SIS History Part 01

Document text

~
.
c cc,c- CC~.-:"=OC "= ~ ~=, ~~,~=-
II!",--
~- . -- ~-1a- r,i";,j'O,;-,, !;!! Ij~-~~- --- --- '-
~
, -=:-;;:.;;;:;;:::~ - - .-- -- _L..C-=
- ~
- ~ -
- ~ =~. - --- ~
-- "
- 0 ."- ~
. -.. . .. . . . - -
~ "
..

(
BI8'lOiY OF '!'BE 118 DIVI8I~
c
8f9/04
A~ IN~ORKATION OONTArNBD
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN ~HEQYSK
CLASB7r7ED BY 60267 NLS/MLT/vta - AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: Z5X (1) 6/~/20Z9
) ~ .
"
,1\
,.
,/
r

.~Er
a
'1' JBI.& 0 F 00 I'l'EIi'l'S
Page
1.
HIS'lOBICAL S~I AND CdITIgJl
 1
A. ORG~ Am BjCK~UliD
 1
B. Bm,Y ORGmUTION ,1m TICH1iI~~ EMPtIED
 2
C. LA'rm ORGOOUTIOH AIm ~~'1' OF 'l'ECHM ~~
 11
D. PEAl PEBIOD OF OPliU.'lIOE IN L&TIN AMElUCA
 22..
E. FBI 815 ~RK AJm OOVERAGI II KJREIJN OOUNrtcrm
O'rHm THAN LATIN .&Mr.RICJ.
 29
r. SI5 FIN.ANCE5
 33
G. JURISDICTIONAL DIYlICUl.TW At."D LACK OF
(XX)PBRJTION
 3S
B. CRITI~
 4l
II.
ORIanl All) SOOPZ OF SIS
 J.6
A. ESTJ.BLISmiEtll'
 46
B. ~EItrAL DIRECTIVE
 47
c. CXX>PEtUTIVB WNCTIONS 'W'l'1'H OTHER OO~NrAL
AGEICIFaS
 48
D. DELIMITATION J.~
 49
:s. JUB.ISDICTIu~JL DIFI"ICULTDS
 Sl
.
:r. LACK OF C<X>PBRAT!01l
 7l
G. ~ST-WAR ~ ~R ~REIGfi INTELLIGBNCE OO~GE
 76
1. Budget Bureau Plan
 ??
2. Plan Proposed b7 General William Dooovan
 ?8
3. Plan ProPO8ed b7 Joint InteU:igeDCe
Committee of Joint Chiefs of Stefl
 79
4. 'nIe lBI nan
 80

8l
bl
 81
I liS)
1. Presidentiel birecti ve
84
85
96
 ADM! b"LSTrtATIVE DEVEWPMENrS
 RI.
96
 1. SELF£TION Am 'rRAINnlG OF ~NI~"EL
96
 1. Selection of Personnel
96
 2. Early 515 Lec~ures
98
 3. Spanish end Portugese Schooling
99
 4. Post-Spsmsh Training am Supervision
5. Later 515 Lectures, 19'+4
6. 5IS In-5ervice School
?
Quarterlr SIS Conference
8. isiatic and European Schools
9. Inspection Procedures
B. FINANCES
1. Hamling of Pilnds
2. Finance of. IMividual Fmployee
3. Fiscal Year Appro9riations am
ExpeDiitures
c. PARTICIPATION OF A)jERICAN OOMPANIES WITH 515
1. The Cover Company Plan
2. The Companies Used as Covers

D. CO)I4UNICATIOIS
1. Mail-Drops aDi Double-Talk Letters
2. Secret Inks end Codes
3. Diplomatic Pouches and Couriers
4. C8ble Service
136
 s. FBI Radio Network
E. DEVEIDPI£Nr OF OOVKR!GE
1.1940
2.1941
3. 191.2
4. 191.3
S. 191.4
6.1945
 167
7. 1946
 170
8.1947
 1"10
9. Development ot the Legal Attache System
 173
10. Operation Outside the Western Henispbere
 174
F. ORIJAlIIU'rIONAL DEVE1A>PWENr AT THE SEAT OF
OOVERNWENT
 178
IV.
~ OP.EaJTWNS
 180
J.. PLAN'l SURVEY PRO ~
 180
1. Background
 180
2. SurV'8YS Made
 181
3. SurveJS of Diplomatic Facilities
 184

~
f
~.CI
ft1e -Jor objective8 1D prepariDg the hi8tory ot the SIS
ni.'ri.i~ are,
To I8"mde a OOq>lete, useable ~bO<* CODCern1.Dg our
entire operations in the SIS field whicb could be used
a8 a guide book in .etting up a .. SIB ~tion in
the 8't'ent it. 0eC8M necessary.
'10 1R"OYid8 re8d1l7 a'9'8ilable data 'which could be used to
ou'tliDe our operatimlS or to present our acC~l1Sb88l1t8
it Deeded tor Cqrea8ional ~..ti8OIl)" or tor an'1 other
.ia1.lar hearins.
To outliDe 1D .~al the Mterial o~t&1Ded 1D our t1188
am too 1Ddioaw ita locat1~ in oJ'Ider t.bat ~tel7
detCled data w1U be available ~ 8Dy phase of our SIS
operatical in the ev8E1t 8uch data becomes DeC88sary tor 1111'rea8OD. , .
Dle bistcnoJ' which follows 1s di'd.ded into .tift '9'011188 wb1ch
are described bel~ I
Volu8 I coota1ns a chronological record of the ~-!I1n18trat1 ve
deftlOP8Dt ot the ~..u' 8 SIS program including the
Presidential Directives establishing the program, the develOJDiS1t
of coverage, tlle baTVI1i"g ot finances, and the 1I8e of coYer
c~-n1e8 in ~ prograa 8S _11 as other ~~atrat1ve d8t.ai18.
Yom-8 II 81¥1 III ccntain the bi8to17 of tJ1e Bur_u'a -jor
accoq>118hmenta in each 1nd1'V'idual cQ,mtrJ as weU as a 118't.
01' all per8~1 that .Z'8ted 111 the 1nd1Y1dua1 c~trie8.
1 bibliographf 18 1nol1lded tor each COImtr,-. 1 mater list
of SIS pere0DP81 is alsc iDcl\.ted.
VO11188 IV am V, 'which constitute an addendum to the b1stol"1',
c~ta1n copies of the SIS A!'_nt'al operations report8 which in
th88e1T88 are a history of SIS operat1=a.

(
11
~,,1 ~
IJI ~-I S
~ i ~ ',\
JJ-~t' ~ \g:
v' I
'\
a~
Q
'"
l
'~Er""
SE~r
f:).
I
1
,
~
~
~
.
I f ;-,.",
\l\
/
.I -","J
.Ia
/"
L,
~
I.
I
/
.I
I
J
t
)

a
 . s'rn~Er
t
-,
".GUIIO '"
ECUADO~.-'
.eUI~
I
-
~
'"
'"
-'7\
.~
.-
.--
'V
~
( B
,...
PERU '".. ,'.-,
\",'
"-.\ BOLIVIA
R
A
z
L
'"
- ~ .IA-.-
--.
\,
.-I-'~-
..o~ ,\ <- v ~ "'46'11;""'\1 '. '4; ""t'-L&J( ~ 't:.c..1...,
~ .-- ,-~.)
~ -,.,
~
\
\,
~
_-.0
~-
" (!-
J-
IA--.)
~~
--
-.
-0-.
.-- .-
.\ .--.- 10..rz)I ~UlI.~ ~. I
-- -~T (!J
--
~ ~
1
J ~
~_.
~""I
.iii
~
.

B. roLICE LIUSOH JJfiJ T.tUININ:J 01' LA" EBKlRC~
OFFIC~ D U.TD jJlEB.ICA
1. Visits to th.e Bureau b1' Latin .American
Officials
2. Police Linson _ants '!'raiDing School
3. Police Liaison bY' Countries
4. Proposed. Police Conference J Bue~s Aires J
Argentina, Kay 2? J 1942
5. ProJX)sed Pan American Police Confereooe
1943
 212
6. Pan American Co~ress of Cr1minoloa,
Santiago, Chile, Key 1944
7. SecoDd Net1onal Mexican Police Congress
Guadalajara, Mexico, October 1-3, 1945
8. LACP Corrvention, Ki8Di Beacb, Florida,
December 10-12, 1945
9. International Crill1w Police Callmiss1on
C. OOVERAiJE OF PJ1I AKEJUCAN OOBJERE1.i~
 221
1. Fourth Inter-American Conference of
Foreign Vinisters, llexico 01 t7, )(8x1.co,
February 25th to March 9, 1945
2. United Nations Conference on Internation81
Organizstion, San Francisco. CelitorD1a,
April 25th to June 26th, 1945
3. Foreign Minister's Conference, Loman,
KDgland, 1945
 223
4. J'orei&D Minister's Con1'erence, ~scow,
Russia, 1947
D. M) lI) GiUPBS
I. OOKPLBTE SIS ST J.TISl'ICS

T
.
v.
OPFJUTIONS IN EACH OOUm'RY
A . AP..GEl(f IN!
1. SIS Facilities and Objectives
2. Kajor Accomplishments
229
a. Geman Activities
229
(1) Buenos Aires Branch of LIR
Group
 229
(2) HDZ Case
230
(3) EFE Courier sy-st-
234
(4) R~ SPEER Persomel
(5) Axis J~ents Removed from Key
Posi tions in American ~irms
(6) The IfSt2y-Behind" Groups
240
b. Japanese Activities
21.4
(1) Tomiya KO8eki and Shozo MUrei
Directed Espionsge Activities
244
(2) Henri Cetherin Gravet
247
(3) Japsa Network
248
c. Italian Activities
250
d. The Communist )i)vement
254
(1) Local Communist Activities
254
(2) Soviet Dipl~atic Activities
256
e. Uses Made of SIS Information
257
(1) Blacklist and Economic Date
257

.
 (2) Efforts to Fbrce Action Against
Axis Agents by Argentina
t. Activities Arising from Argentine
Political Situ~tion
3. Personnel
4. Bibliography
268
e. Investigative Files
268
b. J.dministrati ve Files
c. Monographs
B. AUSTitI!
274
1. SIS Facilities and Objectives
2. Jiajor Accomplishments
3. Persomel
4. Bi bliogra.phy
2. I nve stig ati ve Files
275
b. AdministratiTe Files
C. BERalJDA
276
1. 515 Facilities and Objectives
276
2. Major Accomp11shnents
276
3. PersOMel
277
4. Bibliography
277
a. Investigative Files
2'"'!'7
b. Adm1mstrative Files
277

-S~E7-
D. B:>LIVIA
1. SIS Facilities am Objectives
2. Major Accomplish.ments
e.. Axis Agents
b. Smuggling J.ctivities
c. Punt Surveys
d. Kidnapping of Mauricio Hochschild
e. Political and Revolutions.r,. Activities
 281
(1) Major Elias Belmonte
 281
(2) Political Upheavals
3. Personnel
4. BibliographY'
 284
a. Investigative Files
b. Administrative Files
c. )&o~gre.ph8
 286
E.~L
1. SIS Facilities end Objectives
2. Major Accomplishments
8. Ge~n Activities
 287
(l) CRt Redio Ring
(2) CIT Radio Ring
(3) LIB. Radio Ri~
(4) LFS Radio Ring
~ET
296
S~Er
(5) m Radio Ring
(6) JOt! Redia Group
(?) Werner Christoph "ialtematb
(8) Ferando Manoel de Almeide e Motta
Marques
(9) The Apfel Sabotage Group
~o) Black Listed Firms
b. The ComImmi at )i)vement
(1) Local Communist Activities
307
 (2) Soviet Activities
c. Domestic Politic~l M2tters
d. Cooper2t1on with Local Americen LFw
Enrorcement Officers
e. Procur~ent of Technical Date.
3. Personnel
4. Bibliography
a. Investigative Files
b. Administrative Files
,320
c. KolX)graphs
.321
i. CANADJ.
.321
 1. 515 Facilities and Objectives
321
2. Major Accomplishments
322
3. Persomel

4. Bibl1ogrephl
322
 a. Investigative l"iles
.322
 b. Administrative Files
\;. CHnE
1. S]s Facilities and Objectives
2. KBjor Accomplishments
a. German ~.ctivities
(1) PIL Radio R.i.~
(2) The Apfel 5ebotsge Case
(.3) p~ Case
334
 (4) WI Radio Station
(5) O\1illermo Hell_ann (Crewe)
(6) Heinz August Luning Case
.3.37
 (7) Chilean Internment Program.
338
 b. Jspamse Activities
339
 c. The Communist Movement
339
 (1) Loc~l Communist Activities
31.1
 (2) Soviet Diplomatic J~tivities
d. Cooperation or Other Branches or the
mnbassy
341
342
3. Persomel
344
4. Bibliography
344
 a. Investigative Files
347
 b. Administrative Files

c. MonogrRphs
H. OO~~IA
1. SIS Facil~ties an1 Objectives
2. Major J.ccomplisment.s
a. German Activities
(1) Beriberto Schwart.au Eskildsen
351
(2) Max Vogel
(3) The Hemp:.Dn HeiM"ich Rullhusen
Bischoff. Case
 351
(4) Ludol! Oscar Max Poensgen (Koch)
(5) Intenment Program
b. Spanish Falange Jot1 vi ties
c. Communist Activities
d. Platimm Smuggling
e. Colombian Political Situation
3. Personnel
4. Bibliography
.359
 8. Investig ati V8 Files
.362
 b. Administrative Files
,362
C. )(olK>graphs
)64
I. OOST! RICA
.364
 1. 515 Facilities and Objectives
361.
 2. Major Accomplisbaents
364
a. Early Coverage
SE~E_r

SESREf
b. German Activities
c. Co:DllD-1nist Activities
)68
 d. Spanish Falange Activities
e. Ibliti.cal Affairs
1'. ~scell~neous
3. Personnel
4. Bibliography
a. Investi5ative Files
b. AdII1inist.rat1ve Files
c. Monographs
J. CUBA
1. SIS Facilities and Objectives
2. Major Accomplishments
a. German Activities
(l) Control ot German Nationals
(2) !lcase - Alejandro Urzaiz Gusman
)78
 (3) Heinz Auiust Luning Espionage Case
379
 b. Japanese Activities
)82
 c. Spanish Activities
)8)
 d. Communist Movement
.383
 (1) I.Dcal Communist Activities
.38?
 (2) Soviet Diplaa.atic Activities
3~
 e. Joint Cuban-American Interll!1ent Program

f'. '!'revel Control Program
g. Cuban Poll tical Matters
392
b. Crimi~ Investigations
i. Relations wi tb the Cuban Police
3. Persomel
4. Bibl1ogr8phY
a. Investigative Files
b. Adra1ni strati ve Files
c. ~nographs
K. CUiUCAO" ~HERl.ANDS WFaST DDIES
.399
 1. 515 Facilities and Objectives
:399
2. )(ajor Accomplishments
399
 3. Per~mel
.399
4. Bibliography
400
L. OOMINICAN REro~~C
400
 1. 515 Facilities and Objectives
400
2. M2jor !ccomplis1ments
400
 a. Internal Po1.i.tical Trends
401
 b. German Activities
401
 c. CanJm1n1st Acti viti es
403
d. Spenish Falange
1.04
3. Persomel
40~
4. B1bliograph'f
405
 a. Investigative Files
SE~ET

b. Administrative Files
c. MJnographs
M. ECUAOOR
1. SIS Facilities and Objectives
2. Major Accomplis1ments
a. Gem-An Acti'Vities
b. Italian Activities
c. JapAnese Acti'Vities
413
d. ColMmn1st Activities
415
 e. lDcal Political Activities
). Personnel
417
4. Bibliography
1.17
 8. Investigative Files
420
 b. Administrative Files
420
c. Monographs
421
N. EL SALVAOOR
421
 1. SIS Facilities and Objectives
422
2. ',Major Accomplishments
422
a. Axis Activities
423
 b. Spanish Falange Activities
'.23
c. IDcal Pol1t1ca~ Coverage
1.23
d. CCXD"",niBt Activities
424
 3. Personnel

4. Bibliography
a. Principal Investigative File8
b. IAmini streti ve Files
c. Momgraphs
o. ENGLAl'4"D
1. SLS Facilities and Objectives
 ~
2. Major Accomplishments
8. Bureau Source lk>. 1
b. CoC8Se
c. War Roan Liaison
d. French Intelligence Service
 4.30
e. Stanc1b
!. Post,-War Liai8on
.3. Personml
 431
4. BibUograph'1'
 431
a. Investigative Files
 4.31
b. AdlUiDistrat1'V'e Files
 4.31
P. lI'lw«:E
 432
1. 515 Facilities and Objectives
 432
2. Major AocompJa.sbnents
 432
a. Dosol\ Case
 432
b. Liaison Of..tice Established at
U. 5. Fcbas8)"
 432
3. Pereomel
 433

4. BibUogr2ph1
a. Investigative Files
b. Administrative Files
~ . GERMANY
1. 515 Facilities end Objectives
2. Kajar Accomplish!llents
a. Interrogation of Nazi ~igwigs"
and InteW-gence Chiefs
 434
b. Arrest of Hens Karl Albrecht Blum
c. Captured Documents
d. Requests from United States Army
.for Int'ormation
e. German Espionage Activities in the
J.merican Eubassy" Berlin
.f. Russian Ketters
3. Persoxmel
438
4. Bibliogrsphy
440
R. GUt'rEKALA
1.40
 1. 515 facilities and Objectives
440
2. Major !ccomplishll8nts
JJ.O
 a. InternMut. Program
443
 b. Espionage Investigations
443
 (1) )(21D1s1 Enrique PaneUa de SilT8
444
 (2) Jose Gregor'J.o Diez
SE~T

(3) WiUia:a otto Luces
445
 (4) Zeto John George Michel Guadagni
c. Commumst Activities
d. Political Coverage
i.47
e. Criminc-l Cases
(1) Jose! John Donat, Selective
Service Fugitive
(2) Robbery of U. S. MSil Between
u. S. and Guetelnsla
 448
.3. Persomel
4. BibliographY'
"9
 8. Investi~8tive Files
451
 b. .Adm1nistrati ve Files
451
c. Mooogra~ht1
452
S. HJ:ITI
452
 1. 515 Facilities end Objectives
452
2. Kajor AccompUs1ments
452
a. Internnent Program
452
b. Political Coverp,ge
4S3
c. Com;nuni st .Ac ti vi tie s
454
3. Personnel
454
4. BibUograph'1'
454
 a. Investigati'9'8 Files
4~
 b. Jdministret1ve Files
457
c. Ifooogre.pbs

T. HQ}"1IXJRAS
1. 518 Facilities and Objectives
2. Idajor Accomplishments
a. Internment Progrmn
b. Co IDD. uni sa
459
 c. Coverage or Political Activit7
d. Alleged Misconduct ot Embes~y Secretary
4C()
3. Persormel
4. Bi bliogre.phY
46l
a. Investigative Files
b. Administrat1 ve Files
46)
c. Kooogr9phS
U. ITALY
1. SIB Facilities and Objectives
2. Kajor Accomplishments
8. Brackx Espionege Case
b. Pound Treason Case
c. Informent Coverage and Inve8tig~tion
ot Local V2tters
3. Personnel
465
 4. Bibliography
466
 V. JAkA.ICA, liUTISH IFaST INDIES
466
 1. SIB Facilities and Objectives
466
2. Major 1ccolllplisbments

a. Censorship Li8ison
b. Benjamin Katz
J. Perso~l
4. Bibliography"
8. InvestigEltive Files
b. Administreti ve Files
468
W. JAPAN
1.515 Facilities and Objectives
468
2. Kajor Accomplishments
4~
 a. Tokyo Rose Treason Cese
466
 b. 16erk Lewis Streeter
c. Sunset Espionage Case
d. Politicu Af..fairs
e. Co:llnunist Activities
3. Personnel
4. BibliographY'
a. Investigative :Files
b. Administrative .Files
x. MEXICO
1. SIS Facilities aDd Objectives
2. KBjor Jocomplishments
a. German loti vi ties
47.4
 (1) Elsie Shriber Cese
(2) Apprehension ot Gerhard
Wilhe1m Kunze
 47;

~!~~~!
(.3) Ernst Oscar Hop!
(4) rhe Mexican Microdot Case
or .Clog Case"
b. Black List Cases
c. Anti-United States Propage.nda
(1) The "Assocjetion for the
Protection o£ Un1 ted States
Ci ti zens in J&exico a
(2) Gerardo )Iur111o aka Dr. Itl
484
 d. Caumunist Movement
1.84
 (1) Mexican Co:DDmnist Pert,.
(2) Vicente !A)mb~.rdo Toledano
(.3) The German Communists and the
So-called -Free" European Moveients
 487
(4) Spanish Comm,nist Activities
(5) The -Alto Casen and the
ColDDl1ni.st Underground
 491
(6) Soviet Diplom2tic Activities
e. Securi t1 Measures Taken in Mexico Besed
u?On Information Supplied b~ the Bureau
t. Criminal Matters
(1) Mexican Fugitive Located
(2) ~ttle Angelo. Scerria
(3) Charles Angelo Colombo, Jr.
(4) Merrill Albert Cof'f'ey
(5) George Richard Heiden

503
 .3. Personnel
506
 4. Bib1iogreli1Y'
SO6
 a. Investigative Files
b. Adm "" strat1T8 15..1.88
c. Monographs
Y. ncAil.AOO!
 5l2
5l2
 1. 815 Facilities and Objectives
2. Kejor Accomplishments
a. Control of' Axis Nationals
(1) Investigetions of Axis Nationals
(2) Control .as\lres Adopted with
SISAid
 ro
b. Communist Activities
 514
c. Political Matters
.3. Personnel
 SlS
4. Bibliography
a. Investigative Files
b. Administrative Files
z . P .wK.t.
1. 5IS Facilitie8 aDd Objecti?es
2. Major Accomplishments
8. Burglary Investigation tor the Arm1
b. Survey of German Legation Archives
520
 c. lDcal Political Uf.2irs

.3. Personnel
4. Bibliography
521
 8. InYestigative Files
523
 b. Administrative Files
AA. P AIU.!JUAY
1. S15 Facilities and Objectives
524
 2. Major AccomplishlUents
a. Relations with Paraguayan
Govenment O.tficials
 524
b. German Activities
(1) Control ot the Banco Germenico
de la Americ a del Sud
(2) Ge~an Social Aid Association or
Asociacion Alemena de Ayuda Soci~l
(3) Germanic Union of Pareguay or the
Union Germanico del Pe.raguE'Y'
(4) '.falter Streich
(5) Fraudulent Paraguay-tin
Identification Documents
(6) Pablo Stagni
c. JapeD8se Activities
d. Smuggling and Economic Matters
e. Communist Movsnent
f. Political Affairs
5.34
 3. Personnel

SE-,ET
4. Bibliography
a. Investig at! ve Files
536
 b. Administrative Files
c. Kooographs
BB. ~
1. 515 Facilities end Objectives
2. K2j or Acco!l\,15_shments
a. Interment Program
b. German /..cti vi ties
c. Japanese Activities
d. Spanish Aoti vi ties
e. Colmun1st Activities
r. Peruvip~ Political Activities
g. F.dI Intelligence Schools tor
Peruvian Army
3. Personnel
4. Bibliography
a. InvestigatiTe Files
557
 b. Administrative l'"'iles
557
 c. )i)oographs
cc. PHILIPPI~ ISLAlmS
sse
 1. 515 Facilities and Objectives
ssg
 2. KBjor Accomplishments
559
3. Per~mel

4. BibliographY"
559
 a. Administretive Files
DD. R)ilTUGAL
1. 5IS Facilities and Objectives
561
2. Kajar Accomplishments
8. Investigation for the lJnited Stetes
:&I1bassy
b. Japanese Espionage
561
c. Geman Espionage
561
 (1) Inspection of Microdot EquilDent
(2) Inf.ormlltion Obteined after
Cessation of Hostilities
 562
563
3. Personrel
563
4. Bibliography
56.3
 a. InvestigBtive Files
563
 b. Admin1.strati ve Files
564
m. SPAIN
,564
 1. 515 Facilities and Objectives
b7C
564
2. }(ajar Accomplishments
b7D
564
 a. Double Agents
(l ).I - L }CJX)wn under.. the COQ.e IN~ I I in the
nSpanip Case II
(2)1 - .1. ~wn a~
I lin thel I
b. German Acti'ri ties b 7 C
56/.
565
565
~10~ 'J.

566
 c. Communist Activities
3. Personnel
4. Bibliography
a. Investigative Files
b. Adm.inifltrative Files
568
 FF. TRINIDAD, BiUTISH "iF.sT nJDms
1. 515 Facilities and Objectives
2. Major Accomplishments
a. General Coverage
b. Interrog~tions
3. Personnel
4. BibUogrs.ph1
GG. UImGUAY
572
 1. SIS Facilities and Objectives
2. Major Accanplisbments
8. Geman Activitie8
(1) The Fuhrmann Plan for Nez!
Conquest of Urugua7
(2) Paul K8as - German Espionage
(3) Juan Alberto BoTe Trabal -
Gerlaan Espionar;e and PropagElnda
( 4) Fri. tz Arthur Berthold Rabe -
Ge1'm.en Espionage
 577
(5) 8m Assistance with Double
Agent in "R'lcasew
 578.
,578
 (6) Bleck List Investigations
s~

b. Anti~nited 5tetes Propaganda
c. The ColDD1UI1ist *>vement
(1) !Dca1 Communist Activities
(2) Soviet Diplomatic Act~vit~e8
581
J. Personnel
4. Bibliography
585
 a. Investigative Files
b. JdmiDistrative Files
c. Monographs
HH . VENE ZUELA
1. 815 Facilities and Objectives
2. Major Accoaplistments
a. German Activities
588
(1) -Apfel" Sabotage Organizetion
(2) QuiJlica Bayer-Weskott Drug
Confiscation
 5~
(3) Attempted Purchase of
Venezuelan Oil
 '91
591
 (4) Black List Firms
592
 b. Angel Arpon - Diamom Smuggling
593
 c. Plant Surveys of. Oil Companies
594
 d. The Communist Moveaent
594
 (1) ~cal CaD:nunist Activities
59~
 (2) Soviet Diplomatic Activities
e. Politiqcal At.tairs am Revolutionary
Movements
597

f. In!ormant Coversge
(1) Oil Compeny Contacts
(2) The Besque Organizetion
(3) Communist Coverage
3. Persomel
6Ol
4. BibliographY'
601
 a. Investige.tiT8 Files
b. Administrative Files
c. »onogrEiphs
(X))iL{E1\frS Ot' ortiER 00 ~~'l' AL AGENC~
AND OTHER OU1'bIDE SOURC~
VI.
A. ~JfOKS REaARD~G S15 O~.TIONS AND PmcsoNNEL
1. State Dep~rtment Officials
a. Argentina
(00
b. Bolivia
608
c. Br2zil
610
d. Chile
611
e. Columbia
613
 f. Cuba
614
 g. 1)0 ud. ni can Re PIIb 11 c
614
h. Ecuador
615
i. Guatenala
615
 j. Mexico
616
k. Niceregu8
616
1. Paname

m. Psrpgusy
n. Peru
o. Venezuela
p. Jre8t Britain
q. Italy
619
 r. Polish Government in Exile
s. Portug~l
2. Army
3. Navy
4. Coordinator ot Inter-American '1te1rs
5. Board of Economic "Narfsre
6. Foreign Economic Administration
7. Department of. Can.'Uerce
8. Commissioner of Narcotics
9. Justice Depsrtment
10. American Businessnen Doing Business Abroed
11. l"oreign Agencies w Individuels
B. )l)HJGttAYd'l;) AtiJJ SPmIAL ~S
C. PLANT WdVEYS
D. REMARKS !\E3,ARDING DI5(X)NrINUAOOB 5I& PR{JGJ:(,AM
1. Curtailment in 1945 tor Lack ot Funds
2. Camnents RegBrding Discont1mence and Final
Termination of SIS Program.
 650

VII.
MASTm LIST OF 6Pl.CIAL AGENTS AND SP-"~.&L
IMPI.D Y1.BS AS S I GIFJ) 'l'O S IS
 668
702
 GE~ BIBLIO{;RAPHY
 VUI.
A. Fn.E 5YSTDt USED K>R 515
 702
B . (EBERAL SIS ~
INDEX
;
 r
~RET

S"Q
(RET\
HISTORICAL Smf.iARY AND CRITIquE
 I.
OB.IGDl AriD BACKGROUND
 A.
()
(
Early in ~. 1940. conversations took place between the
Director of the Federu Bureau of Investigation and Assistant Secretary
of state A. A. Berle with regard to the desirability of setting up a
Special Intelligence Service under the auspices of the FBI to gather
secret intelligence in connection with subversive activities throughout
the Kestern Hemisphere. excluding Panama. These conversations resulted
in further conferences and discussions between the Director of the FBI.
Mr. Berle. and the respective heads cf ONI and G-2. Following agree-
ment among these officials with regard to the establishment of such
a Service. its scope. jurisdictio.n. and activities. Mr. Berle under-
took to obtain from the President of the united States a specific
directive authorizing a Special Intelligence Service to operate in
the Western Hemisphere to be established and operated by the Director
ot the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Yr. Berte succeeded in secur-
ing such a Presidentie.l Directive and this was set torth in a memorandtDII
signed by Mr. Berle. dated June 24. 1940. addressed to General Sherman
Miles# Assistant Chief of Staff in ~ge ot G-2. Admiral iiuter S.
Anderson. Director of ONI. and Mr. John Edgar Hoover# Director of the
FBI.
The memorandum recorded that ~. Berle had talked person~lly
with the President in the presence of General Miles Rnd had on this
occasion requested specific advice as to the President's wishes con-
cerning the formation of a unit for foreign intelligence ~ork. The
memorandum stated. "The President said that he wished the field to
be divided. The FBI should be responsible for foreign intelligence
work in the Western Hemisphere on the request of the State Department.
!he existing Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence Branches
should cover the rest of the world. as and YI-hen necessi ty ~ise8.1t
The memorandum continued that. -It was understood that the propo8ed
additional foreign intelligence work should not supersede any exist-
ing work now being done and that the FBI might be called in by the state
Department on special assignments outside the American Hemisphere under
special circumstances
t
Based upon the above Presidential Directive and a specitic
request from the State Depar'tDlent (with full agreement on the part ot
the Military Intelligence Division ot the War Department and the Office
of Naval Intelligence). the Director instructed in June of 19~ that a.
Special Intelligence Service be established wi thin the FBI tor secret
operations in t he intelligence field in Latin America. The 1a-:-.8 Assistant
Director P. B. Foxworth was appointed by the Director ~o be in charge ot
1Jl:QJ,nt-
~1.1. TNFORM~~TON CON~ATNBD
HEREIN IS UNCLASSI.I8D EXCBPT
WHBRB SHOWN OTHBRWISB
CLABBTPTRD BY 602~7 NLB/ML~/vta -~ RBABC»l: 1.. (C) . .
DBCLABB:tPy C»l:c-X 7f13/202g.~,

the Special Intelligence Service and 1 ta work. It was agreed among
the officials of the interested agencies and departmeQts of the
Government that the FBI' 8 Spe ci al Intelligence Servi ce would operate
throughout Latin America (with the exception of PanamP. which would
remain under exclusive ~ jurisdiction) for the purpose of obtain-
ing all types of information including economic, industrial, financial
and political that might be ot interest to the various depariments
and agencies of the Federal Government. It was also &breed. however.
that this Service would emphasite 1n its operations abroad the obtain-
inb of data relating to the activities, identities, and the operations
ot individuals and corporations throughout the ~estern Hemisphere who
were actinb in a manner detrimental to the best interests of the United
states in connection with the war then being waged in Europe or otherwiae.
(
Under appropriate in8truationa from the Direotor. ~. Foxworth
proceeded immediately to e.tablish an appropriate supervisory staff
at the Seat of Government in .ashington and the Special Intelligence
Service. Which will be hereinafter referred to as SIS immediately began
reorui ting and dispatching to foreign countries in Latin America FBI
Agents for the purpose of carrying out the above-described mandate.
B.
EARLY ORGANIZA'1'ICIIT AND TECImIQOES E.1.1PLOYED
Immediately tollowing the tormation ot SIS at the Seet ot
Gove~nt. the Director designated Special Agent J. E. La\vler. who
W~S at that time Special ~gent in Charge ot the Richmond Field Division.
as Number One Man under Wr. Foxworth. It ~ contemplated in the
beginning that most ot the assignments would be undercover and that
FBI Agents proceeding to South America tor investigative purposes would
be ab1e to utilize the pretext ot representing same American commercial
fi~ It should be noted that no arrangements were perfected with the
state Department or otherwise ~r the &asigaaent ot FBI Agents in
American Embassies and Consulates abroad. it being contemplated that
the entire arr8ngement could best b. handled on the basis ot undercover
4gents being sent trom Washington with sui table pretext. allot whom
would report directly back to ~LShLng~on the information obtained by
tJiem.
For the purpose of faoili ~ating this type of operation. the
Bureau established during August of 1940 offices at Roam 4332. RCA
Building. &0 Rookefeller Plaza. Hew York City. under the fioti tious
name -Importers and Rxporter8 Service Company.- The address was later
moved to Ro~ 3144. 30 ~okefeller Plaza. Hew York City. This tioti~ioU8
firm ~ ostensibly engaging in ~he bu8iness of 8ecuring information
for clients (al80 fictitious) as to the po8sibilitie8 of foreign trade
(
2

(
in Latin A8r1oa either with regard to the 18pOrt.tion or ez:port.-
tion o.f proouota to am traa the Um. ted States. !hrough 'tt.88 ar-
rang.-nta, Agent. were ue1gped .for o1aMeetim wark in Latin
!be .t1ret j.geDte 8ent iDto Cut-. were utilizing t.be cOYer ot. ~d am coutroUed b1t I
~operat1.on tad been 8ec~.
 (
 lot ~ -York
It was deteDdmd e&r~ ~t tbe .t1ct1t1oaa rim, de8cribed
above, would ~t Mn'e .ffec'tl '98J.1' u a coyer or pretext for actual
operatiore in Latin "-rica im8nuch a8 the oC8p&~ ~t act'a&l1,y be1~
engaged in a~ legit1Ete bU811888 cou1.d not be u~cted to 81.Jrtain ~
deception for .. appreciable ,.length of t188 8bouJd AgeDta 'traftUrc
in Latin A8rJ.oa ac't18il7 begin contaoU~ Latin J88r1_n bui1888
il1t.8resta umer b pntext of tbeir oonr. !he fictitiou .t1.m was
continued 8ol~ a8 a C0'98r or .front for the *- York Offioe in the
mA. Bm.1ding ~1 Jw. of 191.1, at wtd.ch 't1M i't -8 d18cODt1DMd due
to 'Ute fact \hat experience bad shown tbe f1~ rue to be .ore of a
DU1san~ aid detrJ._nt tban an adftntage. !hi8", Jar'ticu1ar~ true
wi tJ1 regard to the 8barraeaeat caU8ed b1' a oomtant 8tream of 8&les8n,
bU8ima8 im88t1ga'ton of ftrloua Vpe8, adftrtiaing 8o11.c1tora, etc.
PoU~1Jg discolItiaanGe of * US8 of ~ ftct1 tatoua f1ra
1188" the Bureau ooD'tim»d to operate tM office in ~ ~A Bu1ld1~
in Jew York without any- cover or front. whateoewr for the purpose of balliUng
all 18cessarr arraDge8nta in oom.ction with as8f.gm.ng am aiDaimrw
appropriate coven to ftr1~ umeroowr J'BI AgeDt8. It was d8ter8d.md
'that tbe office could be 8intail8d 8Uch mre etf1cieDtl'r aJx1 effecti '981.1'
without 817 spurious f1rm. laD on ta door alii w1.tbou't ofteriug to arvom.. aplamtion as to the identi't7" etc." of the ocCUpBnte. b office
..s .f118J.l1" discoDtim8d altogether in »O'98Blber" 1945" as an eco~ ~
in '91.. ot the then 8Xtre8 uncertaiut,. &8 'to the Bureau's future in
foreign intelligence work. Such ~m.Dg work ae was I808S8&l"1' in COD-
motion with the operatiom of this otfice was baniled directq fr~ witb1.n
t.be nga1.ar ~ York Pield D1'91sion in the Ulll~ states Court. Roue"
Foley Square" .. York.
DuriDg t. II&jor po~on of. the tt- tbat tbe ~ Tork SIB
Of'fice in b r.1 Bai1ding in ... Tork w&8 tumtiozd..ng uuJer the spuriO118
firm mE of. t. 8J8J)Or'ters am Exporterl Semce CCmII8lt",' 1M) Agent
W&8 8peci.f1oalq ..8ig~ 'to the II&1.nwraDOe of this J8rt.icular ot.tJ.ce
although it wae tJlequentI.,. Yieited by Agents aid Of.f1.e1a18 of ~ Bureau
f.rc-. .8h1.~n. A clerical np101" wal, of. cGurle, on COl8taDt duty.)'or a abort period in late 1940 alii earq 1941, Spea1al AgeDt in Charge b7C
B. A. Souq' 8iDtaiD8d ~ or lees d1nct ooDtro1. of' the Mew ;ork SIS .. Office. !-- being lucceeded during 191.1 by f.o~r ~a1a1 Agent! - I
I L who ooDtiIm8d in charge of' "ilia ot.tJ.ce .ut1~ Roft8Jer. 191.2.,
when tbe ]a tter was lucceeded br fo1'8r Special Agem L J
S¥ET
-3-- ~

~
DoT1. coDt.1m18d in thi. capaciV 1mt.i1. hi. resignation in Jaly',
1945. fbe office re81md uDi.r~=d f~ that ti8
UJItU i\ oloeed, ot Spec1a1. "pDt who bad .for a D8-
ber ot ,..ar8 assi8ted fomer Special Agent in the operation of
the o.f.f1ce am tlI8 18ml1ng of i\8 OOftr ArraDgellent work.
(
In Sept8ber, 1940, tM or1.lilBl group ot Agent. ... d!a-
natched t.o Latin J.8r1oa. Special :B8pl078e (1.a~~~~]r c1al. lit)
~ . c 1&1 Age
Uru~J 5p8cn.&J. Agent tq Brasil: SD&ai~ Age- I to Ar . c uti lto V..s\Wla.
Special A nt 88 alread7 in Cuba at tld.8~. Speaial
Agent 0 course, bad been operating in ~co tor 8~ \18.
~8 npreeented the .tint a:tens1T8 cOftrage in Latin ~r1ca.
Alao in Sep~r, 1940, arrang.-Dte 'were perfected whereby"
the ]ate A8Bi.~nt Director P. B. Foxworth traveled ~ughout Latin
Aaerica o&teD8i~ &8 a ~r ot an BcoDC8l..c C<ad.s81on engaged in
coDiuc'ting a 8urvwr ot Latin AMr1can coDii tiom tor tbe Coordimtor
ot C~ra1a1 am Cult.ural Bela~om ot t.tin JMrica, Mr. ~son B.
Rockefeller. Daring thta trip, M coJltacted auoh repreaentatiwa ot
SIB who bad al1'e8d7 been dispatohed W IAtin A:8r1ca tor the purpose of
comult1Dg with 'tba am faa1li ta'tiDg tMir operatiom. Be as erabled
upon 111.& "turn 'to furn1sh oomiderab1.e reporte &8 too comi t1om, eta.
'Valuable .from an 1ntelligeDC8 point of Tin. Be was &180, of c0UJ'8e,
enab1.ed to advise ~ Bureau with 1'8&&M t.o oertain changes am mw pro-
cedurea that prom advantageous in ~DI8c'tion with .future SIS operaUom
in the Western ~m1.&phere. During 1I1.s ab8eD08 from Washington, Special
Agent J. E. I.-W'ler, ht8 IaJi)er Ox. *n, acted in charge of SIS uDtil
~tober of 1940, at w}d.ch t.i8 Mr. Lawler'R8 8uoceeded by" tOrMr Special
Agent in Cbarp Spemer J. ~n, who colltil8l8d in tJd.8 capaoiv UDt1.l
Kr. J'az:wort.h'8 ret.um in hbruar,-, 191.1.
(
'!lieN weN U of Jamarr 1, 19/.1, fourieen Bureau -pl078es
ei tber 8tatiomd or tra'V'811ng iD Lat1D £81"1ca OD intelligence work in
addition to Mr. Foxworth. 'ft1e latter i~lMed fomer Special Agent in
Cb&rgel L who bad been 8peJdiDg t!Je ajor port.1on of Ills ti-
in axioo 8i~ Sept8lJber, 1939, but who was for81q &8eigJ8d to ~oo
City in Septaber, 191.0, with peme81on to \188 the facilities 01 tile
UId.'ted State. ~87 ~re, alt.bDaah 18 was mt. fo1'8lq at.t.cbed to t.be
.ba8q, with 8pec1~c 'title, .\0. ~l later. 'ft18 aboTe also iml\.ted
tol'Mr Special Agentl - I who bad been prior t.o t.be advent. of
SIS 8Dgaged in police traillLzag ac~ '9i tie8 in Brasil am Bogota, Col_bia,
a8 an open, accredited repNaeDtati.'Y8 of t!Je Bureau. Be was at tJ1e u.-
of the foration of srs ..g8d in «)mucti.Dg certain traimng in couDter-
iuteUigenoe ac~'Yi~e8 for t.b8 ColC8b1an ~ aD! police orgald.utionS
in Bogo'ta, ~lC8b1a, am ~ in coDl8cti.on with )ds ..si~nt. 8Utmdt,ti~
certain int.e1l1ge~ reports co~rm. Dg ooD!1 t.iona, eto. in ColC8bia.
b
Iu tb8 begi.Im1Dg, J.~Dt8 .elec'ted tor tMee La~D _rloaD ae-
81gJ8Dt8 ...re brought. lDto WasbiDgt.oD rrom ~ do_etic field am .turnt.sbed
4 sEt~T

(
brief tra1ld.~ COl8i8tiDg of being as tIIioUlh].,r briefed .. ..
praotioab~ w1~ regard ~ ~he oountrr to which tbq were beiZW
ass1gmd alii b work am iDfo18t1on expected frca them. Certain
_teria1 '8. obta1md for briefiag purposes fro. tM filea oJ: ~be
A1'IG", Rl.vy, State Depart8nt am ta freasUQ" ~partment. Tbe .Agents
were also required to 8't~ aftilable lit.erature, etc. conoermng
the countJ7 'to wbl.ch tJI8T were proMed1ng. It was mt &8 a rule
pose1ble ~o brief the .Agents notA regaM to .ub98rsin ac~v1t1es
am comi tiom of this k:1.m for the reason that such informtion
was oo't a'Vailable in the UJd. Wd stat.es. It should be 1'e88mbered in
}:88sing that there had arisen in b UD1.ted St.tes comiderable ap-
prehe~1on w1'th regard ~o the extent of *zi pemtration am 18.31. activi-
ties 'Ulrougbout IAUn "-rica. ('D11s was true to a les8er extent with
l'eprd 'to Ita11an Faaci8t, Spamsh FalaugS.st, am C~-~s't act1'Yit.1es.)
MIlch publia1 V bad occurred, pract.1oalq all of w1d.ch waa couched in
alanld.st-phrueologr without &ZO" .pecific or accurate inforstion. b
~u discoftred upon wDertak1ng t.b8 prograa that tbere ... a oC8plete
abseDoe of a~ aooura'te data or details co~erJll~ 'the 'true extent or
rature of subversiTe acti'Yities, current or potential, in t.~n "-rios.
It was, of course, true that t.be Bureau i teelf b8d accumulated ~rta1n
specific leads am data requiring 1D988t1gation .frc:.D its bamling of
intelligence 'Wolic in 'the UDited States. \'his was tr.- with Ngard..
esp1oIBge leads growing out of ~ Ducue am leads arising from prior
FBI iD98st1gat.1oD of an am l'aJ.anglst act.1nUes in b UlIlted States.
'Dw AgeDt.8 were thorougblJ' brieted, ot course, col1Oerlll.ng these matters
1mofar as infOr.-t10D was a'9ailable.
In addi ~OD to the above-described brie.a.ag, imotar &8 was
practicable Agenta urI1ertak1ng ~be88 foreign us1guneDta 'were from the
outaet trailwd with ~he cooperation of t.he FBI 1'8chld.cal Laborator,-
in the ue of .eont inks am codes. OI-ig1Jalq the Special Agents
were tIIrD1.sMd with a so-call8d 1 code de81gmd for .. in seDi1rc
oablegrms aid for tral8l1~tal of _s8888s through the an i-t l808ssal'1'.
~ Agents qu1~ detendl8d tnat 'tobe use of ~his coos in cablegrams
was IXJt poa81ble because ~ Latin A.r1oan countries bad laws 1'8qu1.r1~
the regl.stra~on of codes ued owr tJ.1r OOIImmlcatiol8 facilities.
There was then denloped the so-called n coo. desigl'8d to parmi. t TeI"1'
bri.f MaAges to be o~ealed w1tbi.n the coDt.ext of ~r8Blle~
c~c let-ters.
(
In tbe begi.m4ug" of OOur88, efforts W8re .as to 8ecure the
services of Spem.al Agents who had 80- kmwledge of ~ language of
the oouat1"1' to 'whim. 't.b87 -.re usigl8d; h~'V8r, t1t1.s IK>t alw81'S beiDg
possible, 8~ earl,}" l&nguage train1.ng W&8 af!ONed the Agents b7 per-
mtting ~ to s'tud7 at o~rc1a1la~ge 8chools (uauall1' BerUts)
while umergoiDg train1Dg with their respective OO'98r ~8paDl.88. In -
the beginDI.ag" Agents sent out umeroO'98r .ere !urD1shed ft1"1' litUe
traiDl.ng u to their ooftrs, th18 be1~ d~ to tM .fact that 'the ~.,.r

CQlpani.8S the_elves wre Mt im1ined to umertake at tlds ti:IIe long
aD:! S~~_8 expemi V8 traiDizag programs tor the 1Biirld13AJ. Agents
being &saigMd umer the particular COftr iDYOl98d.
(
.A. poet office b~ located in New York Cit,' was assigmd to
each Agent as tM address to wb1ch he would correspolxl bT mil am
.furlllah the intelligeme in.foration obtaimd 'b7 htJI. It ehould be
mtedl of coursel tbat the Uld.ted Sta'tes W&8 mt at this ti8 iDV'olYed
in war and s~ latit1Xie was permi.tted with regard to the use of
8doUble talk. aDa ~t1c letters of the kind desigDed to coDNer a
special M8m.Dg in the .,. of intOl"8tioD despite the fact that 00
specific code was used. S~ difficulty" was experienced with tohese
letters deep! te the fact that the UDt ted States ADa the 'Var1O'US Latin
AErlcan countries iD9'olTed bad ~ cemorabip ngulat1o~ at the u.,
the dif.ticulV being caused ~ the Bri't18hl who were at war am who
were aiDtaiJl1. a ftrl' close 8Di acU ft watch with regard to world-
wide .u am other 008DWd..oatiOI8 chame1... In the event the Bri'hi.sh
did obtain access to the oontents of such a 1.etter while .88 was
traDSi tiDg TriDidad or S08 ot_r Br1. t18h ~Dt.roned point, tb87 would
upon occasion beoOM 8U8pia10'U8 of the writer ani \UXfertak8 too dete1'81m
tJ1e bOM fides tlwreot.
.As might. be expected due to ooD:l1t.iom am CItrc1IDSt.ances
over wbich the Bureau bad absoluteq ~ ~Dt.rol, ~ TO11Dl8 of 1Dtel11-
geDC8 1Dt.orat.1oD .frCIB each AgeDt -.s 1a ~ 'beg1Dm.Dg am for s~
~ 'hereafter qui. te 8Ell am ot 11 'ttle real ~ue. 1'he AgeDts were,
of course, ere or less c(8pleteq ~~lDiliar with the couDtries in
wJl1.ch t.b8y were trriDg to operate aid \18~ '98rr defi.o1eDt with
regard to tbe aae of the language tbereof.. The CbaDce of worthwhile
accompl1slBeDt in the wq of local orientation aD! the estab118hEnt
of. worthw1D.le inforant.s am sources of. iD:fo1'ma~on mturaliy required
cotmderable t.1.8. *&mrhile, of course, the Agent, who waa U8~
alom in the particular cooDt.1"1" to wh1.oh M had been ass1gmd, was
possessec1 of a '981"1" poor preten for cla~es't1.m operat1om am the
wideDlng of his circle of. acquaintances. He was pO8seased of a '981"1"
poor, il8deq,uate am extreEq 8l~ .am of cOIIIDuDlcat.ion. (Thq
were autborised to use cable but. o~ in O&se8 of extNE _rgemy-
due to the utter iapractioabiliV of. a satisfactory code for o~ro1al
cable purposes.) 'DIe letter cC8BUDi. cation f.r~ the Agent. to the Bureau
treq,ueDtJ,y l"8Q.ui.red weeo am e'98n 10-.er in t.he event t.b8 Br1. t.18h or
8~ otber 1ntere8t.ed 1Dte1Ugenoe 88rv1~ del~ t~ En tor iDter-
ception purposea. Even wbeD a oC8IUDI.oat.1oD ~ t.hrollgh it contaiMd
o~ 8811 1801.a'ted blte of ~orre1.a'ted am UMoordizated 1n.torat.ion.
(The y c~e ordilar1.q required approxL-.teq three large pages of
close typlDg in the guise of a mlSl letter to eD:ipher approx1mateq
om 1.im of 1n.toraation). !be 8801"8" 1* was JK>t 8Uch more 8ati8t.ao~orr
i_smch &s the Bureau (1ml.t1Dg the 'lechDlcal laboratory) was in 81
experi_utal stage with regard \0 the use of 8ecret 1* am proper reageDt.8.
CoDBiderable experle.,. 'With regard to act'aal U8 was requ1..red to at.tain
aIV' appreaiab1e degree ot 18Pr0Te8Dt. am pert..c\1on.
';fti~~6

(
~ i80lated am ~orrelated bite of iD!'oration seat in
b1' the ftrious wdercowr repre..nt.aUw. ... when recei't8d at t.be
Seat of Goft~nt transcribed into an appropriate letter am di8s_-ted
to the state Departaent, &8 ...n &8 'to KI:D am OBI. fb88e AgeMie.
would oroi18rily take no ac~on with regard to such tral8l1ssiolm
fro. 'the Bureau imo.tar &8 can be d.tel'8il8d except iDV'ar1abq the
State DepartMat am lreq-ut,q KID am ORI would distribute the iD-
formation through their .afe diPlomaU c 88&D8 of cftnmtD1 cation to
their rwspeati",e reprw88ntati'Y88 8&1e1-1 am cOll.tortab~ established
within t.b8 Umted States D1PlC88t1.c .ssion in the country to w!d.d1
tb8 iD!'oratioD related am fr~ whenoe it bad ..lated. The al8D8t
invariable result ..ould be a d1Pl~tic dispatch or cable repl,y'
fr<a tb8 particular d1p1~t1c office 1D9'OlTed delV1.~ am demuncing
t.h8 authenti.ciV o.t t.he ongil&1 info1'8tion 8'tJPPl1ed b1' the umercoT8r
Agent.
'ftIe Bureau learl8ci through "l"T difficult .xper1eDCe that
'rirtua11J' &f11' information referred to a dipl~t1c officer of 'the State
Depart8eDt, the ArBor or the NaV in prao'ticaliy all" foreign coaDt.l"T
for cC8D8ut .fr<:8 Washington would 1n'9ari&~ result in denumiat1o~
of t.he iD1"oration, as wen as its 80urce, unless the particular diplo-
_'tic of.ticer bad pre'VioU81,y received am reported f~ sources of his
own s1811&r iD.tOl'88u'on. 'DIe 8Ost unfortumt.e aspect of the matter
resulted trC8 the procli'Yit,- of these dipl~tic o.tfi~rs to i818diate1J'
at~t b1" t.b8ir ~ iDV8S'tiga'tiYe ~~ t.o ascertain the iden'tit.y of
the clamestim source of the _ter1&! in q1Ms't.ion. !his, of course,
resulted in actiw efforts on t.be part or the TarioU8 aRba8sies in Latin
AJJ»r1.ca to UD:098r Bureau umercowr Agent.. ~s be0&8 iDC1'8a8il1g1.J'
emarras81ng as the 'YO1U8 of _terlaJ. fro. eaoh ouDt1"1' increased ilB8uoh
as ~ regularl7 comtituted am authenticated dipl~t.1c of.fi~rs oroi~
col8id8red tMae clames'tim "ports &8 being a ret1ec'tion upon their o.D
efforts in the iDtelligeuoe .t1.eld.
Whi.le 1 t w~ be a 8er10U8 1li8t.ak8 to attempt to deteM
the authenticity aM accUr&ar of the8e earq intel11geDCe report. trC8
wdercO't'er Pm npre8eDt.at.1 8, (the pLol8er Ageats could 1D reaU.
pertora little except report r80rB, etc. c_ag to their atteDtioD
wi tbout &IV' po8sibill 't3' ot actual wrl.t1oatioD) '\he reporte were at
least u good &8 tbe ordi..1')" tra i88iom t~ t. UD1ted Stat..
diplo_t1c at8s1on in 'tb8 particular couDtl'1' illYOlftd, particularq
1D ta 8peo1aUsed field of 8ub'Yeniw act.1.'riU8s.
J'roII tJ18 beglmdag 1 t was ob'Viou ~re waa meded mob
c:'.oeer Uai8on aid cooro1mt.1on be'tw..n the Pm repreaenta~ Tee a.ning
~r
7

abroad aid the regular dipl~~c 81181.om ul1gmd in the 1--
couDtr1es. It was, boweTer, i8P0881ble to effect 'tIJi.. prooedUN UDUl
Much 1&ter d~ to the a:t1"88 reluotame of the State De~nt am
1 ~8 Aaba8sadors abroad to haft PSI Agellt.a 8ta~iomd in 'the re8pec~ ft
~ba8si88 am Comulate8 umer d1pl"~c oOftr. It 'A8 obYioU811'
impossible to baft !'HI uJdercoftr operati"'8 'tbe..l'988 ll&inta1n per-
sol81 ~ntact aui liaison w1~ tbe Tar1oua ~8ie8 am d1pl~t1c
1I18810m abrO8d. 'lhi8 apparent I8ed was brought to the attention ot
the BUI-.au b7 Mr. F~ort.h upon !li.s return from the abOft-de8orlbed
Bun.,. 1D x.t1n .AaerJ.oa.
(
On April 17, 191.1, 'the BU1'8au attempted through a conference
'With Mr. Serle of tM State Depart..Dt to arra~e ~ as81g.-nt of
a li81.ted --er ot Bureau SIS repreS8DtatiY88 uDler diplOEtic ~ftr
in the UD1. 'ted St.tes »abas8ies aid Comulatea abroad. Mr. Herle ad'ri.ed
.traDkl1' that he realised the med for this procedure am would att88Pt
to arrange 88e. Be was, howftr, frank in stating tbat he aDticipated
coI8iderable objection &Ix! oPP08ition .frt8 otber quarter. wit1d.n the
State Department, particul&r1.v tI. Foreign Service both in Washington
am abroad.
b
Sh°rtl1' .following the 1'8turn o.f Mr. l'axwortll tr.- ~ abo'98-
me~o~ 8Un'87, M .. usi~ w be in ctarge ot tl. Natiol8l
Detense Di'W181on (later reJ.-ed tlI8 Secur! t,. D1nnon), aD! SIS, a.
a part ot We Din.1on, -8 placed d1rectl7 umer t.b8 supen1s1on
ot to1'8r Special. Agent in Charge Spemer J. Dr8.Tton, who &8 1D!1cated
abave bad been acU. tor .~ ~Dtb8 .. Jrr. 7aI:worth' s aaber ~ *n.
l'oraer Special AgenU --"8&. des1gmted &8 JllDlber One ~n
to Mr. Jhoqton. Sho'rtl7 therwatter Mr. Spru1.Ue Braden, the then UId. ted
states "-bu8ador to ColC8b1a, took the 1m. ~a't1 '98 in req1MS't.1ng from
'U18 State Depar-.nt tI. usigJDeDt. ot a Bureau Agent to tt. A8r1can
~887 in Bogota tor 'the purpo8e ot halXil1ng sub'98n1.,. acti.nties in-
.,.stiga~om aDi 'tJ18 ~oM1lBt1on ot 1Dtel11ge~ activities in ColC8b1a
during the _rgenar. fht.e &8s1gz.-Dt. which 'W&8 etfected in April,
191.1, 'W&8 in reaUv the fO1'8rum8r ot what e.,.nt1la1.11' b8O&M t.be
Bureau'. -L8pl AttacM 87.tea,- ool81.t1ug of mtworka of Agents aD!
e8!)larees in each couutry in Ia~n "-rica operating umer a Bureau
Agent aes1gmd in each UJd.'ted States labuay- with t.J8 title ot ~gal
Attache.- nd.. was a lo~ t1M in ooai.ng, however, am in t.be begi.DIJ1.ng
~ ettort Ed8 to 8stabUsh the Bureau Agent S8nt to Bogota, Co1(JB)1a,
tor .en1~ in b ~uq as the ad8i.m.strat.i'Y8 o.f.t1~r in charge ot
Bureau ao~rl~es in ~ cormtry ot Colcab1a. Be waa 118truoted to
reDier such as8ietame as Ddght be possible aDS practicable to tM
um.~over awn, part.i.cu1arl,- in ngal'd w 'be haIXJUng ot their correspon-
dence with ,he Bureau throud1 the pouch.
11'
(
~ng the 8pr1~ am .~r of 1941, the rearm tMnt or. A~Dte
tor .ervice in t.t1n _rica was ~~ed col81derab11' am P'11"818nt to
State Depart..nt apprO'Yal, tbe Bureau .tarted ..ork1~ towaro a goal
or. ha'91ng 250 Agem. in Latin "-rica b7 lo'Y8llber of 1942. It 8hould
be mted that in addi t.1on to Bureau .A.genta, eftorts bad been 8de from
~ oU'ket ~ eaplO7' 8pea1.al 8Plar~.-.~ tot. PD'PO88 of oarrr1 ng on
8 ~~ET . ~ ---

S~ET
(
intelligence work in Latin A8rica. In the latter connection,
efforts were, of oourse, ~de to -plO1' im1'9id_ls from other walks
of life 'Who bad extemi'V8 experience in Latin .America and kmw-
ledge as to ~ 1.anguage. A maber of 8uch special employees were
employed and furnished 'UIe z.oessary- instruction am traiD1ng wi tb
regard to the atter of forwarding oOl8DUDi.oatiom, etc. to the
BuNau through an appropriate drop bcm: in *'- York Cit,-. Comiderable
information of TaJ.ue from an 1nte1.l1gence viewpoiDt. was received
.from S08 of these special employees al tllough as a gemral rule it
W&8 disc0T8red that. FBI Agent.8 even with their limted ktXJWledge
of Latin America alxi their limlted kmwledge of the language iuvo1.ved
still offered auch more prcai8e with r8~ to eventual success am
8ffic1e~ in this type or operation than did special emplorees bired
from other waJ.k8 of 11.fe. It should not be owrlooked, hCM8ver,
that so- of the special emplO3"eee beOaJE exceedingly adept am oon-
s'bi tuted extr8De1,T valuabJ.e SIS employees. A mDber or these remained
wi th the Bureau in the BIB field serving in il1Oreasi~ e!.t1cient
oapaci ties wltil ~ em of the war.
b1C
D.1r1.ng the ~r of. ],9~, Mr. Drqton was replaced b)r
former Special Agent in Charge Frank Boll~n as Cb1ef. of. the SIS
Dl vision. It bad b1' t.hts t.1M been discovered that the increased
tempo 'With Ngard to t.he recruitaent. o.t Agents .tor service in L8S.n
-'-rica wouJ.d require f.oral language traimng on a 8<1a_hat whole-
sale basts imsmuch as the number of. Bureau Agents in t.he do~8'tA1..C
field with alO" re&sorable degree of k~ledge of either Spanish or
Portuguese was quite ll.8l ted. P'or t.h18 reason, & regular language
'traiDi.[:.~boo~S.~"::~~ChOOl was i . 'tuted b)" the Bureau, being taught b7 Special
Agent TtlLe 8choo], was in t.he wrr beginning
comuo SIS , but was during the fall of 1941 tram!erred
UIder the juri8diction ot tbe Traim.ng DLvision in order that SIS
traird.Dg could be carried on on the 88118 basis &8 other Bureau traia-
1ng.
b-'C
As of J~ 1, 1941, 26 Special Agents ani Special mIIplO1'8es
were assigDed b1' tb8 Bureau in Latin America or alre4rJr umerw&y- ~
their assig.-nte in Latin AMrican countries. During the s~r
of 1.91.l~ it was &1.80 possible to secure the assi~ut of ore FBI
Agent. umer dipl~t.ic COTer in the Uni't8d States WJaasy in each
of t.h8 following a1tie8s Santiago, Chile; Rlo de Jamro, Brazil;
ani caracae, Ve~sUA1a. ~ng the _.e period~ former Specia1.
Agent. in Charge! L who bad been serving in Mexico in a 8OM-
what informal capacit.,., W&8 tOr5lq attached t.o t.he American
~8BT uJder diplca\tic COTer. The titles used b1 these represen-
t.at.ives 8tat1.0~ in s.ba8sies abroad T&r1ed, so.- of t.heII being
kmwn as Legal At.tacbe~ other. as CiTil At.tache, am S08 just Attache.~ were, in effect, serv1ng in the same capaci'tv'" as umerooftr .
represeDtati'V'es except that. t.b87 weN eDjo71ng diplOEtic co'Ver am
were required to assist. t.be uJderooT8r Agente wberenr practicable ~
pa.rticu1ar~ with regard to balliling cO8lWd.catiolB to alii .frca tbe
Bureau 'tbroDgb ~- d1p1.~\10 pouch. In add! t.ion to '\.be abOTe,
t.b8re was di8p&t.obed to Qa1to, Ecuador, during -the s~r of 1.941,
an FBI j.gent. as8igred in ~~ open for ~be p&rpO88 of working nth
9 8EGRE~
s~
'tile Bc\ladorean Goft~nt am poUce otfic1al8 in ~ field ot
subvereiw activities. Also, an .&.geM was &88ig~ openl7 to
Hamilton, Bermwta, tor tb8 purpose ot _iuta1m.ng appropriate
Ua1son with British Intelligence alii Seou11.V repreeeDtatives
in BemMa wheN a large am vel'1' ~rt.aDt. British oontrol poiJJt.
tor C8l8orahip operatiom 88 being carried on at the t1M.
(
As Idght be expected, both the 'YOl~ am quali'ti7 ot
in.foz-.tion trom Bureau representatives in Latin -rica had begun
to iap~e _rked~. !he !irst Agerlte sent out in 1940 bad b7 Ws
u- begun to beccae r.asomb1.y wen oriented &D1 adjuated in LaUn
A8rioa; also, the !ew 8cattered Agente as8igmd in a total o! five
Um.. ted States ~8i.s in Latin _1'1ca were prO'Y1~ to be ot.
trememoU8 assi8tance in co~ct1on with 'tJ1e en~re SIS pr~~.
It will, o! course, be realized that the Service was still far t.raI
efficient am was in fact sUll in a 8trict p10188r1ng am experi-
_nta1 stage at the ti- ot the Pearl Harbor Attack on Deonlber 7,
1941. Much ot tM iJ1.fol'llAtion being obt.ained in Latin "-rica, it
was later determ1.1»d, W&8 at that ti8 elBMting .trC8 "prot.es8ioml
intOr8nta" who were extl'88q plenti.ful am ft1"1" active in aU ot.
~ Latin Jmerican countrie8. bse "pro!essioml inf'ormante" were
iJliividuals '810 had discovered through prior dealings with Um. ted
States r.ba881' representatives am British representati~8 tJ1at th81"
could am ~18Y b7 t.urrd..8b1ng into1'&t1on ot. an intelligence 181I'e.
Their intormtion WI.8 m'98r investigated or checked for accuracy,
confil'8&tion, etc. aIxt oroina.ri17 t.be1 were SMm emugh to real1 ze
qui toe ear~ in ~ ~ that tb8)'- could increaae t.belr earD1.ngs am
the 8a.le prioe of their inforu.t1on, t.be acre st.artl1ng 1 te mture.
Bureau AgelIt8 working umer cover, 88 wen as t)K)ee working umer
diploatic caver in the various ~88ie8, could mt ftr,. well avoid
aaIlng in contact with t.bese .protes8ioral into1'8.nt.8.. As a _tter
ot fact, this t'Jpe of irdiv1dual in pract1ca~ all of 'U1e Latin
AMrioan couJJtriee had beC08 so enthU81.utic with regard to tM
mol8Y to be made from this sort of thing tJ1at th87 engaged in 8eeking
out America.. am Br1 tiah on a s~bat 'Wholesa].e basis alwqs
.tr1rl~ to enlist.. clients aoo r.w ~8tOMn for their thr1vi~
trade.
It req.1I1.red tiM am exper1en~ tor ~u Agents to be
able to reoogmse alii deal proper~ ..s.th these 8professiolB1 inforsnta.-
The intomation furm8b8d b1" the8e 80urC88 was, of course, mt alway8
.t1oti tioua aM, &8 a -.tter of fact, t.be inforution.. frequut,11"
't-.8ed upon comlderable truth, although al8:>st alwa,.8 colored am
SC8nbat exaggerated. It also upon occuion amtactured out
of whole cloth aM all tims ot tozaer1e8, tra1¥iuJ.eDt eteWQ" code.,
eto. "1'8 belbg foisted off 1X)t on1y on Bureau repr8Sentati'V'88, but.
&180 on Unitoed State. til1tarr Attaches, Umted States lBval Attaches,
am ot!»r allied iDtew.ge~ rwpresent.t.i'Y8s in Latin _rica, in-
cl\¥t1.ng tM British, in return for sub.tantial payMnte ot 8>M7.
s~10
LATER ORGANIZATION AND ~OVEMElrT OF -mClmIQUE
 c.
(
under the stimulus provided ~ the United states' entry
into the war, S18 coverage was speeded up immediately and the
Bure~u began immediately to strive tor a goal ot 500 Agents assigned
in Latin America at the earliest possible moment. There was. ot
course. complete agreement from the state Department and other
interested Government Departments ~d Agencies concerning this
progr~ The recruitment ot Agents trom the Domestic Field was
accelerated and the training program at the Seat of Government. under
the auspices of the Training and Inspection Division. was stepping
up in an etfort to tr8in and dispatch to Latin America for assignment
all available Agents in the shortest possible period at time.
'!'he lTew York SIS Of!ice. then oJ)era~ng tmder tile su!'er-
vision of former Special Agent I L accelerated its work
wi th regard to obtaining covers for Agents and increased training
vdth regard to the use of these covers.
"
biC
Immediately following Pearl Harborl that ial on December
11. 1941. the Bureau dispatched seven additional Agents to Mexico
for the purpose of covering vital points in that country such as
Baja California and other danger points from the standpoint of possi-
ble ene~ landing or subversive activities.
During the latt.er part of December. 1941. two Speci8.l Agents
of the FBI were as8igned indefinitely in a constant travel status
throughout Latin America to act as speci8.l couriers and expedi ter8
for the purpose of assisting Bureau represent~ti ves generally in the
carrying on of intelligence work. These men were frequently referred
to as SIS traveling Inspectors. although they were not in reality
inspectors and did not actu~lly perform ordinary inspection duties.
When these two repre8ent~ti ves were in! ti8.lly assigned to the above-
described duties. the Bure~u did not have. properly speaking. any
est~bli8hments whatsoever in L~tin Americ~ susceptible to an ordinary
Bure~u inspection. One of the traveling couriers W~S assigned under-
cover as ~ DeWS reporter and the other one was assigned under the
cover of a State Department courier.
Arrangements were perfected with the State Dep~t for
the use of their cable communications facilities in order that FBI
Agents stationed in Embassies abroad could dispatch to the Bureau
messages of sufficient length to set out impcrtant intelligence data
coded in an 'x' code developed by the FBI Technical Laboratory for
cable use. the ca.bles to be routed to the Burtta.u Through the St..te
Department' s Codes and Communications Section.
Also. the Supervisory Staff ot the SIS Division at the
Seat ot Government was increased and the work with regard to
S~T
11~ '-- -

8Up8rv1si~, ooordiratiD&, am di88emmtiag SIB inteUigeMe in-
formation to the St.te am other interested Go'Y8n8nt ~part.1It.8
was a c cel. rated am i:mprov8d upo n .
At this t1._, the Bureau'8 SIS Mo~graph Project was
launched at the Seat ot Gover~Dt, ~be object being to prepare
a aomgraph on each of the La'tin A:8rioan ~uD'tr1e8 -blch would
contain allot the inte1ligeuce data obtaimd or obtaimble b1'
tI1e Bureau, along with IBce.8aJ7 baCkgroum in.tO~t1.0D co~rD1~
the coUDt1"1imolm to Eke the aooograph 'taluable mt o~ .tor
briefing purposes, bu't &1.80 as tbe 1nto~t1OD a...nab1.. w1.~ re-
gard to aumrs1ye acti 'Y1. tie8 am ou.r iDtelligel»e info1S&t1on
in each of 'U1e LatiD American oountries.
(
Ittorta wen 8p8eded up to obtain State ~pa~nt u-
si.taMe alii cooperation in comection wi tb tb8 &8sigu.nt ot
addi t.ioml J'BI Agents in UJd ted States ~s1.s alii Comulates
abroad; also ettorts to set up am operate an !'BI radio mtwork in
Latin "-rica "1"8 intensified, approval being secured t~ the
State ~partaent am the ColC8b1an GO'V'e~nt (through the coopera-
~on am gocxi offioes of Un1 ted St.ates ~~sador Spruille Braden)
to establish a radio in the UD1 ted States ,ti)asq in Bogota, Cololi)1.a,
for the transmission ot intelligence am other information to the
Bureau. Subsequent,q in April, 1942, tb1s radio station was completed
am bepn transmit~ng on regular sohedules to tbe Bureau's aster
station located I8&r Washington, D. C.
I)Jr1~ April, 191.2, former Special Agen't in C!8rge Fram
Bon~n was succeeded a8 Cidef ot the SIB m'Y18ion b7 C. H. Carson,
who r8a11*1 in t.b1s capaci 't)" until the tiJal c10s1~ of. the SIS
D1~8ion and the oes8atiob of ita work on ~ 1, 1947.
Ponowing tIle departure ot Special AgentJ I prenousl1' _ntiomd, as the .A.8818tant to the ch'1et of tM SIB .
m vision, Special Agent B. K. Clegg was ra8d the Assistant Chi.f.
Upon the d.~ure ot C1e~ ~~nt in Latin Jaerica in
March, 1945, Special Agem .. made .A.asistant Chief am
continued in this poeit1on was decided to terminate SIS
operatiom.
 b7C
(
P'oraer Speai.al Agent I ) who had during Februa17
of 1942 delBrt.8d on a pereoD8.l 'tour of La~D "-rica for 'the purpoee
ot aking briet 'Vi 81 te to each cOl1Dtr,- am BUney:1Dg comi tiol8 therein
in bebalt of the Bureau's program, returned to Washl..'Jgton in April
am 'R8 ~iate11' as8igJ8d to the superYi81on ot ~.ratiol8 desigmd
'to strengthen am iDtemif3' P'BI oo.eraBe in Latin .Ame.rloa, ~rticular~
wi th regard to the use ot better coven tor the c1arxiest1m Agents.
am better cover t.raimng in order to permi't them acre treed~ of
action i~ obta1~ iDt8ll1geMe data.

T
During April of 1942, an FBI Agent was sent b1" the
Bureau +'0 Ottawa. Canada. for 'thA tmrDOSA of AA1"vi nc 1n d1l'9Ct
(
(5)
pI
(
~
During *YO of 1942, tJIe Bureau, following appropriate
clearance from. the State ~part,.,nt, began traim.ng am dis-
patcbing male 8tenographers to assist FBI Agent8 assigIed in
Um. ted States Bllbassies abr~d. FBI Agent8 were dispatched
-~:m:~r- toi- ton ~Pt. nf' ~i",- 'P mnAn AM ~"~+ "
~
»1
~ Age~1 was ~80 c.J18~~hed- ~O HavaIB, ~, ~t- ~ ~Q.~S~ ( S-,
01. the State ~partJlent 1.or the purpose 01. assisting the Cuban
police in co~ction wi th intelligence I8tters. It had been
agreed that this Agent would enjoy the cooperation 01' the UIIi ted
States EDbas87 in Cuba to the extent of being embled to utilize
'the diplomati.c pouch 1.or tlJe transmission 01. correspomence to
the Bureau.
D\U"ing ~, 1942, the Bureau finally succeeded in ob-
tairdng the ~cessary clearance tor an Pm AgelIt to be statiored
in tM United States ~asey in Buenos Aires, Argentim, tor
the purpose of ass1stirJg in intelligence work. Additioml radio
statiom were opemd in - am Jum in San'tiago, Chile, Rto de
Janeiro, Brazil, am Quito, Ecuador. ~ Ju1J", 1942, we a8s1gned
Agents as Vice Comuls to 8even Vice Comu1ate8 in Chile am
shortJ:y- thereafter two Agents wre assigned as Assistant Consuls
in two Argentim 01 ties.
~aJ:Irhile approxillate~ 25 Agents per month were bei~
processed, traimd, etc. am di8patChed to Latin Amrica in an
uDiercowr oapaciV. Tide intemification of the recruiwnt
of Agents tor service in LaUn America, B>8t ot wh~ were 8till
going down in an underoover capacity, Decessi tated a thorough
C&D9'8SS of the doMstic field through the cooperation of the
various Special Agents in Charge in quest of appropriate am
qualified volunteers for these foreign assignments. ~le
there was mver &IV bard am tast Bureau rule with regard to
the use of volunteers o~ on foreign a8signments, efforts
'Were at all tiD8S made to utll1se volunteers if available. It
had been foum impracticable am unwise to perm1. t Agents to
be accompamed on SIB assi~nt8 by ft TeS am t_lies for
which reason eftorts were ade to confim the assigJmBnts
13

insofar as po8si~ am practicable to the ranks of uanarried
Agents. During this same perioo, the Bureau was striving to
cope with enormous probl8nS am respo~i hili ties in the Dome8ti. c
Field Service brought about by the sudden omet of war with such
attemant problems as great~ iDCreased work in the field of
espionage, sabotaLe, alien e~ control, etc. ~~ effort
was made, of course, in the recrui tcent of Agents for Foreign
Service to avoid at this extreme13" critical am crucial period
d1srup~ng t,b8 DoII8s~c Fie1.d am veteran Agents with key assit';n-
.ntB in the ~stic Field Service were not ordimrily comidered
availab1.e for SIS &8BigDment aDd, as a matter of fact, most of them
did not even volunteer f'or such assigmlent for a mmlber of' reasons.
(
Due to the above am other reasom, the overwhelDd.ng
majorit.y of Agent.a recrui'ted for SIS Service during this period
were young am so8What lim ted in FBI Domstic Field investigative
experience. Virt.ually none of the Agents on t.hese assif;DDent.S bad
the beMfi t of. arv prior admimstrati ve and superviso'rj' e:xj:erience.
Everr effort. was, of course, being made to dispatch t.he Agent.s t.o
the areas in Latin _rica where their services were most meded.
However, it was 'Virt.ualq impossible t.o de'termim 8uch fact.a in
Washington at the tim; also, imsDlUch as the overwhelming- majority
of t.he men being sent. out. were st.lll going urder cover, it. was t.o
8 ome extent nece8sa~ to dispatch the Agents as rapialT as possible
'to t.hose areas for which co-vers could be locat.ed. The priary- med
at this time was considered to be the matter of getting the Agents
ou't on &ssigmnent, particularly inasDl1Ch as it. bad been det.ermimd
that an Agent could not be expected to proouoe arv worthwhile in-
format.1on unt.il a.tter he had served on assigDDent for a mDber of
months at the V8l"Y' mmmum in order to learn local customs, the
1anguage, etc.
To illust.rat.e the extreDl8~ rapid increase in our coverage
during the ear~ months faUCRring our entry into the war, it 8oould
be noted that aD of July 1, 1942, a t,otal of 152 FBI Specia1 Agents
am Special linplay'ees, exclusive o.t all clerical perso~l, inclming
radio operators, were assigmci abroad on the SIS program.
(
 During t.bia period of 8uch rapid growth, despi t.e an ex-
treme pauciV of info11Dation as to actual comitions with regard
to t.he amoUJIt of ~cessary work, etc. in each of 'the variOU8 coUJJtries
wlU.ch would have perDd. tted more careful am more accurate planIItng
am as8ig~nt, 1 t was probab13 1nevi table that Ddstakes am errors
would be made of such a mture as to cause .future difficulV.
14

(
(
While the qmntity aPi qualitY" of the ilItelligence flow
from the BUl'eau coverage in Latin iDJrica contiJ1\1ed to gr~, oerta1n
basic dUficulties aid umesirable factors ~t orl1¥ contillJ8d with
the i~rease of coftrage, but actua~ became much D>re acute.
'l'J:i.8 was particularq true with regard to ~ canp1.ete 1.ack of
coordimtion within the SIS field as among tJ1e 'Various i.gelIt.s
performi.ng work abroad. Each AgeIIt. am employee was more or les8
worki ng on direct assig.-nt am charter from Wastli. ngton without
arvthine approaching adequate 1.ocal 8uperv1sion, coordimtion, am
assistance. The Agents who had been assigJ)ed in the :&nbassies were
doing the best that coul.d be expected, but they coul.d DOt keep in
touch with the comtantly increasing number 01' umercover _n to
alf' adequate extent aId tlleY", of course, had ~ autbori V tor 1.oca1.
supervision am coo1dimtion. Tbe traveling courien, frequentlyreferred to as traveling inspectors, were extre~ly liDd ted b1" the
mture ot their covers.. transportation, etc. in 8intaimng contact
wi th 8uch a large mmi3er of Agents am emp1oy-ee8 scattered throughout
the entire Western Hemisphere. The increased volume of intelligence
information Dent to Washi.ngt,on frCIII our umeroover repr.,sentati ves
intensified the hostility of the local Embassies am Diplostic
officers tOW'ard tmse ~n supp1.1ere of inf'o1'rl8tion to Washington,
such inf'o1'D8tion frequently being ei tber c~lete1y unknown am un-
reported to the regular Dip1.~t.i.c M1.ssiOnB or in SQD8 respects
directly contrary to current reports being subni tted by' such 1t1.ssiom.
The~ con:li tioIE, of course, resulted in increased ac~v1ty
on the part of Um.'ted states d1plouat.1c officers (State, War am
18.",,) statiomd abroad toward the em of uncoTering, exposing, am
embarrassing the Bureau's uMercover Agents. Unfortumi8.y this was
frequentJy not T8ry- difficult to perform imsJlJUch as tJ1e Bureau's
umercover representati'98s were in large .-&sure 7O~, healt}vo,
intelligent, persolW.ble _rlcam of draft age aid obTioue military-
poteDtial1V opera~Dg umer weak and frequeDt1y illogical CO'98rs
in the Latin American oountries desplte the fact that their country-
was at war. In the major1.v of il8tances, Bureau representati'988
were so-.what conspicuous d~ to circumstances over w}xi.ch the)" had
absolute~ no coDtrol ani urtual~ aU of them were at various ti_s
8U8p8 ated .
Sam of the umercaver peOp1e in order to obtain the cor.-
.fidence of pro-Nazi 1M1v1duale am tb". obtain inforation fran
witbin pro-J8.zi ranks were engagi.ng in what. appeared to 10c&1 Um. ted
states State Depart.n8nt" Kili't.a17 officials am laval officLals to
be extre_1y queetiomble aM s118p1c1ous activities am aesociat.iom.
*1:0" of ~e _n also becalM suspected by the Bri~sh" s~ leg1.t1mate)Jr
am otMrs apparently sole~ due to the fact that the British suspected them of being Bureau l'8preaentat.iT88 am desired to expose them b7 .
embarrassment am barassuent..
(

The ~eau had bec<m1e so insistent wi tJ1 regard to the
necessity and urgency of FBI Agents beine stationed in Embassies
and Consulates abroad wKler diplClDatic cover that despite continued
reluctance on the part of ~ diplcmlatic missions abroad by November
of 1.942 auoeau representatives were stationed in all ttlited States
D:'.bassies t1U'oUghout Latin America vrith the exception of Honduras
and Panama. In the larger countries, a number of men had been so
assigned, SOI:Ie in the ~assies and sane in the various Consulates.
Through the cooperatioo of ID.". Berle, clearance was obtained fra!1
the State Department for exclusive use of the title "Lezal Attache"
by FBI representatives in united sta tes ~ba8sies abrca~ with t~e
sole exception of Uexico ~ Haiti in which countries tt.e ~ted
States Ambassadors objected so stronr),y to the term -Legal Attache"
that the B.1reau consented to use in these two c~tries the term
"Civil Attache."
(
The :Bureau in Ju1.'1". 1942. 6ecideci after carEf'ul delibera-
tion to establish in each Ubi ted States EmbasB; throughout Latin
jz;terica where we hac representatives. an Office to havc local juris-
dictior. and administrative suI)Crvision of t~ work for the entire
country involved. These Offices 1rere modeleci. f'or all practicable
purposes. as closely after FBI Domestic Field orf'ices as possible.
The Legal Attache in each country was designated as being in charge
of' the Office ana 'rFaS charged with "'i.he res~onsibilit7 f'or the
adl!lini8trative su.oorvision under thE Bn-eau's direction of' all wark
performed in t.he particular COWl"r.l""J involved. Thus. "he LeZal
f~t"taci1e beca:;;e in' eff~ct an FBI Special A(;cnt in Charge. At the
SaJOO tw. the Bureau instituted the prac"i;,ice of transmittjng all
instructi0n3. etc. ot' a general and uni.tarm nature via the cedi\Bn
ot' N1jemoranda to AU Legal Att.aches". "fthich \O"ere n~red and pre-
pared along the general lines of t.radit.iODal ~eau Bullet.ina ~~d
t.raditi(mal SAC Letters.
~ the end of 1942 the ~.ca~ hac succee~eri in estaOlisrjL~~
racio stat:ions in "t.ile followjng fore~:n local1',,1esl Bogota, ColCBnb1a;
Santiago, Chile; Q-.11to, Ecuador; tio de Janeiro. Brazil; HaVa118, Cuba;
Lima, Peru; and Wontevideo, ~<7Uay. Also, arranzements vrere bein.r;
"perfected as rap~ as possible '~o establish radios in additional
cOWltries. The FBI Technical Laboratory haC ~evised for SIS use a
special cipher code whiCh was substituted for the old ~" code in
all countries wbere1n we had Offices establial.d ha~ dipl~tic
1I8uni t7 .
The ~u had succeeded by this time in establishing .&gmlts
in many of the t)1ited States Consulates in South .AJ!lerica, particularly
in the larger and more important countries. These Agen':lis be~e, ur\der
the above described procedure, 'ri.rtual Residmlt Agents and their Offices
in the respective Consulates were patterned as closely as possible and
practicable after traditional Resident ~ency Offices in the 1m. ted
States.

t
(
At the saos t~e, there ~S ado?ted and approved ~ the
Bureau a unifoItil systmn of re?ortinz by the SIS Offices involving
the use of' a standarcl and unif'om report f"orm especially desisned
for use by Leg2.l Att.a,ches. This report _s fundamentally bascd
ver:,' closely upon the traditional FBI D<X:1estic Field r8?ort torn.
al though. of course, certain chances haG to be incGrporated duo
to t.he peculiar nature of' 51$ TlOrk such as t~ f"act that practically
all information bein(; reported originally eDBnated froc confidential
informants and the additional fact that virtually all 1nfonl1ation
reported was tranSl:dt~ to other Agencies of the t111ted states
GoverImlent f"or ir..!"ormative PUT?O8es.
Upon the establishment o:f Le~al Attaches or:fices'in the
various Embassies patterned closeiy after FBI Domestic Field Offices,
the Bureau insti"l:.uted the progrBli1 of having each Legal :..ttache care-
fully corrdinate his worl: within the th1ited States DJbassy. In this
regard, the Legal Attache was required to keep the Ambassador L"lfo1'l!1ec!
pers~. and otherwise with regard to the intelliGence data obtained
and bei.~ reported upon. Coordjna.t1on was also worked out. with tm
local t)11ted states Witary 8J¥i Neval Attaches tlnoou;h a series of
weekly conferences and also mutual distribution on a selective basis
of reports anC in1'ormat1on .obtained in the intell~ence field. T1'.e
Legal Attaches were instructed to be especially oare1"ul in keeping
l:U1tary and Naval Attaches, prOlII?tly advised of all information
haV'in(; special m:Ui"~ry or naval interest. I.."l practicau.v all of
the »nbassies. the tmi~d States A1!lbassadors, bein(; particularly
impressod vii th the value of the wcrk being perfOrEd by the or.rice
of the Legal Attacf!e, in contrast "lith prior conditions locally,
instructed that the La~ 4ttache would be ~he EmbasST of:ficial
designated as coordinatcn- of intell1GCIlce inf'or::Jation 1I'ithin the
Embassy. Within a very short period of time, each Legal Attache
beca.~e firJ:1l:>" established as ""Iihe responsible Azaerican official with
regard to clandestine 1htell1g81ce matters, particularly in the
field of' subversivE: activities and matters related thereto.
T~ enlarg~t of the 518 Superviso17 setup and organi-
zation at the Seat of Government had kept pace correspondin:ly with
the increased coverage and orbanization in the Field. It never did
become- however- necessary to build up an 1D¥!u1y top-heavy organi-
zation at the Seat of Government fran the stan~oint of nucbers of
personnel enGabed- etc. The largest nucber of supervisors assigned
to this project at the Seat of Oov~t at 8!\V" one time was
twentrfour supervisors. which mmIber was assir;ned 0n1;y for a
briei' periol"J d\n"ing the very peak of SIB operations.
818 files ~ 1nd1ces, which bad fr~ the outset been
established and maintained 'Jdthin the SIS Offices at the Seat of
Govermnent, were, during the winter of 19~2--l943, transferred
17
-~r-T"

to the regular Bureau Files Division alcmg with the neces5al7
cleri'cal persOIU1el. etc. who had been engaged in working on the
project in t!:'.e 815 Offices.
t
Fran the viewpoint of an outside observer, the ~eau's
5IS program a1'ter the above improvements had become an extremely
e1'fid.ent and capable organization. Fran a strictly FBI administra-
tive viewpoint. however. it was still .tar below ordinar,. Dlreau
standards and in many respect5 just entering ~OD it5 most acute
experimental and development stage. The mere issuance of instru-
tions frOJ!l 'Washington to the newly developed ~Ga1 Attaches, most
of' whom were extremly limited in inve8'tigative experience. virt.ually
all being ?dthout any prior administrative or supervisory experience,
did not by any- means .1DIDediatelY' solve the ~.. problems and di£fi-
culties inherent in this type of ~k. As might be ex;>ected many
mistakes were _de bY' the newly- fledged Legal Attaches due to lack
01' exper1encc together with the fact that they were in many respects
coping with an entire new and unexplored problem. It required time
to properly synchronize and adjust the undercover A;,;ent program in
each country as an efficient and sm:>othl.)- working part of' each Legal
Attache's Office. ProDlems with regard to the handling of conferences
wi th these undercover men. the supervision of' their work, safe means
of coJlDl1\Ulicat10n 1d1ereby the undercover people could safely furnish
their output promptly to the Le3al Attache's Office. required time
and cons1deraDle experimentation.
(
The BIlreau ;ms still attempting by every means possible
to acc91erate its total coverage throughout Latin America. Agents
were being sent out at the rate of approximately twentrfive to
'thirty Agents per month am it was not possible or practicable .tcno
many .easons to coordinate this additional coverage carefUlly with
the Office of the Legal Attache. It must. of' course. be kept 1n
miIxi that during the f"irit few months followine the establisllDmlt
of' the LeI18l Attache systen very few of' the Legal Attaches had arv
cocprehensive picture thenselves of the actual1fOrk within their
0Im country. Yany of them. were quite new to the country at the
time of being designated and much of the work was still largely
Wlexplared and surveyed.
Some et£ort was made to sOlicit tram eaoh Legal Attache
estimates as to the number or people needed by- them, rot these
80lioi tations proved almost oanpletely valueless and the 9.1reau
continued to send 1mdercover people out cm ~e or less the same
basis as before.
This state of affairs enormously canplicated the problems .
of the newly designated Legal Attache who was already strugE;l1ng with
mB.r13' dif'.ticulties. The OTerall result was. of course. that within
18

(
a pericxi of months, Agents were dei'W tely overcrowded in some
areas in so far as the T/ork to be pcrfo~ed was concerned while
other Offices were suffering fram a lack of Agents. Every effort
ViaS "being made -t.o augment the S-taf'f of each Legal Attache by send-
ing Agents in-~o ~he various countries assigned as Assistant Legal
Ac~taches and assigned in Consulate Offices. There were serious
limitations, hov.-ever, as to the rapidity with which this phase of
the program could be carr:..ed on due to a variety of reasons,
including the necessity for clearance and approval from the state
Department, and i:.he particular ~bassy involved for each such
assisament. It ,~s inevitable that rnanj~ of these undercover
people '\'rere not properly superVised, especially during the early
days of the Legal Attache s~rsteD and for a number of mon':...hs subse-
quent thereto.
It should be mentioned in passing that early in January.
1943, the &Jrea'~ dis9a~~ched to Latin America, eighteen Sgecial
Azen'c.s £r0I:l the Domestic Field especially qualificd on plant survey
work for the pu:r-l)oSe of surveying throughou;:' the enw'e hemisyhere
a total of 104 dif'1'erent companies. installations, ports and organi-
zations \~th a total of 1$0 branch facilities, requiring p~ical
survey. T"'nese SUl'VeYS were comucted at the request 01' the state
Depar ment, 'War Dep~ment, Nav;o- Department and the War Production
Board. This project was eminently successful 1'roc the standpoint
01' '"he war]: accOl:1plistJ.ed and the results obtained. These eighteen
Special Agents however were in all respects comDletely without prior
training 1n 1'oreign \70rk a11d 'had no lmO';'-led:;e whatsoever v,'ith regard
to the Spanish or PortUt'i;uese lancuaze.. TIle Legal Attaches anC: their
Stafts (still extreoely mea~r in most countries) T:ere req-uired to
furnish eve~ assistance in the plant survey project in order to
expedi ~~e it to the greatest possible extent. This, of course,
resul ted 1n many of the Legal Attaches neg1ect~ vital portiops
ot theu no11Dal work. particularly fran an administrative viewpoint;
that is, ';;he constant supervisjJ1g and assisting of the various
\U1dercover Agents still being sent into the countries as rapidly
as possible.
SOJile Legal Attaches proved callpletely inadpquate to their
task and had to be replaced. A very £ew begen to resign and enter
the A.rr;.ed Services. liorala tluooughout the Field Service in Latin
.America suffered to SOl!le extent especially during the Spr~ and
S\'mer of 1943, follO1ring overwhelming allied victories in liorth
Africa and Sicily.' These victories, 'of cOln"se. did to s~ extent
de1'late the importance of. intelligence work in Latin America or at
lea~t the urgency thereof due to the fact that dan3er fr~ enemy
\
/'
~ET
'9'

invasion no longer ensted. A. much larger percentage of. resiptions
began to occur f.rCD the 1D1dercoTer personnel and 8«Da or t~se £.gents
after short periods of. assignment became tlloroughl7 disgusted with
local cmd1tions cd ccapletely disiUusioned 'Whm raced with s0me-
thing entire~ di.tterent f.rCMI. the glamorous picture dsioned by' them
bef.ore \mdertaldng the assigDDaeDt. .. relatiTe~ _n number either
resigned or requested a transf.er back to the Dc.-stic field, despite
the fact that the Bureau had ezpended cmsiderable sums or moo.,. in
training and preparing them f.or the assignment, not to Mntim1 the
important t~ el8lent in training aM preparing rep1acements which
cou1d not be expected to produce wortbwhile results 1mtll they had
been on assignment tor a number of mmths. !he Agents were, of
course, subjected to all kinds or ridialle and 8Dbarrassing questions
.fran large number of AJlerican Kilitarr and Raval perecxmel. stationed
t.hroughout Latin AJDerica as to wIv' they were not in uniform and were
trying to sell soap, magazines or perform 80M other o8tensib~
unimportant and nm-war cmnected job.
(
DI1e to the above and II8n1 other reasons and ai.rcumst~ce8 ,
all more or less complete~ out .tr~ under the Bureau's C<X1trol~ a
c~id.J'8ble number or resiptious and requested transfers tr~ SIS
took place during 194.3 moStl1" as indicated abon trCIn 1mdercover
people. It should be kept in mind, honnr, that each resi~at1on
or request or t~ster f~ SIS attracted especial attention due
to the nature or the circumstances involved in order that an incorrect
picture win not be presmlted. As a matter or ract~ the percentage
ot resi~at1ms~ plus requested trans.rers~ was Ca1s1derabl,y lower
than the actual percentage of reaigaationa during the same period
frc.1 the Bureau' s ~8tic Field Serrlce. The fact, however, re-
mains that a cmaiderable number of re8i~ation8 did occur in the
me phase of the Sem~ in wh1d1 nme should have OCClll'red.
)lean'While, exp&nsi<l1 of 'the SIS Field coverage was cm-
tinued at the same rate as previoU81y 1U1ti1 October 4, 1943, at which
time, tt. Bureau ceased further SIS assigDments except wherever special
need might arise, 8uch a88i~ts to be personally approYed b1' the
Djrector. .At the time of this particular order, the Bureau bad a
total of. ~ splf11'ees assiFed to SIB work:, including a tota,l of.
94 Bplayees ass1~ed in Tarioua DirtsimlS at the Seat of OoTemMnt
cgaged ~ matters perl.a1n1ng to Sl~ and also including a maber
of emplayees in Hew YoN City assiFed more or les8 exclusiTe~ to
SIS work and mI\tters pertaining thereto. On thi8 particular date,
the ~au bad its largest total coverage ~sist1ng of Special
Agents «l t~eil'Pl assi~t, the total figure being:~. On the
same date, 'tile lureau had as.i~ed abroad 29 rldio eq>10788S, 10translators, crr~tographer& and photographers, U special 8P1Q78es .
and a total of. 89 clerical pmplf11'88s, Mking a grand total ot 48J!; .
Bureau empl01'8e8 m toreiF aas1gDD18Dt at the tt..
S~T
20

ml0rtly after this, on October 25, 1943, a letter was
received ~ the Bureau from ~. Berle of the State De,artnent
(t:w letter was actuall;r prepared by one ~iel ~nle"'J, a subordi-
na"~e officer L~ 1,~. Berle's Division of the State Departnent),
\7hich, in ef'fect, indicated "'\.hat the Bureau "liaS du?licating work
lJerforJD("d by the State Department and other Department~ in connec-
tion with the investigation and reporting of political and
econocical matters. The Bureau replied by pointinG out tho facts
and )/;r. Berle acDitted error and later Tdthdrerr the letter from
the record. However, it had becoce quite apparen-~ to the Bureau
it.se1.f tha't, a dras~ic reduction in 515 personnel was advisable
inasnuch as thc ~ork had reached suCh a stage that '-~he cQntL~ued
assigment of such a large nu."!lber of J..gents, particularly S'llch a
larGe pro,ort.ion of undercover Agents, was no 1.on~er justified.
Accort1ingly, durins October. November and December of 1943, the
Bureau recalled £rrn~ assisncent in Latin America A3ents and o'~her
e::!.,lO:Tees on a somevlhat wholesale basis. A total of 136 Agents
alon; TI~ th a n~.ber of other enp1.oyees W&re re~ed to the
united States f'or reassignment in the Domestic Field durinz thesemonths .
The Stat.e Depart.ment, as well as the various ~assies.
be cane somewhqt, alarmed at these heavy \'lithdra\-mJ.s of personnel
and be~an ?rotestinz such action. The St.a~e Department .,~s joined
b:>' tho various Ambassadors, etc. ~"l requestinz re~t10n by the
Bureau of full-scale ?olitical and -econan.ic investiga.l~ions and
reporting abroad (this '"fork having been "i;emporarily discontinued
as a rcsult of the above described State DepartJ:aent 1etter). The
Bureau comp1.1ed with the request al thouB'h 'Withdrawals from Latin
Amsrica Continued stead~ in so far as the state of the work
indicated that the services of wuch eaployees could be spared.
Tris Tri thdrawal pro~am was in fact ~-tremely beneficial and
advantageous to -ihe overall efficien~J of the SIS prograDe The
Bureau was thus enabled to readjust its field coverage in foreign
countries on a practical and sound basis depeming entirely upon
the actual personnel needs teT:'.,orarily or perxnanently in eE'.ch
country and locality. Many of the ConsuJ.ar Offices were closed
during "this period inasmuch as justification for continuance of
same r~~ ceased to exist, and all in all ~he personnel was
comp1.etely readjusted, "the averwhelI:1ing majority of same being
thereafter assigned in Ecbassies and Consulates with diplomatic
cover s~pplemented in cer~ain areas by strategically placed"
undercover representativeE utilizing covers best adapted to the
particular assignment on the basis of past experience.
21

~~"G;~~~...
PEAK PERIOD OF OPERATICIlS Dr LAm: AlreRICA
 D.
('
Br1ll1an~ resul~s had been ob~ained in the field of
investigati ve accomplishments abroad to such an extent that a
clear-cut picture exis~.d by Oo~ober. 1943. with regard ~o the
8J0011Dt of pending and necessary 'Work in each office end each
area. The very large and extanai ve German espimlage rings in
Brasil had been completely eliminated. Espionage activity had
been eliminated in Cuba. The large and extensive espionage
clandestine radio rings in Chile had been completely investigated
and virtually all of the people arrested. The major espionage
subjects and rings in Argentina had been definitely identified
and were being kept UDder more or less constant surveillance.
The same si tua.tion existed in Paraguay. in Uruguay and Colombia.
The principal subjects in the ex~ensive Clog Case in Mexico had
been identified and were being investigated via surveillances
and other methods. !be Alien Enemy Control Program whereby many
dangerous ene~ nation8ls were apprehended and either interned
locally or (in most oases) sent to the un! tad sta~e. for intern-
men~ had been virtually completed in all except a few countries.
Extensive and eft1oien~ informant networks had been established
in each country to such 8n extent that InY type of investigation
could be conducted on a sound and efficient basi. approaching FBI
Domestic Field standards of efficiency.
..
The police liaison progr~ during 1943, had been extended
to most of the major and important countries throughout Latin Americ&.
'!'ds program involved sending one or more FBI Agents into certain
Latin America countries upon request by these coun~ries ~hrough diplo-
matic Channels tor the purpose of furnishing instruction and assistance
to the police and other Governmen~ officials interested in intelli-
gence and criminal work. These so-called police liaison men were
assigned openly ..s represen-tatives of 'the FBI. They worked. however.
in e&ch instance under the jurisdiction ot the Legal Att&che and
proved invaluable in connec~ion with the Bureau' s overall intelli-
gence cover&ge and work. ~ough the police liaison arrmge.nt it
was possible &nd feasible to obtain almost any type of inves~i&ati ve
assis~ance and informAtion from the police in pr&otic~.lly every
oountry in La~1n Americ& with the ex~ption of Argen~tna. (No formal
police liaison arrangement existed in Xex1co. although the S88 rssul ts
were being ob~ained by .ana of h.."Vi~ pl..ced one of the r~ng police
ottici..ls on our informant pay rolls).
(
Extenei va inro~ant n8twork.~ provided thorough coverage with
regard to Latin American post office 8t'tablishments; police depart-
ments; cable and radio offices; telephone companies and facilities;

T
)
steamshi~) lines; air lines; customs offices; bovernnent departments
generall~. even incluc1ing in many ~)laces the Presidential Palace;
(we had at var _ous times FBI A~ents assi~ed as special advisers
to the President in different countries).
In addition to the above, extensive informant coverage
had been established amonG foreign ~bassies in each country and
also among local professional and business groups, ref'uzee grOU?S,
etc. Due to the primary mphasis being placed Ui'on German, Italian,
and Jap~~e8e activities, especial e££orts hac be~~ made to infil-
trate these. ;rou,s with informants and in SODe ins~~ces with under-
cover Agents. A nwber of double agents had been developed, JlBjn-
taining direct contact with eneay espionage groups.
The plant smovey program throUGhout Latin America had been
completed with ccellent resuJ.ts a.'1d in a nwnber of countries, con-
taining the !:lore important installations from the standpoint of OlU'
strategic war 1nteres.~, ~eclal so-called securi ty liais~4 Den had
been assiGned in the countries to maint2in security liaison ,nth
local o££icials, etc. Agents so assiGned elso proved o£ ines.~imable
~ue in streng"~heninG the overall intell1gence covera3e and investi-
gative network.
kadio stations had by this time been established in
rlrtua11~" all of the 1IJIPortant Latin American co\U1tra.es with the
exception o£ l!eJI".ico and Argentina.
F;tcellent work had been performed and was then be~
performed with reGaru -::'0. the smugi;linb of strategic materiafs by
eneI!!;{ grou9s endeavoring to smUGgle same throUB'h the Ibel'ian
Pcninsula into Germm1Y. The most 1J:Ji)ortant work in connection 'With
this enemy smugr;l:iJ1.::; program arose in connection with industrial
diamonds from. Brazil and Venezuela, and platinum from Cola:lbia and
Venezuela. In ~y, 19~ a special squad of ~ents 'Was dispatched
to Bogo.i:.a. Colanbia (a key point in coMection with the platinum
and diamond smugZlins activities) at the request of united States
Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane, for the purpos~ of facLtitating in
every ,my the control of this dangerous problem. This special
squad of Agents operated under the overall jurisdiction and super-
vision of the LeJal Attache in Bogota. ColClDbia. It was enabled
tJ:1rough worldng nth the local customs officiels. nine inspection
and tax collecting officials. etc. to identit'y and eliminate so
many- of the important smugglers that the backbone of the practice
in so far as it might affect strategic war aims was virtuarly
broken within a few months. It should be noted that these Agents
in cooperation with the American ~ssy advised With local govern-°
ment officials in devisiJ1g and preparing cOOlp1.etely new laws and
regulations designed to protect allied war interests in connection
with -r.he smuggling of such strategic materials.
S~T
23

In connection with the esJ~ablishment of a thorough and
efficient informant network in each CO1.U1try, it had been necessary
to deal with the v~/ troublesome and dangerous ~ofessiona1
informant" .Droblem described earlier. This was handled ve~. "
effect1T&J.y-following the establishment of the Legal Attache system
I'll November, 1942. The "professional intoruant.~", who were causing
untold confusion, waste and harassment by the fumishjng of in-
accurate and frequen~ fictitious inforcation concerning enemy
activities, were identified, completely exposed and eliminated from
the scene by the end of 1943. The most successful method of
acca:lplishing this end proved to be as folio-iTS: The regular Attache
or same other Agent, in same cases undercover representatives, would
act~lly employ the troublesalle intormant, analyze his reports and
check carefully through coordinative means withjJ1 the Dnbassy to see
if such informant or accanplices were .t\n'nishing the same information
to other American officials within the mDbassy. The accuracy of the
infca'il8tion would be checked through actual investigative means
frequently by keeping the suspected informan"t under constant S1.u-
veillance by special so-called surveillance informants.
~ these and other related means# such as telephone and
the mail surveillance# bribery of the informant's mistress. etc.#
it was almost invariably possible to completely expose the spurious
nature of' the informant's data within a canparatively short period
of time. ()lce exposed# .t;he:r were a:?propriately deno\D1ced and with
regard to ~he more troUblesome ones neutralized with the assistance
of the local police or internment authorities. 1(any' of these
Itprofessional inforsnts" ere refugees of ore ldnd or another.
Certain mistakes were made in various instances with re-
gard to the development and subsequent handJ.ing o£ informants.
The most o..erious error and the only OlJe which tended to cause any
serious difficultY'. was the failure on the part of certajJ1 BLUOeau
.A(;ents. during the height of waz-time activity, to propem, and
adequately insulaT.e informants with cuto--out sa£eguards. his was
particularly tr~ in Argentina where the Agents 'Were 1ror g under
considerable diffuculty inasmuch as they '\Yere themselves being
surveilled. harassed and hampered by the .A.rgentine Police and
other authorities.;) ~
.A. number of informants in ArgentjJ1a learned wit:l' con-
siderable accuracy the identity 01: the1r principals, these bejng,
of' course, Bureau Agents. In most instances when this OCC\lrred,
the Btn'eau .Agents were operating undercover, however, there were
actuarly same occasions when the informant was pe~tted to learn
the identityof' some Bn1:essy or Consular Agent principal. .

~ET
number of these informants were eventually arre~ted by the
Argentine police and tortured into maId.ng more or less canplete
confessions, including information possessed by them as to the
true identity of' their principals. LuclWy there were no instances
1Dvolving identification of the Federal 8.11'eau of Investigation
i tsel£. In only ~ instance was an FBI Agent actuali.;l arrested
and in this instance the Agent (assigned 1n1dercover) was enabled
within a very f'err d~~ to secure his release with the cooperation
of' the DnbasS":f and, of course, iJ:Iilediateq left Argentim, not
being again assi,..med on SIS. This J.gent was to s~ extent care-
less and was criticized therefor, however, his de~ction and
apprehension involved excellent police work on the part of tJ1e
Argentine Police. Qlce in difficulty, the Agent acted admirably
in maintaining his cover, denyin,; his Built, and completely pro-
tecting the Bureau. The Argentine Police~e not able to secure
enough evidence, whereby he was released. Upon a nUtlber of
occasions, horrever, it did became neces5ar~r or the Bureau to
smuJ3'le undercover Agents out of Argentina by means of a motor
launch which was mainT.a.med on i:.he Rio Plata in the Argentine
Ibrbor for this and s1I:1llar purposes. Certain in1'~ts were
also smUS3led out' of Argentina in the same manner. The procedure
wvolved placing urxlercover Agents or informants lmOYm or believed
~o..-b~ under suspicion on the part of. the Argentine Police in the
leunch at night and o;.ake them thereby .to Uonj,evideo, tir%"UB.Y",
which is located just across the river from Buenos Aires. As a
precautionary safeguard, the practice was later adopted in Argentina
of' 1mmed1ate1y sm~g1ing out of' the country q- undercover Agent
who had maintained contact. with any- inf'ormant lalovm or. believed to
be under suspicion or surveillance on the part 01" the .Argentine
Polici;J The Office had a sufficient nur::ber of- infomants through-
out the various police organizations whereqy the Legal Attache Tms
kept fully infomed all to just which of our infomants were sus~cted
and bejng investigated at aD)'" particular time.
~(:
There was ome minor du"fuculty .ill co~tries other than
Ar~entina due to this same tail\U'e on the part or Agents to exercise
extreme care in utilizing cut-outs in dealing with informants in
order to prevent the infonnants .from obtainiJ1E identif'y:ing data
concern1ng his true principals.
Early in 19114, the Bureau sent Inspector ~on ()Jrnea on
an inspection of all Fm Offices and installations in Latin America,
subsequently followed by inspection Tisi ts on the part of ~. O\n'nea
to FBI Q1'f1ces and instu1ations in foreit:ll countries other than
J,atm America. ~. Q\n"nea was assisted jJ1 these inspections by
s~

~~:;~~:;~d b 7 CSpecial Agent Heber M. Clegg and of the SIS Divim.on.
These inspections proved invalua e ~t regard to '~he cWdng o£
necessary administrative changes in each ai'fice to render same more
e££icient and more neariy in accordance with FBI Domestic Field
Office procedure. The inspections were exc~edinGtY ~uhorough and
covered eve~; i)hase of SIS activities. Completely uniform pro-
cedures (with ~he excei)tion of such slight local variations as
.proveO unavoidable due to peculiar local circUI:lStances, etc.) were
~laced into effect as a result of these inSDections. A camolete
de'~ailed manual o£ instructions was pre~)ared at '~hc Seat o£- Govern-
ment based .'~Pon needs ~herefor revealed in the course of L~~ections.
~~ch ~ual was fUrnished to each SIB Of£ice.
)
(
A nUI:1ber of administra-i;ive changes \7el'C effec;;'ed in the
personnel assi~ents as a result of -i;,he inB;.)ection~ ~TlO Lcza1
Attaches havinG been replaced in ~his connection.
In a6dition to the value of the ins?ections from .~he
standpoin':c, of overhaul, unifying and streaJ!1l.inir.z adI;rlnistrative
office procedure, ~rsonnel supervision procedure, etc. along the
lines of FBI Domestic Field procedure, they also proved of
incalculable assistance in helping morale anci esprit de corps
amon;:; SlS Employees assiened in Latin America ma.V of whom had not
returned to the united states or had any a~prec1able contact ;nth
"~he Burea~ or its officiala since originally assigned to Latin
~erica j-ears before. T~~se inspections, ~ich incl\roed detailed
intervie~ ,?i th each e~loyee, as we~l as detailed advice, instruc-
tions, etc. to the emplqyees, tended to emphasize to each of the
emplO"Jees, the Bureau's Contin"lled mterest in them and their work.
It should be noted that travel restric~as well as
circumstances 111 connection with the DJreau's overall work and
responsibili~es, had been such that travel to the t!1ited states
and to Washington from srs assigrunents had been li.-:lited and
restricted to the greatest possible extent. While it had proved
absolutely necessary in a number of instances to briniJ various
EL~lqyees bac~ for individual conferenccs, etc., cvery effort had
been made to minimize this travel to the greateSt possible extent.
At the t~ of the inspections, the ve~r apparent and
pressing need for BOte regular program of detailed In-Service Train-
ing for Agents assigned abroad was establishcd, and inasnuch as the
prior reasons fo~ strictly lil:1itin~ and miniJrizing travel frOJn Latin
America to Washington no longer existed, there was insti tutec a .
proJram of In-Service Training schools for such Agents. These

(
schools were, of course, extremely valuable not only from the
standpdnt. o'.!' pure instructional benefits, but also fraIl the stand-
point of mor~e and esprit de corps. The Director instructed that
durinb the schools, each Legal Attache, anc ~~ch other Agents that
DLigbt desire, DRlSt meet and talk with the Director arxi encage in an
intervi~ with each Aasistant to the Ddrector and with each Assistant
Dlrector at the Seat 0.1" Government with re~ar(~ to local problems and
the work generally. This proved of inest1ma.blc value, and trCl:l this
period forward, there was no di.1"ficulty whatsoever with regarc to
morale and esprit de corps. The Le~al Attaches were eno~ously
bene.fiteci fr~ their talks with the Director, the .i8sistants to the
Director anc~ the various Assistant Directors. They were enabled
to outlinE' their problem, o.1".1"er suggestions, and obtain advice
and assistance. This program of In-Service TrainiDG Schools
continued wi-;;h increasingly beneficial results until late 1945
when they were discontinued due to the then extreme uncertainty ot
the Bureau's f.uture in 515 "i"{ork, it bein;; deemed that due to this
uncertaintJ~ they were no longer justif.ied.
.Uso, during the abave described inspection program, it
became necessary to dispatch feDale sten~3raphers and emplqyees to
foreign 5IS Offices due to the fact that male elerical em",;,loy-ees
were no lon6er available in sufficient nW:lbers" to handle the work.
(~e clerical employ-ees were not exempt fran Selective Service
Drai't F~gulations). The Adcinistrative Division selected from a
larbe n\Cber of volunteers the most efficimt and experienced Bureau
stenographers ana clerical employ-ees available for this assignment.
The Training D1 vision. assisted by the 515 nL vision. prepered a
detailed course of instruction and training far these clerical
emplo,oees pertaining not On1:y to the clerical work that they would
perform in t:.e roreign offices, but also conditions generally,
incluCing such mtters as health. social activities. clothing,
security regulations, etc. Due to the experience and excellent
quality of the female stenographers and clerical S!.ployees utilized
on this project, the overall program was moroous~ benefited.
particularly with regard to the perrormance of 'erficimt administra-
tive functions within each Office.
(
It should be noted that dur1ng August, 19~, the Bureau
.t1nally succeeded in est,ablishing an Office in the .AJnerican r.nbassy
in Honduras despite the continued objections and opposition or the
Uti tea States ~assador John D. Erwin and the First Secretary- or
anbassy. o~ Jam B. Faust. .Also, during ~. 1945. the aJreau,
21

at the request of the A.rrv and the State DepartMent, established
a l1&isoo office in the American .~SS1' Ul h-~. This office
W85 d1scorIt.inued during the Sm'IOOr q;t 1946, following almost
CQ..'1tinuous dU'ficulty with J.r~ authorities in the Panama Canal
Zone and the Republic of ~_nama, c~cern1ng intolerable jurisdic-
tional limi tatims and harassment.
 (
Early in 1945. it had become possible frJr the beau to
permit .Agents assiOled in Q!lbassies and Consulates in Latjn America
to be acoompanied <Xl assignment by" their 'rI1.ves and families. It
was not possible and feasible frJr ~ercover 1!leIl to be acoC3llpanied
by their wives 00 assiguaent and this was not pemitted at afI3' tiDe
durina the SIS progrmn.
A considerable n'mDber at cIder and mare exper1~ced FBI
Ianestic Field Agents began to apply for 818 assignment follow1ng
the last mmt1oned develO}8ent. A b1DDber at these were furnished
assignments and the overall res-.ll t was generally beneficial. J.8
a rule it was discovered that t.he ~der and more experienced dCX!lestic
field Agent encoun"tie~.eC Jmlch more d.1.t1'1culty in l~g the language
and adjusting themselves to local c~nditions abroac ".:,ban was the case
wi th regard to the 1'O1mgor men more recmtlj' graduated trmo colleges
and universities. It is undoubted1;( true. hoI7ever. that SIS suffered
to s~ extent fran a lack of maturity and experience on the part 01'
those assigned abroad 1'rcm1 the time of its inception until the mld.
Following the surrender of' Japan and the cessatim of
hostill ties 1n AUf';Ust, 1945, the ~eau began to experience extr-
dti'ficul ty in obt~1'lg any clear-out decision with regard to the
future of the 8m program 1n order that ap?ropr1ate plans and
preparations could be cCBi>leted f~ the carrying m of this work.
A ~iod of extreme uncert.a1nty and fluctuation ensued, 1Ihich
corxiition continued to an ever incJ'eas~ extent until the f:inal
and irrevocable decision to close the Of£ices in JUly, 1946. Dur-
ing this period of uncertainty and fiuctuation. the Bureau U!Ja:1
a number or occasi~ issued instructions o£ a drastic na.i-.1n"e to
SIS Field persomel designed to cCZlnence £inal closing of opera-
tioos. These 1n8tructiona would have to be changed within a
period or several cays due t.o conflicting instructions and deci-
sions trom the State Department and other interested ~part8e1ta.
~ o£ the .ore efficient personn~ were recalled at various
tiDes during this period £or a n_er o£ reasons ar¥i could not
be replaced due to tJ1e mcertaintY' of the entire program.,
The" quality o£ the work continued excellent, am a~stra-
tively 518 hacJ de.t1n1teJ;y "c~e of' age." Up \D1tll the final decision
s~6 28
~

to cl08e in July ot 1946 (at which time certain preparations tor
tinal closing became neoe88ary which had a crippling effect aD
etficiency. etc.). SIS Offices continued to perfonD extremely
efficient work abroad. The Bureau' CODLT.18nced the operation of
finally cl08ing each SIS ~fioe an4 +'uPnin~ "-yo +~- wnyok. "",Pi a- I
din+:;t\n- f"i1..- _+-n. +1\ +J.~
bj
(
'S)
(
It was deoided prior to ~ olo8ing ot SIB Ottioes in
Latin J.merioa to maintain t\tture l~a1s~ assignments f'or 'the
primary purpose ot maintaining li~son with police and other
Government8.l authorities in the to~low1ng countries, Vexica,
Cuba and Brazil. Agents &aligned ~or liaison purposes in those
countrie8 are attaohed to the Uniwd States Embusy therein with
the title ot Legal Attache.
(
\
;.
;
\
 29

~
(
.I
S~T
30

(
(
(
31

nIring Sept_er, 1944. two Specw ,4gents of the FBI
were assigned to Paris, hance, .tor the purpose o.t ma1ntain1ng
direct and cont1nuous liaism with 4rray' Intelligence authorities
assigned to Supreme Headquarters 'Al1ied Forces. Later 1n 1944.
three additional Agents were assi~ec to the same project. Theass~ent was subsequmtly 1ncreas~ to include five additiCX1al .;,
Agents, 1ncl1¥.iing two Agents .tor as$1gnment as Attaches in the
American »nbassy in Paris, France, tollO\11ng its reestablis1DDent
under t1lited States Ambassador Jetf+rSal Caffery. The Agents.
assigned directly 1n liaison with ~ted states ArlIt{ Intel1ieence
Forces in France, proceeded with S. Intelligence Headquarters
into Hamburg and &rlin, Germany, f~nCM1ng the capitulaticm and
occupatim of' the J.aGt named countr(. Two Agents were aJ.so assigned
to "\ihe maintenance of djrect liais~ with American Intelligence
authorities at GeneraJ. mark's HeadClUa1'ters in Vienna. Aus'tria.
Late 111 1945, all FBI Agents and Petsonnel assigned to the ma~e-
nance ot direct lUison with ArJ!G'" aUthorities in France. Austria,
and Germany, were recalled due to ~tolerable conditions imposed
'b7 ~ InteJ.J.igence aU'bhorities wit-h regard to the maintenance ofsuch assigmnents. .
(
Foll~ the liberation pt the Philippines in 1945, two
S~c1al Agents were dispatched to $e Philippines tor the PU1"?ose
of' maintaining direct and con'tinuo~ liaisoo'1li'th American Intelli-
~ce officers at ~ 1111 t.ed States ArI1O1 at 'this pomt. 8ubsequent13",
two addi'tional Agen'ts are dispEltc~d mJ. this assignment ~ a BIlreau
inspector was sent over far the ptn-pose of inspectmg the B.noeau 's
installation in the Philippines durting August, 1945. Shortly there-
after the surrender of Japan and occupa'tion thereof by American troops
resulted in the Bureau inspector (T. E. Naughten), accompani£ed by two
Special .Agents, proceeding 'to Tokjr~ aloog 'Wi'th American Army Intelli-
gence Headquarters. Thereafter. ths assignmen~s were cootinued. both
in the Philippines and Tol~o. Japan, follOlrJng the retum to the
U11ted 8t.a'tes at Jnspec'tor Naughten,. far liaison purpoaes. These
assignr:ren'ts were finally si.I!1Ul tane~ly discootinued 1n August. 1946.
due to the fact that the importance at the ass~ts to the Bureau
had materjally decreased in additidn to the fact that it had be~
discovered virtuaU,y impossible to ~k harmoniously a.J¥i cooperatively
in liaison with ~ Intelli.gence authorities abroad.
It will be noted fran the foregoing that the ~eau is still
maintaining liaisoo assignments in 'London, &1gland, Paris. France.
1(adrld, Spain and Ottawa. Canada. These assignments in addi tim to
those be.ing maintained in a liaison capacity" 1n Latin America constitute all foreign assignments ,at the present time. -
~ET
32

P.
SIB FINANCJm
Ianediately up~ the .formation o.f tJ. Bureau'. 818
program, .funds W8re proTided from the President' 8 cOD.fidential
.fund, 8eparate and apart .from the BUJteau' 8 regular appropriation.
rbis, o.f cour8e, permitted much greater 8ecreay with regard to the
Bureau's SIB work inasmuch as the .t=ds did not have to be acco1m.ted
.for by vouchers, etc. cleared through the General Accounting O.f.fice.
However, the Bureau established its own SIB "I'OUoher system pattemed
as closely as pos8ible and practicable after the regular Govern-
mental voucher system and all .f\mds ~xpended in any way whatsoever
were covered by s8lary, liTing and q~ers allowance and expense
vouchers.
(
(
b7C
Due 'to 'the nature of the appropriation, and the nature ot
the clmde.tine ~rk being pertol'8d, salarie. -re not ordinarily
paid by Gove~tal check. 'l'he protedure was a8 follows 8 The
Chief Clerk' 8 O£fice obtained the neoes8ary tunds from the Treasury
Depar'bDent and these tund8 were dep08ited in the City Bank in
Washington. D. C. in an account ma1n~ained under ~e ~s o£
Messrs. W. R. Gla'rin. D. M. Ladd and! I All withdrawals
trOD. tbis accOWlt were required to ~ supported by vouchers approved
and ligned by the above mentioned three otficiall. All checks dravln
~ the authority of .uoh -voucher. were required to be .igned by at
leas't two of the above described of£tcials. upon being lent on
..sigument. individual employees were adTanced such funds as might
be neoelsary to cover cost of transportation and other unusual and
emergenay expenses which might arise prior to the receipt of lalary
and expense reimbursements. The8e adTaDces were if nece88ary per-
mi tted to continue tmt1l the tenlination of the 818 ..signment. a't
which time tiDal accounting8 W8re 8uPmltted and the adTance accoWlt8
8ettled.
Al8o. following the e8~abl~8bmen~ of Legal Attache Oftioes.
lo-called Oftioe Advance acooUD~. were maintained and charged personally
to the Legal A~taohe iDvolwd. The.. ad'V8noe8 perm! ~ted the Legal
Attache to draw ftmd8 tor _r~8Doy expenditure8 of 8uch a nature as
would no~ perm t dela:y enco\mtered brs awn ting reimburs_nt on
expense 'tOuoher8. e~c. Thele Oftioe Advmo. aOCO\mt8 were likewi..
tiDally .ettl.d upon the clo.iDg of each Oftice.
<.
A s\mlllary of appropriatio~ md funds made a'nilable and
expended by tJ1e Bureau C81 1 ta 318 program 18 as followal
1.
33

( ,
(
(

!be _ount ot .s.ooo.ooo.oo waa included in the IJureau'.
regular appropriation bill for 1947 for use in continuing SIS
operations. '1211. _OW1t. was not in tny waY' whatsoe-ver earmarked
as to the Umler in which it Ihould "e expended. At the beginning
ot the 19.1 ti80al year. Bureau .-plOJ8e8 Who bad been preT1oualy
remoYed from the re~lar Bureau roll. .nd paid by ohecks drawn on
the apecial SIS baDk aoCO\mt were returned to the regular Bureau
rolls and salary checks to them were drawn froa the regular Bureau
appropriatiml. BxpeD8e checks and oth.et;:~:Jexpen8es were
drawn from the ..e 515 bank aCOO1D1t 1m. which .a.
repleni.bed by the Chief Clerk' 8 Office U8e 0 slip voucher.
(
b7D
(
The f'oll~ 'table will "neot fund. actually made
available and actually expended on sIB operation. from 'the time of'
it, inception until June 30, 1947.
Fi8cal Year-
F\md8 A-va11abl.
. tOO.ooo.oo
i'o'tal
iXP8Dditure
. 1".~.6l
 1941
1942 Carried fwd. from '41 . 226,~.S9
A,dd'l ~propriation. 600.~.OO
1943 Appropriati~. 2.900,~.00
Le8s '42 deticit 14,~6.7l
1944 Carried fwd. from '43 76,sP6.11
Add'lappropriation8 6, 450,opo.OO
1945 Carried twd. from '43 76,306.11
Carried fwd. fro. '44 1.925.0b0.oo
Add'l appropriations 1. 175,qoo.OO
1946 Carried fWd. trom '45 176.qoo.OO
Add'l appropriations 2.771,357.00
1947 Appropriations
bpenditure to J\me 30. 1947
766,669.39
 '169.596.10
2,885,973.29
 2.810. ~.18
(
6.626.306.11
 3.626.000.00
S, 176, SOS.ll
 3,000,305.11
2,946,~51.00
3,000,000.00
2,946,357.00
1.989.172.89
!o'tal
 f15.185.529.89
G.
JURISDICTI<>HAL DD'FICULm:s A1f,~ LACK OF COOPERATICII
Juri.dictional d1£tioul t1.. and laCk ot proper cooperation.
lupport and a88iltanoe trom iDterel1ed GoverbDent Depart..ntl and
AgCcie8 were e%perienoed by the ~eau 1'roa the nr')" inception 01'
'the SIS program. or-h1l"'" due in p~ at l..st to ~ very 100le md
so8what oonrusiDg mandate .et torth in the Prel1dential Directi'W8.
described hereinbefore.
Apparently G8Der~ Sberaaa Mile.. then Aa.1stant Chiet ot
start in charge ot G-2. ~ted stat,. ArII)". was .~t tn8tr\mental
S~ET35

(
in securing sucn a loosely drmm and dubious outline of tho &noeau IS
jurisdiction 1n the SIS field. Gen~ra1. W.1.es was insistent iran the
be~inning that alreau \fOrk in the f~e1gn intelligence field would
not cateriall,y restrict or ljJ!11t 8~called trad1t1CB1al activities of'
ATmy and Navy Intell1gence .abroad, ~he latter being more or less
included under the auspice" of JIj.l1t.ary and Naval Attache activity.
t
It was necessary soon aft~r the ince.>tion of the SIS
pro~ram to draw up specific and detailed -delimitation agre8:lents"
for the purpose of delimiting by a~eement betVieen -i;,he three primary
intelligence agencies opere-ting in ~t1n America. name~. ~. OJI and
FBI. the jurisdictio~ responsiblli~ and functions of each of the
-participating agencies. These delilllitation agre~ts were changed
rr~ time to tiE althougil gener~ speaking they werc based upon
the general premise that the Bureau would aSS1De responsibility for
the iJIV'est1gation of clandestine intelligence generally nth pr1mary
emphasis U?on subversive activities, etc.. and the krm¥ and Navy
would have responsibility and would coofine thejr activities to
matters of peculiar military or nav~ interest. The various delimita-
tion agre~nts covering SIB jurisdiction were honored more by viola-
tion t.han observance cspecially on the part of the Ar~. ThroUgllout
the entire history otSIS, it was the general pattern of ~ activitY'
abroad that the ltUitary Attache would to a large extent ignore the
terms of "he delim1 tat ion agreanent applicable at the time and would
invariab1y answer protests, etc. on t}., part of the Legal Attache to
the ef£ect that he was carrying ou-~ specific instructions tram ~
Headquarters in the United States and tIBt A.nv" interpretation of the
delicitation agreement did not gener~ s~dng de11m1 t or restrict
investigative activities on the part of the U1litary Attaches.
CorresplWtdi~~'y, protests. diacussim and negotiation with J.crD Head-
quarters officials in Washington throoghout the entire 8m program
with regard to obvious and fia':!;rant violations 01' the deliJ:dtation
agreement invariably resul tea' in such Headquarters o1'ficials of JrrD
wpassing the bu~ to the Attaches and otl:er of£icials in tho field
with the excuse that "~here had mereJJr been a ms,merstandmg and
misinterpretation 01' the terms 01' the del1mi -tation agreement by the
local KUitary Attache. As 1Micated above. this pat tern .8 repeated
80 1'requent1y and so persistently 't.J1at there can be little, U 81'0'",
doubt but that tJ1e local 1:Wt,arr .A,ttaches were. in effect. carrying
out the instructions of 1[ID Headqualrters 1n Yfa8h1ngt~ D. C.
Th18 naturall:1" resulted jp much local coofusion. endless
duplication and SaDetf8s considerable snbarrassment. It was only
~ the exercise of the utmost alertness and vigilance. together withprcxapt md v1g<n"OUB protests in s~~ terms. tin t the Bureau was .
enabled to keep this situation within any reasonable degree ot control.
36

(
f

Tbe other Kilit,arr Attach~ tlU'oughout Latin AMrica wre
.~ewt8t prooe to m8re1-v dabble in the 1nve8t1gat~ or 1nt~l11gence
Ettere in a sC88Wbat ineffective and not too ba1"IDtu1 ~~.
(
~tiCX1 bas been JI8de~ of the difficulty ezperi- mced by ta. aJreau in'tr,'iDg to k in direct l1ai8m1 'With ~
Dltel11gence attached to field toro 8 1n Prance, QermarQ" and Austria.
n118 d1t.ticult,- as caused Iv' ce intolerable re8tricti~.
11mitatiCX18. etc. pre8cribed tor t activities of Bu"eau A&8Jt8
88dgned in l1ai8m1 capacit)" _:-a::ra1 :Idw1D L. Sibert, ~2. Chief.
laA"opeaD '!'heater. attached to £l.aenbower'. ~quartera.
nlriDg Sept8lber. 194$. when the had a t.otal at 11 Agent.a.
together with mces881T clerical Pet'.0Imel, engaged extenai'gel7 in
11a18~ 1Dte1l1geDCe opeMt1~ of Yttal 1mp~e to FBI re~i-
bllities in cmmectiml witb tJw 1n~gence and eecurit)" work in the
Western Bem1sphere. General S1bert sued a recClaerdation that this
torce be reduced to a tot.al or two te tor 'the entire European
'1!1eat.er, these .Agents to be o~ed to virtually no intelligence
activit.1es ccept a1ntC18nce of t=e11a1sm at I8adquart.ers. The
alreau. of coarse. 'Wit1m-ew all per e1 tr~ 11ai8m1 'With 'the ArIG"
except those .Agent.s .m+.-j"1Dg 11& m with OBneral MacArthmo's
~quartel'8 in the Pacific. The ~tt.er AceDt8 ..re 'WitMr~ during
1946, when it bad be~ obt'l0ll8 ~t satistact<a"7 l1aiBml could not
be Eint.a1J8d nth .Ar8G'" field D1t.e111geDce PQI.Oces.
b~
Salle d1tf1cul't.7 b)'- '8Q" of lack of cooperatim was experienced
with the '()11't,ed States Baval Attach abroad, bat thi8 was of a Ve17
Ja1nor Dat1noe and ~ 1Dvar1a~ .. actor1J..Y" adjusted. l't should,
of CO1U'ae. be noted 1n tm latter ction that the tited States
B&'9'1' wit1dra' almoet mti1r8J:l" .f'r~ inteU1gmJ.Ce pict\U"e in Latin_rica toll~g 18Portant allied :val and laid victories .in BorthA.t'rica aDd the ~ terranean area :toe in 1.9112 - earl7 in 1.943.
Thereafter. thq 81Dta1ned Ba'9al It taches m17 .in the 8)8t 1aport.ant
co1mtries 1D Latin j.-rica aDd the.~ en-101'ed TeI7' ..u aIxi 1.i8ited
stafts with ve17 ]Jm1ted .tuDd8 aDd otber tac111ties .tm- 1DteW,geDCe
work.
b.7D
(SI
38

(
(S'
("
(5)
 bl
f
liS)
~S)
!be lack or cooperat1m1 ~ the part at tm State Department.
and it.s repre88Dtatifts e:zperi~ed ~ the 81reau during the S1S
program was largeJ.:r C81tered in the State Depar~t F~eipl Career
Service aM tt. of.t1.c1al8 directly cmulected with the adDd."~-trat1m
thereat.
!he State ~tact r.r..r s.rric. wu trm the Meet
ezt~ 8U8picio.- at the Blreau iand its SIS prccr-. '1'h88e people
wre &IVt~ except cooperatin although a. befit. d1p1~'t. t.b81' .

(
(
m'd1nar~ retra1ned tr~ di8p1&1in1 open hC8t1J.1 V . The alreau' s
~ d1t1'1cu1.v in ~..in1DC t.be :priY1lege of operating in ~ted
States :m.ba8818s 81d CmI8u1ates th1'qugbout Latin AMrica bas been
described in ~ det.a1l above. ~ -_a c&ued in a large ~
b1' hostfii t7 and lack of cooperation on the part of the Foreign
Career S8rY1oe. It 18 t.rae that .oe the FBI gaiDed the pri'9'Uege
of operating in the Mas818s cd C~tes, tM Agents were _bled
through their good wmok aDd briJ]~a8t results to sell the auoeau and
the SIB In'ogram to the _'tas.dar8 8Dd to a D1JDIber ot subordjnate
ca1'eer at'fic1al8. 0eDera1~ 8p88Jd~. howvm, the Career SerY1ce
r~~ned extr8811' aupicioua and ~te jealous of the Bureau's ~k
in tJle tore1p field and ~ oarse%' o.t.tic1a1s who openl7 'Yo1ced
support. and entlms1a- tor the SIB program were pro'tably in actua1.1t'1
bost1J.e t.hereto.
1'1. DJreau 8xper181oed gr,.t di.tf'J.culV in securing proper
.tac1l1U8 tor our tore:i.gn operat1on8. such .. d1pl~t1c passports.
tu1.l diplC8atic poivi1eges md iI8ta1t1es in mlbass1es. CCX18ulates
etc. aD7 career off'! cials .e8ed toO take delight in wi tbholding
cooperat.1oo by W87 of tum1Sh1ng ob~tim aDd o'b8'tacles to the
.mo. etf'1c1mt ~i~ at t~ sts program. SC8e of t~ .Allbas88d~s
who 8uwort,ed the progra exh.1b1t.ed undesirable tendencies to daB1nate
the" work of the Legal Attache within the maba.ay and to -boss- it
to an 1nj1A"iO\1s e.xtmt. This was ~ or .t~ tited States
a1:8ssador Spruill. a-ad-. who at me t18. wb1le assigned in Havana,
Q1ba. umertook to personally cCDtrPl and ftpervi88 all 1nf'ormants
used by'Legal. KW't.a17 am laTa]. Attaches.
~ted States ."'sadmo .sser-.1th. wbile &8s18ned in
_VaDa. om.. was 8Xtr8e1,7 1IDCoopetoat1ft aDd .. later general1:1'
bost1le aDd. mcooperati'1'8 wh81 ..81~ &8 tbited States Ambassador
to ~o. ~;1Qg the latter .taps of the 8IS prccram. .AB>as8&dor
Kesser881th exhib1. ted acre SlthD81a~ tor and coopc-aUoo with tI8
SIS program. & ~ and pro~ st.1ll 18. hii"iiii'i'"~. 't8s1call7
hostile to 'U1e beau and to Ute ~ ~ogr- except 1n 80 tar &8
he +.hints it 88r'Y8d biB beat adYantage to ah1b1.t tr1and11ne88 am
& 8pirit at ooo-~tim1.
(
Fcraer D11.ted State. ~8ador Jom D. a-.1n. a88igD8d
in BcxMiura8, _s -.tr-.17 hO8tlle to the idea of ~ aJreau
operating SIS act1dt1ea in Bc8M!u~. ~ persisted in tJd.s attitude
to 81M:h an a:tmt that the 8D"eau 'R8 \mable to establish a Legal
Attache in the mlI.8q in axn-oAi"a8 Imt1l 'tJ8 S\UIIII8r of. 19la4, at
which u. it '8. nece88a17 to:r t18 Secretar)'" at ~te to per~J'
moder Amba8..dmo a-w1n to accept 8Qch an 8.a1gD1181t d8ap1 te h18
continued bost1l1'ti7 and obj~tim8.
S~T40

~
 Efforts were made at TariOMS time. by state Department
officials and the Career Service to hamper the work ot Bureau
Agents in'61e field of political and aconomic intelligence. The
Bureau at one time in 19~ 1Datruote~ the cessation ot this kind
of work altogether whereupon the staite Deparbnent withdrew its .t'on.r
objections and specifically reque.t.ti that SIS work in thi. ccmnectica
be resumed and continued.
(
(
to 8\8 Up the attitude of the State Department, it i8
beliend accurate to .tate that auch t18, money and diffioulty in
e.tabliahiDg the S18 program on an efficient ba.i. could have been
completely a'VOided with proper coopetation fr~ the Depar'bDent as
a wbole (wbich the Bureau certainly bad every right to expect),
whiCh oooperation ... definitely not forthoam1ng. Such cooperation
and a..i.tance from the State Dep~t and its representatives,
... na later enjoyed by the Bureau, had to be won m1 m 1ndi'ridual
piece_al basia after long deI8¥', much expen8e and diffioul ty.
H. CRITIQUE
-- -
Detailed information with regard to the accampli8hments
of aDd results obt8.iDed by the Burea.'s SIB prograa are set forth
in detail. both summarily aDd by oo~try in the main volume. follow-
ing this Special Supplement under the heading. aAcoompli8hments..
 (
(
(
These atati8tical accomp11.hmen~s and re8ul ~I. speak for
tJlemael '981 and can wi thou't doubt be .. seed &s brilliant. b FBI
was instructed 'to set up the SIS pro$ram during the S~r o.f 19~
\mder extreM difticul tiel and without any precedent wh&ts08'Y81' to
.follow with regard to this type o.f wOrk in foreign countrie8. As
will be noted tr~ the foregoiDi. th. as8istance 8nd cooperation
.from the mo8~ in~.re.ted Deparizen'ts of 'the Goft~n~. which ~he
Bureeu had e'98ry I'igh~ to expeo-t. W&. not torthCO81ng ~ aDY'th1Dg
like a 8a~ia.faotory basis. Despite theee difficulties. the FBI
did es~abli8h a foreign in'988tigati'98 organ1.a~ion operating as an
1n~egr8.l par't o.f tbe FBI whiGh was in 8ddi ~ion ~o being the ~ly
etfic1mt in'988t1gati '98 lenice oper..ted by 811 Jg8nC)" of the Go'98m-
ment abroad to date a service which ~tually approached FBI standards
in the un! ted States with regard to Q,.rall et.ficieDC)" and competence.
1'he total coat which will be noted tl!'om the .foregoing iD.foraa~ion
concemiug SIS .f1nan088 was ex't~l~ in8igni.ficant when compared
wi 'th Go...~n'tal expend1 ture 1n ~eotion wi ~h this type o.f opera-
tion in other areas. the efficiency of ~e Service was 8uch that 8D)"
type of iD'ftltigation d81ired could be conducted on a prompt and
ett1cient basis aDd aDy type ot iDto~t10n desired by 8nY phase ot
...~~:;S:~:1~:i~E;::[~ 41

the tali ted Stat.e8 Oo9'_-::-~t oou1~ be obtained FC8f'tl1', et!1c181tl7
and cCllPletel7 without _18rr&8~t to the AMrican Goveml8Jt.
Th18 eucC8S8 18 uMo.mtel;D;3f attribUtable sole1,y to the arerall
eft1ci.mq of the FBI am its ad.4aj-tratim1.
(
 aIQI' a18take8 wre _de, b1t b7 wre corrected 111
accordance w1tJ1 OV'erall FBI a~-.W..8trat1ve prooed\U"e. 08181'&1J.7
8pea~n-£ it can be 8ated tlBt suCh 81stake& that were ade ~e
att1'ibutoable to a ~ete lack ~ pri~ experience b1' the FBI in
to1'e1gD operat1mm, the ccaplete ~ at &DI' precedent t~ thi8
t,.pe of' operatico. aDd otmr cir~tanoe8 mre me le8& CC8Pletel7
r8OYed tr~ au...u carol.
08Der~ ~-J!:iD&. the 8i8takea and errors ot -jm-
importance were 1D8'vitable wh81 ~id8red 1D the light ot &1l
c1rcu.tanoss &ppl1cable to the mt.1re progam. rt 8ig!Jt be
profitable. h~. to renew ~ 1D 818IarJ' .t8ahi~ 88 & basis
tar po8.s.ble cCWl81derati~ am Au.- 1D ~ct1~ with possible
.tI1ture operat1CXl8 at a mDdlap cl-.racter.
1. .tt _8 det1n1tel1' . ~8t&ke 'to wMlertake tl8 e8t&bl181r-
.nt. at intelligence coverage 8ol~7 ~ the ba8i8 of c~~e8t1ne
operat1~8. B8p0e88Dtat1CXl 8hoald ban been 8et up in the begilm1ng
in tb8 variOU8 Maanes and atra~gic Cc.I8ula'te8 with c~ete staffs
caegan1sed Uc:I1g 't.~e 1W8 or B.lreau ~8t1c P'18ld CX'.t1ces. Tb18
car~age should thm have bem~88nted ~ atrategica11,J' placed
clandestine oOV'..age rollowinc car .tu1 Ruq ~ t!:e ~ or anoeau
~q repre88nt.at1on as to tm c 8 applicable and otteriDI the
great.est chances at 8Uocea8.
.As preT1~~ 1D41.c&t.ed. -u. &bore ract '888 the Ie88m or
expcoience aM c~d F(i)ab13- baft been learDed in no other...,..
Al80, at the t1De at' Ule e8tabl1.~t or 8m, it..8 not poe81ble,
due to the attitme of the State D8pa~, to establish the 8J,egal
Attache ~. a8 it later 088 to G18t. It 18 Y8r,- dub10U8 1.t
the State DepartMnt ~d haft 8"-r agreed to such operation ucept
m1 an 1nd1.'9'1d118l p1ec-u bui8 rqucMinc ~l.D~~st1ne operat1oa8 in
ach 001Dltr,- am the d1tf'1aul ties Czper1eaced br all ~erDed 1n
c~oU~ tMrnitb.
1't is ~ 8Ore dllb1oa.a ~ t.he Pr..id8rt. would baft ordco8d
the necessary cooperation frCD tl1e IState ~rtMDt in the begj.nn1ng
o:l' it such orders 8'9G had tl87 been torthc~ ooald bave been
8UCC88atu1l7 18Pl~ted at the t188.
 (
:r
42

S~Er
(
2 . .Agcte wre b1-18.f'ed .tar t.oo burri8dl7 and sen t oat
m &ssi..-nt tar too rapidl7 tm- F.r a881.uat1~ aM adj~t
into 'the progra wJ.th 1"88U1.t.aDt 1U e.t.teots.
(
 Tm abov'e 818take ... Dat~al am probab1.y" imTi'table
81d81' all of tm C1r~tanceB 1D't'O1ftd. D1 t18 futwe, ~ar,
it 18 believed ~t in ocxmec't1c wi1t.h 8IQ' 81-'1.'" tJpe of ~ati~
81Cb creater care 8h~d be d8'Yoted tIC detailed m-iefing and train-
~ of ~ .n utilised. together ~ a 81Ch ~. care.tul estimate
&8 to the nt81b8r8 actually needed I,*, proper pertmo.nce at the work.
I't 18 DOt b8U8'Y8d 'U8t thi8 818tak~ would haft eD8~d if the 91reau
bad been able to ..tabl1Bh CC8P8t-t repr8sentat1m with proper jur1a-
diction am. authorit7 1n tJ. Ta1'ioua tiI1ted State8 ~88ie8 at t~
ftJ'1' beg1DniDg of the SIS ...osraa 1II&aJCh 8S such ~887 repre~ta-
t.1~ could mft supplied ~ ~u wi th 1.nto~tim needed in mak1ng
proper est1atea as to the 88JUDt 01 p81'eormel Deeded in each area.
3. b Aids Hlected t«- SIS &e8igJ88Jt8 were 1n tm
Uy~..]8ing ~1.t.7 or 1.D8'tances 70=£", md mm-e 1Dexperi~ed
tJBn _8 des1rable.
(
Tb18 818 take was again Jrqb8bl7 1n8Y1. table due to a nr1et7
at c1r~8S &S eet tcaoth ab09'8. The ~ were largely picked
trCID Tolunteer ranks and 1 t _s tM 7OUDger am 8m'8 inexperienced
Agents. 8)st 01' wh~ ~. Bingle. .t YO1.1mteer8d. Also. the 7ounger
men ae_d to po888SS 80re qualifications am 1'acU1t.y with regard
t.o laDg1Jag8 qual1.t1cat.1<X18. .Al-o. "P 'tmt1l awral:1ate1;J! 1~ the
older and amoe c;per18DCed £g_ts w+re Jargel7 tied up on extr-17
urgent. aM rltal Ikaestic J'ield 'Ma"~ 8M were not being recCDMMed~ the Special £gGS 1n Charge tmo I SIS aS81grDeDta.
Desp1 te tm 8lO" leg1tiat.e rea8~ .tcno 'thi8 OCCmTenoe.
1't i.8 .~ bel.1eYed that the BIJIo_u should. in the event of' s{ftl11.~
opC'atiCX18 in the tat liT. carel- C«Iaidezoat1cm to the .tter
o.t .ueO't~ a pa-oper pl"oport.1on at alder and a:perienced 8D
(pI"etera~ with prior adai.D18trat1Ye and execut1Te experience) .tm-
a881gD8nt to wmok at this kind.
(
4. 9fbe .Agents m 818 sut,..ed b-~ a lack of adequate
841p8rY181m. a~~8Wat1Te diac1~L~ 8Jd direct omJt.act. w1t.h t.be
Bm-MU of the kind .t1D'D18bed -- reFJ.ar ID-Serri~ tr~\1D1Dg, in8pec-
tiCXl8, etc.
S£~R~J:.
43

O«xi1tiana applicable at *8 u. were det1n1te1,y re8p(W181h1.e
tor tb1s 81t1l&ti~. Pr1«- to tbe adftnt of tl. Legal Attache 878t8.
late .in 1942. th..e --. at OOm-H. DO 10CBl supeni8ion what8O89'er
aM virtually no direct cC81tact wi~ the aDOeau. Later the Leg&].
.A.ttac!88 'Rre U1811¥ ~ 1naper1~ed and .8peci~ .in the
beginn1ng arerb\UOdened with a varieV of prd>l88 of such pressing
m"~ to cause thea to Mlleat pl"qJer e~strat1on aDd 8upervUi~
of 8ubcsod1nate pS'sonnel.
c
Up \JDt.U 19l1la. trav&1. re8Wict1CX18 Cd Ua1tati~ due to
8r oolxt1.tiona -.r8 such that ID""~ce trail\iDi- etC. on the part at
.Agents 8881gDed to 8m was '9'1rtual1.7 18Po8s1h1.e. S5milarl7. it. 18
doubted if it was Fact1cal on the &s1s ot 'rital DClMstic Field needs
to assign re~ 81reau 1nspectca-s too ~ program Dlch earlier than
occurred (early in 19!W). The tact. however. r8DaiD8 tat these
advantages were 8~e17 meNd md ~edl.v cost 8IS 8lch 1n tM
'WaY' of etfic1mcy- &8 wU a8 i8Pr~ JIOrale am esprit de corps.
s. IJwtructiona .turzd.eb8d to .Agente engaged ~ SIB nth
regard to local Ettms of operation wre not altogether adequate
perticular~ with regard to the d898lq)1ng aDd MmJ_ing or 1nf~ts.
TJds det1c181Q' was due ~t1re1y to tm lack of f~ 8Ireau
experience mo 8D1' eBtabl18hed preoe4ct in oameat1m with the baJMn~
of .fmoeign 1nte1.11gcce wmok. .
Later in the SIB program. UpCB1 the inst1 tut1CX1 of SIB
In-SerYice Schools in 19111&. adequat. detailed iD8truct1~ wre .fur--
ni8hed ~ t.he basis or ~st ~~ which had been gained 8Ore or
less b)" trial and error.
6. The ~1ng ot caver Wm"k, that 18. tI. se1eat1~ o.t
cmers tor Tarioua Agents in the ntioua localities. together with
adequate cover t1'81D"~~ tar the ~t _s 8Xtr.-1,y taulv aDd weak
1mt1l cC8parative1,y late in t.b8 SIB prosram.
'l'ha above mistake was als9 due largely to lack ot uper1eme
in tore1~ 1I1teU1gmce work. coup1~ wi t.h the turthco tact that the
BJreau was ~~t81.T un1n.tca"8d w1t.h regard to o~ti~. c~rcia1
am oth..-i8e 111 the 'Various localities in Latin America. {bier all
or the ci1'C188~s apn;J;i~-5ble at the t1.8e it was probabl,y 1Dm.table
that the jgctl would be g1'9WD the ~st l1kely lomxliDg COf'erl am
di8p&tched to the 8O8t log1oall7 BotmdiDg areas tor the exploitatim
or 8UCh cm-ers. What was Meded md later developed W88 adequate

(
am C(8petent .U&""~~D with r.~ ~ just which COV'e1"S would prove
adequate aDd logical .f'r~ w1th1n ~ cO\mtry to which the repr..euta-
tift _s being amt. .A.1.80. it wu ~C.88ar7 to give consideration to
the particular k1M ot work that t~ particular umercover Agent was
going to perform. in tlle CO\D1tryo in order that his COV'W would pelBit
thi8 tJpe of activit,..
Po1l~ establ1s1:mlent or b Legal Attache 818t8 th18
FObl. _8 succes8full7 adjU8t.ed. It 18 doubted it better results
coa1.d lave been 10gical1y gpected .-rlier. It should also be noted
tor poe81b1e .tI1t1noe reterC1Ce t.bat D~cia1 covers generall'J' .in
-.rt1ll8 are extr~ wak and obj~i~b1e unless the 8IIPl018e
to be as818Ded 1UKier 8888 is s~t e1der~ M" atberwise ob'9'1OU817
Rft+- ~ ~_f't. _t.aria1. h1-
S)
(
(

..~
<mGDI AND SCOPE CF SIS
 II.
A.
EST AB LISJD.IENT
The earliest conftraat1o~ wi tJ1 regard to the poss1b1li ty
ot establishing an FBI Intelligence Service in x.. tin America
tor the ~se ot obtaining am ~tr1but1ng information of
a secret intelligence nature took p;1Ace be~n" the Director and
the then .Assistant Secretary of S~ A. A. Berle earl,- in *'1,
1940. 111". Berle, ~ such con'Y8!L-aat1ons, 1Micated to the
Director that there ~ a med for lauch a Service to be conducted
b7 the FBI am tba.t PreS1dent1al~oval ~refor wwld be
secured by Mr. Berle. Conversatio and Mgot1ations concerning
this proposed Serrlce contillled 1 the scope of such discussions
included the then Director of ON! , Admiral Walter S. Anderson,
and the ~hen Director ot KID, GeMI1a1 Sbeman M:iles. Considerable
discussion with regard to this _t~r took place at the Inter-
departaental-Intelligence ConterenQ8 atte~d b7 the Director,
Ge~ral Mil,s and Aclniral Arderson, 'With their re&pecti'ge aides.
on :May 31, 1940. at which t18 it +s agreed that etforts w~ld
be 88de to have Mr. Berle of the ~te- Department clarify in
specific detail the desires of the ,State Deparaent concerning the
establ1ahment o.t a secret intellig~ce service as well &8 the scope am
jurisdiction tbereo.t. (66-8603-17)
b?C,
Prior to this 't1me, the ~I bad, upon request fr~ the
State Depa~nt.. furnished, during 1939, an FBI Agentl I
to carry on certain police 1nstruc~ional and advisory 'Work in Brazll
aM Colombia.
!Ii enlarged Interdeparta~al Intelligence Conference, a ttemed
b'1' the Director, Admiral Amerson, General Miles and JIr. Berle of
the State Department was held on ~ 3, 1940, at which t1ae ge~ral
agreement W88 reached that ~he FBI 'WOUld establish a special intelligence
service to obtain secret intormatiqn throughout Latin America (exc1u~
Panama) wi'U1 the cooperation of the State, War am NaTy Depar1aenta.
'!he Conference deS1gDa ted a spec~ ccmmittee to s'bl<i1' the question and
8Ub11it specific rec(Dmedat1ons aa to plana, etc. concerning the proposed
1nt.eUigence aerv1oe to be eatabl1~hed b'1' the .FBI. This ~ ttee
consisted of Captain Bode of ONI, Qolo~l JaMs Lester of MEn, Selden
Chapin of ~ State Departa.ent am Mr.E. A. '1'~ of the Bureau. (66-860~
nlrilJ£ these d18~Si0n8. it should be noted tl1at ~ specitic
~d .t:or such a sentce to be sstablished by the FBI was ge~rall7
stated to be tor the purpose ot 1mestigating subftraia actintiea
directed aga1D8t b United States from foreign countr1es, it being
1M1ca ted tba t the proposed 88rr1~ ~d probabl7 !unction at least,
in its initial stages only in the Western Hemisphere. It shwld a180
SMET
'~

be noted tbat partiwlar apprehension -.s gemrally expre81ed co~rning
tbe danger of lub'gersift activities aDd the need of inV88t.1gat.1on thereot
in MeXico, the Caribbean .Area am uong the east coaa t ot South _rica.
'rbis, of course, was <b1e to the tact tbft the 'Ar in &!rope bad at that
tiae reached such a 8tage as to partiaJ1Ari7 threaten those areas. It
8hould a180 be kept in 81M as a backg~ tor tbe8e d1&Q18siOD8 that a
great deal o£ pablicity bad occurred within the United States CODCern1ng
the Bazi 1Df'lltration at Latin Aaer1ca, particular17 in Manco, Cent.ral
.A88r1ca aIKi along ~ east coast ot ~th Aaeric-.. This IXlblicity, bad
sin~ the begi~~ ng of the war in ~, reached alara1st proportiom
and ot.fic1.al WubiDb"ton, along nth the in.rormed public in ti:lC Urd ted States
was openly apprehensive with regard. to the tlue extent of. Bazi penetration
and inf'1uence in the areas named above.
(
On June 12, 1940, the D1rect~ ot the FBI addre88ed a aeaor8l¥hla
to the AttorMY General ~t the United States ootlining past discussions and
I8lotiatiOD8 with regard to the e8t.bl~l88nt or a special intellil~
service in toreign ~tries to tunct1an uIKier the administration or the FBI;
am that atfiratii'e steP8 were ...i~ the fol'8Ulation of a 8pea1tic am
detailed progru rrCB. the President tor a determination &8 to matters ot
policy. (66-8603-34)
Cont1miZJg to pres8 .tor the proposed program, ~. Berle agreed.
to secure the approval of the State Dep.r1aent add ot the President tor the
establis}8ent ot tbe Spe~ IDt.ell1geqce Service (66-860.3-26). Jar. Berle
indicated to 1Ir. i.. A. Tamm (66-8603-27I) that the President approved the
plan in a per80~ d1sCU88ioD 'With 1!r. Berle, but that before aovea were
being made, he dMired to secure writ~n authoriziation.
£.
~SIW mAL DIREC TIVF.
The Presidential Directive wldch lfr. Berle bad been working for
was first OIltlined in a aemoraM\D ~ t11e 8ignature of 1Ir. Berle, dated
June 24, 1940 arxl addres8ed to Ge~al JJ1les, Ldmiral Arderson and lfr. Booyer.
This EmorAMUJI recorded U1&t 111'. Berl, talked with the President by telephone
in tbe presence of Gel8ral Viles aM r,quested advice as to the President's
wishes as to the fo~tion of a unit tor toreign intelligence work. The
msoraMum stated, -the President 8aid that be w1818d the field to be divided.
The lB! should be re8pan8ible for foret.gn intellicence work in the _stern
Hemisphere on the request of the State DepartADent. The existing lti.11 tar)"
Inte1ligence am RaTal 1ntel11cen~ B~cbes should cover Ule re8t ot the
world, as and when neces~ ty arises.- This ~orarxl.1D further 8tated that
-it was understood tlI8t the proposed additional foreign intelligence wOrk
8hould not super8ede aD3'" existing work; now ti,eing done and that the FBI II1ght
be called in b,. the State Depart.:ent on special &ssigrmenta mltaide the
.A8rican lBI1isph&re Ulmer special a1rQJ88tances...8 (61.-5002-/.,.14.43;
66-8603-1.1.1:)
(
. In accordance with this _qraMum it was 1D11cated to the Director
of the FBI that acme tort,- aen ..~ be des:!gnated .tor tn1s usigl8nt with
the progTem that rou~ appropriate special training they would take up
du ties in various Central and South A$er1oan countries aM 1nsu1ar po88e8~.
( 66-860.3-29 )

COOPmATIV& mfC1'Iorm WI'lB (1t~ ao~l&!E}lfAL AGEII:IES
 c.
In 'ri8W at the jur18d1c't1.o~ l1a1te and 8COpe at act.1rtt7 imPO8ed
upon the SIS progru of the Federal ~eau at Imest1lation, 1 t was
decided tbat, acting ~rel.T &8 a service organ1&ation, 1nfor-.Uon att.r
eY&luat1on aM correlation at Wash1ngt,on, D. G., would be di8seminated to
the following agencies in accordan~ 'With their partietllar interest in the
~aJ.lar 1nf0r8t1on to be forwarded:
I
1.
State x.part.ient - All _ter1al pertaining to Latin Aasrica
(
2.
BaYy' Department - All _ter~ relating to the actiT1t188 o.t foreign
NaftJ. ~pattaent8, krltime information concerning
espionage agents and their act1v1t.18s.
.3.
War Departaent - All .terial pertaining to the ~nt or 'b'oops ir
Latin AEr1ea, espiOMg8 agents and ~ir actiYit1ef
which pertP-in to 81l1tary interest.
4.
Office or the Coordinator or Inter-American A.f'tair8 - All uter1al
on matters pertaining to subversive poll tical
activities, e~ propagalxia, data recardinc
~erce ~ 1JxiiYidoals dealing ~erc1all7 with
s,apath1.zer8 or eubjects of Axis nE.tions.
s.
(
Of't1ce or the Coordinator or Intor81.t1on - All . tters pertaining
to IAtin "-r1ca which are related to 8MJa1' subjecu
and activities in &rope.
6.
Treasul"1' Department - Information regarding the movements of
qusst1onabl. or em~ rums and the individuals
responsible tJleretor.
7.
Karit1ae CC8DI1881on - 1Iar1~ attera invol'9ing 8h1pp1Dg am
port cCDmerte.
8.
Board at EconOld.c Wartare - .-tters concerning .~tes1c _terial8
aM C(8Dler~l da ta.
In add1~ion t.o ~he di8s~t.ion of intormat.1on t.o spec1tic
gove~ntal agencies, it. was. provide. 'that. data of urgent. 8J¥i 'Yital interest
would be provided tor t.be inf0r8tJ.on o.f tt. President. &8 he desired aM
t.ba t. rurt~r, upon reques ta ot ot.Mr ,o~ntal agencies, spec1&l
in'V8st.1lat.1one am services wQ11d be coMucted and reported.
 t
(
On Jul,- 2, 1940, the Inte~par1aentAl InteU.1.g~ CoDterence was
attemed b)- the Director, At81ral ,AndfrsOD, Oe~ral Milee am Mr. Herbert
r..aton, 18s1etant Secretar" or the Treaeur,-. At this meeting, Aa1ral
ArxleraoD, General tiles aM Kr. Ga.e~ agreed to fum18h to the Bureau.. Wlal
tr~ their reep8cU...e t11ee which 81g~t be or ftlue to ~ PSI as backcrourwi
uterial for use in trAin"~ Bureau Aeent.8 tor foreign 88sigmente. It was
&Im~ced at this conference bT the Director that Aes18t.nt Director P. E.
'~rth of the FBI had been designated in charge of the Bureau 's SpeciAl
Intew.g8nce Senice. (66-860)-)0) .
48

DELIKITATICIf AG~~T
 D.
General Miles of KID expres8ed early concern with regard to
the juri8dictional .cope to be exercised b7 the Bureau' s SIS Program.
By let~er da~ed July 23. 19tD. addtessed to the Direc~cr. he suggested
tha~ the Bureau's SIS Program be 4efinite17 limi~ed in scope to ~he
matter of 8ubver8ive ao~ivities. p-.rticululy those that might be
ho8tile ~o the UDi~ed St&~e8. being carried an in foreign countries.
by organ1I&~1on8 having direct lea4s into the united states. It W&S
further his opinion 'that 'the purp08e of 'the S18 was primarily to supple-
_nt b7 1mderconr information the dat& which our 8.Ccredited official
agents in foreign countries could obtain.
~ July 26. 1940. Genera). )(iles' me~randum on limiting the scope
of the SIS was di8cus8ed and the q~stion as to its operations placed
before the conference. A't this 't~ General )(ilea rei'tera'ted an opinion of
limi'ting the scope of S18 in oontrast to Admiral Anderson who fel't that
res'trictions should not be placed upon the interpreta'tion of the Presi-
dent's Direc'tive but 'taat the service should be as liberal as possible 80
'th&t its operators should report ewry-th1ng brought 'to their atten'tion.
The conclu.ion of 'the conference group was that the SIS should not be re-
stricted in the scope of its operations but that in addition to obtaining
social. financial. economic and political information. emphaai. should be
placed on obtaining information concern1~ sUbversive activities detri-
~tal to the interests of the United states. At this time Mr. Hoover
pointed out tha't he was willing at any 'time to w.i ve direction of the
operations of the SIS it the War 8bd Navy Departments desired to take it
over and operate it. (66-8603-43).
(
Botwi thstandtng the conclusion of the Con£erence Group. General
Miles under date of October 12. 1940 again reiterated his feelings by
letter to the Director as to the scope of the SIS and wished to make clear
hi. point that it was his conception that the scope should be along sub-
~r8i?e lines of activity or anti-Amerioan hostility as an underlying
'trend which the official repre8en'tative8 of the state. War and la-vy Depart-
ments are not in a po8ition to ge~. (64-5002-39).
In order to definitely and oonolusively define the field. under-
date or fBbruary S. 1941 an agreement as to the scope or ope"rations or the
Military Intelligence Division. the Office of Naval Intelligence and
the Federal Bureau or InV8stigatiOD in foreign 8nd domeltic intelligence
was set up. rh1s agree_Dot signed by Brigadier General Sherman llilea for
the War Depar'tll8nt. Captain Alan G. Kirk. Director of (Ill. and the D1rec-
tor noted that wIll.. the Federal Bureau of InV8ltigation i8 engaged in
the 801iciting and obtaining or data relative to econoDdc. political. in-
dustrial. financial and subnrsive conditions in the Latin A.mericu.
Thele operations are carried on through Special Agents assigned to these
countries. 8pecial .-ployee8 and informants engaged to operate in the
Latin Americas. In addition. the FBI, particularly in tJ1e New York area
was engaged in contacting repre8entatives of American bu8iness tirms havint
intere8ts or personnel in the Latin '-ericas tor the purpose ot developing
source8. channell and flow ot information through the representatives of
the8e companies 8tationed in the Latin Aaerioaa.8 (66-8603-88X)

For the purpo8e o~ 8upplementing thi8 program, under date
of February 7, 1941, the Director 8ubmitted a memorandum a8 to the
inTesti~atiT8 jurisdiction 8Dd re8pon8ibdlity of the FBI in the BIS
field for the Attorney General' s U8e in preparing a memorandum for
appro..l by the Pre81dent. (6B-86OS-9l) This memorandum declared.
-Western Hemisphere 7Oreign Intelligence
I.
The Fede~al Bureau ot IDTe8tigation shall be exclu8i vely
re8~on8ible tor the oolleoting of information and data
dealin~ 1Ii th economic,. indu8trial, financial, political
and subver8ive activities in all oountries or the We8tern
Hemisphere excepting the Republic of Panama and the PaD8m8
Canal Zone.
The Federal Bureau or InTeatigation shall haTe exclU8iTe
jurisdiction for the maintenance of representati Tea in the
Iatin Allerioan Republics, other than the Re~blio or PaD&D8.
The Federal ~reau ot InTesti[atiou will have exclusive
jurisdiction and sole responsibility tor the establishaent
and maintenance of oontacts ~th American firms having intere8ts,
ta011i tie. or per8onnel in the Latin ~rican Re~bli08. other
than the P~public or Panama tor the ~08e of collecting
data pertaininZ to economic, indu8trial. financial, political
and subversive activities.
It shall be the responaibility of the Federal Bureau of In-
ve8tigation ~o fUrni8h to the ~10U8 branches of the Federal
Government suQh information as is obtained and i8 of interest
to them. The War and Navy Department8 and other governmental
department8 will oall upon the Director or the Federal Bureau
of InT8atigation for 8peoific information in the categories
en~rated from ti- to ti- al they -y haTe need for Iuch
intor-.tion.
II.
The prOTillona of Part I are no~ ~o be oon,trued or interpre~ed
al superseding, curtailing or li8dting the e,tablilhed function,
of the I41U tary or Naval J.~~aohe8 in any oouzitry in 'Ylhich they
are or ..y be a,signed nor will tbi. olsule place any restric~i~
upon the aeou"ti ve branches or the Federal (JovemJDent in sending
missions to such countr1el as may from time to time be necessary..
( 66-86-03-91)
.
On ~roh 3, 1941, the then Seoretary or ~ar, Henry Stimson, addressed
to the Attorney General a 8emorandum su£gestiDg that re8ponaibility with
regard to foreign intelligence work wi thin the Western Hemi8phere be placed
upm.. the FBI without delild.ting the operations of lB.1itary and laval
Intelligence in their specialized tiel~. of operations. this 8et forth
50

~T -,
.further tbe plan tor a per8aMnt.l7 U8~ c~ttee CO1818t.1Dg
of . field repre88ntat1ft of tl1e PBI, KID md on to operate &8 a
pool of 1ntor-.t1on relatiDg to contacts, conrage and data to
be ob tained . ( 66-8603-97) .
E.
JURI8DIC'fIOIAL mmCULTIES
Umer date of both Karch 12 and March 15, 1941, Mr. Booftr
intoraed the A ttOl"D87 General b7 _orandua that both 1IID
and 00 ware endeaTDring to invade the SIS field aoo obtain juria!1ct1on
O'Y8r ~ matters Which ahould be bamIled b,. the B\1reau. (66-860.3-97,102)
In new of the Director 's op1m.on that to avoid duplication or
effort 1D such a 8erY1~ m2e unit .~ bave the sole respoD81bU1v. it
was his belief that there should be a reCODlDendation that SIS be r_oftd
fr~ the PBI am that work be trana.terred to 81 tJ1er Km or ON! aM on
March 25, 1941, t~ Direct=- adT18ed 'tile conference that he would ute
this recC8l.elKiat1on to the A'ttorney ae..ral am that the SIS be di8-
contilDJed b,- the FBI and taken over b7 the ir81' and HaT7. ~ral l(11e8
stated that be felt that such a step at tb1a t1ae would be umt18e since
the !rDf1' and lavy have no trained personnel to take o~ tlle work am
that t.1M 18 of the areatest i8p0rtanc,. (66-860.3-11.6)
In th1s connection it 18 noted tbat in 'tJ18 week:l.1' conference
of Auguat 6, 1941. captain I1rk stated bt he was t.bor~~ and
unalterably opposed to ~ propositiom that the Ha'yY take over CC8pleteq
am exclusively the COftJ'1Dg of iDt..mgence operations even in KeXi.co.
(64-.1.101.-)0)
(
~ted .7 lS, 1941., a .1oint .eaorandua was prepared b7 the
Federal ~reau of Inw8tigation, tile Iilitarr Intelligence Divilion of
the 'War Depar_nt am the Ot.f1~ or Janl Intelligence outlining the
extenai 'VeI888 of the coordinated prOgJ"am of tl.ee agencies. Included in
this aem,oralKiaa, it was stated concern1nl the SIS that 8tl18 Federal.
Bureau of Inve8tigat10n _in'taiM underconr agents, inforaanta, et
cetera 1n all ~e Latin .-.r1can cQ1ntr1ea. An extens1ft program of
~ter-1ntel11gen~ ut1.11sine the ..m~1 of .a.rlcan busine8s t1.ru
opera ting 1D tlle Ia tin _r1caa 18 in opera tion 1'or the plrpoee ot _in-
ta1ning a Cm8tant 8'b1fi1' ot the Axis operations, propaganda, et cetera,
1n theae owntr1es. apec1al .A&enta are also operating in umerCOYer
capacitiea abroad.- (66-8603-190)
(
On ](ay 20.. 1941.. Mr. Berle of the State x.partaent, as a
begirmjn~ .~nt to 11~ SIS &gents 8~ officiAl eta'Q18, Bet tortA
three categories or 81wationa in wbiJch representati'ges of b SIS D1'riaion
would operate in the I.t1D Aaer1~ l8p1bl1ce. (64-5002-114) Br18fi'1'tbese three 8ia.tioDB were outl1D8d to be. .
1.
A 8i~tion in which an A.-:rican Republic t88 uked tor
tJ}. 8erv1088 of an Aaer1can expert to be _1nta~ 1n
51

~ET~
connection wit.b tl1e Un1t.ed States 81.881.m1 in t.bat
count.ry witJ1~t concealaent.
.A. ai~tion in which the United Statea Dipl~tic mlsion baa
asked tor tM 8erYi~8 or such aD' .~rt tor i t8
own assistance.'
2.
(
3.
A 81tuaUOD in which it 18 de.-ed desirable to bave t.M
expert to 10 directly to the COImtr,. 1DTOlved but without
reepoD81bil1tT to the D1plC8&tic a18sioD or &rI1' respons1bi11t,.
bT 88M.
~ June 4, 19it.1 the ~ In't.e.-departaental InteU:1.gence
Conference -mers in the interest of add! tional conrage disouS8ed
a proposal for the J'BI to haft a rmaber ot its agent. spec1tioall7
attached 'to i'l8ba881es in SOIlth Aaerican OQ1Dtr18s with d1pl~ticstatus to perform the functions of. c~ting IBI intelligence bl
acti'91ties in tboa8 countries. (66-8603-~) .
I
(S)
bl
. 1!-D1rector Hoover' 8 Op~on .aD ~-'i~D - .,l the conference wnereupon -
~ ~. &.11. T- stated that Mr. Booftr's opinion was that if ColoMl
Donovan was taking over SIS in the Eastern Hei8phere he sh~ a180
take onr SIB work in t.. 'Western B.upbere. (66..s60)-~S8) .
Tb18 8ituation (66-4104-31,32; 66-860~61) was d1scuaaed
with Mr. Berle, QeD8ral Mile. aJ¥i Captain Kirk, all of. whaa .ere ot the
88118 opinion am telt that the 8i'tA1at1011 8bould be clarified. However
relative to the We.tern Hem18p_re, Mr. Serle 8tated tJJat he was OPpOBed
to the tranaterence ot SIS COftrage ...,. fr~ the Bureau.
 bl
Mr. Berle advised that as rar as-
present 8ituation w1tb the FBI band1.ing the Western BaDuphere bad been
working Y8I'7 aa t18tactcrUy . In add1 tion GeMral Miles am Captain lirk
adVised tbat thq ~ .roUOW'Mr. Hoover's recOmMI¥iati.0D8 and that. the,-
were 8&t.is.ried with the Fe8ent 8ituation ot canrage by the FBI.
(68-603-26lI.j 64-1.101.-.:36)
'- On Deo8>er 22, 1941 the Attomey Ge~ral tonarded to t,~
Director a propo8ed DirecU".. tor tile President's 8i&Dature to tJ1e bead,
52

~S)t'~
"
of the goverzaeDt.al departaents am.ag81C1es CODCerMd in order to
bave eatabl18hed. detiD1 te autbor1ty to CQ1'b fumre lD8taIJCes of this
t)"pe as foU~.1
(
.In accordance with pre'V1OU8 iDS ~ctiOD8 the Federal
Bureau ot Invest.1gat1on bas set up a Special InteU1ge~
Service covering tl1e .stern ~phere with agenta in
llexico, Central .Aaerica, ~outh AMrica, ~ caribbean,
AI» t'~da. ~ose contact aM liaison ba'9'e been es-
tablished wi tl1 co1T8spolxliDl intelligence officials ot
tbe.e CouDtr188.8
-In order t.o ba'ft all ~e8pon8ib1U t.y tor t.h18 t.,.pe ot
1ntOr8t1on in b Federal Bureau of Inwst1gation in
this tield, I bereb,. approve thi8 arr8Di88nt. and re-
quest t.he beads ot alllO'Ye~~ depar18eDt.8 am
ageDO1ee OODcerD8d w1~ it. to clear direct.l7 w1~h t.be
Federal Bureau of IaY8st1.gation in CODD8c~on wit.h &r11'
sucb 1Dt.e11igenoe work conteaplated w1t4in t.be 8phere
im1cat.ed.8 (66-8603-299)
The Director, after reviewing tis p~osal suggested that the
following addition be aade to the mr8iCt1ft, 8The Director or tM
Fdderal Bureau of Investigation 18 autbor1Hd and 1n8~cted to
conn~ _et.iDgs of the .ch1e!s of the various correspOlKiiDg intelligence
8er9'1ces opera t1ng in the Western Be_phere and to _1main liaison
witb all intel11gence agenb1es operatiDg in 't!8 Western Hs18phere8.
(64-5002-118) The Director bel1eftd. 'bbat b7 tI11s addition interlopers
who 8igbt. de811'8 'to euperDpoae an ~~8S&r1' 8~cture upon existing
relationeh1p8 in intelligence work woUld thereb7 be completeq es'topped.
(
(
!(S
~6~ ~
1'bi8 -.ora~~ ... signed ~7 the President on Deoe8>er 23,
1941 and.. closely tollond by a 8ubsequent ..orandum trom tbe
President dated ~~8»er 30, 1941 in which latter, the President bl
bel1ewd that tbe 88D1Oranm1_BI of ~~ber 23 interfered with work
already being coldlcted bJ' o~ agencies and.k:~ :~the ( S ) .
.l.ttomq G\;4)8raJ., the UIKier.ecretary of' State t.a:D
and om 8t.1-aighten out tl18 program by conference an n a e
b1a &8 to wbatev.. ... M0888&ry b7 -7 ot aD _oded Directift. (66-660.3-328)
The Director's 'riewpoint as to this 8iUJat.1.on was as before
tbat be felt tbat operations in CenQ-al am South .&8erioa sbaUd b. the
.~_.:." - -- - --- . 16, 19/.2 set. up in tinal tO1'8 ti scope ,I
ot work and the responeib1l1t7 tor 1Dtel11geDCe Work in tt. Western ,
Hell18phere in the Federal Bureau or Iavest1gat.1on &8 rec~el¥ied b7 the "
D1rect.or. (66-5002-127) ~.- ~

It _s poiDt.ed wt at the Jamar,' a, 1942, Int.erd8para~
Intelligence Conference when General JaymoM E. Ise brough-E up tbe
question as to wba t add1. t1oDal steps wre to be toUOW8d bJ' the ftI in
relation to SIS work 1Uxier this new D1rectift that t.be tollowing tift
18I1ediate steps were to be t.akm.
(
To call an Interdepartmental InteU1gen~ Conference beween
t.be C~D8di.n, British and ~ricaD8.
1.
To tollow ~s Conterence with 8IX)br tor tbe M8Xican,
Central and Latin aerican ofticials.
2.
To increase tl1e Spec1al .Agent coverage to 2S0 agents.
 3.
To increase the maber of' radio traJ-.itting 8tatioas in
South "-rica.
4.
The addJ.t1on o.t inspectors and couriers to .tac1l1tate t-
tr~amUsion of iDtorEtion.
s.
It as &180 pointed out by Mr. K. A. ~ at tb18 888ting ~t a
mJ8:>8r or agent. were pre..Dt.l7 iD8tructing police schools iD CeDQ-al
am SOUth --rica aIKi that this pol1ar as intended to be CODtimled.
am expaMed. {66-e60.3-344)
At the Januarr 28, 1942, ~t1.ng a .feeler. plan was again
brought up by General JIiles &8 to ttIe que8tion of' Caribbean defense
~YMi in coordination with ~ UI8rcOYer B1'8te11 of SIS .tor Central
~ South Aaerica to tie in 'With tlJe ArII1 headquarter8 in P&D8& UIK1er
the 1m.ed1ate jur18d1ction of' General .1I¥1ren. )ho. Hoover expressed his
feelings to the effect tbat JaD was presently recei"YiDg .1'8!'l'~~ in the
line of le~ral intelligence fr~ the ecoDC81c, political, .tiD8Dcial and
8ubvern ft field .tandpoint uJKier ~ present 878te11; and to put the
Bureau to obtaining cC8bat intelligence and 1nf.or8&t1on w¥l8r o..ral
AIKir8W8 ~ be an invasion of a 81Utary or naval problea. .. a result
o.t 'this, it was hi. desire tat the di'Y18ion or jur18diction 'With the
P~:!!A~ Caoal 1.om be kept separate am a. a COD8equence, Kr. Hoowr did
not feel that the SIS c~ utAbl18h thi8. (66-8603-342)
BO88ftr, in order to OOftr tbia point., wxier date ot 'ebrD.a17 25,
1942 . new agreement was signed by the KID, ON! and !BI tor the coord1-
nat~ of SIS operat.1ona in t.be Jestem lBnispbere wit.h part.1cular
ret.erenDe to t.be CaDal Zone probl- by 1ntere~. 'lb18 auW86nt. (64-.5002-
131) _nq reiterated t.he prev1.oua D1reotives bJ' endeavoring to 8et wt.
the parUcular tact. tlIat close .~rat.1.on ..ong the beadquart8r8 or t.b8
t.hree asenc1e8 in all fields ... a ~t.ualq reoOlDiSed D8~88ity. It
furtber deriDed tbe relpom1biU t..,- tor t.he gb+.ai D8D08 ot infora'ti.on or
particular interest to Il1l1 tary and laval &gencie8 in tiae8 of 8U0e88
wbsre the inforution as of' a Da'Q1r8 cl08el1 allied w1tl1 cC8bat 1Dtelli-
pnce.
54

(5)
 ~1
-(64-'+l04~167) ~ Bur~~ ~~:8.~~-~~~-gV~s.-TIne ";I.I1W~"-- .,. -- -~. _rage rr~ t.he orri~ or Naval Intelligence
should t.bat Office so desire, or &8 an alternative, to completely abstain
from co'98rage in Mexico provided t.hat. tb8 Office of Naval Intelligence
wou.ld talc:~ ent.ire responsibili't1 for that area. This was generall7 pro-
tesW b7 ONI aDd the sit.uat.ion was final~ allowed t.o remain in the
stat.us that. existed pre'ri.OI1s~. (64,.If+l04-l97,204)
(
bl
(5)
bl
f64-4l04-233,25) In- response to th~ pro~st ~~~. ~ver .
as to t.h8 mbil1t,. of' tlle Bureau to operate under tJ1is 8Y'8tem, )ir.
E. A. Tamm took the matter up with Ir. Fletcher Warren or the State
Department aM Mr. Berle in -which tb1s pol1CY' was 1nrormBllT modified to
exclude tl1e Bureau's activities in SIS.
~~,
(S)
(
Once again, in order to cover a prosp8ct.i.ve jur1sdict.ionalconf'lict on who was to have the r8sponsibUit,. for handling atters such
as these, the InterdepartlMntal Intelligence Conference CaDmittee requested
a report from a subcanm1ttee appointed to draft an agreement relative
to the SIS program. The purpose was to further strengthen the cooperation
between the various intelligence agencies b% the issuance of' a joint
. mrA~ti.ve under the d,limitat.i.on agreeIMnt.
. _:b2-co'rtl:/""4~aL , S )
 l
(5)

'st~
tor Special IDteU1&en~ operatioqa 1.11 tbe ~8tern I8ID.18pbere
in aacordan~ with the Pr..1canto18liMtNction ot JaDe 24,
1940, alP J8IIUa17 16, 1942, and ~n0U8 1D8wctiOD referred.
to therein, aM in bamolV' wi tb t~ 'Acr--nt tor Coordil8 t1OD
ot tile Federal Bureau or ID'988tigatiOD, Ottice ot .'Val Intelli-
gence and the K11itary IntelUceDOe D1'918i~.' do hereby acree
tb& t this agr~t euppl8eDta aU pr8'V1~8 del181tat.1on
agr.-ent. CODCern1Dg intelligence operatoiooa ~t81de of the
UDited States, agree upon the U8~nt ot r88p0D81b1lit7, ..
giY8n in paragra}i18 n, III, IV. tor iDtell1ce~8 co'W8rage in
I8.xj,co, Central "-rica, (wi tb the ucepUOD or the ReP\ibli0
or PaD8I.). South .'-rica, the r&rribb-.n, am C~D8da. lelp«!-
81bllity &S81gD8d to one org8ni.r.at.1.on in & giftD tield earn-8
wi tb it the obligation t.o pro'Y1d8 b1' tbe aost expedi t.ioua .am
pos8ible cousistent with requisite Hcar1ty to ~e other 8Ub-
eczo1billl aaeDO18. an pert1D8Dt 1Df01'88.t.1on r.ce1't8d 1n that
field, but it does not 1aPl7 tbat the responsible &£eDCY alom
18 intere8ted in, or that it oDl1' w1U work in, tbat field.
Cloa8 ooopera t1oD ..oog the headQ-.&rter. of the tbr8e acenc188
in all tieJ.d8 18 a ..t~ recoglJ1sed Mce881 V .
(
l
It will &180 be MceSaarr that c1oee cooperation am
coordil8tion a:1et be-aen the repreHnt.tifts ot each ot tbe three
agencies assigned at each "-r1oan 8ba8ay or lega tion in ~tin
_rica. SItch oooperat1~ 8hoald 1~l~de direct contimlwe l1a18on
be~n b legal, 8111t&rJ', and -'981 attacb8s tor a tree excbange
ot ~ell1cen~ am otMr 1Dto1W&t1on ot -tual1Dtereat. ID n-
ot the tact that theee operat1om en'V'1eage intelligence activities
ot an 1n'988tila't1.w mtare 1D 8Owre1gn toreip o~1ee, it 1.
agreed tba t the three 1Dt8re.ted ,,11O18e will MiDtain JR"oper
coord1Dat1on with the A88r1can ~&8aador or M1JI1ster iDTolved,
to the eM that aU Aaer1can iDtem.l1eence aotivit18. ard the
.A8r1can wr procr- in &IV' par't1.cul&r ~tr,. rill ~t be ..barr&8eed.
or jeopardir.ed b7 1IDooord1Dated action. In order tor such proper
oa«d1Dat1oD to a:18t, it 18 -~e8U7 t.b&t ~e lel&1 attad1e be
awn.ad ot tM identity and acti'V1 ties or all FBI uDdercover
operativee 1D each part.1~ COUDtr)" iD'VOl'nd; turt.ber, tbat all
of the 1Dgeet1ga't1ft activity aM intOl'88.tion d8qloped bJ' the IBI
ulXlerOO9'er operaUfte be tho~1y comod1Dated through the legal
attache. It ie Ukewiee .ce.sary that the identitie. aIxi
operations ot &lf1 uMerCOftr opefttiY88 or tl1e A8rioan IDtew.gence
C_M be kDOWD at all 'tiae. to the 8il1t.8r)" attache in the particular
country in'V'Olftd, aDi 'that all act1T1t1.a aM 1Dtorut1on ...eloped
b7 such uD:l8rCOftr operatift8 be coordinated through tlw 81li'tu7
attache in each c0aDtJ7 1D'V'O1~. the abow pron..i~ wUl apPl7
in ~ct UDMr with r.,ard to tM Dam ataa in each c~
1D'YOlftc1. It 1. agreed tbat -1~r the lesal, a1l1tAry nor _.-1
attache will b. oaU.d upon to dtwlge the 1d8Dtit,- ot &IV' uIKlercovwr
operat1ft to &U7 1IMi1T1nua1 or otfic1al except in ca.. or aoet vpDt
8U1tar)" ~r d1plC88tic m~..1v. It 18 &&reed that &IV"
(
56

,s~t<iiT
-
ques'toion relative to arl1' umercoftr operati'" or 8U8p8cted
ulKierco'Ver operative should be iJlEedlateq d1scus8ed wi tJ1
the appropria te a ttacbe of the particuJ.ar agency 1DVolftd
prior to 8rJy' other action. In the event p;'oper adjustment
cannot be etfect.ed by other ManS, &IV' question concerning
an umercover opera't1ve or suspect in the latter connection
shwld be adjusted between the bead~ters of tlJe three
agencies involved.
811.
 MD> will be responsible tor I
1.
.1 oontima t1on or ttw work 1101'8&117 o.l tl1Ded
tor aI¥i executed b7 8111tary at aches.
2.
The collection of' 81litar,- 1nt~t1on needed by
the 8111 tar, tOl"ces. To ~s eoo, authority to
..1ntain such personnel &S the War Department
deems MC88Sary tor the perttOrllSnce of such
duties is recOEQised.
3.
All _tters ot an inten1i8D~ na'blre, including
espionage, sabotage, and nbversin activities, in-
'W'Olving United States .Army persomel.
4.
Procure.ent of intor.ation concerning espionage,
sabotage, or other subver8j)ve act1v1ti8s, on or within
United Stat.e8 81l1.tary areas and/or UlOS8 other areas
controlled, directed, operated or of interest t,o the
United State8 Jl11itary 88t.ablli188nt.
t
s.
FUrnisb1ng such cooperation and assi stance to
either ot the other ~ agencies as might be practical
a1Xi feasible uJ¥ier the circumstances, upon specific
request trCD the part1.~ agenC1' involftd. This
specific request wouJ.d include a specific request
tr~ the appropriate attacbe of the part1~lar agenC1'
irrrol Yed.
-In.
 ON! Will be %'8epoD81ble tor I
1.
A contilmA tion of the work nol81q ~tl1md tor
and executed by Naval Attaches.
2.
The collection of lI1fOrut10D needed by the 18ftl
torces. To this end, authf>r1ty to 8&inta1n euch
per8onnel &8 the .~ Depatt8ent deeas D8~8&r'J'
tor the pertOrMnC8 ot 8uch duties 18 recognised.
3.
All utters of an in'tellig,nce Dature, including
8Sp1O18ge, 8abOtage, am eub'Y8I'si'Y8 acti'Yit1ee,
involTing United States Kavy personnel.
. Sf¥,
57

PrOcure8nt of intormat1on concerning eep1.onage,sabotage, or other eubvere1.ve activities, on or
within United States naval b$Bes aM/or 'UlOSe
other plAces of naval interest to the nt'-tional
effort.
4.
(
 Furnishing such cooperation end assistance to
either ot the other two agencies &8 II1ght be
practical and feasible urMier Ute c1r~t.ances,
upon specific request frC8 the appropriate attache
of the par'U.~ agency invOlved.
5.
PBI will be responsible .tor:
8IV.
1.
The obtaining or the Western Hemisphere, including
)lexico, Central AMrica (w111h tbe except.1.on or the
Republic or Panama), South .-.erica, 'Ule Caribbean, and
Canada, of ecODaalic, poU't1~, 1nCU8trial, financial
aM subversi-ve information, also 1DtOrJl8.t1.on con-
~rniDg aov_ent8, organisa t1ons , and iMi viduals
whose activities are prejudtcial 'to the intereste of
the United states, by reason of espionage, sabotage,
or otherwise.
'!be Federal Bureau ot Inveef,1ption will be respon-
8ible tor the furnishing to the Uil1tar'1' and Naval
services ot all pertinent information obtained.
2.
bI
3.
Conducting surveys in the I:Ie.ture of plant 8Ur'ge18 with
respect. to plants am other f'ac1l1t1es '91.ta.l. to the
production, Mm11'acture, a~ transportation of'
strategic materials f'or use in bebalt of the United
Ba tions' war erfort. The 1Iatter will include the
matter o.t .furn18bing techniical ad'ri8ers am inStructors
to the local g0'V'8r18ents, 1!¥iustr1es, and. of'tic1al8,
with regard to plant 8UrVeJ8 and plant protection
_tters.
: )
(SI
58

-SESR~J:
(
8m1 t.ions or ar, aM other supplies eusC8ptible to 81il tar"
use j unusual ass_biles am actions or 1M1 'V'1duals, organiza-
tions or ~1"" ties; daODS go. tions of' umue f'rieMl1ne8s
or hostility; uMue interest in iDiividual8, orpni.atioM,
or cC8Dllm ties; or other inforut1on 1Mioating preparations
.tor or carrying on of' open or eurrept4.tious aU1tary operations.
3. In periods of predC81D8nt a1J,1tary interest, tbe
Assi8tant Chief of Staff in charge or tilitar" Intelligence
(Director or Naval Intelligen~) win ad'Y1se the Director of
Xaval Intelligence (Aas1stant Chief at St.a.rf in charie of
nu t.ar)T Intelligence) and the D1reo~ of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation of the DatA1re of intorution desired rr~
those two services and sball advise the two Daaed ~rectors
of any coverage desired beyond the n~rmal coverage of th088
agencies. The j}!rector of Bawl In~lliI8nce (A8s18tant
Chief of start in charge ot M1l1tary Intelligence) am tbe
Federal Bureau ot Investigc..tion will undertake to perfora
the add1 tiona1 tasks requested in 80 tar as it is practical
and possible wi U1in the l1a1tatioDS of the facUities anilable.
They will advise the Assistant Chief ot ~'t.a.ff in charS. of
K1Utary InT.ell1ge~ {Director or HaTal Iutellic8nce} of the
addi tional &8s18tance, it &rJ7, which they will be able to
renoer, am it will then be the responaibUit.,. of K1litary
Intel1ige~ (Oftice of )laval Intel1:j.gence) to take ~
MC8SS&ry 8teps umer its own direction to satisfy its ~
req,uir88nts .
(
~
(
(S1ln8d) Gen. Strong
Kajor Ge~ral George V. strong,
A8SU tant Chief of Staff,
G-2, War x.par~nt
(Signed) H. C. Train
Rear Adm1r&1 H. C. ~a1n,
Director, O.ffic8 o.f Naval InteUigence
(Signed)
 J. Edgar HoOTer
bi
«
Ik)n. J. idgar Hoover, s a tion"I n& -- h~_..a 1 ~1"'AA11 of" Invss t12:a tion"-
S)
c
- 81. The uMera1&Ded, in ONer 'to reauce T.O "Wr:1.{o:LDg w£a ~-~~ -
59

~
pr1nci~e8 - -; the operat.1on ot a De-Qrork to locate
clandestine radio stations in La~D Jaerican countries,
agree upon the asS1gmDeDt of respoD81bil.it" as described in
paragraphs 2 and .3 be1~:
«
 1!ID wiU be respoD8ible tor.
 2.
a. 'ibe 88 tablis188Dt or a ~twork to 1oca te clandes ~
radio stations in various Latin AMncan countries by 181¥iiD1
d1rection-.tindj.ng and c~unication ~iJDent to the suveral
cwnt.r1es cCilcermd, by turnishing technical assistance and b7
coardiD&tiDe the stations inwlved.
b. Dissell1Dll.ting the information obtaimd to representa-
tives of mI, OUI and 'the appropriat.e agency of 'the local
coun tor,. .
3. lBI w1.ll be respOl81ble tori
a. Taking tbe action COnaic8re<1 aost ad'Yisable, &tter
confe1T1ng with representatives of JoIID, either by el18inating
or operating the cladestim stations that have been located.
b. l:eepiDi representatives of' laD supplied with all in-
tormation that establishes or tends to 8st&bl1sb the existence
and/or location ot any clandestioo station, aM which has been
received b7 FBI tbrwgh other 8e8ns t.ban those described in
paragraph 2&.
c. The tran8m1ssion of such material by an operated
claooestine station a.s is requested. b7 nD.
(Biped)
 Gen. Strq
Major General George V. Stro~,
Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, fiar Depart.lent.
(Signed)
 H. C. l'rain
.~ Adait'al H. C. Train,
Director, Office of Haftl Intelligence.
(Siped) J. Edgar HoOTer
Hon. J. Qigar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of In'988t.igation.8
s~so

~VELO~NTS AND CHAlI~S
The agreement of' ~cember 1, 1942, &8 to the operat1.on ot' the net-
work to locate clandestine radio stations in Iatin _rica and the action to
be taken upon the 1ntoration der1V8d. the~rO8 was cancelled by an agre_ent
of February 6, 1943. (64-5002-145) However, the need tor a juriBdictioual
agreement as to this utter was oontilDled by a new agreement sia1larq dated
which stated:
(
(
KID will be resJ)onsible forI
 -2.
The eatablislBent of a oetmrk to locate clandestine radio
.stations in various Latin AJlFr1~ ~es including tJ1e
West InC11es by lending direction-finding and communication
equiJB8nt to the several countries cmcerned, by furnishing
technical assistance am by coordinating the stations involved.
D1sseaiD&ting the inforaation obtained to representatives of
FBI, ON! and the appropr1a te agenq- o.r the local cOImtry.
FBI will be responsible f:or I
 3.
Taking the action cDn81d.ered most adTisable, after oonwrrence
by representatives or laD and om, either by eliminating,
operating or leaving UIDOle8lted the clandestiM eta tions tba't
have been located.
 (
Keeping representatives of MID and OHI supplied with all
information tba't establishes or 'tends to establish the
existence and/or location ot any claMestine station, am
which baa been received by PBI through other .ana than
those described in paragraph 2&.
The transmission of such .a~r1al bT "an operated clamestine
station as is requested b7 :1m> or OBI.
(aigned)
 Kajar General George V. St.rong
Assistant Chief of Staff
G-2, War Department
(.~) Rear Admiral H. C. 'rrain
Director ot Ha'Val Intel11ge~
 (
(81gDed) Ron. J. I:;(igar Hoaver
D1rector, "'de~ Bureau of' IDftstigaUm
SECRET
61

-SEtR~~
Considerable contu.ion existed among the representatives of the
intelligence agencies and the jaba88ador8 in the Latin ~ric8n field &8
to the DelimitatiaD Agre888nt with ref-rence to special intelligenoe
cperatioD8 in the Western Hemisphere. .. a consequence. the Depart..Dt
of S~ate (64-&10&-460) furnished a copy thereof to each kmbalsador in
the La~in ...rican republics on JUly 19. 1943. The furni8hing of 8uoh
material ""8 pursUaD't to aD agreement between Direc~or John Edgar Hoover.
General strong and Adm1ral Train on April 36. 1943. in order ~o clear
~hi8 contusion.
In the event anY' subsequent mnditioations are _de 'to 'tne
agreement transmitted herewith, I Will inform you aooordingly.-
This oommunication was 8igned by As8istant Seoretary ot State
Adolt A. Berle, Jr.
In 'View of this transmittal, the Bureau turniahed a brief of a
copy of the Delimitation Agreement to all FBI Legal Attaches. (64-4104-83)
(
On September 15, 1943, a mee~ing was he ld of the Interdepartmen~al
Intelligenoe Conference in the office of Rear Admiral H. C. Train. During
the course of thi8 ~eting, General Stron~ brought up the question of the
Delimitation AgreeM11t and stated 'that he ~d.r.d whether it might not
be advi8able to 8uppl..nt this agree.nt by 8088 in.truo~ion. .uch as,
-This agr...nt is to be a general gu1~ - despite the agree8nt it i8
your job ~o get along ~ogether in the field.. Be 8tated the rea.on he
had rai8ed thi8 question was becau8e of the difficulty in Venezuela
~re i ~ was indicated the agreement ~s to be .et a8ide; that it had
been proposed in Venezuela that the Army inve8tigate only the Venezuelan
A.rmy or mili'tary -.tters, the Ba'V)" only 'the Venezuelan lra'V)" and 8h1ppinZ
matters, and the FBI all other matters.' General Strong stated that a
straight line cannot be just drawn dividing the work but that he felt
that if the PBI starts an inquiry and the investigation develops military
iDtor..tion, the FBI .hould continue the handling of the oa.e and the
same maDDer or handling oases should be engaged in by other agenoie8.
'I'hi. situation was brought about by the fact 'that the llili tary and Waval
Attao~e8 at the .american Mu8)" at Cdaca8, Venezuela, had beg1m to
initiate iDtelligenoe inquiries and tavestigatlon8 without regard to
the DeliJDi taU on ,igree_nt and a8 a consequence a prot..t _I lodged by
the Bureau in respect 'tJlereto.
Admiral Train tD re.pon.e ~o General 8~roDg' 8 .~a~emen~ .tated
'that he thought General StrODg' 8 info~l definition of the di Tiding ltD..

-
as to jurisdiction was being carriec out everywhere. Gener.l Strong
indicated that it was except in Venezuela. It was the Director' s
opinion after suCh statement that he believed ~~e .~esment was WDrkin~
marvelously and that the only trouble ~ch had arisen in connection
with it was in the one instance of Venezuela whiCh could be cured
by sendin~ out a "trouble shooter". It was agreed by the conference
thereupon that DO ohanbe would be made in t~e Delimitation Agreement
but that should instances of difficulty arise in the future a "trou~18
shooter" would be immediately aent out from Washington.
During ~he summer of 1943~ the War and Wavy Departments
formulated a plan Whereby the headquarters of their intelligence setup
would be stationed at Gua~emala City. Gua~emala. Which would be
responsible for all of the Central ~rican countries. The !ali~ary
A~~aches in ~osta Rica. San Salvador. Hioara~ and Honduras woulo. be
subordinate there~c. As for the naval situation, a similar plan of
Qentraliza~ion in Guatemala Ci ~y was proposed.
In response to this proposed reorganization, informal
inquiries were ma,de as to the possibility that the Bureau's SIB setup
'Wot'.ld be similarly reorganized. .(64-4104-491)
The Bureau recognized that this reorganization might work for
the limited inquiries comin~ under the jurisdiction of the War and Navy
Departments with respect to the Delimi tation Agre~nt but believed
that tl18 system would not work tor the Bureau' 8 SIS organization due to
the Taried problems of espionage, sabota~e and subversive activities
~ch confronted each Legal Attaohe in eaoh country, and as a c~sequ8Doe.
it was decided an September 13. 1943. that the Bureau woulcl not reorganize
its SIS system to establish such a headquarters of central i~.rormation
at Guatemala ~i ty.
hi.
bl
S)
In coDnection 1dth this agree-.ent, a problem has now art.en
Which I think you m81 wish to cover by clarifying instructions toyour people in the field. .
The Delimitation Agreement or April 30 recogn1led that the
FBI would obtain 'economic. political, industrial, tiDancial, and
subversive information'. I think the context makes it clear that this
S~-'ET
.~~. 63 '

-.as information a8 it aight relate to subver8ive aoyements. It
has, however, generall.y' be.n interpreted in the field as pItting
the Legal Attaches uDier the dut,' at reporting g8MraUy on aU
ecoDalic, polit1~, indu8trial, and financial Etters in the c~r,.
in which they- act - which reporting, of course, almost exactJ,f
dupUcate. the precise reporting t.mctions at the E8ba881'. 'Die
result bas been a wry considerable amount at umwceaBar: effort.
I -.ention b~r way of' example a report ~ansmitted to the Department
umer date at October 16, 1943, entitled 'Re I Strategic Kineral.
ot Brazil'; another t.I'an81tted. Ul¥ier date ot October 14, 1943,
entitled 'KiDing Suney, State of Boliyar, venezuela'; and a third
tranSl1tted. w¥i8r date of' Octcmer 14, 1943, entitled. 'Re}
Presidential CabiMt of Co1CBbia, .A11gu8t, 1943'. These are _re1.7
Q1rrent illu8tra~ona.
I think that 7W win rea~ realize tbat Ule 8oet emaustiw
general econaaic s1aldies of Brazil baTe already been _de both by
the staff of econca1c experts attached to the &lbassy for that plrpose,
am bY'the Of.f'ice of Eco~c -arfare. The S88 is true of the subject
Etter of the other two reports. ~ point is not that the reporta do
&fI3' damage, but that theY' add DOthing to the discussion since they are
_rel)" non-cpert repetition of c8.ta already co1l3cted by experts. Yoo
will readilY' real1r.e, al80, that a report on the new organization of' the
Colombian Cabinet by President Lopes aerely covers in gereral t'aahion
gr~ which tJ1e pol1 t1oal reporting section ot the &llbassy bad worked
up on the basis of material they had been gathering for years. Again,
DO hara is dore eave tJ18.t of considerable waste of effort.
It 18 thought that 7OU may wi8h to clarity the field 1nst.1"Uct10ns
80 that the .en report OD econalJ.ic, political, industrial, and financial
matters only when they relate to subversift or 8sp10rage activities.
There 18 an adaed reason why it might be wen to cut down on all
wmecessary effort. It 18 increU1ngq plain that operat.1ons like 'the
OM ~ ban been carrying on han been accepted b7 Oltr Aaer1can
Migtj)ore Onl7 becauae the7 are part or continental c8fen8e. A8 t.be
M08ss1V for the defense recedes, there 18 increasing pressure tor
the nt.}nrawal or these staffs. I th1nk we have to ae~ that, ~
that the tide of war no longer threa tena tJ:ae u-18pbere 88 d1rec~
88 was the cue S(Be t1me ago, the 8own program shoold be OM of
orderly reduction san in those cases where there are acti ft problems
ot eubftrs1n act.1vit7. Ir SCDe or the dupl1catiTe work 18 el1m1nated,
the reduction oan take place without interfering with necessary- 'WOrk.
To the extent that 1ntorMt1oD receiftd in the8e reports 18 u8eful
to the EI b,. -,. o.t backgrouM, 1t can probably be provided to you
wi tbout d1tf1cult'1 tbroogh the Stat. De~ent.
A IIUIber ot Foreign Serri.~ Officers to wh~ I haft talked 8xpr88S
the opinion that there i8 a definite place tor Legal or Civ11. .Attaches

-in ~ missions enn dur~ tiMs ot peace. I would like to see this
attiwde continlle, aoo believe it will; 8lxi close cooperation in de-
tining the tields of repor~Dg will, I think, be ot help.
Any :1:.D8truction which 7011 11&7 desire to issue to the Legal Attaches
c1ar1f'7i11g the _&Ding of the Deliaitation !gr..ent will assist in this
respect.-
On October 27, 194.3, this ~~l11eat1on 88 acknowledged and answered
S)
I have noted very oarerun,. Y'our CC8ments and observa tioDS with
regard to the possibilitY' that sQl1e of our Legal Attaches -'1' be
dupl1ca t1ng to s~e extent the functions more properq assigned to the
.AJ8rican EDbass1es proper or to other goverraental agencies having
representatives attached tJ1ereto.
I am sure you will recall tba t all along I bave very- defin1tel.T
and cuarly imisted that tllere be a c~rcut, specific delineation or
jurisdiction and responsibility in order that there will not be aIV' un-
~cessary duplication in 80 far as our toreign intelligence activities
are concerned. I can assure you that I am most anxious to avoid allY' un-
necessary duplicat.i.on, not only because or the tact that I basically dis-
approve any- unnecessary duplication or division of responsibilitY', wt
also because of our man,' pressing dutus and resporwibili ties in the ~I,
which, of course, mean that our need tor all available investigative and
clerical personnel is such that. we cerftainJ.,- do not have 8ItV' tiae to 8peM
performing duties that. could or 8h~d be pertormed by other goverllDental
departments or agencies.
c
I want. '1'011 t.o kn~ that. I bave ~'1', bT wa'1' of reiteration and
clar11"icat.ion, issued iMt.ruct.ions 'too aU FBI Legal At.t.aches tllat. they- are
in t.he fut.ure t.o nfrain frCD obt.a~ or report.ing in &lf3' manner what.-
soever &lf1' informat.ion or data per't.a1ning to econC81.c, polit.ical, industrial,
am financial _t.t.era, unless such informat.ion relat.e8 sp8c11"ically and
direct.ly t.o subversi" act.ivit.ies, including espionage or closeq relat.ed
ma t. ters . I sa sure 'that. 11" t.here ba8 been ~ slight.e8 t. t.endenGy' on the
part. of any- FBI Legal At.tache or ot.~r Special Agent. assigned in a foreign
countr.v to umertake &IJ1' act.ivit.y with respect to .t.ters not clear17
8l¥i specifically related to subversive activit.7 or eEpionage, t.bese
supp18entary instructions will cla~ the utter. I bave also instructed
that there be vel')" close supervision"Wi th regard to t.lds phase of ~ work
in order to insure that. in the tuture ~ Legal At.t.aches and other
personnel assigned in foreign COImt.ries will concern themselves ex-
clusively with subversive act.1v1t1es am closeq related _ttere.
65

-
-I have noted that you refer in 1aD.r letter to three reports
furnished by the mI to the State De~tment, and cC8lllent to the
effect tbE..t these reports are in the ~ure of unnece8sary duplication.
I am sure you will recall the highly ~ortant investigative work
being performed by FBI representatives ~hoot ktin America con-
cerning the smuggling of vi tal stra teg1c .. ter1als to en8llY" countries,
which work, we bave been assured both b7 officials of the State Depart-
ment and by representatives of the orttce 01' Econclldc Warfare, is most
necessary and urgent. 'Dle SImlggling of strategic materials, such as
in:.1ustrial diamoms, platilma, et ceten, to en8DlY' countries via IWUtral
shipping, is believed to be strict1-T in the nature of subversive activities,
part.1Ql1arly inasmuch as we know tran wr investigative efforts thBt this
actd.v1ty is being carried on b7 the same enany agents who are engaged in
other types of activit! in behalf of the enemy, such as espionage. In
direct connection.nth the investigation of these matters in Venezuela,
which country, as YOll will recall, produces an important quantity' ot
industrial diamonQs of high quality', as well as certain other strategic
materials bei~ sDl1ggled to the erlelnY', the Legal Attache obtained 1'rom
a confidential source the report whic-.h we transm1 tted to you on
October 14, 1943, entitled 'Minil:Jg Survey, state of Bolivar, Venezuela.'
1'1115 report, as you. will note fran my letter of October 14th, was
prepared in 1942 by a Venezuelan official for the ~inistry- of Fomento
in Ve~zuela, and it deals with many- pertinent details concerning the
production of strategic materials that we know are being smuggled to the
el18m.v from Vemzuela and elsewhere in Latin .America. The report in
question was of considerable interest ana importance to the Legal Att~;che
and to this Bureau in connection with its investigation of smuggling by
enemy agents. Copies of same were furnished by the Legal Attache to the
American Embassy in Caracas, Venezuela, and also to the Military, Naval,
and Commercial Attf.ches, as well as to the representative in Caracas of
the Office of Econanic Y.arfare. It was furnished to the FBI in 1iashington,
D. C., and, in accordance with our usual practice, was furnished to the
State fJepartment as being of possible interest and value. In the latter
connection, I have previously instructed that care be exercised to see
that all information of potential interest or wlue to the State :lA!part-
ment, obtained by" OIlr representatives, be pranptly forwarded.
You will a180 note t.bat. t.he report which yoou ment.ion 1n )"our ]et.ter,
ent.it.led 'Re: St.rategic Minerals or Brazil' and transmitted t.o t.he
Stat.e Department under dat.e of October 16, 194.'3, is very s;m11A1" tn
nature t.o t.he above described report trom Venezuela, inasmuch as it.
likewise deals with t.he product.ion, et. cetera, of strat.egic minerals
and other material in Brazil 'Which we do know to be of vital int.erest
t.o enSly agent.8 in connect.ion wi th 8mUCf',ltng acti v1 t.ies . This report
also was obtained tran a cont14ent~'\l source and is, according to our
information, quite reliable. It de1'1n1teq was ot interest and import-
ance to the Legal A.ttache aI¥i his statt in connect.ion with smuggling
activit.ie8 of e~ &gents, and i t. ~.s dist.ributed, as of possible
66

.interest, to the State De~_Dt am other agenc1es, botb at Rio de
Jam1ro, Brazil, aDi WUbiDltoD, D. C.
(
Th. otMr report .8Dt1~d in 1'W1" letter 18 'UJ8 OIM entitled.
'Be a Preei.ent1al Cab1J»t of Co1C8bia, .auguBt, 1943,' which as wax.-
81tted to 7DU bY' ~ FBI ~ Oct.0b8r 14, 1943. 'l'b18 reJ8"t l1kn18. ...
abta1nec1 fra a cont1d8nt1al BCNr~, be1.1eved to be ~plete1,. reUable,
aM .8 turnished, tirBt, to tbe '-r1~ t:Ab&8s1' in BoCota, Colab1a,
.. well &8 too the Military aIM! laftl Attaches. It w111 be DOted tra an
--18'ilW.t1~ of tbe report that it ooDta1D8 1ntm'8&t1on bel.1ewd bT *
Legal Attache to be ot OOD8id81'able 1aportan~ wi tl1 ",peat to tIi8
a~18d pla8 of Pr881dent Alf'oaao Lopes to C8rr1' ~t oertaiD reorgan-
1..tiona aDd cbaDI" with r-card to the police 878tea, &8 well .. in
other tielda. While ~ 1Dt~tion contaimd in t.. report ...
pr18&ri1,y of intereat to the Lecal .&.ttacbe am to tbe FBI in comw ct1 on"
witb t.b8 poli. 81'Q1at10n in ColC8b1a, part,icular1l7 Ule attitude aM
backlr~ ot the ~ D1rector GeMral ot Iat10D&l Police, Alt0D8o
Araujo, 1t wiUbe mted UJat it 4O8B ~.t tort.b 1ntGr8tion or an
int,e1l1ge~ _tare wi ~ reprd to to.. ba<*gr~ of c..ta1n other
Colcab1an aab1Det oft1.c1al8 .B to C--.lm "1c or pO881bU a.raan
oo~ctioD8, et cetera.
I did 'Ant to point _t to ,.~ that ~ 1nf'ora t1on conta1Jled in
each ot the three report. was ot 1Dte~8 t aDd. nlue to ~ Acent8 in
cODMct1W1 w1.~b ~1r iDve8ticatiml or aubvereiw act1nt1es aD1 cl08e~
related _ttoen. It there wu &fX7' cilpUcat1on, we .we not aware ot it,
1Da8l1cb as ~hie 1Dtoration .. DOt aft1labl. to u. .tr~ &IV' otber
goV8r1aental departaent or agenq. !be nporte were di8.g.ibu ted to the
State IMpart8ent .. ot possible 1.Dtere8t, in accordance with ~ u8Ual
pract1~. Howftr, I do real1se tull7 that 'Mre -,. be imtanoee in
~ct1on wit.h which 1M1'Y1d11al I.gal Attache. or other Special Aaente
"Y' t8ft . telKieDOf toward uMee1rable dIIpll~t.1.W1, aM, .. ~cated
above, I baft i8sued 1D8truC~10D8 which I .. 8Ure will CC8plete~
clarity the atter.
(
I baft 8180 ~ted witb real intereat T~ ~8Dt. OOD.~~ 'toM
PO8s1bll1t". ot reducing wr COYerage asJd 1n'V'88t1gat1ft actin. through-
~t tbe We8tern H818JDre, in new of abaJIied world coD11Uom. I ba...
of coar.. ~8d. 1'or the ~t Hftral .~b8 that ~ MiUt.r,- aDd
lanl nctor1ea in .A.trican aM Med1 wn-anean tbea are, .. wwU as ele.-
where, ban _teriaJ.q reduced. tM 'threat. of 8JII' ~ 1nft81.m1 upon the
_"nlAnIi of tb18 ~pb8re. !'be- clanged com1ti0D8 witJ1 recard to
t.be owr-.ll p1c'Qlre ot 'the war haw, or ~.e, in ~ op1n1~, ut..reci
mD81derabq the D&'b.uoe am potency or t.be d8Di8r tr~ an en.,. 'fift.h
~1~' in Latin "-ri... A8 I .a.1..d ~ ora1l7 todaJ', I haft alreacQ'
anticipated tM po.a1bll1v of a ..terial reduction with r88pect to tbe
IBI OOYerage tbr~t tM 188tern s.i8li1ere aDd, a. a _tter or tact,
a~ tiae &10 I taRed 1D8tnct.10DS to fob. effect t.ba t t~ wwld be DO
turtber addition, ill the ..,. of perao~l, t.o our coyvage in La't1n
A8r1.. I baTe &180 pr8'Y1OU8q .ent 1D8tructioDS to an of au.r I.egal
(
67

8Attache. throughout the He.s.8phere to lurT.., their work and 'the
local situation and condition. oaretully, in Tiew ot the ohanged
world picture, .0 that we aight determiDe juat how 81ch - oan
.ately reduce perlODDel engaged in thi, pha.e ot our operation.
at the pre.ent time. Further, in this oOlmeotion, you will be
interelted to know that we are already reducing per.ODDel a..iCDed
to this project and, .. a 8&tter ot tact, approxi..tely tifty
Special Agent. are already UDder tn-truction8 to return to the
UD! ted States in furtheranoe ot thi8 reduction and curtailm8Dt.
In line with II)" cODnraation witJ1 you today", I 8m ialUiug
add! tioaal 1n.truo~ion8 ~ th regard to a further lurTey and ltudy
or conditione a. they actually" exlat troa day to day, in order
'that we can determine upon 8Uoh turtber reduction a. ..y b.
d.-.ed lat. and practicable.
I kDow that you .ult realize how aDXiOU8 I .. to reduce the
&mDUDt ot Bureau per.annel a..i~.d ~o thi. pba.. ot our work a.
.oon .. it is pol sible to do 10. iD&8much a8 thil perloanel i,
urg.ntly needed at the pre.ent ti- with regard to our o'ther du'tie.
and re8pan8ibiliti88 in connection with the war effort. In the
lat't~r connection. I am sure tha't you realise ~he po.it1on of the
FBI. iDa88UCh a8 we are only following the delire8 of the State
Department in regard to thi. entire ~oreign iD'telligenoe project.
The FBI did Dot 1011oit in my -y thil type of a8stgl18nt. IDd
8hould it beo08 the de.ire of the State Depart.nt at any tiM
that we do 10. you -y be sure that we would be Tery glad to wi th-
draw .from this field o~ operatl~ altogether.-
As a resul~ of ~hi8 8ituatiOD, the Bureau i~dia~ely
inl~i tuted a reduction and retrenChment program of i tl per80unel in
Latin America 1Da8~Ch as the repor~ing of political, ecaaomic, financial
and 10c1al aatterl wal immediately dilcantinued. (See leotion on Growth
of CoTeraKe).
011. -.rob 17. IMa. ".i.ta.D.t Dir.otor B. I.. TaJID had a o~er8DOe
with £..1.tant Seoretary ot stat. £dolt £. !erle, Jr. oODoerning the
situation. ... Serle stated that he -'1 reoeiTi~ a Dumber of iDquirie8
trom ~10an 1mbaa8ies in Latin Amer1ca (s.-6002-l63) oonoerning the
Bureau's withdr...l ot lIS personnel aDd d1splayed wir.. from seT8ral .
Ambasladors (at Santiago, Chile and La Pa., BoliTia) oonoerDing the
-.tter and that there 8l.t be .0. 8ismder8t-'!ding lince the Stat.
Depart8nt did not des1re that the Bureau abandon its Latin "-noan
ooverage on a whole.ale .oale. £t th1s time, Mr. Berle .t~ed in
erreot that hi. letter of Ootober 25, 1943, was a 8istat:e and that h.
desired to 8w1thdra... suoh a letter anA o8Doel it on the State
n-'part8nt'l recorda.
A.alatant Direc~or tamm adTiaed hi. that the Director could DOt
aocept the wide.pread re8paD8lblll~lea conferred upon the Bureau ~ the
Dell81 tat 1 on Agre888Dt in the 8I8 field in the lllbt of the or! tlcl.. ot
the Bureau' a oper.'ti~.
S~T
S8

~
.. a re8ult or thil lituat1an, on December 27, 19~3, the
B~~te DepartmeDt revoked it. policy as expre.sed in the le~ter ~rom
~. Berle or Oc~ober 25, 1943, Whereu,on the SIB Bec~ion resumed the
re~ortin~ or social, political, ecODomio and financial 1nforma~ion. However, . luCh resuptian coverage was baled upon the reduced personnel
without implementing 8IS'1 8~arr8 in Latin America to their previou8
point. In connec~ion with this interchange or letters, 1 t il iD~erest1ng
to note 'that the 8~ate Depar't8n~ at no t1ae advised i~8 lAtin .l.merioan
Imballies or the withdrawal or the Bureau from the coverage of these
matters or or the sublequent renewal or 8UCh oOTerage.
On September 20, 1944, informal and confidential 8U&Ge8tiOD8
wre receiyed by the Bureau from Mr. Fletcher ~en, of the State
Department. that the Bur~au again oeaS8 the distribution to the State
Department of political intor..tion and that eYer)" effort be made to
show a substantial reduction in Bureau personnel assigned to the Yarious
diplomatic Dd8sions in Latin Amerioa.
UBited States Amba8sador Geor~e ues8eram1th had pointed out
Why the Bureau's SIS per8onnel ehould be immediately di8cODtinued when
Germany i~ knoCked out of the war. He summarized the salarie8 paid
to all Bureau perlonnel as co~e~ with salaries reoeiTed by officers
in the ~oreign 8ervice and 8howed ~hat the Sum8 were excessiTe as against
the resul tl obtained. He pointed out that the work ot the Bureau wa.
duplication in the simplest form with reference to po11~ioal reporting.
4 large bloc of foreign lerYioe otfioers at t he State Department and
in t he field were bent upon haTing the Bureau expelled from Latin
jmerioan and other potts immediately upon the terminatiOD ot the war
in Europe.
(
According ~o this cantid.n~ial intormation received. ~he
Bureau 'ft.1 in part uDknowingly allilting the opposition by submitting
political information and thereby unknowingly building up a record 10
that at the proper time the oppo8i tion oould launch an aTalanche ot
complaintl 8uffioient to 8way the top o~ticia18 ot the State Department
which would re8ult in a reque8t from tJ1e Whit. Bouse that the Bureau
oeaS8 all HIS operations in Latin Amerioa and countries ~o which
Le~l At~ache. are a88igned. .. a relult ot thi8 intormation. a
radiogram was 8ent ~o all Legal ~ttaohes on September 21. 1944. 1n8tructing
them to diloaDtiDUe the inve8tigation and distribu~iOD ot political
information to the State Department and a program' ot retrenchment in
Bureau personnel a88i~d in the various diploma~io RdI.ion8 in Latin
America was in.ti touted.
 c
lath reference to the di8tribution of political information.
the Bureau adTi8ed Rear Admiral R. E. Schuir88n. then Director ot
laval Intelligence. and ~jor GeDeral Clayton Eia.ell, "8i8tant Chief
of Start in charge of G-2. (~litary Intelligence DiTision) that the
Bureau was no longer inTest1cating political matters to any extent due
to the attitude of the State Depart88nt. but that the Bureau. of course.
had 8ouroe8 Which do furnish important information.
69

riley were fIlrther &~.ed tha't . BUJOe&U would hrni8h 'them 'With
political iDtormation reoe1.ed throug~ these 8ource. on a confidential
bali8 .0 that the7 could be per8ODall, &dviled regarding the
i8Portmt happaingl in Iatin Amerioa. It was exprel8ly 1mderltood
that they would not red18tribu'te th18 material or di8cu88 it .t th
the Stat. Department &8 being baled aD the Bureau' 8 data.
(
Such an arrangement. howeTer. prelented the posliblli'ty of
poll tical _tters of an important nature becoming aTailable to the .I.rIo"
and Bavy but not the State Depar't.-Dt and lublequently dilclo8'are of
failure to 8upply the 8ta'te Dep~t wi'th this iD:fo~tion with
relulting embarrassmeat tor the Bureau. Accordingly. on April 2. 1945.
iDstructiaaa were i,sued to all Legal Attaches to resume the
di8tribution and tnT88tigation of political matters on a selectiTe
basis. !hereafter we resumed furnishing political reports to the
8'ta te Depar't88nt in Washington.
(
(
s~
70

-~:§:C@~~--
LA.CK OF ~IOH
F.
!be tiles are replete with ftriQ18 8_or~ conceming tile
lack ot cooperat10n .n~d by the Bureau in it. SIS proll'-
fr<8 ftr1oue GowrzaentAl "cenc1e. am to a le.eer extent fr~
t.he.Brit1sb. 10 att8i)t will be Mde h8re1l8ft.er \0 record.
chroDOlOC1C&1q eYW£7 1D8tance ot the lack of .operation
8I1CWDtered by the Bureau in 1ta SIB work. '!'be _jori t,. of
t.he 1D8tanC8s, as appropriate 88or'8Dia win reflect, resulted
trC8 jur18d1ct10DIJ. clashes am d:18ptt_. It SD be 1eDeral11'
atated tba't the .ar., tbr~ ita wr1~ MI.lita17 A'ttacM.
am A881ltant8 thereot, contriwt.ed tbe greate.'t D18ber of
1.D8t.anoea .iDYO1YiDS lack of c~raUon. 'rb888 1D8'taDC88, bJ' aDd
large, tollowed a ratller det1Dite ~ttern. -17, the part.iCl1lar
til1t.a:f7 A'tt.ache or otber ott1oer inYolftd 1D8i8ted upon
enlaliag exteD81'Yel7 in dup11cato1"rintell1genGe work without
propel' aool'd.1z-.Uon w1t.h t.b8 I.eg~ A't'taobe am 1Dftr1abq
indicated tbat nch action bad ~ Ipec1t1C8U7 ordered
.tl'~ MID beadquarter8 in wa:ah1DCton.
(
The practice as 80 uDiftr.lit ~e ob'ri.0U.8 that tM
MilitaIT Attaches in ~t 1D8t1Dcea wre &CtDall7 carrJinc
out orders re~i ftd b7 them trC8 -.m in t.b8 UDi tad State.
although there as S08 ftI'1ance lOcalq in the interpretat1OD
or such «den. MiUtary Attac~. CeDe~ placed a "'17'
loose 1nterpreta t1on am construcUon upon the ter8 of
the ~0U8 Del1a1t&'t1on Aar88". toward the em of permitting
a »111t.ar,- Att..cbe to engage in ~t ab~t &IV' t7p8 acto1Y1't7
wi. thOIIt. regard to the Legal J. ttacile or other ottic1al8 tba t
a1ght be directoq re8p0D81ble tor sum act1dt7.
In the OftrwbelmiDg -jor1t,. or 1D8t&n~8, t- d1lt1~U.8
.!lC~.mtered were adjusted 81 tber 1!~ or in W..biDgton wi ~ t
tt. creation of _jar 1n~~~nt8 of L18agr888Dt aI¥i friction.
It 18 t.rue that .trequent.1.1' tae.. eo-called &ci"~Mt8 prO'Ved to
be aore or lei' acreeMDU tor ~Dt8' 8&ke, bc.8't8r, b7
constant. alerta.8 aD1 '91c1lance in prote8t1Dg, etc. the Bareau did
8nl.ge t,o keep the 11tuaUon aore or 188, eat1,tactoril7 \U¥ieI'
control.
c
'1bere w1ll be recorded bri~ here1D&tt.er ~ta1n of t-
.ore i8P0r~ 1D8tanoe1 of conf11ct and lack of cooperation in order
to trace ~ ge.ral pattern 8I¥i 8180; to record t.ho.. 1D8~~1
which h1atorioallr caused tM aolt d1.tt1malt'r and. are .oet ap~
recorded in a bi8tortC DarraUw Of th18 k1D1.
Iaed1ateq toUowiDg tbe ..tabl18188Dt of the Bureau'. SIB
in 1940, GeJ8ral brMn Mil.., .n "'.18taDt Ob1.et of St&tt in
cbarg. of MID, 1D81at.d upon .,t8b118biJ111D 8ew York an 1U¥ier-
~wr ofti. '" 81nta1n omtacu With _rican tiru do1DI
bU81De8. in Ll.UD .A8r1- tor tbe 8pec1t10 purpOM of obta11d.J11
trC8 the npre8ent.attw8 of nab fi1"88 1DteUig-. 1DtOZ8.t1on

{
(
o.t a CeDeJOal aatare alleged b7 ae-.ral M1le8 to be _eded b7 the
A1'm1. (66-,5424-2407) JU8roul oontermcel took place w1t.h 1'eI8rd to t.h18
..t.t.er am. 8&t.18factol'7 agre_ent. .. ..,.. ~ch8d. b
Director fialq tocIk t.1Ie pOI 1 t.1on 'tbat. be det1n1't.el7 o~ ~t. 8CI"M
wit.h t.he preai8e t.bat. MID .. proper~ act.1De wit.td.n
ita preroga'tift8 in 0BI'!'1iI1g on this t.'fpe ac't1n t.,. ba,t. ~~ob
.. OeMral MUe8 tiaa":,' aJMi ~D8b~ in8i8ted tbat MID
as properl1 acting wit.bin iu jur.t.8dict.1on, t., the mrect.or,
wvald _1'8~ ~e to Fot.e8t with 'U2e re.enat.ion that tM
Bureau did DOt. am would DOt. enr agree to t.M position takenb1' General Kile8. Probabl7 due to tb18 .d_.at 8tand on the
p81't. of t.be l)J,rectC8', 08r.ral KUeI aM KID, .. a _tt.er of
actual tact, M'Y8r p18bed t.b18 progra apprecUbq and. with.i.n a
few aontD8 tM entire plan ~ or Ie88 died a ..tural dMUl.
&1bsequentq in 1942, 1m m"8a ted a leparate branch to ba1¥U8
int.lligeDC8 _t.ten in I.t..1D AErica part1Al17 on an uJxt8r-
~ftr bui8. fb18 orcaD1u.'t1on.. kI¥Jwn .. the A88rican
Inte~8DC8 CmI_M. It or1.gi.n&u.,. beaded b7 Colonel WilU- Herd
and its beadquarterB were located in Mi81, nori4a. be effort.
were 88d8 b7 t.b18 Orlani.ut1.on to 8end umerconr r.~e.entat1'Y88
into kt.1n .-rica w1t,bOQt &lq' ooardinatton wbat8oeftr
wit.h -u. Bureau aM in 8~ i..~., it ~ deterlliDed
their ulxiercoftr people .r8 DOt ~ properq DOt.1fieti to
&rKi coordinated wi'tb MID'8 ~ Mi,l1taq At.t.acbe.. 'DIe
greatoe_t difficult,. enc~red trC8 ColoMl Herd am h1.8
orcanisat.1on, ho..Y8r, in tI. reala of objectionable
iD8t.ruCt.10D8 18aued b7 Colo..l Beltd to the ftrioua United State8
MW.t.arT At.t.acbes in x.t..1D .&..rioan CQ1Dt.r1... (64-.4101 247)
'D1e K111tarr Attaobe. were generall1' b<8baJ'ded with an 81Mn.88s
8er1e8 ot d1rect1ft8, etc. t1"ca the A8r1~ Inte1l1ge~ CC8MM
iD8tructing ~ to 8Dgage in all typu ot intelligence act.1Y1't7
without regard to the 't.1"ue prerogat1w8 at tbe x.gal Attache.
or &IQ'ODe 818e. 'fbia act.1'Y1't7 1'88ult.8d in a contiml1%li ene.
ot proteata, d18~810D8 and _gOtiati0D8 witb KID in WuhiDlt.oD
to eud1 an extent that the .A88r1- Intelligence CC8818zx! was t1Dau,.
au'bed on a reuombly .. t.18tac.,. bu18. The b8~tera i
...re dur1DC 19438OT8d. back to "bilagton, D. C. aM ~ ent.1.r.-
organisation enntu.aUl' 088884 act.1'Y1tiea .. a 8eparate entit,.at KID dur1Dg 1944.
Most of the d.1tt1.cult7 encamt.ered with KID repres.ntaUft.
geMra1l7 as a result ot Colonel Herd'. actidt1e8 or otberw1H
~nter8d in JrpntiD&. Bri!8d.t.r Ge~ral JobD w. x.age, the UD1ted.
State. M1.l1tar" Attact. in BD8M8 Air.. !r~ 19U ~1 1945 ..
-~11" UDC~t.t.W and !rank 1D dec~ hi. CC8plete d18recard
tor ta. ~11a1tat.10n .A&r.~t in 80 tar .. its pron.i,)D8 !1a1t.ing
in &IV' wq hia exteDli ft intelligence actiY1 tie.. Oe~ral r.ace bad
ted 811 1IIta-Wc8nce orc8D1aat.ton .C88wbat _teD8ift .. t.o per.01m81
aDd 1ntoz.-Dt ~'l8rqe prior t.o tbe 8dftnt of tile Bureau '. weal Att.am.
in ArgeDt1I8 dUring *1' of 1942. OeDeral UDCe proceeded t.o 1Dfts'ti&at.e
..p10D8ge ad 81bwra1ft acti'9it-. 18D8rall7 on & wbole8&18 basta
wi~t 8111' coord18t1ml w1~ 'the Bv...'. J.gal Attache. !'b18, of
courae, reaulted in -.ch conta..1an am ..,.ral dupl1cation in .0 tar ..
12 -- - . .-

(
tJ1e two org&D1sa~1oD8 were c~rn8d.. aeJ»ral z.nae'8 lack of
cooperation am d1.8recard ~or tlIe Del181't&t1on Agreeaent re8ulted
.in a Dlaber of prOte8ts, etc. to ~be Headquarter8 of MID in
WUb1Dlton, .oat or which bad little, if &lI1', effect. Boweftr,
on Febmary 8, 191.1., OeD8ralleugel,8 contimed lack of coopera~ion
resulted in a conteren~ beW8en X_Bra. ~. A. TaD and C. H.
Car8on of tbe Bureau aM Major Ger.-a! Clayton B1aaeU who was
then bead of MID. <8Mral Bi888l1 prca18ed to look into the
...t~ and to def'iD1tel.y 888 that G8!8ru Lance ... 8t1"&1cbtel8d
Q1~ and tbat be CC8P118ci wi tb a proper 1Dterpret&~ion of ~be
Delimitation "cr...nt. 'M1ile h1.8 8ub8eqU8Dt act1'Y1tie. in
Arcent1l8 ...re far fr~ 8&~18factC&"7, be d1ci appareDtq aake 8~
effort to at least coordizate b1.8 act1'Y1t1e8 with tboee of the
Legal AttaDbe and to keep tbe 1Atter adneed concerDing his
8&jor 1DYeatigat.1oD8. Prote.t. wi tal regard to his act1 n tie a
contlDled Wltil hi. transter t~ .6Iogent1D& in 1945.
Genera1l7 speaking '98rJ' l1ttl8 d1tti~. 8ncwnterea
tr~ Bawl Atta0he8 am their ftriQU8 aa818t&Dta throughoutIatin Jaerica b7 the ~'. SIB. !lao - a g_ral 1'\&18,
it was di8CO'V8red tbat such incidents &8 did occur wre ratber
..11y ad.ju8ted on a .at18tactor,. tJaai.. .A8 a utter of tact,
United State. Ba'9al Attache. thr~t J.t1n .&Erica became
increuingly 1.Dactift aM paalift in the tield of intel1ig8D~
of pr1-.ry interest to tbe Bureau toUowi.Dg Aaerican and Briti.b
laMiuga in Borth Atrioa late in 1942. '1'beir .tattl were redu~d
to 'the _1 ni~- and tJ:a87 d1aracteri8t.1.calq depended upon, al8o8t
entirelr, tbe lBpl Attache tor intelligence 1nfrraation of aU
k1.I¥i8 except utters of direct na'W81. inter.s't which they obta1.D8d
throagb direct contact witb Ha'9al Officials in the ~tr7
invol 'Ye4.
(
. 'PhAr. ~& OIW ~n&t.aDce W'OrtJq of .eD't1on duriDg 1942 u'VO1nng
a I L statioued at Becife. Brasil. who persisted
in nasraDt a tte8pte to UDCOTer. ellbarru. !ad MUtral1.S. au
EI Uarcanr .Agent I I 8tat10D8d in tJ118 b 7C
area. '!'be aot1ri.~i.. of th1a t'~lMier, actiDg tor the UD1ted
States HaTJ'. were part1cu1ar~ untor'QlDat,e 1J8881ch as 'the Bureau
'waS DO~ 1D a po81't.1OD to ~eM 1~..l.t or 1t.8 U~OOftr agen~ because
of blatter's UlKierCO'fer 8atu which .e did DOt _nt to ad81t
opeD17 tol I '1!18 -~ter was- tinallY _sa~1stactor1l7
adjusted when the Bureau as able to tz&D8terl ~ to
.stablish on a .ar=:=~ da to basi. &11 en~ in ~b8 .-10&11 CoD8Ulate
at Recite, Brasil. nb8equenUy proved ut18tactorily
coopera't1ft wi'th 'tM dIIq aocredi aM autb.n~1cated Agen~ in 'b
Aaeriaan CoD8Ulate. (64-3000-315. 316)
(
.ntioD 8hODld also be 848 of 0111'8 d1l'8ct am blanketretu8a1 to .t8u'Id.8h ~o 'tbe BareaU ~D8 tex.t of' decoded ~ eapioage b 1
.8Sag8S 8ent ~~~st1nel7 tr~ .Argent1Da to GerMD7 on Deo8ber .20,
1943. This reru8&l OD t.b8 p8r't of' ~he .v... predi.cated by AdmiralR. E. Schuir8DD upws the pr8i8e tI8~. ~ ~. ftnt. -1+.-1' ataftM~~ I
the ...ag.., w~ W8re obt.a1niDg ~Ij
(62-66'727-1~4)
b1Q
(5)
 .

-~~ --- .
lffr=' bI ,.
(SI
(
On No~r 1. 1943 (62...61.42-7-751). Major GeMral George V.
bead of' MID. ad'Y18ed the ~ of' . neW' obarter .l;ranted
b~
(::1)
( 51)
( ~)
t
t
The Federal Bureau of IDt'es~gation ot tM Departaent ot ~tiC8
baa been directed by tbe Pre8iden~ ~o ba~~~ ~ iDteUic_ce im-e8ti-
gat1ODS wi tbin the Western B8I18pbere other than thOle _tterl UligDed
to ~be iAtel11&eDoe brancbe8 or t.b8 Sen1ce toroee. 'fbi8 wCRlld seem to
Dega+.e .. t.boaght tbat the Pre81dent desires &IV" other aa8r1C1 to operate
in the 1DteU1gence tield in t- "1 tern B81ephere, aside trCD the8trict.q.uitary ar¥l DAval f1mctions U81pd to the 8Wt.arr - 18ft!
atta0b88 under 8x18tiDg Facti.. Pr~ tbe po1nt of ftew or ~be x.~
aent, tbe &rraogea8nt pre_~ljDg, which it 18 uDderstood the ...
directi... i8 not designed to d18~, baa worked ati8taotO1"iq aM
probabq w'1ll be .'ten 8Or8 aatiatacto1"1' a. present p1&D8 tor pr8ftnting
duplication are 1nore&8~ ett.ctiw.
~

(51
Section a --'Ac~lat,1oD.1 1 fair interpretation of the word
'acC181lat.1on' ~ci 81.80 1ap~ tbe ..~~ 'obtaining' J tberUore,
(5)
The Depal't88nt would be grateful1f 7OU wwld cont1ra wbe'tb8l'
tbese conatruct1oDS are correct..
 c
. .. .. rMUlt of ~be abOft clar1.t1oau'on, DO dUt1~t'J' was -:i8l8X8d
by the Bureau in com8ction with the abow d88cr1.bed D1rectift b7 the
Joint. Cbiet. of St.&tt.
G.
functibl8 . '

certainty of the Bureau' 8 .tatua in the for.i~ iDtelligeno8 field
~ - .- . . -~ _A '---"""""".-
(
bi
(
(S)
- newspaper puD.LJ.OJ.~. J.DG .v,,-" v_v -~ ..:-::"--:-.-~-:-~~~ ~~: ~_..
_11 as the 'text of a 8imilar plan propo8ed by the Joint Chief- of
Statt were pu~l1_hed 1D the Washington ft.B Berwd, 'the Chicago
'lribtme and 'the ... York Daily Jen by a W...hing'ton correspondent
or the Chicago Tribune. !biB publlca~ion resulted in considerable
plb 11 ci ty concerning 'the -.ariOUB pIan. and ramiticationa thereof.
The various plans lubmitted will be let forth and dilcul.ed
briefly hereinafter in tJ1e chronology- in 'Which they were presen'tedl
(
 . 1. !!dget Bureau Plan (62-16274-266)
This plan tor UD1 ted states Secret World~ide Intelligenoe
Coverage. after s8'tting forth that present Mthode ot ooordinatiDg
intelligence intormation and the work ot the iDtelli~enoe agenoies ot
the united States GoverDm8nt are inefricient, costly and result in
triplication or ettort. sets up a soheme tor an Interdepartmental
ooordtn8ting body. oo~osed or As8istant Secretaries or state. War,
Bavy. Treasury and the )Asistant Attorney General. The Aa8istant
Secretary or State would be the ohalr8n or tAe group. Sub-groups,
or repre8entative8 from Tariou8 agencies concerned. would be set up
at each 8't)'Pe or locus of operation" 1Ihioh would be charged bY' the
top group ~th deTeloping detailed operating plans. The thesis ot
both the critioism of present oondition8 and ot the operating plan8
appear8 to be fO1md in this stat~t, -In so.. .uure the
partioipation ot ..,.ery agencY' of the OOTern8nt is an essential
feature ot complete security. particularlY' as regards espionage.-
Under the plan set forth, each agency would continue to operate in
its particular field b')" clearing through the coordinating apnoy.
In this plsn it il pointed out that legillation already
.nlt. KiTing the ftrioua agencies t.b8 Moel.&ry p~rs to opera'te
wi thin their particular fields and that no add! tlonal legillation
would be neoe.8ary to put their propo.ed plan into operation. !be
Bureau ot the Budget attached.. lugge.ted agre_n't by the agenol..
'to ettec-tuate 'the propo.ed plan. In 'the plan \mder 'the headiDg
S~T
71

(
.Conclu8iGD8 aDd ReoO888Ddatioa.,- it i. ltated, e!bere il a
growing oonnotion that our 1ntemal ..0\U'1ty oazmot be ~8W8d
apart from the external intlu8DOe. at~eot1Dg it.. !he elBence
of the plan il that all agenoie8 ot the GovernmeDt should be
included in the plan and that one coordinator or .czar" il not
practicable. It 18 al80 olaimed tba~ the .committee device. is not
errectiTe, apparently referring to the IDt8r-Departmeutal IntelligeDOe
Committee. In the plan 1 t 18 8Ugge8~ed that any group organi&ed
to develop a GoTerDa8D.~-w1de plan _t be charged with a det1m te
relp~1bi11t1, and repre.entat1on from the Dep&rt.ent. muat be on
a euftioiently high level to perai t delegation ot power and authority,
and it 18 pointe
…[truncated]