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FD-302 Rev. 10-6-95!
ELL II*IFElP!I{ATIElI*I CIIIIJTAII-JET!
HEIFEIH I5 LTIIIIILASSIFIEIII
_1- DATE l2-l5-ZIJIIFE EV." SCIIBZ4 UII Ei3!iI£T;'I'1*I_.t'Tl'I
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Date of transcription Z3 1 Z 2 O O3
On 07/25/2003,| date. . . 13'of birthJ | social security account number: b?
telephonezl LLresidence:Lh i | home tele one: p was
interviewed by| L Special Agent, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Washington Field Office, and[::::::::::] Postal
Inspector, United States Postal Inspection Service, New Jersey
DlVlSlOn. After Special Agent[:::] and Postal Ins ector showed
E:::::::]their official identification and advised f the
purpose for the interview,[:::::::]provided the following: I
worked at the United States Army Medical Research
Institute o ectious Diseases "USAMRIID"L, Fort Detrick,Maryland from Itol Iworked as a| rjin the |Division. His area ofspecialization was to '
pmwmgmnmi 07/25/2003 ad I$03 2'79AWF222936POI~eQO ,9292°92*ti1=# 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID;279ABAC101392 Daredicmed N A
Postal Ins ector
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency."am
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I Iwas shown floor plans of buildings andI Iat USAMRIID.I Ihighlighted the areas where b6
t e Ames Ba spores were stored Note: the floor lans b7C
highlighted are filed in a 1A envelope FD34O!!. b2
I" ified three rooms in Suite bFof the Bacteriology Division, aI I suite,I IroomsI Iand Room| Icontained a walkI in re rigeratorI I Icontaining Ames Ba
spore cultures. The temperature of the walk in cooler was 4°
Celsius.
I I I ' was located in this room.. Room£::%::]contained a
pass through autoclave, used for sterilization, w lC was
accessible from the outside hallway. The autoclave was large
enough to hold tall carts full of dead animals.
[:::::::]identified on the floor plan for building[::::] a' passage between Suite[:::]and SE%E§5::] of the Bacteriology
Division located between rooms and Anyone who had
access to SuiteI Ialso had access to Suit and vise versa.
Icouid not remember which roomI Iused as
primary lab. Bruce Ivins and both . . evel
investigators used roo as their primary lab. This room
contained a refrigerator an or freezer where Ba was stored. A[:::::;:::¥:;::l ?QLJ Iworked inulte o t e IDivision. AlsoII I I I Iworked in suiteof the lVlSlOn I II Iand expert in Anthrax, worked primarily in su1te[::::]
of thel IDivision. I Imav currently be working at
theI II Iworked in Suites an
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of the[::::::::::;;]Division.I |cannot remember the room
E:::::::::::]primarily used. Rooms d| |were used as
men's change rooms. Rooms| |and were used as women'schange rooms. Room I was used as an office and had a des
writing. lab, room had a refrigerator. Room
contained the animal cages; room had a fermenter for growing
large quantities of Ba cells. Room was a laboratory not used
for Ba work. Room[:::::]served as the walk in cold room. The two
labs where Ba work primarily occurred were rooms[:::::]andhoweveryE;:::::;g]does not recall who was assigned to room
These la s wou have had a refrigerator or freezer or both.
The Ames Ba, along with other strains of Ba, was din vials kept in several freezers and refrigerators in the[ff2fTsuites[:::] and[:::1in the[:::::::;:::;]Division. Purified Ames Baspore colonies cou d be maintaine un er refri eration for earswithout ' yone with access to theisuites || or|:|E:]in.theTfiiii?i::::fTDivision had access to anyt ing stored in the
freezers or refrigerators. When left USAMRIID inl |E:::], The[:::] suites[::] and in e Division
housed the stock of Ames Ba at USAMRIID.
In 1978, ' Ieitherkeys or badges were needed for access to the] |suites. Later
swipe cards were introduced which were programed to restrict entry
to designated suites.
Someone could easily grow Ames Ba and label it Ba Vollum
and no one would know the difference. Likewise, someone could take
a swab of Ames Ba and grow as much Ames Ba as they desired in '
another lab. did not ve any Ames Ba spores or vegetative ce s wit whentiifdeparted from USAMRIID.ib6
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There were not any contractors, subcontractors or outsidelab assistants that worked with Ames Ba whileE::::::]was at
ff USAMRII the staff workin with Ames Ba were in house sta . b6In room%:::%%iin the[;;;;;:;;:;;]Division, kin b7C
refrigerator was dedi storage of Ba culture b2
collections. While at USAMRIID, neither nor any other b7?
researcher released live strains of Ames Ba to another research
faci1ity.| Iwould have had to authorize the
release of Ba strains from USAMRIID to an outside facility.
[:::::::]did not work with a lyophilizer at USAMRIID. E:::]
was not aware of any freeze dried Ames Ba spores stored at USAMRIIDwhile[::]worked there. However, the technique to weaponize Ames Ba b6
would involve] I bvc
I from USAMRIID,
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had the most expertise in the weaponization of Ames Ba. It is
likely that anyone else with expertise in weaponization would be a
Ph.D. level microbiologist.
[:::::::]was unaware of any areas at USAMRIID had
problems with bacterial contamination. The[::::]suites and[:::]lD[;:;:;%::::;:]W¬I¬ under negative pressure. The air inside
ven e roug a filtration system with hoods that employed a b6
germicidal light and ultraviolet light. Bacterial DNA absorb the bvc
wavelengths of this type of light and die from the absorption. bg
bx|:| did not work in bui1ding|;| at USAMRIID.
Researchers in building[:::::]did "piggybac " into and out of the
hot areas; however, they were protective of their workspace and
only allowed close colleagues whom they regularly worked with to
follow them into the hot suites. Visiting scientists were notallowed to enter the[::::]suites during the time[:::::::]worked at
USAMRIID.
An one with access to the[::::]suites in the[:::::::::::::] Y
Division could have removed a sample of Ames Ba merely by taking a
drop of Ames vegetative cells and sealing them in a small tube.
The tube could be carried by hand out of the[:::] suite or wrapped
in foil and placed in the pass through box in Room[:::::1 Suite [::]
[::] The foil would protect the Ames Ba DNA from the harmful
ultraviolet light in the pass through box.F
E:::::::]is not aware of anyone who said they might make b6Ba for improper use. Likewise,g::]is not aware of anyone with b7c
either access and/or the knowle ge to create or handle Ba who
expressed hostile attitudes toward the media, the United StatesSenate or the Democratic Party. E::::;::Ldoes not know anyone|UUU
believes or suspects was involve wit t e mailings of the anthrax
letters. Note: described in a prior interview, dated
01/19/2002, ho believes the Ba was dried and prepared for the
'mailings in 2001 . Rather,[::]thinks the attacks were foreign
based because they are the opposite of the mission and goal of the
researchers at USAMRIID to protect the armed services and the
public through development of a vaccine.[::::::::]is not aware of
anyone he has worked with who was lax in handling Ba or who
inappropriately expressed interest in biological agents convertibleto weapons. Likewise,[;:1is not aware of anyone at USAMRIID
rumored to be intereste in acquiring Ba, other biolo ical orchemical agents or the means to produce them. [::::::%]is not aware
of anyone who expressed an interest in undermining forensic
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techniques. [:::::::]is not aware of any unoffical or unrecorded
92 work involving Ba or its simulants.
Neither[:::::::]nor[:::]associates have any personal or92 . . . . .professional association with Trenton, New Jersey Princeton, NewJersey, or any where else in New Jersey. Neither[:::::::]nor[::::]
associates traveled to New Jersey in September and October 2001.
The standard operating procedures for decontamination of
Class II and Class III biosafety cabinets first involved wiping
them down with bleach or a similar phenol based disinfectant.
Second, washing the surfaces with water to prevent corrosion from
the bleach/disinfectant. Third, switching on the cabinet's built
in ultraviolet lights,
[:;;;;::]<iid not work in theL;;;;:;::]Division at USAMRIIDand does no now whether paraformald r glutaraldehyde
fumi ation was used there. Howev aformaldehyde was used inthe Division in roomif::?ij A wall was knocked down
in to a ow the moving of a fermenter too large to fit
throug the doorway. After the fermenter was in place, the wall
was rebuilt and resealed, but paraformaldehyde was needed to
decontaminate room[::::] before it was ready for use. [:::::::] has
not smelled bacterial decontamination agents in the virology suitesbecause[::]has not worked there; however[%::ghas smelled bacterial
decontamination agents in room[:::::]in t e acteriology suites.
[::;:::::]does not remember seeing or using any plastic
storage con to store his materials at USAMRIID.numbered alliifffab note s and all were inventoried. e tthem all at USAMRIID whentifleft.[:::]believes they should be
archive USAMRIID but does not know where they are currently
they might be stored in the library.
has not purchased pre-stamff:invelopes like the
sstored. El believes
ones in the anthrax mailings for either or someone else
use. remembers using metered envelopes at USAMRIID. Likewise,
has not used any vending machines in Frederick to purchase
pre-stamped envelopes.
[::::::]has never had contact with| I
[::::::] did not personally host visiting foreignscientists at USAMRIID; however, during[:;:]tenure there, most of
the foreign visitors were from England. ecurity personnel
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maintained a logbook record of foreign visitors. Foreign visitors
to USAMRIID were escorted at all times. They were not permitted
access to any hot suites or locations where Ba was stored or
utilized. As a result, there were not any opportunities for themto remove samples undetected. [::::g:] is not aware of any foreign
visitors requesting samples of any ind from USAMRIID. The
; Director's office coordinated all foreign visits to USAMRIID.
i [:::::::]does not remember any foreign visitors displaying interesti in the Ames strain of Ba, weaponization techniques or lyophilizing
methods. Foreign visitors only had access to the conference room.
4 They did not stay long enough to undergo the required series of
vaccinations and background investigation to obtain a security
clearance.
No foreign visitors to USAMRIID asked[:E:::::]where they could
urchase prestamped envelopes in Frederick during their visit.
does not remember any foreign visitors expressing anti-
American sentiments during their visit.
[::::::]was asked to account for[:::]whereabouts during
Se tember 17 and 18, 2001. In turn,[::]provided copies of emails
sent during work on Monday, September 17, 2001, at| |[::;::::]never observed any foreign visitors using pre-
stamped enve opes resembling the envelo es in the anthrax mailings.
|:|was asked to account for|:|whereabouts' duringOctober 5,6,7,8 and 9, 2001. In turn,[::]provided copies of e-
mails Isent during work on Friday, October 5, 2001, at
92
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FD-340! envelope.The copies of emails[:::::::]provided are filed in a 1A
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5'a192
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V FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ALL II~IFEI1?!I-[ATIIZHI CEIBITAIIHED
HEFEIIJ IS THIICLASSIFIEIII
DATE l;:l52l3l35 B: =':|El15'¢i¢l UL BAIJ.rDIi.~*TH Data oftanscpon O6 :12 C2003
On June 6, 20034
Social Security/ .
I dare of birth
Accou t Number] | wasA emplo ent, the UNITED STATES ARM atl place of ?hMEDICAL RESEAR STITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES USAMRIID!PORTER STREET, FORT DETRICK, MARYLAND MD!, 21702, telephone,EEEEEEEE5:] by Special Agents SAs!| |AND
After being advised of the identities of the interviewin gAgents and the purpose of the interview,[::::::]provided the
following information:
i atUSAMRIID, was queried regarding microorganism decontamination
technologies andftheir effects on subsequent ch ' ' A
analyses.
telephone and
with bleach. Hydrogen
cleave peptide bonds.
DNA AWAY, a
destroys proteins and
with bleach, DNA AWAY
reduced if additional
target microorganismsparticipated in the discussion.telephone also
Sodium hypochlorite, a primary component of household
bleach, denatures proteins via oxidation. Destruction of bacterial
spores and degradation of DNA result from contact with ~51O%
household bleach. DNA has been detected using polymerase chain
reaction PCR! techniques pursuant to treatment of bacterial spores
peroxide is a strong oxidizer, known to
caustic oxidant produced commercially, also
DNA. The effectiveness of decontamination
and similar commercial products may be
organic molecules and proteins are present
along with tHe microorganisms. These additional molecules may bind
up the decontaminating agent, thus hindering interactions with the
~ Protein denaturation is the primary mechanism of
inactivation by formaldehyde gas. Specifically, formaldehyde
interacts with amine groups and affects carbamide linkages.
Positive hits with PDR have been obtained after decontamination;
however, a detectable PCR signal could require ridding t- ampleI
l§1[::].ZD1, gs
hwwamnw O6/O6/2003 M Fort Detrick, Maryland "
?X§92QX%
by Ae? 279AWF-222936-USAMRIID 279A-BA-ci0i3929w@d
SASH 9
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agencyb6
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of excess formaldehyde. recalled a study conducted by[::;::]
LNU an phonetic! using tissue embedded with Wes
Nile virus and paraffin. The aim of the project was to determine
the effectiveness of DNA extraction following formalin fixation of
the tissue. This method of decontamination did not hinder
subsequent DNA amplification; however, proteins within the tissue
were affected. A methodology was developed which facilitated the
release of formaldehyde from tissue-using organic reagents.
Oxidation and halogenation of bacterial spores result
from exposure to chlorine dioxide gas. Chlorine binds to cellular
components yielding inactivation of proteins and enzymes required
f r
as researched extensively th¬'use
or clorine dioxide as a deco aminant.
The intensity of gamma irradiation used for
decontamination is typically not enough to nick strands of DNA.
However, exposure to gamma rays may damage the DNA and decrease the
sensitivity of PCR techniques. Significant amounts of radiation
would be necessary to completely abolish a PCR signal. Generally,
the degree of DNA chopping depends on the extent and intensity of
exposure. DNA.has also been shown to survive the autoclaving method
of decontamination.
Latent fingerprints are lipid imprints which may be
destroyed by alcohols, detergents and physical wiping. Gamma
irradiation was not known to affect the detection of latent
fingerprints.| |and| lwere not aware of studies
to determine the effects of forma e y e vapor, chlorine dioxide,
and hydrogen peroxide on the detection of latent fingerprints.
Bacterial spores are more resistant than vegetative cells
to decontamination efforts. Generally, the effectiveness of
. disinfection depends on the concentration of the decontaminant and
the length of exposure. Often, postdecontamination analyses yield
negative culture results and positive PCR hits. These results
indicate the absence of detectable levels of viable microorganisms,
but the presence of characteristic DNA. When testing for the
presence of microorganisms, it is important to test first for
viability via culturing, followed by confirmation analyses using
PCR.
[::::::]indicated that SA[::::::::::::]was familiar with
postdecontamination tests of biosafety cabinets treated with'
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bleach. Swipes of biosafety cabinets following decontamination
yielded no growth on culture media, but detectable levels of pXO1
and pXO2 in some samples. A study was conducted whereby pre-
decontamination sampling was used to identify the 'hottest', or
most contaminated, areas in a biosafety cabinet. Detectable levels
of DNA were obtained from these areas after decontamination with
bleach.
The following USAMRIID personnel may provide further
insights into the impact of various decontamination methods on
subsequent scientific ' UCE IVINSJ II land
Internet searches may yield additional information related to
decontamination of biological materials, including diagrams of key
mechanisms of inactivation.
[:::::] provided the Agents with a manuscript containing
an overview of decontamination technologies and descriptions of the
mechanisms of action of numerous decontaminants on micro ' s.The document, titled DECONTAMINAIION, was co ored byiimiiiivand
| SCIENCE
APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SAIC!, NATIONAL CANCER
INQTITETE T FREDERICK, FORT DETRICKL MARYLAND, 21702, telephone
The manuscript is maintained in.aIIA envelope FD-
34O! lso recommended the following textbook as a useful
reference: DISINFECTION, STERILIZATION, AND PRESERVATION, 5th
edition, Seymour S. Block, Editor, Lippincott Williams & Wilkins,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 2001. Photocopies of the first two
pages of the textbook were provided to the Agents and are
maintained in a 1A envelope.
The Agents were also provided with copies of USAMRIID'S
records of transfers of Bacillus anthracis that occurred from 1997
thr quested in a letter dated June 5, 2003, fromSSAtEfE:ifff::if:fi The EA101 forms provided by USAMRIID are
maintained in a 1A envelope.
A .._ 0. 6 wl-it
FD-30% Rev. 10-6~95!
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ALL II1IFER1LiaTIlIlI~I IIIJIJTAIIIED
HEFEIIII IS T_E~IIIL£tSL':§IFIED
DATE J.2l~52!3ElEi EFT BE-I324 UC B§&lJ.¢"DE¬fTH
_ Date of transcription Q 9 Z 14 Z 2 Q Q3
/.
On Se tember 11, 2003, g A date of bebir~:hJ irsei was W
interviewed at| | Tlace of emelo ieggégghe United SgaggimégyMedical Researc Institute ofmgngpctious Diseases iUSAMRlIDlocated at Fort Detrickl Mar land 21702, work telephp h[::::::TXE?? beingadTsed §%m¬ identities of the agénE§ aha Ee
purpose of the interview provided the following
information:
I
individua contacted to schedule the exam said that - b7CUSAMRIID had requested thaé Ibe polygraphed for reliability
issues. [:::::] knew that others had similar experiences when
contacted by polygra hers, and that many of them complained top1Commander of USAMRIID about the situation| iwas polygraphed on the same day as and had thesame problem. [:::::]
[::::::]provided the agents with a co ofi lcurriculum|vitae c.v.! which listed] |home address|a§ Hfelt that£::]was given misleading informationregarding o ygraph examination.[::] advised that the b5
home telephone
c.v. is maintained_in a 1A envelope, FD-340.
educational history, as outlined rn[:::]c.v., is
as follows: obtained his Bachelor 'ence degree in
[:::::::]from the University ofl Iin his _
Science degree iq
University 1n| | and his Doctor o in
|and| |from the University of| I
[:::::::] employment histor as outlined in[:::]c.v., is
IY,
as fOllOWS:|
5'}
mvwigationon 09/11/2003 at Fort Detrick, Maryland ' ,7,
~ '?3°92 ,92'»z2>92 him
PM 279A-WF-222936USAMRIID92/ 279ABA-C101392 Dawdicmed N A ~
SA -
by SA
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your age
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
Q .. ~~
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[::::::]did not work with either the Brokaw or New York
Post letters, although[::]recalls seeing material from the Brokaw
letter.
[::::::]knew that[:::::]had handled the Daschle and LeahY b
letters, but[::]did.not see anyone else work with the letters.
[::::::]recallad[:::::]clearing people out of the lab prior to
working with one of the letters. »
| I FThe FBI photographed Ehe letters in Ehe I
Veterinary Medicine room across the hallway from
that were ideal for photographing the evidence.Eiffjrecalled
the letters were contained in double ziploc bags while being
FBI personnel were present at the time.advised that there were flat tables in the Vete ' y Medicine room
that
photographed. This activity took place after normal business
hours, and] I a number of technicians, and many
During the fall of 2001,E;;;§::::]primary work areasincluded the following: Buildin Suite[:::1 Suites[::]and- [:], Rooms|_____________1 and[:::i and the Clinica Lab sub- as wellside of Building] | At that time,[:::;;::::;][?i:i?i:??i]anthrax studies with monkeys using B.a. o aine from1076
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BRUCE IVINS, I I
[::::::Iknew[;::::::::;::g:lonly in a professional manner.
They interacted at mee ings, an c a ted in the hallwa s about work
and general topics, such as weekend activities. was b6
working on an Ebola project at that time, and never 117Ijllaborated on projects. AfterI:I left th Division,andI:Ionly exchanged greetings. - '0-' hat their
st conversation would have been around 1998. had no knowledge
of who[::::::]nmy have socialized with at US*" I.
I Idid not recallI Imentioning either New
Jersey or never made any comments
about Senator Tom Daschle Senator Patrick Leahy, the New York
Post or Tom Brokaw. never ' anthrax withI:I' and: advised that onl knew in a virolo nt y gy co ext.I:¬|did not recall discussing biological or chemical
w rfare.
I I toldI:I that I
I but did not provide anydetails as toI work. advised that it was difficult to
distinguish what actually told[:::]from what was circulated
around USAMRIID or in the media.06
di recall seein i'n B ' 'ngI:I W
althou h did see in Building near Suite and in the
Division A ministration area. I
at USAMRIID, had a laboratory in BuildingI I andthereforeI Imay have worked in that laboratory space.
I:Ilearned about the history of B.a. Ames at USAMRIID 136after the anthrax mailings of 2001 had already taken place. I:I bx
thought that Ames was sent in by an investigator in Iowa and v
isolated at USAMRIID.
I series of experiments in approximately
1998 to determine at what point B.a. could be isolated from an
infected animal. Washed B.a. Ames s ores obtained from IVINS wereprovided directly to the group for the stud and IVINS
o conducted the quality con ro _ r e experiments. I
laboratory group handled the spores, as well as all o e samples,
after the exposures had taken place. |:|provided the agents
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[::::]a reprint documenting this work in Military Medicine, Volume
164, December 1999, and titled "Comparison of Noninvasive Sampling
Sites for Early Detection of Bacillus anthracis Spores from Rhesus
Monkeys after Aerosol Exposure" on which the lead author was MAJOR
ALEC S. HAIL. This scientific paper is maintained in the 1A
envelope, FD340.
During the same time frame in 1998, the walkin cold room b2
in Suite |:|was used to store B.a. Ames spores which had been blF
obtained from IVINS. These spores were used in studies where human
white blood cells were exposed in order to find early markers of
infection.
Ialways obtained B.a. b§one in] |laboratory group grew spores. bC SPOIGS EIOIH as I10
r I Iof phenol and water. were stored in a mixture
did not
spores beyond branch
of USAMRIID.I ' f mT
distribute or share any of IVINS B.a. Ames
of[:::1 nor has[:] ever sent B.a. outside
[::::::]had no knowled e of anyone at USAMRIID who haslyophilized live B.a. Ames. Ini:::::bnly dead B.a. Ames is
lyophilized. The Special Pathogens Sample Test Laboratory SPSTL!prepared dead, lyophilized B.a. spores of various strains for use
as controls, These lyophilized spoesI were requested throuqhEhe SPSTL was beginning to initiate a
complete set of paperwork, including a request form, to document
such transfers; however some transfers may not have been
documented.| |and| |would have information on the
lyophilized spores.
E::::::]had no knowledge of[::::::::::::::]protocols for
producing B.a. spores, and has never expressed an opinion regarding
whether the B.a. contained in the 2001 mailings was broth or agar
grown.
I With regard to
USAMRIID
provided the following informationali$@ to
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[First Name Unknown FNU[] I I
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all visited USAMRIID for short meetings, and would not
ave a access to any laboratory spaces. Their access was limited
to USAMRIIDs conference rooms. -
| Iofi |visited USAMRIID for a coupleof weeks in ZUUD and worked in a co d laboratory onElectrochemiluminescence ECL! antigen detection assays.[%::]had an
unescorted visitor ass and did not have access to any " ot"laboratory s aces. E::::::::::] likely had the most contact withI |whilei Iwas at USAMRIID.E::]nm have taken some antibodiesback to| withl |however[:E]did not transport any
select agents upon return.
[::::::]did not discuss anthrax with[::::::] an didnot work with any bacteria while[::]was at USAMRIID. did not
express any antiAmerican sentiment during[:::]visit, nor did[::]
» ask about, or have in his possession, an re-stam ed envelopes.|m0st likely worked in Building[::E:fRooms , and [::]
Two yophilizers were present in these rooms; however would not
have had access to these instruments.b6 *
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I Iprovided the agents with a copy of a list of| |archived,
received electronic mail for September 17 and 18 2 O1, which ismaintained in a lA envelo e FD340. Althoughliiarchives all of[:::]sent electronic mE%%%§:;:}oes not have those records for August
or September of 2001. t ought that those months may have been
lost during the time when there was a problem with one of the
servers at USAMRIID. l
E::::::]also provided the agents with a copy of[:::]
electronic calendar for the week of September 17-23, 2001, which is
maintained in a 1A envelope, FD34O. Although there is one meeting
FD-302a Rev. 10-6-95!n " 0
06
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Continuation of FD-302 of I ~ , On O 9 / 1 1 / 2 O O 3 , Page __§__
indicated for n September 17, 2001,[;:::::]could notrecall ' ue <3[::] extensive w rk sc edule at thattime. can verify that[::::ijwas present at wonk
during that time period.
[::::::]provided the agents with a copy of[:::]electronic
calendar for the period of October 1-14, 2001, which 1S maintained
in a 1A envelope. Although there are appointments and activities
listed for October 5-9 2001,[::::::]cou1d not be sure thatl I
attended them due to| I busv work schedule.|
[::;£;;]recalled| Ion October 6,2001 howeve was not certain thatL__Jattended! ||on October 7, 2001, as[::]may have worke a
instead.
-K
n
J
L_ __ i 1 3
x
FD-302 Rev. 10-6-95! I
ALL II-IFDPIUJTIUI-I EEI-ITAIIITEII
HEPEIIII IS IDICLASSIFIEI1
-1- DATE ].2l52UUEi BY 60324 UC EZiJI§!'DH,.*TH
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Date of transcription 1 O Z 1 6 Z 2 Q O 3
I non I I , SSNI II home telephone number
, was interviewed at the Amerithrax3 Offsite in
Frederick, Maryland. After being advised of the identity of theinterviewing agents and the nature of the interview,[:] provided
the following information:
I Ireceived his PHD in Bioloqy fromI I
University]136
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I I Iworked ' I
includingI Iand the University ofI I
L___J
While working at the University ofI Iwas
Ihas never produced sporesor dried any controlled substance. '
[::::::]began working at the United States Arm Medical
Research Insti te of Infectious Diseases USAMRIID! on b§
From until approximately worked fo _ bC
. While in thworkedI Iof buildingI I in roomI andI I
worked wi
I hpl was responsible for
In was moved to the
Cur rks on buildingis working withI I I
I I The lab thatI Iis m
9M.30ZE%
kp beFiI¢# 279A-WF222936-USAMRIID92/279BA'-C101392-92z.3Z92DaI¢ dictated 10 16 Q b/C
SAby SAI I
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned 0 your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.IW%%mmnw 10/16/O3 M Frederick, Maryland
v 1 __
' FD-30221 Rev. 10-6-95! I .
3
b6279AWF222936USAMRIID W;
cmmmmnmndmzw __4 ,On1O/16/03 ,Pge 2
currently working in is secured by a manual push button combination
lock. .
While at USAMRIIDZI was immunized against Botuinum b6
in /F
oes not have access to] Ilabs or
building has never worked with Bacillus anthracis Ba!. '
attends meetings During thesemeetings some in ividuals discuss their research and because of he
that fact has become familiar with names of some of the bi
individua
andls w 0 work with Ba including: Bruce Ivins,
h!.| |is also aware that
works witfa. has never discussed Ba wiEh anyone at
USAMRIID .
06
[:::::::]does not have an ersonal or rofessional Y P Pcontacts in New Jersey. Occasionally,EEE;:::]has passed through
New Jersey on the way to New York, but does not recall oing toNew York close to September 11, 2001. Additionally,[:::::¬]does
not know anyone that works at USAMRIID that has personal or
professional contacts in New Jersey.
[:::::] has occasionally seen piggybacking through some of
the doors at USAMRIID but advised that it is not supposed to occur.
has never seen or used pre stamped envelopes.
Additiona y, has never used or seen large sterilite
containers at D.
E;:::::;]does not know anyone at USAMRIID that appears to
be unstab e or as discussed using any agent inappropriately.E;:::;:]does not discuss politics with[:;:]colleagues and has never
ear anyone discussing the anthrax mai ings.
[::::::]knew that Ba samples were going to be tested at
USAMRIID however,[::]did not know that the letters were atC
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279AWF222936USAMRIID
Continuation of FD-302 of | I , On 1 0 / 1 6 / O 3 , Page106
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USAMRIIIL [::::::]did not play any role regarding the samples or
letters.
[:::;;::lhas never had a foreign visitor come to seebut [:]has a en ed lectures given by foreign scientists.
has never seen an unescorted foreign visitor and advised tha
are not allowed into the laboratories.
[:::::]never saw, met or talked tol
£_v
Rev. 01-31-2003! Z
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
I Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 10/03/20033
To: Washington Field Attn: SA[;;;;;;;;;;;;] AMX 2
SA AMX 1
AL L IIIIFUHIIATIDE-I CDIITFAIITEII
, _ HPEIN IS UNCLASSIFIEDF1°m= WaShl119'tO1'l Field DATE 12-15-anus BY 60324 U: BMJ;'DE.-*'TH
AMX 3
Contact:I I Postal Inspector
Drafted By: I ICase ID #= 279A-WF222936POI Pending!-553%
279AWF222936USAMRIID Pending!-Les
Title: AMERITHRAX
MAJOR CASE 184
FEZEQRi;__RenQIL_resnlrs of investigation to date regarding
Details: has been investigated in captioned case based
upon her wor with and access to Bacillus anthracis Ba!.
I Iis aI Iand hasbeen employed with the United States Army Medical ResearchInstitute for Infectious Diseases sincelh _Ihasphysical access to the "hot suites" and as participatedin
aerosol challenges using Ba. also received pipets ofsolutions from BRUCE IVINS w 1c spread on agar lates.[;;::;;;;]believed the solutions con ained Ba althoughE::] does notno e strain. ,
As per FD302, date July 28,2003 has noknowledge where Ba is stored at USAMRIID and h s no expertise inweaponization techniques.[::::;:1has not traveled to New Jerseyand has no friends or relat1ves92residing in that state.
A review o telephone and financial recordsfor calendar year 200 we y unremarkable and show no connection
to New Jersey.
Timeline First Mailing .00 P.M:, 9/17/2001 thro
8:00 p.m., 9/18/2001!
I
I IEY.1 _ 92
° _ 9292I06
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To: Washington Fie From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF222936POI, 10/O3/20033
A time line ofl Iactivities for
the likely periods of th mailings or the anhrax letters from106
Princeton, New Jersey was compiled using USAMRIID security key _ b7
card access, telephone and credit card use ds. The time line
focused on any[:::]hour period for whic would be
unaccounted, with the premise that it ta hours to drive
round trip fromI ItoI
A review of USAMRIID ke card building accessrecords reveal that on Sep ember 17, 2001[j%::;;] entered bibuilding| |atI I hours and r mained at wo_ untilggggg? bC
at On September 18, 200l,E::¬?:::kntered buildinghours and remained at work u92til[:::] hours.
eview of phone records for telephone/account numberI sub§g;iber| I
1 According to
A review ofI Icredit card account
history did not show any credit card transactions during the
period of the first mailing. _
Time-line Second Mailing :00P.M., 10/6/2001 through
92 11;00A.M., 10/09/2001!
A review of credit card account
A review of home telephone records disclose
that on October 8, 2001 at an ou ing telephone call was
made from home to
. On October 9, 2001, key card building acces ordsreveal[::::;::]was at USAMRIID, and entered building E:ffTat[::::]hours and e ited at[::::Ihours.
has been interviewed on several occasions
related to the921nvestigation. Investigation to date has revealed
no direct, testimonial, or circumstantial evidence which
2
isclose that onISeptem er 17, b2
2001, a an outgoin tele hone call was made from b7Ehome telephone t On September 18 2001, Miat an out oinq telephone call was made fromJIQgQQE@gUU b7Qhome te ephone to? I was interviewe uly2003 and stated] I I LI
history disclosed that on I E3,transactions occurred in I '
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136
1:713
Y - To: Washington Fie From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF222936-POI, 10/O3/20033
indicates that was involved in the preparation or mailing
of the anthrax- ace etters.
| Iwas interviewed aboutzwork with Ba. in
January 2002.]
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FD~302 Rev. 10-6-95!
MJ, II~1FllF!T'TATTF.lI~I l".llT1'T£.Ii~I|!'ITJ
A HEEEEIIJ IS TIIJCLAISSIFIEIII
I -I- DATE l2l5~2l3l3i3 BY EH32--1 UC BAl'L*'DI*'U'TH
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Date of transcription ]_ !Z IQQQ3
On October 2, 2003, I kE beI Iwith Social_5eQnrit¥_Acco gurren b7c
ad ress] Itelephone number was interviewed b PostaI*InspectorE and Postal Ins ectommmmmmmhat the FBI
merit rax III o fice in Frederic , Maryland. After being advised
of the purpose of the interview and the identity of the
interviewing Inspectors,[:::]provided the following information:
[::;:1works at the United States Army Medical Re
Institute o nfectious Diseases USAMRIID! as aI bmarfs in the b6 I I Division under bvc
University oI Ireggived_hi§_i:§§elor of Si 'I _* his BhD DJ I Ifrom the
I Istarted at USAMRIID
onI I
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now works in LabsI:I and|:| in
bulldlHg[:::] Prior to the September 2001 anthrax m ihad onl entered the[:::]lab to assist in [::::::::::f:%if?f
was decontaminated and the equipment was moved to[:]
NS had swabbed outside the suites and found anthrax
spores. [:::]was not sure what strain discovered outside thelabs. However, due to this discovery,Efi:Iwas taken down and
decontaminated. The decontamination process was accomplished bI BRUCE IVINS, I Iand | |
[::::]was aware that there were Ames es stored in thewalkin coolers/freezers between labs[::] and[if?Fduring the
decontamination process.[::::]knew that anthrax was stored in bothliquid and frozen forms in the coolers. The materials in th ¥92~//coolers were moved from[::] to[::] during the cleaning proc s. kQ ,2
hwswwon 10/3/2003 at Frederick, Marvland b6
@;¢3@ m ,vpm> b7C
PM - - - RIID 279ABACl0l392 Daredicmwd n a
Postal InspectorI I by : Inspector
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
FD-302a Rev. 10-6-95! 0 ' 0
279AWF222936USAMRIID 279ABAC1Ol392
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Continuation of FD-302 of | , On 1 O / 3 / 2 O O 3 , Page 2
w
was not aware of any piggybacking
into suites. The security officer; is extremely cautious
in terms of security. ~
[:::::]did not do any work in the [::] suites. In order to
work in building[::::]a scientist must have extensive vaccinations.
[:::;:;;]does not have any ons in mind concer in the n bmait? o e anthrax letters.[?ffjdid not know[:::::%::?::::] nor
did recall if they had ever met. .
[:::::::] stated that the whole anthrax field benefitted after
' ' th f ld the anthrax mailings. There was ver little interest in e 1e ,until after the anthrax mailings.[::§:::::::::]benefitted from theaftermath.| Istated that unlike the cutting edge reseafch on
anthraxEs hard to work with.| Ichose to work at USAMRIID under| l[::::::::::]for better pay.
[::::::] has never used a lyophilizer at USAMRIID. wasaware of one located in the cold side of the laH[:::] bJ%E?g]has
never used it. [:::] did use a lyophilizer in graduate school.
[:::::::]has never worked with dry anthrax spores. ' not
aware of any studies at USAMRIID that involved dry spores. is
involved in using wet spores by injecting them into the test
animals.
was shown a number 6 prestamped envelope. [:::]
stated that did not recall seeing one of the envelopes.
examined py of the layout of USAMRIID buildingstated that[i:fj and[:::] suites contained walk-in
for storing anthraxb6
107$
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FD-302a Rev. 10-6-95! ' '
2'79AWF222936USAMRIID 279A-BAClO1392 b6
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Continuation ofFD-302 of _ , On 1 O / 3 / 2 O O 3 , Page 3
also traveled to| lbut returned the same dav. I |
| and| | traveled to| I New Jersev
durin t e summer of 2002 d g an
|:| has not hosted any foreign visitors at USAMRIID.
agreed to take a polygraph examination regarding the
anthrax mailings.
I > 4, A '92 I r. Q
FD-302 Rev. 10-6-95!
-1-
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ALL II~IFCIF!I{..TIEJI~I EUIJTAILIED D5
HEREIN I1-J UIIIELASSIFIEIII 137C
DATE 13-15-2008 E35 513132112 UC BMIr'D1<I.*'TI-I _ _
Date of transcription 10 Z 1 O Z2 Q Q3
On October 10, 2003, _ W , born
I Iwith Social Security Account NumberIt;home_ o e umber I
was interyiewed=Qy Postal Inspector and ?ostal 1InspectorI IatL} Ijplace on emp oyment t e United StatesArmy Research Institute o nfectious Diseases USAMRIID!. After é§>é§>
being advised of the purpose of the interview and the identity of
the interviewing Inspectors,[::::::::]provided the following
information:
E:::::%;;;;;;;:]has worked at USAMRIID sinceI I FromI I b,to worked inI Ias an bicreturned to in '
as aI I
I I currently works in Ehe ivision inthe Department ofI I under the Branch
Chief. - .
4
I Iwork with anthrax was ma
Iwh1leE:]was in ince
has worked with virusesbilities i A '|
works at the direction of
the Principle Investigators.
[::::::::] is not familiar with processes for drying
anthr x or working with a lyo hilizer believes that=BRUC iI£lNS, andIi . Iare the ones that would
know ho_ to weaponr anthrax.
WhileI Iwas worked in the labs Iwhere animals were use . Since as wor ed in building bb
[::::1 rooms| Iand as access to the hot suites in b7:
buildingI Iand is familiar with building
the walk-in coolers in room the cold storage refri erator in r
room[::] and the cold storage room in the basement.
b2
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mwemmlm 10/10/2003 M Frederick, Marvland A
2"/9AWF-222936 "92@92 921Nl.: RE"%92 " r "F|°# 2'79A~WFZ22936 1/ 2'79ABAClOl39Z Dam dlctamd I1 <3. be
IPostal Inspector b7Cw I IPostal Inspector L--J
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
I
" ' ¬ ¬
FD-302a Rcv. 10-6-95!
279AWF222936USAMRIID 279ABAC101392 Zia
1 Continuation ofFD-302 of _| , On 1 O / 1 O /2 O O 3 , Page 2
_ _ lsaid
that in the basement there are a lot of freezers. Each freezer has
a list of contact names if there is a problem with the cold
storage. A person could determine if any anthrax was stored there
by locating the contact person. Up until recently there were no
locks on the freezers.
[::::::::]believes that it would be easy to remove bio-
agents from USAMRIID. The agents are stored in vials. They could
be double bagged, decontaminated and taken out through the Airlock,
via a pass box or hand carried out through the shower . isnot aware of anyone piggy-backing into the suites, but| surmised
that it could be done.
new while[:%&wifred in'| I1 y in buildings and |:| be
in|knew that was authorized to enter all areas of the b7@
aci itv. On occasions ' '
[::::::::] said that[::::::] was a good worker. E:::::] bg
a eared to work hard and seemed bright never heard Yr | | b,;express any antigovernment views never heard[:::::::]
talk about anthrax
last saw at U ID aro February
2001 k I was wor ing in Room Wh n ted the b6
lab, was in the hall with a tour group. ecalled kctha was wearing i
There was a military man and a erson in a suit withs sur rised to see |:|psince|:| knew that|:|had left USAMRIID an asked[:;] what he was doin thereIwas located near
former office.| Icurrently works in the office
where used to work, however they never worked in the office
at the same period.
E::::::] replied that could no tell[::::]E::::::§]was wearin agvisitor's badge. did not recognize anyone who[::]was with
and did not recall the rank of the military man.
would tell ' d hard to b6
believe. was in the and would stop bvcby and ta . On one occasion told that|__Jwas M
and soon a er o d that was92 H This caused to suspectEE2::::E5EEi
_li_
I 1
FD-302a Rev. 10-6-95!
279AWF~222936USAMRIID 279ABAClOl392
Continuation ofFD-302 ofb6
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| | ,on1o/10/2003 ,Page B
stories so[:] would just go[:::]way and disregard what [:::::::]
said.
has heard rumors about Iaround USAMRIID
i
E::::::::]has never hosted foreign visitors at IID.[::]has never purchased or seen #6 prestamped envelopes.said that[::]was not involved in the anthrax mailings. 5
[:::::::::]does not have any connections to New Jersey and
l to New Jersev in 2001. ' I' lreturned to USKMRIID_6J
[::::::;:] agreed to take a polygraph examination regarding
the anthrax mai ings.
FD-302 Rev. l0-6-95!
-1-
-FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HHEIH I3 UNCLASSIFIED b6
DATE 12-15 EDGE BY E0324 UII BM-1r'DI¬.»*'TH . . b7?- Date of transcription Q 9 Z 2 5 Z2 Q Q 3
On September 25, 2003,I I I born ' ' I::;I I Iwith Social Security Account Number a
Itele hone numberI Iff' l QI , o ice te ephone number was interviewed bPostal InspectorI and Postal Inspector
at[::] place of employment, the United States Army Research
IInstitute of Infectious Diseases USAMRIID!. After being advised
of the identit of the interviewing Inspectors and the purpose ofthe interview,f::::]jprovided the following information:
he
I Iis theI in the b7@
Iat USAMRIID. started at I
USAMRIIDI
I Iearned her Masters Degree inI I
fromI IinI I
According toI Iis the anthrax specialistIwithin theI I When the Dascwle letter arrived at USAMRIID,
USAMRIID wanted to make sure thateverything was done correctly on the letter I I I
Ireturned to USAMRIID onI I
Iworked up to[::]hours per day and tested up
to 100 potential bio-hazard samples per day. At first they were
testing for many different agents. After the anthrax letters were
discovered they began testing for anthrax. I I
E:::::::::]worked extra hours during September to November 2001 and
received over-time for the extra work.
hwwwmwnw 9/25/2003 M Frederick, Maryland
, ;huS ,vAtgHR#92279AwF-222936USAMRIID 279A-BA-C10l392 Dmemwmd n/a
IPostal Inspector
M , Postal Inspecto
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. it is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
FD-302a Rev. I0-6-95! D l
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279AWF222936USAMRIID 2'79ABAClO1392
Continuation 0fFD-302 of . _ , On 9 /2 5 /2 O O 3 , Pagc 2
In September 1999,I_ I[:1 a study to determine the diagnostics of anthrax exposure. The
study exposed monkeys to anthrax to see where they could detect
anthrax ex osure before the monkeys became deathly ill. BRUCE
IVINS andI Iprovided the anthrax s ores to the' ' ' ' he monkeys. F Iwfre also involved in the study.
Qwas also involved but did
not actually participate in the experiment. There was no y
wd thrax used in th t d [:::::]' f d th t th po er an e s u y. in orme a e
aerosolization machine only works with liquid form. The study
began on September 14, 1999 and the last three monke s were ex osed
to anthrax on October 19, 1999. I Istated that
did not participate in the studies nor didI Iask about the
studies or observe any phase of the study.
' I I knew casuall when worked at USAMRIID.
was aware that rked with roup in theU knew that worked with? _ Isaid thatI I was not the type of person thatI Iwanied
to converse with;
Inever discussed science withI Ifelt thatI Ialways
appeare and hanny I ' e was
located said that atone time was also under theI IDivision.
I During 1997 2QQ1 the people that used the
lyophilizers assiqnedl IwereI II I andL______J The
lyophilizers were used only on dead tissue, not ' rganisms.Everything is killed before it is lyophilized. Eijff:Tsaid to
lyophilize live anthrax would ' cause the machine and workarea could be infected. [:::::?f:iii%i:%j used to eat their lunch
c ' 'FD-302a Rev. 10-6-95! G
279AWF222936USAMRIID 279ABAClOl392
®mmmmnMH%2M __{:::::::::::::::] ,On9/25/2003 ,Pw= 3
EE%%;;;:::::] where two of the three lyophilizers are located.'d ' t d t t ' th t ll. S' sai summer in erns use o ea in a room as we incethe interns were not vaccinated they could have run the risk ofbeing exposed if live anthrax would have been l o hilized there.Only one of the two lyophilizers currently in1iU%was in thatlocation prior to 2001. To run the lyophilizers, a person wouldhave to know about the machines because they are difficult to run.One is run by an old computer system and a person would need toknow how to operate the machine. The lyophilizer in room E::]is anolder model that was due for replacement but was retained due tohigh usage. It is a noncomputerized machine but a person would
have to be familiar with it to run it.
' The top of the lypohilizer holds vials of the agents.
The vials are opened so that the moisture can escape. Themoisture condenses in the bottom of the machine in a frozen state.
It is later thawed and emptied out of a rubber hose into a
container and then poured down the sink. If live agents were
lyophilized, it would infect the machine and area. . 92
The log books were not provided to the FBI butE::T______:rw§§___J Fcgmpilinq documents to turn over to the FBII ' ' |
The log books date back to May 1997
and include most of the items lyophilized. Sometimes items werelyophilized when the printer was down so the documents could not be
printed, therefore they were not included in the notebook.
[::::::]provided copi of the 1995 organizational chart ofUSAMRIID as well as a copy offs[::::::::::::] Copies of the documents are included in Ehe aEtacLd
1A Envelope.
On occasions thq |hosted foreign visitors.[::::;::::]
would brin in rorei sIt6Ts-J H * gn vi .However, none of Ehe VlSlE6TL thatl iwas familiar with inquiredabout anthrax. The visitors| |were all atb6
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FD-302a Rev. 10-6-95-!
27§AWF222936USAMRIID 279ABAClOl392
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USAMRIID to study viruses. They were involved in "Hantavirus"
studies. [:::::]recalled visitors from Romania who were interested
in West Nile Virus and other visitors from South America. All of
the visitors] I were supervised at all times. If
they stayed at USAMRIID for any length of time, they were allowed
to enter the[:::] suite. No vaccinations were required for this
suite. There was never any anthrax in that suite.
E:::::]examined a sample prestamped, #6 envelope. E::::]
stated that[:::]never saw an envelope at USAMRIID like that nor did[::] know of any like that being used there.
i [::;:::]did not have any idea as to who may have done the
anthrax mai ings.
E;::;g:recalled that during the time after 9/ll/O1,[::::]
was at wor a ot. They worked very long hours during that period.
E::::] was not in New Jersey durinq the anthrax mailing times.
does take trips to|
has no other connection to New Jersey.
[:::::] stated that there was nothing_in lfinances thatwould be of interest to this investigatiow.
E:::::]could not recall an items that would help time-line her uring the mailing dates. Ei;;:]remFmbered_wQrking_lQng_1hours at USAMRIID durinq the mailing avs. I
agreed to take a polygraph.