Document text
INTERROGATION
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution Is unlimited.
FIELD MANUAL 34-52
*FM 34-52
Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 28 September 1992
INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION
Table of Contents
Page
PREFACE 0.6. ee ee en ee tee neces iv
CHAPTER 1 - MILITARY INTELLIGENCE MISSIONS AND 2.0.0.0. 0000 cece ewes 1-1
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
Warfighting Doctrine 2... ee ees 1-1
The Intelligence Cycle. ee te et eee ees 1-4
Intelligence Disciplines 2... ee ee eee 1-2
intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations... 0. 6... ee 1-3
Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain, and Time Available Factors .......0..220505 1-5
Definition of Interrogation ©... 0 ee ee ene 1-6
Definition of Prisoner of War and Enemy Prisoner of War... ..........20005 1-9
Pertinent Articles of Geneva Conventions ©. 0.0.0... ee eee 1-10
Types of Sources 6. cee eee tee eae 1-10
Personal Qualities... ee ee eee ee eee 1-12
Special Areas of Knowledge 2 0. ee ee tens 1-14
Interrogator Capabilities and Limitations. 2... ee ee 1-15
Conflicts. ee te ee tee ee eee eee nae 1-16
Interrogation Missions 2. 0. ee ne nes 1-17
Drug and Law Enforcement Agency Operations. ©... 0. ee es 1-17
CHAPTER 2 - COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE 2.0.0... 0. cc eee ences 2-1
Tactical Operations Center 2... ee ee ee es 2-1
Interrogation Below Division... 0.0.0 2 ee ee 2-2
Division Interrogation Assets... eee 2-3
Corps Interrogation Assets and Organization 2.2.0.0... 00.00 cee eee eae 2-6
Echeions Above Corps Interrogation Assets and Organization ............0.0. 2-7
Enemy Prisoner of War and Interrogation Facilities ..............2.0000. 2-9
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 34-52, 8 May 1987.
FM 34-52
Page
Corps Facilities 00. ete ee tee tees 2-10
Echelons Above Corps Facilities... 0 00. ee eee 2-12
Medical Company Interrogations 2... ee ee es 2-12
Interrogation at Brigade and Below 2... ee ee eee 2-12
Special Forces. 6 ee ee ees 2-14
Amphibious Operations . 0.0... ee ee ee ens 2-14
Airborne Operations 60. ee ee tte 2-15
Interrogator Supported Operations «2 6. ee es 2-18
Theater Interrogation Facility 2... 0.0 ees 2-22
Support Relationships... 0 ee ee ee ee ee es 2-24
CHAPTER 3 - THE INTERROGATION PROCESS «00. ee ee ete ee eee 3-1
Collection Priority 6.0 00 ee te ee eee eee 3-1
Screeming 2. ee ee eee 3-2
Planning and Preparation «2... ee ee et ees 3-7
Approach Phase 2.0. 0. ce ee eee ees 3-10
Questioning Phase 6... ee eee ees 3-20
Termination Phase. 2... 0. ee ee tee ee 3-26
Reporting Information 2... 0000 ee ee 3-28
Interrogation with an Interpreter 2.0. ee 3-29
Sirategic Interrogations and Debriefings . 0.0... ee ee tt eee 3-31
CHAPTER 4 - PROCESSING AND EXPLOITING CAPTURED ENEMY .....-...0- 6-25 eee 4-1
DOCUMENTS
Document Categories 2.0. et ee ee eee 4-2
Document Handling... 2.2.0.0. 2 2 ee ete 4-4
Document Exploitation . 0... 0. ee eee 4-7
Translating ©... ee ee ee eee 4-9
Evacuation Procedures 2.000 0 0 ee ee ee 4-12
APPENDIX A- UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE EXTRACT 2.0... 0c ee enn eeee A-1
APPENDIX B- QUESTIONING GUIDES 2.0.2. cc tee ete eee B-1
APPENDIX C - $2 TACTICAL QUESTIONING GUIDE AND BATTLEFIELD EXPLOITATION ..C-1
OF CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT
APPENDIX D - PROTECTED PERSONS RIGHTS VERSUS SECURITY NEEDS .........-..-- D-1
APPENDIX E-REPORTS 0.0.0. ce ce ee ee ee ees E-4
APPENDIX F - COMMAND LANGUAGE PROGRAM .. 0... oe ee ee tee ee Fl
APPENDIX G - INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE TRAINING 2.0.2.0 5 2 eee er eee eee G-1
ii
FM 34-52
Page
GLOSSARY . 0 ee ee eee ee een ee tee ene Glossary-1
REFERENCES 2.000000 0 cece eee ee cnet een ee ee bee bene References-1
INDEX oo ee en ee ne eee ep enn eb eben tne ae Index -1
FM 34-52
PREFACE
This manual provides doctrinal guidance, techniques, and procedures governing
employment of interrogators as human intelligence (HUMINT) collection assets in support of
the commander’s intelligence needs. It outlines the interrogator’s role within the intelligence
_ collection effort and the supported unit’s day-to-day operations. Details are presented on how
interrogation assets accomplish their assigned collection mission.
Material in this manual applies to operations in low-, mid-, and high-intensity conflicts.
Principles outlined are valid under conditions involving use of electronic warfare (EW) or
nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons.
This manual is intended for use by interrogators as well as commanders, staff officers, and
military intelligence (MI) personnel charged with the responsibility of the interrogation
collection effort. Unless otherwise stated, descriptions pertaining to duties, functions, and
responsibilities of the G1, G2, G3, G4, and G5 apply to equivalent positions at other
organizational echelons.
Interrogation is the HUMINT subdiscipline responsible for MI exploitation of enemy
personnel and documents to answer the supported specific information requirements (SIR).
These SIR responses, along with those of other MI disciplines, are correlated to satisfy the
force commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and intelligence requirements
(TR).
During previous armed conflicts, interrogators contributed significantly to the overall
intelligence collection effort. They revalidated and established keystone interrogation
doctrine (for example, theater interrogation facility [TIF] operations) and documented
valuable lessons learned. This knowledge became the genesis for evolving interrogation
doctrine.
During Southwest Asia operations, interrogators organized and operated a massive
document exploitation (DOCEX) effort. Interrogation units screened, interrogated, or
debriefed 49,350 enemy prisoners of war (EP Ws), and gathered enough captured enemy
documents (CEDs) for DOCEX to fill 18 trailer trucks.
MI interrogation units are a proven and valued collection asset. This manual incorporates
the operational experiences and lessons learned. It builds upon existing doctrine and moves
interrogation into the 21st century.
These principles and techniques of interrogation are to be used within the constraints
established by the following:
@ The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
@ Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field of August 12, 1949, hereinafter referred to as GWS.
FM 34-52
® Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949,
hereinafter referred to as GPW.
@ Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of
August 12, 1949, hereinafter referred to as GC.
Doctrine in this publication conforms with and supports principles contained in FM 34-1.
This publication implements the following Standardization Agreements (STANAGs):
@ STANAG 2033, Interrogation of Prisoners of War, Edition 6.
® STANAG 2044, Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War, Edition 5.
® STANAG 2084, Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Equipment and
Documents, Edition 5.
This publication also complies with STANAG 1059 and Quadripartite Standardization
Agreements (QSTAGs) 170, 523, and 328.
The use of the terms EPW, detainee, and source are interchangeable during interrogation
process.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer
exclusively to men.
The proponent of this publication is the US Army Intelligence Center. Send comments
and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank
Forms) to Headquarters, US Army Intelligence Center, ATTN: ATSI-TDL-D, Fort
Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000,
FM 34-52
CHAPTER 1
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE MISSIONS AND INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION
OF THE BATTLEFIELD
This manual is about interrogation operations. The
purpose of this chapter is to define the interrogation
mission and its critical elements; describe battlefield
operations, TEW operations, and the intelligence
processes, disciplines, and the mission, enemy, troops,
terrain, and time available (METT-T) factors that shape
and drive the interrogation process.
It also addresses the personal qualities and special
areas of knowledge of the interrogator and the
capabilities and limitations of interrogation. It includes
information on the various levels of conflict, interroga-
tion missions, intelligence preparation of the battlefield
(IPB) and the intelligence cycle. The level of detail is
structured to assist you in understanding the interroga-
tion tactics, techniques, and procedures described in the
remainder of the manual.
WARFIGETING DOCTRINE
Battlefield operations demand seizing and maintain-
ing the initiative. When operations are properly
designed and executed, initiative accrues significant
benefits from the outset of an operation to final victory.
It permits attacking where, when, and what, while forc-
ing the enemy to react and try to adapt to our opera-
tions.
To gain the initiative, the commander must
@ See the enemy early and determine the capabilities
and intentions of the enemy.
®@ Find and track enemy follow-on echelons.
@ Identify enemy high-value targets (HVTs), which,
if successfully attacked, wiil contribute to the
degradation of important enemy battlefield func-
tions.
® Identify, locate, and develop the required targeting
data for the attack of high-payoff targets (HPTs),
which, if successfully attacked, will contribute to
the success of friendly plans.
@ Detect enemy weaknesses and develop the neces-
sary data to support the exploitation of these
weaknesses.
@ Effectively use electronic warfare (EW) assets to
support battlefield operations while protecting
friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
@ Determine the enemy’s capability and guard
apainst that capability,
® Protect friendly forces and operations from enemy
intelligence collection operations.
@ Ensure the enemy is defeated.
@ Use the weather and terrain to friendly advantage.
The commander uses defensive and offensive opera-
tions to destroy enemy first-echelon forces and deep-at-
tack to simultaneously delay, disrupt, and manipulate
enemy follow-on forces. The commander anticipates,
creates, and exploits windows of opportunity, using
flexible battle planning, to gain the initiative through of-
fensive operations.
By effectively employing maneuver and fire support
assets, manipulating the enemy, and expertly using the
weather and the terrain, the friendly commander can
successfully defeat a superior enemy force. OPERA-
TION DESERT STORM is an exampie of the success-
ful application of this doctrine.
IEW support is vital to the successful planning and
execution of battlefield operations at all echelons. In-
telligence support at brigade and battalion levels
focuses primarily on close operations, while at division
it focuses on close and deep operations. Corps is the
focal point for intelligence operations that support rear
and deep operations.
THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE
Intelligence operations follow a four-phase process
known as the intelligence cycle, which is shown at
Figure 1-1. The intelligence cycle is oriented to the
commander’s mission. Supervising and planning are in-
herent in all phases of the cycle.
FM 34-52
PLANNING
AND
SUPERVISING
J DISSEMINATING [|
AND USING
ee uy
a il
The imtelligence cycle is continuous, Although the
four phases are conducted in sequence, all are con-
ducted concurrently. While available information is
processed and additional information is collected, the
il
a i a
es
i al i
PLANNING
AND
SUPERVISING
Figure 1-1. The Intelligence cycle.
intelligence staff is planning and directing the collection
effort to meet new demands. Previously collected and
processed information (intelligence) is disseminated as
soon as it is available or needed.
INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINES
The IEW system includes three MI disciplines: sig-
nals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence
(MINT), and HUMINT. Intelligence interrogation falls
within the realm of HUMINT.
SIGINT
SIGINT is derived from the intercept, analysis, and
exploitation of threat communications and noncom-
munications radio-electronic emissions.
iMINT
IMINT is obtained from the analysis of radar,
photographic, infrared, and electro-optical imagery.
HUMINT
HUMINT is obtained from information collected
from human sources and consists of the following intel-
ligence collection operations:
® Interrogation cf EPWs, civilian detainees, insur-
gents, defectors, refugees, displaced persons, and
agents or suspected agents.
@ Long-range surveillance (LRS) patrols.
® Strategic debriefing.
@ Controlled collection operations.
® Open-source exploitation, to include publications
and broadcasts.
Reports of contact from forward units.
Observation and listening posts.
Low-level source operations (LLSO).
HUMINT liaison contacts.
Afier World War II, the US General Board on Intel-
ligence surveyed 54 division G2s, 18 corps G2s, and 7
@ @® © @
Army G2s. It concluded that 43 percent of all intel-
ligence produced in the European theater of operations
was from HUMINT, and 84 percent of the HUMINT
was from interrogation. The majority of those surveyed
agreed that interrogation was the most valuable of all
collection operations.
HUMINT is vital in all combat operations, regardless
of echelon or intensity of conflict. By nature, HUMINT
lends itself to the collection of information about the
enemy’s thought processes and intentions. HUMINT
can provide information on almost any topic of intel-
FM 34-S2
ligence interest, including order of battle (OB) factors,
as well as scientific and technical (S&T) intelligence
subjects. During OPERATION DESERT STORM, in-
terrogators collected information which helped to—
@ Develop a plan to breach Iraqi defensive belts.
© Confirm Iraqi supply-line interdiction by coalition
air strikes.
@ Identify diminishing Iraqi troop morale.
@ Identify a US PW captured during the battle of
Kaffi.
INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONS
The intelligence cycle supports six tasks which are
common to all echelons and which must be worked, at
least in part, concurrently to satisfy the needs of the
commander. The commander may have to prioritize
these functions when resource and time constraints dic-
tate.
INDICATIONS AND WARNING (i&W)
1&W identifies major shifts in enemy tactics, opera-
tions, and strategy which will set or change the terms of
battle. They protect the commander from surprise and
identify areas or times of risk by detecting enemy ac-
tions that are counter to planning assumptions.
@ At the operational level, they identify potential
enemy action and determine the need for a military
response and the probability of hostilities.
@ At the tactical level, they focus on the timing of
hostilities rather than on their probability.
1&W prevent surprise and minimize risk through the
early identification of enemy activities and capabilities.
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE
BATTLEFIELD
IPB integrates the environment with the enemy's
fighting doctrine and actions. It reveals his capabilities
and vulnerabilities and allows the commander to sys-
tematically predict his actions. It also allows him to un-
derstand the battlefield and how to synchronize all of
his battlefield operating systems for maximum effect.
The results of IPB and staff wargaming are used to
coordinate and synchronize the intelligence system
regardless of the echelon at which it is performed or the
intensity of conflict. IPB is more than preparation of
the field of battle during hostilities. IPB considers the
entire environment of conflict, supporting contingency
as well as planning operations.
® At the strategic level, IPB focuses on all factors
that contribute to military potential and includes
political, economic, sociological, and S&T aspects
of the enemy’s ability and intent to conduct
military operations.
@ At the operational level, IPB identifies the enemy's
political, economic or military center of gravity,
the lines of operation, and the points in time and
geography where the decisive engagements of a
campaign will occur. It also predicts the courses of
action (COAs) the enemy is likely to follow. This
is done by incorporating political, economic, so-
cial, and geographical factors, as well as military
factors (such as his military potential and ability to
apply air, ground, and naval power).
@ At the tactical level, IPB focuses on the details of
the terrain, weather, and enemy. It predicts and
prioritizes the enemy’s COAs and synchronizes the
application of combat power on identified decisive
points.
In mid-intensity conflict (MIC) to high-intensity con-
flict (HIC), IPB focuses on the traditional aspects of ter-
rain, weather, and enemy. Many of the factors evaluated
in IPB at the strategic level are used during IPB for low-
intensity conflict (LIC) at the operational and tactical
levels.
Social, economic, and political factors that affect the
environment of conflict are considered in IPB. The
population must be examined in as much detail as the
enemy and the terrain to understand what an enemy can
or cannot do, Figure 1-2 shows the intelligence cycle
using IPB.
FM 34-52
|
Tn
| i i
E
. t ela HE
THUAN i
k AYIA
tl RU
| |
HE i if
H p:
HEE
FAR
E
ARIAT ENE
rer) EB WAAR
SEE EEET
aaa
i :
Figure 1-2. Intelligence cycle using IPB.
SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
Situation development confirms or denies the enemy
COAs predicted in IPB. It confirms predicted centers of
gravity and decisive points and identifies enemy
strengths and vulnerabilities. This enables the com-
mander to make timely decisions and effectively apply
his combat power.
TARGET DEVELOPMENT AND TARGET
ACQUISITION
Target development and target acquisition provide
targets and targeting data for aitacks by fire, maneuver,
and electronic means. They identify and locate those
targets that will have the greatest impact on the
campaign’s decisive engagements. These include deep
operational reserves, strategic and operational levei
command, control, and communications (C) nodes, key
lines of communication, and air and naval staging
facilities throughout the enemy’s depth that contribute
to his combat potential.
At the tactical level, they address those HVTs that
directly contribute to the application of combat power
at decisive points on the battlefield,
BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (BDA)
BDA provides the commander with the effect of
friendly operations on the enemy. It focuses on the
enemy’s remaining military capabilities and potential.
At the operational level, it also considers the
FM 34-52
campaign’s effects on the enemy’s economy and opera-
tional infrastructure as well as his military force struc-
ture.
BDA is focused on providing effects of particular
strikes and aitacks, or a series of them. BDA is per-
formed by the same collection assets used to satisfy the
commanders intelligence and targeting priorities;
therefore, BDA cannot be performed continuously
without degradation of other capabilities, such as situa-
tion development and targeting. The commander must
prioritize the BDA effort, identifying what he must
know and when he must know it, just as he does for his
PIR and targeting priorities.
FORCE PROTECTION
Force protection identifies friendly vulnerabilities
and the enemy’s efforts to exploit them. At the opera-
tional level, it includes the early identification of sig-
nificant improvements in weapon lethality, the
introduction of weapons of mass destruction into the
conflict, or the commitment of terrorist or other uncon-
ventional forces into friendly rear areas.
Force protection goes beyond countering enemy in-
telligence and includes the protection of all forces that
contribute to our combat power. At the tactical level, it
emphasizes measures to counter the enemy’s intel-
ligence collection capabilities and to protect the force
from enemy action.
MISSION, ENEMY, TROOPS, TERRAIN, AND TIME AVAILABLE FACTORS
The METT-T factors are important to the com-
mander when planning interrogation operations.
METT-T determines how the commander will use inter-
rogation assets. The effect of METT-T on interrogation
missions is discussed below.
MISSION SUPPORT
The supported force’s mission bears directly on how
the interrogation element will be employed. In cordon
and search operations, commanders may determine in-
terrogators are best suited to screen the populace in
order to identify insurgents and their supporters. In
counter-drug operations, commanders may use inter-
rogators to exploit documents and to train US and
foreign agents in interrogation techniques. In all con-
flicts, the focus will be on EPW interrogation and CED
exploitation.
The mission influences interrogation operations in
other ways. For example, if the force’s mission is offen-
sive, interrogation elements must be highly mobile, with
secure communications to the supported G2 or $2.
They must be constantly prepared to move forward with
the element they are supporting. This limits time avail-
able for exploitation and dissemination.
On the other hand, if the mission is defensive, inter-
rogation elements have more time to exploit individual
sources. They may also have more flexibility to exploit
EPWs or detainees and CEDs, to fulfill the
commander’s intent to construct operational graphics.
Collection requirements vary according to echelon.
Strategic echelon requirements reflect the wide scope of
interest of the theater and national command authority
(NCA); whereas, tactical PIR and IR--and resultant
SIR--reflect the immediate, more narrowly focused in-
telligence interest of the maneuver commander.
FM 34-52
ENEMY
The enemy, and our knowledge of the enemy, can in-
fluence interrogator assignments and the complexity of
the exploitation process. One factor which affects inter-
rogation operations is the type of opposing enemy force.
The techniques and procedures used to collect from in-
surgents in a LIC may differ from those used to collect
from regular enemy forces in a MIC to HIC.
For example, an EPW from a regular forces unit may
have undergone political indoctrination, but his com-
mitment to his unit may not be as strong as that of the
insurgent who is passionately committed to an ideal.
Thus, interrogators may have more difficulty persuading
the insurgent to talk.
Another factor affecting interrogation operations is
our current intelligence holdings on the enemy force
and the interrogator’s understanding of the threat. Our
intelligence holdings on the composition of a newly
formed insurgent organization usually will not be as
complete as holdings on the composition of a regular
enemy force. Thus, the focus of interrogation efforts in
the early stages of a LIC may be on enemy force com-
position; whereas, the focus in a MIC or HIC may be on
enemy force missions or intentions.
Cultural aspects also affect interrogation missions.
The employment of some basic interrogation techniques
will differ based on the ethnic and cultural background
of the enemy, and our failure to understand and adapt
to this could hamper the collection effort.
TROOPS
The number, experience level, and language
proficiency of interrogators affect the tactical employ-
ment of interrogation elements. Due to the limited
number of interrogators at any echelon, interrogation
element commanders have to pick from available inter-
rogators. They must manage personnel to ensure the
most experienced are used to the best advantage (for ex-
ample, to exploit complex enemy documents) and select
EPWs most likely to answer SIR.
Interrogation element commanders often have to
contend with a mismatch between language-qualified
personnel assigned to the unit and languages needed to
perform the mission. They overcome the mismatch by
acquiring local national (LN) interpreter support
through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1 (Personnel).
They can also augment their interrogators by requesting
other available linguists within the supported command
to serve as interpreters.
Another troop-related factor which affects interroga-
tion operations is the training of all soldiers on EPW
handling and evacuation. EPW treatment during the
early stages of capture is critical to the success of sub-
sequent interrogations. The availability of military
police (MP) support at brigade and above can enhance
interrogation activities. Interrogation operations are
more effective in 2 controlled environment where EPWs
are adequately guarded.
TERRAIN
Terrain and weather are relevant to interrogator
operations and affect site deployments, communica-
tions, and mobility. MP must ensure proper shelter and
security for the EP'W facility if it is collocated or imme-
diately adjacent to the EPW collecting point or intern-
ment facility.
TIME AVAILABLE
Information collected through interrogation opera-
tions is valuable only if it is reported in a timely manner.
Exploitation procedures may need to be adjusted to
make the most use of time available. At the tactical
level, interrogations will be brief, PIR driven, and
reported in concise formats such as size, activity, loca-
tion, unit, time, equipment (SALUTE).
At the operational and strategic levels, time will
generally allow for a more expanded interrogation effort
and flexible reporting format, such as the intelligence
information report (ITR).
The challenge is for interrogators to be proficient lin-
guists and skilled members of a highly organized collec-
tion activity. This ensures the acquisition of the
maximum amount of pertinent information regardless
of time available.
Like other intelligence assets, interrogators must
serve the commander. Interrogation operations are of
no value unless they contribute to the accomplishment
of the supported commander’s mission. To understand
the interrogator’s role in mission accomplishment, one
must understand the interrogation process.
DEFINITION OF INTERROGATION
Interrogation is the process of questioning a source to
obtain the maximum amount of usable information.
1-6
The goal of any interrogation is to obtain reliable infor-
mation in a lawful manner, in a minimum amount of
lume, and to satisfy intelligence requirements of any
echelon of command. Sources may be—
@ Civilian internees.
@ Insurgents.
® EPWs.
@ Defectors.
® Refugees.
® Displaced persons.
@ Agents or suspected agents.
@ Other non-US personnel.
A good interrogation produces needed information
which is timely, complete, clear, and accurate. An inter-
rogation involves the interaction of two personalities
the source and interrogator. Each contact between
these two may differ because of individual charac-
teristics and capabilities of the participants. Further-
more, the circumstances of each contact and physical
environment vary.
Other forms of intelligence interrogations include in-
terviews, debriefings, and clicitations. There are certain
principles which generally apply to all types of inter-
rogations; namely, the objective, the prohibition against
use of force, and security.
OBJECTIVE
Each interrogation must be conducted for a definite
purpose. The interrogator must keep this purpose firm-
ly in mind as he proceeds to obtain usable information
to satisfy the assigned requirement, and thus contribute
to the success of the unit’s mission.
The objective may be specific—-Establish the exact
location of an ammunition storage facility. Or it may be
general—Seek to obtain OB information about a
Specific echelon of the enemy forces.
in either case, the interrogator must use the objective
as a basis for planning and conducting the interrogation.
He should attempt to prevent the source from becoming
aware of the true objective of the interrogation. The in-
terrogator should not concentrate on the objective to
the extent he overlooks or fails to recognize and exploit
other valuable information extracted from the source.
For example, during an interrogation, the inter-
rogator learns of the presence of a heretofore unknown,
highly destructive weapon. Although this information
FM 34-52
may not be in line with his specific objective, the inter-
rogator must develop this important lead to obtain all
possible information concerning this weapon. It be-
comes obvious an interrogation objective can be
changed as necessary or desired.
PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF FORCE
The Intelligence Staff Officer (J2, G2, or $2) has
responsibility for all command intelligence functions.
He assists the commander by—
@ Supervising the collection, evaluation, and inter-
pretation of all intelligence information.
® Disseminating intelligence to appropriate higher,
lower, and adjacent units.
® Assuming primary responsibility to ensure that all
command intelligence functions are conducted in
accordance with international, US, and other ap-
plicable law and policy. Specifically, the J2, G2, or
§2 is responsible to ensure the GWS, GPW, and
GC are not violated by intelligence personnel.
One of the significant means used by the intelligence
staff is the interrogation of the following:
@ EPWs.
® Captured insurgents.
® Civilian internees.
@ Other captured, detained, or retained persons.
® Foreign deserters or other persons of intelligence
interest.
These persons are protected by the Geneva Conven-
tions for the Protection of War Victims of August 12,
1949, as they relate to captured wounded and sick
enemy personnel (GWS), retained enemy medical per-
sonnel and chaplains (GWS), enemy prisoners of war
(GPW), and civilian internees (GC), Captured insur-
gents and other detained personnel whose status is not
clear, such as suspected terrorists, are entitled to PW
protection until their precise status has been deter-
mined by competent authority.
In conducting intelligence interrogations, the J2, G2,
or 82 has primary staff responsibility to ensure these ac-
tivities are performed in accordance with the GW5,
GPW, and GC, as well as US policies, regarding the
treatment and handling of the above-mentioned per-
sons.
FM 34-52
The GWS, GPW, GC, and US policy expressly
prohibit acts of violence or intimidation, including
physicai or mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure
to inhumane treatment as a means of or aid to inter-
rogation,
Such illegal acts are not authorized and will not be
condoned by the US Army. Acts in violation of these
prohibitions are criminal acts punishable under the
UCMI. If there is doubt as to the legality of a proposed
form of interrogation not specifically authorized in this
manual, the advice of the command judge advocate
should be sought before using the method in question.
Experience indicates that the use of prohibited tech-
niques is not necessary to gain the cooperation of inter-
rogation sources. Use of torture and other illegal
methods is a poor technique that yields unreliable
results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and
can induce the source to say what he thinks the inter-
rogator wants to hear.
Revelation of use of torture by US personnel will
bring discredit upon the US and its armed forces while
undermining domestic and international support for the
war effort. It also may place US and allied personnel in
enemy hands at a greater risk of abuse by their captors.
Conversely, knowing the enemy has abused US and al-
lied PWs does not justify using methods of interrogation
specifically prohibited by the GWS, GPW, or GC, and
US policy.
Limitations on the use of methods identified herein
as expressly prohibited should not be confused with
psychological ploys, verbal trickery, or other nonviolent
or noncoercive ruses used by the interrogator in the
successful interrogation of hesitant or uncooperative
sources.
The psychological techniques and principles in this
manual should neither be confused with, nor construed
to be synonymous with, unauthorized techniques such
as brainwashing, physical or mental torture, or any
other form of mental coercion to include drugs that may
induce lasting and permanent mental alteration and
damage.
Physical or mental torture and coercion revolve
around eliminating the source’s free will, and are ex-
pressly prohibited by GWS, Article 13; GPW, Articles
13 and 17; and GC, Articles 31 and 32. Torture is
defined as the infliction of intense pain to body or mind
to extract a confession or information, or for sadistic
pleasure.
Examples of physical torture include—
@ Electric shock.
® infliction of pain through chemicals or bondage
(other than legitimate use of restraints to prevent
escape).
@ Forcing an individual to stand, sit, or kneel in ab-
normal positions for prolonged periods of time.
® Food deprivation.
® Any form of beating.
Examples of mental torture include—
® Mock executions.
@ Abnormal sleep deprivation.
@ Chemically induced psychosis.
Coercion is defined as actions designed to unlawfully
induce another to compel an act against one’s will. Ex-
amples of coercion include-—
® Threatening or implying physical or mental torture
to the subject, his family, or others to whom he
owes loyalty.
@ Intentionally denying medical assistance or care in
exchange for the information sought or other
cooperation.
® Threatening or implying that other rights guaran-
teed by the GWS, GPW, or GC will not be
provided unless cooperation is forthcoming.
Specific acts committed by US Army personnel may
subject them to prosecution under one or more of the
following punitive articles of the UCM]:
@ Article 78 ~- Accessory after the fact.
® Article 80 - Attempts (to commit one of the fol-
lowing offenses).
Article $1 - Conspiracy (to commit one of the fol-
lowing Offenses).
® Article 93 - Cruelty and maltreatment.
® Article 118 - Murder.
@ Article 119 - Manslaughter.
® Article 124 - Maiming.
@ Article 127 - Extortion.
@ Article 128 - Assault (consummated by battery;
with a dangerous weapon; or intentionally inflict-
ing grievous bodily harm).
® Article 134 - Homicide, negligent:
-- Misprision of a serious offense
(taking some positive act to conceal a serious crime
committed by another).
-- Soliciting another to commit an of-
fense.
-- Threat, communicating.
See Appendix A for the text of these offenses.
While using legitimate interrogation techniques, cer-
tain applications of approaches and techniques may ap-
proach the line between lawful actions and unlawful
actions, It may often be difficult to determine where
lawful actions end and unlawful actions begin. In at-
tempting to determine if a contemplated approach or
technique would be considered unlawful, consider these
two tests:
@ Given all the surrounding facts and circumstances,
would a reasonable person in the place of the per-
son being interrogated believe that his rights, as
guaranteed under both international and US law,
are being violated or withheld, or wiil be violated
or withheld if he fails to cooperate.
® [f your contemplated actions were perpetrated by
the enemy against US PWs, you would believe such
actions violaie international or US law.
If you answer yes to either of these tests, do not
engage in the contemplated action. If a doubt still
remains as to the legality of a proposed action, seek a
legal opinion from your servicing judge advocate.
FM 34-52
The approaches, psychological techniques, and other
principles presented in this manual must be read in light
of the requirements of international and US law as dis-
cussed above.
Authority for conducting interrogations of personnel
detained by military forces rests primarily upon the
traditional concept that the commander may use all
available resources and lawful means to accomplish his
mission and to protect and secure his unit.
It is the stated policy of the US Army that military
operations will be conducted in accordance with the law
of war obligations of the US. The GWS, GPW, and GC
establish specific standards for humane care and treat-
ment of enemy personnel captured, retained, or
detained by US military forces and its allies. Suspected
or alleged violations of these standards will be reported,
investigated and, if appropriate, referred to competent
authority for trial or other disposition. Violations of
the GWS, GPW, or GC committed by US personnel
normally constitute violations of the UCMJ.
The commander is responsible for ensuring that the
forces under his command comply with the GWS, GPW,
and GC. Should violations occur in the conduct of war-
fare, the commander bears primary responsibility for in-
vestigating and prosecuting violations.
SECURITY
The interrogator, by virtue of his position, possesses a
great deal of classified information. He is aware his job
is to obtain information, not impart it to the source. He
safeguards military information as well as the source of
that information.
This becomes very clear when one considers that
among those persons with whom the interrogator has
contact, there are those attempting to collect informa-
tion for the enemy. The interrogator is alert to detect
any attempt made by the source to elicit information.
DEFINITION OF PRISONER OF WAR AND ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR
A PW is a US or allied person detained by an enemy
power. An EPW is a person detained by US or allied
powers. The first issue interrogators must deal with is
who must be afforded PW treatment. Figure 1-3
paraphrases Article 4 of the GPW. In addition, the fol-
lowing personnel shall be treated as PWs: Persons
belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of
the occupied country, it—
® The occupying power considers it necessary by
reason of such allegiance to intern them; in par-
ticular, if—
@ Such persons have made an unsuccessful at-
tempt to rejoin the armed forces to which
they belong and which are engaged in com-
bat; or
Fi 34-52
PWs are persons who have fallen into the power of the enemy and who are—
Members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, militias, or volunteer corps forming
part of such armed forces.
Members of other militias and volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance move-
ments, belonging to a part of the conflict, and operating in or outside their territory, even if
this territory is occupied, provided such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized
resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions by—
--Being commanded by a person responsible for their subordinates.
--Having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.
--Carrying arms openly.
--Conducting their operations by the laws and customs of war.
Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not
recognized by the Detaining Power.
Persons who accompany the armed forces without being members of it, such as civilian mem-
bers of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labor
units Or services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, if they have received
authorization from the armed forces they accompany, who shall provide them for that pur-
pose with an identity card as described in the Geneva Conventions.
Members of the crews of merchant marine, and crews of civil aircraft of the parties to the
conflict, who do not benefit by more favorable treatment under any other provisions of inter-
national jaw.
Inhabitants of an unoccupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously
take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into
regular armed units provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.
Figure 1-3. Definition of prisoner of war (GPW).
®@ Where they fail to comply with a summons made
to them with a view to internment.
Obviously, there are many personnel who qualify for
and require treatment as PWs. If there is any question
whether a person should be treated as a PW, treat the
individual as such. The determination whether an in-
dividual qualifies as a PW is a Staff Judge Advocate
(SJA) function, but has a direct impact on the interroga-
tion effort due to GPW requirements. It is especially
important in LICs to distinguish between PWs and
criminals.
PERTINENT ARTICLES OF GENEVA CONVENTIONS
Several articles of the GPW apply to inter-
rogators and interrogation operations. The articles
most commonly used by
shown in Figure 1-4.
interrogators are
TYPES OF SOURCES
The interrogator encounters many sources who vary
greatly in personality, social class, civilian occupation,
military specialty, and political and religious beliefs.
Their physical conditions may range from near death to
1-19
perfect health; intelligence levels may range from well
below average to well above average; and security con-
sciousness may range from the lowest to the highest.
FM 34-52
Afticle 13--P ws must o¢ humanely treated. Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power
causing death or seriously endangering the heaith of a PW in its custody is prohibited. PWs must al-
ways be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public
curiosity.
Article 14--PWs are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons and honor. Women
shall be treated with all regard due their sex, and shall always benefit by treatment as favorable that
granted men.
Afticle 15--The Power detaining PWs shall provide, free of charge, for the maintenance and medi-
cal attention required by their state of health.
Article 17--This article covers several requirements with direct impact on interrogation.
@ Every PW, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names
and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or (SIC) serial number, or failing this,
equivalent information. If he willfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a
restriction of the privileges (emphasis added) accorded to his rank or status.
® For example, this does not mean if a prisoner fails to give this information he loses status as a
prisoner, only special privileges. An example might be an officer who fails to identify himself
as such. An officer cannot be compelled to work (Article 49}. An officer who fails to identify
himself as such could lose this privilege.
® The questioning of PWs shall be carried out in a language they understand.
@ No physical or mental torture nor any other form of coercion may be inflicted on EP Ws to
secure from them information of any kind whatsoever. EPWs who refuse to answer may not
be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.
Article 18--All effects and articles of personal use, except arms, horses, military equipment and
documents, shall remain in the possession of PWs. They will also retain their metal helmets, gas
masks, and like articles issued for personal protection. Effects and articles used for their clothing or
feeding shail also remain in their possession, even if such effects and articles belong to their regula-
tion military equipment.
@ Badges of rank and nationality, decorations and articles having above all a personal or sen-
timental value may not be taken from PWs.
@ Sums of money carried by PWs may not be taken away from them except by order of an of-
ficer, and after the amount and particulars of the owner have been recorded in a special
register and an itemized receipt has been given, legibly inscribed with the name, rank, and
unit of the person issuing said receipt.
Article 19--P Ws shall be evacuated, as soon as possible after their capture, to camps situated in an
area far enough from the combat zone for them to be out of danger. Only those PWs, who, owing to
wounds and sickness, would run greater risks by being evacuated than by remaining where they are,
may be temporarily kept back in a danger zone.
Article 33--Medical personnel and chaplains, while retained by the Detaining Power with a view to
assisting PWs, shall not be considered as PWs. They shall, however, receive as a minimum, the
benefits and protection of the Geneva Convention. They shall continue to exercise their medical and
spiritual functions for the benefits of PWs.
Figure 1-4, Pertinent articles of the GPW.
1-11
Sources may be civilian internees, insurgents, EP Ws,
defectors, refugees, displaced persons, and agents or
suspected agents. Because of these variations, the inter-
rogaicr makes a careful study of every source to
evaluate his mental, emotional, and physical state, and
uses it as 2 Dasis for interrogation. He deals mainly with
inree categories of sources: cooperative and friendly,
nouiral and nonpartisan, and hostile and antagonistic.
COOPERATIVE AND FRIENDLY
A moopcratlve and friendly source offers little resis-
ance iu bucrrogation, and normally speaks freely on al-
Ost any topic tatroduced, other than those which tend
-O incrimenaie or degrade him personally. To obtain the
manimun: umount of information from cooperative and
3 eR coy sources, the interrogator takes care to establish
i proscrve a friendly and cooperative atmosphere by
Rot inquiring into those private affairs which are beyond
he scope of the interrogation. At the same time, he
must avcid becoming overly friendly and losing control
fthe interrogation.
NEUTRAL AND NONPARTISAN
A. neutral and nonpartisan source is cooperative to a
limited degree. He normally takes the position of
answering questions asked directly, but seldom volua-
teers information. In some cases, he may be afraid to
answer for fear of reprisals by the enemy. This often is
ihe case in LIC where the people may be fearful of in-
Surgent reprisals. With the neutral and nonpartisan
So urce, the interrogator may have to ask many specific
questions to obtain the information required.
HOSTILE AND ANTAGONISTIC
4 hostile and antagonistic source is most difficult to
interrogate. In many cases, he refuses fo talk at all, and
offers a real challenge to the interrogator. An inter-
rogator must have self-control, patience, and tact when
deating with him.
4
“as
At lower tactical echelons, there is generally insuffi-
ign time available to effectively interrogate a hostile
or antagcnistic source. When time is available, and the
Source appears to be an excellent target for exploitation,
the source should be segregated and approached in an
effort to obtain his cooperation. Because of possible
high stress and frustration levels that such a source may
invoke in you, great care must be taken to maintain your
self-control. No matter what the source says or does,
you must abide by the provisions of the law of war as
previously discussed,
The absence of the use of threats in interrogation is
intentional, as threats in and of themselves constitute 2
form of coercion. Any attempt at enforcement of a
threat would constitute an act prohibited by the GWS,
GPW, or GC and is punishable under the UCMJ.
A hostile or antagonistic source may be best exploited
at echelons where sufficient time and resources will
generally be available.
The successful interrogator is a skilled professional
who is able to rapidly evaluate sources of information
and adapt his approaches and techniques accordingly.
The interrogator extracts intelligence from two primary
sources: human sources and material sources (primarily
CEDs). The senior interrogator determines which of
these sources may be most effectively exploited to meet
the supported commiander’s PIR and IR.
CEDs (see Chapter 4) include any piece of recorded
information which has been in the possession of a
foreign nation and comes into US possession. This in-
cludes US documents which the foreign nation may
have possessed. There are many ways to acquire a docu-
ment, some are found in the possession of human
sources, on enemy dead, or on the battlefield. There are
three types of documents:
@ Official (government or military) documents such
as overlays, field orders, maps, and codes.
® Personal (private or commercial) documents such
as letters, diaries, newspapers, and books.
® Identity (government or military} documents such
as cards and books.
PERSONAL QUALITIES
Ax interrogator should possess an interest in human
nature and have a personality which will enable him to
gain the cooperation of a source. Ideally, these and
other personal qualities would be inherent in an inter-
rogator, however, in most cases, an interrogator can cul-
ivate these qualities if he has the desire and is willing to
ark
EN
devote time to study and practice. Some desirable per-
sonal qualities in an interrogator are discussed below.
MOTIVATION
Motivation is the most significant factor to achieve
success, Without motivation, other qualities lose their
Significance. The stronger the motivation, the more
successful the interrogator. An interrogator may be
motivated by several factors; for example:
@ An interest in human relations.
® A desire to react to the challenge of personai inter-
play.
® An enthusiasm for the collection of information.
@ A profound interest in foreign languages and cul-
tures.
ALERTNESS
The interrogator must be constantly aware of the
shifting attitudes which normally characterize a source’s
reaction to interrogation. The interrogator—
@ Notes the source’s every gesture, word, and voice
inflection.
® Determines why the source is in a certain mood or
why his mood suddenly changed. It is from the
source’s mood and actions the interrogator deter-
mines how to best proceed with the interrogation.
@ Watches for any indication the source is withhold-
ing information.
@ Watches for a tendency to resist further question-
ing, diminishing resistance, contradictions, or
other tendencies, to include susceptibility.
PATIENCE AND TACT
The interrogator must have patience and tact in creat-
ing and maintaining rapport between himself and the
source, thereby enhancing the success of the interroga-
tion. The validity of the source’s statements and mo-
tives behind these statements may be obtainable only
through exercise of tact and patience. Displaying im-
patience may—
@ Encourage the difficult source to think if he
remains unresponsive for a little longer, the inter-
rogator will stop questioning.
® Cause the source to lose respect for the inter-
rogator, thereby reducing his effectiveness.
An interrogator, with patience and tact, is able to ter-
minate an interrogation and later continue it without
arousing apprehension or resentment.
CREDIBILITY
The interrogator must maintain credibility with the
source and friendly forces. Failure to produce material
FM 34-52
rewards when promised may adversely affect future in-
terrogations. The importance of accurate reporting
cannot be overstressed, since interrogation reports are
often the basis for tactical decisions and operations.
OBJECTIVITY
The interrogator must maintain an objective and dis-
passionate attitude, regardless of the emotional reac-
tions he may actually experience or simulate during the
interrogation. Without objectivity, he may uncon-
sciously distort the information acquired. He may also
be unable to vary his interrogation techniques effective-
ly.
SELF-CONTROL
The interrogator must have exceptional self-control
to avoid displays of genuine anger, irritation, sympathy,
or weariness which may cause him to lose the initiative
during the interrogation. Self-control is especially im-
portant when employing interrogation techniques which
require the display of simulated emotions or attitudes.
ADAPTABILITY
An interrogator must adapt to the many and varied
personalities which he will encounter. He should try to
imagine himself in the source’s position. By being
adaptable, he can smoothly shift his techniques and ap-
proaches during interrogations according to the opera-
tional environment. In many cases, he has to conduct
interrogations under unfavorable physical conditions.
PERSEVERANCE
A tenacity of purpose can be the difference between
an interrogator who is merely good and one who is su-
perior. An interrogator who becomes easily dis-
couraged by opposition, noncooperation, or other
difficulties will neither aggressively pursue the objective
to a successful conclusion nor seek leads to other valu-
able information.
APPEARANCE AND DEMEANOR
The interrogator’s personal appearance may greatly
influence the conduct of the interrogation and attitude
of the source toward the interrogator. Usually a neat,
organized, and professional appearance will favorably
influence the source. A firm, deliberate, and
businesslike manner of speech and attitude may create a
proper environment for a successful interrogation. If
the interrogator’s manner reflects fairness, strength, and
efficiency, the source may prove cooperative and more
receptive to questioning.
1-13
FM 34-52
However, depending on the approach techniques (see
Chapter 3), the interrogator can deliberately portray a
different (for example, casual or sloven) appearance and
demeanor to obtain the cooperation of the source.
INITIATIVE
Achieving and maintaining the initiative are essential
to a successful interrogation just as the offense is the
key to success in combat operations. The interrogator
must grasp the initiative and maintain it throughout the
interrogation.
The source, especially if detained by military forces
during tactical operations, normally has undergone a
traumatic experience and fears for his life. This anxiety
is usually intensified by the source’s lack of knowledge
and understanding of what is about to occur (fear of the
unknown), or by the unfounded fear he will be tortured
or éxecuted.
The interrogator has a position of authority over the
source. The source realizes this fact, and, in some cases,
believes his future might depend upon his association
with the interrogator.
SPECIAL AREAS OF KNOWLEDGE
The interrogator must be knowledgeable on a variety
of subjects in order to be effective in exploiting sources.
Some of these areas are—
@ Proficiency in the target language.
® Knowledge of the target country.
@ International agreements.
@ Enemy materiel and equipment.
® Armed forces uniforms.
® OB information.
In addition to these subjects, the interrogator should
have a knowledge of basic psychology and neurolinguis-
tics.
PROFICIENCY IN THE TARGET LANGUAGE
The interrogator must be proficient in one or more
foreign languages to exploit both human sources and
CEDs. According to the GPW, a prisoner must be
questioned in a language he understands.
The more proficient an interrogator is with the target
language, the better he will be able to develop rapport
with his source, understand the nuances of the source’s
speech, and follow up on source leads to additional in-
formation.
The skilled linguist will be able to translate CEDs
quicker and more accurately than the interrogator who
is merely familiar with the target language.
KNOWLEDGE OF THE TARGET COUNTRY
The interrogator should be familiar with the social,
political, and economic institutions; geography; history;
language; and culture of the target country. Since many
sources will readily discuss nonmilitary topics, the inter-
rogator—
1-14
® May induce reluctant prisoners to talk by discuss-
ing the geography, economics, or politics of the
target country.
@ May gradually introduce significant topics into the
discussion to gain insight about the conditions and
attitudes in the target country.
®@ Should keep abreast of major and current events as
they occur in the target country to better under-
stand the general situation, as well as causes and
repercussions.
LAW OF WAR
The interrogator should understand US law of war
obligations contained in the GWS, GPW, and GC
regarding the treatment of EPWs, retained personnel,
and civilian internees (see Figure 1-4).
ENEMY MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT
The interrogator should be familiar with the
capabilities, limitations, and employment of standard
weapons and equipment so he may recognize and iden-
ufy changes, revisions, and innovations. Some of the
more common subjects of interest to the interrogator
include the following:
@ Small arms.
@ Infantry support weapons.
@ Artillery.
® Aircraft.
®@ Vehicles.
® Communications equipment.
® NBC defense.
ARMED FORCES UNIFORMS AND INSIGNIA
Through his knowledge of uniforms, insignia, decora-
tions, and other distinctive devices, the interrogator may
be able to determine the rank, branch of service, type of
unit, and military experience of a military or
paramilitary source. This knowledge is helpful during
the planning and preparation and the approach phases
discussed in Chapter 3.
OB INFORMATION
OB is defined as the identification, strength, com-
mand structure, and disposition of personnel, units, and
equipment of any military force. Interrogation OB ele-
ments are separate categories by which detailed infor-
mation is maintained. They are—
® Missions.
Composition.
Disposition.
Strength.
e@ ¢ 8 6
Training.
@ Combat effectiveness,
@ Tactics.
@ Logistics.
® Electronic technical data.
® Miscellaneous data.
During the questioning phase, OB elements assist the
interrogator in verifying the accuracy of the information
obtained and can be used as an effective tool to gain
FM 34-52
new information. Aids which may be used to identify
units are—
® Names.
@ Commanders.
Home station identifications.
Code designations and numbers.
Uniforms and insignia.
Guidons.
® 6 *® & @
Documents.
® Military postal system data.
@ Equipment and vehicle markings.
UNDERSTANDING BASIC PSYCHOLOGY
An interrogator can best adapt himself to the EPW’s
or detainee’s personality and control of the their reac-
tions when he understands basic psychological factors,
traits, attitudes, drives, motivations, and inhibitions.
For example, the timely use or promise of rewards and
incentives may mean the difference between an
interrogation’s success or failure and future EPW or
detainee exploitation.
NEUROLINGUISTICS
Neurolinguistics is a behavioral communication
model and a set of procedures that improve communica-
tion skills. The interrogator should read and react to
nonverbal communications. An interrogator can best
adapt himself to the source’s personality and control his
own reactions when he understands basic psychological
factors, traits, attitudes, drives, motivations, and inhibi-
tions.
INTERROGATOR CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS
HUMINT collection is capable of obtaining informa-
tion pertinent to all six IEW tasks:
Situation development.
® Target development and target acquisition.
® L&W.
@ IPB.
@® BDA.
® Force protection.
Interrogators are trained as linguists to question
EPWs and civilian detainees and to exploit CEDs.
During their collection, interrogators attempt to obtain
and report any information possessed by these targets
that pertains to the IEW tasks. This persistence is
determined by comparing the information obtained to
the SIR contained in the interrogation element’s collec-
tion mission.
Interrogators are capable of collecting information on
political, economic, and a wide range of military topics.
For the most part, interrogators attempt to organize
their collection effort according to the OB elements
analysts use. In addition to these elements, inter-
rogators also obtain PIR-directed information on the
1-15
FM 34-52
missions assigned to enemy units. Appendix B discusses
relevant questioning guides.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
The environment in which interrogation operations
are performed affects the degree of success achieved.
There are primarily two areas, both having limitations,
upon which the interrogators depend:
@ The IE'W process which gives direction and pur-
pose to their collection efforts,
@ The conduct of combat operations which provides
them with collection targets; that is, EPWs,
detainees, and CEDs.
If the IEW process or combat operations are not
ideal, use what you can to capitalize on capabilities.
IEW Process
The IEW process can limit interrogators by assigning
collection missions which are not suited to HUMINT
collection capabilities; as well as by not disseminating
copies of the following reports;
@ Intelligence summary (INTSUM).
® intelligence report (INTREP).
® Daily intelligence summary (DISUM).
@ Periodic intelligence report (PERINTREP).
@ Supplementary intelligence report (SUPINTREP).
® Other intelligence reports.
Combat Operations
Combat operations can limit interrogators by—
® Delaying evacuation of EPWs or detainees and
captured documents, thereby limiting time avail-
able to exploit them.
@ Allowing prisoners and documents to be
mishandled, thereby decreasing their exploitation
potential.
® Not providing the equipment, supplies, and secure
communications needed for successful operations.
INHERENT LIMITATIONS
Interrogation operations are also limited by the very
nature of HUMINT collection. EPWs or detainees and
CEDs must actually have the desired information before
interrogators can collect it. With EPWs or detainees,
there is always the possibility knowledgeable individuals
may refuse to cooperate.
The UCMI, GWS, GPW, and GC set definite limits
on measures which can be taken to induce an EPW or
detainee to cooperate.
CONFLICTS
HICs are conflicts between two or more nations and
their respective allies, where the belligerents employ
modern technology complemented by intelligence;
mobility; firepower (to include NBC weapons); service
support; and C™ resources.
MICs are conflicts between two or more nations and
their respective allies, where the belligerents employ
modem technology complemented by intelligence;
mobility; firepower (without NBC); C’; and service sup-
port resources for limited objectives under definitive
policy limiting employment of destructive power and
geography involved.
LiCs are political-military confrontations between
contending states or groups below conventional war and
above the routine, peaceful competition among states.
They
® Frequently involve protracted struggles of compet-
ing principles and ideologies.
® Range from subversion to the use of armed force.
1-16
® Are waged by combining and employing political,
economic, informational, and military instruments.
® Are often localized, generally in the Third World,
but contain regional and global security implica-
tions.
LIC operational intelligence requirements are
HUMINT intensive and demand detailed familiarity
with the military, political, and front organizations of
the insurgent enemy, and the environment in which he
operates.
The interrogator’s familiarity with the areas of opera-
tions (AQs) must include an understanding of the insur-
gency, its objectives, history, successes, and failures.
This understanding is required not only on a general
countrywide basis but also on an expanded basis within
the interrogator’s particular AO. Therefore, it is essen-
tial the imterrogator grasps the importance the insur-
gent organization places on accomplishing political
objectives as opposed to military successes,
One measure of the interrogator’s effectiveness is his
ability to apply appropriate interrogation techniques to
the personality of the source. Interrogations associated
with LIC operations dictate the need for skill in the full
range of interrogation techniques so the interrogator
can conduct the many types of interrogations demanded.
Warfighting doctrine IEW principles apply for LIC;
however, intelligence indicators for insurgent activity
are unigue. Anything insurgents can do to influence
and direct a society toward overthrowing iis government
is reflected by some action or indication, no matter how
subtle. Some MI advisors may be required to assist
paramilitary and nonmilitary elements in developing
HUMINT sources and exploiting their information.
As US forces are committed to the LIC operation, in-
terrogation support will more closely adhere to the
traditional tactical environment. Typical LIC missions
are—
FM 34-52
@ Counterinsurgency and insurgency support.
@ Combatting terrorism.
@ Peacekeeping and peacetime contingency opera-
tions.
HUMINT is a major LIC source because of the neces-
sity to exploit the local populace and to know and un-
derstand enemy intentions. In LIC, interrogators
exploit EPWs and CEDs. For example, in addition to
conducting EPW operations at collecting points, inter-
rogators may participate in cordon and search and
roadblock operations, tactical check points, and low-
ievel collection missions in conjunction with the sup-
porting CI unit (see FM 34-60A(S)). Interrogators may
also provide support to drug and law enforcement agen-
cy (DLEA) operations.
INTERROGATION MISSIONS
Interrogators perform various types of missions. As
discussed previously, the two main missions are person-
acl and document exploitation. There are other func-
tions for which interrogators ate ideally suited because
of their language and HUMINT training. These in-
clude-—
® Linguist support to hostage negotiations, counter-
drug, and special operation forces (SOF) opera-
tions.
@ LLSO linguist support.
@ Psychological operations (PSYOP) linguist sup-
port.
® Civil Affairs (CA) linguist support.
@ Treaty verification and observer duties.
DRUG AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY OPERATIONS
Army interrogators may assist Federal law enforce-
ment authorities and, where lives are endangered, state
and local law enforcement authorities, after concur-
rence by the Army General Counsel and approval by the
Secretary of Defense or his designee. (See AR 381-10,
Procedure 12, and AR 500-51.)
Army interrogators may assist law enforcement agen-
cies and security services or foreign governments or in-
ternational organizations only in accordance with
applicable law and policy, including any status of forces
agreements. Such assistance will ordinarily constitute
security assistance, which must be approved in accord-
ance with AR 12-15.
Under no circumstances will interrogators assist any
law enforcement authorities in any manner without
prior approval by competent authority after a legal
review of the proposal.
117
PM 34-52
CHAPTER 2
COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE
The interrogation architecture (interrogators and in-
terrogation units) is a seamless system that supports
operations from brigade to theater level. The dynamic
warfighting doctrine requires interrogation units be
highly mobile and have automation and communication
equipment to report information to the supported com-
mander.
Regardless of their employment level, interrogation
units should be equipped with state-of-the-art automat-
ion equipment, necessary HUMINT software, and dedi-
cated and secure communication equipment with skip
echelon, digital, voice, facsimile, and optical scanning
capability. This equipment enables interrogators to—
@ Receive data base information.
@ Manipulate that information.
® Incorporate it into their operational data bases.
®@ Produce tactical information reports.
By using secure communication equipment, inter-
rogators are able to disseminate time-sensitive informa-
tion to the supported commander as answers to his PIR
which facilitates decision-making. The Prisoner of War
Information System (P WIS) is a databased system main-
tained by the provost marshal’s office at theater level. It
has the capability to recall an EPW’s evacuation audit
trail.
This prisoner of war interrogation (IPW) com-
munication and automation system facilitates transmis-
sion of EPW-derived information from brigade to
theater; it precludes duplicated effort in EPW or CED
exploitation.
The MI unit commander must ensure interrogators
have the necessary equipment to accomplish their war-
time mission. The MI unit commander retains overall
responsibility for interrogators assigned to his unit. The
manner in which these interrogators are controlled
depends on how the MI unit is task organized for com-
bat.
If interrogators are deployed in general support (GS)
of the division, the MI battalion commander exercises
control over them through his $3 and the battalion tac-
tical operations center (TOC). If interrogators are
deployed in direct support (DS) of a division’s subor-
dinate units, they are tasked by the commanders of
those units through their SZs.
TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER
Normally, interrogators are a primary source of OB
information. The interrogation element chief should
ensure that he or someone appointed to this duty has
daily personal contact with the division or corps collec-
tion management and dissemination (CM&D) section
at the TOC. During these visits, all questions and infor-
mation pertaining to OB and intelligence target priority
lists can be discussed and later disseminated to various
interrogators.
Interrogator elements must receive all reports and
findings made by analysts; in turn, all interrogation
reports should reach analysts. Direct contact must be
maintained between these two elements, preferably in
person or by telephone. This ensures access to impor-
tant information which may arise between liaison visits.
TASKING RELATIONSHIPS
When interrogators are task-organized under the
IEW company, the team leader directs the tasking. The
DS and GS teams are under operational control
(OPCON) to the IEW company when they are support-
ing that company. The officers responsible for tasking
interrogation elements ensure the following steps are
accomplished:
@ Collection missions that reflect the capabilities
and limitations of interrogators are assigned.
@ INTREPs are integrated with information
provided by other collectors during the IPB
process.
® Copies of the INTSUM, INTREP, PERINTREP,
DISUM, and SUPINTREP are disseminated to the
interrogation element as they are published.
@ Close contact is maintained with the interrogation
element.
2-4
FM 34-52
INTERROGATOR TASK ORGANIZATIONS
Interrogators are not assigned by tables of organiza-
tion and equipment (TOE) to units below division.
However, MI parent units often task interrogators and
place them in DS to brigades. For example, in a light
division, there are usually enough interrogators assigned
to send forward deployed interrogation teams, known as
"GO" teams, to the brigades to complement light
division operations.
EPW interrogation may be desirable at all echelons,
but is not practicable due to limited numbers of inter-
rogators available. As a minimum, there should be an
interrogation element at the division central collection
point, corps holding areas, and theater internment
facility.
Interrogation elements at all echelons are task or-
ganized, and may not mirror the TOE organization in
their parent unit.
DEPLOYMENT SITES
Interrogation assets are mobile enough to be shifted
in response to new developments. The initial deploy-
ment of these assets are guided by the exploitation
priority established by the commander. Operations are
conducted at an echelon that will allow interrogators
the best opportunity to satisfy their assigned collection
mission. The areas discussed below should be con-
sidered when making the deployment decisions.
Number of interrogators Available
The number of interrogators available limit the num-
ber of deployment sites that can be used. MI com-
manders at corps consider how many interrogators will
be available for interrogation operations after augmen-
tation has been provided to subordinate divisions. The
number of interrogators also play a key role in deciding
the level of intense or sustained collection operations
they can conduct.
Type and Intensity of Combat Operations
Intense collection employs all available interrogators
with little or no provision for them to rest. The major
disadvantage of intense collection is these interrogators
become exhausted quickly. Interrogations amount to
prolonged conversations under extreme stress. Once
the available interrogators are exhausted, collection
stops until they recover or additional assets arrive.
A severe decrease in interrogation effectiveness can
be expected between 12 and 18 hours after the onset of
intense collection, with 18 hours as the maximum time
possible for intense collection. This kind of all-out ef-
fort can be justified when critical information must be
obtained or confirmed quickly to forestall a major dis-
aster. Similar problems can be expected during intense
CED exploitation.
Sustained operations can be maintained indefinitely.
They also allow the commander some rested inter-
rogators 16 use on a contingency basis in a differeat
location. Disadvantages of sustained collection are
fewer sources are exploited over a given time and opera-
tions are slower.
Support Available
In making deployment decisions, the area where
operations are to be conducted must provide the sup-
port required by the interrogation element. This sup-
port includes—
@ MP coordination.
@ Priority access to reliable means of secure com-
munications,
@ Adequate shelter and security.
® A flow of CEDs and sources to exploit.
INTERROGATION BELOW DIVISION
The first interrogation could take place at brigade.
Interrogation teams are attached temporarily to
brigades in enemy contact when determined appropriate
by the division G2. These teams come from the inter-
rogation section of the parent division. Interrogation
personnel are organic to separate brigades and armored
cavalry regiments (ACRs). Interrogation at brigade
level is strictly tactical and deals with information of im-
mediate value.
Other information the EPW might possess is
developed at higher levels. At brigade, the scope of in-
terrogation changes from hour-to-hour as the tactical
situation develops. These interrogations must be
geared to cope with any tactical possibility at a
moment's notice.
interrogation personnel in DS to brigade will be col-
located or immediately adjacent to the division forward
EPW collecting point in the brigade support area
(BSA). For MI units to receive $2 support, the
collecting point and interrogation site will
FM 34-52
be collocated and accessible to the command post
(CP).
DIVISION INTERROGATION ASSETS
An MI battalion is organic to each division. It
provides combat intelligence, EW, and OPSEC support
to light or heavy infantry and airborne or air assault
divisions.
The MI battalion provides special support the GZ
needs to produce combat intelligence. Interrogation
personnel organic to the MI battalions compose the in-
terrogation support element.
The intelligence and surveillance (&S) company
provides division CI, interrogation, and surveillance
support.
The I&S company interrogation team manages the
division’s interrogation assets, including those inter-
rogation teams attached from corps. Additional team
duties are—
® Screen CEDs.
® Provide interpreter and translator support.
® Liaison with PSYOP and G5 personnel.
ORGANIZATION (LIGHT DIVISION)
In a light division, interrogators belong to the 1&5
Company, MI Battalion. Figure 2-1 shows this struc-
ture. Light division MI battalions have 25 interrogators
subordinate to the 1&S company. Two 5-man DS teams
in the interrogation platoon ensure the platoon can pro-
vide support to two committed brigades,
Piatoon Headquarters
Platoon headquarters provides C for the interroga-
tion element. It consists of a platoon leader and ser-
geant. The platoon headquarters coordinates with—
® 1&S company commander for personnel status, ad-
ministrative support, and logistical support prior
to deployment to the division support area (DSA).
® MI battalion $3 for intelligence tasking and
deployment of interrogation assets.
@ Division G2 for reporting, enemy situation up-
dates, and PIR, IR, and SIR.
@ DISCOM commander for DSA logistical and com-
munications support, and interrogation element
location in the DSA.
Figure 2-1. MI Company (1&S), MI Battalion, Light Division.
2-3
FM 34-52
® MP company commander for division central EPW
collecting point location, and EPW processing and
evacuation procedures.
® Medical battalion commander for procedures to
treat and clear wounded EPW for questioning.
@ CI platoon leader for requirements and joint Cl
and interrogation procedures.
@ MI company team leaders for deployment of DS
interrogation teams.
@ CA and PSYOP elements for requirements and
processing of civilian detainees and refugees.
Operations Section
This consists of a section chief (warrant officer), non-
commissioned officer in charge (NCOIC), and two 4-
member interrogation teams. The operations section
chief manages the interrogation effort to ensure inter-
rogations respond to division intelligence requirements.
DOCEX Section
This consists of a section chief (warrant officer) and
three document examiners. The DOCEX section may
be used as an additional interrogation team when
priority of exploitation and EPW capture rate dictate.
The division G2 determines whether interrogation or
document examination will have priority.
When three brigades are committed in an operation,
the DOCEX section may be employed as a third brigade
level team.
DOCEX assets may also function in an interrogation
role when the number of EPWs at the division central
collecting point requires additional division level inter-
rogators or when the CED rate is very low.
interrogation Teams
Each imterrogation team consists of a team leader
(warrant officer), NCO assistant team leader, and three
team members. Teams are normally employed as part
of the MI company teams which provide [EW support
to the brigades.
ORGANIZATION (HEAVY DIVISION)
In a heavy division, interrogators are assigned to the
I&S Company, MI Battalion. Figure 2-2 shows this
structure,
Figure 2-2. [&S Company, Mi Battalion, Heavy Division.
2-4
FM 34-52
ORGANIZATION (AIRBORNE OR AIR ASSAULT ORGANIZATION (ACR AND SEPARATE BRIGADE)
DIVISION) In an ACR or separate brigade, interrogators are as-
In an airborne or air assault division, inter- signed to the operations support platoon of the MI
rogators are assigned to the 1&S Company, MI company. Figure 2-4 shows this organization.
Battalion. Figure 2-3 shows this structure.
Figure 2-3. 1&S Company, MI Battalion, Airborne or Air Assault Division.
Figure 2-4. MI Company Operations Support Piatoon for ACR and Separate Brigade.
2-5
FM 34-52
SPECIAL FORCES GROUP Interrogation teams may be combined with the CI sec-
In a Special Forces Group (Airborne) (SFGA), inter- tion when not conducting interrogation operations.
rogators are assigned to the Military Intelligence
Detachment (MID). Figure 2-5 shows this structure.
LEGEND: * ASPS and CM&D sections are consolidated on TOE.
** All SIGINT MOSs are consolidated under the ASPS per the 31803L000 TOE.
Figure 2-5, Organization, MI Detachment, Support Company, Special Forces Group.
CORPS INTERROGATION ASSETS AND ORGANIZATION
At corps, interrogators are assigned to the MI Bat- of a company headquarters, PW and CI operation sec-
talion (Tactical Exploitation) (TE). Figure 2-6 shows tions, Cl and interrogation platoons, and a maintenance
this structure. The Cl] interrogation company consists section.
Figure 2-6. MI Battalion (TE).
2-6
FAR 34-52
The CI platoon has nine teams and the interrogation terrogation company. Figure 2-7 shows this
platoon normally has eight teams, Interrogators can be structure,
laced in a DS ivisi ivision in- ee . . .
a see n Ds 5 aoe to divisions to augment division in There are also linguist battalions which augment and
, support Active Component (AC) units in time of hos-
The corps also has a Reserve Components (RC) tilities.
MI Battalion (TE), which has a subordinate CI in-
Figure 2-7. RC MI Battalion (TE) Corps.
ECHELONS ABOVE CORPS INTERROGATION ASSETS AND ORGANIZATION
The MI Battalion (Collection and Exploitation headquarters company (HHC), MI Company (Ci), anc
[C&E)), as shown at Figure 2-8, has a headquarters and MI Company (Interrogation and Exploitation) 1&5).
Figure 2-8. MI Battalion (C&5), Mi Brigade (EAC).
aoe
FM 34-52
The MI Battalion (I&E), as shown at Figure 2-9, has
an HHC and three MI companies (1&E), of which one is
GS. Two MI companies (IZE) (INTG) operate the
theater, joint, or combined interrogation facilities, while
the MI company (1&E) (GS) is for GS to echelons corps
and below (ECB).
The MI Company (Interrogation) of the MI Battalion
(C&E) and (I&E), as shown at Figure 2-10, has a com-
pany headquarters, operations section, communications
section, food service section, and an L&E platoon, con-
sisting of two sections.
The MI company (I&E) (GS), MI Battalion (&E),
has a headquarters section, an operations section, and
three interrogation platoons, each with a platoon head-
quarters and eight sections. Figure 2-11 shows this
structure.
\s
Ia
Ea
a
al
We | - |
fn ni Ce
Figure 2-10. MI Company (INTG), MI Battalion (C&E) and (&£).
FM 34-52
Figure 2-11, MI Company (I&E) (GS), MI Battalion (&E).
ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR AND INTERROGATION FACILITIES
There are significant differences in EPW and inter-
rogation facilities at each echelon; this is due to the
numbers of EP'Ws, the missions of the various echelons,
and the size of the interrogation elements.
EVACUATION AND GUARDING EPW
Initially, the capturing unit is responsible for evacuat-
ing and guarding EPWs. In brigade-size operations,
battalions evacuate prisoners to brigade collecting
points as the situation permits. In most cases, EPWs
are evacuated rapidly using backhaul transportation
from brigade collecting points to departure areas be-
cause they require food and guards, both of which are in
short supply at brigade. EPW collecting points should
be located close to supply routes to speed evacuation.
BRIGADE AND LOWER ECHELONS
At brigade level, EPWs can be detained in open
fields, courtyards, gardens, jungle clearings, or similar
Sites if they are hidden from enemy observation. If
necessary, these areas can be enclosed with barbed wire
for more efficient EPW handling. Because EPWs sel-
dom remain at a forward collecting point for more than
a few hours, EP Ws are not usually kept in a building or
other shelter.
Interrogation facilities at battalion and brigade are
kept to a minimum. Brigade interrogation personnel
should be located adjacent to the brigade forward EPW
collecting point in the BSA. The collecting point
should be out of sight and sound of other BSA activities,
it should be close to normal evacuation routes.
The distance between the collecting point and CP is
important. When possible, the collecting point and in-
terrogation site should be within walking distance or a
few minute’s driving distance of the CP.
Interrogators with battalions or brigades should have
vehicles equipped with radios for rapid communication
with their respective intelligence officers and other in-
telligence agencies.
DIVISION FACILITIES
The principal EPW tactical interrogation takes place
at division. While the procedure is similar to that used
at brigade, the interrogation scope is broader.
Previous interrogation reports received from brigade
are reviewed. This information is expanded by further
interrogations for tactical information to include all OB
elements.
The interrogators at division level will prepare and
disseminate summary interrogation reports. As dictated
by the tactical situation, the interrogation facility at
division may be augmented by corps interrogation per-
sonnel
The division’s central EPW collecting point is
operated by division MP under the supervision of the
division provost marshal.. The interrogation section
should be located immediately adjacent to the division’s
2-9
FM 34-52
central EPW collecting point, normally along the main
supply route (MSR) within or near the division support
command (DISCOM).
The distance between the interrogation facility and
G2 section (rear) is not as critical as at brigade level.
Personal liaison between the interrogation and intel-
ligence sections, although important, may not be re-
quired as frequently as at brigade.
At division, the G2 directs interrogation section col-
lection efforts in conjunction with the CM&D section
and the MI battalion commander, who serves as one of
his principal assistants.
Compared to brigade facilities, division interrogation
facilities are expanded. This is because the division in-
terrogation section handles and interrogates more cap-
tured personnel, and interrogations are conducted in
greater detail. When practicable, interrogations at
division should be conducted in improvised interroga-
tion rooms in buildings adjacent to the division collect-
ing point. If possible, separate rooms should be
available to permit several interrogations at once.
CORPS FACILITIES
The corps EPW holding area is established and
operated by MP under the supervision of the corps
provost marshal. The Corps Interrogation Facility
(CIF) will usually be a more permanent type facility
than at echelons below corps. It should consist of
operations and interrogation areas with separate,
enclosed interrogation booths or rooms. If possible,
there should be a separate DOCEX area. Figure 2-12
shows a sample CIF.
be
_MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE.
OPS-P
SECTION
PHA PHA
THA |IN PROCESSING) ARRIVAL
STATION POINT
CHA
2-16
PRA
PHA PROCESSING
STATIONS
Figure 2-12. Sample Corps Interrogation facility (CIF).
The commander, CI Interrogation Company, MI Bat-
talion (TE), MI Brigade (Corps), is the CIF com-
mander. CIPs are the principal establishment for the
exploitation of captured personnel and CEDs. Func-
tions of the centers include-—
® Conducting tactical and strategic interrogations
based on the intelligence requirements and specific
guidance of the corps G2 section.
® Screening to select sources suited for further ex-
ploitation at a higher echelon interrogation center.
® Screening of EPW and other sources of specific CI
interest.
@ Interrogating sources of interest to PSYOP intel-
ligence based on their requirements.
@ Preparing and disseminating interrogation reports.
Continuous coordination between the CIF com-
mander and EPW holding area commander is essential.
At a sub-level, it is also important for interrogators to
maintain a good working relationship with MP at the
holding area.
MP, who are in constant contact with EPWs or
detainees, can provide interrogators valuable informa-
tion on individual sources. By properly handling
prisoners at all times, they also contribute to the success
of interrogation operations by helping to reduce resis-
tance by the sources.
The CIF should be administratively and operationally
self-sufficient and located within or adjacent to the
EPW holding area, close enough to facilitate opera-
vions.
ADEQUATE INTERROGATION FACILITIES
At corps level, particular emphasis should be placed
on providing facilities adequate for the interrogation of
EPWs of higher positions or rank. Because imterroga-
tions will normally last longer than at division, a greater
degree of comfort should be provided, if possible. In
other respects, the type of interrogation facilities and
equipment parallels those found at division.
OB SECTION
OB analysts are a valuable interrogation facility asset.
They ensure PIR, IR, and SIR are updated, and report-
ing is in response to them. In addition, they maintain a
situation map (SITMAP) and OB updates to keep inter-
rogators current on tactical situations.
FM 34-52
EDITORIAL PERSONNEL
The senior interrogator may assign interrogators to
edit INTREPs. They also may use the organizational
chain of command to ensure quality control of report-
ing. When OB analysts are available, the commander
may task them to edit reports.
DOCEX SECTION
The DOCEX section receives documents taken from
captured personnel, battlefield casualties, and positions
abandoned by the enemy. It processes captured docu-
ments; for example, screens for intelligence value,
categorizes, and translates. It forwards translation
reports on information of immediate tactical value.
(Chapter 4 describes document categories.)
SPECIALIZED INFORMATION
The scope of interrogations at corps is widened by the
commander’s intelligence requirements, SIR of the
numerous technical service staff agencies, and other in-
telligence agencies and services. All such special needs
for information are coordinated by the corps G2 sec-
tion, interrogators must be aware of these overall intel-
ligence requirements to adequately exploit captured
personnel.
Because of the range of specialized information re-
quired, interrogation at corps level should be conducted
by interrogators who specialize in fields such as armor,
engineering, medicine, and other specialized subject
areas.
To extract detailed EPW information, the senior in-
terrogator will assign some interrogators as screeners
and others to specialized areas. However, he must coor-
dinate, for example, with technical intelligence
(TECHINT) assets. This is to prevent duplication or
gaps in information obtained.
Continuous coordination is required between all
echelon interrogators to ensure a smoothly functioning
operation.
The corps MI brigade applies the technical expertise,
intelligence manpower, and equipment needed by G2 to
produce integrated combat intelligence. The corps
commander has OPCON, while the G2 has staff super-
vision over the MI brigade.
ail
FAM 34-52
ECHELONS ABOVE CORPS FACILITIES
At echelons above corps (EAC), the MI company
(I&E), MI battalion (C&E) or (I&E), MI brigade
(EAC), will form the Theater Interrogation Facility
(TIF). The TIF, which is commanded by an MI captain,
provides interrogation support to the theater or joint
command and to national level intelligence agencies.
The TIF will—
® Be located within the main theater EPW intern-
ment facility.
® Be tailored organizationally to meet requirements
of the theater and situation.
® Include interrogators, CI personnel, and intel-
ligence analysts from the Army, Air Force, Marine
Corps, and, in some cases, the Navy.
@ Be organized similarly to the CIF; that is, by func-
tion.
® Have intelligence analysts to handle requirements
and keep interrogators informed of changes in the
operational or strategic situation.
@ Maintain the capability to deploy "GO" ‘teams to
multiple theater EP W camps, as well as to forward
deploy them to corps and ECB as needed.
®@ Provide experienced senior interrogation warrant
officers and NCOs who are graduates of the
Department of Defense (DOD) Strategic
Debriefer Course (additional skill identifier 9N or
N7) and physical plant for the Joint Debriefing
Center (DC), where exploitation of high-level
(Category A) sources takes place on operational
and strategic topics.
MEDICAL COMPANY INTERROGATIONS
Sometimes it may be advantageous to conduct inter-
rogations at the medical company. Wounded prisoners
being evacuated through medical channels are frequent-
ly valuable sources of information; however, inter-
rogators Cannot represent themselves as medical or Red
Cross personnel.
The fact the EPW is wounded, and in an "enemy"
hospital, puts him in a state of mind conducive to inter-
rogation. The permission of competent medical
authority is required before wounded prisoners can be
interrogated.
US Army doctors and medics are considered com-
petent medical authorities. In their absence, the inter-
rogation may not commence, even upon direction of
nonmedical military authority.
When interrogating a sick or wounded EPW, great
care must be taken to avoid implying that treatment will
be withheld if cooperation is denied. The interrogation
process must not interfere with timely medical treat-
ment, to include administering medication to reHeve
pain.
INTERROGATION AT BRIGADE AND BELOW
Interrogators are not usually attached below brigade
level unless the combat situation requires limited tacti-
cal interrogation at battalion or lower. In this event,
skilled interrogators from the MI battalion will be at-
tached temporarily to committed battalions. They will
assist in exploiting EPW immediately upon capture to
extract information needed in support of the capturing
unit.
Interrogations at battalion or lower are brief and con-
cerned only with information bearing directly on the
combat mission of the capturing unit. The following are
examples of circumstances warranting an interrogation:
® A unit or landing force assigned an independent
mission in which the S2 is primarily responsible for
2-12
collecting information necessary to fulfill the unit's
mission. Inumediate tactical intelligence is neces-
sary for mission accomplishment.
@ There is a definite need for interrogation at a
lower level to permit rapid reaction based on infor-
mation obtained.
@ It is advantageous to have an EPW point out
enemy defenses and installation from observation
points in forward areas.
BATTALION S2 CONTROLS
Interrogators employed for temporary periods at bat-
talion level receive PIR, TR, and SIR from the sup-
ported battalion $2. This will ensure interrogators are
fully oriented to the battalion's collection mission.
In other instances, interrogators may be placed at
brigade in an “on-call” status, from which they can
proceed to any of the subordinate battalions as cir-
cumstances warrant. Upon completion of a low-level,
immediate-type interrogation, they can return to
brigade and again become available for immediate
employment.
Commanders and S2s below brigade level who are un-
able to obtain interrogator support from higher
echelons should include provisions in unit and staff
Standing operating procedures (SOPs) for the “tactical
questioning" (not interrogation) of EPWs or detainees.
They should identify assigned personnel for language
capability.
Interrogation personnel should provide training in
the area of tactical questioning to designated $2 person-
nel, The potential for abuse of the EPW is greatest at
the initial capture and tactical questioning phase. With
the excifement and stress of the battlefield, it may be-
come easy for unskilled personnel to resort to illegal
techniques to elicit critical information.
‘Your instruction must stress the importance of the
proper treatment of EPWs. Emphasize that the abuse
of an EPW at the initial stage of contact often renders
future interrogation futile.
If you are engaged in, or supervising the tactical ques-
tioning of EPWs, you are responsible for ensuring that
EPWs are treated in accordance with the requirements
of international and US law. Any tactical questioning
conducted must be in response to the supported
commander’s PIR. Appendix C discusses S2 tactical
questioning.
At this level the brigade 52 must maintain secure
communication with interrogation personnel to ensure
requirements are answered. Except under extreme
weather conditions, and MP availability, it is not neces-
sary to keep EP Ws within the confines of a building or
other shelter at battalion level since they will not
remain for more than a few hours before being
evacuated.
FM 34-52
The capturing unit escorts or transports EPWs or
detainees to the nearest collecting point, and turns them
over to the MP. Interrogators in DS of the brigade will
screen and categorize all EPWs or detainees, question
them, and report information obtained in response to
brigade PIR, TR, and SIR. They will do this under time
constraints, as all EP Ws or detainees must be evacuated
without delay.
In spite of the temporary nature of the forward EPW
collecting point, interrogators should maintain enough
space between the collecting point and the interrogation
site 10 ensure the privacy of interrogations. EPWs or
detainees should not be able to observe or hear inter-
rogations in progress.
INTERROGATIONS IN OTHER OPERATIONS
The functions and basic operational techniques
employed by the interrogation element attached to the
infantry division apply to interrogation elements sup-
porting armored, amphibious, and airborne operations
in any terrain or climate.
Differences arise primarily in the planning stages and
interrogation objectives. These differences normally
result from the inherent characteristics of each type of
unit and terrain and climate involved.
For example, the interrogator engaging in airborne
and amphibious operations will be dependent upon in-
telligence support from higher agencies during the plan-
ning stage. This is necessary because the unit does not
have actual contact with the enemy until a specific
operation begins.
Once H-hour arrives, the interrogator will be faced
with a rapidly developing and changing tactical situa-
tion. At this time, the degree of success correlates to
the preparations made during the planning stage.
Consequently, the interrogator must make a con-
certed effort to learn everything possible about the ob-
jective area—terrain, enemy, and weather—and relate
these factors to the mission of the unit supported. Only
by taking these steps will the interrogator be able to cn-
sure success, and be prepared to begin interrogations as
soon as possible after contact with the enemy is estab-
lished. Interrogation objectives depend upon the mis-
sion assigned and type of unit supported.
2-13
FM 34-52
SPECIAL FORCES
Special Forces perform five primary missions:
® Unconventional warfare.
@ Foreign internal defense.
® Direct action.
® Special reconnaissance.
@ Counterterrorism.
The primary role of Special Forces is to influence
deep, close, or rear operations beyond the forward
limits of conventional military forces. These operations
May extend into a hostile nation’s homeland or into the
territory of hostile states that threaten Hines of com-
munication in the friendly strategic rear.
The Special Forces Group (SFG) normally deploys
three two-person teams, as required, to support group
operations. One of the teams may be attached to the
joint interrogation facility GIF). Special Forces inter-
rogation activities include, but are not limited to—
@ Interrogating EPWs, debriefing detainees and
returned US personnel, and other persons of intel-
ligence interest to the supported commander.
® Exploiting documents that appear to directly satis-
fy the supported commanders specific operational
requirements (SORs).
® Participating in overt elicitation activities. These
activities include Haison, escort, observer, and
treaty verification measures.
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
The assault landing team is the basic subordinate task
organization of the assault echelon of a landing force.
Regardless of whether a battalion or brigade landing
ieam is the basic element, it will operate independently
during the first stages of the landing, and be organized
to land, overrun beach defenses, and secure terrain ob-
jectives.
The interrogation element, along with CI teams,
should participate in all aspects of the planning phase
affecting the landing force to which it is attached. Inter-
rogators should conduct specialized training. The chief
interrogator should coordinate with the landing force
intelligence officer on all matters concerning inter-
rogators after the landing has been made.
The interrogators obtain as much background infor-
mation about the enemy as possible to interrogate cap-
tured enemy personnel. Interrogators should study—
® All maps, charts, and photographs of the terrain
and defenses of the landing areas.
@ All INTREPs on the enemy armed forces in that
area.
® Available information on enemy reserves, as well
as on Civilians residing in the area.
Interrogators should engage in other phases of train-
ing, including rehearsals, to smoothiy execute embarka-
tion, movement, and debarkation operations.
The interrogation element attached to an amphibious
landing force will be OPCON to the landing force intel-
a-t4
ligence officer, and employed at his direction. Small in-
terrogation teams may be formed, which will embark on
separate ships. Communication silence will place an ef-
fective barrier between these teams until that silence is
lifted.
When the assault begins, organizational artillery, air
support, and naval gunfire depend primarily on shore
units for accurate target information. As a result, inter-
rogators may be required to concentrate their efforts on
target acquisition.
The importance of information obtained from cap-
tured enemy personnel is magnified when establishing a
beachhead. This is because the commander is unable to
undertake probing actions to “feel out" the enemy as he
can during a more conventional land operation.
INITIAL INTERROGATIONS
Interrogators should conduct initial interrogations
near the landing beach close to the CP to communicate
information without delay. If necessary, interrogators
may be sent forward to operate with assault companies.
EPW are turned over to the landing force shore party
for custody and eventual evacuation.
Further instructions on interrogations and EPW han-
dling are in the intelligence annex of the landing force
operations order (OPORD). The interrogation of
civilians for information of intelligence value also is an
important part of the interrogation mission.
ESTABLISH AND OPERATE
When headquarters of the next higher echelon above
the landing force has landed and established its CP,
some of the interrogators may be returned to the com-
mand level from which they were originally detached.
At this time, collecting points and interrogation
facilities can be established and operated as in ordinary
ground operations.
FM 34-52
The shore party or helicopter support teams operate
EPW coliecting points in the vicinity of the landing
beaches. EPW are evacuated from these points to
designated ships by landing craft, helicopter, or am-
phibious vehicle. Retention in the objective areas is
begun as increased facilities, supplies, and personnel
permit, consistent with reasonable EPW safety from
enemy action.
AIRBORNE OPERATIONS
The functions and basic methods of operations by in-
terrogation personnel with airborne operations are
Similar to that of an infantry division. However, the
method of employment of interrogators is somewhat
different. Interrogators who are to operate with air-
borne units must understand the peculiarities in opera-
tions, as well as in training.
The most significant difference between airborne and
normal ground operations is airborne operations are
usually carried out behind enemy lines. Before the
operation, airborne qualified interrogators must—
@ Gain a realistic and complete picture of the enemy
situation.
® Study enemy units identified in the objective area,
and those capable of moving to counterattack our
forces.
® Locate significant terrain features in the objective
area.
The command echelon to which interrogators will be
attached depends on each airborne battalion for the as-
sault phase, Interrogators move into the objective area
with the unit they are supporting. They are OPCON to
the unit intelligence officer.
AS soon as the objective areas and the missions of the
respective units within an airborne force are designated,
the interrogators who are to take part in the operation
must receive details on most aspects of the operation.
Interrogators must be provided with—
@ The SIR and proposed H-hour.
® Maps, photographs, and other data required for in-
terrogations.
® All information on enemy units which are outside
the objective area, but are capable of being
employed to counterattack US forces.
Interrogators should spend sufficient time coordinat-
ing with other intelligence specialists, particularly
analysts, to provide a realistic and complete picture of
the enemy situation.
They must study enemy units identified in the objec-
tive area, as well as significant terrain features, to pro-
vide a background for more comprehensive inter-
rogations when the first EPWs are captured. Prior to
the actual airborne assault, interrogators must know CP
locations of the division and its subordinate units.
Interrogators involved in airborne operations must
anticipate the numerous problems which will affect the
interrogation mission. For example, it is conceivable
during the assault phase that no basic transportation
will be available to interrogation personnel; thus,
flexibility is critical in planning and executing airborne
operations.
COLLECTING POINTS AND INTERROGATION
FACILITIES
Collecting points and interrogation facilities are es-
tablished and operated as in other operations when-—
@ Headquarters of the next higher echelon above the
assault units have been airdropped.
@ Assault units have established physical contact
with higher headquarters.
AIR ASSAULT (AIRMOBILE) OPERATIONS
Air assault operations are characterized by a high de-
gree of tactical mobility. They are conducted by
transporting infantry and field artillery units, with the
necessary combat support (CS) and combat service sup-
port (CSS), into battle by helicopter. Once deployed on
the ground, air assault infantry battalions fight like
other infantry battalions. The essence of air assault tac-
tics is a rapid tempo of operations over extended ranges.
In division air assault operations, to support more than
2-15
FM 34-52
one brigade, there must be corps augmentation. FM 71-
101 describes air assault operations.
Security of aircraft enroute to landing zones (LZs) is
a major concern. Friendly aircraft and air defense sup-
port must ensure air routes are free of enemy aircraft
and air defense systems.
When remotely monitored battlefield sensor systems
(REMBASS) are available, friendly ground assets
emplace REMBASS along likely enemy ground ap-
proach routes in the LZ to detect and report ground
movement. Ground surveillance radar (GSR) is
employed to warn of enemy movement on friendly
flanks.
Air assault operations require extensive HUMINT
support in operation planning. CI analysis is critical to
ensure OPSEC measures are taken to prevent divulging
critical information, such as—
@ Date and time of operation.
® Size of force to be employed.
@ Ajir routes to and from planned LZs.
® Planned LZ locations.
Cl must also support staging area actions to prevent
espionage, sabotage, and acts of terrorism which could
adversely affect the operation.
Interrogation is a primary source of information for
air assault operations IPB. Interrogation support of ini-
tial stages of the operation may be critical to its success.
The assault force commander needs immediate and
current enemy intelligence. Lack of immediate ques-
tioning of EP'Ws captured in securing the LZs or in fol-
low-up actions may cause failure of the operation.
Planners must consider the difficulty in getting EPWs
back to a support area during the early stages of an air
assault operation. Interrogators should support the air
assault elements as soon as possible. This may mean an
interrogation team is included in the air assault force to
Operate at a forward EPW collecting point established
in the vicinity of the LZ.
Normaily, one interrogation team should support
each air assault battalion during the assault phase. If
the air assault battalion is using more than one LZ, the
team may be split to support each LZ.
216
After assault units have established a ground link-up,
some cr all of the interrogators may be returned to the
echelon of command from which they were detached.
Interrogators supporting the early stages of an air as-
sault operation must be provided with the SIR, which
are critical to the operation’s success. Interrogators
must plan ahead on how to question EPWs to satisfy
immediate collection requirements.
ARMORED AND MECHANIZED INFANTRY
OPERATIONS
Armored units normally operate on extensive fronts,
with deep zones of action and dispersed formations. Be-
cause of the mobility and wide range of action of ar-
mored units, interrogation normally is not as detailed as
in other divisions. Interrogators must remain mobile,
operate with minimum facilities, and be alert for sudden
changes in the tactical situation.
Planning and Operation
With a few exceptions, the planning and preparation
necessary for interrogators supporting armored units is
the same as for those supporting regular infantry units.
Since radio is the normal means of communication, all
interrogation team members must be familiar with voice
radio procedures and know how to operate radio equip-
ment common to armored units.
interrogator Employment
Interrogator personnel who support armored or
mechanized units will come under OPCON of the 32,
G2, or S2 of the supported unit. Interrogators at all
leveis of armored or mechanized units must be able to
operate during fluid situations, and remain mobile at ail
times. Because of this mobility, liaison with the J2, GZ,
or 82 will not be as frequent as in other units.
Interrogators must operate with maximum efficiency
on the basis of radio communications, messages, and
written reports. As in other type units, interrogation
personnel remain OPCON to the G2 until operations
begin. At that time, the division MI battalion will at-
tach interrogation personnel to subordinate units.
After an operation is completed, interrogation person-
nel will revert to division control, pending a future mis-
sion.
Normally, imterrogations within armored units will be
Hmited to interrogating EP Ws for location and deploy-
ment of antitank weapons and defenses, enemy
roadblocks, and presence of enemy armor. In fast
moving offensive operations, interrogators are best
employed with the forward elements of the units.
Limited Interrogations
EPWs are questioned briefly at the point of capture
(POC), and evacuated to division EP W forward collect-
ing points, or are turned over to division MP for evacua-
tion. Interrogators with battalions and brigades in
armored operations should have vehicles equipped with
radios so they can communicate with the respective in-
telligence officers and other intelligence agencies.
General exploitation techniques and procedures are
modified to fit the environment and objectives of each
interrogation.
EP Ws are a primary source of information during tac-
tical operations. The ability to exploit that source is a
critical factor in mission success. EPWs are first-hand
and last-minute observers of enemy operations. They
represent one of the few forms of direct association with
the enemy and usually possess valuable information.
Other sources of information are enemy and friendly
civilians, refugees, defectors, captured agents, and in-
formers. Because these sources may have lived in or
passed through areas occupied or controlled by the
enemy, they can provide valuable information.
CEDs are another important source of information
which interrogation personnel will exploit in tactical
operations. Documents will be found in the possession
of EPWs or other detainees and on the battlefield.
Often, they provide critical and sometimes detailed
enemy information.
FM 34-52
CAPTURE RATES
US military involvement in tactical operations during
and since World War Il has shown that conflict
penerates large numbers of EP Ws, other detainees, and
CEDs. The higher the intensity of conflict, the larger
the number of EP Ws, detainees, and CEDs.
In OPERATION DESERT STORM, EPWs were
captured, and surrendered, in such great numbers that
many with information had little or no contact with in-
terrogators until they were transported to rear area col-
lecting points. By this time, any tactical information
they had was of limited use.
In LIC operations in Grenada and Panama, the EPW
capture rate was lower, but the detainee rate was higher.
The following factors contributed to an extreme chal-
lenge for interrogation operations:
@® Limited size of US forces.
® Limited number of language-qualified inter-
rogators.
® The focus on local populace.
® Massive amounts of CEDs.
To be successful, interrogation support to tactical
operations must be carefully planned. Available inter-
rogation assets must be balanced against the operations
objective, enemy situation estimate, and projected EPW
capture rates,
The formulas in Table 2-1 are used to estimate the
approximate division-level EPW capture rates. These
formulas could vary according to type of conflict and
mission.
Table 2-1. Divislon-level EPW capture rate.
Defensive Posture.
00035 EP Ws* = 9 EP Ws/day
*per combat soldier per day.
.00367 EP Ws* = 94 EPWs/day
Offensive Posture
Counterinsurgency Operations
EPW capture rate for counterinsurgency operations
may be very low. However, failure of the enemy to wear
a uniform or other recognizable insignia results in an
identification problem. As a result, large numbers of
civilian suspects may also be detained during opera-
tions.
This requires individual screening at brigade and
division levels of detained personnel to determine their
status and appropriate disposition. In Viet Nam, the
ratio of EP Ws approximated one for each six detainees
taken into custody.
2-17
FM 24-52
Terrorisis
Terrorists are a fact of contemporary life. They are
dedicated, intelligent, well financed, resourceful, and as-
tute planners. They are difficult to identify and are not
easily captured or interned. The use of terrorist tactics
worldwide has increased significantly over the past 25
years, and this trend is not expected to abate in the fu-
ture.
Besides peacetime, acts of terrorism should also be
expected in time of armed conflict. US forces must be
prepared to engage in counterterrorist activities to as-
sist the civil and military police. Current doctrine states
counterterrorist activities may involve use of general
purpose forces as well as those specifically organized
aid trained in counterterrorist techniques. There is no
data available on projected terrorist capture rates.
INTERROGATION OF PROTECTED PERSONS
Civilians and refugees caught in the middle of a con-
flict are protected by the GWS, GPW, and GC. Most of
the provisions discussed below apply whether the
civilian or refugee is found in the territory of a party to
the conflict, or in occupied territory. Civilians and
refugees fail into the broadly defined category of
protected persons under the GC.
It is important to keep in mind that protected per-
sons, even those who might be detained by you, are not
EPWs. They must be treated differently and kept
segregated from EPWs. The rights and protections af-
forded EPWs and protected persons, as well as those
control and disciplinary measures that may be used
against them, are different. Appendix D provides GWS,
GPW, and GC provisions for protecting persons rights.
INTERROGATOR SUPPORTED OPERATIONS
Combat operations which the tactical interrogator
supports are discussed below. No matter what the
operation is called, it is still incumbent upon the inter-
rogator to gain critical combat information in support
of that operation. The interrogator plays a key role to
ensure the combat operation is a success,
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
Successful offensive operations demand imagination,
thorough coordination, and skilled execution. These
operations are characterized by—
@ Agpressiveness.
® Initiative.
® Rapid shifts in the main effort to take advantage of
opportunities.
@ Momentum.
® Deep and rapid destruction of enemy forces.
Offenses should move fast, follow successful probes
through gaps in the enemy defenses, and shift strength
quickly to widen penetrations and reinforce successes to
carry the battle deep into the enemy rear operations.
They should destroy or control the forces or areas criti-
cal to the enemy’s overall defensive organization before
the enemy can react.
In the offense, certain principles are essential to bat-
tlefield success:
® Knowing the battlefield.
2-18
@ Denying the enemy intelligence.
® Disrupting and destroying enemy command, con-
trol, communications, and intelligence (CD.
@ Maintaining operational integrity.
Interrogation provides a high percentage of informa-
tion on the enemy and terrain which, along with
weather, are the key elements in knowing the bat-
tlefield.
Movement to Contact
Movement to contact is a tactical operation to find
and engage the enemy. The force is organized to hold
the bulk of its combat power in the main body. It moves
aggressively toward the enemy, making maximum use of
IEW resources to find the enemy before the enemy
detects the friendly force.
When contact is made, combat information and intel-
ligence determine where and with what force to attack
and overcome enemy resistance. Interrogation is an im-
portant source of that information.
In a movement to contact, the friendly force may en-
counter an enemy defending or moving to contact.
Once contact is made, the action must be resolved
quickly if the movement to contact operation is to con-
tinue. This is normally done by a hasty attack launched
as quickly as possible with whatever assets are on hand.
No time is available for detailed IPB and analysis, other
than what has been done prior to movement to contact.
The analyst quickly updates the intelligence analysis for
as quickly as possible with whatever assets are on hand.
No time is available for detailed IPB and analysis, other
than what has been done prior to movement to contact.
The analyst quickly updates the intelligence analysis for
the commander and continues the update as the attack
progresses.
TEW resources look deep to determine second-
echelon vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities form the
basis for friendly offensive action, particularly deep in-
terdiction.
While continuing to look deep, IEW resources also
support close operations directly. They continue to be
sensitive to enemy vulnerabilities which would bring
maximum friendly success when exploited. Where pos-
sible, IE'W resources support deception operations.
in the movement to contact, interrogators should be
deployed forward to interrogate EPWs as well as in-
digenous personnel, particularly refugees, to determine
as much as possible about the enemy and terrain which
lies in the path of the advancing force.
Meeting Engagement
The meeting engagement may be the result of move-
ment to contact. It occurs when a moving force, incom-
pletely deployed for battle, engages an enemy force
about which it has inadequate intelligence. Once con-
tact is made, electronic countermeasures (ECM) are
employed against enemy key C and electronic guidance
systenis.
All available collection resources deploy to determine
the size, composition, disposition, capabilities, and in-
tentions of the enemy force. They immediately report
critical information, such as the location of assailable
flanks and other enemy vulnerabilities, to the force
commander. The commander needs this information
quickly to decide whether to bypass, attack, or defend
against the enemy.
Meeting engagement battles can be avoided if IEW
resources are effectively integrated and used. If intel-
ligence is effective, the commander can prepare for bat-
tle before encountering the enemy force.
Hasty and Deliberate Attacks
In hasty and deliberate attacks, JEW tasks are virtual-
ly the same. MI resources determine as much informa-
tion as possible about the enemy’s defensive posture.
Key information determined by IEW assets includes—
® How the enemy’s defense is organized.
FM 34-52
@ Where enemy reserve and counterattack forces are
located, and when they move.
® What NBC weapons systems the enemy has, and
where they are located.
@ Where the enemy’s conventional artillery is lo-
cated,
@ Where enemy radio electronic combat (REC) as-
sets are located.
In a hasty attack, the need for rapid collection of com-
bat information is critical. In such an attack it may be
advantageous to deploy interrogation teams down to
battalion level to operate in a similar manner as in the
movement to contact.
In the deliberate attack, intelligence on the enemy is
more complete, and interrogation support may not be
provided below brigade. However, planning for a
deliberate attack should task organize interrogation as-
seis to satisfy the greatest need.
For example, a committed brigade that conducts the
main attack receives the support of two interrogation
teams; a brigade in a supporting attack receives only one
team; and a brigade in reserve receives no interrogation
support.
Exploliation and Pursull
Commanders planning offensive operations must be
prepared to conduct exploitation and pursuit actions.
Without prior detailed planning for these contingencies,
fleeting opportunities to press a successful attack to
completion may be missed. [EW resources, particularly
MI assets, play an important part in planning for and ex-
ecuting exploitation and pursuit missions.
IPB is critical and helps identify enemy vul-
nerabilitics. Intelligence supports targeting by identify-
ing, locating, and tracking enemy forces which may
move to counter exploitation forces.
After the initial assault, MI assets determine the in-
tegrity of enemy defenses. They locate gaps, holes, and
weak spots that may be exploited. They determine if the
enemy intends to defend in place, delay, or withdraw to
subsequent defensive positions. ECM are maximized to
increase enemy force confusion.
Reconnaissance in Force
A reconnaissance in force (RIF) is a limited objective
operation by a substantial force to obtain information
and to determine enemy dispositions and strengths.
2-19
FM 34-52
The RIF also tests enemy reactions to friendly force ac-
tion, Enemy reactions may reveal major defensive
weaknesses which could be exploited.
Even when using RIF to gain information, com-
manders executing it must be alert to seize an oppor-
tunity to exploit tactical success. If the enemy situation
must be developed across a broad front, a RIF may
probe the enemy at selected points.
Recognizing that RIF is primarily an information-
gathering operation, commanders must carefully con-
sider the risks involved. Precise plans must be made in
advance to extricate the force or to exploit success.
In many respects, MI RIF support is like movement
to contact. Interrogation support is critical since EP Ws
will be an important source of the information the RIF
seeks. Interrogation support, described in movement to
contact, may be the most efficient means of supporting
the RIF.
River Crossing
River-crossing operations are an integral part of land
warfare. The objective of any river-crossing operation is
to project combat power across a water obstacle while
ensuring the integrity and momentum of the force. Be-
cause the modern battlefield is so lethal, and small
enemy units can be destructive, crossings must be quick
and undetected. Therefore, it is essential that rivers be
crossed in stride as a continuation of operations.
MI units contribute to the planning and execution
phases of river-crossing operations:
@ IPB enables the commander to select the best
crossing site and know the battlefield beyond, so
operations can be sustained without interruption.
@ JEW forces deploy forward and continue seeking
enemy weaknesses for exploitation, and to warn of
enemy forces capable of affecting the operation.
® Other elements guard the flanks to prevent enemy
surprise.
® MI resources further help the commander know
the battlefield and guard against a surprise attack
by identifying, locating, and tracking enemy NBC-
capable delivery systems.
Based on the picture of the battlefield drawn by the
G2 as a result of IPB, the commander decides whether
the crossing will be—
@ Hasty or deliberate,
2-20
® Day or night.
@ Wide or narrow on the front.
MI units normally are not part of the assault force;
however, GSR teams may accompany the assault force if
surveillance of enemy approaches to the exit bank can-
not be conducted from the entry bank. Additionally, in-
terrogators should be included in the assault force if
immediate EPW exploitation is deemed critical to
developing intelligence on the exit-bank battlefield.
Evacuation of EPWs back over the crossing site to a
support area collecting point normally will be delayed.
This is due to the need to get the maximum amount of
force across the river in the shortest time. Two-way
traffic in the early stages of the crossing may be
precluded.
A forward collecting point on the exit-bank side of
the river may be established immediately behind the as-
sault force, and interrogations can be conducted to ob-
tain information critical to the immediate situation. To
accomplish this, organization of interrogation assets as
outlined under movement to contact may be employed.
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
Defensive operations can retain ground, deny the
enemy access to an area, and damage or destroy attack-
ing forces. They cannot, however, win the battle by im-
posing the will of the commander on the enemy. For
this reason, the defense is a temporary expedient, under-
taken only when it is impossible to conduct offensive
operations, or when attacking in another area. All
defensive actions are undertaken in anticipation of ul-
timately resuming the offense.
Commanders plan the overall defensive effort on the
basis of the METT-T. Ml assets are allocated within the
elements of the organizational framework to support
the overall scheme. The IEW principles for supporting
offensive operations apply to the defense, as well as to
other operations. Interrogation support to defensive
operations, likewise, is basically the same as that
provided to offensive operations. Listed below are im-
portant factors to consider in defensive operations:
@ The primary focus of intelligence requirements is
on which enemy will attack and when, where, and
how they intend to do it.
@ The decentralized, fluid nature of the covering
force battle requires interrogation support at the
lowest possible echelon. This requires DS inter-
rogation teams from the division MI battalion and
the MI brigade (Corps). Questioning of civilians
and EP Ws is brief and is conducted to obtain infor-
mation of immediate tactical value. Interrogators
gather information about the identification, com-
position, disposition and direction of movement,
strength, and capabilities of enemy forces involved
in the immediate covering force battle.
@ More interrogation support is required at corps.
The enemy has the initiative, and will probably
conduct operations in the friendly rear area.
Support of defense operations requires the closest
management of interrogation assets, The necessity to
FM 34-52
support the covering force must be balanced against the
increased corps rear operations support. The increased
emphasis on rear operations may mean fewer corps in-
terrogation assets available to support division.
The G2, in coordination with the MI unit com-
mander, may determine that an echelon between the
covering force and corps will not be supported. For ex-
ample, EPWs may be interrogated by DS interrogators
supporting the covering force, and then be evacuated
back to division, bypassing brigade. Additionally, the
five-member DS team, which provides flexibility, may
have to be reduced to two or three interrogators. Table
2-2 shows interrogation support in LIC.
Table 2-2. interrogation support in LIC.
INSURGENCY
| @ Interrogate EP Ws and detainees.
@ Exploit CEDs.
@ Provide PSYOP linguistic support.
® Train insurgent combatants in interrogation tech-
niques.
COMBATTING TERRORISM
e@ Provide PSYOP linguistic support directed against
terrorisis.
® Provide CA linguistic support.
@ Provide linguistic support for Haison with military
or paramilitary HQ.
® Provide linguistic support during PW exchanges.
@ Debrief members of US peacekeeping forces for
intelligence purposes.
COUNTERINSURGENCY
® Interrogate EPWs and detainees.
Exploit CEDs.
e Train HN forces in interrogation techniques.
® Provide linguistic support to other US forces ,
advisors, and trainers.
Provide PSYOP linguistic support.
® Provide CA linguistic support.
®
In counter-drug operations-—
—Train HN personnel in interrogation
techniques.
—Exploit and analyze drug-related
documents,
PEACETIME AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
@ Provide PSYOP linguistic support.
@ Debrief knowledgeable civilians being
evacuated from danger zones during NEO.
@ Support counter-drug operations by—
—Training HN personnel in interroga-
tion techniques.
Exploiting and analyzing narcotics-
related documents.
221
FM 34-52
THEATER INTERROGATION FACILITY
The EAC interrogation facility will normally be desig-
nated as the TIF. A TIF is staffed by US Ammy inter-
rogators and analysts, with support from Air Force,
Navy, Marine Corps, and other US national agencies as
required. in a multinational operation, a combined in-
terrogation facility may be established with allied inter-
rogator augmentation. In addition to conventional
theater Army operations, a TIF may be established to
support a joint or unified command to meet theater re-
quirements during crisis or contingency deployments.
MI battalion companies, MI brigade (EAC) provide
US Army interrogation support to the EAC TIF. The
mission of the TIF is to—
® Establish liaison with host nation (HN) com-
manders to achieve critical intelligence informa-
tion in response to theater and national level
intelligence collection requirements,
@ Ensure communication between HN and US
military TIF commanders, and establish rapport
with HIN interrogation activities.
@ Coordinate for national level collection require-
ments.
® Interrogate PWs, high-level political and military
personnel, civilian internees, defectors, refugees,
and displaced persons.
® Participate in debriefings of US and allied person-
nel who have escaped after being captured, or who
have evaded capture,
@ Translate and exploit selected CEDs.
® Assist in technical support activity (TSA) opera-
tions (see FM 34-5(S)).
The MI battalion (I&E) has an HHC for C°, and
three interrogation companies, of which one is Active
Component (AC) and the other two are RC. The com-
panics consist of two MI companies, IKE (EPW sup-
port) and one MI company, I&E (GS-EAC).
The two MI companies support EPW compound
operations. Their elements are primarily for GS at
EAC, but may be deployed for DS at corps and division.
The MI company (I&E) (GS-EAC) provides priority in-
terrogation and DOCEX support to corps and divisions,
to the TIF, and to temporary EPW compounds as re-
quired,
2-22
A TIF is organized into a headquarters section,
operations section, and two interrogation and DOCEX
sections. It will normally have an attached TSA section
from Operations Group, and a liaison team from the
Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (ICMEC).
The JCMEC liaison team assists in exploiting sources
who have knowledge of captured enemy weapons and
equipment.
The headquarters section provides all command, ad-
ministrative, logistical, and maintenance support to the
TIF. It coordinates with—
® Commander, MI Battalion (I&E) for personnel
status, administrative support, and logistical sup-
port prior to deployment.
® Battalion S3 for deployment of interrogation as-
sets.
@ Theater J2 for reporting procedures, operational
situation update, and theater and national level in-
telligence requirements.
@ Provost marshal for location of theater EPW
camps, and for procedures to be followed by inter-
rogators and MP for processing, interrogating, and
internment.
® Commanders of theater medical support units and
interament facility for procedures to treat, and
clear for questioning, wounded EPWs.
@ Commander, CI company, for CI requirements and
joint interrogation and CI procedures.
OPERATIONS SECTION
This section (where ideally the officer in charge [OIC]
has the 3Q additional skill identifier) is organized into
the operations, OB, and communications elements. The
operations section—
@ Designates work areas for all TIF elements.
@ Establishes and maintains TIF functional files.
® Establishes interrogation priorities.
@ Maintains a daily log and journal.
@ Disseminates incoming and outgoing distribution.
&
Conducts liaison with local officials, adjacent and
subordinate intelligence activities, CI, MP,
PSYOP, the JCMEC, Plans and Policy Directorate
(15), and provost marshal.
@ Conducts coordination with holding area OIC or
enclosure commander for screening site, medical
support, access, movement, and evacuation proce-
dures for EP Ws.
Conducts operations briefings when required.
Manages screening operations.
Manages EPW access for intelligence collection.
Assigns control numbers (see DIAM 58-13).
e®6e¢ © @® @
Supervises all intelligence collection activities
within the TIF.
OB ELEMENT
This element-—
® Obtains the initial data base and updates and
maintains it.
@ Establishes and maintains OB workbooks and files
to include data generated by intelligence informa-
tion which has not been verified.
@ Maintains STUMAPs displaying enemy and friendly
situation.
® Catalogs, cross-references, and disseminates col-
lection requirements to TIF collection elements.
@ Reviews INTREPs for inclusion into data base.
@ Conducts OB briefings when required.
OTHER MI ELEMENTS
Collection missions are tailored and assigned by the
CM&D section subordinate to the G2 at corps and
division. The same functions are performed at brigade
and battalion by the battlefield information control cen-
ter (BICC). These elements must ensure the assigned
collection mission is passed by secure means, through
established channels, to the interrogation element.
If interrogators are deployed in a GS role, the CM&D
section will pass its interrogator taskings to the MI bat-
talion TOC. If interrogators are deployed in a DS role,
they will receive taskings directly from the BICC.
The CM&D section (through the MI battalion TOC)
or the BICC must maintain close contact with the inter-
rogation element. This contact allows a two-way flow of
communication.
The CM&D or BICC element needs the contact to
accomplish the preceding three steps. They also use the
contact to revise the interrogation element’s collection
FM 34-52
mission as required. The interrogation element re-
quires the contact to ensure it receives current guidance,
direction, and assistance in solving collection problems.
ALL SOURCE ANALYSIS SYSTEM (ASAS)
This system provides assistance to the J2, G2, or G3
and MI unit commanders who collect and analyze intel-
ligence and perform CI and EW functions. The follow-
ing elements feed into the ASAS.
imagery ExploHation
Interrogators should maintain close contact with im-
agery exploitation elements. Interrogators may be re-
quired to identify items on air photographs and should
report information of interest to the imagery analysis.
Imagery analysts can aid interrogation personnel by fur-
nishing photographs for use in connection with inter-
rogation and by verifying leads originally obtained
through interrogation.
TECHINT Personnel
Normally, interrogation elements coordinate with the
TECHINT sections of the RC battalion (TE). The
TECHINT section, and its field teams, furnishes
guidance and requirements to the interrogation ele-
ments through questionnaires and interrogation guides.
These are valuable aids to the interrogator in obtaining
specific TECHINT information.
Interrogators notify the nearest TECHINT personnel
io obtain detailed technical information and guidance.
At tactical levels, this is the exception rather than the
rule, but it may be necessary when information is of im-
mediate tactical value.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
Coordination between CI and interrogation elements
is always necessary. This coordination is effected con-
tinuously, directly or indirectly, and at the discretion of
the intelligence officer. CI elements are active in the
security screening of refugees and civilians in the com-
bat zone.
Cl personnel and interrogators must work together to
ensure proper interrogation of enemy civilians or per-
sonnel speaking the enemy’s language. Interrogator
personnel can further assist the C] effort by—
@ Furnishing leads on suspected enemy agents and
intelligence personnel.
® Informing CI elements concerning enemy person-
nel dressed in other than enemy uniforms.
2-23
FM 34-52
@ Referring to CI elements, or making available to
them for interrogation, all EP'Ws and other sources
of Ci interest. CI personnel are trained for imter-
rogation in cases of suspected espionage, sabotage,
or subversion. Their knowledge of the CI situation
(to include hostile intelligence activities) enhances
full exploitation of appropriate sources.
MILITARY POLICE
The corps MP commander operates the corps EPW
holding area and provides escort guard support to
divisions for EPW evacuation in routine or medical
channels. EPWs are evacuated from the corps holding
area to the next higher echelon with the least possible
delay. ;
The MP commander also arranges and coordinates
transportation requirements to include rations and
water, if required, for the movement to include number
of vehicles, railroad or passenger cars, or aircraft with
the time and place of departure.
Expeditious EPW evacuation is provided by the prior
dispatch of escort guards to establish a ready reserve at
the supported divisions. This reserve evacuation
capability is maintained by sending additional escort
guards on a continuing or as required basis. These
guards may also be attached to EPW and processing
reception camps as needed.
EPW administrative processing is done by MP PW
processing units. Processing includes personnel record
preparation, fingerprint and identity cards (if needed),
and internment serial number assignment.
PSYOP
Normally, interrogation elements coordinate with
PSYOP elements to obtain information concerning the
motivational factors and cultural value systems of the
individuals to be interrogated.
PSYOP units, as a part of their normal operations,
develop detailed analysis concerning psychological and
cultural factors of friendly and hostile elements in the
AO. Such information will help interrogation person-
nel to understand the source’s attitude, value system,
and perception; it will also help to obtain information
more rapidly, and at the same time, PSYOP information
on current conditions in enemy country or among
enemy forces. A PSYOP PIR would be established to
cover this requirement.
SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
Successful interrogation operations require support
from elements within their echelon of assignment, in-
cluding all major staff organizations. These elements
are collectively responsible for the planning that creates
the overall environment for interrogators. The intel-
ligence staff's (J2, G2, or $2) direct contribution to in-
terrogation operations has already been discussed. Its
general responsibilities are outlined below, along with
those of other staff and support elements.
PERSONNEL (G1 AND $1)
The G1 and S1 are responsible for—
@ Supervising the medical support furnished to sour-
ces.
® Maintaining a list (oy language and proficiency) of
qualified linguists within their command.
@ Coordinating with the G5 for procurement and
payment of other interpreters and translators
needed to perform intelligence and nonintel-
ligence duties.
The Gi and S1 ensure the echelon’s operations plan
(OPLAN) contains complete provisions for source han-
aed
diing and evacuation. This plan must satisfy the inter-
ests of all other staff officers and provide for—-
® Humane treatment of all sources,
® Prompt evacuation from the combat zone.
® Opportifilties to interrogate sources.
@ “Integration of procedures for the evacuation, con-
trol, and administration of sources with other CS
and CSS operations (through the provost mar-
shal).
@ Training for all troops on the provisions of inter-
national agreements and regulations relating to
sources.
@ Ensuring delivery of EPW and detainee mail.
@ Maintaining EPW and detainee statistics.
@ Administration and control of EPW currency and
pay records, to include coordination with ap-
propriate intelligence authorities about investiga-
tion of large sums of money.
INTELLIGENCE (J2, G2, AND $2)
The J2, G2, and $2 are responsible for supervising ap-
propriate censorship activities relating to sources. They
aiso-—
@ Coordinate with the G3 to ensure plans for inter-
rogation, CI, PSYOP, and CA operations are in-
cluded in unit training plans and OPLANs.
@ Draft instructions for MI handling, evacuating, and
exploiting captured enemy personnel and CEDs.
(They coordinate with the G3 to ensure draft in-
structions are included in the command SOP,
OPLANSs, and supplementary orders.)
® Project source capture flows.
® Determine the number of interpreters and trans-
lators needed to perform intelligence duties.
® Control the procedures used to process and grant
clearances to the interpreters and translators who
need them.
@ Coordinate with GS on screening of non-suspect
local nationals and displaced persons.
OPERATIONS (G3 AND $3)
The G3 and $3 are responsible for operations, plans,
FM 34-52
® Evaluate, in coordination with the G2 and G5,
enemy PYSOP efforts and effectiveness of friendly
PSYOFP on target groups.
SUPBLY (G4 AND 34)
The G4 and S4 are responsible for storing and main-
taining supplies and equipment needed by subordinate
units to conduct source handling operations, as well as
delivering them to subordinate units as they are needed.
The G4 and S4 also supervise—
® Command policy for evacuation and internment of
captured enemy personnel, and evacuation and
safekeeping of CEM and CEDs.
® Real estate acquisition and construction of source
holding area facilities.
®@ Collection and distribution of captured enemy sup-
plies. (This is coordinated with the intelligence
and operations staffs.)
@ Procurement and distribution of rations 10 source
holding areas. (Captured enemy rations will be
used when possible.)
® EPW and detainee transportation.
@ Determination of requirements for use of source
organization, and training. Where MP assets are not labor for the logistical support needed in source
available, or insufficient, they are responsible for ob- handling operations.
taining, organizing, and supervising employment of ad- @ Logistical support to interpreter personnel.
ditional personnel as guards. The G3 and S3—
® Prepare, coordinate, and publish the command
SOP, OPLANs, and supplementary orders. This
includes instructions for handling, evacuating, and
exploiting captured enemy personnel and CEDs,
which are drafted by the G2.
® Incorporate interrogation operations into future
plans and operations.
® Ensure subordinate units are trained in proper
handling and evacuation of captured enemy per-
sonnel, captured enemy materiel (CEM), and
CEDs.
® Train guard personnel.
® Provide G2 and S2 with details of planned opera-
tions.
® Plan and supervise all PSYOP activities in support
of tactical operations.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS (GS AND $5)
The G5 and $5 are responsible for CA. They—
® Advise, assist, and make recommendations that re-
tate to civil-military operations (CMO) and CA
aspects of current or proposed operations.
@ Prepare estimates and conduct studies and
analyses for CMO activities.
@ Prepare the portions of operations, administrative,
and logistics plans and orders for CMO activities.
@ Determine requirements for resources to ac-
complish command CMO activities, including CA
units and personnel.
@ Coordinate with local US government, G1 and $1
representatives, and HN armed forces for procur-
ing native linguists for interpreter support.
@ Recommend command policy on obligations be-
tween civil and military authorities; on the AO
2°25
FM 34-52
population; and on the works and activities arising
from treaties, agreements, international law, and
US policy.
® Provide civil support for tactical and CSS opera-
tions and prevent civilian interference with these
operations.
@ Coordinate military support of populace and
resource control programs.
@ Provide technical advice and assistance in reorien-
tation of sources and enemy defectors.
® Coordinate MI aspects of CMO activities with the
G2 or $2.
ADDITIONAL SUPPORT
Besides the major staff elements, an interrogation
element requires support from several other elements in
order to conduct operations. These elements are dis-
cussed below.
Communications
Secure, reliable communication must be available at
or near the interrogation element’s deployment site.
Priority access to these communications must be ar-
ranged to support contact with collection management.
Staff Judge Advocate
This element can provide legal support and advice on
the interpretation and application of international
regulations and agreements about handling sources. It
is also a channei for reporting known or suspected war
crimes.
tlealth Service Support
This element must clear all sick and wounded sources
before they can be interrogated. Seriously sick or
wounded sources are evacuated through medical chan-
nels. If adequate facilities are not available in EPW
hospitals, EPWs are admitted to military or civilian
medical facilities where treatment can be obtained.
Each EPW is medically examined and weighed at
least once a month. Provisions are made for the isola-
tion of communicable cases, disinfection, and inocula-
tions. Retained medical personnel and EPWs with
medical training are used to care for their own sick and
wounded,
2-26
NBC Protection
All EPWs will be provided NBC protection. If EP Ws
do not have their own NBC protection equipment, or
their equipment is not usable, the detaining forces must
provide them with proper NBC gear.
Chaplain Support
The unit ministry team, consisting of the chaplain and
chaplain assistant, provides religious support. The team
coordinates with the G3 and $5 to provide religious
support for refugees, displaced persons, and indigenous
civilians. It provides services for EPWs or assists
detained clergy of enemy forces and other detained cler-
gy. The team provides burial rites according to the
religious rites of combatants. Religious preference of
EPWs will be obtained from DA Form 4237-R
(Detainee Personnel Record) (see Chapter 3).
inspector General
This element is a channel for reporting known or
suspected war crimes.
Public Affairs officer
The public affairs officer advises and informs the
commander of public affairs impact inherent in planned
or implemented EP W operations.
Engineer Officer
The engineer officer assists in planning the construc-
tion of EPW enclosures. He also assists the G2 and $2
in developing obstacle intelligence (OBSTINTEL)
during the IPB. OBSTINTEL requirements are
reflected in the PIR and IR. Much of the IR is technical
in nature and warrants direct coordination with the in-
terrogator to ensure the right questions are asked.
Through the J2, G2, and S2, he will also analyze the in-
formation collected and its impact on the maneuver and
engineer plan.
Miltary Band Unit
At division and corps, the band may augment the MP
by providing security at central collecting points and
corps holding areas.
FM 34-52
CHAPTER 3
THE INTERROGATION PROCESS
Criteria for selecting personnel to be interrogated
vary with the—
@ Commander’s collection requirements.
® Time limitations.
@ Number and types of potential sources available.
@ Exact circumstances surrounding the employment
of US Forces.
In this regard, source selection is important in
conducting interrogation at tactical echelons of
command because of the proximity to enemy ele-
ments, number and conditions of detainees, and
time restrictions.
The interrogation process involves screening of sources
for interrogation and the use of interrogation techni-
ques and procedures. Screening and interrogation in-
volve complex interpersonal skills, and many aspects of
their performance are subjective. Each screening and
interrogation is unique because of the interaction be-
tween the interrogator and the source.
The five interrogation phases—planning and prepara-
tion, approach, questioning, termination, and report-
ing—are discussed later in this chapter.
COLLECTION PRIORITY
Interrogators are wained to exploit sources and
CEDs. This allows the all-source collection manager
three exploitation options for interrogation assets:
They may exploit sources alone, exploit CEDs, or ex-
ploit both simultaneously.
In the past, it was assumed interrogators could ac-
complish the dual collection mission no matter what
type of combat operations were being supported. This
may no longer be true. Unit staffing, coupled with the
amount of CEDs and sources, may prevent exploitation
of sources and CEDs simultaneously.
The density of interrogation assets and command em-
phasis on the collection effort determine mission re-
quirements. The feasibility of a dual collection mission
may also be the result of initial IPB by the commander’s
intelligence staff. If an echelon cannot conduct a dual
collection effort, interrogating sources receives the
priority for two reasons:
@ The greater intelligence potential of a source.
@ The rate at which people forget detailed informa-
tion.
An individual's value system is easier to bypass imme-
diately after undergoing a significant traumatic ex-
perience. The circumstances of capture are traumatic
for most sources. Many former PWs indicated extreme
disorientation immediately after capture. Capture
thrusts them into a foreign environment over which they
have no control. Their mores were of no use to them
during this period. Most of them survived this phase by
clinging to very basic values (love of family and loyalty
to friends or comrades).
Since humans are adaptable, this initial vulnerability
passes quickly. An individual’s established values begin
to assert themselves again within a day or two. When
this happens, much of an individual's susceptibility to
interrogation is gone.
Memory stores information in two areas: short-term
and long-term memory. The five senses constantly
transmit information to the brain’s short-term memory
temporarily and then shifts to the brain’s long-term
memory. The time at which this transfer takes place
varies, but research shows a great amount of detail is
lost during that transfer. The percentage of information
lost beyond recall varies from study to study, but 70 per-
cent is a conservative estimate.
Much of the information of value to the interrogator
is information the source is not aware he has. Although
no research data is available in this area, it is likely this
type of information will be lost quickly.
CEDs, while not affected by memory loss, are often
time-sensitive and thus are screened quickly for possibie
exploitation (see Chapter 4).
The supported echelon’s intelligence officer deter-
mines the guidelines for priority of exploitation. The
commander’s intelligence needs and the J2’s, G2’s, or
$2’s estimate of the enermy’s intentions dictate the ex-
tent to which these guidelines can be applied. Expicita-
tion priorities are reviewed and changed when needed.
3-1
FM 34-52
SCREENING
Screening is the selection of sources for interrogation.
It must be conducted at every echelon to—
® Determine source
knowledgeability.
cooperativeness and
@ Determine which sources can best satisfy the
commander’s PIR and IR in a timely manner.
PREPARE TO CONDUCT SCREENINGS
Screeners should obtain a copy of the element’s over-
all objective statement from the PIR, IR, and SIR and
become familiar with the intelligence indicators listed
there. Screeners must use their experience and imagina-
tion to devise ways to identify EPWs and detainees who
might possess information pertinent to these indicators.
For example, one group of indicators may concern
new enemy units moving along a specific avenue of ap-
proach. In this case, a screener may want to concentrate
first on screening EPWs and detainees captured near
that location. When he questions those EPWs or
detainees, the screener might try to determine what
units are due to arrive in that area in the near future,
The ability to recognize branch of service and rank in-
signia can be of great assistance to screeners.
Screeners coordinate with MP holding area guards on
their role in the screening process. The guards are told
where the screening will take place, how EPWs and
detainees are to be brought there from the holding area,
and what types of behavior on their part will facilitate
the screenings.
DOCUMENT SCREENING
If time permits, screeners should go to the holding
area and examine all available documents pertaining to
the EPWs and detainees. They should look for signs
that certain EPWs and detainees are willing, or can be
induced, to cooperate with the interrogator. Previous
screening and interrogation reports and EPW personnel
records are important.
interrogation reports identify EPWs and detainees
who have been cooperative in the past. Prior screening
reports indicate EPWs and detainees who appear
cooperative. During EPW inprocessing, MPs prepare a
DA Form 4237-R, which is prescribed by AR 190-8. A
sample is shown at Figure 3-1. DA Form 4237-R con-
tains additional information not required by the GWS,
GPW, and GC, but which the EPWs and detainees may
have volunteered during inprocessing. The volunteer-
3-2
ing of information is one indicator of EPW’s or
detainee’s cooperation.
When examining documents, screeners should iden-
uly topics on which EP'Ws and detainees have pertinent
information. Screeners should make a note of any
documents captured with specific EPWs and detainees
that may contain indications of pertinent knowledge
and potential cooperation.
PERSONNEL SCREENING
If time permits, screeners should question holding
area personnel about the EPWs and detainees. Since
these personnel are in almost constant contact with the
EPWs and detainees, their descriptions of specific ones
can help identify sources who might answer the sup-
ported commander’s PIR and IR.
Screeners should identify and note those EPWs and
detainees whose appearance and behavior indicate they
are willing to cooperate immediately or are unlikely to
cooperate ever. Unless time is critically short, screeners
should-—-
@ Personally observe the EP Ws and detainees.
® Pay attention to rank and branch of service insig-
nias, and condition of uniform and equipment.
@ Carefully observe the behavior demonstrated by
other EP Ws and detainees.
® Look for things like attempts tc talk to the guards,
intentional placement in the wrong segregation
group, Of any overt signs of nervousness, anxiety,
or fright.
@ Note any EPW or detainee whose appearance or
behavior indicates willingness to talk.
Ci SCREENING
Before initiating the screening process, the inter-
rogator establishes liaison with supporting Ci agents.
The CI element, through the CM&D, provides PIR of
Cl interest. During the screening process, interrogators
identify sources of Cl interest. After these sources have
been interrogated for any information of immediate tac-
tical value (as needed), they are turned over to Cl. Clis
interested in sources who——
® Have no identification documents.
@ Have excessive or modified identification docu-
ments.
FM 34-52
DETAINEE PERSONNEL RECORD
Far uss of thie form, vee AR 1908, whe prapansnt egency ke OD CSPE FR,
PART bt - TO BE COMPLETED AT TIME OF PROCESSING
1. INTERNMENT SERIAL NO. (1-54)
3. MAME (last, frat, middle) (14-04) BS. RANK 196-97)
GARD! US-1501-23176
CH'OE, HYON-SIK , SRSGT
& ENEMY SVC NO, (28-46) &, TYPE (7) 6, DATE OF CAPTURE (48-53)
7. DATE OF SIATH (54-59)
611642 REG 8 OCT $9
24 FEB 77
@. NATIONALITY (60-62) (9. EQUICATION (6231 10. RELIGION (63 645/11, MARSTA (65) [12 MW CAMP WIC (66-71 13, PW PROCESS DATE
ear . _ {32-77}
KOREAN (DPRK) |combulsory| None Single |US-AA3CU 3 G2?
CARD IG 34, SEX fla) 15. LANGUAGE 1 (75-148) 16. LANGUAGE f aie
(Kevpuncher wal pick | Mf KOREAN KOREAN
neni AICI d BRAKE)
17. PrYSICAL CONDITION (79) 18. PW CAMP LOCATION {20 223 19. ENEMY UNIT (23-34)
Good AB654321 3BN, 34REGT, 17INF DIV.
20. ARM OF SVC (95) 21, MOS (36-49) 22. CIVILIAN OCCUPATION (30.45) 123. UIC-CAPTURE UNIT (46-57)
Army TIACINF) FARMER US-ARA7DD
24, COMPS AREA OF CAPTURE (52) 125. PLACE OF CAPTURE 26, POWER SEAVED 27. PLACE GF QIATH
IV AB123456 DPRK KAESONG
28. ADDRESS TO WHICM MAIL FOR Pw MAY BE SENT 29. PATHE A/STEPFATHER
3 DONG 35 BAN CH'OE, KANG-T'AE
KAESONG, 30. MOTHER'S MAIDEN NAME
= “
DPRK =< YI, NYONG-CHA
33. PERMANEAT HOME ADDAESS OF PW d2. NAME, GS, AND RETATIONSHI
INF OR MARS
See Item 28. ee <—o and 30.
33. OTHER PARTICULARS FROM iD CAAaD.
HT - 1.70 meters HAIR ~ Black
WI ~ 65 Kilos EYES - Brows
3S. IMPOUROEG PERSONAL EFFECTS AND a oe
>
== = Se ~
26 WON = a
+
y 4
H
=
=,
THE ABOVE LIST OF wrouncte ITEMS t§ CORRECT eon \de, fad =< we
(Sogeunslhe of Petaage)
36. REMARKS 37. PHOTO
None.
PHOTO PHOTO
(Frant View} {Rilghe Profile)
38, PREPARED BY sIndividual and unit)
39, SIGMA RE
SFC D.C. SMITH, 17th MP Co. SFC S.C Lk
4G. GATE PREPARED #1, PLACE
8 Oct 99 29th INF DIV REAR INTERNMENT FACILITY
DA FORM 4237-8, Aug 85 EDITION GF MAY 82 1S OBSOLETE \,
Figure 3-1. DA Form 4237-R (Detainee Personnel Record) (front).
PM 34-52
PAATH — TORE MAINTAINED BY UNIT HAWING CUSTAOY
Ade LAST Mame b. FIRS’ NAMES
CH' OF HYON-SiK
43, iINTEANMENT SERIAL NUMBER
U5-1501~23176
aa, MEDICAL RECORD
a. JIMUNIZ ATION (Vaccinations and innoculahions with Dates?
Smallpox ~ 15 APR 98
b. MAIOR ILLNESSES ANC PHYSICAL DEFECTS (With foaira) c. BLOOL GROUP
NONE. B POS
45. INTE RNMENT EMPLOYMENT QUALIFICATIONS
FARMER
48. SERIOUS OFFENSES, PUNISHMENTS, AND ESCAPES (With Dates)
NONE.
a
== te a
ay. TRANSFERS —— =
FROM (Location) nee i DATE
UE
&G, REMAAKS
a, FINANCIAL STATUS AT TIME OF “ MST INTERNATIONAL TAANSFEA :
a. CERTIFICATE OF CREDIT BALANCE ISSUED TO £Pw (Amount? in wore) b AMT IN FIGURES
¢. LOCATION id OATE
a. FINANCIAL STATUS AT TIME OF SECOND INTE ANATIONAL TRANSFER
a. GERTIFICATE OF CREQIT BALANCE ISSUED TO GPW Amount in wordal db AMY IN FIGURES
¢. LOCATION gd Bate
Si. AEP ATRIATION
8. REABON
6. MOOSE 4. DATE
82. FINANCIAL STATUS AT TIME OF REPATRIATION
&. CEATIFICATE OF CREDIT BALANCE ISSUED TO EPWramuuni in words) @. RABAT IN FIGURES
6. LOCATION Is. DATE
REVERSE OP NA FORM o PBT RR, AL BR
Figure 3-1. DA Form 4237-R (Detainee Personnel Record) (reverse).
3-4,
Possess unusually large amounts of cash or valu-
ables.
@ Possess knowledge of critical interest (for example,
nuclear power or chemical plant operations,
weapons test and development).
@ Are illegal border crossers.
@ Attempt to avoid checkpoints.
@ Are on the black, gray, or white list
(FM 34-60A(S)).
@® Request to see CI or US Army Intelligence
personnel.
@ Have family in the denied area.
Screeners should always try to screen cooperative
knowledgeable EP Ws and detainees first. These include
EPWs and detainees identified during the screener’s
review of documents, questioning of holding area per-
sonnel, and their own personal observations. Based on
screener notes and recommendations, they establish the
order which EPWs and detainees will be questioned.
The holding area guards are then told to bring these
EPWs and detainees, in order, to the screening site one
ata time.
A screener must use a screening report to record in-
formation as it is obtained from the source. Figure 3-2
is a format for a screening report. All information
shown is rarely obtained from any one source. The
blocks save the screener as much additional writing as
possible. If PIR, IR, and SIR information is obtained, it
is spot reported in SALUTE format. When this type of
information is obtained during screening, it must be ex-
ploited fully and reported as soon as possible.
FM 34-52
Source screening ends when the screener is sure he
can make an accurate assessment of the source’s poten-
tial cooperation and pertinent knowledge. At this time,
the source is returned to the control of the guards, and
the screener records his assessment on the screening
report,
The assessment is recorded using a screening code.
The screening code is an alphanumeric designation
which reflects the level of cooperation expected from
the source and the level of knowledgeability the source
may possess. Table 3-1 shows the codes for assessing
SOUTCES.
Those sources who have been assigned to the same
category may be interrogated in any order deemed ap-
propriate by the senior interrogator. Category 1A sources
normaily should be the first to be interrogated;
Category 1B, next; followed by those assigned to
categories 2A, 1C, 2B, 3A, 2C, and 3B. Category 3C
sources are normally interrogated last.
This order ensures the highest probability of obtain-
ing the greatest amount of pertinent information within
available time. Screening codes may change with the
echelon. The higher the echelon, the more time is avail-
able to conduct an approach.
Figure 3-3 shows the order in which sources will be
interrogated. The term "screening category” should not
be confused with the categories that are assigned to
EPWs and detainees based on their intelligence value.
There are five interrogation phases which take place
after the screening process.
® Planning and preparation.
Table 3-1. Instructions for assessing sources.
CODE COOPERATION LEVEL
1 Responds to direct questions.
2 Responds hesitantly to questioning.
3 Does not respond to questioning.
KNOWLEDGEABILITY LEVEL
A Very likely to possess PIR information.
B Might have IR information.
Cc Does not appear to have pertinent information.
FM 34-52
3-6
MP NUMBER: EVACUATION DATE:
LNAME (P); AW RA/S o |DATE: __ 7 Aug 97
c LNAME (M): A | TIME: S417
mR | FNAME: HAITHAM PLACE: ZA /23YS5@
S |MNAME: A6DULLAA y fcap unm: /0o/2/3/4 AZE7
O |svcnD no: /234S67 mR | CIRCUMSTANCES: AFTER
n DOB: 24 OCT £0 E FIRE FIG A7
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MARITAL STATUS: M (S) WD A
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BRANCH: AF (AB) CG MC NV PHYSICAL CONDITION: SEX: (M) F
yy | RANK: ALT WOUNDED: Y (WN)
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L Ss
[ $
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T | DUTY PSN: ea EES E [MENTAL CONDITION:
A | JOB: CMAN : EDUCATION = & YRS
2 | STATION: wy INTELLIGENCE: AVG + AVG (AVG—)
SKILLS: SHWARPSHOPTER = {MENTAL STATE: AER VOLS
EXPERIENCE: A SYC 9 Mes. ‘
C Lion. OTUDENT SCREENER: SFC ROYCE
| | one: D | DATE: TIME:
Vv — A | COOPERATION: ({XHigh) 2 3 (low)
L PPUTIgS: A KNOWLEDGE: A (High) (> C (low)
Hf BGW List: Y @ BGw CODE:
A | SKILLS: OG. SOURCE CATEGORY: A B (CG) D
APPROACH: PIRZCi, INCENTIVE
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIREMENT CODES:
E
p M
A
&
R
i K -
Q S
Figure 3-2. Screening report format.
FM 34-62
AMOUNT OF PERTINENT KNOWLEDGE
Least
Mast
PRIORITY
1 u i iv ¥
Tm 1-8 1-6
2-A 2-8 2-6
3-8 3-C
PEXPECTED COOPERATION
eS
>
Least
Figure 3-3. Interrogation priorities by screening category.
® Approach.
@ Questioning.
® Termination.
@ Reporting,
PLANNING AND PREPARATION
Once the senior interrogator has assigned specific
sources to his subordinates, the interrogators develop a
plan for their interrogations. These plans reflect the
supported commander’s PER, IR, and SIR and current
tactical situation. If they do not, subsequent interroga-
tions will not help the element to satisfy its assigned col-
lection mission, and information needed by the
supported unit will be missed.
Each interrogator, where feasible, begins his
preparation by examining the SITMAP, OB data
base, and pertinent information contained in the inter-
rogation element's files.
Screening reports (Figure 3-2) and DA Form 3976
(Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Tag) are excellent
sources of information the interrogator needs.
Figure 3-4 shows a sample of DA Form 5976. There
should be at least one of these documents available on
each EPW and detainee. Additional sources of infor-
mation may be—
@ Documents captured with the EPW or detainee.
® Reports from interrogation elements at previous
echelons.
® DA Form 4237-R (Figure 3-1).
The planning and preparation phase and the ap-
proach phase (discussed later} are interrelated. In the
planning and preparation phase, the interrogator
gathers-—
@ Information on the source’s circumstances of cap-
ture.
@ Comments from others who have been with the
source.
@ Information on the source’s observed behavior and
personal traits.
® Peculiarities from the screening sheet.
This information helps the interrogator develop a
picture of the source and enables him to select ap-
proaches most likely to work.
There are four primary factors that must be con-
sidered when selecting tentative approaches:
@ The source’s mental and physical state. Is the
source injured, angry, crying, arrogant, cocky, or
frightened? If so, how can this state be best ex-
ploited during interrogation.
3-7
FM 34-52
O
O
4. GATE BNO Tate OF CAPTURE
ob ibs 3002 JANG)
RRLXXXIA |
4, | BATE OF Ooh
_STEwAer L.Hoep | 12 MAY S% |
. SERVICE BO :
mar XX KX K- XKK
7 iver Eerw I galD .
$ LOCATON OF CAPTURE Hore conrsmaiea -
“mA 1324
Ban earrune | Cononeeeew | peter Bn
~Nasg Survender| ~ wounded; AR fle ~AKAay
bre hee 7 Ere fe Protective.
~Desay mine iyi pers oe y
a Gee Ot ete.” lm Pop
a DATE Amo TE OF LAPTURE
—tiL3002 TA Fi
XRXXXX1B
a Sate OF MAIN
_Srewser 4. Aoed
SRTRRGE 20
MAL. KKK OK KX
7 wet Orson {Dead 18
IZ MAY Se | _
Brace
3. SATE AMD Teme OF GarTyRE | 2.
LU 3002 TANac.
Siewaer Lb. Heob
Sua, | SERGE WD.
Mae 1832487
10, ESC TON OF WEAPONS,
Ak ATA rie, . Totectioe Me: Me sk, Aik o,
Ped Aouad. 2.62 Gmmudi fies,” "3 fang
NatAI Tea) Gfbae hha, Porsond Faeeré,
ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR (EPW) CAPTURE
fr ot stm A Eat A)
sae of tng form, mea sey Ne Propanant agency is
‘Attach this part of tag lo EPW. (De nat remove f +m EPW.)
Search - For weapons, mihtary docur .enis, or
special equipment. ;
. Silence - Promubet iglung am EPWs for ease
of control. m9 ong
sm
¥
4
9. Segregate - By rank, sax, and aaponatity.
4. Saleguard - To prevent harm or escape.
§ Speed - Evacuate from the combat zone.
8. Tag - Prsaners and documents or spec:al
equipment.
DA FORM 5976, JAN 94
CARD (Part &)
©
Po Mare to Unit
Funit retains for records.)
paysving, wire, or other duraale material to
gach the appropriate section of this form to
the EPW's equisment or property.
DA FORM 5976, JAN 31
DOCUMENTSPECIAL EQUIPMENT!
WEAPONS GARD (Part C)
Atach this part of Gag to EPW's retained property.
{Be not rameve fram property.)
as a minimum, the lag must inckxie the following
saformalor:
~ em 3%, dale and ime of capase.
~ Hem 4, caphaing unit.
~ Hem 9, place of caphwe (grid coordinates).
- Ham 10, cicumsiances of caplure (how ihe
EPW was
OA FORM £975, JAM $1
O
O
Figure 3-4. DA Form 5976 (Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Tag).
®@ The source’s background. What is the source’s age
and ievel of military or civilian experience.
@ The objective of the interrogation. How much
time is available for the interrogation? Is the com-
mander interested only in specific areas (PIR, IR,
SIR)? Is this source knowledgeable enough to re-
quire a full OB interrogation?
® The interrogator himself. What abilities does he
have that can be brought into play? What weak-
nesses does he have that may interfere with the in-
terrogation? Can his personality adapt to the
personality of the source?
The interrogation may require the interrogator con-
duct research to obtain detailed data on a specific
geographic area, political proup, weapons system, or
technical field. In the technical field, TECHINT per-
sonnel assist the interrogator.
‘There are various weapons identification guides to as-
sist the interrogator in identifying any weapons men-
tioned by the source. However, the source should not
be shown this guide until he has thoroughly described
the items, or has drawn a picture of the weapons.
The interrogator may require maps, documents,
recording and photographic equipment, screening
reports, and other aids to facilitate the interrogation.
From these aids, he must select those best suited to ac-
complish the objective, determine their availability, and
arrange for their procurement well in advance of the in-
terrogation. Some aids the interrogator may use are—
@ DA Form 3976.
@ Previous mterrogation reports.
@ Documents found on an EPW or detainee or on
the battlefield.
Maps.
Imagery or aerial photographs.
OB data.
Guards.
CA and PSYOP personnel.
® Informants.
e¢ @ @ 8
@ Physical aids (such as lights, tables, drafting tools).
® Interrogation guides.
FM 34-52
The interrogator must consider in advance obstacles
and limitations which may affect the interrogation.
These obstacles and limitations may include—
® EPW or detainee legal status.
Time and facilities available for interrogation.
The military situation.
Knowledgeability.
Language restrictions.
® Physical condition.
@ Psychological aspects.
@
Other issues which may appear during the course
of the interrogation.
Logistical requirements include—
Billets.
Office space.
Heat.
Light.
Messing and detention facilities.
@® 8 © 8 8 8
Transportation which may be required in support
of the interrogation.
The various staff sections of the supported command
may be called upon to furnish the necessary logistical
items mentioned above. All support requests will be
coordinated with the appropriate staff officer by the
EPW or detainee camp or collecting point commander.
Interrogators should question guards about the sources,
time permitting, as part of preparation. Since the
guards are in constant contact with the sources, they
may be able to provide information on—
Their physical condition.
Demonstrated attitude and behavior.
e
@ Contact made with other guards or sources.
@ How the source has been handled since capture.
®
Hearsay (H/S) information from others who have
handled the source.
@ Confirmation of capture data, especially the cir-
cumstances under which the source was captured.
3-9
FM 34-52
Time permitting, each interrogator should un-
obtrusively observe the source to personally confirm his
identity and to check his personal appearance and be-
havior.
After the interrogator has collected all information
available about his assigned source, he analyzes it. He
looks for indicators of psychological or physical weak-
ness that might make the source susceptible to one or
more approaches, which facilitates his approach
strategy. He also uses the information he collected to
identify the type and level of knowledge possessed by
the source pertinent to the element’s collection mission.
The interrogator uses his estimate of the type and ex-
tent of knowledge possessed by the source to modify the
basic topical sequence of questioning. He selects only
those topics in which he believes the source has per-
tinent knowledge. In this way, the interrogator refines
his element’s overall objective into a set of specific in-
teirogation subjects.
The major topics that can be covered in an interroga-
tion are shown below in their normal sequence. How-
ever, the interrogator is free to modify this sequence as
necessary,
® Missions.
@ Composition.
@ Weapons, equipment, strength.
@ Dispositions.
@ Tactics.
® Training.
@ Combat effectiveness.
® Logistics.
@ Electronic technical data,
® Miscellancous.
As a result of the planning and preparation phase, the
interrogator develops a plan for conducting his assigned
interrogation. He must review this plan with the senior
interrogator, when possible. Whether written or oral,
the interrogation plan must contain at least the follow-
ing items:
@ Interrogation objective.
® EPW’s or detainee’s identity, to include visual ob-
servation of the EPW or detainee by the inter-
rogator.
@ Interrogation time and place.
® Primary and alternate approaches.
@ Questioning techniques to be used or why the in-
terrogator selected only specific topics from the
basic questioning sequence.
® Means of recording and reporting information ob-
tained.
The senior interrogator reviews each plan and makes
any changes he feels mecessary based on the
commander’s PIR and IR. After the plan is approved,
the holding compound is notified when to bring the
source to the interrogation site. The interrogator col-
lects all available interrogation aids needed (maps,
charts, writing tools, and reference materials) and
proceeds to the interrogation site.
APPROACH PHASE
The approach phase begins with initial contact be-
tween the EPW or detainee and interrogator. Extreme
cate is required since the success of the interrogation
hinges, to a large degree, on the early development of
the EPW’s or detaince’s willingness to communicate.
The interrogator’s objective during this phase is to ¢s-
tablish EPW or detainee rapport, and to gain his willing
cooperation so he will correctly answer pertinent ques-
tions to follow. The interrogator-—
® Adopts an appropriate attitude based on EP'W or
detainee appraisal.
® Prepares for an attitude change, if necessary.
3-19
® Begins to use an approach technique.
The amount of time spent on this phase will mostly
depend on the probable quantity and value of informa-
tion the EPW or detainee possesses, the availability of
other EPW or detainee with knowledge on the same
topics, and available time. At the initial contact, a
businesslike relationship should be maintained. As the
EPW or detainee assumes a cooperative attitude, a
more relaxed atmosphere may be advantageous. The in-
terrogator must carefully determine which of the
various approach techniques to employ.
Regardless of the type of EPW or detainee and his
outward personality, he does possess weaknesses which,
if recognized by the interrogator, can be exploited.
These weaknesses are manifested in personality traits
such as speech, mannerisms, facial expressions, physical
movements, excessive perspiration, and other overt in-
dications that vary from EPW or detainee.
From a psychological standpoint, the interrogator
must be cognizant of the following behaviors. People
tend to—
® Talk, especially after harrowing experiences.
® Show deference when confronted by superior
authority.
® Rationalize acts about which they feel guilty.
@ Fail to apply or remember lessons they may have
been taught regarding security if confronted with a
disorganized or strange situation.
@ Cooperate with those who have control over them.
@ Attach less importance to a topic about which the
interrogator demonstrates identical or related ex-
perience or knowledge.
® Appreciate flattery and exoneration from guilt.
@ Resent having someone or something they respect
belittied, especially by someone they dislike.
® Respond to kindness and understanding during
trying circumstances.
® Cooperate readily when given material rewards
such as extra food or luxury items for their per-
sonai comfort.
Interrogators do not "run" an approach by following a
set pattern or routine. Each interrogation is different,
but all interrogation approaches have the following in
common. They—
@ Establish and maintain control over the source and
interrogation.
@ Establish and maintain rapport between the inter-
rogator and source.
® Manipulate the source’s emotions and weaknesses
to gain his willing cooperation.
The successful application of approach techniques
eventually induces the source to willingly provide ac-
curate intelligence information to the iaterrogator. The
term “willingly” refers to the source’s answering the
FM 34-52
interrogator’s questions, not necessarily his coopera-
tion.
The source may or may not be aware he is providing
the interrogator with information about enemy forces.
Some approaches may be complete when the source
begins to answer questions. Others may have to be con-
stantly maintained or reinforced throughout the inter-
rogation.
The techniques used in an approach can best be
defined as a series of events, not just verbal conversa-
tion between the interrogator and the source. The ex-
ploitation of the source’s emotion can be harsh or
gentle in application. Some useful techniques used by
interrogators are—
@ Hand and body movements.
® Actual physical contact such as a hand on the
shoulder for reassurance.
@ Silence.
RAPPORT POSTURES
There are two types of rapport postures determined
during planning and preparation: stern and sym-
pathetic.
In the stern posture, the interrogator keeps the EPW
or detainee at attention. The aim is to make the EPW
or detainee keenly aware of his helpless and inferior
status. Interrogators use this posture with officers,
NCOs, and security-conscious enlisted men.
In the sympathetic posture, the interrogator addresses
the EPW or detainee in a friendly fashion, striving to
put him at ease. This posture is commonly used in in-
terrogating older or younger EPWs. EPWs may be
frightened and confused. One variation of this posture
is when the interrogator asks about the EPW’s family.
Few EP Ws will hesitate to discuss their family.
Frightened persons, regardless of rank, will invariably
talk in order to relieve tension once they hear a sym-
pathetic voice in their own tongue. To put the EPW at
ease, the interrogator may allow the EPW to sit down,
offer a cigarette, ask whether or not he needs medical
care, and otherwise show interest in his case.
There are many variations of these basic postures.
Regardless of the one used, the interrogator must
present a military appearance and show character and
energy. The interrogator must control his temper at all
times, except when a display is planned. The inter-
314
FM 34-52
rogator must not waste time in pointless discussions or
make promises he cannot keep; for example, the
interrogator’s granting political asylum.
When making promises in an effort to establish rap-
port, great care must be taken to prevent implying that
rights guaranteed the EPW under international and US
law will be withheld if the EPW refuses to cooperate.
Under no circumstances will the interrogator betray
surprise at anything the EPW might say. Many EPWs
will talk freely if they feel the information they are dis-
cussing is already known to the interrogator. If the in-
terrogator acts surprised, the EPW may stop talking
immediately.
The interrogator encourages any behavior that
deepens rapport and increases the flow of communica-
tion. At the same time, the interrogator must dis-
courage any behavior that has the opposite effect.
The interrogator must always be in control of the in-
terrogation. If the EPW or detainee challenges this
control, the interrogator must act quickly and firmly.
Everything the interrogator says and does must be
within the limits of the GPW, Article 17.
DEVELOPING RAPPORT
Rapport must be maintained throughout the inter-
rogation, not only in the approach phase. If the inter-
rogator has established good rapport initially and then
abandons the effort, the source would rightfully assume
the interrogator cares less and less about him as the in-
formation is being obtained. If this occurs, rapport is
lost and the source may cease answering questions.
Rapport may be developed by
® Asking about the circumstances of capture. By
doing this, the interrogator can gain insight into
the prisoner’s actual state of mind and, more im-
portantly, he can ascertain his possible breaking
points.
® Asking background questions. After asking about
the source’s circumstances of capture, apparent in-
terest can be built by asking about the source’s
family, civilian life, friends, likes, and dislikes. This
is to develop rapport, but nonpertinent questions
may open new avenues for the approach and help
determine whether tentative approaches chosen in
the planning and preparation phase will be effec-
tive. If these questions show that the tentative ap-
proaches chosen will not be effective, a flexible
3-12
interrogator can shift the approach direction
without the source being aware of the change.
Depending on the situation, and requests the source
may have made, the interrogator also can use the fol-
lowing to develop rapport.
@ Offer realistic incentives, such as—
~~Immediate comfort items (coffee, cigarettes).
—Short-term (a meal, shower, send a letter home).
-~Long-term (repatriation, political asylum).
® Feign experience similar to those of the source.
@ Show concern for the source through the use of
voice vitality and body language.
@ Help the source to rationalize his guilt.
@ Show kindness and understanding toward the
source’s predicament.
@ Exonerate the source from guilt.
@ Flatter the source.
After having established control and rapport, the in-
terrogator continually assesses the source to see if the
approaches—and later the questioning techniques—
chosen in the planning and preparation phase will in-
deed work.
Approaches chosen in planning and preparation are
tentative and based on the sometimes scanty informa-
tion available from documents, guards, and personal ob-
servation. This may lead the interrogator to select
approaches which may be totally incorrect for obtaining
this source’s willing cooperation. Thus, careful assess-
ment of the source is critical to avoid wasting valuable
time in the approach phase.
The questions can be mixed or separate. If, for ex-
ample, the interrogator has tentatively chosen a “love of
comrades” approach, he should ask the source questions
like “How did you get along with your fellow squad
members?" If the source answers they were all very
close and worked well as a team, the interrogator can
use this approach and be reasonably sure of its success.
However, if the source answers, "They all hated my
guts and I couidn’t stand any of them,” the interrogator
should abandon that approach and ask some quick, non-
pertinent questions to give himself time to work out a
new approach.
Smocth Transitions
The interrogator must guide the conversation
smoothly and logically, especially if he needs to move
from one approach technique to another. "Poking and
hoping" in the approach may alert the prisoner to ploys
and will make the job more difficult.
Tie-ins to another approach can be made logically
and smoothly by using transitional phrases. Logical tie-
ins can be made by including simple sentences which
connect the previously used approach with the basis for
the next one.
Transitions can also be smoothly covered by leaving
the unsuccessful approach and going back to nonper-
tinent questions. By using nonpertinent conversation,
the interrogator can move the conversation in the
desired direction and, as previously stated, sometimes
can obtain leads and hints about the source’s stresses or
weaknesses or other approach strategies that may be
more successful.
Sincere and Convincing
If an interrogator is using argument and reason to get
the source to cooperate, he must be convincing and ap-
pear sincere. All inferences of promises, situations, and
arguments, or other invented material must be believ-
able. What a source may or may not believe depends on
the interrogator’s knowledge, experience, and training.
A good source assessment is the basis for the approach
and vital to the success of the interrogation effort.
Recognize the Breaking Point
Every source has a breaking point, but an inter-
rogator never knows what it is until it has been reached.
There are, however, some good indicators the source is
near his breaking point or has already reached it. For
example, if during the approach, the source leans for-
ward with his facial expression indicating an interest in
the proposal or is more hesitant in his argument, he is
probably nearing the breaking point. The interrogator
must be alert to recognize these signs.
Once the interrogator determines the source is break-
ing, he should interject a question pertinent to the ob-
jective of the interrogation. If the source answers it, the
interrogator can move into the questioning phase. If
the source does not answer or balks at answering it, the
interrogator must realize the source was not as close to
the breaking point as thought. In this case, the inter-
rogator must continue with his approach, or switch to
an alternate approach or questioning technique and
FM 34-52
continue to work until he feels the source is near break-
ing.
The interrogator can tell if the source has broken
only by interjecting pertinent questions. This process
must be followed until the EPW or detainee begins to
answer pertinent questions. It is possible the EP'W or
detainee may cooperate for a while and then balk at
answering further questions. If this occurs, the inter-
rogator can reinforce the approaches that initially
gained the source’s cooperation or move into a different
approach before returning to the questioning phase.
At this point, it is important to note the amount of
time spent with a particular source depends on several
factors:
@ The battlefield situation.
® Expediency which the supported commander’s PIR
and IR requirements need to be answered.
@ Source’s willingness to talk.
The number of approaches used is limited only by the
interrogators skill. Almost any ruse or deception is
usable as long as the provisions of the GPW, as outlined
in Figure 1-4, are noi violated.
An interrogator must not pass himself off as a medic,
chaplain, or as a member of the Red Cross (Red Cres-
cent or Red Lion). To every approach technique, there
are literally hundreds of possible variations, each of
which can be developed for a specific situation or
source. The variations are limited only by the
interrogator’s personality, experience, ingenuity, and
imagination.
APPROACH COMBINATIONS
With the exception of the direct approach, no other
approach is effective by itself. Interrogators use dif-
ferent approach techniques or combine them into a
cohesive, logical technique. Smooth transitions, sin-
cerity, logic, and conviction almost always make a
strategy work. The lack of will undoubtedly dooms it to
failure. Some examples of combinations are—
@ Direct—-futility—incentive.
@ Direct—futility—ilove of comrades.
@ Direct—fear-up (miid)}—incentive.
The number of combinations are unlimited. Inter-
rogators must carefully choose the approach strategy in
the planning and preparation phase and listen carefully
213
FM 34-52
to what the source is saying (verbally or nonverbally) for
leads the strategy chosen will not work. When this oc-
curs, the interrogator must adapt to approaches he
believes will work in gaining the source’s cooperation.
The approach techniques are not new nor are ail the
possible or acceptable techniques discussed below.
Everything the interrogator says and does must be in
concert with the GWS, GPW, GC, and UCMI. The ap-
proaches which have proven effective are—
® Direct.
@ Incentive,
® Emotional.
® Increased fear-up.
@ Pride and ego.
Direct Approach
The interrogator asks questions directly related to in-
formation sought, making no effort to conceal the
interrogation’s purpose. The direct approach, always
the first to be attempted, is used on EP Ws or detainees
who the interrogator believes will cooperate.
This may occur when interrogating an EPW or
detainee who has proven cooperative during initial
screening or first interrogation. It may also be used on
those with lite or no security training. The direct ap-
proach works best on lower enlisted personnel, as they
have little or no resistance training and have had mini-
mal security training.
The direct approach is simple to use, and it is possible
to obtain the maximum amount of information in the
minimum amount of time. It is frequently employed at
lower echelons when the tactical situation precludes
selecting other techniques, and where the EPW’s or
detainee’s mental state is one of confusion or extreme
shock. Figure C-3 contains sample questions used in
direct questioning.
The direct approach is the most effective. Statistics
show in World War I, it was 90 percent effective. In
Vietnam and OPERATIONS URGENT FURY, JUST
CAUSE, and DESERT STORM, it was 95 percent ef-
fective.
Incentive Approach
The incentive approach is based on the application of
inferred discomfort upon an EPW or detainee who lacks
willpower. The EPW or detainee may display fondness
3-44
for certain luxury items such as candy, fruit, or cigaret-
tes. This fondness provides the interrogator with a posi-
tive means of rewarding the EPW or detainee for
cooperation and truthfulness, as he may give or with-
hold such comfort items at his discretion. Caution must
be used when employing this technique because—
® Any pressure applied in this manner must not
amount to a denial of basic human needs under
any circumstances. [NOTE: Interrogators may not
withhold a source’s rights under the GPW, but
they can withhold a source’s privileges.] Granting
incentives must not infringe on these rights, but
they can be things to which the source is already
entitled. This can be effective only if the source is
unaware of his rights or privileges.
® The EPW or detainee might be tempted to provide
false or inaccurate information to gain the desired
luxury item or to stop the interrogation.
The GPW, Article 41, requires the posting of the con-
vention contents in the EPW’s own language. This is an
MP responsibility.
incentives must seem to be logical and possible. An
interrogator must not promise anything that cannot be
delivered, Interrogators do not make promises, but
usually infer them while sidestepping guarantees.
For example, if an interrogator made a promise he
could not keep and he or another interrogator had to
talk with the source again, the source would not have
any trust and would probably not cooperate. Instead of
clearly promising a certain thing, such as political
asylum, an interrogator will offer to do what he can to
help achieve the source’s desired goal; as long as the
source cooperates.
As with developing rapport, the incentive approach
can be broken down into two incentives. The deter-
mination rests on when the source expects to receive the
incentive offered.
® Short term—received immediately; for example,
letter home, seeing wounded buddies.
® Long term—received within a period of time; for
example, political asylum.
Emotional Approach
Through EPW or detainee observation, the inter-
rogator can often identify dominant emotions which
motivate. The motivating emotion may be greed, love,
hate, revenge, or others. The interrogator employs ver-
bal and emotional ruses in applying pressure to the
EPW’s or detainee’s dominant emotions.
One major advantage of this technique is it is ver-
satile and allows the interrogator to use the same basic
Situation positively and negatively.
For example, this technique can be used on the EPW
who has a great love for his unit and fellow soldiers.
The interrogator may take advantage of this by telling
the EPW that by providing pertinent information, he
may shorten the war or battle in progress and save many
of his comrades’ lives, but his refusal to talk may cause
their deaths. This places the burden on the EPW or
detainee and may motivate him to seek relief through
cooperation.
Conversely, this technique can also be used on the
EPW or detainee who hates his unit because it withdrew
and left him to be captured, or who feels he was unfairly
treated in his unit. In such cases, the interrogator can
point out that if the EPW cooperates and specifies the
unit’s location, the unit can be destroyed, thus giving
the EPW an opportunity for revenge. The interrogator
proceeds with this method in a very formal manner.
This approach is Likely to be effective with the imma-
ture and timid EPW.
Emotional Love Approach. For the emotional love
approach to be successful, the interrogator must focus
on the anxiety felt by the source about the circumstan-
ces in which he finds himself. The interrogator must
direct the love the source feels toward the appropriate
object: family, homeland, or comrades. If the inter-
rogator can show the source what the source himself can
do to alter or improve his situation, the approach has a
chance of success.
This approach usually involves some incentive such as
communication with the source’s family or a quicker
end to the war to save his comrades’ lives. A good inter-
rogator will usually orchestrate some futility with an
emotional love approach to hasten the source’s reaching
the breaking point.
Sincerity and conviction are critical in a successful at-
tempt at an emotional love approach as the interrogator
must show genuine concern for the source, and for the
object at which the interrogator is directing the source’s
emotion.
If the interrogator ascertains the source has great love
for his unit and fellow soldiers, the interrogator can ef-
FM 34-52
fectively exploit the situation. This places a burden on
the source and may motivate him to seek relief through
cooperation with the interrogator.
Emotional Hate Approach. The emotional hate ap-
proach focuses on any genuine hate, or possibly a desire
for revenge, the source may feel. The interrogator must
ascertain exactly what it is the source may hate so the
emotion can be exploited to override the source’s ra-
tional side. The source may have negative feelings
about his country’s regime, immediate superiors, of
ficers in general, or fellow soldiers.
This approach is usually most effective on members
of racial or religious minorities who have suffered dis-
crimination in military and civilian life. Ifa source feels
he has been treated unfairly in his unit, the interrogator
can point out that, if the source cooperates and divulges
the location of that unit, the unit can be destroyed, thus
affording the source revenge.
By using a conspiratorial tone of voice, the inter-
rogator can enhance the value of this technique.
Phrases, such as “You owe them no loyalty for the way
they treated you,” when used appropriately, can expedite
the success of this technique.
Do not immediately begin to berate a certain facet of
the source’s background or life until your assessment in-
dicates the source feels a negative emotion toward it.
The emotional hate approach can be used more effec-
tively by drawing out the source’s negative emotions
with questions that elicit a thought-provoking response.
For example, "Why do you think they allowed you to be
captured?” or “Why do you think they left you to die?"
Do not berate the source’s forces or homeland unless
certain negative emotions surface.
Many sources may have great love for their country,
but may hate the regime in control. The emotional hate
approach is most effective with the immature or timid
source who may have no opportunity up to this point
for revenge, or never had the courage to voice his feel-
ings.
Fear-Up Approach
The fear-up approach is the exploitation of
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