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/ U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investlgation
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Allegations of Al Qaeda Trafficking in Conflict Diamonds
Executive Sumary
In November 2001, the Washington Post initiated a series
of articles linking the al Qaeda terrorist network to diamond
trafficking in West Africa. According to the media reporting, al
Qaeda operatives, using aliases and based in Monrovia, Liberia,
reaped millions of dollars from 1999 to 2001 through the sale of
diamonds mined by the Revolutionary United Front RUF!. Reporting
on this issue continues amid the current crisis in Liberia.
The FBI's Terrorist Financing Operations Section TFOS!,
in concert with other agencies, has endeavored to determine the
validity of these allegations. FBI efforts consisted of
investigation in the U.S. and several foreign countries including
Ghana, Belgium, Sierra Leone, and Burkina Faso. During this
comprehensive investigation, more than 25 individuals ranging from
former high-ranking RUF rebels to diamond dealers responsible for
exporting an estimated 80% of the diamonds mined in Sierra Leone
were interview. None of the individuals interviewed were aware of
any al Qaeda diamond buying from the RUF-controlled areas as alleged
by the media.
Several countries also conducted investigation into al
Qaedas alleged diamond trafficking activities in West Africa. TFOS
met with several law enforcement and intelligence officials from
various countries mentioned in the media reports. Based on the
results of their independent investigations, these officials found
that al Qaeda fugitives were not involved with the trafficking of
conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone. The Belgian Federal Police
investigated and are aiding the prosecution of a weapons for
diamonds transaction involving the parties the media contends dealt
with al Qaeda. The witnesses to this investigation denied that al
Qaedas operatives were involved with diamond trafficking in the
region during 2000 through 2001. Furthermore, numerous witness have
identified the alleged al Qaeda aliases as actual individuals from
Senegal involved in the diamond trade of West Africa.
Lastly, the FBI, and others in the U.S. Intelligence
Community, have interrogated numerous detainees believed to have
significant financial knowledge of al Qaeda finances. These
detainees specifically denied that al Qaeda used diamonds as a
funding mechanism to support terrorism.
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It lS the property of the
FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
' J. . E
Allegations Relating to al Qaeda's
Trafficking in Conflict Diamonds
In November 2001, the Washington Post initiated a series
of articles linking the al Qaeda terrorist network to rough diamond
trafficking in the war-torn West African country of Sierra Leone.
These articles quoted several unidentified U.S. and European
intelligence officials as well as unidentified sources who allegedly
had direct knowledge that al Qaeda reaped millions of dollars, from
1999 to 2001, from the sale of diamonds mined by the Revolutionary
United Front RUF!, the rebel army of Sierra Leone. According to
the media reports, Aziz Nassour, Samih Ossaily, and Ibrahim Bah,
acted as conduits for an extensive pre9/11 diamond buying operation
by al Qaeda operatives Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani and Fazul Abdullah
Mohammed, who were using aliases. This allegedly resulted in the
purchase of 2O million dollars in gems by al Qaeda operatives. The
media reports also claimed that the Presidents of Liberia and
Burkina Paso were paid bribes to assist and serve as hosts for the
al Qaeda terrorists during their diamond buying operation.
Since the initial Washington Post report, several other
media sources, including the BBC and the NGO Global Witness, have
published or aired additional reports regarding this alleged al
Qaeda/conflict diamond connection. Several of these reporters and
organizations have interconnected relationships and have extensively
shared sources and materials on this topic.
On April 17, 2003, Global Witness, a London based NGO,
published ninetynine page report entitled: "For a Few Dollar$ More
How al Qaeda moved into the diamond trade." This report followed
the initial reporting by the Washington Post but added more indepth
background and details, along with supporting documents. This
report's principal author and investigator, Alex Yearsley, told the
FBI that his intent for this report was to draw attention to the
conflict diamond crisis in West Africa and thus, push forward theKimberly Process.1 l
Even as recent as July 4, 2003, the Washington Post
continued its original reporting stating that "[Liberian President
Charles] Taylor sold some of the [conflict] diamonds to al Qaeda in
2000 and 2001 as the terrorist organization moved its cash to
commodities in advance of the Sept. ll attacks, according to'a year-
long investigation by European law enforcement agencies."
92
1
1 The Kimberly Process LS a multi-nation agreement that requires certifications for the
legitimate trading of diamonds in an attempt to end the funding of rebel groups through the
international smuggling of the gems.
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Primary Allegations Under Investigation
In order to determine the validity of the allegations that
have become so prevalent in the media's reporting of West Africa and
al Qaedas alternative financing operations, the FBI set forth to
conduct an in depth investigation related specifically to the
following predominant allegations:
! that three al Qaeda operatives, Abdullah Ahmed
Abdullah, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed, all East
African embassy bombing fugitives! spent time in Sierra Leone,
Liberia, and Burkina Faso, during different periods from September
1998 through 2001, in order to purchase diamonds from the RUF
rebels; and
! that these a1 Qaeda operatives entered the rough
diamond trade and cornered the West African diamond market in
Antwerp, Brussels, during the summer of 2001, in an attempt to
thwart anticipated law enforcement efforts in the wake of the
attacks which were to occur on 9/ll/2001.
While the FBI focused it efforts on fully examining the
leads related to the above listed allegations, significant overlap
existed to allow for further examination into the potential
terrorist exploitation of the West African region as well as the use
of the particular resource, diamonds, to fund terrorist operations.
This investigation covered not only interviews of those most
knowledgeable with the diamond trade in the region during the
relevant time period, but also obtained information from those
responsible with enforcing the laws and maintaining the intelligence
base for the regions affected by diamond trafficking and terrorist
activity. Furthermore, the FBI interviewed or directed questions to
detainees knowledgeable with al Qaeda's finances.
Overview of FBI Efforts
The FBI's Terrorist Financing Operations Section TFOS!,in
concert with other agencies, has endeavored to determine the
validity of these allegations. FBI efforts consisted of
investigation in the U.S. and several foreign countries including
Ghana, Belgium, Sierra Leone, and Burkina Faso. This comprehensive
investigation included over 25 interviews - ranging from former
highranking RUF rebels to diamond dealers responsible for exporting
an estimated 80% of the diamonds mined in Sierra Leone. Also
included in this investigation were over a dozen meetings with
various law enforcement and intelligence officials. The FBI/TFOS
and others in the U.S. Intelligence Community, have interrogated
numerous detainees believed to have significant financial knowledge
of al Qaeda finances. These detainees specifically denied that al
Qaeda used diamonds as a funding mechanism to support terrorism.
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On Februarv 4, 2003, the FBI met with
further assistance to substantiate the allegatio s of the alI Qaeda/conflict diamond connection at that time. |lwas reluctant to provide any
In conjunction with this investigation the FBI created amatrix addressing each of the specific allegations involving al be
Qaeda's involvement in conflict diamond trafficking made by the b7c
media. The results of this matrix are consistent with this LHM. b7D
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FBI/TFOS Travel to Freetown and Kono, Sierra Leone
On June 6, 2003, FBI/TFOS traveled to the Kono diamond
field region of Sierra Leone where, according to media reports, al
Qaeda fugitives Ahmed Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed traveled in late
December 2000January 2001. These al Qaeda fugitives allegedly
stayed at Small Lebanon, the residence/office of RUF Ground
Commander Issa Sesay, for several days during this period and
remained in the Kono area for three weeks. FBI/TFOS visited Small
Lebanon and other areas around the Kono region, including the main
diamond mining area.
While in the region, FBI/TFOS interviewed a former RUF
Commander in charge of Kono; the RUF liaison officer in charge of
all passes for visitors; and a Sierra Leone government intelligence
officer, all of whom were in the area and had visited Sesay at Small
Lebanon on an almost daily basis during the relevant time period.
They stated that they would have known if foreigners were ever at
Small Lebanon or in the Kono region. They all advised that they
were unaware that any white, Middle Eastern, or East Africans were
ever present at Small Lebanon or in the Kono area. They were shown
a photo spread containing photographs of al Qaeda fugitives Ahmed
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2
Ghailan i, Fazul Mohammed and Sheikh Ahmed Sal S , im weden. None of
the individuals shown the hoto p spreads were able to identify the al
Qaeda operatives.
A159 interviewed durin th' q 1S trip was a|
~ lwas aware of diamond transactions occurring at h Small Lebanon, he did not recognize any of the al Qaeda members in D
the photo spread.b7C
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FBI/TFOS Interview of I
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Alleged Special Forces Team Operation
The Washington Post quotes unidentified U.S. Defense
Intelligence Agency officials as monitoring Ahmed Ghailani and Fazul
Mohammed in Western Africa in the weeks following 9/11. According
to media reports, the Pentagon had a Special Forces team in
neighboring Guinea ready to snatch these al Qaeda fugitives.
However, the FBI met with DOD officials in Washington and the
These meetings revealed that Ehis aflegation was
a se. advised that while a group of U.S. Special
Forces were in Guinea during that period training with their host
country counterparts, these U.S. forces were not attempting to
apprehend any al Qaeda fugitives.
FBI Travel to Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso
According to media reports, prior to March 2001 and again
from July 2001 through the summer of 2002, al Qaeda fugitives, Ahmed
Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed, stayed in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso,
under the protection of President Blaise Campaore. During these
extended periods, the al Qaeda fugitives allegedly stayed at the
government's official guest house known as the "Maison des Hotes."
Allegations cite European intelligence reports stating that the al
Qaeda fugitives moved between a protected area in Liberia and Maison
des Hotes in the district of Zone du Bois, further described as the
Presidential compound in Burkina Faso, and remained there for at %6least two months after 9/ll. ' §7c
On June 13, 2003, TFOS/FBI inspected the facilities of theD7D
Maison des Hotes at Zone du Bois, as well as the bungalow complex
located next door. The Maison des Hotes is not part of the
presidential compound as alleged by media reports; it is several
miles away. The Maison des Hotes is a simple three bedroom
residence, while the adjacent bungalows are six, one~room units.
TFOS/FBI interviewed the two Chefs, the Facilities Manager, and the
Commanding Officer of the Presidential Security Detail in charge of
the Maison des Hotes and the adjacent bungalow complex. All were
employed in their respective positions at the time of the alleged
visits of al Qaeda fugitives Ahmed Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed.
They were shown photo spreads that included photographs of Ahmed
Ghailani and Fazul Mohammad and were.unable to identify either man.
None of those interviewed had any knowledge of Middle Easterners or
East Africans staying at Maison des Hotes or nearby facilities
during the relevant time period.
also met withwhQ_was aware to
10
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security forces were completely surprised by the various articles _and have spent considerable time and effort to determine if there P5
was an al Qaeda presence in the country. [:::::::::::::::]was 57C
convinced that the media allegations that fugitives Ahmed Ghailani Q73
and Fazul Mohammed were hosted by President Campaore or staying as
guests at the Maison des Hotes were false. However, he added that
Burkina Faso could not guarantee that al Qaeda operatives have never
discreetly passed through the country.
Evaluation of Allegations Related to al Qaeda's Involvement in
Diamond Trafficking in West Africa
The FBI has conducted a comprehensive investigation into
this matter. Investigative results do not support the media
allegations that al Qaeda fugitives Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, Ahmed
Khalfan Ghailani, and Fazul Mohammed engaged in a diamond buying
operation in West Africa.
This indepth investigation revealed Ehat the
in lVl ua s involved in Nassour's west African diamond trafficking
operation during 2000 and 2001,| I
provided consistent details of all aspects of the operation, while
specifically denying the involvement of the al Qaeda fuoitives Ahmed
0-. -_ ' -_ _ U00-.un Q -.00, :00 .0 Ann-0 :00 -u
Ithe FBI's investigation
urfher determined that M5hammad_D. Keneme and Soulemani M. Guessen
were not aliases used by Ahmed Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed, but
rather they were true names of actual diamond traders from Senegal
employed by Aziz Nassour. Several witnesses involved in Nassour's
operation, who knew the two Senegalese men, viewed photographs of
Ahmed Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed, and stated that they were not
photographs of Mohammad D. Keneme and Soulemani M. Guessen.
Additionally, investigation into the allegations that
Ahmed Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed were guests at Burkina Faso's
official guest house, Maison des Hotes, for at least two months
after 9/11, met with similar negative results.
Furthermore, the allegations that the U.S. readied a
Special Forces team to snatch Ahmed Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed in
Western Africa in the weeks following 9/ll were determined to be
false.
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The July 4, 2003, reporting by the Washington Post
alleging that a yearlong investigation by European law enforcement
agencies revealed that Charles Taylor sold diamonds to al Qaeda in
2000 and 2001, is questionable. The FBI has conferred with FBI's
Legal Attaches, the U.S. State Department, other U.S. agencies, and
several of our foreign law enforcement counterparts in order to
determine the source of this information. Based on this search, the
only European law enforcement agency that has conducted a year-long
investigation into this issue is the BFP and they specifically deny
having developed any evidence to suggest al Qaeda's involvement in H6purchasing diamonds from Charles Taylor or the region. :7c
< The extensive investigation conducted by the FBI in this D73
matter contradicts the allegations raised by the various media and
Global Witness reports. Based on the investigation conducted by the
BFP, the media allegations detailing Nassour's involvement with
diamond trafficking in exchange for weapons and equipment to the RUF
is accurate; however, there is no evidence to support the
allegations that al Qaeda operatives were involved in this
operation.
The witness identifications of al Qaeda fu itives weremade after 9/ll. Furthermore, with the exception of?
only two witnesses identified al Qaeda fugitives as being involved
in diamond trafficking in West Africa. The senior RUE official's
initial identification was made only after the U.N. Special Court's
investigators showed the witness an FBI Most Wanted Terrorist
oster n a traditional law enforcement photo spread. E:::::]'[?::::::::fidentification was after he claimed he viewed the FBI's
te Poster on the Internet. Even though the two witnesses,[:%ffE:¬fand the former senior RUF official, were involved in the
same diamond trafficking operations during the same time frame, they
identified different al Qaeda fugitives. Both witnesses based their
identification on a one~time sighting of the individuals they later
thought were al Qaeda fugitives. These witnesses did not have any
further information concerning the individuals they saw and they
were not aware if they purchased diamonds. Based on hinvestigation conducted, it is believed that[;:::;:::f:i;kas
mistaken in his identity of the two al Qaeda ugi ives med
Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed, and was referring to Souley Guisse and
Mouhamed Kenemi, the two Senegalese males brought in by Aziz
Nassour. Conversely, the former senior ' ial denied seeingthe two al Qaeda fugitives identified byifgifiij but did identify a »
third al Qaeda fugitive Sheikh Ahmed92Salim we en. The forofficial met the man, he now believes to be Sweden, throughjimim[;:;::]on only one occasion, and he added that this person l
1 eria without consummating any diamond deals. The fo Fofficial could not provide any further information, andTfii:fT after
being shown a photograph of Sweden, denied ever seeing him. No
witness confirmed seeing the al Qaeda fugitive Abdullah Ahmed
Abdullah.
I2
REQ S-4a thru e 000000092
FBI Investigation into Allegations that A1 Qaeda Operatives Cornered
the Market on Western African Diamonds
According to the Washington Post, al Qaeda "reaped
millions of dollars in the past three years from the illicit sale of
diamonds mined by the rebels in Sierra Leone" and al Qaeda
"operatives oversaw a 20 million dollar diamond buying spree that
effectively cornered the market in the region's precious stones."
This activity allegedly occurred during the summer of 2001 and was
used to finance terrorist operations and protect funds from law
enforcement scrutiny, in anticipation that their accounts would be
frozen after the 9/11 attacks. The articles claim that the al Qaeda
operatives originally bought diamonds from RUF rebels at low prices
seeking to resell them for large profits in Europe, but in July 2001
they changed tactics and bought far more diamonds than usual, paying
premium prices for them.
On March 17, 2003, TFOS/FBI traveled to Johannesburg,
South Africa, to meet with the De Beers Diamond Company's Crime
Intelligence Unit regarding its knowledge of possible al Qaeda
involvement with conflict diamonds. De Beers was not aware of any b7
unusual activity in the Antwerp diamond market with regard to raw
diamonds from West Africa during the summer of 2001. Furthermore,
De Beers did not have any information, other than the above
mentioned media reports, relating to al Qaeda's presence in West
Africa.
_Diamond Investigative Unit in Antwerp, reviewed the
records of Aziz Nassour's Belgian company, ASA Diam. Also examined
were Samih Ossail s extensive records seized upon his arrest.According to theh ASA Diam sold 20 million dollars worth of raw
diamonds in Antwerp during the first five months of 2001 and then
reinvested more than 19 million dollars of these funds for the
purchase of additional diamonds from West Africa.
Based on its comprehensive review of ASA DIAM financial
records, the@III!advised that media assertions that "[i]nvestigators
say that at least 20 million dollars was withdrawn from the account,
money they believe was a portion of the company's transactions
[linked to al Qaeda's buying activities" was false. According to theq the money was not tied in any way to al Qaeda, but traced back
to est Africa for the purchase of additional gems.
92
On December 29, 2002, Washington Post reported that "[i]n
Ossailyfs case, the Belgian investigators92say that they uncovered
bank records showing that the diamond company enjoyed a sudden surge
in business and turned ove ost one billion dollars the yearbefore September ll." Thef:jiTinvestigators overseeing Ossailys
case told the FBI that such assertions were clear exaggerations and
13
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estimated that ASA DIAMs business, during that time frame, was less
than 25 million dollars.
conflict diamonds throughout Africa may have been transferred to_
Lebanon, which is believed to be his current location since fleeingThe -noted that profits Aziz Nassour made trafficking C
"7
Belgium.Thegcategorized the Washington Post's assertion that
"al Qaeda opera es oversaw a 20 million dollars diamond buyingspree that effectively cornered the market on the regions stones" as:
ridiculous. They advised that it would take much more than this,
ossibly billions of dollars, to corner the raw diamond market. TheQ! added that during no time in 2091 was there any drying up,
ndance, or unusual activity of Western African gems in the
Antwerp market.
also adviLed the FBI in April 2003, that any "drying up" of Sierra
Leone diamonds or later increase in amounts exported could be
explained by the hoarding of the raw stones prior to the Kimberly
Process becoming effective and the U.N. sanctions being lifted
during this period. y
"recs FBI interviewed di
in Sierra Leone.
I They both advised that
they closely monitor the West African diamond trade and did so even
during the period the RUF controlled the mining areas of Kono and
Tonga. They were not aware of any unusual fluctuations or
"cornering" in the West African diamond market during 2001 or
anything else out of the ordinary, including sales in gems in excess
of one million dollars or any al Qaeda diamond purchasing in the
region.
Evaluation of Allegations Related to al Qaeda Cornering the West
African Diamond Trade
As a result of this investigation, the FBI has determined
that there is no substance to the allegations that al Qaeda
operatives purchased 20 million dollars in diamonds that cornered
the market. The FBI has been in contact with.other intelligence,
law enforcement, and regulatory agencies in the U.S. and abroad;
none have identified the diamond/gemstone trade as a significant
source of funding for al Qaeda.
Possible Terrorist Group Funding Through Conflict Diamonds.
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Due to the high value, relatively small size, and
concealable nature of diamonds, the trafficking in diamonds and
other precious gems could represent a simple and essentially risk-
free means of transporting assets for any terrorist organization.
As such, the FBI recognizes the potential systemic vulnerabilities
in the current prevention of conflict diamond trafficking, and that
the region and its resources require further monitoring.
Currently there is an indication that trafficking of
conflict diamonds occurring throughout Africa may be derivatively
supporting the Lebanese terrorist group Hizbollah° through
religiousbased contributions. This is based on the general
understanding that Lebanese diaspora communities throughout Africa
control much of the diamond trade, as well as other exportimport
businesses. Many of these Lebanese are Shiite-Muslims with close
ties to Lebanon. As these factors are merely indicators, further
monitoring of the situation is warranted.
The official diamond trade in Sierra Leone has grown from
1.4 million dollars in diamond expcrts in 1999, to 6.5 million
dollars in 2000, 26 million dollars in 2001, 41.7 million dollars in
2002, and 33.4 million dollars during the first five months of 2003
The Sierra Leonean Police, the U.S. Embassy officials in Sierra
Leone, and U.N. Special Court personnel, opined that the majority of
diamonds are illegally smuggled out of the country and that the
total of official and illicit diamonds exported from Sierra Leone on
a yearly basis is estimated to be an amount up to 300 million
dollars.
, while the FBI's investigation did not show any connections
between al Qaeda and the trafficking of conflict diamonds, the risk
of terrorist groups using such precious stones as alternative
financing methods for laundering, transporting, or profitgenerating
purposes remains high. Additionally, other terrorist networks may
currently benefit significantly from fund raising efforts directed
at those who are profiting from the diamond trade. As such, the
U.S. State Department and the U.S. intelligence community, as well
as their counterparts in other countries and international
organizations need to be actively engaged to monitor what is
occurring throughout Africa in the movement and trade of precious
minerals and gems.
6 . - . . . _The FBI/TI-OS team investigating this matter has noticed a common theme during the
course of investigation - a confusion between the al Qaeda organization and the Hizbollah
organization. Many individuals interviewed during this investigation freely interchange the
terms Hizbollah and al Qaeda
15
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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Federal Bureau of Investigation
In Reply, Please Refer to J11]-Y 1 8 , 2 O O3
File N0. I I
Allegations of Al Qaeda Trafficking in Conflict Diamonds
Executive Sumary
In November 2001, the Washington Post initiated a series
of articles linking the al Qaeda terrorist network to diamond
trafficking in West Africa. According to the media reporting, al
Qaeda operatives, using aliases and based in Monrovia, Liberia,
reaped millions of dollars from 1999 to 2001 through the sale of
diamonds mined by the Revolutionary United Front RUF!. Reporting
on this issue continues amid the current crisis in Liberia.
The FBI's Terrorist Financing Operations Section TFOS!,
in concert with other agencies, has endeavored to determine the
validity of these allegations. FBI efforts consisted of
investigation in the U.S. and several foreign countries including
Ghana, Belgium, Sierra Leone, and Burkina Faso. During this
comprehensive investigation, more than 25 individuals ranging from
former highranking RUF rebels to diamond dealers responsible for
exporting an estimated 80% of the diamonds mined in Sierra Leone
were interview. None of the individuals interviewed were aware of
any al Qaeda diamond buying from the RUFcontrolled areas as alleged
by the media. . ' *
Several countries also conducted investigation into al
Qaeda's alleged diamond trafficking activities in West Africa. TFOS
met with several law enforcement and intelligence officials from
various countries mentioned in the media reports. Based on the
results of their independent investigations, these officials found
that al Qaeda fugitives were not involved with the trafficking of
conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone. The Belgian Federal Police .
investigated and are aiding the prosecution of a weapons for
diamonds transaction involving the parties the media contends dealt
with al Qaeda. The witnesses to this investigation denied that al
Qaeda's operatives were involved with diamond trafficking in the
region during 2000 through 2001. Furthermore, numerous witness have
identified the alleged a1 Qaeda aliases as actual individuals from
Senegal involved in the diamond trade of West Africa.
Lastly, the FBI, and others in the U.S. Intelligence
Community, have interrogated numerous detainees believed to have
significant financial knowledge of al Qaeda finances. These
detainees specifically denied that al Qaeda used diamonds as a
funding mechanism to support terrorism.
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the
FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
Allegations Relating to al Qaeda's
Trafficking in Conflict Diamonds
In November 2001, the Washington Post initiated a series
of articles linking the al Qaeda terrorist network to rough diamond
trafficking in the wartorn West African country of Sierra Leone.
These articles quoted several unidentified U.S. and European
intelligence officials as well as unidentified sources who allegedly
had direct knowledge that al Qaeda reaped millions of dollars, from
1999 to 2001, from the sale of diamonds mined by the Revolutionary
United Front RUF!, the rebel army of Sierra Leone. According to
the media reports, Aziz Nassour, Samih Ossaily, and Ibrahim Bah,
acted as conduits for an extensive pre-9/11 diamond buying operation
by al Qaeda operatives Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani and Fazul Abdullah
Mohammed, who were using aliases. This allegedly resulted in the
purchase of 20 million dollars in gems by al Qaeda operatives. The
media reports also claimed that the Presidents of Liberia and
Burkina Faso were paid bribes to assist and serve as hosts for the
al Qaeda terrorists during their diamond buying operation.
. Since the initial Washington Post report, several other
media sources, including the BBC and the NGO Global Witness, have
published or aired additional reports regarding this alleged al
Qaeda/conflict diamond connection. Several of these reporters and
organizations have interconnected relationships and have extensively
shared sources and materials on this topic.
On April 17, 2003, Global Witness, a London based NGO,
published ninetynine page report entitled: "For a Few Dollar$ More
How al Qaeda moved into the diamond trade." This report followed
the initial reporting by the Washington Post but added more indepth
background and details, along with supporting documents. This
report's principal author and investigator, Alex Yearsley, told the
FBI that his intent for this report was to draw attention to the
conflict diamond crisis in West Africa and thus, push forward the
Kimberly Process.l
Even as recent as July 4, 2003, the Washington Post
continued its original reporting stating that "[Liberian President
Charles] Taylor sold some of the [conflict] diamonds to al Qaeda in
2000 and 2001 as the terrorist organization moved its cash to
commodities in advance of the Sept. 11 attacks, according to a year-
long investigation by European law enforcement agencies."
1 The Kimberly Process is a multi-nation agreement that requires certifications for the
legitimate trading of diamonds in an attempt to end the funding of rebel groups through the
international smuggling of the gems. _
2
b6
_ _ . b7C
Primary Allegations Under Investigation
In order to determine the validity of the allegations that
have become so prevalent in the media's reporting of West Africa and
al Qaeda's alternative financing operations, the FBI set forth to
conduct an in depth investigation related specifically to the
following predominant allegations:
u_92J
all East
African embassy bombing fugitives! spent time in Sierra Leone,
Liberia, and Burkina Faso, during different periods from September
1998 through 2001, in order to purchase diamonds from the RUF
rebels; and
! that these al Qaeda operatives entered the rough
diamond trade and cornered the West African diamond market in
Antwerp, Brussels, during the summer of 2001, in an attempt to
thwart anticipated law enforcement efforts in the wake of the
attacks which were to occur on 9/11/2001. i
While the FBI focused it efforts on fully examining the
leads related to the above listed allegations, significant overlap
existed to allow for further examination into the potential
terrorist exploitation of the West African region as well as the use
of the particular resource, diamonds, to fund terrorist operations.
This investigation covered not only interviews of those most
knowledgeable with the diamond trade in the region during the
relevant time period, but also obtained information from those
responsible with enforcing the laws and maintaining the intelligence
base for the regions affected by diamond trafficking and terrorist
activity. Furthermore, the FBI interviewed or directed questions to
detainees knowledgeable with al Qaeda's finances.
Overview of FBI Efforts
The FBI's Terrorist Financing Operations Section TFOS!,in
concert with other agencies, has endeavored to determine the
validity of these allegations. FBI efforts consisted of
investigation in the U.S. and several foreign countries including
Ghana, Belgium, Sierra Leone, and Burkina Faso. This comprehensive
investigation included over 25 interviews - ranging from former
highranking RUF rebels to diamond dealers responsible for exporting
an estimated 80% of the diamonds mined in Sierra Leone. Also -
included in this investigation were over a dozen meetings with
various law enforcement and intelligence officials. The FBI/TFOS
and others in the U.S. Intelligence Community, have interrogated
numerous detainees believed to have significant financial knowledge
of al Qaeda finances. These detainees specifically denied that al
Qaeda used diamonds as a funding mechanism to support terrorism.
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In conjunction with this investigation the FBI created
matrix addressing each of the specific allegations involving al
Qaeda's involvement in conflict diamond trafficking made by the
media. The results of this matrix are consistent with this LHM.
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Another unidentified source used by the media to supportthe alleqed al Qada/conflict diamond nexus was determined to'be[::::]
Iwas interviewed by Ehe FBI and detailsd1 and others in I
buying diamonds from the Kono Region of Sierra Leone. I I
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FBI/TFOS Travel to Freetown and Kono, Sierra Leone
On June 6, 2003, FBI/TFOS traveled to the Kono diamond
field region of Sierra Leone where, according to media reports, al
Qaeda fugitives Ahmed Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed traveled in late
December 2000~January 2001. These al Qaeda fugitives allegedly
stayed at Small Lebanon, the residence/office of RUF Ground
Commander Issa Sesay, for several days during this period and
remained in the Kono area for three weeks. FBI/TFOS visited Small
Lebanon and other areas around the Kono region, including the main
diamond mining area. _
While in the region, FBI/TFOS interviewed a former RUF
Commander in charge of Kono; the RUF liaison officer in charge of
all passes for visitors; and a Sierra Leone government intelligence
officer, all of whom were in the area and had visited Sesay at Small
Lebanon on an almost daily basis_during the relevant time period.
They stated that they would have known if foreigners were ever at
Small Lebanon or in the Kono region. They all advised that they
were unaware that any white, Middle Eastern, or East Africans were
ever present at Small Lebanon or in the Kono area. They were shown
a photo spread containing photographs of al Qaeda fugitives Ahmed
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Ghailani, Fazul Mohammed, and Sheikh Ahmed Salim Sweden. None of
the individuals shown the photo spreads were able to identify the al
Qaeda operatives.
- 4
Iwas aware of diamond transactions occurring at
Small Lebanon, he did not recognize any of the al Qaeda members in
the photo spread.
FBI/TFOS Interview ofl l
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bvc ,mAlleged Special Forces Team Operation bD T
The Washington Post quotes unidentified U.S. Defense
Intelligence Agency officials as monitoring Ahmed Ghailani and Fazul
Mohammed in Western Africa in the weeks following 9/ll. According
to media reports, the Pentagon had a Special Forces team in
neighboring Guinea ready to snatch these al Qaeda fugitives.
H th FBI met with DOD officials in Washington and the
I These meetinqs revealed that this allegation was
false. I while a group of U.S; Special
Forces were in Guinea during that period training with their host
country counterparts, these U.S. forces were not attempting to
apprehend any al Qaeda fugitives.owever, e{Defense Intelligence Atfache in Freetown. Sierra Leone,| |
FBI Travel to Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso
According to media reports, prior to March 2001 and again
from July 2001 through the summer of 2002, al Qaeda fugitives, Ahmed
Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed, stayed in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso,
under the protection of President Blaise Campaore. During these
extended periods, the al Qaeda fugitives allegedly stayed at the
government's official guest house known as the "Maison des Hotes."
Allegations cite European intelligence reports stating that the al
Qaeda fugitives moved between a protected area in Liberia and Maison
des Hotes in the district of Zone du Bois, further described as the
Presidential compound in Burkina Faso, and remained there for at
least two months after 9/ll.
On June 13, 2003, TFOS/FBI inspected the facilities of the
Maison des Hotes at Zone du Bois, as well as the bungalow complex
located next door. The Maison des Hotes is not part of the
presidential compound as alleged by media reports; it is several
miles away. The Maison des Hotes is a simple three bedroom
residence, while the adjacent bungalows are six, oneroom units.
TFOS/FBI interviewed the two Chefs, the Facilities Manager, and the
Commanding Officer of the Presidential Security Detail in charge of
the Maison des Hotes and the adjacent bungalow complex. All were
employed in their respective positions at the time of the alleged
visits of al Qaeda fugitives Ahmed Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed.
They were shown photo spreads that included photographs of Ahmed
Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed and were unable to identify either man.
None of those interviewed had any knowledge of Middle Easterners or
East Africans staying at Maison des Hotes or nearby facilities
during the relevant time period.
also met witd i djwho was aware o Ehe various a egations relate to
al Qaeda's presence in Burkina Faso. He advised that he and his
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security forces were completely surprised by the various articles
and have spent considerable time and effort to determine if there
was an al Qaeda presence in the country. [::::::::::::::::]was
convinced that the media allegations that fugitives Ahmed Ghailani
and Fazul Mohammed were hosted by President Campaore or staying as
guests at the Maison des Hotes were false. However, he added that
Burkina Faso could not guarantee that al Qaeda operatives have never
discreetly passed through the country. .
Evaluation of Allegations Related to al Qaeda's Involvement in
Diamond Trafficking in West Africa
The FBI has conducted a comprehensive investigation into
this matter. Investigative results do not support the media
allegations that al Qaeda fugitives Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, Ahmed
Khalfan Ghailani, and Fazul Mohammed engaged in a diamond buying
operation in West Africa.
|:|
This in-depth investigation revealed that the
"in lVl ua s involved in Nassour's West African diamond trafficking
operation during 2000 and 2001, with the exception[:::::::::]
provided consistent details of all aspects of the operation, whilespecifically denvinq the involvement of the al Qaeda fuqitives[¥:::::]
the FBI's investigation
urt er etermine a o amma . eneme and Soulemani M. Guessen
were not aliases used by Ahmed Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed, but
rather they were true names of actual diamond traders from Senegal
employed by Aziz Nassour. Several witnesses.involved in Nassour's
operation, who knew the two Senegalese men, viewed photographs of
Ahmed Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed, and stated that they were not
photographs of Mohammad D. Keneme and Soulemani M. Guessen.
Additionally, investigation into the allegations that
Ahmed Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed were guests at Burkina Fasos
official guest house, Maison des Hotes, for at least two months
after 9/ll, met with similar negative results.
Furthermore, the allegations that the U.S. readied a
Special Forces team to snatch Ahmed Ghailani and Fazul Mohammed in
Western Africa in the weeks following 9/ll were determined to be
false.
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The July 4, 2003, reporting by the Washington Post
alleging that a year-long investigation by European law enforcement
agencies revealed that Charles Taylor sold diamonds to al Qaeda in
2000 and 2001, is questionable. The FBI has conferred with FBI's
Legal Attaches, the U.S. State Department, other U.S. agencies, and
several of our foreign law enforcement counterparts in order to
determine the source of this information. Based on this search, the
only European law enforcement agency that has conducted a yearlong
investigation into this issue is the BFP and they specifically deny
having developed any evidence to suggest al Qaeda's involvement in
purchasing diamonds from Charles Taylor or the region.
The extensive investigation conducted by the FBI in this
matter contradicts the allegations raised by the various media and
Global Witness reports. Based on the investigation conducted by the
BFP, the media allegations detailing Nassour's involvement with
diamond trafficking in exchange for weapons and equipment to the RUF
is accurate; however, there is no evidence to support the
allegations that al Qaeda operatives were involved in this
operation. .
The witness identifications of al Qaeda fu itives weremade after 9/ll. Furthermore, with the exception[::f:::::::::::::]
only two witnesses identified al Qaeda fugitives as being involved
in diamond trafficking in West Africa. The senior RUF official's
initial identification was made only after the U.N. Special Court's
investigators showed the witness an FBI Most Wanted Terrorist
oster not a traditional law enforcement photo spread. [::::::][§:::::i::] identification was after he claimed he viewed the FBI's
M st Want d Poster on the Internet. Even though the two witnesses,[ii::::::fi]the former senior RUF official, were involved in the
same diamond trafficking operations during the same time frame, they
identified different al Qaeda fugitives. Both witnesses based their
identification on a onetime sighting of the individuals they later
thought were al Qaeda fugitives. These witnesses did not have any
further information concerning the individuals they saw and they
were not aware if they purchased diamon I
investigation conducted, it is believed was
mistaken in his identity of the two al ae a ugi ives
I Iand was referring to Souley Guisse and
Mouhamed Kenemi, the two Senegalese males brought in by Aziz
Nassour. Conversely, the former senior RUF official denied seeingthe two al Qaeda fugitives identified[:;::::::g::]but did identify a
third al Qaeda fugitive Sheikh Ahmed Sa im Swe en. The former RUF
official met the man, he now believes tq
E::::]on only one occasion, and he added that this person left
Liberia without consummating any diamond deals. The former RUF
official could not provide any further information, and Balde, after
being shown a photograph of Sweden, denied ever seeing him. No
witness confirmed seeing the al Qaeda fugitive Abdullah Ahmed
Abdullah.
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FBI Investigation into Allegations that Al Qaeda Operatives Cornered
the Market on Western African Diamonds
According to the Washington Post, al Qaeda "reaped
millions of dollars in the past three years from the illicit sale of
diamonds mined by the rebels in Sierra Leone" and al Qaeda
"operatives oversaw a 20 million dollar diamond buying spree that
effectively cornered the market in the region's precious stones."
This activity allegedly occurred during the summer of 2001 and was
used to finance terrorist operations and protect funds from law
enforcement scrutiny, in anticipation that their accounts would be
frozen after the 9/11 attacks. The articles claim that the al Qaeda
operatives originally bought diamonds from RUF rebels at low prices
seeking to resell them for large profits in Europe, but in July 2001
they changed tactics and bought far more diamonds than usual, paying
premium prices for them.
On March 17, 2003, TFOS/FBI traveled to Johannesburg,
South Africa, to meet with the De Beers Diamond Company's Crime
Intelligence Unit regarding its knowledge of possible al Qaeda
involvement with conflict diamonds. De Beers was not aware of any
unusual activity in the Antwerp diamond market with regard to raw
diamonds from West Africa during the summer of 2001. Furthermore,
De Beers did not have any information, other than the above
mentioned media reports, relating to al Qaeda's presence in West
Africa. '
Y [:::::]Diamond Investigative Unit in Antwerp, reviewed the
records of Aziz Nassour's Belgian company, ASA Diam. Also examined
were Samih Ossaily's extensive records seized upon his arrest.
According to the BFP, ASA Diam sold 20 million dollars worth of raw
diamonds in Antwerp during the first five months of 2001 and then
reinvested more than 19 million dollars of these funds for the
purchase of additional diamonds from West Africa. '
' mprehensive review of ASA DIAM financialrecords,[:?iiff:??;;if:jithat media assertions that "[i]nvestigators
say that at east mi ion dollars was withdrawn from the account
money they believe was a portion of the company's transactions
linked to al Qaeda's buying activities" was false. AccordingE:::::::::]
On December 29 2002 Washington Post reported[::::::é;::]
the Belgian investigators say that they uncovere
an recor s s owing that the diamond company enjoyed a sudden surge
in business and turned over almost one billion dollars the yearbefore September 11." | L1 IE:::]told the FBI that such assertions were c ear exaggerations and[::::]the money was not tied in any way to al Qaeda, but traced back
to West Africa for the purchase of additional gems.
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estimated that ASA DIAM's business, during that time frame, was less
than 25 million dollars. -
I Iprofits Aziz Nassour made trafficking
conflict diamonds throughout Africa may have been transferred to
Lebanon, which is believed to be his current location since fleeing
Belgium.
[:::::::]categorized the Washington Post's assertion that
"al Qaeda operatives oversaw a 20 million dollars diamond buying
spree that effectively cornered the market on the regions stones" as
ridiculous. They advised that it would take much more than this'bl b ll' f d ll to corner the raw diamond market. E::::] i i ions o o ars,[?fff:::f:]that during no time in 2001 was there any drying up,
abundance, or unusual activity of Western African gems in the
Antwerp market. . '
also advised the FBI in April 2003, that any "dryLng up" of SierrL
Leone diamonds or later increase in amounts exported could be
explained by the hoarding of the raw stones prior to the Kimberly
Process becoming effective and the U.N. sanctions being lifted
during this period.
TFOS/FBI interviewed diamond exporters| IIb7C
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they closer? mottof the West Atrican diamond trade and did so even
during the period the RUF controlled the mining areas of Kono and
Tonga. They were not aware of any unusual fluctuations or
"cornering" in the West African diamond market during 2001 or
anything else out of the ordinary, including sales in gems in excess
of one million dollars or any al Qaeda diamond purchasing in the
region.
Evaluation of Allegations Related to a1 Qaeda Cornering the West
African Diamond Trade
As a result of this investigation, the FBI has determined
that there is no substance to the allegations that al Qaeda
operatives purchased 20 million dollars in diamonds that cornered
the market. The FBI has been in contact with other intelligence,
law enforcement, and regulatory agencies in the U.S. and abroad;
none have identified the diamond/gemstone trade as a significant
source of funding for al Qaeda.
Possible Terrorist Group Funding Through Conflict Diamonds
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Due to the high value, relatively small size, and
concealable nature of diamonds, the trafficking in diamonds and
other precious gems could represent a simple and essentially risk-
free means of transporting assets for any terrorist organization.
As such, the FBI recognizes the potential systemic vulnerabilities
in the current prevention of conflict diamond trafficking, and that
the region and its resources require further monitoring.
-Currently there is an indication that trafficking of
conflict diamonds occurring throughout Africa may be derivatively
supporting the Lebanese terrorist group Hizbollah6 through
religiousbased contributions. This is based on the general
understanding that Lebanese diaspora communities throughout Africa
control much of the diamond trade, as well as other exportimport
businesses. Many of these Lebanese are ShiiteMuslims with close
ties to Lebanon. As these factors are merely indicators, further
monitoring of the situation is warranted.
A The official diamond trade in Sierra Leone has grown from
1.4 million dollars in diamond exports in 1999, to 6.5 million
dollars in 2000, 26 million dollars in 2001, 41.7 million dollars in
2002, and 33.4 million dollars during the first five months of 2003.
The Sierra Leonean Police, the U.S. Embassy officials in Sierra
Leone, and U.N. Special Court personnel, opined that the majority of
diamonds are illegally smuggled out of the country and that the
total of official and illicit diamonds exported from Sierra Leone on
a yearly basis is estimated to be an amount up to 300 million
dollars.
While the FBI's investigation did not show any connections
between al Qaeda and the trafficking of conflict diamonds, the risk
of terrorist groups using such precious stones as alternative
financing methods for laundering, transporting, or profitgenerating
purposes remains high. Additionally, other terrorist networks may
currently benefit significantly_from fund raising efforts directed
at those who are profiting from the diamond trade. As such, the
U.S. State Department and the U.S. intelligence community, as well
as their counterparts in other countries and international
organizations need to be actively engaged to monitor what is
occurring throughout Africa in the movement and trade of precious
minerals and gems.
6 The FBI/TFOS team investigating this matter has noticed a common theme during the
course of investigation a confusion between the al Qaeda organization and the Hizbollah
organization. Many individuals interviewed during this investigation freely interchange the
terms I-Iizbollah and al Qaeda. _
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