at the Al BakrBase who led the Air Force planes that conducted the CW attack onHalabja. [SABIR interview, June ll, 2004].
SABIR was under the impression Halabja was underIranian control, and was not aware of a number of Iraqi citizensstill residing within the city during the chemical weaponsattack. SABIR claimed the decision to utilize chemical weaponson Halabja came quickly, and the DMI was not consulted.
63
l63IHQl462938
The FBI obtained a copy of the video footage of thechemical attack on the village of Halabja. The footage, whichappears to have been recorded by an Iranian film crew, depictedevents leading up to the attack, and the aftermath of the attack
1991 INVASION OF KUWAIT
Iraq and Kuwait are parties to the 1925 Geneva
, "*~;*;¢-$34! >uNn§R*1~>ss *3?
La :35
:+ Q1,
A,»;§ S3,}, cs;
/' "
/_ 5; 92'/Lu Is,/<"
wt ;
Protocol, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the 1954 Hague
Convention. Specifically, Iraq was a party to the four GenevaConventions of 1949 which protect noncombatants, such ascivilians living in occupied territory, and prisoners of war.
64
l63IHQl462938
HUMMADI stated the fiasco of invading Kuwait was a
decision completed in 30 minutes. During an RCC meeting, HUSSEIN
recited an old farmer's proverb that claimed it is better to cut
our necks than to cut our sustenance. HUSSEIN listed the reasons
for invading Kuwait and then canvassed the committee members. He
asked ALDURI what he thought and ALDURI sarcastically protested
that Kuwait was a country. HUSSEIN asked AZIZ, who was wise
enough to convey a subtle, indirect warning without openly
opposing HUSSEINs judgment. AZIZ explained if an invasion were
conducted, predictable consequences would follow. At this point,
AZIZ took 10 minutes to lay out the suretofollow adversarial
responses of the Arab League, the United Nations UN!, the United
States, and the rest of the Western world. But, AZIZ knew that
if he did not approve HUSSEIN's plan, he would be thrown out.
When ALMAJID was asked his opinion, he shouted, Crush them!
[HUMMADI interview, May 27, 2004].
While in United States custody, HUSSEIN stated that
after the 1980-88 war with Iran, Iraq was trying to rebuild.
HUSSEIN likened the situation with Kuwait as similar to two
individuals fighting. The fight ends and the two parties go
their separate ways. Thereafter, one of the previous disputing
parties is bothered by someone else who also wants to fight.
Then, there is no choice but to fight again.
According to HUSSEIN, Khomeini and Iran would have
occupied the entire Arab world if it had not been for Iraq. As
such, Iraq expected the Arab world to support them during and
after the war. However, Iraq saw the opposite regarding support,
especially from Kuwait. At the end of the war, as Iraq began the
rebuilding process, the price of oil was approximately $7 per
barrel. In HUSSEIN's opinion, Iraq could not possibly rebuild
its infrastructure and economy with oil prices at this level, and
he believed that Kuwait was especially to blame for these low oil
prices.
In an effort to solve the situation and stimulate
economic recovery, Iraq sent DR. HAMMADI, Iraqi Minister of
Foreign Affairs, to Kuwait. HAMMADI's conclusion, and that of
the Iraqi leadership after the meeting, was that the oil price
situation was not just the responsibility/work of the Kuwaitis.
Iraq believed some other entity, some larger power, was behind
this "conspiracy."
Iraq also sent government officials to Saudi Arabia to
convince the Saudis to pressure Kuwait. There, the Deputy
Chairman of the RCC met with the brother of Kuwaiti leader Prince
65
l63IHQl462938
Sabah. In addition, the Saudi Minister of Oil came to Iraq and
held talks about oil prices, the Iraqi economy, and the actions
of Kuwait. HUSSEIN claimed that a Kuwaiti official said, "We'll
make the economy in Iraq so bad, an Iraqi woman will sleep with
you for 10 dinars." HUSSEIN told the Saudis that if Kuwait did
not stop interfering in Iraqi affairs, he would make the Kuwaiti
dinar worth 10 fils.
HUSSEIN stated when Kuwait was faced with facts
regarding "stealing" Iraqi oil by slant drilling, they admitted
to having taken "only two and a half billion barrels." They
stated this fact "as if it were nothing."
Regarding problems with Kuwait, Iraq sent delegates to
other Gulf countries, the names of which HUSSEIN does not
remember. These delegates explained the Kuwaiti and Iraqi
situation. The other countries promised to correct oil prices at
the next Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC!
meeting.
At that meeting, HUSSEIN recalled a decision was
made to fix oil prices at $16-17 per barrel. Kuwait concurred
with this decision. Thereafter, the Kuwaiti Minister of Oil or
Minister of Foreign Affairs stated Kuwait would not abide by the
OPEC decision.
Regarding loan debts owed to Gulf countries as a result
of support received during the IranIraq War, HUSSEIN stated
these were not loans and were supposed to be free aid from these
countries. The countries originally used the word "loan" as a
formality to disguise the purpose of the funds. When Iraq was
informed the money were actually loans, Iraq held discussions
with these countries, including Kuwait, to resolve these debts.
Because the money had been "registered as loans" to Iraq, Iraq
could not secure loans from other countries in order to rebuild.
HUSSEIN stated he twice discussed a change in oil
prices to $25 per barrel. Once, when the price per barrel
reached $50, HUSSEIN wrote a letter, dictated to AZIZ, which was
sent to the Thoura newspaper. In the letter, he told the oil-
producing countries they should not take advantage of
industrialized nations. HUSSEIN asked them to reduce the price
per barrel to $25. He commented this was strange at that time as
Iraq had oil and could use the money. When the price dropped to
$7 per barrel in 1989-90, HUSSEIN called for an increase to $24-
25 per barrel. In HUSSEIN's opinion, this price would not burden
the consumer or hurt the producer.
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HUSSEIN stated there was a meeting of the RCC prior tothe invasion of Kuwait where the matter was discussed. The RCCleadership had hoped the Saudis would "interfere" and have asolution. The Deputy Chairman of the RCC traveled to SaudiArabia, but returned unsuccessful. Thereafter, the matter couldonly be discussed and decided upon in favor of military action.HUSSEIN acknowledged the possibility that one or more RCC membersopposed or voted against invasion, but does not specificallyremember any such opposition. He does not remember if a majorityor all the RCC members agreed on military action. HUSSEINstated, "I was against attacking if a solution could be found.
The final decision to invade Kuwait was made in orderto "defend by attacking." HUSSEIN further justified the invasionbased upon historical facts, stating that history dictates thatKuwait is a part of Iraq.
HUSSEIN stated the objective of invasion was "the oneannounced." That is, Kuwaitis were to rule themselves and woulddecide what kind of relations they would have with Iraq. As forthe Kuwaiti leaders, HUSSEIN stated they were "conspirators"against Iraq, Kuwait, and all Arab countries. These leaderscontinued to conspire even after leaving Kuwait upon the Iraqiinvasion. They were controlled by the United States.
HUSSEIN remarked, "We can discuss this for days." TheUnited States and 28 other countries took seven months tomobilize forces for war in 1991. This mobilization occurredbecause of the perceived military threat posed by Iraq's power.This threat motivated US politicians to support action againstIraq. In addition, the ability of companies to earn financialprofit from war also motivated support for action against Iraq.The preemptive strike by Iraq into Kuwait was conducted so thatdefensive lines could not be completed. HUSSEIN reiterated thelack of American forces in Kuwait does not mean there was not a"conspiracy."
HUSSEIN repeated the goal of invading Kuwait was toallow Kuwaitis the right to "decide the way they wanted to dealwith Iraq." HUSSEIN denied the declaration of Kuwait as the 19thProvince of Iraq contradicts his previous statement. Accordingto HUSSEIN, a Kuwaiti government was established after invasion,which included a Prime Minister and various other ministers.HUSSEIN denied Iraqi RCC member, ALMAJID, was appointed Governorof Kuwait. He added the Kuwaiti cabinet decided to "join theIraqis." When questioned whether they were given a choice,HUSSEIN replied, "Did Iraqis agree to join the United States in
67
163IHQl462938
the recent war against Iraq?" He continued that Iraq's acts withrespect to Kuwait were more logical than the United Statesposition on Iraq in the most recent war. HUSSEIN stated thedesignation of Kuwait as the 19th Province was "deserved andlogical." In 1961 or 1962, Kuwait was a Province of Iraq underPresident Qassem.
When noted to HUSSEIN that Kuwaiti citizens voted 100percent after withdrawal of Iraqi forces not to become a part ofIraq, he questioned whether this was the "respected opinion ofworld " HUSSEIN further asked, "What is the opinion of the Iraqipeople now?" The forces of other countries have remained in Iraqlonger than Iraq occupied Kuwait. These countries have no rightto this as they are not Arab. HUSSEIN finished this portion ofdiscussion saying "we will not come to a conclusion" and "daysare needed to discuss" this matter.
On November 19, 1992, The Department of the Army, JudgeAdvocate General JAG! published an unclassified report detailingIraqi war crimes during Operations Desert Shield and DesertStorm. The report was based on investigations conducted by the199 JAG!, st. Petersburg, Florida, and the 208° JAG,Washington, D.C. [The report is attached as document #XX]
According to the report, the 199 JAG collectedevidence of Iraqi war crimes committed against citizens andresidents of Kuwait. Evidence included written and videotapedaccounts of victims who were raped and tortured, photographs ofmurdered Kuwaitis, and videotapes of burial sites and tortureimplements.
Documents collected authorized the reeducation ofKuwaitis and the deportation of Kuwaiti citizens to Iraq.Summary executions were authorized for Kuwaiti civilians foundpraying on their roofs, and other Iraqi mandated offenses, suchas failing to display pictures of HUSSEIN, refusing to serveIraqi soldiers in stores and markets, possessing pictures ofmembers of the Kuwaiti royal family, and writing antiIraqi graffiti.
The 199 JAG confirmed through its investigation ofKuwaiti medical records, that for the period of Iraqi occupationof Kuwait from August 2, 1990, to March 3, 1991, a total of 1,082Kuwaiti deaths could be directly attributed to Iraqi criminalconduct. The deaths included 120 babies left to die after beingremoved from incubators taken to Iraq and 57 mentally illindividuals killed simply because of their handicap.
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HUSSEIN was questioned regarding his decision directingthe withdrawal of Iraqi forces to ignite Kuwaiti oil wells.HUSSEIN denied Iraqi forces ignited oil wells. He admitted thatIraqi forces burned "oil in trenches" as they retreated. Theresulting smoke blocked target acquisition by coalition aircraftand prevented additional Iraqi troops from dying. HUSSEINadmitted that he was told "a few" oil wells had been ignited. Hestated that even if he were shown pictures or videos of theseevents, he would not believe Iraqi forces committed them becausethese forms of media are easy to manipulate and fabricate.HUSSEIN believes that it would not be a crime for the Iraqimilitary to burn oil in order to prevent planes from attackingthem. If such an event took place, this would have been an actof a desperate person who had no weapons remaining with which todefend himself. When questioned as to how he would respond if hewas offered proof that the 150 oil well fires in Kuwait were anact of sabotage by the Iraqi military and not an act of defense,HUSSEIN stated he would provide a response at that time.
When questioned regarding ongoing Kuwaiti resistanceduring the Iraqi occupation and efforts by the Iraqi IntelligenceService IIS! to stop it, HUSSEIN stated, "I do not have ananswer with these details." When again asked, HUSSEIN replied hehad given his answer and, "I am not a person who gives away hisfriends."
HUSSEIN was questioned regarding a letter datedFebruary 19, 1991, from HUSSEIN KAMIL hereinafter KAMIL! in thename of Iraqi President HUSSEIN to ALMAJID. The letter stated,in part, that the Iraqi military should remove any and allproperty from Kuwait which will aid in the rebuilding of Iraq.HUSSEIN stated the normal method of conveying directions from thePresident was via letters from the Presidential Diwan. KAMIL wasnot a secretary but one of the Iraqi Ministers. KAMIL was "knownfor his way of doing things." HUSSEIN was read the letter by thetranslator and asked whether the letter referred to items used bythe Iraqi military in Kuwait or to things from Kuwait itself.HUSSEIN stated that he never instructed the Iraqi military toremove items, either their own equipment or Kuwaiti items.HUSSEIN opined that the letter may refer to equipment in Kuwaitutilized by the various Iraqi Ministers for critical servicessuch as electricity, water, transportation, and telephoneservice. He stated the letter was dated nine days before thecease fire. HUSSEIN denied the letter referred to Kuwaitiproperty. He stated it was simply a letter from one ministersubordinate to another minister, asking for return of materialstaken to Kuwait by Iraqi forces. HUSSEIN stated he did not issue
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the letter. He asked what items or materials were taken fromKuwait after this letter was published.
When questioned whether members of the Iraqi leadershipwere allowed to issue letters in the name of the Presidentwithout his knowledge, HUSSEIN stated, "There are bad elementseverywhere. He KAMIL! is dead now." HUSSEIN denied knowledgeof other members of the Iraqi leadership who might have acted onauthority of the President without actually having powerdelegated to them by HUSSEIN. HUSSEIN acknowledged thereferenced letter was not conveyed in an official manner. Hereiterated the official method of issuance of such a letter, uponorders from HUSSEIN, would have been to send a communication fromthe Presidential Diwan to, in this case, ALMAJID. This letterwould have specifically enumerated the powers being delegated tothe recipient, in this case, KAMIL. [HUSSEIN interview, March 3,2004].
HUSSEIN was questioned about the 45 coalition POWs andthe purpose of the apparent compulsory appearance of two Britishpilot POWs on Iraqi television. The interviewer noted the pilotsappeared to have been physically abused and that featuring themon television violated the Geneva Convention. HUSSEIN stated thePOWs, especially the pilots, would likely have provided differentdetails about their capture. Some would say they were capturedby farmers or villagers while others would say by a "group ofpeople." These Iraqis might have celebrated the capture of thecoalition combatants by hitting and pushing them around. TheIraqi military was not always in control or aware ofcircumstances regarding captured individuals becausecommunications between military units had been knocked out bycoalition forces.
Regarding coalition POWs captured in 1991, HUSSEINclaimed not to know that the POWs had been abused by anyone inthe Iraqi military or the Iraq Government. But admitted thatothers may have "behaved in a bad manner" and that he wasspeaking only about his personal knowledge of the matter.HUSSEIN added he would provide such information if he were awareof it. He stated he subscribes to the Koran, a document mucholder than the Geneva Convention. The Koran and Arab traditionteach that it is "noble" to treat a prisoner well. HUSSEINbelieved the principles enunciated in the Geneva Conventionshould be respected by the entire world regardless of one'scircumstances or nationality.
HUSSEIN neither confirmed nor denied that all coalition
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POWs were tortured while in Iraqi custody but stated that thisinformation is "on the conscience" of those who reported it andthose who conducted the investigation. HUSSEIN explained thatleaders command by "communication instruments." Lower levelcommanders lead by "vision or voice." Without propercommunication instruments, each entity behaves according to "howit sees things." HUSSEIN reiterated that Iraqi communicationssystems were inoperative during the 1991 war. Accordingly, hespeculated that some reported acts of physical abuse, such as theburning of a POW's hair, might have been acts of a "simpleton."Regarding whether the abuse of coalition forces could reasonablylead one to believe that it was a widespread practice conductedby theentire Iraqi military, HUSSEIN replied, "I answered."
HUSSEIN maintained that he did not question theaccounts of abuse of coalition POWs and that he had no personalinformation to either confirm or deny these allegations.However, from a practical perspective, he did not doubt the Iraqipeople, after being attacked by coalition pilots, might haveabusedthe pilots, especially if they had participated in theircapture. [HUSSEIN interview, March 5, 2004].
HUSSEIN was informed the Kuwaiti Government claimed theIraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait caused $180 billion indamages to the country. HUSSEIN asked for the source of thisinformation. When told the source was Kuwait, HUSSEIN askedwhich neutral and legal entity questioned Kuwait regarding thebasis of their conclusion, and opined that "no one"for details of their investigation of this matter.questioned whether evidence supported these Kuwaitiasked Kuwait
HUSSEIN again
assertions.
HUSSEIN reiterated that "Kuwait is Iraqi" but was"stolen" from Iraq by a British resolution. He added that ifKuwaithad not been a country with oil, it would not have been"stolen." HUSSEIN stated that the arrogance of the Kuwaitirulers
belief
wanted
Kuwaitmade them "stupid" and ignited the war. He stated histhat the United States, located across the Atlantic Ocean,Iraq to be poor. However, he could not understand howwould want to exist next to a "hungry country."
HUSSEIN emphasized he was not saying Kuwait did nothave the right to make these statements; rather, he wasquestioning the identity of the neutral entity which examinedthis matter and whether it was discussed with Iraq. HUSSEINsuggested something similar to a court should have been formed tohear the details from both sides and to decide this matter.However, this did not happen.
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The interviewer told HUSSEIN Kuwait never asked forcompensation for the damages suffered during the Iraqi invasionand occupation. Kuwait did, however, ask for the return of 605POWs who have not, to date, been returned. HUSSEIN stated theseKuwaitis were not "captives" and are missing as characterized bya UN resolution. He stated that many "stories and novels havebeen woven" around this issue, similar to the matter of Iraqiweapons of mass destruction WMD! but that the Kuwaiti POWaccusations have been proven false, similar to the WMD rumors.HUSSEIN stated that individuals often become "missing" during awar and provided, as an example, the one coalition individualstill missing from the first Gulf War and the thousands of Iraqisand Iranians missing from the IranIraq War. As for the 605Kuwaitis, HUSSEIN stated that Kuwait knows their fate. HUSSEINdenied knowing that 605 Kuwaitis were captured in circumstancesother than combat after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
HUSSEIN acknowledged AZIZ SALEH ALNUMAN was Governorof Kuwait during the Iraqi occupation and reported directly toALMAJID, the Iraqi Minister of Interior at that time. Iraqiprovincial laws enumerated ALNUMAN's duties as Governor.HUSSEIN does not remember whether he appointed ALNUMAN orwhether the RCC appointed him by decree.
In Iraq, the Constitution enumerated the RCCs and thePresident's, who is also the Chairman of the RCC, authority.Some governmental appointments like those given to highrankingofficers in the military, to judges, and to general directors,were based on a "republican" directive. HUSSEIN explained thatthe Iraqi system did not prevent the President from submitting aname for appointment consideration and requesting subsequentfeedback from the RCC. Decisions in Iraq were signed by thePresident, and it was his prerogative whether to consult withanyone. HUSSEIN stated "his style" was to always consult withothers when the time came to make a decision. Governors wereassigned based on a "republican" or Presidential directive.HUSSEIN did not remember if he discussed the appointment of AL-NUMAN with the RCC.
HUSSEIN was questioned regarding Iraq's use ofKuwaitis, Japanese, and westerners as human shields during thefirst Gulf War, positioning them at key sites like communicationscenters and military positions. HUSSEIN denied that suchindividuals were taken to Iraqi military positions but added thatthe Iraq Government did not prevent individuals from volunteeringas human shields to protect facilities such as communicationscenters. HUSSEIN claimed that he did not remember whether such
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volunteers existed in 1991. The translator read HUSSEIN an IraqGovernment communication from QUSAY HUSSEIN concerning the usageof Kuwaiti prisoners as human shields. HUSSEIN stated that hehad no information about this letter, and answered only, I
answered" when informed that American forces had recovered thedocument from an Iraq Government building. HUSSEIN asked whetherthe captives discussed in this communication were ever questionedabout being held in Iraqi captivity or being used as humanshields. HUSSEIN stated that Iraq released all the Kuwaiticaptives. When informed that the document was dated March 14,2003, HUSSEIN stated, "It is a forgery. It is impossible." He
suggested the communication be examined closely to determineauthenticity, and added that he thought it was dated 1991.HUSSEIN stated if the document is truly dated 2003, it is aforgery, and added that Iraq did not have captives in 2003.HUSSEIN stated QUSAY HUSSEIN was not the type of person to "makeup things." He reiterated that experts in the United States andin Iraq should scrutinize this document for authenticity.[HUSSEIN interview, March 11, 2004, interview].
HUSSEIN stated that HASHEM, and SALEH, Second CorpsCommander, represented Iraq at the cease fire talks during thefirst Gulf War. Their positions and viewpoints were the same asthose of the Iraqi leadership: to secure a cease fire and tostart the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq. HUSSEIN statedIraq had no goal of continuing the war and desired a cease fire.
When questioned about other items discussed by Iraq atthe 1991 cease fire talks, HUSSEIN stated he did not remember anyadditional Iraqi requests other than the withdrawal of foreignforces from their territory. In HUSSEIN's opinion, the fightingwould have continued without this withdrawal. HUSSEIN deniedknowing that Iraq asked for and received permission to continueflying helicopters. He further denied knowing the purpose ofsuch an Iraqi request.
ALMAJID claimed he was summoned to an Iraqimeeting on August 7, 1990 with HUSSEIN and other IraqiAt the conclusion of the meeting, HUSSEIN announced tothat ALMAJID would go to Kuwait. At the time, SABAWIIBRAHIM ALTIKRlTI hereinafter SABAWI!, HUSSEIN's brotleadership
leaders.
everyone
HASAN
her, wasalready in Kuwait. HUSSEIN's declaration to the Iraqi leadershipauthorized ALMAJID and SABAWI to "manage" Kuwait. ALNUMAN wasappointed Governor of Kuwait and was "included" in the security
plans.
The work in Kuwait was divided into two parts; SABAWI
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served as Director of Intelligence in charge of security ofKuwait and ALMAJID was responsibile for maintaining
"organization" among the various Ministries. SABAWI was incharge of the Security Committee of Kuwait which included membersfrom various government components including intelligence,special security, the police, the military, and the militia. AL-MAJID stated that he and SABAWI had equal overall responsibility
over Kuwait.
ALMAJID knew of the destruction/sabotage of the Burganand AlRumaila oil fields by the Iraqi military. ALMAJIDclaimed that this "operation" was neither his responsibility norunder his control, but rather fell under the direction of the
Iraqi military. [ALMAJID interview, February 4, 2004].
THE 1991 UPRISING
On March 1, 1991, one day after the Gulf War cease-fire, rebellion began in Basra. Within days, the rebellionextended to Karbala, Najaf, Hilla, AlNasiriyah, AlAmrah,Samawah, Kut and Diwaniyya. At one point, all but two of Iraq'sprovinces were in open revolt.
The RCC issued decree #64, dated March 9, 1991, whichgranted the following powers to Ba'ath Party officials [Enclosure
#1:
l. To grant comrades, members of the Regional Command
of the Socialist Arab Ba'ath Party, or members of the
Revolutionary Command Council who directly supervisethe forces and columns that face resistance from the
groups of traitors and agents who are supported byIran, the power of the President of the Republic to
reward and punish.
2. To grant the Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary
Command Council the powers of the Chairman of the
Revolutionary Command Council for the purposes
mentioned in paragraph 1 of this decree.3. To grant the Minister of Industry and Military
Industrialization the powers stated in paragraph 1 of
this decree.
4. This decree shall be in force from the day it is
issued until the end of the crisis.
5. The Ministers and pertinent authorities must
implement this decree.
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TARIQ AZIZ stated that on March 4, 1991, two days afterthe Gulf War ceasefire, the RCC signed and released RCCResolution #64 which gave governors control of military forces intheir territories. All of the RCC members except AZIZ, whoremained in Baghdad, were in the south of Iraq or outside ofBaghdad at this time. AZIZ was working on implementing UNResolutions 687 and 688 which involved the repatriation of POWs.He met with HUSSEIN on occasion, but spent most of his time withthe Director of Military Intelligence, General SABIR AL-DURI.AZIZ believed that in actuality, the RCC was not consulted onResolution #64 although they may have heard of it. AZIZ believedthat it made sense to give authority and power to the governorsin a time of crisis, but there would have been no voting orfeedback, only HUSSEINs order. [AZIZ interview, May 6, 2004].
ALZUBAYDI stated after the United States liberatedKuwait in 1991, HUSSEIN telephoned him and directed him to traveland take charge of the southern city of Nasiriyah. ALZUBAYDIbelieved HUSSEIN chose him to resolve the 1991 Shia Intifada Uprising! in a peaceful manner because he was a Shia. Eventhough he is a Shia, ALZUBAYDI considered himself a Ba'thist andan Iraqi first. He believed that Shia's from Iran caused the1991 Intifada, and learned that they were revolting against thegovernment. According to ALZUBAYDI, there was widespreadlooting and violence aimed at Iraqi government officials andBa'ath Party members in Nasiriyah. ALZUBAYDI maintained thatIran started the 1991 uprising because they wanted to invade and
occupy Iraq. The Republican Guard and Special Forces werealready in Nasiriyah trying to quell the uprising when ALZUBAYDIarrived. ALZUBAYDI remembered conducting meetings with varioustribal leaders, community leaders, and elders in Nasiriyah in anattempt to resolve the situation in a peaceful manner.
KAMAL MUSTAFA ABDALLAH SULTAN ALTIKRITI hereinafterKAMAL MUSTAFA! was the Commander of the Republican Guard Forcesand Regular Army in Nasiriyah during the 1991 uprising. TheBa'ath Party leader, ALZUBAYDI's assistant, was AZIZ SALIH AL-NUMAN. ALZUBAYDI stated that the Republican Guard Forces andRegular Army were equipped with light weapons and did not haveaccess to or use armored tanks or helicopters. [ALZUBAYDI
interview, May 27, 2004].
ALZUBAYDI adamently denied ever killing anyone,ordering executions, or witnessing any executions or atrocitiesduring the 1991 Intifada in Nasiriyah. ALZUBAYDI stated thatPresident Saddam Hussein should be held responsible for theviolence that occurred during the 1991 Intifada. [ALZUBAYDI
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interview, June 5, 2004].
ALZUBAYDI's statements are inconsistent with mediavideo footage showing the Iraqi forces use of helicopters andtanks to regain control in Southern Iraq. Additionally, there isvideo footage of ALZUBAYDI physically assaulting a detaineewhich contradicts his statement that he resolved the uprising in
a peaceful manner.
On March 1, 2004, a day after the United States endedits offensive military operations in Iraq, KAMAL MUSTAFA receivedorders from HUSSEIN KAMEL to take a regiment of Special
Republican Guard SRG! troops to Nasiriyah with ALZUBAYDI,
reorganize the party and reassign responsibilities. Thisinvolved reappointing employees and selecting and assigning a newGovernor. KAMAL MUSTAFA understood his instructions were totravel to Nasiriyah and establish command to run the Army at
Nasiriyah. Once he met up with ALZUBAYDI, KAMAL MUSTAFA was toprovide protection for ALZUBAYDIs command, remain two days andturn the situation over to the special forces. His main task wasto protect the command by setting up check points and securingthe route of travel. Once secure, he was to use local units to
replace his troops and withdraw. KAMAL MUSTAFA was not told
about rebels, revolution or uprising. He was never told to
clean up the cities.
The regiment that KAMAL MUSTAFA assembled to deploy toNasiriyah consisted of four companies of infantry troops, a
support company and a headquarters company. These companies weremade armed with light rifles, medium machine guns, RPGs, rocketlaunchers, and were accompanied by a mortar platoon, an airdefense platoon and a 106 antitank gun element. Each companyhad a radio communication system. ALZUBAYDI arrived at the SRGHeadquarters at 3:00 a.m., and the entire regiment departedBaghdad at 5:OOa.m., southbound for Kut. The regiment traveledin a caravan. ALZUBAYDI and the command element traveled in therear of the formation. One of HUSSEINs bodyguards traveled with
the group.
In Kut, the group learned from a party member thatthere was a disturbance in AlHayy. The Governor informed them
that the Mayor was missing and that party members had been
killed. The regiment came under fire as they arrived outside ofAlHayy. They responded with RPG and light weapons fire. AL-ZUBAYDI decided the regiment should deploy. The regiment brokeup and deployed, with two companies deployed on line and preparedto retaliate. An hour later, the regiment entered the city.
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There were no targets for the support weapons, rather, the
regiment used light and medium machine guns and RPGs. All of the
attacks were visual. The advancing forces came under fire and
returned fire, although it did not last long as there was no
resistance. The enemy had apparently thrown down their weaponsand retreated. ALZUBAYDI and the Governor of Kut put the cityin order. This happened while KAMAL MUSTAFA and the regiment
were still there. Some party members, police and some of the
Governor's men were still fighting. Some people were captured,
but the SRG did not debrief or transport them. [KAMAL MUSTAFA
interview, April 29, 2004].
ALMAJID denied personal knowledge of any persecution,including executions and imprisonment, of Shia Muslims living insouthern Iraq in 1991, and denied personal knowledge of the
destruction of Shia villages during this or any other time.
[February 4, 2004 interview]. However, on January 2, 2004, AL-
MAJID stated that he and other military commanders had received
orders from HUSSEIN to execute any Iraqi civilians who were
uprising against the Iraqi regime. On March 2, 1991, ALMAJIDarrived in Basra where approximately 200 Iraqi civilians were
being detained by the 51st Division under the command of SAIF
ALDIN ALRAWI. Of the 200 civilians detained, 36 were being heldat Saad Circle, in Basra, for committing crimes against the Iraqi
Government. Of the 36, all but two had admitted to the crimes.
However, the two were implicated by the other 34. ALMAJIDexecuted the two by shooting them with a rifle to make an example
out of them. ALMAJID claimed he released the other 34.
[Attached as Enclosure #1
Regarding the 1991 Uprising, HUSSEIN stated that withina day of the cease fire of 1991, "some elements" had initiated
sabotage operations in the southern Iraq cities of Basrah,
Nasiriyah, and Amarah. Later, this activity spread to the
northern cities of Suleimaniyyah, Erbil, and Kirkuk. HUSSEIN
stated the groups conducting these operations were "pushed by
Iran," and Iraq captured 68 Iranian intelligence officers who
were later exchanged for Iraqi prisoners.
At the time of the uprisings, most bridges in Iraq had
already been destroyed, electricity was unavailable, water
service was sporadic, and food supplies were minimal. In theaftermath of the war, these factors contributed to general unrestin the country. HUSSEIN stated that "elements" participating in
the uprisings were a mixture of thieves, rebels and "those from
Iran," whom HUSSEIN described as individuals from Iranian
government services, Iraqis of Iranian origin, and Iraqis who had
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"escaped" to Iran. Their nationalities were difficult to
determine with any degree of certainty because many had
intentionally destroyed their citizenship documents.
HUSSEIN stated that in reasserting government control
of the country, Iraqi leadership considered the southern area of
Iraq a high priority as Iraqi forces primarily encountered and
fought Iranians in this area. After order was restored in
Southern Iraq, government forces focused on the Northern Regionwhere Iraqi forces met little or no resistance. The fighting in
Northern and Southern Iraq lasted approximately two months.HUSSEIN stated, "God made us victorious." Thereafter, according
to HUSSEIN, Iran continued to insert groups of IO to 15 peopleinto Iraq to conduct operations against the government. However,
these individuals were, for the most part, thwarted by members of
the local population. Ultimately, following an agreement between
Iran and Iraq, these hostile operations ceased.
HUSSEIN characterized the uprisings in 1991 as
insurgent activity conducted by "outlaws and thieves." He didnot consider the insurgents to be revolutionaries. When asked
what factors allowed these disturbances, HUSSEIN answered that it
was support from Iran, weakness of the Iraq Government after the
war, and possibly assistance from coalition forces. He notedthat the war had weakened all government institutions, including
the police and the military. Gradually, however, the Iraqi
military grew in strength and eventually overcome these rebels.
According to HUSSEIN, the Iraqi military's "blade got longer andlonger." He acknowledged, however, that the Iraqi military's
weakened state created the opportunity for this lawlessness in
the first place.
HUSSEIN believed the goal of the insurgent activity wasto gain control of Iraq. In his opinion, Iran supported
insurgent activity in 1991 after Iran failed to gain control of
Iraq through the previous war with Iraq. Iran wanted to controlall, or at least a part, of Iraq, and particularly the southern
portion. HUSSEIN believed Iran also wanted to extend its powerto eastern Saudi Arabia and the entire Gulf region.
The RCC gave the Iraqi Provincial Governors control of
the military during the Uprisings to protect the people and thestate and to reestablish security and a "normal life." Thepeople and the nation were threatened by widespread killings,
theft, arson, and general destruction, all of which had to bebrought under control. HUSSEIN denied knowing the specificmethods that the Governors and the military used to reassert
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control. HUSSEIN stated, "They were given the authority, and
they carried it out." HUSSEIN claimed that he did not ask for
details of the operation but did request and receive status
reports regarding the progress of operations.
HUSSEIN denied that the Geneva Convention applied to
this situation, claiming it only applied to wars; that is, only
to situations when a foreign country is an occupying power. He
claimed the Geneva Convention was applicable to attempted coups
or internal unrest involving crimes like burning and looting.
when asked again what restrictions were placed on the Iraqi
military during the 1991 Uprisings, HUSSEIN replied that an
Iraqi, whether civilian or military, knew what was acceptable as
humane behavior and that there is no need for someone to have to
tell them how to behave.
HUSSEIN stated, "I am responsible for what I decide"and added that he was not responsible for how an Iraqi acts.
HUSSEIN claimed that if an Iraqi wanted to use him as the
justification for his actions, he would accept that assertion so
long as it did not harm his HUSSEINS! reputation. In HUSSEIN's
opinion, a leader is responsible for a subordinates actions if
the leader learns of the subordinate's transgressions and
confronts the subordinate with the wrongfulness of those actions.
He stated that each individual is judged based on his own law and
constitution. [HUSSEIN interview, March 13, 2004].
HUSSEIN stated that he learned about the Southern Iraq
situation the same way as any leader of a country. Whenever
faced with a situation, the Iraqi leadership assembled and
consulted "quickly" about the best way to confront an issue.
HUSSEIN stated that initially, those involved in the
uprisings in Southern Iraq were among "those who had crossed theborder from Iran." Others in Iraq committed similar acts, while
some were not involved at all in the incidents. According to
HUSSEIN, if the Iraqi Government's reaction had been slow andweak, some might have shown sympathy and assisted the Uprising
participants out of fear that those who caused the disturbances
would ultimately take over power in Iraq. HUSSEIN speculatedthat some participated because they were simply "greedy thieves
and robbers."
HUSSEIN asserted it was the duty of the Iraq Governmentto confront individuals participating in the Uprisings. HUSSEIN
stated that the "arms of the authorities had been severed" but
the Iraq Government "picked them up and struck the enemy." He
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stated that those who would not be deterred by words would be
deterred by weapons. Therefore, the Iraqi leadership ordered the
army to assemble as many forces as possible to confront
"treachery" and the disturbances. HUSSEIN acknowledged that
incidents of looting by certain individuals "got mixed in" withthe actions of those participating in the uprisings.
Regarding the decisions regarding whom to place incharge of areas in Southern Iraq during that time and what
authority and powers to delegate, HUSSEIN replied, "I said ourdecision was to confront and defeat the enemy " The participants
in the Uprisings were to be "put in their place," if not by word,
then by weapon. HUSSEIN stated that a lengthy discussion of this
matter was not required. The individuals who had crossed the
border from Iran were members of the Dawa Party who were assisted
by additional Iranian forces. Together, these individualskilled, burned, looted, and committed other crimes. According to
HUSSEIN, when faced with this situation, one does not need to ask
one's self what action to take. Procedure, however, dictated
that the Iraqi leadership meet to discuss the matter. All
members agreed regarding the necessary Iraq Government response
to the situation.
HUSSEIN stated the threat to the Iraq Government in1991 existed in both Northern and Southern Iraq. An uprising was
even attempted in Baghdad. HUSSEIN stated that those "sitting onthe fence" joined the uprisings after witnessing police stations
or government offices attacked and seeing no response by theauthorities. As the Iraq Government reasserted control, the
"enemy" went to a new area or reinforced in an old one.
According to HUSSEIN, the Iraqi military strength grew over timeand "the circle started tightening around the enemy." [HUSSEIN
interview, March 16, 2004].
Regarding the senior Iraqi leaders assigned in 1991 toSouthern Iraq to deal with the Shia uprising, HUSSEIN stated, "We
assigned responsibility to whoever was going to handle thesituation." ALZUBAIDI and KAMAL MUSTAPHA ABDALLAH were sent to
Nasiriyah, KAMIL was sent to Karbala, ALMAJID was sent to
Basrah, and ALDURI was sent to AlHillah to confront the Shia
uprisings in those areas. During this interview, HUSSEIN deniedthat he had previously stated that in 1991, he was only
interested in results and did not want to know the details of howhis commanders would stop the Uprising. HUSSEIN asked, "Who saysI did not want to know how?" When informed by the interviewer
that HUSSEIN himself had previously made this statement, hestated that any person's main goal would have been to stop the
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disturbances and to end the "treason." [HUSSEIN interview, March
23, 2004].
1991 Chemical Weapons Use
In the early morning of March 7, 1991, an unidentified
Iraqi Government Official requested authority to use liquids
against rebels in and around An Najaf. Regime forces intended to
use the liquid to defeat dug in forces as part of a larger
assault.
KAMIL, then Director of MIC, ordered senior officials
in the CW program to ready CW for use against the revolt. His
initial instruction was to use VX. When informed that no VX was
available, he ordered mustard be used instead. However, mustard
was ruled out because of its detectable persistence and Sarin
selected.
On or about March 7, 1991, R-400 aerial bombs stored at
the Tamuz Airbase were readied for use. Al Muthanna State
Establishment MSE! technicians mixed the two components of theIraqi binary nerve agent system inside the R400s. Explosiveburster charges were loaded into the bombs and the weapons
assembled near the runway. Helicopters from nearby bases flew to
Tamuz where they were armed with Sarinladen R400s and other
conventional ordnance. As of March 1991, about a dozen MI8
helicopters were staged at Tamuz Airbase.
The helicopters were used to fly dozens of sortiesagainst Shia rebels in Karbala and the surrounding areas. A
senior participant from the CW program estimates that 10 to 20 R-
400s were dropped. Other reporting suggests as many as 32 R400smay have been dropped. According to an Iraqi helicopter pilot,MI8 helicopters were also used during the IranIraq war to drop
chemical munitions.
Following the initial helicopter sorties over Karbala,the Senior Chemical Weapons Program Officer overseeing the
operation received an angry call from KAMIL's office. The callersaid the attacks had been unsuccessful and that further measures
were required. The R400s, which are designed for highspeeddelivery from higher altitude, likely did not activate properlywhen dropped from a slowmoving helicopter.
As an alternative to the R400s, the MSE filled largeaerial bombs with CS tear gas!. Over the next two weeks,
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helicopters departed Tamuz Air Base loaded with CSfilled bombs.
One participant estimated that more than 200 CSfilled aerial
bombs were dropped on rebel targets in and around Karbala and
Najaf.
Trailers loaded with mustardfilled aerial bombs were
also transported to the Tamuz Air Base. A participant in the
operation stated that mustard gas was not used on the rebels
because of the likelihood of discovery by the Coalition.
According to the source, the mustardfilled bombs were never
unloaded and were not used.
Refugees and Iraqi military deserters reports of the
1991 attacks include descriptions of a range of CW and improvised
poisons that were used in the areas around Karbala, Najaf,
Nasiriyah, and Basrahh.
ALMAHAWIL MASS GRAVE SITE
According to the HRW Report of May 2003, Vol. 15, No.
5, while many of those buried in the AlMahawil mass graves
remain unidentified, remains that have been identified by
relatives establish that the bodies are those of Iraqis arrested
during the 1991 uprisings and killed while in Iraq Government
custody. HRW interviewed many of the relatives of those
identified in the mass grave, making the crucial link between
their disappearance in 1991 and the discovery of their remains in
the AlMahawil mass graves.
KAMIL MUHAMMAD DAWUD hereinafter DAWUD!, a Baghdad
lawyer, age 74 all ages are given as of the time of their
disappearance!, and his son KHALID, a 29 yearold university
student, drove from Baghdad to AlHillah around March 9 or 1O,
1991, searching for DAWUDS older son, then a soldier in the
Iraqi army. While the older brother soon returned home, KAMIL
and KHALID disappeared. Their family found KAMIL'S halflooted
car near the AlMahawil Army Base sometime later, but received no
information regarding their fate. On May 17, 2003, their family
identified their bodies at the large AlMahawil mass grave site
based on the presence of DAWUDs watch and Khalid's
identification document. DAWUD was blindfolded and both men had
their hands bound. [HRW interview with RASHID KAMIL MUHAMMAD,
Baghdad, May 18, 2003]
k | hereinafter[::::;::] age 42, was at igcthe AlMa awfl grave site looking for five re atives who were "
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missing from a rural village in the AlMadhatiyya district
located approximatel 2O kilometers southwest of AlHillah.According tc>[:;:::;rthree of his brothers were arrested on March
23, 1991, when oca Ba'ath officials demanded that all local
villagers attend a meeting at the local Ba'ath party headquarters
and arrested approximately fifteen people. His brothers, SUBHAN,age 54,g:::::] age 44, and age 36, all farmers, were
arreste and never seen again. himself was briefly
arrested with the other three but was released just as they were
taken to Al-Mahawil military base because he was a soldier on
activ ' ' ry duty who had not abandoned his post during thewar. :?iiiffidentified the remains of his brother, SUBHAN, among
the bodies recovered from the AlMahawil mass grave based upon
the identity documents he found on the remains. Two other
elat f l t d d th t'r ives o were a so arres e aroun e same ime.
the 21 yearold son of his brother[::::::]and
age 22, were soldiers returning to duty. Aperson who said he was an eyewitness to their arrest told[g:::::]
that the two were arrested at a Ba'ath Party operated chec point
on their way to their military division. [HRW interview with
| |Mahawil, May 16, 2003.]
[:::::::] two cousins remain missing, but as they were
arrested around the same time as relatives whose remains have
been identified in the mass grave, the family believes they were
likely executed and buried around the same time.
| la 40 yearold teacher, described for
HRW what happened when loyalist Iraqi forces entered his district
in March, 1991: the military entered AlShamali [the northern
part] on March 15 and the cleansing operation started in the
villages. They destroyed many houses in the villages usingbulldozers. They cut down the palm trees and the orchards. They
chased and traced all the sons of my tribe. They arrested many
people who were on the street, even people just passing through
the area. They distributed checkpoints all over and contro ledroads [HRW interview with] a
Nine relatives of here arrested onthe same day in March, 1991. His only brother,| |[:::::] a 25 yearold army deserter, was arrested at his home by a
group of Ba'ath party members, security officials, and police
officers; his 31 yearold cousin| kn armyofficer, was also arrested at his home; his father's uncle,
MUHAMMAD OBAID HUSSEIN, age 54, was arrested at his home alongwith his three sons, 23 yearold| la soldier,
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27 yearold ABBAS MUHAMMAD OBAID, an agricultural worker, and 29
yearoldI I a soldier.I I
age 67, another ncl f hi f her, was arrested as he came home
- a 30 yearold teacher, and
a farmer cousin whose age he 'were also arrested. At the AlMahawil mass grave,Ei?:fff:Effj
I:|identified the remains of ABBAS MUHAMMAD OBAID and HADI
OBAID HUSSEIN based on the identity documents found on their
remains. He believed that his other relatives were also buried
in the same mass grave because they all were arrested and
disappeared on the same day.
I I a 46 yearold worker, and
his son, a soldier, were arrested and disappeared on March 12,
1991, as they came home from his shop in AlHillah. A second
son,I I 16 at the time of the arrest, told HRW
that he was in the car with his father and brother when they were
stopped at a checkpoint operated by the General Security al-Amn
alAm!: the Amn had the names of my father and brother, and
said they needed to investigate them. I I
identified the remains of his father at the AlMahawil mass grave
based on identity documents found on his remains and was still
searching for his brother's remains at the time of the HENinterview. [HRW interview withI IMay
14, 2003]
KHALID HASSAN KHUDAYYIR, age 13, and his 33 yearold
cousin, FUAD ABD ALHUSSEIN KADHIM, left their native village of
Albu Alwan and walked toward the nearby city of AlHillah to
purchase food on March 4, 1991. FUAD ABD ALHUSSEIN KADHIM had
been a soldier two years before the 1991 Uprising but had
returned to civilian life. The two young men disappeared and for
years the family had no information about their fate. Their
bodies were found at the AlMahawil ma qrgye with tbeifidentit documents [HRW interview witjs I
Many more families still searching for their missing
relatives told HRW similar stories of unresolved
disappearances. a 45 yearold woman, wast ical. Her 14 earoId son I I went missin on March 7YP Y I 9 ,
1991, after she had asked him to go fetch some water from the
river in AlHillah's Bab AlHussein neighborhood. When she asked
the soldiers stationed on a nearby bridge about him, they
threatened to shoot her and ordered her to leave. She never
heard again of her son and failed to locate his remains after
looking through hundreds of bags containing human remains at the
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AlMahawil mass grave site. [HRW interview with[:::::::::::::] 3Mahawil, May 14, 2003] hr?
HRW was given a list that, according to local
officials, contained more than 1,200 names of identified victims
from the two AlMahawil mass graves. However, the list appears
limited in its usefulness and reliability: the actual numbering
of the victims was sloppy; the numbering jumps suddenly from
victim 830 to victim 931; many victims take up more than one
number; and some victims are listed multiple times. A closer
examination of the list suggests that relatives have claimed
slightly less than 1,000 of the victims from the mass grave.
These identifications were made in a variety of ways and some are
of dubious reliability. While some relatives were fortunate to
find remains containing identity papers, in other cases family
members guessed as to identity based on much more circumstantial
criteria such as items of clothing, medications, and cigarettes
found with the corpses.
It is similarly difficult to estimate the total number
of unidentified persons exhumed from the two AlMahawil mass
graves as no records appear to have been kept. Local officials
gave widely varying figures, but a HRW count of the unidentified
bodies just before their reburial concluded that approximately
1,200 bodies remained at the large AlMahawil mass grave and just
over 100 bodies remained at the AlMahawil brick factory mass
grave. It appears, moreover, that some of the bodies from the
brick factory mass grave were moved to the large AlMahawil mass
grave site. Taken together, it appears that no more than
approximately 2,300 bodies were recovered from the two AlMahawil
mass graves.
Although the list of claimed victims provided by local
authorities is of limited reliability in terms of the total
number of victims, it does provide some crucial information about
the likely identity and residence of the victims. The vast
majority of the victims appear to have been young men from the
general area around AlHillah, indicating that the mass grave was
a result of a localized campaign of arrests and executions in the
AlHillah area. The relatively small number of victims from
Karbala, AdDiwaniyah, AnNajaf, and Baghdad in the mass grave
appear to have been traveling through the AlHillah area at the
time of their detention and therefore, were probably not arrested
elsewhere and transferred to the area. Among the victims are
more than a dozen Egyptian nationals who were working and living
in the AlHillah area.
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According to local officials in AlHillah, severalpersons who were taken to the Al~Mahawil mass grave sitessurvived the executions at the AlMahawil brick factory massgrave site. HRW located one such survivor and his remarkable
story provides important information about the manner in whichthe mass execution campaign was conducted in AlMahawil.
L I hereinafter[::::::::::::]was only 12 years old at the time of the 1991 mass arrest
campaign. On March 16 19 , his 28 yearold mother, KHULUDABUD NAJI, took[:::::::::%j and two other 13 year old relatives,his uncle, MUHANAD ABUD NAJI, and his cousin, MUHAMMAD YASSINMUHAMMAD, from their home in the AlSada neighborhood to theirgrandfather's house in the Shaawi neighborhood. On their way, asoldier stopped the group, asked them where they were going, andaccused them of being looters. E:::::::::::::]nmther explained
that they were just going to their grandfather's house, but thesoldier arrested all of them and took them to a nearby school
bui1din9- ACC@Idin9 tOE:::::::::::] they put us in a school ina classroom. By the evening, the classroom was filled with
people because they kept arresting people. As evening fell, thepeople detained in the classroom were taken to the AlMahawil
military base where:
they blindfolded us and bound our hands, and
then they put us in landcruisers with shaded
windows and a bus. We were about 25 to 30
people [detained].m They took us to the Al-
Mahawil military base. Some of us were taken
to another area [of the AlMahawil base].
They put me, my mother, my cousin, and myuncle in a tiny room. In the night of the
same day, they brought a 14 yearold girl and
a 30 yearold woman to the same room.
The family spent the night in the tiny room withoutfood. The next morning they were questioned by highrankingofficers, including a lieutenant-colonel, who noted their names,the neighborhood they came from, and similar details. Followingthe perfunctory questioning, they were taken to a large hall atthe AlMahawil military base where they were again joined byother detainees:
They took us to a big hall [and] started
bringing in people now and then. We stayedthere for two days. There were so many
people.... They were children, women, and
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men. We were sitting in [family] groups, me
with my relatives and the others with their
relatives. No one dared to speak to the
other groups.
Toward the end of the second day, the evening of March
18, 1991, the detainees in the big hall were taken outside andlined up in the yard of the compound. They brought some
blankets which they ripped and the tied our hands andblindfolded us with those,"E:::::fi:::]recalled. They covered
our eyes and put us inside some TATA buses looted from Kuwait.We were between 45 and 50 people on each bus. It was very
crowded, there were two nennls ch chair. [HRW interviewwith I May 16, 2003]
After the detainees were loaded on the buses, they weretold that there were some checkpoints on the road, and th 'asked, they should say they were going to Baghdad.[::::::ff:if:::]who could see a bit through the blanket covering his eyes,
recounted the route taken by the bus:
There was an asphalt road from the door of
the military camp. Then we turned off into a
remote, dusty dirt road, an agricultural
road. We turned off the main road, and I
didn't know where we were going. I was
sitting on the bus at the chair near the
window. There was an abandoned canal, I was
sitting on that side of the bus....I couldn't
see clearly, but there was a buildinglater,
when I looked [after the executions], it was
a brick factory.
Almost as soon as the buses stopped, the executionsbegan. People were pulled off the buses, thrown in a predugpit, machinegunned, and then buried with a bulldozer. AL-
HUSSEINI told HRW how he survived:
When they started taking us off the bus, some
of us began reciting the shahada [Muslim
declaration of faith]. My mother told me,
Repeat the shahada, because we are about to
die. I heard the shouting of the children.
We grabbed each others hands, me, my mother,
my cousin, and my uncle. They pulled us, we
were all together. They threw us into the
dugout grave. When I fell down, there were
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so many bodies underneath me. I lay down on
top of them. They started to shoot on us.
There were two [groups of] men. One was
taking the people off the bus, and others
were shooting at people in the hole. One of
them pulled at my clothes and said, That one
isn't dead, shoot him. They shot again, but
still I was not shot. So they gave an order
to the bulldozer driver to bury the grave. I
was at the edge of the grave. When the
shovel came, I spontaneously tried to crawl
out. It was sundown now. I crawled to the
edge of the grave, and got to a place where
the bamboo was on my face and I was able to
breathe through it. I heard the man who was
standing on the hill instruct the shovel
driver to bury us morehe had seen that I was
not yet buriedbut the driver left the place
and didn't do it.
After he heard the noises of the vehicles fade away,E::::::::::]crawled out of the mass grave, leaving his deadrelatives behind. He made his way to the main AlHillahBaghdadroad, and met four sympathetic Shia Iraqi soldiers who helped
him return home.
Witnesses to the AlMahawil Arrests and Detentions
There are many others in the AlHillah area whowitnessed the mass detentions and executions. Their testimonies
provide further evidence of the mass detentions at Al~Mahawil
military base and the subsequent executions of thousands.ISKANDAR JAWAD WITWIT, the newlyappointed Mayor, was a high-ranking Air Force officer based at AlMahawil at the time. Hesaid that the Iraqi government crushed the uprising in AlHillah
by March ll, 1991, and immediately began a massive arrest
campaign throughout the area:
They arrested everyone they saw [and tookthem to AlMahawil military base]. If they
found men, women, or children, they took
them. People were brought from AlHillah,
An-Najaf, and Karbala for execution. The
executions happened every day; they killed
thousands of people. [HRW interview with
ISKANDAR JAWAD WITWIT, Hillah, May 17, 2003]
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I I who was himself arrested onMarch 16, , on suspicion of supporting the uprising,explained part of the massive AlMahawil military base had beentaken over by individuals and organizations directly involved inthe arrests and the killings. These people included highran
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