Document text
FM 34-45
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
ELECTRONIC ATTACK
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
FM 34-45
Field Manual Headquarters
No. 34-45 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 9 June 2000
TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
FOR ELECTRONIC ATTACK
Contents
Page
PREFACE iv
Chapter 1 OPERATIONS AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1-1
The Potential 1-1
Methodology 1-2
The Environment 1-2
Electronic Warfare 1-2
Tactical Electronic Attack 1-4
Current and Future Threat Electronic Warfare Capabilities 1-4
Chapter 2 ELECTRONIC ATTACK IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS 2-1
Information Operations 2-1
Information Superiority 2-1
Chapter 3 ELECTRONIC ATTACK IN TARGETING: KEY PERSONNEL,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND COORDINATION 3-1
Electronic Attack in The Targeting Methodology 3-1
Key Electronic Attack Personnel and Organizations 3-3
Key Electronic Attack Coordination 3-8
Chapter 4 DECIDE 4-1
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 4-2
Target Development 4-3
Requirements Management 4-7
‘This publication supersedes FM 34-40-7, 23 November 1992.
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
FM 34-45
Page
Mission Management 4-8
Asset Management 4-12
Chapter 5 DETECT 5-1
Electronic Support Data 5-1
Deploy Electronic Support and Electronic Attack Assets 5-1
Collect Electronic Support Data 5-13
Collection for Database Development 5-15
Search Techniques 5-15
Cross Cue 5-16
Process Signals Intelligence Data 5-17
Situation Development 5-17
Electronic Attack Effectiveness 5-18
Chapter 6 DELIVER 6-1
Tactical Decisions 6-1
Technical Decisions 6-1
Conduct Electronic Attack 6-2
Jumping EA Assets After EA Missions 6-5
Report Electronic Attack Results 6-6
Summarize Status of Electronic Attack Results 6-8
Chapter 7 ASSESS 7-1
Operator Evaluation 7-1
Unit Combat Assessment 7-3
Reattack Recommendation 7-5
Appendix A THE ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENT A-1
Military Electromagnetic Spectrum A-1
Military Operations and Electromagnetic Environment A-1
Principal Electronic Warfare Activities A-3
Appendix B SIGNAL-TO-NOISE RATIO REFERENCE B-1
Ratio Formula B-1
Future Trends B-2
Appendix C ELECTRONIC DECEPTION C-1
Types of Electronic Deception C-1
Electronic Deception Planning C-2
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Page
Electronic Deception Techniques C-4
Appendix D MESSAGE FORMATS D-1
Appendix E EXAMPLE FORMATS AND TARGET REPORT E-1
General E-1
High-Payoff Target List E-1
Target Selection Standards E-2
Attack Guidance Matrix E-2
Sensor or Attack Matrix E-3
Optional High-Payoff Target List and Attack Guidance Matrix E-4
Target Sheets E-6
Electronic Warfare Annex E-7
Appendix F DIRECT SUPPORT TO THE BRIGADE F-1
Task Organization F-1
Organization and Operations F-2
Appendix G MILITARY OPERATIONS ON URBANIZED TERRAIN G-1
Appendix H BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM H-1
Organization H-1
Operations H-1
Glossary Glossary-1
Bibliography Bibliography-1
Index Index-1
iii
PREFACE
The purpose of this manual is to —
• Address the deployment and employment of electronic attack (EA) assets at
division and brigade.
• Discuss concepts and principles unique to EA.
• Describe how to integrate EA into the targeting effort.
• Address specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) when applicable.
This manual is a guide for Army commanders, staffs, and operators who plan
and/or execute EA. It applies equally to the Active Component (AC), US Army
Reserve (USAR), and Army National Guard (ARNG).
This manual complies with FM 34-1 and is consistent with current joint doctrine.
It assumes the user has a fundamental understanding of the doctrine in
FM 100-5, FM 101-5, FM 34-1, FM 6-20-10, and FM 34-130.
The proponent for this publication is Headquarters, US Army Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Send comments and recommendations on DA
Form 2028 directly to Commander, US Army Intelligence Center and Ft
Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-FDC-D, Ft Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.
This manual does not implement any International Standardization Agreements.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not
refer exclusively to men.
FM 34-45
Chapter 1
Operations and Electronic Warfare
Division targeting teams and electronic warfare (EW) personnel work
together to ensure that EW is integrated into targeting, is thoroughly
planned, and is vigorously executed. The use of standard EW targets
without thorough analysis and planning significantly limits the potential
of EW as a true combat multiplier. Inadequate planning leads to the
uncoordinated use of EW and limits the effects of both EW and fire
support (FS) as a whole. On the other hand, if EW is adequately staffed,
trained, integrated into targeting, planned, and executed, it helps the
commander reach his targeting objectives by dominating the
electromagnetic environment (EME).
EW can attack the threat when it is most vulnerable through a quick,
accurate, timely, and responsive means that can also provide a fast
assessment of the operation. Additionally, EW is important because it is
a responsive tool to perform suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD); it
is also one of the integrated tools used to conduct information operations
(10). However, EW is effective only when the commander decides there is
more value in conducting EA (for a specific high-payoff target [HPT] at a
specific point) than performing additional collection in order to produce
more intelligence.
THE POTENTIAL
1-1. The potential for EA is unlimited especially within the information age.
• Offensive operations often provide the friendly forces the element of
surprise. Prior to units crossing the line of departure (LD), EA assets
begin their missions. EA may focus on the scout or reconnaissance net
to ensure intelligence indicating friendly forces attacking is not passed
to the threat command post (CP). As units begin to engage the threat,
EA assets then shift their effort onto the threat’s counterbattery,
command and control (C 2 ), and artillery. The suppression of these
targets denies the enemy the ability to effectively control his forces and
also disrupts the flow of information to his artillery and
counterbattery, thus rendering them useless. At this point, EA
systems engage specific targets. A unit near a bridge that was
destroyed is jammed to prevent the requesting of engineer support.
This will cause a delay in maneuvering an enemy unit that would
protect a vulnerable flank.
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• Defensive operations, conducted with the immediate purpose of
causing an enemy attack to fail, often allow the friendly force to close
off areas and create devastating engagement areas while denying the
threat critical information. EA assets cover constricted terrain areas
along the threat avenue of approach (AA). The engineers erect
obstacles in order for maneuver and artillery units to create an
engagement area. EA assets begin their mission as soon as the threat
enters the area and no longer has direct contact with other units. At
this time units engage with artillery and destroy threat forces.
Because the threat has no communications, the engagement will be
swift, with high casualties and lost momentum, thus ending the threat
attack. EA also will be used in counterreconnaissance to deny threat
scouts the ability to pass vital intelligence back to their commander.
METHODOLOGY
1-2. There is not a separate methodology to conduct EW. The best way to
conduct EW is to effectively integrate EW within the targeting methodology
and TTP. This manual and the flow of products are in accordance with
FM 6-20-10. They provide a clear and relatively simple framework,
terminology, and TTP to plan and conduct EA as a subset of EW. The
framework begins with the targeting functions of DECIDE, DETECT,
DELIVER, and ASSESS.
THE ENVIRONMENT
1-3. Operations are executed in an increasingly complex EME. Almost all
military units use electromagnetic (EM) devices for communications,
navigation, sensing, information storage, and processing. The increasing
mobility and affordability of sophisticated EM equipment guarantees that the
environment will become even more complex in the future. This environment
creates vulnerabilities to and opportunities for EW for both friendly and
threat forces. The threat and the friendly commanders depend on this flow of
information to make informed decisions. EW can exploit this dependence.
Appendix A further describes this environment.
1-4. The need to control the EM spectrum and the type of EW actions that
can be used to control that spectrum depend on the operational environment.
During peacetime, government bodies and international treaties and
conventions control the use of the EM spectrum. However, standing rules of
engagement (ROE) give joint commanders the authority in peacetime to take
appropriate and necessary action to protect their forces. The type and level of
EW actions appropriate to a particular operation depend on threat
capabilities, threat vulnerabilities, and operational objectives.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
1-5. EW includes three major subdivisions: electronic protection (EP),
electronic warfare support (ES), and electronic attack (EA). EW is waged
(through the use of EM or directed energy) within the EM spectrum to —
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• Secure and maintain effective control and use of the spectrum for
friendly forces.
• Attack the threat and to deny the use of the spectrum through damage,
destruction, disruption, and deception.
ELECTRONIC PROTECTION
1-6. EP involves actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment
from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of EW that degrade,
neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. This manual contains very
little discussion of this subdivision of EW.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT
1-7. ES involves the search for, intercepts, identification, and location of
sources of radiated EM energy (intentional and unintentional) in order to
recognize and collect information on the threat. ES provides information
necessary for immediate decisions involving EW operations and other tactical
actions. Both EA and ES are critical and mutually supportive components.
ELECTRONIC ATTACK
1-8. EA involves the use of EM, directed energy (DE), or anti-radiation
weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of
degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is
considered to be a form of fires. EA includes —
• Taking actions to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the EM
spectrum (for example, jamming and EM deception).
• Employing weapons that use either EM or DE to destroy EM
equipment (for example, lasers, radio frequency [RF] weapons, or
particle beams).
First Recorded Instance of Deliberate Radio Jamming
The first recorded instance of deliberate radio jamming took place in
September 1901 in the US. Interestingly, it was aimed at securing commercial
gain rather than military advantage. As now, there was considerable public
interest in the America’s Cup yacht races, and the newspaper first to reach
the stands carrying each result stood to reap a large profit.... A third
company. ..failed to get a sponsor but.. .used a transmitter more powerful than
its competitors, and one of its engineers, John Pickard, worked out a method
which allowed him to jam signals from the other companies while at the same
time to report on the progress of the race from his boat.
Source: The History of US Electronic Warfare, Volume I
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TACTICAL ELECTRONIC ATTACK
1-9. EA is best used as a combat multiplier in conjunction with other fires
into an engagement area. Used alone, EA is only a delaying or disrupting
fire — its effects are reduced. Additionally, the technique of using EA fires
independently of other fires provides the enemy time and training to
overcome the effects of future EA. While EA operations within a theater or
joint task force area of operation (AO) are often complicated, tactical EA
operations (to include division operations) are relatively simple.
1-10. The scope of tactical EA operations are limited by doctrine, organic and
supporting capabilities, and realistic unit standing operating procedures
(SOPs). However, when a tactical echelon lacks adequate organic or
supporting capabilities, it can request support from a higher echelon.
Sometimes a tactical echelon might not even know of an existing capability at
a higher echelon. The US Air Force (USAF), US Marine Corps (USMC), and
US Navy (USN) have the EA equipment for the SEAD. With the Army’s
dependence on aviation assets, the request for support from echelons above
corps (EAC) in the joint arena for SEAD support will remain constant.
CURRENT AND FUTURE THREAT ELECTRONIC WARFARE
CAPABILITIES
1-11. While allied forces are able to conduct EA, many threats, using off-the-
shelf equipment, have the ability to conduct EA with greater distance and
against targets conventionally safe against EA. The current communications
environment provides many potential threats with a rich environment to
conduct EW and exploit friendly communications. The more a unit relies on
communications, the more vulnerable that unit is to threat ES and EA. In
general, many threats currently have the capability to —
• Detect and locate friendly units because of our use of EM equipment.
• Monitor and exploit friendly unit’s communications to include
collecting information on a unit’s mission, combat strength, logistics,
morale, weakness, and other critical information.
• Deny a friendly unit's use of the EM spectrum, thereby degrading that
unit’s ability to plan operations, execute C 2 , receive and process
intelligence, and execute operations.
1-12. The future communications environment will provide threats with a
target-rich environment for EW. In general, future threats will be able to —
• Detect, locate, and jam low probability of intercept (LPI) signals. The
Army currently uses many types of LPIs (for example, Single-Channel
Ground and Airborne Radio System [SINCGARS]).
• Use DE to destroy computer networks by using electromagnetic pulses
(EMPs) to destroy silicon chips inside equipment.
• Use electronic deception to enter and control friendly voice and data
nets.
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Chapter 2
Electronic Attack in Information Operations
IO are actions taken to affect adversaries and to influence other
audiences’ military decisionmaking policies (MDMPs), information, and
information systems, and defend friendly MDMPs, information, and
information systems. EW is an integral part of 10; consequently, EA is
closely tied to 10 planning, integration, and execution.
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
2-1. 10 consist of two supporting elements: offensive 10 and defensive 10.
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
2-2. Offensive 10 are the integrated use of assigned and supporting
capabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect
adversary decisionmakers or to influence neutral audiences to achieve or
promote specific objectives. The capabilities and activities include, but are
not limited to, operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological
operations (PSYOP), EW, physical destruction, special information
operations, and computer network attack (CNA).
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
2-3. Defensive 10 are the integration and coordination of policies and
procedures, operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend
friendly information and information systems. Defensive 10 are conducted
through information assurance, physical security, OPSEC, counter-deception,
counter-propaganda, counterintelligence, EW, and special 10.
2-4. Defensive 10 ensure timely, accurate, and relevant information access
while denying adversaries the opportunity to exploit friendly information and
information systems for their own purpose. Although they are not integral
components of 10, public affairs and civil affairs are enabling activities that
may contribute in the execution of 10 tasks and promote attaining specific 10
objectives.
INFORMATION SUPERIORITY
2-5. The goal of Army 10 is to achieve information superiority. Information
superiority is a window of opportunity created by a focused effort that allows
the actions or beliefs of the enemy commander to be influenced in support of
decisive operations. It can be gained by the integration and synchronization
of information management and 10. Information management is the
directing of relevant information to the right person at the right time in a
usable format to facilitate decisionmaking. It uses procedures and
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information systems to collect, process, store, display, and disseminate data
and information. (See Figure 2-1.)
2-6. One of the friendly commander’s 10 instruments to achieve or promote
specific objectives is EW. EA is a valuable offensive 10 tool. When planned,
coordinated, synchronized, and integrated with the friendly FS plan, EA
becomes a combat multiplier. EA can effectively confuse the threat and
disrupt the threat commander’s operation. The only difference between
traditional EA planning and EA in support of 10 involves the specific 10
objectives and targets. Specific 10 objectives may differ significantly from
tactical military objectives. Additionally, the commander may use EA in
support of 10 and/or solely to complement supporting activities of 10. 10
targets may include, but are not limited to, adversary perceptions,
knowledge, personnel, equipment, information systems networks, or
population.
Information Superiority
Capabilities
Public Information
Public Affairs
Public Diplomacy
Civil Affairs
Information Operations
PSYOP
Counter Deception
Physical Destruction
Counterintelligence
Electronic Warfare
Counter Propaganda
Computer Network Defense
OPSEC
Computer Network Attack
Deception
Type of Use
Strategic
Targets
Effects
Strategic
Jperational
Figure 2-1. Information Superiority
2-7. The planning, coordination, and execution of electronic fires remains
consistent with the same methodology (Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess)
described in FM 6-20-10. During the DECIDE phase, the 10 cell brings
unique 10 HVTs into the wargaming process. This results in unique 10
HPTs that are integrated with all HPTs into the attack guidance matrix
(AGM). The electronic warfare officer (EWO) provides the 10 cell feedback on
the outcome of EA, so that the 10 cell can decide whether or not to nominate
the target for reattack. Due to the nature of 10, however, feedback may not
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be immediate and it may require a significantly longer period to make an
assessment.
2-8. Successful application of EA in 10 depends on IPB. Once the targets are
identified, developed, and integrated in the targeting process, EA is applied
as an effective 10 tool. EA is synchronized and applied in conjunction with
other 10 elements and supporting activities to maximize the effect of these
operations.
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Chapter 3
Electronic Attack in Targeting: Key Personnel,
Organizations, and Coordination
Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate
response to them on the basis of operational requirements and
capabilities. The DECIDE, DETECT, DELIVER, and ASSESS
methodology directs friendly forces to attack the right target with the
right asset at the right time.
The targeting process provides an effective method for matching the
friendly force capabilities against a threat's targets. Another important
part of the targeting process is to identify potential fratricide situations
and perform the coordination necessary to positively manage and control
the targeting effort. The targeting team and staff incorporate these
measures into the coordinating instructions and appropriate annexes of
the operations plans (OPLANs) and/or operations orders (OPORDs).
Targeting is a dynamic process; it must keep up with the changing face of
the battlefield. The staff must continually update the tools and products
described in this manual based on changing plans, situation development,
and combat assessment. As a participant in the staff targeting process,
the EWO ensures that EA is thoroughly integrated within targeting. This
includes integrating EA into all the appropriate annexes and products.
ELECTRONIC ATTACK IN THE TARGETING METHODOLOGY
3-1. The modern battlefield presents many targets with different
vulnerabilities exceeding the number of resources available to acquire and
attack them. The commander must determine which targets are most
important to the threat and, of those targets, which ones he must acquire and
attack to accomplish his mission. Then as the operation unfolds friendly
forces must identify, track, engage, and assess the results on priority threat
targets.
DECIDE
3-2. DECIDE, as the first step in the targeting process, provides the overall
focus, a targeting plan, and some of the priorities for intelligence collection.
The targeting team must plan targeting priorities for each phase and critical
event of an operation. Initially, the targeting team does not develop EA
targets using any special technique or separately from targets for physical
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destruction. However, as the process continues these targets are passed
through intelligence organizations and further planned using collection
management (CM) procedures. The EA plan (from DECIDE) is integrated
into the standard targeting products (graphic or text-based). Some of the
most critical products that involve EA are the —
• High-payoff target list (HPTL).
• AGM.
• EW annex.
3-3. Different personnel and organizations perform five processes as part of
or in conjunction with the MDMP in order to plan EA:
• Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).
• Target Development.
• Requirements Management (RM).
• Mission Management (MM).
• Asset Management (AM).
DETECT
3-4. DETECT is a critical function in the targeting process. ES and EA
assets deploy to detect HPTs (based on what the targeting team identified as
HPTs during DECIDE). The intelligence operating system cross-queues
assets based on a collection plan and the threat situation. It is critical that
ES assets are deployed and work closely with EA assets. In order for EA
assets to effectively perform EA, they need critical data like the location,
signal strength, and frequency of the HPT. ES assets will find the “weak
link” (with the support of the target assessment and signals intelligence
[SIGINT] teams) in threat communications that the EA asset can attack.
DELIVER
3-5. DELIVER is the execution of EA against the targets identified in the
HPTL, AGM, and EW annex once friendly forces identify, locate, and track
HPTs. EA assets must satisfy the attack guidance developed during
DECIDE. Executing EA requires close coordination between ES and EA
assets when the EA asset is jamming the HPT. Recommend EA assets use
maximum power based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, and
time available-civilians (METT-TC). The commander makes the ultimate
decision on how much power EA assets will use to accomplish the mission.
Essential to this is the synchronization of lethal fires and nonlethal fires
(EA). This synchronization is accomplished through AGMs, intelligence
synchronization matrixes (ISMs), and EW annexes.
ASSESS
3-6. Combat assessment (CA) is the determination of the effectiveness of
force employment during military operations. CA is composed of three
elements:
• Munitions effects assessment (MEA).
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• Battle damage assessment (BDA).
• Reattack recommendations.
3-7. MEA and BDA (when combined by the staff) inform the commander of
effects against targets and target sets. Based on this information, the G2
continually analyzes the threat's ability to conduct and sustain operations
(sometimes expressed in terms of the threat’s centers of gravity). The
bottomline is to either recommend reattack or not. The specific assessment of
EA involves all three of the elements of CA as an integrated part of the
targeting effort. One unique part of MEA for EA is the close coordination
between ES and EA assets necessary to perform an operator evaluation
(based upon the jamming effectiveness).
3-8. BDA is the timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the
application of military force (either lethal or nonlethal) against a target.
BDA in the targeting process pertains to the results of any attack. Producing
BDA is primarily an intelligence responsibility, but requires coordination
with operational elements to be effective. BDA requirements may be
translated into priority intelligence requirements (PIR) or information
requirements (IR) if it is linked to the commander's decisions. The G2
answers BDA requirements by providing the commander a series of timely
and accurate “snapshots” of the effects on the threat. The “snapshots” include
an estimate of the threat's combat effectiveness, capabilities, and intentions.
This helps the commander determine if their targeting effort is accomplishing
their objectives and if reattack is necessary.
KEY ELECTRONIC ATTACK PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATIONS
3-9. The main CP is the critical location that plans and, to a large extent,
controls EA for division operations. This CP is functionally organized to
support the coordination needed to synchronize targeting (EA is thoroughly
integrated within these operations). Tailoring the structure and relationship
of the staff sections is necessary to ensure a cohesive coordinated targeting
effort. Figure 3-1 shows the key EA personnel and organizations.
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THE COMMANDER
3-10. The commander issues guidance on the concept of operations for close,
deep, and rear operations as well as for future operations. He defines the
mission, the concept of operations, his intent, and supporting tasks. His
intent and targeting objectives guide the actions of the targeting team.
TARGETING TEAM
3-11. The targeting team is an ad hoc organization, which is driven by
mission. Generally, the team will consist of the Deputy Fire Support
Coordinator (FSCOORD), Air Liaison Officer (ALO), EWO, and
representatives from the G2, G3, Air Defense Artillery (ADA), Engineers, and
Army Airspace Command and Control (A 2 C 2 ) element. The G3 adds
additional members as necessary (for example, Deception, PSYOP, Civil
Affairs, or 10).
3-12. Targeting team members go through the target list and decide (with
the guidance of the G3 representative) which targets to attack and with what
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type of fire (lethal and nonlethal). This task includes requesting support
from higher echelons (for example, coordinating USAF support through the
Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) at the Air Operations Center
[AOC]). The chief of staff is responsible for supervising the targeting
processes, chairing targeting meetings, and leading the targeting team. The
targeting team —
• Develops HPTs from the high-value targets (HVTs).
• Works with the G2 to perform target development.
• Develops the HPTL, AGM, and BDA requirements.
• Updates these products as the situation changes.
3-13. The Deputy FSCOORD is a key player in the targeting team. He
provides the latest status of FS resources and plans their use in support of
the operation. Specifically, he —
• Coordinates the functions of the targeting team.
• Recommends methods of attack for HPTs.
• Develops timelines and accuracy guidelines for the target selection
standards (TSSs) (in coordination with the G2 section).
• Monitors changes in the situation and reassesses the HPTL, AGM,
TSSs, and BDA requirements.
• Coordinates subordinate units' attack requirements.
• Receives BDA and determines if the desired effects were achieved or if
additional attacks are required (with the G2 and G3).
• Ensures the air tasking order (ATO) supports target nomination in
accordance with SOPs.
G2 PLANS OFFICER
3-14. The G2 Plans Officer —
• Maintains HVTs (with the targeting team analysis and control element
[ACE] and field artillery intelligence officer [FAIO]).
• Uses the targeting team ACE to template potential HPTs.
• Recommends named areas of interest (NAIs) and target areas of
interest (TAIs) to the G2 to support targeting.
• Coordinates with the collection manager to ensure adequate
intelligence collection to support the targeting plan.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE OFFICER
3-15. The EWO —
• Helps the targeting team determine EA requirements against specific
HPTs.
• Ensures EA can meet the targeting effect (in terms of the targeting
objective).
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• Coordinates with the SIGINT team (ACE) through the collection
manager to satisfy ES and EA requirements.
• Prepares the EW annex.
• Provides EA MM for the division.
• Prepares and coordinates the EW annex for OPLANs and OPORDs.
• Determines and requests EAC EA support.
• Recommends to the G3/G2 whether a target should be engaged with
EA.
• Expedites meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and interference (MIJI)
reports to the ACE for targeting.
ANALYSIS AND CONTROL ELEMENT
3-16. The ACE provides support for EA missions through the collection
manager, SIGINT team, targeting team, all-source team, and FAIO. This
organization fuses intelligence to identify the best target inside a target set.
COLLECTION MANAGEMENT TEAM (ACE)
3-17. This team —
• Passes specific information requirements (SIR) that support EW to the
SIGINT team.
• Works with the EWO, MI battalion, and SIGINT team to ensure that
the collection plan and ISM are synchchronized with the AGM and EW
annex.
• Either develops EW tasking for organic or supporting EW assets or
requests EW support from a higher echelon (with the EWO and
SIGINT team).
TARGETING TEAM (ACE)
3-18. This team —
• Interacts with the G2 Plans Officer, the FAIO, and the EWO to support
EA as an integrated part of target development and targeting.
• Produces and compares target overlays to IPB products and current
intelligence. (NOTE: This is a critical part of critical nodes analysis.)
• Nominates HPTs in support of the G2 Plans Officer.
FAIO
3-19. The FAIO—
• Collocates with the ACE specifically near the targeting team (ACE),
collection management team, and all-source team.
• Supports the G2 Plans Officer (as necessary).
• Supports the targeting team (as necessary).
• Provides input concerning the threat, TSSs, attack guidance, and list of
HPT types (as necessary).
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• Is the threat artillery expert in the ACE.
• Provides feedback to the ACE, the targeting team, and artillery BDA
via the division artillery S2.
SIGINT TEAM
3-20. This team —
• Identifies and tracks targets (to include EA targets).
• Performs MM and controls EA to include tasking EA and ES assets.
• Provides technical data to the ES and EA assets.
• Provides graphic depictions of line of sight (LOS) and threat target
emitters.
DIVISIONAL MI BATTALION
3-21. The divisional MI battalion is responsible for conducting EW
operations within the framework of the division commander's intent. To
facilitate its mission, the G2 section provides the MI battalion the HPTL,
AGM, EW annex, and the collection plan. The MI battalion is responsible to
deploy the ES and EA assets and to provide training, maintenance, logistics,
and AM. These ES and EA assets normally operate in general support (GS)
to the division.
MI BATTALION COMMANDER
3-22. The MI battalion commander plans and directs the employment of his
subordinate intelligence and intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) assets.
The commander —
• Coordinates with the G2, G3, and collection manager.
• Acts as the asset manager. Employs assets in accordance with the
OPORD (to include the EW annex).
GS MI COMPANY COMMANDER
3-23. The company commander directs the employment of his ES and EA
assets. The commander —
• Coordinates with the collection manager for the deployment of ES and
EA assets for preplanned missions.
• Provides service support to ES and EA teams.
• Ensures the training of ES, EA, and target assessment teams.
• Conducts signals intelligence/electronic warfare (SIGINT/EW)
operations in accordance with tasking.
• Performs rapid SIGINT analysis of collected data to determine which
position will conduct tasking.
PLATOON OPERATIONS CENTER
3-24. The platoon operations center (POC) is the control point for ES and EA
assets. The POC is comprised of a —
3-7
FM 34-45
• Transcription and analysis (TA) team.
• Collection and jamming (C&J) platoon leader.
3-25. The POC is collocated with the brigade analysis and control team
(ACT) and will assist the ACT in maintaining the enemy situation picture,
MM, and AM of ES and EA.
C&J PLATOON LEADER
3-26. The C&J platoon leader is responsible for his ES and EA assets. The
C&J platoon leader —
• Coordinates with the G2 and the G3 for movement and secure routes in
a GS role. While in a direct support (DS) role coordinates with the
commander and/or S2.
• Runs the POC which contains the TA team.
• Ensures that teams are resupplied and that their service support
requirements are met.
EATEAM
3-27. EA teams provide operators and equipment to perform the actual EA
mission. They —
• Orient on targets and conduct EA.
• Monitor targets when tasked by the SIGINT team.
ES TEAM
3-28. ES teams provide operators and equipment to perform ES mission.
They —
• Cue EA systems to targets.
• Develop targets for EA.
• Perform direction finding (DF) of targets for orientation of EA systems.
KEY ELECTRONIC ATTACK COORDINATION
3-29. The EWO coordinates with the following key staff members in order to
plan and execute EA.
3-30. The G6 —
• Performs spectrum management to include deconflicting EA (in the
form of the restricted frequency list [RFL]).
• Coordinates closely with the Chief of Staff, G3, and other targeting
team members to help develop the targeting plan.
DEEP OPERATIONS COORDINATION CELL
3-31. The Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC) is an emerging
organization that can be employed on a stand-alone or ad hoc basis. It is
located at the main CP and plans, coordinates, and synchronizes the corps or
division deep operations. Making deep operations work requires the full-time
3-8
FM 34-45
efforts of several personnel (FSCOORD, G3 plans, G2, and aviation officer).
Additional assistance from other staff agencies (Deputy FSCOORD, EWO,
ADA officer, ALO, G3 air, and PSYOP) are included as required. The chief of
staff directs the DOCC and approves all deep operations. The DOCC, which
has robust communication links —
• Acts as the deep operations C 2 node in order to support the successful
execution of deep operations.
• Stays abreast of the status of close and rear operations and continually
assesses its relationship with deep operations.
• Is responsible to confirm and validate the original DECIDE criteria for
a deep operation target.
• Allocates and controls the attack resource to engage the target.
3-32. With the DOCC in place, the C 2 process is continuous and interactive.
The DOCC ensures the commander's intent, missions, and events drive the
process.
3-33. The G3 —
• Ensures the HPTL, AGM, and BDA requirements are integrated with
the decision support template (DST) (by coordinating with the
targeting team).
• Ensures the plan to include targeting reflects the commander's concept
of operation.
• Determines if the desired effects were achieved or if reattack is
required (with the Deputy FSCOORD and G2).
3-34. The G3 Air—
• Supervises the A 2 C 2 element.
• Deconflicts the division’s airspace. (NOTE: This is an important
aspect of planning and execution if you plan to use EA from an air
platform.)
3-9
FM 34-45
Chapter 4
Decide
DECIDE, as the first step in the targeting process, provides the overall
focus and sets priorities for fires (to include EA) and a portion of
intelligence collection. Many key personnel and organizations are
involved in DECIDE. They perform a number of structured processes
against the framework of the MDMP to plan the use of lethal and
nonlethal fires for each phase of the operation.
Based on targeting priorities, the targeting team and other organizations
will produce graphics and text tools to maintain focus on the process and
synchronize the effects. Planning EA within the MDMP framework as a
portion of DECIDE is comprised of five interrelated processes as shown in
Figure 4-1.
4-1
FM 34-45
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
4-1. The initial IPB, as a subordinate step to mission analysis (the
second step of the MDMP), starts the important analysis that eventually
leads to EA planning. In terms of EA planning, the two most important
products out of the IPB process (and into target development) are HVTs
and EW analysis products. Figure 4-2 illustrates how IPB fits into EA
planning.
MDMP
Figure 4-2. IPB in EA Planning.
HIGH-VALUE TARGETS
4-2. An important part of step 3 of the IPB process (evaluate the threat) is
creating or updating threat models. A component of the threat model is
generic HVTs. As the G2 Plans Officer provides the framework for the initial
IPB (in order to support operational planning), the different portions of the
ACE support the production of threat courses of action (COAs) and other IPB
products. As the ACE develops threat COAs, the targeting team (ACE)
analyzes the generic HVTs. Then they capture the most important HVTs for
that particular threat COA into an HVTL. The targeting team (to include the
4-2
FM 34-45
EWO) uses the HVTL to help develop HPTs after the wargame. HVTs are
not specific or unique to EW; they support the entire targeting process.
EW ANALYSIS PRODUCTS
4-3. The SIGINT team, as part of both ongoing situation development and
analytical support to IPB, uses the threat order of battle (OB) and HVTs
(from the targeting team) to prepare net diagrams and other graphic
planning and execution products. These products help the EWO identify
critical communications nodes. These critical nodes are essential to the
threat in order to use the EM spectrum. The EWO depends on assistance
from the SIGINT team (through the collection manager) to ensure all HVT
net diagrams are further broken down to show unique nodes that will disrupt
the entire net if “jammed.” These nodes become the initial candidates for EA
targets.
TARGET DEVELOPMENT
4-4. During COA analysis (wargaming), threat COAs are analyzed in terms
of their impact on friendly COAs. The wargame takes place using an action
or reaction technique. The entire staff identifies the enemy battlefield
functions that must be attacked. The commander and his staff analyze the
criticality of friendly operating systems in the context of a specific COA. The
G3 identifies the best places to attack HPTs in relation to the friendly COA;
these places are designated TAIs. TAIs are points or areas where the
friendly commander can influence the action by lethal or nonlethal fires
and/or maneuvers. This manual discusses only those aspects that are most
important to describing EA planning. FM 6-20-10 and FM 34-130 provide
comprehensive doctrine for target development.
4-5. The targeting team uses two important products (besides threat COAs
and the supporting products) from the IPB process for target
development — HVTs and EW analysis products. After target development,
the three most important products that flow into RM and MM are the HPTL,
AGM, and EA portion of the battlefield operating system synchronization
matrix. Figure 4-3 illustrates how target development fits into EA planning.
4-3
FM 34-45
MDMP
Targeting Team and staff develop
HPTL and AGM -- both are
critical to collection management.
HPTL and AGM help the CM team
synchronize collection to
targeting (to include ES and EA).
Target
Development
EWO provides EW
annex to the SIGINT
team through the
collection manager.
Figure 4-3. Target Development in EA Planning.
HIGH-PAYOFF TARGETS
4-6. Through wargaming the staff identifies the HPTs that must be
acquired and attacked for the friendly mission to succeed. During COA
analysis, the targeting team develops the HPTL, the targeting portion of
the DST, and BOS synchronization matrixes. (This provides times for EA
(non-lethal fire.)) For example, during the close fight, enemy artillery
could be the priority for lethal and nonlethal fires. From this target set,
specific HPTs (for example, an artillery battalion fire direction center
[FDC]) is designated for lethal and nonlethal attack for a synergistic
effect. The battalion FDC would be engaged with EA to disrupt
coordination of fires by causing critical delays during the battle and
would eventually be engaged by lethal attack (in accordance with the
HPTL, AGM, and the TSS) for destruction. (For a more detailed
discussion of the wargaming process, see FM 101-5.)
4-4
FM 34-45
ATTACK GUIDANCE AND DAMAGE CRITERIA
4-7. Knowing target vulnerabilities and the effect an attack will have on
enemy operations allows a staff to propose the most efficient available
attack option. The commander provides critical guidance by stating that
he wants to disrupt, delay, limit, damage, or destroy the threat.
4-8. The FSCOORD will provide the EWO with a desired level of damage
or degradation. The EWO determines if current EA assets are able to
range the target and achieve the mission, and how the mission will take
place to achieve the desired effect.
EFFECTS OF FIRE
4-9. On the basis of the targeting team’s guidance, the EWO recommends
how each EA target should be engaged in terms of the effects of fire and
attack options to use. The effects of fire can be to deny, disrupt, delay,
and divert the target. The unique nature of EA, a non-lethal fire, and
subjective use of these terms means the EWO must clearly communicate
the intent of the terminology to both the targeting team and the collection
manager. When applied to EA, these terms differ from when applied to
describe physical destruction as defined in FM 6-20-10. The following
criteria are captured in the AGM and EW annex.
Disrupt
4-10. Disrupt is designed to fragment the target’s nets. This disruption
will in turn cause the flow of information to slow, and in some cases stop
the flow, until the net control stations can reinitiate the net and its users.
When the enemy will attack, this tactic is effective as they move to LD.
This tactic is simple to initiate and requires little coordination.
Delay
4-11. Delay is designed to fragment movements and deny the threat the
ability to communicate in order to change routes. This tactic will necessitate
the use of alternate forms of communication to continue movement (for
example, hand-and-arm signals, runners). This effort will cause significant
delays to the threat’s movement, especially if tied in with obstacles. Denying
the threat the ability to warn other units of obstacles will cause all follow-on
units the same delay and could force the lead element to clear the obstacles
without engineer support.
Divert
4-12. Divert is designed to prevent the target’s use of critical resources. This
method is used to jam combat support (CS) element’s communication with
combat units (for example, jamming combat service support [CSS] trucks on
their way to an armor refueling or rearming point). Divert is a difficult task
due to the intelligence required to pinpoint targets and upcoming events.
4-5
FM 34-45
Deny
4-13. Deny is designed to control the EM spectrum and prevent the threat’s
use of that spectrum for any communications (whether voice or digital). This
nonlethal fire is used at surge periods to act as a battlefield multiplier. The
success of this fire denies the threat’s ability to receive intelligence and to
pass guidance. These actions in turn place a “stress” on EA assets and
cannot be maintained for long periods.
EW TARGETS
4-14. The EWO helps develop the EW targets as an integrated portion of the
HPTL. The three categories these targets fall into — planned, as acquired,
and immediate — are discussed below.
Planned
4-15. For EW the actual target is the specific communication emitters that
are critical to that target set during a specific military operation. The AGM
as well as the BOS synchronization matrix will have these targets listed.
As Acquired
4-16. EA teams will engage these targets of opportunity upon detection.
Immediate
4-17. Targets (in the form of specific voice and data communications) are
targets that the EWO did not or could not plan but that the targeting team
identifies during the conduct of the operation and that require immediate EA.
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS
4-18. The EWO then analyzes these requirements (in terms of effects and
category) to further plan the EA necessary to service the target. He must
determine the rough plan based on —
• Target vulnerability (in coordination with the SIGINT team). The
EWO and SIGINT analysts use the electronic order of battle (EOB) to
determine targets and use the electronic template to designate specific
targets inside the target system. These targets will take into account
redundant lines of communication (LOCs) and the advisability of
engaging other communication links. An SA-8 battery may be
identified as a critical target for EA, but due to its redundant
communications and short link distance to its subordinate transporter
or erector launchers, one can count on knocking out or degrading only
one of its communications link. Therefore, the communication links
would be "green" for targeting but the overall system would be "red"
because it would still function despite the EA.
• System capability (in coordination with the SIGINT team).
• System reliability (in coordination with the SIGINT team).
4-6
FM 34-45
• ROE. With the increasing technology of EW and dominance, the
monitoring of ethical and humane issues is critical to ensure we do not
deprive the local populace of critical casualty care, humanitarian
support, and other life support through essential electronic
communications.
4-19. The EWO analyzes whether organic assets can perform the mission. If
not, the EWO requests support from higher through G3 and FS channels. He
must also notify the collection manager when he requests support from
higher in order to keep ES and EA synchronized between echelons.
TARGETING PRODUCTS (WITH EA FULLY INTEGRATED)
4-20. The EWO prepares documentation for the missions:
• EA targets on the HPTL.
• EA lines of the AGMs.
• The EA portion of the BOS synchronization matrix.
4-21. The EWO must prepare these documents to ensure the synchronization
of lethal and nonlethal fires and the synchronization of EA with CM (this
includes all three subprocesses — RM, MM, and AM). The end product of this
process is the EW annex.
REQUIREMENTS MANAGEMENT
4-22. After target development, the most important products that flow into
RM and MM are the HPTL and AGM. The most important products that
flow out of RM into MM are the SIR (that the collection manager designates
for ES) that support EA. Figure 4-4 illustrates how RM fits into EA
planning.
4-23. During RM the collection manager performs a critical role by —
• Focusing the initial collection planning (as described in FM 34-2) to
include synchronizing ES requirements to support EA tasks. This
synchronization is accomplished when the CM team passes SIR to the
SIGINT team.
• Ensuring that the EWO passes a clear articulation of the EA tasks
(through the AGM) to the SIGINT team. The collection manager is the
“middle man” and is the path for the EWO to request support from the
SIGINT team. It is critical that the collection manager is a part of this
process.
4-7
FM 34-45
MDMP
Receipt of
Mission
COA
Development
COA
Analysis
COA
^Comparisons
COA
Approval
Orders
Production
Collection Manager provides SIR to
SIGINT team.
EWO passes AGM and EW annex
to the SIGINT team through the
collection manager.
V Requirements
^ Management
J
• The SIR, AGM, and initial EW
annex are the focal point for
the SIGINT team to perform
MM of ES and EA assets.
MM
V(ES and EA)
J
Figure 4-4. Requirements Management in EA Planning.
4-24. During wargaming the commander and entire staff determine decision
points (DPs). When tied to targeting, the DPs ensure the decision to engage
(or not to engage) occurs at the proper time. DPs and TAIs are recorded on
the DST and are included in the intelligence collection plan. Wargaming
helps finalize, among other products, the —
• Individual staff estimates.
• Scheme of maneuver and FS plan.
• DST and BOS synchronization matrix.
• PIR.
4-8
FM 34-45
PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
4-25. The commander designates his PIR following the wargame. Generally,
a PIR should support each HPT or TAI (if the staff plans to engage multiple
HPTs within a TAI). This rule ensures that the commander prioritizes
collection against HPTs. A latest time intelligence is of value (LTIOV) is a
critical part of every PIR. This time (or event in certain circumstances)
ensures that friendly collection does not occur after the point when that
intelligence is not of use to the commander and friendly forces.
SPECIFIC INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
4-26. The collection manager initially combines, validates, and prioritizes
PIR and IR and prioritizes these sets of requirements. He then he refines
these requirements into SIR that are clear, concise, and a “collectible” subset
of the larger requirement. The collection manager takes the time to cross-
check the HPT-related PIR against the SIR that support these HPTs. He
ensures that there are adequate SIR (especially related to ES) to support the
EA as captured on the AGM. The SIGINT team helps the collection manager
perform this step because of their expertise in EW. Then the collection
manager hands the ES-related SIR over to the SIGINT team. At the same
time, the collection manager is capturing ES collection on the ISM.
MISSION MANAGEMENT
4-27. After RM, both MM and AM begin. In terms of MM, the most
important products that are introduced into the process are the AGM (from
target development) and the SIR (from RM). The most important products
that flows out of MM are the specific taskings down to individual ES and EA
assets. During MM the SIGINT team continues the CM process that started
with RM. Figure 4-5 illustrates how MM fits into EA planning. FM 34-2
provides doctrine and TTP for MM.
4-9
FM 34-45
MDMP
Receipt of
Mission
COA
Development
COA
Analysis
COA
..Comparison^
COA
Approval
Orders
Production
• Collection Manager performs informal
planning collaboration with the Ml BOC.
• This collaboration ensures that ES and
EA are quickly and efficiently planned
without any conflicts.
• Most important output: SIGINT team
provides tasking (through an MATM)
and technical data to individual ES
and EA teams.
MM
(ES and EA)
AM
(ES and EA)
Figure 4-5. Mission Management in EA Planning.
REEVALUATE TARGET ANALYSIS AND IDENTIFY ADDITIONAL ES COLLECTION
REQUIREMENTS
4-28. The G2 Plans Officer initially develops the sensor attack matrix, which
is further developed during wargaming. The final signal attack matrix,
which is developed by the SIGINT team, is used to determine the sensor to
detect and locate targets. This matrix will also determine if the resources are
available to detect, locate, and engage a specific target. The collection
manager will use this matrix to task intelligence assets in locating targets.
4-29. The SIGINT team examines the analysis performed during target
development and reevaluates if any subsequent analysis is necessary against
the target. (NOTE: The SIGINT team continually provides intelligence in an
easy-to-use format to ensure the EWO chooses valid EA targets during target
development.)
4-30. The SIGINT team identifies (and later tasks) ES collection based on
the SIR. In order to identify and track the critical communications nodes, the
4-10
FM 34-45
SIGINT team uses its EW analysis (using All-Source Analysis System [ASAS]
workstations) and the latest OB and situation development intelligence from
the all-source team.
DETERMINE EA VIABILITY
4-31. The SIGINT team ensures that organic assets can perform the mission.
If not, the EWO requests support from higher through G3 and FS channels.
Additionally, the SIGINT team reviews the AGM, SIR, any guidance from the
EWO, and the EWO’s initial development of the EW annex. The EWO checks
for any fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) that may have changed EA or ES
missions. There are two important substeps to determine the viability of EA:
• Calculate EA effectiveness. The SIGINT team uses the signal-to-noise
ratio (see Appendix B) to determine the effect of EA on targets at
different ranges. ASAS provides a function to visualize electronic LOS.
These two tools help the SIGINT team ensure that the EA targets are
viable. (NOTE: The EWO, who is a subject matter expert on EW,
knows the general ranges and capabilities of systems to ensure that the
targeting team does not choose a target that EA could not service.)
• Assess technical data. The SIGINT team determines if sufficient data
is available. This data will comprise operating frequencies, power
output, distance between emitters and receivers, retransmission sites,
and any historical information on threat reactions to EA. Additionally,
the SIGINT team identifies (and later tasks) possible jump frequencies.
The SIGINT team will task ES collection on these frequencies upon
initiating EA.
ASSESS EA SYSTEM AVAILABILITY
4-32. The determination of availability is based upon three basic sets of
information:
• Current mission tasking. The SIGINT team weighs each asset's
current missions, alternate targets, and targets of opportunity against
the EW targets and ES collection (in the form of SIR) to determine if
the asset can add any missions to its current load.
• Current asset status. This step is based upon system performance.
Performance is defined by the asset location (if the location is above
targets with good LOS), sufficient power to achieve desired effect, and
if the system can hit targets accurately.
• System performance (mechanical [the vehicle system] and technical
[system and crew operations]). The SIGINT team maintains an
informal record that indicates which systems require a higher degree of
maintenance to remain operational.
DETERMINE ATTACK RESOURCES AND SELECT POINT OF ATTACK
4-33. Based on the attack guidance and effects of fire (as captured in the
AGM and EW annex), the SIGINT team validates the target and the amount
and type of EA necessary. The SIGINT team balances each target against
the total workload on the EA and ES assets and determines the best assets to
4-11
FM 34-45
perform missions (they will task these assets later). With guidance from the
EWO, the SIGINT team prioritizes all missions and targets.
4-34. The SIGINT team creates alternate targets (at least one to each
primary target). The SIGINT team designates the number of assets used on
each target and any time coverage is necessary to jump assets forward. At
this point, main targets are “locked in” while alternate targets are “plotted
in” to ensure the mission is feasible.
EM SPECTRUM DECONFLICTION
4-35. The EWO and SIGINT team perform several actions with the support
of the G6 to ensure that EA missions do not adversely affect friendly forces'
use of the EM spectrum. The SIGINT team gathers data on higher and
adjacent units' EW targets and assesses what impact (if any) these actions
will have on organic missions and vice versa. This same step is performed
with the tasking for EA. The SIGINT team will use the RFL to capture any
conflicts between friendly communications and EA missions. Finally, the
SIGINT team will determine if any interference will occur, taking into effect
the harmonics from the EA mission and, if interference does occur, which
task is the priority.
ESTABLISH JAMMING CONTROLS
4-36. The SIGINT team establishes both positive and negative controls on
EA assets. It establishes a “stop jam” frequency and states procedures for
“stop jam” in case of a loss of communications. The SIGINT team also
ensures that the communication frequency is not in the harmonics of the
target frequency (if using single channel).
TASK ES AND EA ASSETS
4-37. The SIGINT team tasks ES and EA assets through the multiple assets
tasking message (MATM), which is sent digitally or by voice if the asset does
not have the capability to receive digital tasking. The MATM for EA assets
will contain technical and mission data necessary to accomplish the mission.
Technical data will include callsigns, jargon, jump callsigns, signal strength
(in Watts), stop jam frequency, and radio procedures to include threat
procedures to follow in case of jamming. Mission data will include primary
target, time of attack, alternate targets, and targets of opportunity. The
MATM for ES assets will include technical data and mission data. The
technical data for ES assets will mirror that for EA. Mission data for EA will
include SIR, PIR, and the specific EA systems to cue on targets in accordance
with the times detailed in the ISM.
ASSET MANAGEMENT
4-38. After RM, both MM and AM begin. In terms of AM, the most important
products that are produced are the chain of orders (normally an initial
OPORD then subsequent FRAGOs) that deploy and provide the framework
for ES and EA operations. Figure 4-6 illustrates how AM fits into EA
planning. FM 34-2 provides doctrine and TTP for MM. (Refer to Appendix D
for message formats.)
4-12
FM 34-45
MDMP
Receipt of
Mission
COA
Development
COA
Analysis
COA
.Comparison^
COA
Approval
Orders
Production
• Ml BOC performs informal planning
collaboration with the collection
manager.
• Ml Battalion deploys and sustains
trained and ready systems to conduct
ES and EA in GS or DS role.
• Most important outputs: Ml Battalion
OPORD, GS Ml Company OPORD, and
C&J Platoon OPORD.
AM
(ES and EA)
Figure 4-6. Asset Management in EA Planning.
4-39. The MI battalion commander and his Battalion Operations Center
(BOC) (coordinating with the collection manager) task organizes EA and ES
assets and coordinates the movement of EA and ES systems in order to
support EA and ES tasking as developed by the SIGINT team during MM.
This task includes planning to provide continuous coverage on the targets
while other EA and ES systems move.
4-13
FM 34-45
Chapter 5
Detect
This chapter discusses the deployment of ES systems and the collection
and dissemination of ES data in support of EA. For EA to be successful
on the battlefield, the commander must understand the role of ES and
how to coordinate the ES effort in support of EA.
ELECTRONIC SUPPORT DATA
5-1. ES assets collect information for three purposes:
• To provide intelligence.
• To develop the database in the SIGINT team to aid the DECIDE
function.
• To cue the EA assets to active targets.
5-2. Currently database development relies heavily on exploiting signal
internals, which include what is said that specifically identifies the target
and gives target intent. Future ES systems, like PROPHET, will detect and
collect signal externals. Signal externals only identify that an emitter is
active and is located at a specific grid coordinate. If the ES system is
designed to identify what kind of unit is associated with the peculiar
characteristics of the emitter, then you will know a little about the unit but
not the specifics of its purpose, capabilities, and intent. More detailed
analysis, often at echelons higher than that supporting the EA asset, is
required to provide this information.
5-3. DETECT is composed of three functions:
• Deploy ES and EA assets.
• Collect ES data.
• Process SIGINT data.
DEPLOY ELECTRONIC SUPPORT AND ELECTRONIC ATTACK
ASSETS
5-4. Deploying assets is naturally divided into the three basic categories of
platforms:
• Ground vehicle platforms.
• Ground manpack platforms.
• Airborne platforms.
5-1
FM 34-45
5-5. ES assets are not deployed in the same manner as EA systems. ES
systems deploy in various formations to create a baseline which will provide
area coverage for specific missions. For example, the "Lazy W" configuration
is used for a wide coverage along a front where enemy positions are unknown.
Systems will deploy to high ground for best LOS, while still remaining in
proximity to adjacent systems in order to maintain system parameters and
good baseline for DF and cueing operations. Targets from the HPTL will be
found, identified, located, and targeted for a predesignated mission. In the
defensive, ES assets are used primarily to identify targets on AAs into the
AO.
5-6. EA assets deploy to cover specific areas in response to targeting
requirements. EA assets will move to high ground to achieve optimal LOS;
generally valleys, passes, roads, and bridges are ideal target areas because
they create choke points in which EA is most effective. EA assets will not
deploy in the same area unless a high number of targets require two systems
or more to cover them.
GROUND AND AIR ASSETS CAPABILITIES
5-7. Air and ground assets have unique capabilities to consider when
employing. Employ air and ground assets to complement their capabilities.
The collection manager must ensure that the ISM is configured to efficiently
fulfill the requirements. Use of EAC assets should never be the sole source of
ES. Because EAC ES assets are not organic to the ground commander, they
lack the responsiveness and flexibility to collect within a specific area and
cross-cue other sensors.
Ground Capabilities
• Advantages:
■ Ability to continue long-term collection and EA regardless of the
weather.
* Can quickly respond to changes in requirements.
• Disadvantages:
* Assets limited in LOS considerations will shut down to jump
forward in battle.
* Terrain limited.
Air Capabilities
• Advantages:
* Ability to overcome the LOS problems encountered by ground
assets.
* Has a standoff capability.
■ Has minimized terrain interference.
• Disadvantages:
* The depth of planning needed to employ air assets due to the short
duration of missions and maintenance requirements.
5-2
FM 34-45
■ Air assets are extremely weather dependent and are easily found
with DF when using EA.
AIRBORNE PLATFORMS
5-8. Airborne deployment falls into three functions. These assets are heavy
maintenance items and are generally used during specified periods to provide
EA capability on targets not in range of ground assets.
Select Restricted Operation Zone (ROZ)
5-9. The ROZ determines the flight path from which the airborne platform
will perform its mission. This function has five steps:
• Step 1. Determine target LOS. This step entails the analysis of
LOS by the pilot, the senior operator, and the MI battalion S3. They
will analyze the LOS and choose the best possible ROZ to hit the target
considering elevation, range, terrain (for example, mountains, bodies of
water).
• Step 2. Determine communications LOS. This step, which is
performed after the selection of the primary ROZ, ensures
communications with the ACE.
• Step 3. Determine area coverage. This step outlines the possible
areas of effects for EA. During this step possible ROZs are identified
and each is countered against terrain masking. Those ROZs with a
high degree of terrain masking are eliminated.
• Step 4. Determine cover and concealment. During this step the
pilots will determine the altitude of their aircraft in correspondence to
the nearest cover (for example, mountains, ridgelines) for quick evasion
of threat’s air defense.
• Step 5. Determine ingress and egress routes. This step provides
entry into the ROZ and exit points out of the ROZ for coordination with
the BCD. This step is continuously updated as intelligence from the
MI battalion S2 brings to light new air threats.
Coordinate ROZ Selection
5-10. This function covers the coordination for air space with the BCD.
Pilots will request a ROZ with the MI battalion S3. This request will specify
the air space and request it 72 hours in advance. The S3 will then coordinate
the request with the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFLAC)/A 2 C 2
for the ROZ. This JFLAC/A 2 C 2 at the Corps will then pass the request onto
the BCD. The BCD will coordinate with air space managers who decide
whether this request is acceptable or if an alternate ROZ is granted due to air
space limitations.
Review Air Threat Report
5-11. The pilots and crew perform this step. The aviation brigade will
receive intelligence on the current threat to air assets and confirm the
intelligence with the ACE. The pilots and crew will review this report before
the mission. This report may cause the use of alternate ROZs because of a
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FM 34-45
high threat. New intelligence and requirements update steps 2 and 3
continuously.
GROUND MANPACK PLATFORMS
5-12. Manpack collection teams can be deployed alone or in conjunction with
other elements. Independently deployed assets will have the additional
responsibility of team security and added supply considerations.
Ground Manpack System
5-13. Manpack collection systems provide the commander with unique
capabilities when conducting initial entry, stability operations, and support
operations. Found in both light and special operations forces (SOF) units,
manpack systems have characteristics not found in vehicle systems.
Manpack systems are characterized by the following:
• Deployable in areas that are normally not accessible or usable. This
access can be constrained by threat forces and/or routes to site. The
manpack allows the commander to place teams in areas where vehicle-
mounted equipment would present too large of a footprint and terrain
is too restrictive for air assets. Due to this, manpack systems are often
close to or past the forward line of own troops (FLOT).
• Manpack systems also have a lower battlefield signature due to
placement and equipment. Thus they can be used in more low-profile
operations and are especially helpful in urban situations.
5-14. Limitations of manpack systems:
• Very limited mobility of collection teams.
• Teams may have to rely on outside assets (airlift in most cases) to
deploy on the battlefield.
• Manpackable systems are usually not netted, so DF will be limited to
lines of bearing (LOBs) from each system.
• Collection teams will be limited on mission duration (normally 3 to 5
days) and METT-TC dependent.
• Current reporting may be limited to voice communications or short
data bursts depending on equipment.
• Limited communication link, high security requirements, difficult
resupply, and deployment asset.
Special Considerations
5-15. Special considerations must be made for small low-level voice intercept
(LLVI) teams which will be deployed close to the FLOT if not beyond it.
These teams are dependent upon stealth for battlefield survival. The teams
will usually be inserted by air, either air assaulted in or jumped in. Slow
movement due to the weight of these small systems will make security
escorts hard to plan and coordinate. For these sites, situational awareness is
imperative. Evasion plans are briefed and planned with rally points and
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FM 34-45
extract points fully detailed. If contact is made, team members will move as
a group or as individuals back to the predesignated points.
GROUND PLATFORMS
5-16. Current ground systems have to completely shut down in order to
change position. The commander must decide on how much of the baseline
he is willing to lose for the duration of the movement. A commander can
move all or part of the assets. Jumping a part of the baseline at a time allows
the commander to maintain coverage of the targets, but this is a slow process.
5-17. In the case of the "Lazy W" configuration, a commander can start
movement by jumping the two rear operating systems. Once these systems
are in place and operational, the commander would then jump the other three
systems. The other option is to move all systems at the same time. The
commander can negate the loss of target coverage by coordinating with other
assets.
Ground Systems Augmented With Air Assets
5-18. The commander must carefully plan and coordinate for the use of
organic aerial assets. The aerial assets add tremendous flexibility to the
baseline. Aerial assets —
• Can extend the width and depth of the ES ground baseline.
• Can provide coverage on targets while part or all of the ground systems
are in movement.
• Provide the commander with on-the-move capability. This becomes the
critical issue when the battlefield tempo exceeds the movement
capability of the ground systems.
5-19. Deploying ground platforms consists of three interrelated functions:
• Coordinate ES and EA position selection.
• Select ES and EA operational sites.
• Occupy and prepare selected ES sites.
5-20. Coordinate ES and EA Position Selection. This function is
comprised of three actions:
• Select general deployment areas (GDAs). This step consist of five
sequential tasks to determine possible sites and their overall
advantages and disadvantages.
* Review maneuver unit's scheme of fire and maneuver.
Under some circumstances, the GS MI commander may attach ES
and EA assets under the direct control of the DS company. The DS
company will provide a situation report (SITREP) on the AO to the
GS commander for team movement. Upon arrival, the DS
company commander will take control of the asset and, with
assistance from the GS commander, provide logistical and related
support. There are several techniques for site security (for
5-5
example, attached security force such as a fire team, collocation of
ES and EA assets, or providing your own security with internal
assets).
■ Conduct map reconnaissance. In this task the team leader and
the POC leader assess possible site locations and routes to and
from the sites. The POC leader will indicate each team TAI to
ensure focus on each particular AO.
■ Select potential operational sites. From the map
reconnaissance the team leader, with input from the POC leader
and input from the IPB process, will select the best sites from the
potential site list. Elevation, multiple egress routes, LOS of
surrounding areas, and minimal terrain masking to surrounding
areas are essential for EA/ES.
■ Confirm current security in AO. In this task the team leader
coordinates with the POC to ensure that the site selected is secure.
The POC will determine if there are indications of enemy activity
in the AO, or if there are electronic signatures of enemy
transmitters at the potential sites as indicated by DF results
collected by friendly ES assets. The POC will ensure the site is not
expected to have threat movement through the area or to have
strategic importance to the threat.
■ Conduct site reconnaissance. In this task the team leader
performs a site reconnaissance on the ground. Several sites will be
reconnoitered for use as primary, secondary, or alternate sites.
With the rapid flow of the battlefield, there may only be the
opportunity to do this only initially or during a defensive phase of
the operation. In an early entry force this step will not be
performed, and IPB and map reconnaissance will give the best
possible site. Under these circumstances OPSEC is paramount.
Coordinate with maneuver unit commander. This step is
composed of five tasks which are sequential in nature. These tasks
outline the process of coordinating instructions (the fourth paragraph
in the OPORD).
* Coordinate times and routes for deployment. This task is
conducted by the POC leader, who coordinates with the MI
battalion S3 (who then coordinates with the G3) through the GS
MI company commander for movement and routes. If a POC
leader is part of the DS company, he should coordinate through the
DS company commander with the S2 and S3 of the unit that owns
the terrain (usually a maneuver brigade) and inform the MI
battalion S3. This information is passed to the team leader in a
FRAGO from the POC leader.
■ Coordinate operational sites. This task is also conducted by
the POC leader to ensure sites are available for use by ES and EA
assets, and there is no confliction. Confliction can take place with
other assets and nearby assets such as signal assets causing
disturbance in EM environment or being hampered in turn by EA
operations. Terrain deconfliction must be addressed during the
FM 34-45
orders process and at the highest level possible. It is not
uncommon for conflicts to arise with signal, mortars, scouts, and
EW — assets all vying for the same piece of ground. The POC
leader must ensure these steps have been performed before teams
move to these sites.
* Coordinate security. This task is performed by both the MI
company commander and MI battalion S3 who coordinate security
for EW assets. The team leader and the POC noncommissioned
officer in charge (NCOIC) make the coordination between the ES
or EA asset and the maneuver asset that will provide security en
route to the predetermined ES or EA site. For example, an ES or
EA asset would deploy with scouts who are conducting a
reconnaissance mission. Upon reaching the ES or EA site, the
scouts will continue with their reconnaissance mission. A security
force will not always accompany assets during movement, but it is
desirable if possible.
■ Coordinate communications procedures. This task is
performed by the team leader during the POC leader's OPORD.
The team leader will receive procedures and frequencies during the
OPORD, which he will disseminate to the team before movement.
* Coordinate CSS requirements. The team leader at this point
will coordinate any service support requirements for the systems,
vehicles, and radios.
• Obtain approval of general deployment area. This step is
composed of three tasks to obtain approval for ES and EA systems.
* Integrate ES mission with host maneuver unit. This task is
initiated by the GS MI company commander to ensure the
movement and mission of ES and EA assets remain synchronized
with the maneuver element.
* Gain clearance for ES and EA operational areas and sites.
The POC will gain clearance from the company commander for
operational sites for ES and EA. Some considerations will be the
possible duplication of efforts from adjacent units and required
baselines for collection. The required baselines will make the ES
site selection difficult since the sites must fit into an overall
scheme while also having good LOS at each site. EA
considerations are units in the line of electronic fire that may
experience a communication loss during EA missions. Examples of
four possible ES baseline configurations are listed below.
- Standalone, which provides an LOB from the ES asset to the
target (Figure 5-1).
- Convex, which provides good LOBs against targets that are
located to the sides of the baseline of systems (Figure 5-2).
- Concave, which is best, is used when the targets are straight in
front of the baseline (Figure 5-3).
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FM 34-45
- "Lazy-W," which is the most often used configuration because it
offers good DF when the target's location in relation to the
baseline is unknown (Figure 5-4).
■ Gain clearance for ES and EA systems movements. This task
is the final coordination done with maneuver element before the
asset pushes out to its site. This final clearance will give team
leaders a green or red status for movement along predetermined
routes.
Figure 5-1. Stand Alone Operations
5-21. Select ES and EA Operational Sites. This function identifies
primary, alternate, and supplementary sites as well as provides for
preparing site sketches. Communication, target LOS, and range of targets
are essential to operations and are part of site selection. Range will always
be dependent upon terrain, vegetation, emitter power, distance between
receiver and collector, and numerous other factors. The SIGINT team will
use the signal-to-noise ratio to ensure EA systems are within range of their
respective targets. Also considerations for baselines are imperative in
choosing these sites. All possible sites must provide support for the baseline
to effect accurate locations and overall coverage of the battlefield.
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FM 34-45
• Select primary ES and EA positions. This step is composed of five
tasks to determine specific site locations:
* Determine communications LOS. This task is performed upon
reaching the site but before setting up the ES and EA system.
Communication LOS is critical. Without communications the
system will move to a point where communications are
reestablished (for example, after one hour without
communications, the system will move to reestablish
communications).
■ Determine target LOS. The team leader performs this task. He
performs LOS analysis based on recommendations of the ACE
through its use of the ASAS for LOS determination. This analysis
will consider terrain to include mineral deposits, vegetation,
5-9
elevation, large manmade features, and bodies of water. (For more
information, refer to FM 34-130.)
Determine area coverage. The team leader maps, either
informally or formally on paper, the possible area upon which the
system can provide ES and EA. This mapping should be a 360-
degree picture from the system with shade in the areas that are
masked by terrain and thus are not generally collectible or
attackable by the system. Map utilities' field of view (FOV)
function on ASAS can provide general information on terrain
coverage and is used to assist in identifying and eliminating
primary and alternate sites.
Determine cover and concealment. This task is performed
upon reaching the site. The team leader will position the system
on the military crest of the terrain with the antenna rising above
the ridgeline. If possible, use higher terrain behind the system to
avoid silhouetting the antenna against a lighter background such
as the sky. Attempt to use natural cover for the system, while
keeping the system at the best possible site. The ES system will
use camouflage, but will also make optimal use of natural
vegetation. EA systems will not use camouflage due to the
repositioning of the system after mission EA assets depend on
natural concealment and positioning. The use of vegetation on the
system is desirable as long as it does not interfere with quick site
egress or system capabilities. Small LLVI teams will find terrain,
which provides good LOS but is of little or no tactical value
because of their proximity to the FLOT. LLVI teams depend upon
natural concealment and vegetation for site concealment.
Determine ingress and egress routes. If possible, the team
leader will designate both a primary ingress route into the site and
egress route moving away from the FLOT. These routes should
use a high degree of concealment and cover ensuring no
observation of movement can occur from the direction of the FLOT.
FM 34-45
• Select alternate ES positions. This step is composed of five tasks,
which are identical to the task of selecting the primary ES and EA
positions. The target will remain identical to the targets of the
primary ES or EA site. Use these tasks to evaluate and choose the
next best site. This site will be used if the first site is compromised or
deemed unsuitable for the mission. An example would be friendly
intelligence indicating that the enemy is nominating the primary site
for artillery or an enemy axis of advance. If contact is ever made, the
system must relocate due to its limited small arms fire capacity. If
security is added, weigh the benefits of added firepower versus the
larger footprint created by security force.
• Select supplementary position. This position has the same
requirements as above. This site will be the last formally selected site
in the AO and used as a last resort. All above-mentioned factors will
be considered in this step.
• Prepare site sketches. This step is comprised of three tasks. The
team leader will sketch these tasks on a sector sketch. The team
leader will also brief team members on specifics of the sector sketch
(for example, fighting positions, egress routes, and rally points).
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FM 34-45
Figure 5-4. "Lazy W" Baseline
* Fighting position sketch. This task provides a sector sketch,
which includes sectors of fire, dead space, and alternate fighting
positions. These fighting positions are hasty at first and later, if
time permits, are developed into fighting positions. Due to time
considerations and the high amount of movement occurring with
ES and EA systems, this decision will be mission dependent. LLVI
teams will make hasty fighting positions but if contact occurs, they
will break contact and move back to rally points. LLVI teams do
not have the capability to sustain engagements. Stealth and
concealment are the two best security tools for LLVI teams.
■ Ingress and egress sketches. These sketches provide routes to
and from the site, giving specific routes for specific contact (for
example, if contact occurs to the east the team moves out on the
egress route to the west). The team leader will designate vehicles
and ground rally points.
* Administrative sketch. This sketch lays out the location of the
system and chases vehicles along with fire, fuel, and crew rest
points. (NOTE: This requirement is impractical for LLVI teams.)
5-22. Occupy and Prepare Selected ES Sites. This step is comprised of
five tasks:
• Move to site via entry point. This task will begin the movement
from the GS MI company AO or the controlling element to the ES or
EA site. Using tactical road march procedures the team will move out
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FM 34-45
along secure routes, if possible, to the site. If the chase vehicle is
available, it will move out in front of the system 100 meters to act as
security for the system and to determine road conditions for the
system. The engaged ES or EA system will evade and use the chase
vehicle to provide cover for system movement if the chase vehicle is
available. The team will not approach the site from a vantage point
observable from the FLOT.
• Establish security. The chase vehicle personnel perform this task
upon reaching the site. The chase vehicle will confirm or establish the
security of the site before the system moves onto the site. When the
system arrives, communications are established and security will
remain in force until the end of the mission. LLVI teams will typically
send one man forward to the site to ensure security and then move the
entire team to the site for system and antenna set-up.
• Confirm LOS to target area. After establishing security, the team
leader will place the target on the terrain and ensure that he still has
LOS to target. The EA team leader will orient the system on the
targeted area before set-up, either using terrain reference or getting an
azimuth on target from the SIGINT team.
• Conduct system set-up. After communications are initiated and site
location is confirmed along with target location, the team leader will
begin system set-up procedures. The unit SOP will regulate system
set-up, and security will remain in effect during system set-up.
• Minimize antenna masking by obstructions. Performing this task
will not significantly delay the team in relocation. Techniques for this
task include —
* Using high terrain behind antenna to prevent sky lining.
■ Using trees and vegetation to conceal the antenna if they do not
have a high water content.
■ Using the military crest of the hill to keep the antenna concealed as
much as possible.
COLLECT ELECTRONIC SUPPORT DATA
5-23. Collection of ES (communications intelligence [COMINT]) data falls
into two categories: voice and digital or analog data. This data will be used to
identify and target receivers for EA.
COLLECT VOICE DATA
5-24. This function has six subfunctions that when combined and analyzed
provide intelligence on targets and nodes for the effective use of EA against
these nodes.
Intercept Signal
5-25. ES systems will search across the spectrum for enemy communications
(either voice encrypted or clear).
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FM 34-45
Target Acquisition
5-26. Collection for target acquisition is the process where the ES system has
been given specific tasking to locate a particular target. It can be as simple
as finding a particular frequency to provide orientation data for an EA
system. Or it can be as complex as searching the full spectrum for a
particular entity that has met the criteria for EA. The ES system then tips
that frequency and location to an EA system for attack. The length of time
that it takes the ES system to fulfill the tasking is directly tied to the amount
of technical data that is supplied with the tasking. The ES system that has
been tasked to provide tip-off data is also usually tasked to monitor the
effectiveness of the attack. The tasking for this type of mission originates in
the ACE and is refined by the GS or DS company POC prior to being sent to
the system.
Gist Signal
5-27. The operator will provide the gist of the communication; callsign, ID
nets (for example, artillery, infantry).
Locate Target
5-28. This subfunction will be performed either by the system which is
netted or by the POC team using numerous LOBs.
Analyze the Signal and Build a Database
5-29. This subfunction will be performed primarily in POC and above by
98Cs to build net diagrams for the precise delivery of EA to delay, disrupt,
divert, or deny spectrum to enemy.
Report Collection Results
5-30. Operators will report collection data as soon as possible to expand the
SIGINT base.
COLLECT DIGITAL OR ANALOG DATA
5-31. This function has seven steps that somewhat mirror the subfunctions
of collecting communications data.
Intercept Digital Analog Signal
5-32. Operator will scan and identify signal (for example, digital artillery
nets).
Record Digital/Analog Signal
5-33. Operator will record the signal and make notes about the type of
signal.
Identify Emitter Parametrics
5-34. Operators identify signal strength and width.
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FM 34-45
Identify Emitter Function
5-35. This step is completed by the POC team or higher through enemy
historical data and threat models.
Locate Digital or Analog Target or Build Digital or Analog Database
5-36. This step is also performed by analyzing data at the SIGINT team
level.
Report Digital or Analog Collection Results
5-37. This step is performed by the operator along with sending the
recording back to the SIGINT team.
COLLECTION FOR DATABASE DEVELOPMENT
5-38. The collection manager develops clear, precise, and valid tasking to
support targeting. In order to maximize collection, the EWO will coordinate
with the collection manager to ensure the EW target annex is integrated into
the collection plan for ES. Information obtained from this collection will help
update local and national databases in order to perform situation
development.
5-39. Collection will be geared to support the PIR and IR and the current
operation. The collection manager can follow one of several methodologies
when developing the EW target list (EWTL). These methodologies vary from
EW support to targeting to collection for threat database development.
5-40. The collection manager can focus tasking by threat operating systems.
The collection manager plans collection based on the operating system that
he feels will be most beneficial to support PIR (for example, artillery,
maneuver units, reconnaissance units).
5-41. Tasking is based on known frequency, callsign, net characteristics, or
signal characteristics. Characteristics can determine the importance of a net.
Example: If an artillery command observation post (COP) were known to
operate on a specific frequency, that frequency is included in the tasking.
Tasking is based on geographical location. Signals may be of particular
interest if DF places it in an area that is of specific interest.
SEARCH TECHNIQUES
5-42. There are three main techniques of acquiring target emitters. They are
spectrum searches, band or sector searches, and point searches.
These techniques are best used combined, not independently. The techniques
employed will depend on the mission, the number of assets, and their
capabilities.
SPECTRUM SEARCH
5-43. A spectrum search entails a detailed mapping of the entire spectrum
that is exploited by a particular system. This search provides an overview of
the amount and type of activity and where in the spectrum it is located. No
detailed processing is done on signals. The amount of time to identify the
5-15
FM 34-45
signal and produce an LOB or fix is kept to a minimum. This search
technique is best used to first establish what activity to exploit. Spectrum
search allows a single asset to locate and exploit emitters to fulfill mission
requirements. In a multiple asset system, one position should always
conduct a spectrum search to acquire new targets.
BAND OR SECTOR SEARCH
5-44. A band or sector search follows the same guidelines as a spectrum
search but is limited to a particular segment of the exploitable spectrum. By
limiting the size of the search band, the asset can improve the odds of
acquiring a signal. This technique is used only in multiple asset or position
systems. This search will allow for the development of new targets.
POINT SEARCH
5-45. The point search technique is used when a list of specific targets is
provided for monitoring or exploitation. This technique allows for in-depth,
long-term exploitation of signals in a defined environment. Point search
should be used only after a thorough map of the environment is completed
and in conjunction with a spectrum, band, or sector search. This technique is
used to tip-off preplanned targets to EA assets.
CROSS CUE
5-46. When an ES asset acquires an EA target (for example, preplanned or
target of opportunity), the ES asset is responsible for tipping the target
information to the EA asset.
5-47. The EA ground systems have the capability to use either an
omnidirectional antenna or a log periodic antenna (LPA). The difference is
that the LPA increases the effective radiated power and the power is focused
along a general azimuth. In order to use the LPA, the EA system operator
must know the approximate target location prior to the start of the EA
mission. This is one way the ES system supports EA missions.
5-48. The EA aerial systems have only omnidirectional antennas. With both
types of EA systems, the ES assets provide support by providing target
acquisition, target tip off, target monitoring, and jamming effectiveness.
TATEAM
5-49. The TA team will verify and assist the ES assets in target detection.
The TA team will take the notification of a target from the ES asset and
verify the target with the AGM or EWTL. If it is a valid target, the TA team
will notify the ES asset in order to pass the target to the EA assets.
5-50. Along with tasking the EA assets, the ES assets are tasked to monitor
the target in order to quickly identify information that would lead to valid
targeting. Because information is time sensitive, quick reporting is vital.
5-51. The minimum information that needs to be passed to the EA assets are
frequency, location of target, and signal characteristics (if available). This
enables the EA assets to acquire the target and position their antennas in the
correct azimuth.
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FM 34-45
PROCESS SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DATA
5-52. The processing of SIGINT data will create and redefine the baseline of
intelligence necessary for the commander to envision the threat, both current
and future. The data produced by this process will provide support to
targeting, SIR, and numerous other products to the commander. The
processing of SIGINT data takes place at all levels of ES, from the ES asset
operator to the SIGINT team and collection manager. The focus of the
manual is on EA but it provides a brief overview of the process of intelligence
as it applies to EA.
5-53. ES assets will transmit collection data via tactical reports (TACREPs)
to the TA team. The data will include signal type, target identification, and
gist of target activity.
5-54. The TA team will process the ES data, fusing the data to develop a
battlefield picture and provide support in either a GS or DS mode. The TA
team will provide limited processing using support from the SIGINT team via
ASAS, doing limited work on simple voice matrixes, and using the OB and
the EOB. These tools, along with intelligence disseminated by the ACE,
provide a source for intelligence support to units supported in a DS mode.
5-55. The SIGINT team will further process ES data, having feeds from both
the TA teams and, under certain circumstances, the ES assets. The data
processed will depend upon numerous factors. Upon support from higher to
decrypt communications data and intelligence feeds, the SIGINT team will
also use the OB, EOB, and doctrinal templates to determine threat intent
and actions.
5-56. The SIGINT team and the TA team will provide target data to FS
channels. Using the ISM, these teams provide priority to targeting
requirements to ensure intelligence is provided in a timely manner to engage
HPTs. These targets may be engaged by either lethal or nonlethal fires.
SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
5-57. It is crucial that information pass between elements as quickly and as
accurately as possible. Information development data will be passed from the
ACE, down to the ES and EA assets, in the form of technical data and
tasking. Technical information that is developed at the ES asset is also
passed directly to the EA asset (as well as to the ACE) to help with database
development.
5-58. Once the ES system has acquired the target, the operator must
disseminate the information to the EA system. This is done most frequently
with voice communications. The data needs to include the frequency, location,
and signal characteristics. The ES system operator also notifies higher
headquarters that the target was acquired and that the necessary data was
transmitted to the EA system. If the ES system fails to acquire the target,
the ES system operator must notify higher so that the tasking can be shifted
or changed.
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FM 34-45
ELECTRONIC ATTACK EFFECTIVENESS
5-59. During an EA mission, the ES asset will monitor the target to provide
feedback to the EA asset and to provide the analytical element with an
effectiveness report. The purpose of feedback is to keep the EA asset
apprised of the status of the target. The immediate notice of changes to the
frequency, location, or signal characteristic is vital to the success of the EA
mission.
5-60. When a mission is completed, the ES or EA asset will send the
analytical element a detailed effectiveness report in the form of a jamming
effectiveness report (JER) or multiple assets effectiveness report (MAER),
which will be sent digitally or by voice. This report will include the effects on
the target from the perspective of that ES or EA asset. It includes but is not
limited to frequency, location, signal characteristics, effects observed, and
duration. (See Appendix D.)
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FM 34-45
Chapter 6
Deliver
The DELIVER function of the targeting process executes the target attack
guidance and supports the operation once the HPTs are located and
identified. The attack of targets must satisfy the attack guidance
developed in the DECIDE function. This guidance is divided into two
categories: tactical and technical decisions. Throughout this chapter we
will refer to the tasker agency; generally this refers to the TA team at the
brigade TOC. Other tasking agencies can be the General Support
Operations Center (GSOC), G3, and ACE.
TACTICAL DECISIONS
6-1. Tactical decisions determine the —
• Time of the attack.
• Desired effect.
• Degree of damage, or both.
• Attack system to be used.
6-2. On the basis of these tactical decisions, the technical decisions describe
the —
• Number and type of munitions.
• Units to conduct the attack.
• Response time of the attacking unit.
6-3. These decisions result in the physical attack of the targets by lethal
and/or nonlethal means. For more information on targeting methodology, see
FM 6-20-10, Chapter 2.
TECHNICAL DECISIONS
6-4. In the DELIVER phase EA includes conducting and reporting EA
functions. This process is linear and continuous; each step is vital to the
overall effectiveness of EA. EA cannot be a battlefield multiplier if it does not
have continuous ES along with SIGINT team intelligence support. Different
techniques against different units will give varying results. Terrain will
influence these results; it is critical to use terrain to augment the mission of
EA. In defense operations the ability to deny communication when a unit
arrives at an obstacle is an overwhelming battlefield multiplier. The
necessity of reporting the techniques and the threat reaction also will provide
6-1
FM 34-45
a baseline for future missions. In an environment rich with signals, it is
imperative that EA is delivered with precision and overpowering force.
Figure 6-1 shows an example of using ingress routes into division or brigade
AOs.
CONDUCT ELECTRONIC ATTACK
6-5. This operation has three functions. Acquire target, reappraise and
apply jamming equation, and jam target.
ACQUIRE TARGET
6-6. This function has three steps: Confirm target technical parameters,
monitor target frequency, and confirm target acquisition.
Confirm Target Technical Parameters
6-7. This step consists of three tasks:
• Confirm target frequency. The team leader will confirm with the TA
team or POC the specific target frequency and ensure if jump
frequencies were used that they were provided with jump sequence and
correct jump frequencies.
6-2
FM 34-45
• Confirm spectrum scan segments. The team leader will next use the
scan function on the system to determine the exact frequency. This
process is done because recalibration of a system is rare and the
frequency may not correspond exactly.
• Confirm continued monitoring of target. The operator or team leader
will confirm with the TA team the continued monitoring of targets.
Monitor Target Frequency
6-8. This step has three interrelated steps:
• Monitor designated frequency. The operator will monitor the
frequency.
• Monitor designated scan sectors. The operator will monitor the
particular sectors to ensure the system is still on target for the exact
frequency.
• Revisit target frequency. The operator will periodically check on the
target. How often the asset revisits the target is determined by the
number of targets and the SIGINT team.
Confirm Target Acquisition
6-9. This step has four sequential steps:
• Acquire signal. This task is covered in the previous section.
• Identify signal. The operator will identify the particular signals with
data passed by the SIGINT team.
• Confirm signal is designated target. The operator will use this data to
confirm that the target is the same target passed by the SIGINT team.
Examples of this confirmation would be callsigns, jargon, language,
and essential elements of information.
• Confirm signal is preplanned target or target of opportunity. The
operator will confirm that the target is either a preplanned target or a
target of opportunity. This task is the last confirmation that the target
is the correct target.
REAPPRAISE AND APPLY JAMMING EQUATION
6-10. This function will be performed by the SIGINT team to ensure that the
EA asset can acquire the target and the target will be within range of the EA
asset. The jamming equation will give the SIGINT team a range of each EA
system with regard to particular emitters and receivers. Doctrine and
equipment capabilities dictate quick and overpowering EA attack; therefore,
this equation is not used for minimum power. An example of this are targets
of opportunity. The EA team will not have the time to perform the equation
and fine-tune the EA asset to hit the target with minimum power (minimize
the asset’s signature). The requirement for this technique is no longer valid
because these assets deliver quick overpowering attacks.
JAM TARGET
6-11. This function has four steps.
6-3
FM 34-45
Review Jamming Control
6-12. This step will ensure that there is a "stop jam" frequency being
monitored by the system.
Program Jamming Power Output
6-13. This step will pass from the tasker to the jammer the power output for
the system. This step is usually bypassed with the assumption that
maximum power for precise overpowering EA will be used.
Jam Target Using Predetermined Techniques
6-14. This step will direct the EA system in the particular techniques to use.
There are four basic techniques: deception, jamming, masking, and DE.
6-15. Deception. EM deception is the deliberate radiation, reradiation,
alteration, suppression, absorption, denial, enhancement, or reflection of EM
energy in a manner intended to convey misleading information to an enemy
or to enemy EM-dependent weapons, thereby degrading or neutralizing the
enemy's combat capability. There are three primary types of EM deception:
• Manipulative EM deception, which involves actions to eliminate
revealing or to convey misleading EM telltale indicators that may be
used by hostile forces.
• Simulative EM deception, which involves actions to simulate friendly,
notional, or actual capabilities to mislead enemy forces.
• Imitative EM deception, which introduces EM energy into enemy
systems that imitate enemy emissions.
6-16. Jamming. EM jamming is the deliberate radiation, reradiation, or
reflection of EM energy for the purpose of preventing or reducing an enemy's
effective use of the EM spectrum, and with the intent of degrading or
neutralizing the enemy's combat capability. Jamming falls into two
categories, voice and digital (analog) data. Communications jamming is
targeted against hostile voice systems for multiple purposes:
• To introduce delays into the enemy's C 2 system that allows the friendly
commander to fully exploit his options.
• To delay hostile time-sensitive information until it is no longer useful.
• To force the enemy (in conjunction with ES) into actions that are useful
to friendly operations. There are three primary types of EM jamming:
An example of EA forcing the enemy into action useful to friendly operations
out of encrypted communications through jamming allows ES to gather
intelligence from this otherwise secure net and further develops an
intelligence baseline.
* Spot Jamming. Spot jamming may be directed at a single
frequency or multiple frequency through sequential spot jamming
and involves jamming various frequencies one at a time in
6-4
FM 34-45
sequence. Simultaneous multispot jamming involves jamming
several frequencies at the same time. In both spot and sequential
spot jamming, the full power of the jammer is directed against one
frequency at a time, increasing the effectiveness and range of
jammer. Spot jamming is less likely to interfere with friendly
communications because receivers and transmitters can easily
avoid it by slightly changing (detuning) the frequency they are
receiving.
* Sweep Jamming. In sweep jamming, the jammer goes through a
frequency range, then repeats the sweep continuously. All
frequencies in the range are jammed. Friendly frequencies may be
affected unless protected by the Joint Restricted Frequency List
(JRFL).
* Barrage Jamming. Barrage jamming, unlike spot jamming,
simultaneously spreads the jammer's power over a larger portion
of the frequency spectrum, thereby reducing radiated power
directed at any single target frequency. Barrage jamming is
similar to sweep jamming, since all frequencies are jammed within
the targeted portion of the spectrum.
6-17. Masking. Electronic masking is the controlled radiation of EM energy
on friendly frequencies in a manner to protect the emissions of friendly
communications and electronic systems against enemy ES without
significantly degrading the operation of friendly systems.
6-18. Directed Energy. DE is an umbrella term covering technologies that
relate to the production of a beam of concentrated EM energy or atomic or
subatomic particles. A DE weapon is a system using DE primarily as a direct
means to damage or destroy enemy equipment facilities and personnel.
Directed energy warfare (DEW) is military action involving the use of DE
weapons, devices, and countermeasures to either cause direct damage or
destruction of enemy equipment, facilities, and personnel; or to determine,
exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of EM spectrum through damage,
destruction, and disruption. (See Appendix A for more information on DE in
EW.)
Report Inability to Locate Target
6-19. The operator reports the inability to locate the target and therefore to
queue ES assets to search for the target or to pass targets to other EA assets.
JUMPING EA ASSETS AFTER EA MISSIONS
6-20. Dependent upon METT-TC, the commander must review the
advantages and disadvantages of moving EA systems after EA missions.
This decision becomes more critical as threat technology increases.
• Advantages: Jumping systems after each mission increases
survivability due to the strong EM signature produced during jamming
missions. These signatures are easily located if in the VHF range.
When located, ES assets can DF these signatures and provide support
6-5
FM 34-45
to targeting for lethal fires and various other means to destroy the EA
asset.
• Disadvantages: Jumping systems after each mission will dramatically
decrease the amount of EA missions which can be accomplished. The
tear-down, set-up, and movement time will use up critical resources,
specifically time. Due to the necessity of locating EA assets near the
FLOT, movement will also expose systems to threat forces in the area
of movement. Therefore, the decision to move is balanced against
missions and resources.
REPORT ELECTRONIC ATTACK RESULTS
6-21. This operation has two functions: determine effectiveness and
prepare and transmit EA report.
DETERMINE EFFECTIVENESS
6-22. This function has three steps.
Determine Degree of Disruption to Threat Communications
6-23. This step has four tasks:
• Monitor target reaction. In this task the team leader will record and
analyze the reaction of the target. The team leader records the specific
reaction of enemy forces with the support of an ES asset such as
communication phrases (for example, "we are being jammed" "say
again," "repeat all after,") or no verbal recognition of voice
communications or contradictory acknowledgement. Contradictory
acknowledgment (for example, "go to assembly area Bravo" when the
original message was assembly area Golf). These statements would
mark the conclusion of a successful EA mission.
• Estimate degree of degradation to maneuver. The team leader would
once again listen for phrases, which would provide information. The
team leader will also look for phrases that indicate delay, disruption,
and diversion of maneuver elements (for example, "Mike 14 you are off
line," "Mike 14 move back into formation.") If these phrases are
repeated to several different units in the element, the EA is effective.
• Estimate degree of degradation of fires. This task can be analyzed if
the target is a voice net. With the digital artillery nets, the team leader
will not be able to assess effectiveness, but ES systems will be able to
monitor the net to see if the jamming is overpowering the signal to the
receiver. Also, assessment of the battlefield will reveal if the enemy
forces initiated any artillery missions. A forward observer (FO) calling
for fire and adjusting fire —
* Has to repeat coordinate.
■ Is delayed passing adjustments.
* Adjustments are delayed in firing.
6-6
FM 34-45
6-24. The team leader will look to see if the mission is performed and the
degree of effectiveness. If multiple adjustments over several minutes are not
made and the unit moves out of the area, but the FO cannot walk the rounds
onto the unit, the EA mission is successful.
• Estimate degree of degradation. The team leader performs this task.
This effectiveness is determined by multiple means. Voice analysis
identifies similar phrases in the monitoring of target reaction. Also,
the team leader will look for indicators that actions are not followed or
performed. Another way to estimate degradation is for the ES assets to
report the splintering of the net. Throughout these tasks, the ES
systems must support the EA personnel orienting the EA systems. It
is also critical to support EA assets for effectiveness. For EA systems
using encrypted communications channels, the ES system will monitor
the net to see if EA overpowers the system and if the voice net drops
into the "red." These actions are clear indications of the effectiveness
of EA. Many nets will assume bad encryption and simply go "red" to
communicate. If this happens, EA may cease and ES begins to gather
intelligence until the SIGINT team tasks the EA team to reattack the
target.
Prepare EA Rating Table
6-25. This step has two tasks.
• Estimate mission success. The team leader, in conjunction with the ES
assets, performs this task to estimate the degree of degradation of
communication and noncommunications nets. This will determine the
success of mission.
• Describe threat reaction to EA. This reaction is recorded in the
determine degree of disruption to threat communications. These
reactions are compiled by the tasking agency to give overall enemy
reaction to EA.
Prepare to Continue Mission or Begin New Mission
6-26. The SIGINT team will decide whether to continue the mission based
upon the EW annex. If the mission is ineffective, the SIGINT team may task
the EA asset to employ a different technique or it may pass the mission to
other EA assets. If the mission is successful, a determination will be made if
the net is still a viable target or to move onto another mission.
PREPARE AND TRANSMIT EA REPORT
6-27. This function has two steps. These steps conclude DELIVER, although
this is truly a continuous cycle.
• Transmit effectiveness report. A MAER is sent by the team leader to
the tasker to report the overall effectiveness and status (a basic
summary) of the missions performed by the EA asset. The MAER —
■ Will queue the SIGINT team for additional missions and any
specific reports needed before new missions are begun.
6-7
FM 34-45
■ Will also provide details on the target, target reaction, mission
success, and techniques employed.
* Is not only a report on the effectiveness of EA but also upon the
reaction of enemy forces to particular techniques.
■ Is used to build a database on the use of EA against specific units
and their specific reactions and provide EA assets and EWOs more
concrete expectations when delivering EA.
• Summarize significant EA mission technical parameters. These
technical parameters summarize the frequencies and power used on
specific targets.
SUMMARIZE STATUS OF ELECTRONIC ATTACK ASSETS
6-28. This task will provide a basic system status report. The EA system will
send a multiple assets status report (MASTR) to the SIGINT team detailing
the team status. This will provide the exact status of each EA asset to
include the fuel, water, food, and ammunition. When combined with the
system status, they give the SIGINT team a complete understanding of the
system and its ability to perform additional missions.
6-8
FM 34-45
Chapter 7
ASSESS
EW operators constantly evaluate the effectiveness of EA missions and
report this information to the supported unit. The supported unit in turn
incorporates these EA effectiveness reports into their combat assessment
of the targeting effort. The combat assessment is the final function in the
targeting process. The assessment represents the staffs determination of
the effects of fires (lethal and nonlethal) on the enemy and whether these
effects are accomplishing the commander’s targeting objectives. The
combat assessment forms the basis for the staffs reattack
recommendations to the commander and future weapon system selection
and employment. Assessing EA begins with the operators.
OPERATOR EVALUATION
7-1. It is important for the operator to evaluate EA effectiveness based upon
the desired effects contained in the attack guidance. This technique provides
the operator with a quantifiable measure of EA effectiveness. The use of
percentages or other numerical formulas at the operator level are not
accurate and add little to the assessment of EA effectiveness on the
battlefield. The EA system operator and operators of the supporting ES
systems execute the following steps to evaluate the effectiveness of EA
missions.
RECORD JAMMING EFFECTIVENESS
7-2. During jamming missions, ES operators monitor the target to determine
if the jamming is overpowering the signal to the receiver and affecting the
target operator’s ability to communicate.
RECORD EFFECTS ON THE TARGET SIGNAL
7-3. This is particularly important when attacking targets such as encrypted
voice and data networks. EA and ES operators cannot access or exploit the
internals of these communications systems and must judge the effects of
jamming on the signal itself. Understanding the effects of the jamming
signal on the target signal is also important when using EA and ES operators
that are untrained in the target language. If the jamming is overpowering
the signal, then the ES system will hear the noise of the EA system override
that of the target transmitting station. The operator will also see a “spike” on
the oscilloscope when the EA system signal is active. If these indicators
occur, then the EA operator can assume the attack is effectively disrupting
the target’s ability to communicate.
7-1
FM 34-45
RECORD OPERATOR COMMENTS
7-4. Listen for operator comments about difficulty communicating or
executing operations. Phrases such as “I can’t hear you, say again,” “we are
being jammed,” and “repeat all after” indicate that the jamming power and
technique are disrupting communications. Record instances where the
operator repeats movement instructions, firing data, and situation reports.
Note incidents where operators do not acknowledge a transmission and
messages or give contradictory acknowledgments. An example of a
contradictory acknowledgement would be when the operator confirms
“assembly area Bravo” when the original message was “assembly area Golf.”
Additionally, the operator should listen for changes in attitude, rate of
speech, and use of obscenities that reflect the operator’s emotional response
to the effects of EA. Operator comments provide important information
about the EA technique employed and whether the EA mission achieved the
targeting objective.
RECORD COUNTERMEASURES TO JAMMING
7-5. The ability of the operator to recognize and react to EA varies based on
his training, experience, and discipline. An inexperienced operator may
attribute the noise or broken communications to nature or equipment rather
than to EA. This type of operator will attempt to work through the EA rather
than to take countermeasures such as switching to an alternate frequency or
mode of communications. The more experienced and trained operator will
recognize EA and initiate some form of countermeasure to defeat or minimize
the effects of EA. Noting how long it takes the operator to recognize EA and
to take action are important pieces of information for future EA mission on
the target or similar targets.
DETERMINE JAMMING EFFECTIVENESS
7-6. The level of accuracy in this subjective evaluation depends upon the
training and experience of the EA operator. The assessment begins with the
operator reviewing the EA guidance contained in the tasking message or
OPORD. The operator considers the jamming mission successful if the
mission occurred on time, against the correct target, and achieved the desired
EA targeting effect.
REPORT JAMMING EFFECTIVENESS
7-7. The EA operator provides a JER to the TA team, which in turn compiles
these reports into a MAER for the SIGINT team that addresses the
effectiveness of the mission. The SIGINT team will forward this information
in a signal summary (SIGSUM) to the EWO for MEA. This report gives
details on the target, target reaction, and techniques employed. This report
is not only a report on the effectiveness of jamming but also on the
effectiveness of the particular techniques against a target type. Targeting
and planning personnel use this information to ensure EA assets are
employed to their fullest potential against appropriate targets.
7-2
FM 34-45
REPORT DECEPTION EFFECTIVENESS
7-8. Assessing the effectiveness of deception occurs at the ACE as they fuse
intelligence to discern the threat's reaction to the deception operation.
Deception assessment occurs seldomly at the operator level. Indicators for
operators of a successful deception operation are threat forces attempting to
communicate, to gather data, and to coordinate movement if using imitative
deception. (See Appendix D for more information on electronic deception.)
UNIT COMBAT ASSESSMENT
7-9. The unit staff builds the combat assessment from BDA and MEA. BDA
describes the effects of targeting (lethal and nonlethal fires) on the target and
forms the basis for reattack recommendations. MEA addresses the
effectiveness of munitions, weapons systems, and tactics. Together, BDA and
MEA help the unit understand the impact of the current FS plan on the
threat and improve the targeting effort in future operations.
BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
7-10. The G2 is primarily responsible for developing the BDA within the unit
staff. During DECIDE, the G2 assists the commander in setting BDA
requirements for HPTs. The G2 incorporates these BDA-related PIR into the
collection plan and orders to subordinate units. This supports the timely
collection and reporting of BDA information to the G2. For EA missions, this
ensures ES systems are tasked to collect and report on the effectiveness of EA
missions.
7-11. In addition to intelligence reports and operator evaluation, the G2 also
uses target development and FS planning products to develop the BDA. The
DECIDE phase products provide the G2 with the target descriptions, attack
rationale, and desired effects that the targeting team used to develop the
HPTL and concept of fires. The G2 should refer to the following documents
during BDA development. The staff should also update these and other
documents (for example, situation template, target synchronization matrix,
collection plan, and FS plan) based on the results of the BDA.
• Concept of fires provides the task, purpose, method, and desired effects
required to support the commander’s scheme of maneuver.
• HPTL provides a mechanism for prioritizing the analysis effort with
the targeting priorities. The EA effectiveness report should include the
target number to assist in associating reports to targets.
• Target spreadsheet provides the analytic yardstick for comparing the
desired effect contained in the concept of fires and HPLT with the
actual effects. In the case of EA targets, situation templates reflecting
the threat EOB and critical nodes should be present in the spreadsheet
or as a separate electronic preparation of the battlefield product.
7-12. With the raw data such as the EA effectiveness report and reference
material in hand, the G2 begins the task of sorting and analyzing the data to
develop an all-source intelligence BDA of the effects on the target. To further
aid in this task, each BDA is broken down into three components. Each
component allows the G2 to scrutinize and record the effects on the target
7-3
FM 34-45
from a number of perspectives. These three different assessments also
require different sensors, analytical elements, and timelines. They are not
necessarily subcomponents of each BDA report. The four components are
physical damage assessment (PDA), functional damage assessment (FDA),
target system assessment (TSA), and MEA.
Physical Damage Assessment
7-13. PDA estimates the quantitative extent of physical damage through
munition blast, fragmentation, and/or fire damage effects to a target. This
assessment is based on observed or interpreted damage. While EA is not
traditionally thought of as physical damage, the EWO can develop an
immediate assessment of the effectiveness of EA through “observed or
interpreted damage.”
7-14. Observed Damage. Much like lethal fires, EA can be either observed
or unobserved nonlethal fire. Observed EA requires an ES asset to “observe”
or monitor the effects of the EA on the frequency of the system under attack.
The EWO must identify EA targets requiring ES collection during the
DECIDE function of the targeting process. If the requirement becomes a
PIR, the collection manager will then request or task support for monitoring
the EA target. The ES asset will then monitor the target and provide
feedback to the EA asset on the effects of the attack. At the end of the EA
mission, the EA and ES will send a MAER to the EWO and collection
manager on the results of the mission.
7-15. Interpreted Damage. If an ES asset cannot monitor the EA mission,
then the operator must interpret the effectiveness of the attack based on the
asset’s proximity to the target, ability to acquire the target, technical factors
(for example, signal-to-noise ratios), and operator experience. The EA asset
and SIGINT team cannot quantitatively interpret the effectiveness of
unobserved EA. Unlike the physical signs of the effects of lethal fires, the
effects of unobserved EA cannot be evaluated based on post-strike
reconnaissance.
Functional Damage Assessment
7-16. The FDA estimates the degree of degradation caused by EA against the
target compared to the operational objective established against the target.
This assessment is inferred on the basis of all-source intelligence and
includes an estimate of the time needed to replace the target function. An
FDA is a temporary assessment (compared to TSA) used for specific missions.
Target System Assessment
7-17. The TSA is a broad assessment of the overall impact and effectiveness
of all types of attack against an entire target system’s capability (for example,
threat air defense systems). It may also be applied against threat unit combat
effectiveness. A TSA may also look at subdivisions of the system compared to
the commander’s stated operational objectives. It is a relatively permanent
assessment (compared to an FDA) that will be used for more than one
mission.
7-4
FM 34-45
Munitions Effects Assessment
7-18. The FS staff (or G3/S3 through the targeting team in accordance with
FM 6-20-10) is responsible for developing the ME A concurrently and
collaboratively with the BDA. For EA systems, the team depends upon the
information in the EA effectiveness report to determine the effectiveness of
the EA system against a particular target. The assessment forms the basis of
recommendations for changes to increase the effectiveness of the following:
• EA tactics (system selection, positioning, deployment, and
redeployment).
• EA techniques (spot jamming, imitative deception, intrusion).
• EA procedures (tasking and reporting channels, ES and EA system tip-
off, technical data).
• EA systems (system capability, operator qualifications, mobility).
REATTACK RECOMMENDATION
7-19. Based on the BDA, the staff determines if the targeting objectives were
met and if reattack is necessary. MEA helps the staff to select the best
weapon system to execute the reattack. Both BDA and MEA give the staff
the information needed to develop a complete reattack recommendation for
the commander. In some cases, BDA and MEA may indicate that EA is not
capable of meeting the targeting objective. The combat assessment process
allows the staff to —
• Recognize that shortcoming in the FS plan.
• Select an alternate weapon system (lethal or nonlethal).
• Reattack the target.
• Achieve the targeting and operational objectives. (See Joint
Publication 2-01.1 and FM 6-20-10 for more information on combat
assessment.)
7-20. See Appendixes E, F, and G for more information on target reports, DS,
and military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT).
7-5
FM 34-45
Appendix A
The Electromagnetic Environment
EM energy is both a natural and manmade occurrence. This energy, in
the form of EM radiation, is made up of oscillating electric and magnetic
fields and is propagated at the speed of light. EM radiation is measured
by the frequency of its wave pattern’s repetition with a set unit of time.
The standard term for the measurement of EM radiation is the hertz (Hz),
the number of repetitions (cycles) per second. The term “electromagnetic
spectrum” refers to the range of frequencies of EM radiation from zero to
infinity. The spectrum is divided into 26 alphabetically designated bands.
MILITARY ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM
A-l. Figure A-l shows the principal military segment of the EM spectrum
with the corresponding EW frequency bands and radar designations and why
there is occasionally confusion when discussing frequency bands, which share
names in different designation systems. The EME is the resulting product of
the power and time distribution, in various frequency ranges, of the radiated
or conducted EM emission levels that may be encountered by a military force,
system, or platform when performing its assigned mission in its intended
operational environment. The EME is the sum of —
• EM interference.
• EM pulse.
• Hazards of EM radiation to personnel, ordnance, and volatile
materials.
• Natural phenomena effects of lightning and precipitation static
(p-static).
A-2. P-static is created by charged precipitation particles that strike
antennas and gradually charge the antenna, which ultimately discharges
across the insulator, causing a burst of static.
MILITARY OPERATIONS AND ELECTROMAGNETIC
ENVIRONMENT
A-3. The impact of the EME upon the operational capability of military
forces, equipment, systems, and platforms is referred to as EME effects. EME
effects encompass all EM disciplines, including —
• EM compatibility (EMC) and EM interference (EMI).
• EP.
• Hazards of EM radiation to personnel, ordnance (HERO).
• Volatile materials such as fuels.
A-1
FM 34-45
• Natural phenomena effects of lightning and p-static.
A-4. Equipment and systems which operate on the principles of
electromagnetism are characterized by electromagnetic vulnerability which
cause them to suffer a definite degradation (incapability to perform the
designated mission).
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DIRECTED ENERGY IN EW
A-5. DE includes actions taken to protect friendly equipment, facilities, and
personnel and retain friendly use of the EM spectrum. Possible applications
include lasers, RF weapons, and particle beam weapons. As the development
of DEW evolves, TTP must also evolve to ensure their safe, effective
employment. Although some DE applications will easily fit into traditional
EW roles, others will not. For example, in EW terms —
• A laser designed to blind or disrupt optical sensors is ES.
A-2
FM 34-45
• A laser-warning receiver designed to detect and analyze a laser signal
is ES.
• A visor or goggle designed to filter out the harmful wavelength of laser
light is EP.
A-6. The potential for the threat’s use of destructive DE weapons and other
destructive RF weapons is also growing. Intelligence assets must be tasked to
collect information about this threat, and joint planning must include the
development of operational procedures and COAs to mitigate the effects on
these weapons.
PRINCIPAL ELECTRONIC WARFARE ACTIVITIES
A-7. The principal activities used in EW have been developed over time to
exploit the opportunities and vulnerabilities, which are inherent in the
physics of EM energy. Although new equipment and new tactics continue to
be developed, the physics of EM energy remains constant. This physical
constant is the reason that the basic activities of EW remain effective despite
changes in hardware and tactics. The principal activities used in EW follow.
ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY
A-8. EMC is the ability of systems, equipment, and devices that use the EM
spectrum to operate in their intended operational environments without
suffering unacceptable degradation or causing unintentional degradation
because of EM radiation or response. EMC involves the application of sound
EM spectrum management:
• System, equipment, and device design configuration that ensure
interference.
• Free operation.
• Clear concepts and doctrines that maximize operational effectiveness.
ELECTROMAGNETIC DECEPTION
A-9. EM deception is the deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration,
suppression, absorption, denial, enhancement, or reflection of EM energy in a
manner intended to convey misleading information to an enemy or to enemy
EM-dependent weapons, thereby degrading or neutralizing the enemy’s
combat capability. Types of EM deception are discussed below.
Manipulative EM Deception
A-10. This type of deception involves actions to eliminate revealing or to
convey misleading EM telltale indicators that may be used by hostile forces.
Simulative EM Deception
A-ll. This type of deception involves actions to simulate friendly, notional, or
actual capabilities to mislead hostile forces.
Imitative EM Deception
A-12. This type of deception introduces EM energy into enemy systems that
imitates enemy emissions.
A-3
FM 34-45
EM Hardening
A-13. EM hardening consists of actions taken to protect personnel, facilities,
and/or equipment by filtering, attenuating, grounding, bonding, and/or
shielding against undesirable effects of EM energy.
EM Interference
A-14. EMI is any EM disturbance that interrupts, obstructs, or otherwise
degrades or limits the effective performance of electronics and electrical
equipment. It can be induced intentionally, as in some forms of EW, or
unintentionally, as a result of spurious emissions and responses,
intermodulation products, and the like.
EM Intrusion
A-15. EM intrusion is the intentional insertion of EM energy into
transmission paths in any manner, with the objective of deceiving operators
or of causing confusion.
EM Jamming
A-16. EM jamming is the deliberate radiation, reradiation, or reflection of
EM energy for the purpose of preventing or reducing an enemy’s effective use
of the EM spectrum, and with the intent of degrading or neutralizing the
enemy’s combat capability.
Electromagnetic Pulse
A-17. EMP is the EM radiation from a nuclear explosion caused by Compton-
recoil electrons and photoelectrons from photons scattered in the materials of
the nuclear device or in a surrounding medium. The resulting electric and
magnetic fields may couple with electrical and electronic systems to produce
damaging current and voltage surges. EMP may also be caused by
nonnuclear means.
Electronic Masking
A-18. Electronic masking is the controlled radiation of EM energy on friendly
frequencies in a manner to protect the emissions of friendly communications
and electronic systems against enemy ES or SIGINT, without significantly
degrading the operation of friendly systems.
Electronic Probing
A-19. Electronic probing is the intentional radiation designed to be
introduced into the devices or systems of potential enemies for the purpose of
learning the functions and operational capabilities of the devices or systems.
Electronic Reconnaissance
A-20. Electronic reconnaissance is the detection, identification, evaluation,
and location of foreign EM radiations emanating from other than nuclear
detonations or radioactive sources.
A-4
FM 34-45
Electronic Intelligence
A-21. Electronic intelligence (ELINT) is the technical and geolocational
intelligence derived from foreign noncommunications EM radiations
emanating from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources.
Electronics Security
A-22. Electronics security (ELSEC) is the protection resulting from all
measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value that
might be derived from their interception and study of noncommunications
EM radiations (for example, radar).
EW Reprogramming
A-23. EW reprogramming is the deliberate alteration or modification of EW
or target sensing systems or the TTP that employ them, in response to
validated changes in equipment, tactics, or the EME. These changes may be
the result of deliberate actions on the part of friendly, adversary, or third
parties; or they may be brought about by EMI or other inadvertent
phenomena. The purpose of EW reprogramming is to maintain or enhance
the effectiveness of EW and target sensing systems equipment. EW
reprogramming includes changes to self-defense systems, offensive weapons
systems, and intelligence collection systems.
Emission Control
A-24. Emission control (EMCON) is the selective and controlled use of EM,
acoustic, or other emitters to optimize C 2 capabilities while minimizing for
OPSEC detection by enemy sensors; mutual interference among friendly
systems; and/or execution of a military deception plan.
Spectrum Management
A-25. Spectrum management involves planning, coordination, and managing
joint use of the EM spectrum through operational, engineering, and
administrative procedures, with the objective of enabling electronic systems
to perform their functions in the intended environment without causing or
suffering unacceptable interference.
Wartime Reserve Modes
A-26. Wartime reserve modes (WARMs) are characteristics and operating
procedures of sensors, communications, navigation aids (NAVAIDs), threat
recognition, weapons, and countermeasures systems that will contribute to
military effectiveness if unknown to or misunderstood by opposing
commanders before they are used, but could be exploited or neutralized if
known in advance. WARMs are deliberately held in reserve for wartime or
emergency use and seldom, if ever, applied or intercepted prior to such use.
IEW Support
A-27. Electronic forms of intelligence gathering (for example, SIGINT,
measurement and signature intelligence [MASINT]) comprise a significant
portion of the day-to-day activities of the intelligence community. The
A-5
FM 34-45
distinction between intelligence and ES is determined by who tasks or
controls the intelligence assets, what they are tasked to provide, and for what
purpose they are tasked.
A-28. ES is achieved by intelligence collection, processing, and exploitation
assets tasked or controlled by an operational commander. These assets are
tasked to search for, intercept, identify, locate, and report sources of
intentional or unintentional radiated EM energy.
A-29. The purpose of ES tasking is immediate threat recognition and other
tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing. ES is
intended to respond to an immediate operational requirement. However, the
same assets and resources, which are tasked with ES, can also collect
intelligence at the same time that meets other collection requirements.
Intelligence collected for ES purposes normally are also processed by the
appropriate parts of the intelligence community for further exploitation after
the operational commander’s ES requirements are met.
A-6
FM 34-45
Appendix B
Signal-to-Noise Ratio Reference
Signal-to-noise ratio formulas provide personnel involved in EA the tools
that are necessary to compute jamming power outputs and distances.
These products are necessary to fully plan and/or execute EA operations
RATIO FORMULA
B-l. The ratio formula is used to compute the maximum distance a jammer
can be from a target and still be effective (Figure B-l).
f Frequency (50 MHz)
dt Enemy transmitter location to target receiver location distance in km (9 km)
Pt Power output of enemy transmitter in watts (5 watts)
hj Height of jammer antenna above sear level in meters (386 meters)
Pj Power output of the jammer in watts (1 ,500 watts)
ht Height of enemy transmitting antenna above sea level (ASL) in meters (385 meters)
JSR Jamming to signal ratio (JSR) (8:1 (9dB))
dj Jammer location to target receiver location distance in kilometers (solve)
n Terrain and conductivity Factor (4)
2 = Level terrain (over water, lakes, and ponds) good conductivity for a JSR of at least 2:1
3 = Rolling hills (farmland type terrain), good conductivity for a JSR of at least 4:1
4 = Moderately rough terrain (high hills), fair to good conductivity for a JSR of at least 8:1
5 = Very rough terrain (mountains or desert terrain) poor conductivity for a JSR of at least 1 6:1
K Jammer tuning accuracy factor (2)
2 = For jamming FM receivers operating in the VHF range
3 = For jamming continuous wave (CW) or amplitude modulated receivers operating in the
very high frequency (VHF) range
Figure B-1. Signal-to-Noise Ratio Formula
B-2. The use of this formula will provide for the creation of a range fan
which, when plotted for different radios and signal strengths and broken
down into varying ranges between transmitters and receivers, will allow for a
B-1
FM 34-45
general range fan. This range fan will in turn provide the SIGINT teams
with the means to effectively place teams and to determine which target
areas can be affected by specific locations.
FUTURE TRENDS
B-3. The shortcoming of this formula is in its lack of any relationship to
vegetation or signal frequency. These two factors affect the signal-to-noise
ratio to such a degree that only a rough estimate as to a true range fan is
determined. One possible solution to this problem is a system developed and
designed by the Electronic Proving Ground (EPG). The Virtual
Electromagnetic C 4 I Analysis Tool (VECAT) is designed to provide different
users with powerful command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence (C 4 I) system analysis capabilities embedded in a user-friendly
graphical user interface (GUI) environment. For example:
• A communications engineer or spectrum manager can use VECAT to
plan specific communication links or perform area site analysis.
• An intelligence tester may use VECAT to plan evaluations of a sensor
system immersed in a battlefield environment which would be
impractical to duplicate in a field test situation.
B-4. VECAT employs terrain integrated rough earth model (TIREM) as its
core EM propagation analytical engine. TIREM was developed by the Joint
Spectrum Center (JSC) in the 1970s and is used for calculating EM-wave
propagation loss between antennas above a point-by-point representation of
the terrain elevations along an irregular profile of the earth.
B-5. TIREM evaluates the geometry of the defined path, determines
appropriate modes of propagation, and applies suitable algorithms to
calculate the path loss for the dominant mode. As a legacy model, TIREM
suffers from lack of modern user amenities, such as GUI input interfaces and
graphical output formats.
B-6. In VECAT, a powerful graphics interface is used to display the TIREM
results. This allows the user to view either two- or three- dimensional (2D or
3D) data in a variety of combinations and styles. To facilitate its use, VECAT
employs a Geographic Information System (CIS) and an Relational Database
Management System (RDBMS) back-end. The GIS allows the user to place
equipment in realistic positions. The equipment can be chosen from a
database of known equipment and its deployment configuration can be stored
in a database. The user can customize the calculations, thus accounting for a
multitude of equipment characteristics and physical phenomena.
B-7. An important part of VECAT is the C 4 I standard, which is essentially
the Army doctrinal dispersion of C 4 I assets in a geographic area of interest.
With VECAT, the user can create and edit deployments and view
communication links and their terrain profiles and area elevation data.
VECAT provides a visual selection system, allowing the user to easily access
the equipment in the deployment; the selection system permits the user to
work with only those pieces of equipment satisfying specific criteria. The
user can evaluate any subset of deployment. For instance, a user can
B-2
FM 34-45
evaluate the area coverage of a specific EA asset against specific targets in
the EM spectrum.
B-8. For decades, communicators have been concerned with RF propagation
path loss through foliage. EPG has developed, implemented, and integrated
into VECAT the EM Wave Attenuation in a Forest (EWAF) propagation
model, which uses conventional inputs to estimate plausible foliage losses.
The EWAF is an elementary, heuristically based foliage propagation path
loss model that represents a forest as a dissipative dielectric slab lying in a
more loosely half-spaced representation of the ground. Modeling the foliage
by a dielectric slab provides an estimate of foliage excess-path-loss (EPL)
expected in situations where meager information is available regarding wood
density, conductivity, and other electrical parameters of the forest.
B-9. The EWAF model uses empirical foliage path-loss information as a basis
and is therefore closely coupled to actual path-losses encountered in real-
world situations. The EWAF model is not a rigorous attempt to solve the EM
wave equations at the boundaries of the different representative dielectric
slabs. EWAF is essentially a family of curve-fitting algorithms based on
previously measured data for sparse and dense forests in the United States
and Germany, as well as a very dense forest in India, where the mean annual
rainfall is about 3 meters.
B-10. Features of the EWAF model include the effects of antennas within the
forest, outside the forest, and above the forest; wave polarization; forest
density; canopy, trunk, and undergrowth losses; antenna beamwidth; wet
foliage; lush foliage; and other physical or forest conditions. The model
provides a good estimator for EPL due to foliage anywhere in the world.
B-ll. VECAT provides a powerful, flexible C 4 I analysis tool for a wide range
of users. The interface is user-friendly and provides output customized to the
user’s needs. VECAT is expandable and well documented. It is developed to
contemporary standards and uses and reuses existing software when
practical. VECAT is a modern system, available now to meet a wide variety
of user’s needs. VECAT will provide an easy medium in which to perform
engineering analyses, evaluations, and planning studies in the following
functional areas:
• Fundamental EM wave propagation analyses over digital terrain.
• Receive signal level (RSL), often incorporating 3D antenna patterns.
• LOS and terrain masking effects.
• Path profile terrain evaluations.
• Signal-to-interference ratio (S/1) and bit error rate (BER) studies.
• Electromagnetic environmental effects (E3) electric field distributions.
• Spectrum usage and signal modulation.
• Co-site EMI, remote interferer, and jammer studies.
• Fade-and-noise modeling.
• EM wave propagation through foliage.
B-3
FM 34-45
Appendix C
Electronic Deception
Electronic Deception is the deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration,
suppression, absorption, denial, enhancement, or reflection of EM energy
in a manner intended to convey misleading information and to deny valid
information to an enemy or to enemy electronic dependent weapons.
Electronic deception is both parts of EW and military deceptions.
Normally, an electronic deception is conducted as part of a larger
deception, and are seldom conducted alone. Division is the lowest level at
which a deception plan can be initiated, and the commander must
approve all deception plans. Historically, deception operations originate
from EAC.
TYPES OF ELECTRONIC DECEPTION
C-l. Among the types of electronic deception are —
• Manipulative Electronic Deception (MED). Actions to eliminate,
reveal, or convey misleading, telltale indicators that may be used by
hostile forces.
• Simulative Electronic Deception (SED). Actions to represent
friendly, notional, or actual capabilities to mislead hostile forces.
• Imitative Electronic Deception (IED). The introduction of EM
energy into enemy systems that imitates enemy emissions.
C-2. Although electronic deception is usually thought of in terms of
communications, electronic deception is also conducted using digital (analog)
emissions. The signals could mimic the data flows issuing from a TOC when
in reality it is a jammer putting out a signal pre-recorded for this mission.
MANIPULATIVE ELECTRONIC DECEPTION
C-3. MED uses communication or noncommunication signals to convey
indicators that mislead the enemy. For example, to indicate that a unit is
going to attack when it is actually going to withdraw, the unit might transmit
false FS plans and requests for ammunition.
C-4. MED is used to cause the enemy to splinter his intelligence and EW
efforts to the point that they lose effectiveness. It is used to cause the enemy
to misdirect his EA and ES assets and therefore cause fewer problems with
friendly communications. Used in these ways, MED is an EP technique.
C-1
FM 34-45
SIMULATIVE ELECTRONIC DECEPTION
C-5. SED uses communication and noncommunication signals to mislead
hostile forces as to friendly units and/or the capabilities of friendly units.
There are three types of SEDs:
• Unit Simulation. The use of actual equipment or specially designed
simulators to indicate that a unit is in a certain location during a
specified period.
• System Simulation. The use of systems that give off emissions
peculiar to a particular organization. A countermortar or
counterbattery radar is peculiar to an artillery unit; therefore, by
turning on that type of radar you can indicate the probable location of
an artillery unit.
• Activity Simulation. The operation of noncommunication emitters to
imply a type or change of activity by a unit. For example, placing
surveillance radars in a typical defensive array when, in fact, the
intention is an attack.
IMITATIVE ELECTRONIC DECEPTION
C-6. In IED, the enemy’s EM emissions are imitated to mislead the enemy.
Examples include entering the enemy communication nets by using his
callsigns and radio procedures, and then giving enemy commanders
instructions to initiate actions which are to our advantage. Targets for IED
include any enemy receiver and range from cryptographic systems to very
simple, plain-language tactical nets. IED can cause a unit to be in the wrong
place at the right time, to place ordnance on the wrong target, or to delay
attack plans. Imitative deception efforts are intended to cause decisions
based on false information that appears to the enemy to have come from his
own side.
C-7. Properly used, IED can be decisive on the battlefield. However, to be
effective, IED requires electronic equipment capable of convincingly
duplicating the functions of enemy equipment. IED is done if —
• (The transmitter) is compatible with the intended receiver station
equipment.
• (The transmitter) has sufficient power to transmit to the receiver
station.
• A proficient linguist (if voice transmissions are used).
• An operator capable of imitating the transmitting style of the enemy
manual Morse operator (if continuous wave is used).
C-8. If available, however, captured enemy equipment (CEE) should be used
to ensure that the technical characteristics of signals are authentic.
ELECTRONIC DECEPTION PLANNING
C-9. Electronic deception planning determines how to use EM equipment to
mislead the enemy and cause him to do something to our advantage. Each
C-2
FM 34-45
piece of electronic and associated equipment has its own electronic signature.
These signatures are exploited in deception.
C-10. The G3 usually plans and supervises deceptions. The EWO is usually
responsible to the G3 for the electronic deception plan. All of these personnel
work with the G2 to determine the electronic activities most likely to be
intercepted by enemy SIGINT.
C-ll. Careful integration of electronic deception with visual, sonic, and
olfactory actions is critical. What the enemy detects electronically must
remain consistent with other sources of intelligence reports. Because of the
reliance placed on EM radiation (for example, communication, surveillance,
navigation) this aspect of deception requires close attention. Although
electronic deception can be the sole act of deception, the effect is often of short
duration.
C-12. The enemy’s success depends upon his knowledge of your emitters.
Success in MED and SED depends on understanding how your emitters
appear to the enemy. The SIGINT team should keep a profile (database) of a
command’s voice and digital (analog) emitters. This is to determine how best
to electronically portray a desired portion of that command. When planning
MED and SED, it is usually necessary to consider all the command’s EM
emitters. It is necessary to consider what is occurring and what should occur
with all EM emitters in the unit’s area.
C-13. Similarly, when planning an electronic deception, consider all unit
electronic activities, such as —
• Actions that support the current operation as well as those that will
support the deception operation.
• All actions which must be integrated and deconflicted to prevent one
activity interfering with another.
C-14. Some considerations for planning are —
• Close control and coordination will be necessary, especially during
MED.
• The staff plans to avoid confusing friendly operators with deception
communications or with unique returns on digital (analog) equipment.
C-15. Time is critical. Given sufficient time, the enemy can discover even the
most complex electronic deception. A deception intended to deceive the
enemy for two or three days must include a well-coordinated electronic
deception that covers all electronic emitters.
• Adequate for a deception for only a short period just before an attack.
• The electronic deception plan can be relatively simple.
• Enemy capabilities are critical. If the enemy cannot detect your
electronic emitters, the electronic deception will fail.
C-16. The commander can perform MED and SED as long as he uses only
equipment under his control. IED can only be done with permission of the
appropriate commander — within a division, this is usually the division
commander. This restriction is to ensure that IED does not jeopardize the
SIGINT effort. IED, if recognized by the enemy, will provide data concerning
C-3
FM 34-45
the friendly ES effort. This could cause the enemy to improve his
communications security (COMSEC) and procedures to reduce the
effectiveness of the friendly SIGINT efforts. Coordination with higher will
always occur before any MED or SED operations begin.
C-17. False emanations must be —
• On signals strong enough to reach the enemy.
• On a frequency the enemy can intercept.
• In a modulation the enemy can intercept.
ELECTRONIC DECEPTION TECHNIQUES
C-18. The following are electronic deception techniques:
• Leave a significant sample of regimental or battalion headquarters
communication in place while the headquarters moves to another
location.
• Broadcast false information with the intention of having the enemy
receive the message and commit his forces into an area of our choosing.
• Broadcast false unit strengths, dispositions, or locations to confuse the
enemy.
• Exchange operators among units or overload one unit with operators
whose characteristics are probably known to the enemy.
• Place multichannel communications in a battalion area to show a
larger force.
• Pad traffic on secure links to deceptively show a buildup for an attack.
This technique applies to both voice and message traffic when
encrypted.
• Use callsigns and frequencies to lead the enemy to incorrect net
structures.
C-4
FM 34-45
Appendix D
Message Formats
The three message types that must used in conjunction with EA are
MATM (Figure D-l), MAER (Figure D-2), and MASTR (Figure D-3).
These formats will vary with equipment, either voice or datalink.
MULTIPLE ASSETS TASKING MESSAGE (MATM)
(X014)
MESSAGE MAP
MESSAGE NUMBER: X014
TITLE: MULTIPLE ASSETS TASKING MESSAGE [MATM]
12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012
3456789
HEADING/RELOC//
1
KPOS T/S T A : A ANNXXXXXX/AS OFD AT : NNNNNNNN A/ETRO : NNNNN
NNNA
1 2 3
/RELOC :NNAAANNNNNNNN/-/-/AZM : NNN//
4 5 6 7
AMPN/FREE-TEXT INFORMATION OF UNLIMITED LENGTH
FOLLOWED BY AN
1
END-OF-SET MARKER//
HEADING/COMINT TASKING//
1
1KTASK
/DE/STA /TSKACT/MSNNO/IMT /PRY/ON-TIME/OFFTIME
/NN/ A ANNXXXXXX/A A A /A ANNXX/A A A A/
Figure D-1. Example of an MATM
D-l
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1KC0MACT
/DE/CONOT /OCRNFREQ/DT/CN /ACTTYP/ECH-LVL
/NN/XXXXXX/AAAAAAAA/NN/XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX/AAAAAA/A
AAAAAA//
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
AMPN/FREE-TEXT INFORMATION OF UNLIMITED LENGTH
FOLLOWED BY AN
1
END-OF-SET MARKER//
1KCOMPRM
/DE/TGT -C ALL-S IGN /R-FREQ /HIGHRF /MOD/UK /SIG//
/NN/XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX/XXXXXXXXXXX/XXXXXXXXXXX/
AAA/NNAAANNNN/A//
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
NARR/FREE-TEXT INFORMATION OF UNLIMITED LENGTH
FOLLOWED BY AN
1
END-OF-SET MARKER//
RECORD MESSAGE EXAMPLE
MESSAGE NUMBER: X014
TITLE: MULTIPLE ASSETS TASKING MESSAGE [MATM]
CONFIDENTIAL*
EXER/BLUE KNIGHT//
MSGID/MATM/ASAS 9 ID/0723/JUN//
HEADING/RELOC//
KPOST/STA: D0090 1 A/AS OFD AT : 0625 1 900Z/ETRO : 0625 2300Z
/RELOC : 1 6M AB 7621 495 5/-/-/AZM: 062//
Figure D-1. Example of an MATM (continued)
D-2
FM 34-45
AMPN/CONTACT HQ WHEN TEAM IS FULLY OPERATIONAL//
HEADING/COMINT TASKING//
1KTASK
/DE/STA /TSKACT/MSNNO /IMT /PRY/ON-TIME/OFFTIME
/01/Q15101A /ADD /362491/CDF/ 3/252330Z/260000Z
/02/Q15101B /ADD /362521/CDF/ 2/260400Z/260430Z//
1KCOMACT
/DE/CONOT /OCRNFREQ/DT/CN /ACTTYP/ECH-LVL
/Ol/XXXXXX/ONCE /30/XXXXXXXXX /RVRCRS/RGT
/02/XXXXXX/ONCE /30/XXXX /WITHDR/DIV//
AMPN/ENSURE ANY NEW ENTITIES ARE IDENTIFIED//
1KCOMPRM
/DE/TGT -C ALL-S IGN /R-FREQ /HIGHRF /MOD/UK /SIG
/01/VB262 / 23.254GHZ/ -/SSB/16MAB7429/S
/02/AK794 / 241.6 MHz/ -/CW /16MAB7926/W//
NARR/IF ANY NEW TARGETS ARE LOCATED DURING THE
SEARCH, REPORT THEM IMMEDIATELY//
HEADING/ELINT TASKING// MESSAGE MAP (CONTINUED)
1
1KTASK
/DE/STA /TSKACT/MSNNO /IMT /PRY/ON-TIME/OFFTIME
/NN/XXXXXXXXXX/AAA /XXXXXX/AAAA/
N/NNNNNNA/NNNNNNA//
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1KELACT
/DE/ELNOT /OCRNFREQ /DT/R-FREQ /HIGHRF
/EFC/T GT-EQUIP-NAME
/NN/XXXXX/AAAAAAAA/NN/XXXXXXXXXXX/XXXXXXXXXXX/A
A /xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx//
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1KELPRM
Figure D-1. Example of an MATM (continued)
D-3
FM 34-45
/DE/PRFPRI /PULSDUR /SCAN-TYPE
/NN/AAAXXXXXXXXXXX/NNNNNNN/AAAA//
12 3 4
NARR/FREE-TEXT INFORMATION OF UNLIMITED LENGTH
FOLLOWED BY AN
1
END-OF-SET MARKER//
HEADING/EA TASKING//
1
1KTASK
/DE/STA /TSKACT/MSNNO /IMT /PRY/ON-TIME/OFFTIME
/NN/AANNXXXXXX/AAA /AANNXX/AAAA/
N/NNNNNNA/NNNNNNA//
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1KTGTJAM
/DE/OCRNFREQ/DT/RF-
BANDWIDTH/RMOD/TMOD/AZM/POLTGT/ERP/ACTTYP/ECH-LVL
/NN/AAAAAAAA/NN/ NNNNNNNN/AAA /AAA /NNN/AAAAA /NN
/AAAAAA/AAAAAAA//
123456789 10
II
5KJAMFRQ
/DE/LOWRF /HIGHRF /R-FREQ /TGT-CALL-SIGN /SIG
/NN/XXXXXXXXAAA/XXXXXXXXAAA/XXXXXXXXAAA/XXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXX/A//
1 2 3 4 5 6
5KGUARD
/DE/LOWRF /HIGHRF /R-FREQ
/NN/XXXXXXXXAAA/XXXXXXXXAAA/XXXXXXXXAAA//
12 3 4
AMPN/FREE-TEXT INFORMATION OF UNLIMITED LENGTH
FOLLOWED BY AN
1
END-OF-SET MARKER//
Figure D-1. Example of an MATM (continued)
D-4
FM 34-45
NARR/FREE-TEXT INFORMATION OF UNLIMITED LENGTH
FOLLOWED BY AN
1
END-OF-SET MARKER//
HEADING/ELINT TASKING//
1KTASK
/DE/STA /TSKACT/MSNNO /IMT /PRY/ON-TIME/OFFTIME
/01/D00901A /ADD /386111/DF / 3/260730Z/260900Z
/02/D00903D /ADD /386142/COL/ 2/261430Z/261730Z//
1KELACT
/DE/ELNOT/OCRNFREQ/DT/R-FREQ /HIGHRF /EFC/TGT-EQUIP-
NAME
/01/XXXX /HOURLY /90/ 27.60MHz/ -/PW /FC RADAR
/02/XXXX /HOURLY /60/ 830MHz/ -/PW /EW RADAR//
1KELPRM
/DE/PRFPRI /PULSDUR /SCAN-TYPE
/01/PRF18.5 / 0.005/CON
/02/PRF80 / 55.700/CIR//
NARR/IF ANY NEW TARGETS ARE LOCATED DURING THE
SEARCH, REPORT THEM IMMEDIATELY//
HEADING/EA TASKING//
1KTASK
/DE/STA /TSKACT/MSNNO/IMT /PRY/ON-TIME/OFFTIME
/01/Q15101A /ADD /3210A/EA/ 3/261415Z/261430Z
/02/Q15106B /ADD /3225A/EA / 3/261830Z/261900Z//
1KTGTJAM
/DE/OCRNFREQ/DT/RF-
BANDWIDTH/RMOD/TMOD/AZM/POLTGT/ERP/ACTTYP/ECH-LVL
/Ol/ONCE /15/ 9624.20/MCW /MCW /274/ELIPL / 62/COMM /RGT
/02/ONCE /30/ 4762.55/ASB /ASB /169/HORIZ / 46/SEARCH/DIV//
5KJAMFRQ
/DE/LOWRF /HIGHRF /R-FREQ /TGT-CALL-SIGN /SIG
Figure D-1. Example of an MATM (continued)
D-5
FM 34-45
701/ 156.25MHz/ 826.75MHz/ 425.70MHz/MN724 /R
/02/ 725.80MHz/ 270.50MHz/ 195.60MHz/AB265 /R//
5KGUARD
/DE/LOWRF /HIGHRF /R-FREQ
/01/ 255.70MHz/ 1988.75MHz/ 395.25MHz//
AMPN/TIP ANY NEW TARGETS FOUND TO DF //
NARR/REPORT ALL TARGETS THAT COULD NOT BE JAMMED//
Figure D-1. Example of an MATM (concluded)
MULTIPLE ASSETS EFFECTIVENESS REPORT (MAER)
UNCLASSIFIED
APPENDIX I
500-004
Printed: 20-AUG-1999
1993
(U) INDEX REFERENCE NUMBER : S301
AGREED DATE: 22-JAN-1993
MTF IDENTIFIER : MAER
MESSAGE TEXT FORMAT NAME : MULTIPLE ASSETS
EFFECTIVENESS REPORT
FUNCTION OR PURPOSE : THE MAER IS USED TO REPORT
THE EXTENT OF MISSION EFFECTIVENESS
— (POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE) TO THE TASKING
AUTHORITY.
SPONSORS :
RELATED DOCUMENTS
Figure D-2. Example of an MAER
ACCS-A3-
25-OCT-
STATUS:
D-6
FM 34-45
MESSAGE TEXT FORMAT
SEG RPT OCC SETID SEQ FIELD OCCURRENCE SET
FORMAT NAME
© EXER 1 /M/O// EXERCISE IDENTIFICATION
(O) OPER 2 /M/O/O/O// OPERATION
IDENTIFICATION DATA
(M) MSGID 3 /M/M/O/ O/O/O// MESSAGE
IDENTIFICATION
(O) REF 4 /M/M/M/M/ 0101*011 REFERENCE
© AMPN 5 Mil AMPLIFICATION
© NARR 6 Mil NARRATIVE INFORMATION
(M) HEADING 7 Mil EA, EP, COMINT, ELINT,
IMINT,
(M) KASDEG 8 /M/0// ASSET DESIGNATOR
(M) RMKS 9 Mil REMARKS
(O) DECL 10 Mil MESSAGE DOWNGRADING
OR
NATURAL LANGUAGE EQUIVALENT: THE FOLLOWING
CONDITIONAL SETS/FIELDS ARE MANDATORY AS INDICATED:
EXER: IF MESSAGE IS IN SUPPORT OF AN
EXERCISE THAT HAS A DESIGNATED CODE NAME OR
NICKNAME. USE OF SETS EXER AND OPER ARE MUTUALLY
EXCLUSIVE, I.E., IF CONDITIONS FOR SET EXER ARE SATISFIED,
SET OPER CANNOT BE USED IN THIS MESSAGE. IF CONDITIONS
FOR NEITHER SETS EXER OR OPER ARE SATISFIED, NEITHER SET
WILL BE USED IN THIS MESSAGE.
AMPN: IF FLD 2 OF SET REF IS COMMUNICATION TYPE AND ONLY
ONE REFERENCE IS USED, OR ADDITIONAL INFO RELATING TO
SET REF IS REQUIRED.
NARR: IF SET REF IS REPEATED ONE OR MORE TIMES AND FLD 2
OF ONE OR MORE SETS REF CITES COMMUNICATION TYPE, OR
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATING TO SETS REF IS
REQUIRED.
Figure D-2. Example of an MAER (continued)
D-7
FM 34-45
REVISION DATE
: 22-JAN-1993
UNCLASSIFIED
MSG MAP-
S301-1
Figure D-2.
Example of an MAER (concluded)
MULTIPLE ASSETS STATUS REPORT (MASTR)
UNCLASSIFIED
APPENDIX I
500-004
Printed: 20-AUG-1999
1993
(U) INDEX REFERENCE NUMBER : S304
AGREED DATE: 22-JAN-1993
MTF IDENTIFIER : MASTR
MESSAGE TEXT FORMAT NAME : MULTIPLE ASSETS STATUS
REPORT
FUNCTION OR PURPOSE : THE MASTR IS THE VEHICLE BY
WHICH CORPS AND DIVISION ASSETS REPORT OPERATIONAL
STATUS OR ANY CHANGES IN CAPABILITY TO THE ASAC.
SPONSORS :
RELATED DOCUMENTS
MESSAGE TEXT FORMAT
ACCS-A3-
25-OCT-
STATUS:
Figure D-3. Example of an MASTR
D-8
FM 34-45
SEG RPT OCC SETE) SEQ FIELD OCCURRENCE SET
FORMAT NAME
(C) EXER 1 /M/O//
EXERCISE
IDENTIFICATION
(0) OPER 2 /M/0/0/0//
OPERATION
IDENTIFICATION DATA
(M) MSGID 3 /M/M/O/O/O/O//
MESSAGE
IDENTIFICATION
(0) REF 4 /M/M/M/M/ 0/0/* 0//
REFERENCE
(C) AMPN 5 Mil
AMPLIFICATION
(C) NARR 6 Mil
NARRATIVE INFORMATION
(C) HEADING 7 Mil
COMINT, ELINT OR EA
ASSET STATUS
* (C)KPOSTM 8 /M/M/M/C/C/C/C//
COMINT, ELINT
OR EA ASSET STATUS
(C) AMPN 9 Mil
AMPLIFICATION
(0) HEADING 10 Mil
IMINT ASSET STATUS
(C) AMPN 11/M//
AMPLIFICATION
(C) HEADING 12 Mil
REMBASS ASSET
STATUS
* (C)KSTAT 13 /M/M/M/M/M/M/C/C/C// REMBASS
ASSET STATUS
(C) AMPN 14 Mil
AMPLIFICATION
(C) HEADING 15 Mil
HUMINT ASSET STATUS
* (C)KHSTAT 16 /M/M/M/C/C//
HUMINT ASSET
STATUS
(C) AMPN 17 Mil
AMPLIFICATION
(0) HEADING 18/M//
OPSEC ASSET STATUS
(C) AMPN 19 Mil
AMPLIFICATION
(0) DECL 20 Mil
MESSAGE DOWNGRADING
OR
NATURAL LANGUAGE EQUIVALENT:
THE FOLLOWING
CONDITIONAL SETS/FIELDS ARE MANDATORY AS INDICATED:
EXER: IF MESSAGE IS IN SUPPORT OF AN EXERCISE THAT HAS A
DESIGNATED CODE NAME OR NICKNAME. USE OF SETS EXER
AND OPER ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE, I.E., IF CONDITIONS FOR
SET EXER ARE SATISFIED, SET OPER CANNOT BE USED IN THIS
MESSAGE. IF CONDITIONS FOR NEITHER SETS EXER OR OPER
ARE SATISFIED NEITHER SET WTT T RF. USED TN THTS MESSAGE
Figure D-3. Example of an MASTR (concluded)
D-9
FM 34-45
Appendix E
Example Formats and Target Report
The targeting products developed during the targeting process are
actually tools. They are used by the commander, the targeting team, and
supporting and supported units. The products allow them to control and
synchronize targeting effectively and efficiently. As such, there are no
prescribed formats. Each unit will develop tools that work best for that
unit. Factors to consider in developing formats:
• Type and level of the command.
• Operating environment.
• Assets available.
• Missions.
• SOPs.
GENERAL
E-l. Regardless of the formats used, the decide, detect, deliver, and
assess methodology associated with the command decision cycle must be
followed.
E-2. The purpose of this appendix is to provide a menu of formats. They may
be copied and used as is, or the targeting team can modify them to suit the
needs of the command. Also provided is a sample target report format which
can be used or modified as desired.
E-3. These formats are not yet integrated into supporting C 4 I systems such
as tactical fire (TACFIRE) direction system, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical
Data System (AFATDS), Warrior, and ASAS. The need for automation
support is apparent and emerging. C 4 I systems will be asked to incorporate
similar targeting formats.
HIGH-PAYOFF TARGET LIST
E-4. The modified HPTL at Figure E-l is the basic format described in
Chapter 4.
E-1
FM 34-45
EVENT OR PHASE:
PRIORITY
CATEGORY
TARGET
Figure E-1. High Payoff Target List
TARGET SELECTION STANDARDS
E-5. TSSs are comprised of the essential elements as shown in the sample
entries in Figure E-2. HPT refers to the designated HPTs which the collection
manager is tasked to acquire.
HPT
TIMELINESS
ACCURACY
COPs
3 hrs
150 m
RSTA
30 min
150 m
2S3
30 min
500 m
M-46
30 min
500 m
ADA
15 min
500 m
CPs
3 hrs
500 m
Ammunition
6 hrs
1km
Maneuver
1 hr
150 m
Figure E-2. Example TSS
ATTACK GUIDANCE MATRIX
E-6. The AGM (Figure E-3) provides guidance on what HPTs should be attacked
and when and how. The AGM consists of the following.
• HPTL. A prioritized list of HPTs by phase of the operation.
• WHEN. The time the target should be engaged.
• HOW. The attack system that will engage the target.
• EFFECT. The desired effects on the target or target system.
• REMARKS. Remarks concerning whether or not BDA is required, whether
coordination must take place, and so forth.
E-2
FM 34-45
PHASE/EVENT: Attack through the security zone
HPTL
WHEN
HOW
EFFECT
REMARKS
COPs
P
GS arty
N
Plan in initial prep
RSTA and COPs
P
GS arty
N
Plan in initial prep
2S1 and 2S3
P
MLRS
N
Plan in initial prep
2S6, SA9, and
SA13
P
GS arty
S
SEAD for aviation operations
Regiment CP
A
MLRS
N
Reserve Battalion
P
Avn Bde
D
Intent to attack reserve battalion in
EA HOT
C 7
P
TLQ-17
EW
Deny communications to C
LEGEND: I = IMMEDIATE S = SUPPRESS
A = AS ACQUIRED N = NEUTRALIZE
P = PLANNED D = DESTROY
Prep = Include in preparation fires EW = JAMMING or other OFFENSIVE EW
Figure E-3. Example AGM
SENSOR OR ATTACK MATRIX
E-7. The sensor or attack matrix is a tool used to determine if organic sensors
and attack systems can acquire and attack the HVTs for each critical event or
phase of the battle (Figure E-4). Use additional sheets as necessary.
E-3
FM 34-45
EVENT: ATTACK THROUGH SECURITY Z<
:)ne
HVT
COPs
RSTA
M46
2S3
MAIN
FWD
CPs
AMMO
MANEUVER
HVT
SENSOR
ATK
SYSTEM
EPW team
s
A
Mnvr brigade
Cl team
S
s
AHB
LRSD
S/A
D/A 155 -mm
SP
TRQ-32
S
A
A
S
D/A MLRS
ALQ-151
A
A
s
C/A MLRS
PPS-5
A
EW: TLQ-17
OH-58D
s
A
TRQ-32
S/A
TLQ-17
Q36 CMR
S
A
CAS: 20/day
S = SENSOR with capability to acquire target A = ATTACK system with capability to engage target.
D/A = Division/ Artillery C/A = Corps/ Artillery
Figure E-4. Example Sensor or Attack Matrix
OPTIONAL HIGH PAYOFF TARGET LIST AND ATTACK GUIDANCE
MATRIX
E-8. The examples shown in Figures E-5 and E-6 are simpler than those
discussed in Chapter 3 and combine the formats. This allows the targeting team
to specify HPTs in priority order with as much detail as desired. It also allows
the team to immediately specify the when, how, and restrictions information
for attack of the HPTs. The HPTL and AGM will likely change as the battle
progresses from one phase or critical event to another. Therefore, a separate
HPTL and AGM can be prepared for each phase of the battle.
E-4
FM 34-45
EVENT OR PHASE: Attack through security zone.
HIGH-PAYOFF TARGET LIST
ATTACK GUIDANCE
WHEN, HOW, RESTRICTIONS
COPs
Prep, A, N, cannon and/or rocket.
RSTA
Prep, A, N, cannon and/or rocket.
2S3
Prep, I, N, cannon and/or rocket.
M46
Prep, I, N, cannon and/or rocket.
Use corps assets beyond PL Diamond.
ADA
SEAD, P, S
CPs
Prep, A, D
Ammunition
Prep, A, D
Maneuver and reconnaissance patrols
Prep, A, N
LEGEND: I = IMMEDIATE S = SUPPRESS
A = AS ACQUIRED N = NEUTRALIZE
P = PLANNED D = DESTROY
Prep: Include in preparation fires.
Figure E-5. Example of HPTL-AGM (Option 1)
E-5
FM 34-45
PRIORITY
CATEGORY
HPTs
WHEN
HOW
COMMENTS
1
ADA
SA-8, SA-11, SA-15
A/P
N
2
FS
Arty CP MRL, C/B
weapons
1
N/EW
Coord with ES
3
ENGINEER
Bridging units,
pontoons
A
N
4
C J
MRR, MRD CP
A
N/EW
Coord with ES
5
MANEUVER
1st Ech/lead div
A
N
6
RSTA
Fwd intercept DF
nodes
I
N
-
NUKE/CHE
M
I
D
Need BDA
-
RECON
A
N
Not HPT
-
CLASS III
POL
A
N
Not HPT
-
CLASS V
AMMO
A
N
Not HPT
-
CLASS IX
MAINT
A
N
Not HPT
-
LIFT
A
N
Not HPT
-
LOC
A
N
Not HPT
LEGEND:
P
P
[ = IMMEDIATE S = SU1
v = AS ACQUIRED N = NE 1
' = PLANNED D = DE
PPRESS
UTRALIZE
STROY
Figure E-6. Example of HPTL-AGM (Option 2)
TARGET SHEETS
E-9. The decision on which HVTs should or could be attacked requires
knowledge of their individual vulnerabilities, locations, signatures, and functions.
Also considered is the effect that an attack on them will have on the parent
enemy unit. This information, when consolidated, is called a target sheet.
Locally produced target sheets should contain the major sections discussed in
paragraph E-10.
E-10. The construction of target sheets, as shown in Figure E-7, is simple and
much of the information is readily available, although from varied sources.
• Security Classification of target sheet information should appear at the
top and bottom.
• Target Category indicates to which of the 13 sets the target belongs.
• Sheet No/Title should be assigned to the target so it may be referenced in
the future. The sheet number can be used to cross-reference the target
sheet with the spreadsheet. The title refers to the type and function.
E-6
FM 34-45
• Function details the specific operations and tasks that the target is
expected to do. It includes the primary and secondary functions of the
target and indicates any relationship to other target categories or types.
• Description details the number and type of vehicles and equipment in a
position and the approximate number of people with the target. The
description is useful in considering the types of attack systems and
munitions to be used.
* Usual distance form the current forward edge of the battle area
(FEBA).
* Expected posture of the target with respect to camouflage and
orientation.
* Type and amount of terrain occupied.
• Signature describes all possible signatures to include visual, electronic,
auditory, and infrared. This portion is especially useful to target
acquisition and intelligence collection managers.
• Degradation describes the effects on the parent or associated intelligence
unit when the target can no longer function. This is called the
degradation portion.
• Graphic Representation aids in identifying the target and in analyzing
its vulnerabilities. It may be used to help determine the effects desired
against the target.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE ANNEX
E-ll. The EW annex (Figure E-8) is a tool used to determine the attack system
(nonlethal) for targets. The EWO will place HPTs designated by the commander
onto the annex for engagement. The engagements will be synchronized with the
AGM and will be tied to the ISM for queuing for engagement.
E-7
FM 34-45
(Classification)
TARGET CATEGORY:
Engineer.
TARGET SHEET NO/TITLE: GT 75/Ferry crossing site.
FUNCTION:
Provide rapid crossing of water obstacles for tanks and other
systems lacking amphibious capability.
DESCRIPTION:
Target radius-point target.
Posture-exposed on water surface FEBA distance.
Composition: Vehicles, normally two ferries or rafts. (If the river
is over 300 meters wide, there may be as many as five.)
Personnel:
SIGNATURE:
Visual- (See graphic representation)
Electronic-
Other-
DEGRADATION:
Forces lacking amphibious capability must find alternate
means to cross.
GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION: (Omitted)
(Classification)
Figure E-7. Sample Target Sheet
E-8
FM 34-45
SITUATION Detail enemy capabilities, communications, noncommunications, and
radio-electronic combat systems. (NOTE: These may be provided in
appendixes to the annexes.) Outline the higher headquarters’ EW plan
with any additional EW assets or resources to support the unit.
2. MISSION Detail type of nonlethal attack and the mission of this engagement.
3. EXECUTION
a. provide a brief statement of the defensive EW and electronic combat
operations to be executed including priorities.
b. Identify the placement of friendly EW assets
4. SERVICE SUPPORT Detail specific support necessary for asset to remain operational.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
Tabs: 1 Enemy EOB Overlay
2 Electronic Combat Target List
3 Schedule of Jamming
4 Electronic Warfare Contingency Augmentation
5 Joint Restricted Frequency List
Figure E-8. Sample EW Annex.
E-9
FM 34-45
Appendix F
Direct Support To The Brigade
Tactical SIGINT and EW units operate normally in GS of the parent
regiment, division, or corps. This support relationship is the most
effective for providing SIGINT support to the commander’s deep battle
and information operations campaign. In the division, however, EW
assets often operate in DS of the subordinate maneuver brigades. This
support relationship increases the combat power of brigades and the
effectiveness of EA during entry, cross-FLOT, and close battle offensive
operations.
TASK ORGANIZATION
F-l. Task organization is the process of allocating available assets to
subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support
relationships. Formal task organization begins during COA analysis when
the division commander assigns tasks to subordinate commanders and
defines command and support relationships. These relationships are stated
in the division OPORD and its annexes.
F-2. The MI battalion commander uses the division OPORD to task organize
the battalion’s EW assets. Annex A (Task Organization), Annex B
(Intelligence) and Annex T (Electronic Warfare) provide the commander the
information needed to allocate EW assets and support. Normally, the task
organization for organic EW assets is not stated in Annex A but expressed as
requirements in Annex B and Annex T of the division OPORD. It is the MI
battalion commander who lays out the EW task organization and
relationships within the MI battalion OPORD.
F-3. Although FM 101-5 does offer other support relationships, the most
common relationship for MI units places EW and intelligence assets in a DS
role to the maneuver brigade. To provide DS EW support, the MI battalion
commander has two basic options for command relationships: GS-reinforcing
and DS.
GENERAL SUPPORT-REINFORCING
F-4. The GS MI company commander retains command of the EW assets.
Since effective EA requires proximity to the enemy, this command
relationship requires the GS MI company commander to maneuver, control,
and supply the EW assets over an extended AO. It does, however, support
rapid redirection of support between GS and DS with minimum disruption to
command and technical control. This relationship is appropriate for short
duration offensive missions, during defensive operations, or when the size of
the AO is small enough to enable effective C 2 .
F-1
FM 34-45
DIRECT SUPPORT
F-5. The battalion commander attaches the EW assets from the GS MI
company to the DS MI company. This relationship improves the
synchronization of EA with the brigade FS plan. It also adds additional
logistic burden on the DS MI company and increases the company’s
"footprint" (physical and communications) within the brigade’s AO. This
relationship is recommended for entry and cross-FLOT operations, movement
to contact situations, and extended offensive operations where EA is a
significant combat multiplier in the close battle.
F-6. When the MI battalion FRAGO or OPORD arrives, the GS MI company
commander coordinates the linkup between the EW assets and the DS MI
company. The commander issues a FRAGO to the EW assets that includes
departure time, routes, linkup location and time, and pertinent command and
signal instructions. Attachment is effective upon linkup between the EW
assets and the DS MI company. The DS MI company commander integrates
the EW assets into the unit and familiarizes the officer or NCOIC with the
brigade’s mission and AO. The attachment remains in effect until the MI
battalion commander orders a change to the task organization or the EW
assets complete the mission as specified by criteria (event, time, or location)
in the OPORD.
ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS
F-7. EW assets attached to a DS MI company vary in size and capability
based on the mission and unit. In heavy divisions, the MI battalion
traditionally attaches a C&J platoon to the DS MI company supporting an
armored or mechanized brigade. The C&J platoon consists of a headquarters
element, a TA team, a voice intercept team, and an EA team. The
headquarters element and the analysis team collocate with the DS MI
company ACT. This physical collocation ensures that EW is integrated into
the brigade’s concept of operation and allows the S2 to leverage the combined
analytic power of the ACT and the TA team. The DS MI company works with
the brigade S3 to ensure intercept and EA positions are coordinated with
brigade for terrain management and security purposes. Once coordinated,
the intercept and attack teams use the same TTP described in Chapters 5
and 6 to move to and occupy sites.
F-8. The brigade uses the same process described in Chapter 4 to plan and
execute EW operations. While the overall process remains the same, some
roles and responsibilities are shifted and consolidated at brigade level. Some
of these changes are discussed below.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE OFFICER
F-9. At brigade level, the C&J platoon leader assumes the special staff officer
role and responsibilities of the EWO.
TARGET DEVELOPMENT
F-10. The TA team provides the ACT a scaled-down version of the ACE
SIGINT team at division. The size of the team and the nature of brigade
level operations limit the degree of EW target development that the team
F-2
FM 34-45
performs. At this level, the team’s primary tasks are to assist the ACT in
maintaining the enemy situation picture and MM of subordinate EW assets.
Both tasks rely on the team’s low-level analysis of C&J platoon’s intercepts,
broadcast reports received from the common ground station, and technical
support from the ACE. The SIGINT analyst in the team performs target
value analysis and target nomination based on the understanding of the
current situation derived from these information sources. More detailed
analysis of potential enemy electronic targets must come from the ACE.
Since the team lacks an organic processor, it must receive ACE EOB, SIGINT
templates, and EW targeting data from the ACE.
COMBAT ASSESSMENT
F-ll. When required, operators of the intercept and EA systems perform the
initial assessment of the effects of their EA missions. The operators pass the
assessment and technical data to the TA team. The TA team consolidates the
assessments and forwards them the C&J platoon leader. The C&J platoon
leader, as the EWO, evaluates the operator assessments and provides an
evaluation of the effectiveness of EA missions to the S2 and the FSCOORD.
The S2 incorporates the evaluation into the BDA of the target while the
FSCOORD rolls the information into the overall combat assessment. Based
on the C&J platoon leader’s evaluation and the S2’s BDA, the FSCOORD
makes a reattack recommendation to the commander.
F-3
FM 34-45
Appendix G
Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain
This appendix discusses the difficulties and restrictions on ES and EA in
MOUT environments. These problems are hard to overcome.
G-l. Buildings diffract radio signals, making DFs highly inaccurate, unless
systems have LOS. This in turn makes the use of EA difficult without
accurate antenna orientation towards the target. The diffraction also
hampers the ES if signals are at the threshold levels for intercept but are not
intercepted due to the diffraction.
G-2. Use of terrain to lay landlines not readily detectable by friendly forces,
(for example, the use of sewer systems) prevents the use of ES or EA on those
communications. Urban environments favor the use of couriers to maintain
C 2 channels. A modern adversary in an urban environment can make use of
secure Internet service to pass information (for example, passing calls for fire
via the Internet).
G-3. SIGINT teams use EOB to identify threat communications systems and
their critical nodes. Development of the EOB begins with MOUT IPB in
which analysts template the EM spectrum and describe how the threat uses
it. National level SIGINT teams and assets provide additional information
which analysts use to refine the EOB and to support future developments in
the EOB. Other elements, such as PSYOP teams, may contribute to the
development of the EOB by providing information on communications
architecture and critical nodes of public information systems.
G-4. The EWO uses EOB information developed by the SIGINT team to
develop HPTs for specific COAs, and during the targeting process to
determine targets for EA. The EWO also determines the support necessary
to engage targets with assets from higher. During MOUT, IPB analysts can
expect to find three critical communications systems common to most MOUT
environments.
• Radio and Television. Radio and television stations provide the threat
with mass communication, over a large portion of the battlefield. This
communication will also give the threat a propaganda tool.
* Advantage: Easily monitored with ES, one-way communication,
and digitally not encrypted.
■ Elimination: The strong signal generated by radio and television
stations are easily located with ES, After location, three ways
remain to deal with radio and television stations: lethal fires,
nonlethal fires (EA), or capture with friendly forces.
• Telephone and Cellular Phone. Telephone systems provide a landline
capability that is impossible for division tactical SIGINT assets to
G-1
FM 34-45
monitor or engage with EW. National assets are available, but the
EWO or collection manager must request these assets in advance to
monitor and engage this system. Cellular phones, while not depending
upon landlines, depend upon relay station and satellite
communications, some of these communications; can be monitored by
divisional assets while others require national assets support.
* Advantage: Infrastructure is not designed to function after being
engaged with lethal fires. Cellular phones are dependent upon
critical uplinks and are limited by terrain and weather conditions.
■ Elimination: EOB provides the critical nodes of telephone system
for targeting. These nodes can be engaged with lethal fire or
nonlethal national assets. The capture of this system provides a
large database and critical information for targeting (for example,
location and function of threat units using the telephone system).
• Internet. The Internet provides the threat a system for secure
communications. This landline communication system is difficult to
monitor or engage. Coordination with the 10 cell will provide support
and experience on how to best engage this target.
■ Advantage: Infrastructure provides unlimited access for friendly
forces into threat communications; it has no redundancies to
prevent the shutting down of this communication system after
being engaged with lethal fire.
* Elimination: The 10 cell provides the critical nodes of this
communication system. National assets either with EA (DE) or
with information warfare assets can engage these nodes. 10
support for engagement of the Internet is critical due to the
expertise and scope of the 10 personnel.
G-5. Aggressive and focused use of EA is critical in a MOUT environment.
The threat C 2 nets are critical targets. These nets provide the threat the
ability to shape the battlespace to their advantage. In this constrained
environment, where the environment favors the defender, the added
advantage of a strong C 2 net causes numerous difficulties culminating in
unacceptably high losses.
G-6. Hospitals, ambulances, fire fighters, and other agencies rely on the use
of telephones and Internet services to provide humanitarian assistance to
numerous noncombatants: to disrupt these and cause a high loss of life to
noncombatants must be weighed against the mission priority. These
resources must be left intact, if possible, to provide services to maintain the
populace. Friendly forces must curtail their EA of communication resources
due to the ROE and humanitarian constraints. Civilian Affairs must be
consulted before any barrage EA engagements begin, if at all possible, and
must examine the legal and ethical ramifications of disrupting the
noncombatant use of EM.
G-2
FM 34-45
Appendix H
Brigade Combat Team
The emerging Brigade Combat Team (Initial, Interim, and Objective) will
use the same process as divisions, brigades, and squadrons to plan,
execute, and assess SIGINT operations. The structure of the Brigade
Combat Team, however, requires changes to where and who executes the
process. This appendix describes the basic features of EA planning
within the Brigade Combat Team.
ORGANIZATION
H-l. The Brigade Combat Team possesses limited resources with which to
plan and direct EA. Within the MI company, the SIGINT officer in charge
(from the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR] integration
platoon) is responsible for SIGINT RM and performs the role of the EWO.
The MI company can perform only initial low-level SIGINT processing, and
relies upon the Army Force or other external organization for SIGINT
analysis and technical support.
H-2. The Brigade Combat Team’s SIGINT assets that execute EA are found
in the surveillance troop of the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target
acquisition (RSTA) squadron. The SIGINT personnel (in the troop’s sensor
control team of the ISR section in the surveillance troop) provide technical
control of the four Prophet Ground systems. The ISR integration section is
imbedded within the squadron CP during deployment. The four Prophet
Ground systems are divided evenly among the four sections of the multi-
sensor platoon.
H-3. The Brigade Combat Team depends upon the Army Force or higher
echelon organizations for SIGINT analysis and technical support. The
Brigade Combat Team uses the TROJAN SPIRIT II to access these external
SIGINT organizations and their databases. Some specific products developed
outside the Brigade Combat Team’s MI company include the EOB and
electronic preparation of the battlefield. These products support target
development, technical support, and tasking within the Brigade Combat
Team.
OPERATIONS
H-4. After a COA is determined, the Brigade Combat Team’s S3 convenes a
targeting team to develop the HPTL, targeting portion of the DST, AGM, and
BOS synchronization matrix. As a member of the targeting team, the
SIGINT personnel develop the —
H-1
FM 34-45
• EA portion of the AGM and BOS synchronization matrix.
• EW annex with SIRs supporting the EW Annex.
H-5. The EW Annex goes through the ISR planner for approval and
integration into the overall ISR plan. The ISR requirements team further
develops the SIRs and provides the RSTA squadron with technical support for
planned SIGINT missions. The SIGINT personnel coordinate with the Army
Force for SIGINT analysis products and technical support to support target
development and EA operations. When necessary, the SIGINT personnel
request that higher echelon organizations execute EA missions for targets
that the Prophet Ground systems cannot attack.
H-6. The Squadron S3 tasks the surveillance troop based on the Brigade
Combat Team’s OPORDs, FRAGOs, SIRs, and EW Annex. The surveillance
troop commander, with the support of the sensor control team, determines if
the EW assets can accomplish the mission and, if so, tasks the multi-sensor
platoon with the mission.
H-7. The sensor control team in the surveillance troop provides MM and AM.
Acting as the equivalent of the TA team found in divisional C&J platoons, the
sensor control team passes technical data provided by the MI company or
from its own database to the multi-sensor sections being tasked to conduct
the EA and supporting SIGINT missions. The sensor control team fuses JERs
and MAERs from the multi-sensor sections into a single report and sends it to
the MI company’s ISR analysis platoon for BDA.
H-2
Glossary
AC Active Component
2D two dimensional (data)
3D three dimensional (data)
A 2 C 2 Army Airspace Command and Control
AA avenue of approach
ACE analysis and control element
ACT analysis and control team
ADA Air Defense Artillery
AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
AGM attack guidance matrix
ALO air liaison officer
AM asset management
AO area of operation
AOC Air Operations Center
ARNG Army National Guard
Arty artillery
ASAS All-Source Analysis System
ASL above sea level
ATO air tasking order
Avn aviation
BCD Battlefield Coordination Detachment
BDA battle damage assessment
BER bit error rate
bn battalion
BOC Battalion Operations Center
BOS battlefield operating system
C 2 command and control
C 3 command, control, communication
C&J collection and jamming
C 4 I command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence
CA combat assessment
cdr commander
CEE
captured enemy equipment
CM
collection management
CNA
computer network attack
COA
course of action
COMINT
communications intelligence
COMSEC
communications security
COP
command observation post
CP
command post
cs
combat support
css
combat service support
cw
continuous wave
DE
directed energy
DEW
directed energy warfare
DF
direction finding
DOCC
Deep Operations Coordination Cell
DP
decision point
DS
direct support
DST
decision support template
E3
electromagnetic environmental effects
EA
electronic attack
EAC
echelons above corps
ELINT
electronics intelligence
ELSEC
electronics security
EM
electromagnetic
EMC
electromagnetic compatibility
EMCON
electromagnetic control
EME
electromagnetic environment
EMI
electromagnetic interference
EMP
electromagnetic pulse
EOB
electronic order of battle
EP
electronic protection
EPG
Electronic Proving Ground
EPL
excess-path-loss
ES
electronic warfare support
EW
electronic warfare
EWAF
Electromagnetic Wave Attenuation in a Forest
EWO
EWTL
FAIO
FDA
FDC
FEBA
FLOT
FM
FO
FOV
FRAGO
FS
FSCOORD
GDA
GIS
GS
GSOC
GUI
HERO
HPT
HPTL
hr
HVT
Hz
IED
IEW
10
IPB
IR
ISM
ISR
JER
JFAAC
JFLAC
JRFL
JSC
electronic warfare officer
electronic warfare target list
field artillery intelligence officer
functional damage assessment
fire direction center
forward edge of battle area
forward line of own troops
frequency modulation
forward observer
field of view
fragmentary order
fire support
fire support coordinator
general deployment area
Geographic Information System
general support
General Support Operations Center
graphical user interface
hazards of electromagnetic radiation to personnel, ordnance
high-payoff target
high-payoff target list
hour
high-value target
hertz
imitative electronic deception
intelligence and electronic warfare
information operations
intelligence preparation of the battlefield
information requirements
intelligence synchronization matrix
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
jamming effectiveness report
Joint Forces Air Component Commander
Joint Force Land
Joint Restricted Frequency List
Joint Spectrum Center
JSR
jamming-to-signal ratio
km
kilometer
LD
line of departure
LLVI
low-level voice intercept
LOB
line of bearing
LOC
line of communication
LOS
line of sight
LPA
log periodic antenna
LPI
low probability of intercept
LRSD
long-range surveillance detachment
LTIOV
latest time information is of value
m
meter
MAER
multiple assets effectiveness report
MASINT
measurement and signature intelligence
MASTR
multiple assets status report
MATM
multiple assets tasking message
MDMP
military decisionmaking policy
MEA
munitions effects assessment
MED
manipulative electronic deception
METT-TC
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, and time
available-civilians
MHz
megahertz
MIJI
meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and interference
min
minute
MLRS
multiple launch rocket system
MM
mission management
MOUT
military operations on urbanized terrain
NAI
named area of interest
NAVAID
navigational aid
NCOIC
noncommissioned officer in charge
OB
order of battle
OPLAN
operations plan
OPORD
operations order
Ops
operations
OPSEC
operations security
PDA
physical damage assessment
PIR
priority intelligence requirements
pit
platoon
POC
platoon operations center
p-static
precipitation static
PSYOP
psychological operations
RDBMS
Relational Database Management System
REMBASS
Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System
RF
radio frequency
RFL
restricted frequency list
RM
requirements management
ROE
rules of engagement
ROZ
restricted operation zone
RSL
receive signal level
RSTA
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisiton
SEAD
suppression of enemy air defenses
SED
simulative electronic deception
S/I
signal-to-interference ratio
SIGINT
signals intelligence
SIGINT/EW
signals intelligence/electronic warfare
SIGSUM
signal summary
SINCGARS
Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
SIR
specific information requirements
SITREP
situation report
SOF
Special Operations Forces
SOP
standing operating procedure
TA
transcription and analysis
TACFIRE
tactical fire
TACREP
tactical report
TAI
target area of interest
TIREM
terrain integrated rough earth model
TRADOC
US Army Training and Doctrine Command
TSA
target system assessment
TSS
target selection standard
TTP
tactics, techniques, and procedures
USAF
US Air Force
USAR
US Army Reserve
USMC US Marine Corps
USN US Navy
VECAT Virtual Electromagnetic C 4 I Analysis Tool
VHF very high frequency
WARM wartime reserve mode
FM 34-45
Bibliography
FM 6-20-10. TTP For Targeting Process. 8 May 1996.
FM 34-1. Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations. 27 September 1994.
FM 34-2. Collection Management and Synchronization Planning. 8 March 1994.
FM 34-130. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 8 July 1994.
FM 100-5. Operations. 14 June 1993.
FM 101-5. Staff Organization and Operations. 31 May 1997.
Joint Publication 2-01.1. Intelligence Support to Targeting. 23 April 1999.
Bibliography-1
Index
FM 34-45
A
A 2 C 2 . See Army Airspace
Command and Control.
ACE. See analysis and control
element.
ACT. See analysis and control
team.
ADA. See air defense artillery.
AGM. See attack guidance
matr
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