Document text
J anuary 1998
FM 100-11
Force Integration
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Field Manual 100-1 1
Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 15 January 1998
Force Integration
Preface x
Introduction xi
Chapter 1 How the Army Works 1-1
Section I: Introduction 1-1
1 -1 . Building more capable forces 1-1
1 -2. Perspective for leaders and managers 1-1
Section II: The Army's Roles and Missions 1-1
1-3. The Army's Constitutional role 1-1
1 -4. The Army's statutory missions and functions 1-1
1 -5. The Army's societal role 1-1
1-6. The Army vision 1-4
Section III: Command, Leadership, and Management at the National Level. 1-4
1 -7. National command authorities 1-4
1 -8. The Department of Defense 1-4
1-9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 1-4
1-10. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 1-9
Section IV: The Army Environment 1-9
1-11. Army leadership 1-9
1 -1 2. The Army planning system 1-9
1-13. The Army Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System 1-9
1-14. The Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System 1-9
1-15. The Army Mobilization Plan 1-9
1 -1 6. The TRADOC requirements process 1-10
Section V: The Army Organizational Life Cycle Model 1-10
1-17. Management of change 1-10
1-18. The Army Organizational Life Cycle Model 1-10
Section VI: Operating Processes 1-11
1 -1 9. Strategic and operational requirements determination process 1-11
1 -20. Research, development, and acquisition process 1 -1 1
1 -21 . Force development process 1-11
1 -22. Resource allocation and distribution process 1-11
1 -23. Battlefield requirements determination process 1-12
1-24. Manpower allocation and distribution process 1-12
1 -25. Materiel allocation and distribution process 1-12
1- 26. Battle laboratories (labs) 1-12
Section VII: Summary 1-12
Chapter 2 How the Army Intends to Fight 2-1
Section I: Introduction 2-1
2- 1. Doctrine 2-1
2-2. Force projection 2-1
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This publication supersedes FM 1 00-1 1,15 January 1 995
Section II: The Role and Development of Doctrine 2-1
2-3. The role of doctrine 2-1
2-4. Conceptual foundation of doctrine 2-2
2-5. Sources of doctrinal change 2-2
2-6. Validation of doctrine 2-2
Section III: Fundamentals of Army Operations 2-2
2-7. The range of military operations 2-2
2-8. The levels of war 2-3
2-8. Principles of war and tenets of operations 2-3
2-10. The combined arms concept 2-3
2-11. Rules of engagement 2-3
2-12. The dynamics and functions of combat power 2-3
Section IV: Force Projection Operations 2-4
2- 13. Stages of force projection operations 2-4
Section V: Summary 2-4
Chapter 3. The Reserve Components 3-1
Section I: Introduction 3-1
3- 1. Two components 3-1
3-2. The Army National Guard 3-1
3-3. The U.S. Army Reserve 3-1
Section II: Reserve Component Structure 3-1
3-4. RC statutory foundation 3-1
3-5. Recomposition 3-1
Section III: Reserve Component Management Structure 3-2
3-6. Congress and the Department of Defense 3-2
3-7. U.S. Army Reserve Component controls 3-2
3-8. Army National Guard 3-3
3-9. U.S. Army Reserve 3-4
Section IV: Reserve Component Training and Equipment Program 3-6
3-10. Reserve Component training program 3-6
3-1 1 . Reserve Component equipment program 3-6
Section V: Reserve Component Assistance 3-7
3- 12. Full time support personnel 3-7
Section VI: Summary 3-7
Chapter 4 The Force Integration Process 4-1
Section I: Introduction 4-1
4- 1. Change as a factor 4-1
4-2. The force integration challenge 4-1
Section II: Management of Change 4-1
4-3. Organizational change 4-1
4-4. Goals 4-1
4-5. Force management processes 4-1
4-6. Force management tasks 4-2
Section III: Force Integration 4-3
4-7. Scope 4-3
4-8. Mission 4-3
4-9. Force integration components 4-4
4-10. The role of operational requirements in force integration 4-5
Section IV: Foundations of Force Integration 4-5
4-1 1 . The Army Organizational Life Cycle Model 4-5
Section V: Force Integration Planning 4-6
4-12. Planning requirements 4-6
ii
4-13. Impact assessments 4-7
4-14. Planning factors 4-7
Section VI: International Considerations 4-8
4-15. National priorities 4-8
4-16. History and world environment 4-8
4-17. Potential adversaries 4-8
4-18. Technology 4-8
4-19. Missions 4-8
4- 20. Direction and guidance 4-8
Section Vil: Summary 4-8
Chapters. Organization Management 5-1
Section I: Introduction 5-1
5- 1. Organizational integration 5-1
5-2. Management structure, objectives and execution 5-1
Section II: Organization Management Structure 5-1
5-3. Levels of control 5-1
5-4. Implementation considerations 5-1
Section III: Organizational Integration 5-1
5-5. Objective and scope 5-1
5-6. Organization integration team 5-2
Section IV: Assessments 5-5
5-7. Force Validation Committee 5-5
5-8. Functional area assessments 5-5
5-9. Affordability assessments 5-6
5-1 0. Supportability assessments 5-6
5- 1 1 . Executability assessments 5-6
Section V: Summary, 5-6
Chapter 6. Structuring the Force 6-1
Section I: Introduction 6-1
6- 1 . Basis for force requirements 6-1
6-2. Resourcing requirements 6-1
6-3. Balancing resources and requirements 6-1
Section II: Source Documentation 6-1
6-4. Joint Strategic Planning System 6-1
6-5. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 6-1
6-6. DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System 6-1
6-7. Joint Operations Planning and Execution System 6-1
Section III: Organizational Design and Requirements Documentation 6-2
6-8. Organizational design process 6-2
6-9. Documentation of requirements in TOE 6-3
Section IV: Force Structure Development. 6-5
6-10. The influence of constraints 6-6
6-11. Supporting analysis 6-6
6-12. Total Army analysis 6-6
6-13. TAA phases 6-6
Section V: Authorization Documentation 6-8
6-14 Purpose 6-8
6-15. The command planning process 6-8
6-16. Documentation process 6-8
6-1 7. Authorization documentation 6-10
Section VI: Summary. 6-12
Chapter 7. Manning the Force 7-1
Section I: Introduction 7-1
7-1. Manpower constraints 7-1
7-2. Manpower management 7-1
7-3. Role of manpower managers 7-1
Section II: Army Manpower 7-1
7-A. Manpower spectrum 7-1
7-5. Force alignment 7-2
7-6. Active Army Military Manpower Program 7-2
Section III: Personnel Documentation and Acquisitions 7-2
7-7. Personnel Management Authorization Documentation 7-2
7-8. Personnel acquisition 7-2
Section IV: Distribution and Assignment 7-3
7-9. Management of personnel inventories 7-3
7-10. Enlisted distribution 7-3
7-11. Distribution considerations 7-4
Section V: Personnel Sustainment 7-4
7-12. Maintaining balance 7-4
7- 13. Authorizations documentation 7-4
Section VI: Summary 7-5
Chapter 8. Equipping the Force 8-1
Section I: Introduction 8-1
8- 1. Equipping goal 8-1
8-2. Command and staff involvement 8-1
8-3. Total system approach 8-1
Section II: Materiel Development and Acquisition 8-1
8-4. Policy guidance 8-1
8-5. Scope 8-1
8-6. Materiel acquisition life cycle system management 8-1
8-7. Force integration considerations 8-3
Section III: Materiel Requirements Definition 8-3
8-8. Mission needs 8-3
8-9. TRADOC role 8-3
8-10. Requirements documentation 8-3
8-1 1 . Resource allocation 8-5
Section IV: Manpower, Personnel, and Logistics Integration 8-6
8-12. Manpower and personnel integration 8-6
8-13. Logistics integration 8-7
Section V: Major End Item Distribution 8-7
8-14. Distribution considerations 8-7
8-15. Distribution authorizations 8-7
8-16. Distribution priorities 8-8
8-17. Distribution execution 8-9
Section VI: Fielding and Sustainment 8-9
8-18. Total package fielding 8-9
8- 19. Displaced equipment disposition 8-12
Section VII: Summary 8-13
Chapter 9. Training the Force 9-1
Section I: Introduction 9-1
9- 1 . Training and force integration 9-1
9-2. Accomplishing operational missions 9-1
9-3. Competent, confident leaders 9-1
IV
Section II: Combined Arms Training Strategy 9-1
9-4. Training components 9-1
9-5. Principies of individuai and unit training 9-2
Section III: Training Development 9-2
9-6. Deveiopment of effective training 9-2
9-7. Systems approach to training 9-2
9-8. Training requirements anaiysis system 9-2
Section IV: Army Modernization Training 9-3
9-9. System training pian 9-3
9-10. Modernization training approaches 9-3
9-1 1 . Modernization training responsibiiities 9-4
9-12. Training sequence 9-4
9-13. Training pian deveiopment 9-6
9-14. Training evaiuations 9-6
9-1 5. Reserve Component modernization training 9-6
9- 16. Mobiiization and wartime requirements 9-6
Section V: Summary, 9-6
Chapter 10. Sustaining the Force 10-1
Section I: Introduction 10-1
10- 1. Organizationai sustainment considerations 10-1
1 0-2. Effects on associated units 1 0-1
10-3. Baiancing requirements and resources 10-1
1 0-4. Support of fieided systems 10-1
Section II: Logistics Functions and Levels of Support 10-1
1 0-5. Logistics tasks 10-1
1 0-6. Logistics functions 10-1
1 0-7. Logistics ieveis of support 10-1
Section III: Logistic Planning 10-2
10-8. Support considerations 10-2
10-9. Pianning responsibiiities 10-2
10-10. Sustainment pianning 10-2
Section IV: Maintenance Function 10-2
10-11. Categories of maintenance 1 0-2
1 0-1 2. Army maintenance (iess aviation) 1 0-2
10-13. Aviation maintenance 10-3
Section V: Transportation Function 10-3
10-14. Transportation management 10-3
10-15. T ransportation functionai areas 10-3
Section VI: Supply Function 10-3
10-16. Suppiy categories 10-3
10-17. Leveis of suppiy 10-4
10-18. Other suppiy programs 10-4
Section VII: Organizational Sustainment 10-5
1 0-1 9. Authorization documents 10-5
1 0- 20. Force readiness considerations 10-5
Section VIII: Summary 10-5
Chapter 11. Stationing the Force 11-1
Section I: Introduction 1 1-1
11- 1. Compiexity of the stationing decision process 11-1
11-2. Muitipie agency invoivement 11-1
V
Section II: Planning 1 1-1
11-3. Planning organizational stationing 11-1
11-4. The role of installations in stationing 11-2
Section III: Real Property Management 11-3
11-5. Real Property Master Plan 11-3
11-6. Installation Status Report 11-5
Section IV: Military Construction Program 11-6
11-7. Military construction 11-6
11-8. Army family housing 11-6
Section V: Real Property Maintenance Activities 1 1-8
11-9. Objective 11-8
11-10. The annual work plan 11-8
11-11. Funding source and guidelines 11-8
Section VI: Real Property Acquisition, Outgrant, and Disposal Process 11-8
11-12. Acquisition 11-8
11-13. Real property out-grants 11-8
11-14. Real property disposal 11-8
11- 15. Facilities 11-9
Section VII: Summary 1 1-9
Chapter 12. Resourcing the Force 12-1
Section I: Introduction 12-1
12- 1. The resource task 12-1
12-2. Resourcing aim and approach 12-1
12-3. Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System 12-1
Section II: PPBES Responsibilities 12-1
12-4. Secretarial oversight 12-1
12-5. System management and operation 12-1
Section III. OSD Resource Management Framework 12-1
12-6. The Future Years Defense Program 12-1
12-7. Core DOD managers 12-2
12-8. OSD PPBS forums 12-7
Section IV: The Army PPBES 12-8
12-9. Concept 12-8
12-10. Objectives 12-8
12-11. Management decision packages 12-8
12-12. PPBES forums 12-9
12-13. Program evaluation groups 12-10
12-14. Process and structure 12-11
Section V. Planning Phase 12-13
12-15. OSD and joint strategic planning 12-13
12-16. Joint Strategy Review 12-13
12-17. JSPS documents and plans 12-13
12-18. OSD planning products 12-14
12-19. Army planning 12-14
1 2-20. Role of long-range planning 12-14
12-21. Army Long Range Planning Guidance 12-14
12-22. Army requirements determination process 12-14
12-23. Army Modernization Plan 12-14
12-24. Army research, development, and acquisition plan 12-14
12-25. The Army Plan 12-15
12-26. Force development and total Army analysis 12-15
1 2-27. Command planning and documentation 12-15
12-28. Operational planning link 12-16
VI
Section VI. Programming Phase 12-16
12-29. Army programming 12-16
12-30. Army Program Guidance Memorandum 12-16
12-31. Program deveiopment 12-16
1 2-32. Program deveiopment process 12-16
1 2-33. Army program reviews 12-17
1 2-34. POM preparation and submission 12-17
12-35. OSD program review 12-17
12-36. Program Decision Memorandum 12-17
Section VII. Budgeting Phase 12-17
12-37. Budget formuiation and justification 12-17
12-38. Formuiation 12-17
12-39. Transition from the program 12-18
1 2-40. Incorporating command and agency budget data 12-18
1 2-41 . Funding designated support functions: the Army working capitai fund 12-18
1 2-42. Preparing the Budget Estimates Submission 12-18
12-43. Review and approvai 12-19
1 2-44. OSD and 0MB budget review 12-19
1 2-45. President's Budget 12-19
12-46. Justification 12-19
12-47. Budget hearings 12-19
1 2-48. Legisiative approvai and enactment 1 2-20
1 2-49. Continuing resoiution authority 1 2-20
Section IX. Execution Phase 12-20
12-50. Execution 12-20
12-51. Financiai management 12-20
1 2-52. Funds controi 1 2-20
12-53. Aiiocation, obiigation, and reconciiiations 12-21
12-54. Changes from the President's Budget 12-21
1 2-55. Funding ietters for OMA and AFHO 1 2-21
1 2-56. Revised approved program for RDTE 1 2-21
12-57. Financing unbudgeted requirements 12-21
1 2-58. Program performance and review 1 2-22
12- 59. Checking program performance 12-22
Section X: Summary. 12-22
Chapter 13. Force Readiness 13-1
Section I: Introduction 13-1
1 3- 1 . Potentiai effects of change on readiness 13-1
13-2. Minimizing adverse effects 13-1
Section II: Readiness Management 13-1
1 3-3. Force readiness 1 3-1
13-4. Unit readiness 13-2
Section III: Measuring Unit Status 13-2
1 3-5. A combat readiness measurement 13-2
13-6. Chairman's Readiness System 13-2
1 3-7. Army readiness system 13-3
Section IV: Planning and Executing Organizational Change 13-4
1 3-8. Organizations in transition 13-4
13-9. Transition period activities 13-4
Section V: Summary. 13-4
Appendix A. Decision Support Anaiysis A-1
Section I: Introduction A-1
A-1 . Structuring the decision making process A-1
A-2. Quantitative methods and the decision process A-1
Section II: Program Evaluation and Review Technique A-1
A-3. Network diagrams A-1
A-4. Exampie of a compieted PERT network A-6
A-5. Attributes of PERT A-6
Section III: Critical Path Method A-8
A-6. Features of the criticai path method A-8
A-7. A CPM exampie A-8
Section IV: Gantt Charts A-9
A-8. Features of Gantt charts A-9
A-9. A Gantt chart exampie A-9
Section V: Summary A-10
Bibliography A-10
Giossary Giossary-1
References References-1
index index-1
FIGURE LIST
Figure 1-1. Core Competencies 1-3
Figure 1-2. Maintaining the Baiance 1-3
Figure 1-3. The Army Vision 1-4
Figure 1-4. Unified Command Structure 1-5
Figure 1 -5. Joint Strategic Pianning System 1 -6
Figure 1-6. Army Organizationai Life Cycie Modei 1-11
Figure 1-7. Battie Lab Approach 1-12
Figure 3-1 . Categories of the Army Reserve 3-1
Figure 3-2. Nationai Guard Management Structure 3-3
Figure 3-3. Director of The Army Nationai Guard (DARNG) Organization 3-4
Figure 3-4. Management Structure for the USAR 3-5
Figure 3-5. Organization of the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve 3-6
Figure 4-1 . Force Management Deveiopment Process 4-2
Figure 4-2. Force Integration Environment 4-4
Figure 4-3. Army Organizationai Life Cycie Modei 4-6
Figure 4-4. Defense Pianning System Interreiationships 4-7
Figure 5-1. Organization Integration Team 5-2
Figure 5-2. Force Integration Responsibiiities 5-4
Figure 6-1 . Force Sizing 6-1
Figure 6-2. Incrementai Tabie of Organization and Equipment System 6-5
Figure 6-3. Totai Army Anaiysis 6-6
Figure 6-4. Documentation Process 6-9
Figure 6-5. Structure and Composition System 6-10
Figure 6-6. Authorization Documentation Scheduie 6-11
viii
Figure 7-1 . Military Manpower Spectrum ..
Figure 7-2. Enlisted Procurement Process
7-1
7-3
Figure 8-1. Materiel Acquisition Life-Cycle System Management Process 8-2
Figure 8-2. Acquisition Categories 8-4
Figure 8-3. Characteristics of Developmental and Operational Testing and
Evaluation 8-6
Figure 8-4. Equipment Distribution Planning and Execution Process 8-8
Figure 8-5. Distribution Priorities 8-9
Figure 8-6. Distribution Execution 8-10
Figure 9-1 . Army Training System 9-1
Figure 9-2. The Band of Excellence 9-5
Figure 9-3. Army Modernization Training Responsibilities 9-5
Figure 11-1. The Real Property Management System 11-4
Figure 1 1 -2. Timeline for an MCA Project 11-7
Figure 12-1. FYDP Structure 12-3
Figure 12-2. Example of FYs Covered by Type Resource in a FYDP 12-3
Figure 12-3. Example of FY Structure of Resources in MDEPs for a POM 12-8
Figure 12-4. PPBES Framework 12-12
Figure A-1 . Network Diagram A-1
Figure A-2. Example of Network Diagram with Activities A-1
Figure A-3. Activity Precedes Activity A-2
Figure A-4. Concurrent Activities A-2
Figure A-5. Dummy Activities A-2
Figure A-6. Earliest Expected Start Time A-3
Figure A-7. Calculating T^ with Multiple Activity Arrows at One Node A-4
Figure A-8. Latest Allowable Start Time A-5
Figure A-9. Calculating T|_ with More Than One Activity Arrow at a Node A-5
Figure A-1 0. Slack Time A-6
Figure A-1 1 . Complete Network Diagram A-7
Figure A-1 2. CPM Network Diagram A-8
Figure A-1 3. Gantt Chart A-1 0
TABLE LIST
Table 12-1. Army Appropriation and Fund Managers 12-4
Table 12-2. Budget Activity Management Structure for Operation and Maintenance
Appropriations 12-5
Table 12-3. Title 10 PEGs Listing Proponent Agency, Area of Activity,
and Co-Chairs 12-10
Table A-1 . Node (Event) Table A-7
Table A-2. Activity Table A-7
Table A-3. Cost Table A-9
Table A-4. Time Versus Cost Alternatives A-9
PREFACE
This manual provides the Army’s force integration capstone doctrine for use hy those who plan, program,
and manage the introduction and resourcing of changes to the Army’s stmcture and composition. It is an
equally valuable reference for commanders and leaders who execute the changes.
These changes are caused hy the Army’s adoption of new or revised doctrine, organizations, manpower, and
equipment. The effects of change may impact any or all echelons from Headquarters, Department of the Army,
to the installation and unit levels. Changes permeate each component of the Army (Active, Reserve and Na-
tional Guard).
The force integration process minimizes adverse effects on the readiness of Army units and component
commands while changes are implemented. As a result, the Army remains prepared to perform all of its mis-
sions promptly and decisively. These missions range across the spectrum of crisis from humanitarian opera-
tions, through military operations other than war, to fighting and winning the Nation’s wars.
FM 100-5 describes the Army’s doctrinal principles for employing forces to accomplish assigned missions
on this spectrum. FM 100-11 discusses how the Army builds and maintains the force projection capabilities
required to execute these operations.
The proponent for this manual is the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Head-
quarters, Department of the Army. Record comments and recommendations on Department of the Army Form
2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms). Send Forms to Commandant, Army Force
Management School, 5500 2F‘ Street, Building 247, Suite 1400, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060-5923.
X
INTRODUCTION
Title 10 (Armed Forces), United States Code, section 3062, requires that the Army he organized, trained,
and equipped for prompt and sustained land comhat. The doctrine in FM 100-11 supports this statutory re-
quirement.
Events of the 1980’s provided the impetus for the initial effort to document the Army’s management of
change doctrine. During this period, sweeping changes were taking place. AirLand Battle war fighting doc-
trine, Army of Excellence organizations, and over 400 new materiel systems (including the Ahrams tank,
Bradley fighting vehicle, Blackhawk helicopter. Patriot air defense system, and multiple-launch rocket systems)
were introduced into the Army.
The 1988 edition of EM 100-11 provided managers of change with the first comprehensive explanation of
the functions and systems that are known collectively as the force integration process. In 1995, the description
of this complex process was updated to reflect then current doctrine.
This edition provides overviews of how the Army “works” as an institution and as an organization and
briefly discusses our war-fighting doctrine. This manual then describes the force integration functions and
systems that organize, structure, man, equip, train, sustain, station, and resource the force projection Army.
Einally, this manual relates the force integration process to the maintenance of unit and force readiness during
the introduction of change.
FM 100-11, Force Integration
Chapter 1
How the Army Works
Section I:
Introduction
1-1. Building more capable forces
The successful integration of new doctrine, organi-
zations, and equipment into the Army requires the
synchronization of many Army functional systems
and multiple levels of command. Managing these
interrelated functions to huild a more capable force
is necessary to enable the effective conduct of com-
bat operations. While the functions are linked in the
building of a combat-ready force, the processes and
systems that support the functions are not always
linked. Command, management, and leadership exist
to provide that linkage.
1-2. Perspective for leaders and managers
As the Army evolves into the 21st Century, it must
retain its historic foundations. This evolutionary
process is based on the Army’s enduring values and
core competencies, and guided by its leadership’s
vision of the future Army. This chapter reviews
where the Army fits into the national defense envi-
ronment by discussing the Army’s roles and mis-
sions and the chain of command. It provides an
overview of the planning process to reveal how to
determine Army requirements. This chapter con-
cludes with a discussion of the Army Organizational
Life Cycle Model (AOLCM) whose interrelation-
ships and mechanisms allow the Army to provide
forces that are properly organized, trained, and
equipped to accomplish the operational missions
assigned to the commanders in chief (CINC) of uni-
fied combatant commands. Understanding the
AOLCM is critical to the Army’s future leaders and
managers.
Section II:
The Army’s Roles and Missions
1-3. The Army’s Constitutional role
The Constitution of the United States says that “we
the people... provide for the common defense,” that
the Congress raises the Army, and that the president
shall be the commander-in-chief. The United States
Army exists to protect and defend the Constitution
of the United States of America. The Army does this
by deterring and, when deterrence fails, by achieving
quick, decisive victory — on and off the battlefield —
anywhere in the world and under virtually any con-
ditions as part of a joint team. The Congress, by
statute, has provided for a Secretary of Defense,
Secretary of the Army, Chief of Staff of the Army,
and Army missions
1-4. The Army’s statutory missions and functions
The Army executes the will of the Congress by per-
forming its functions of recruiting, organizing, sup-
plying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing,
demobilizing, administering, maintaining, repairing
military equipment, and acquiring and maintaining
real property for Army forces to comply with section
3062, Title 10 (Armed Forces), United States Code
(10 use 3062) which states—
“It is the intent of Congress to provide an
Army that is capable, in conjunction with the
other Armed Forces, of preserving the peace
and security... of the United States... sup-
porting the national policies... implementing
the national objectives... and overcoming any
nations responsible for aggressive acts that
imperil the peace and security of the United
States. [The Army] shall be organized,
trained, and equipped primarily for prompt
and sustained combat incident to operations
on land... [and] is responsible for the prepa-
ration of land forces necessary for the effec-
tive prosecution of war except as otherwise
assigned and, in accordance with integrated
joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of
the peacetime components of the Army to
meet the needs of war. ”
1-5. The Army’s societal role
A distinction exists between the Army as an institu-
tion and the Army as an organization. Both roles are
critical in maintaining a strategic force capable of
decisive victory.
a. The Army as an institution. The “institution”
of the Army is its essence, traditions, history, and
lineage. It includes leader development, doctrine,
training, professionalism, integrity, and the Army’s
tradition of responsibility to the nation. The Army’s
enduring values flow from the American ideals em-
bodied in the Constitution and Declaration of Inde-
pendence. They guide the actions of soldiers as indi-
viduals and groups. Throughout American military
history, these values have provided a firm founda-
tion for military leaders and soldiers. They provide
all soldiers with principles of conduct and standards
of behavior that exemplify those ideals and values to
which Americans subscribe. These values include —
(1) Courage, both physical and moral.
(2) Integrity.
(3) Candor.
(4) Competence.
1-1
FM 100-11, Force Integration
(5) Commitment.
(6) Loyalty to the ideals of the nation, to
one’s unit, and to one’s fellow soldiers.
(7) Personal responsibility.
(8) Fair treatment for all regardless of race,
gender, religion, or national origin.
(9) Selfless service.
b. The Army as an organization. The Army at
any point in time is the “organization.” It includes
units and tahle(s) of distribution and allowances
(TDA) organizations, and soldiers in all compo-
nents, civilians, family members, the defense indus-
try, capabilities, and structure. The “organization” is
highly visible at home and abroad. It serves the na-
tion ‘s peacetime interests and is ready to fight when
called upon.
(1) Core competencies. Core organizational
competencies, as depicted in Figure 1-1, are the
quintessential constants that give the Army the com-
petitive edge over potential adversaries. They adapt
to changing situations and, in combination, have a
synergistic effect on mission accomplishment. They
are critical for successful mission execution and ap-
ply across all military operations. These competen-
cies ensure the Army is —
(a) Trained, with the ability to fight as
part of a joint or combined force.
{b) Versatile, with the ability to respond
across the continuum of military operations.
(c) Deployable, with the ability to proj-
ect combat power rapidly from the continental
United States (CONUS) to any location where po-
tential adversaries threaten U.S. national interests.
{d) Expandable, with the ability to con-
stitute new forces in response to a deterioration in
the international order or emergence of a major
threat to U.S. interests.
(e) Capable of decisive victory, with
the ability to win quickly with minimum casualties.
(2) The six imperatives. The Army’s six im-
peratives support these core competencies and are
the foundation for future success. When properly
resourced and balanced, they coalesce in a trained
and ready force. The imperatives are —
(a) Quality soldiers, trained, motivated,
and challenged.
(b) Competent leaders, clear in their vi-
sion of the future, with fully developed combat
skills.
(c) Challenging training, focused on re-
alistic scenarios and oriented toward joint, com-
bined, and coalition operations and contingency mis-
sions.
(d) Modem equipment that provides
soldiers with the greatest available lethality and best
technology.
(e) Force mix of Army civilians. Re-
serve, and Active forces that preserves essential war-
fighting capabilities in rapidly deployable units. The
correct force mix also allows time for mobilization
and training of follow-on and reconstituted units.
(f) Effective doctrine that accommodates
joint, combined, and coalition maneuver-oriented,
high tempo, and high technology warfare.
c. Coalescence of the Army as institution and
organization. The jWmy maintains a relationship
between the “institution^” Army, with its enduring
values, and the “organizational” Army, the strategic
force capable of decisive victory (see Eigure 1-2).
“Institutional” changes occur slowly through delib-
erate evolution and are indistinguishable to the pub-
lic at large. The “organization” changes more rap-
idly and visibly to meet requirements presented by
national and international realities. In maintaining
the balance between capabilities and requirements in
the “organization,” the “institution” must not lose its
enduring values. They are the foundation during pe-
riods of change and uncertainty. The challenge is to
manage change, increase capability, maintain stabil-
ity, and foster innovation.
1-2
FM 100-11, Force Integration
Figure 1-1. Core Competencies
LEADERSHIP
KEEPING OUR ESSENCE
Figure 1-2. Maintaining the Balance
1-3
FM 100-11, Force Integration
1-6. The Army vision
Essential to any organization’s success is a clear
understanding of organizational goals — the vision.
Achievement of the Army’s vision (see Figure 1-3)
depends squarely on maintaining core competencies.
THE U.S. ARMY
TRAINED AND READY FOR VICTORY
A TOTAL FORCE OF QUALITY SOLDIERS
AND CIVILIANS
• A values-based organization
• An integral part of the Joint Team
• Equipped with the most modern
weapons and equipment
• Able to respond to our nations needs
• Changing to meet the challenges of
today.. .tomorrow.. .and the 21^ century
Figure 1-3. The Army Vision
Section III:
Command, Leadership, and
Management at the Nationai Levei
1-7. National command authorities
The President and the Secretary of Defense are the
National Command Authorities (NCA). The Na-
tional Security Council (NSC) supports the Presi-
dent, as commander-in-chief, with the integration of
domestic, foreign, and military policies on National
security.
1-8. The Department of Defense
The Department of Defense (DOD) includes the Of-
fice of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the military departments, and
the military services within those departments. It
also includes the unified commands and other agen-
cies established to meet specific requirements.
a. Roles of OSD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
OSD and the JCS perform vital roles in the process
of developing and implementing a National military
strategy, defense resource management, and military
operations. The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)
is the most authoritative statement of the National
military policy. Prepared biennially within OSD, it is
the link between planning and programming used by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military depart-
ments.
b. Pillars of defense. OSD establishes force
planning guidance in five categories known as the
“pillars of defense.” In order of priority, they are —
(1) Readiness. This is the ability of forces to
deliver the outputs for which they are designed. This
includes the ability to man, equip, and train in
peacetime and to mobilize, deploy, and fight in war-
time.
(2) Force structure. This is the manpower
and materiel resources of organizations tasked to
perform missions in peace and war.
(3) Sustainability. This is the “staying
power” of forces. It includes the ability to produce
and deliver forces over prolonged periods.
(4) Modernization and investment. This is
the ability to ensure our forces maintain a qualitative
superiority in technology and the ability to incorpo-
rate new technology after proving its capability as a
combat multiplier.
(5) Infrastructure and overhead. This is the
ability to increase efficiency and redirect shrinking
resources to our high quality forces by reducing in-
frastructure and overhead in all program areas.
c. The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System.
(1) The Planning, Programming, and Budg-
eting System (PPBS) is a cyclic process for provid-
ing for current and future programs through three
interrelated phases (planning, programming, and
budgeting). It maintains consistency with national
security objectives, policies, and strategies.
(2) DOD uses PPBS as its primary system
for managing the departments’ military functions. It
facilitates budgeting in forces, systems, and pro-
grams rather than resource categories. It determines
force, system, and program costs and compares al-
ternatives in costs and benefits. In effect, it is the
decision structure within which DOD determines its
requirements and allocates constrained resources.
(3) The DOD PPBS is the primary formal
strategic management system for building and
maintaining the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP), the official record of major resource allo-
cation decisions made by Secretary of Defense.
PPBS progresses from a general articulation of the
national military strategy by the JCS to specific or-
ganizations, manpower, material, training, and sup-
port of the forces necessary to carry out that strat-
egy. The FYDP is the summary of programs devel-
oped within the PPBS.
1-9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The National Security Act of 1947 established the
Joint Chiefs of Staff as the “principal advisors to the
President and the Secretary of Defense.” The Gold-
water-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986
further specified that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff (CJCS), is the principal military advisor to the
President, NSC, and Secretary of Defense rather
1-4
FM 100-11, Force Integration
than the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff (see Figure 1-4).
The role of the Chairman expanded in importance
and influence since the passage of the 1986 Reor-
ganization Act. The Chairman’s statutory responsi-
bilities include: providing strategic direction, pre-
paring
strategic plans, advising on joint program priorities,
and assessing service composite programs and budg-
ets. In consultation with the CINCs and other mem-
bers of the JCS, the Chairman accomplishes these
statutory requirements under the framework of the
Joint Strategic Planning System.
UNIFIED COMMANDS:
US ATLANTIC COMMAND (USACOM)
US CENTRAL COMMAND (USCENTCOM)
US EUROPEAN COMMAND (USEUCOM)
US PACIFIC COMMAND (USPACOM)
US SPACE COMMAND (USSPACECOM)
US SPECIAL OPERATION COMMAND (USSOCOM)
US SOUTHERN COMMAND (USSOUTHCOM)
US TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (USTRANSCOM)
US STRATEGIC COMMAND (USSTRATCOM)
COMMAND SUPPORT
SUPPORT
ROLE OF CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS of
STAFF
Public Law 99-433 (Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1986) specifies that the Secretary of Defense
may assign to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff re-
sponsibility for overseeing the activities of the combatant
commands. However, such assignment does not confer
any command authority on the Chairman and does not
alter the responsibility of the commanders of the com-
batant commands. Subject to the direction of the Presi-
dent, the commander of a combatant command —
• performs his duties under the authority, direction
and control of the Secretary of Defense; and
• is directly responsible to the Secretary of De-
fense for the preparedness of the command to
carry out missions assigned to the command.
Figure 1-4. Unified Command Structure
a. The Joint Strategic Planning System.
(1) The CJCS is charged by 10 USC with
preparing strategic plans and providing for the stra-
tegic direction of the Armed Forces. The Joint Stra-
tegic Planning System (JSPS), as prescribed by
CJCS Memorandum of Policy No. 7 (MOP 7), and
modified by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction (CJCSI) 3137.01, provides the frame-
work for strategic planning and strategic direction of
the Armed Forces. Joint strategic planning begins
the process that creates the forces whose capabilities
are apportioned for theater operation planning.
(2) Within the Joint Staff, strategic planning
is primarily the responsibility of the Strategic Plans
and Policy Directorate, J-5; and the Force Structure,
Resources, and Assessment Directorate, J-8, who
use input from the Joint Staff, OSD, other DOD and
Federal agencies, unified combatant commands, and
the Services to assist in policy formulation, develop
strategy, and provide force planning guidance. Pri-
mary responsibility for the management of the Joint
Operations Planning and Execution System
(JOPES), to include the review and approval of op-
erations plans, resides with the Operational Plans
and Interoperability Directorate, J-7 ; and Operations
Directorate, J-3.
(3) The JSPS constitutes a continuing proc-
ess in which documents or products are coherently
1-5
FM 100-11, Force Integration
produced (see Figure 1-5). Some are developed con-
currently. Key outputs of the JSPS include the Na-
tional Military Strategy (NMS), Joint Planning
Document (JPD), and the Joint Strategic Capabili-
ties Plan (JSCP). Two closely related documents are
produced hy the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC)/Joint War-fighting Capabilities As-
sessment (JWCA) process (defined and discussed
below). They are the Chairman’s Program Recom-
mendation (CPR), and the Chairman’s Program As-
sessment (CPA) (formerly part of the JSPS). The
NMS, JPD, and CPR are provided as advice to the
Secretary of Defense for use in preparation of the
DPG.
(4) In the resulting DPG, the Secretary of
Defense provides policy, articulates strategic objec-
tives and the national military strategy, and provides
force and resource guidance to the Services, other
DOD agencies, and to the combatant commanders.
Based on the DPG, the Services and DOD agencies
prepare their program objective memorandums
(POM). Using the CPA, the CJCS assesses the
adequacy of the Service and DOD agency POMs.
The CPA comments on the risk associated with the
planned allocation of defense resources. The CPA
evaluates how well POMs conform with the priori-
ties established in strategic plans and the CINCs’
requirements.
(5) The NMS, JPD, and CPR initiate the
planning phase of the DOD PPBS. They provide
CJCS advice to the NCA on the overall military
strategy, fiscally-constrained force structure, and
joint program priorities required to support U.S.
National security objectives. Considering its impact
on planning and programming, it is essential that
CJCS advice be included in the formulation of the
DPG.
(6) The JSCP provides strategic guidance,
contingency taskings, and apportions major combat
forces to combatant commanders for use in opera-
tional planning. Using the JSCP guidance, the
CINCs prepare operation plans in accordance with
the procedures of JOPES.
JSPS & CJCS Documents
Joint Strategy Review; Chairman's Guidance
(Continuous Assessment of Strategic Environment)
Figure 1-5. Joint Strategic Planning System
b. The Joint Strategy Review (JSR). The JSR is
the continuous JSPS process for gathering informa-
tion, raising issues, and facilitating the integration of
the strategy, operational planning, and program as-
sessments. Products of the JSR include Issue Papers,
the Long-Range Vision Paper, and the JSR Annual
Report. The JSR Annual Report recommends, as
appropriate, changes to the NMS and guides the de-
1-6
FM 100-11, Force Integration
velopment of the JPD. Approval of the JSR Annual
Report is one of the means available to the CJCS to
inject his guidance into the JSPS.
c. The Chairman’s Guidance (CG). The CG
provides the principal guidance to the Joint Staff and
information to the Secretary of Defense, the CINCs,
and the other members of the ICS regarding the
framework for building the NMS. This guidance
serves as a bridge between the initial assessments
and conclusions reached during the JSR process and
the specific processes that build the NMS, the JPD,
and the JSCP. The Director, Strategic Plans and
Policy, the Joint Staff (J5) recommended CG is pre-
sented in the JSR Annual Report and when ap-
proved, provides his initial guidance. The CG may
also be promulgated via other means anytime during
the JSR process, such as the CINCs Conference.
d. Joint Strategic Planning Documents.
(1) The National Military Strategy. This is
the first formal JSPS document and fulfills the
chairman’s 10 USC responsibility to “...assist the
President and the Secretary of Defense in providing
strategic direction of the Armed Forces.” It is re-
viewed annually during the JSR and revised or re-
published as needed. It provides the advice of the
CJCS, in consultation with the other members of the
JCS and the CINCs, to the President, Secretary of
Defense, and the NSC, as to the recommended mili-
tary strategy and fiscally-constrained force structure
required to attain the national security objectives.
The NMS consists of a contextual setting, an up-
dated intelligence appraisal, descriptions of ways to
achieve national security objectives, a description of
the strategic landscape, and the foundations and
principles upon which the strategy is based. Addi-
tionally, during NMS development, force levels re-
quired to support the strategy, with acceptable risk,
are identified. The NMS is then forwarded to the
President through the Secretary of Defense. The
NMS is developed as required by changes in the rec-
ommended strategy.
(2) The Joint Planning Document. This
document supports the NMS by providing concise
programming priorities, requirements or advice to
the Secretary of Defense for consideration during
preparation of the DPG. It is published in seven
stand-alone volumes: Intelligence; Nuclear; C4
Systems; Future Capabilities; Mapping, Charting,
and Geodesy; Manpower and Personnel; and Logis-
tics. The JPD and the NMS are forwarded to the
Secretary of Defense for his review. Both documents
provide supporting documentation to the Secretary
of Defense for his consideration during the prepara-
tion of the DPG.
(3) The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.
This plan provides guidance to the CINCs and to the
Chiefs of Staff of the Services to accomplish tasks
and missions based on current military capabilities.
(a) The JSCP apportions resources to
the CINCs, based on military capabilities resulting
from completed program and budget actions. The
JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities
based military advice provided to the NCA.
{b) The JSCP is the principal vehicle by
which the CINCs are tasked to develop operations
plans, concept plans and concept summaries for
global and regional contingencies. The JSCP gives
strategic planning direction for deliberate plans to be
developed over a period of 18 to 24 months. The
JSCP supports and implements, through CINCs’
operations plans and the NMS, the NCA’s Contin-
gency Planning Guidance (CPG).
(c) The JSCP apportions major combat
forces expected to be available during the planning
period for both Active and Reserve component
forces found under various conditions of mobiliza-
tion. These apportionments are incorporated into
CINC theater plans.
{d) The JSCP provides the CINCs a
threat estimate likely to impact the operational plan-
ning and force apportionment during the planning
period.
e. Joint Requirements Oversight Council Proc-
ess. The JROC consists of the Vice Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), the Vice Chiefs of Staff of
the Army and Air Force, Vice Chief of Naval Op-
erations, and the Assistant Commandant of the Ma-
rine Corps. Since April 1994, the CJCS expanded
the authority of the JROC to assist in building senior
military consensus across a range of issues.
(1) First, the JROC’s agenda broadened to
include greater initiative in defining military re-
quirements with an expanded focus on the planning,
programming and budgeting process. The JROC
oversees the requirements generation process for
major defense acquisition programs (MDAP).
(2) Second, the JROC activity has been in-
creasingly linked to a dialogue with CINCs on war-
fighting requirements.
(3) Third, the JROC established, as a new
analytical forum for deliberations, the Joint War-
fighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCA). These
assessments cover ten interacting warfare areas.
(4) Fourth, the JROC increased its direct in-
tegration in PPBS. The most significant effort has
1-7
FM 100-11, Force Integration
involved the production of the Chairman’s two
documents — the CPA (with a changed emphasis)
and the CPR (a new document).
f. JROC Review Board. To assist the integration
and coordination effort of the JWCA, the JROC cre-
ated the JROC Review Board (JRB). The JRB con-
sists of the Director, Force Structure, Resources,
and Assessment Directorate, the Joint Staff (J8), and
Service Deputy Operations Deputies. The JRB as-
sists the JROC in overseeing the requirements gen-
eration process and the JWCA process. The JRB
reviews JWCA insights, findings, recommendations,
and provides both guidance and direction.
g. Joint War-fighting Capabilities Assessments.
(1) JWCA teams, each sponsored hy a Joint
Staff directorate (Director), examine key relation-
ships and interactions among joint war-fighting ca-
pabilities and identify opportunities for improving
war-fighting effectiveness. The teams consist of war-
fighting and functional area expertise from the Joint
Staff, CINCs, Services, OSD, DOD agencies, and
others as deemed necessary.
(2) JWCA findings are presented to the JRB,
and then to the JROC for consideration. The JROC
then is instrumental in helping the CJCS forge con-
sensus and explore alternatives. The CJCS draws
advice from the JROC, the other JCS members, and
the CINCs, to fulfill his statutory responsibility to
provide advice to the Secretary of Defense regarding
program recommendations and budget proposals.
(3) The CPR and CPA form the basis for ful-
filling the CJCS’s responsibilities. Designed to offer
the CJCS’s personal viewpoint, the CPR and CPA
are supported by both the deliberate planning proc-
ess and JWCA. Both are produced and delivered
separately from other PPBS and JSPS documents.
h. Chairman ’s Documents.
(1) The Chairman’s Program Recommenda-
tion (CPR).
(a) The CPR provides the CJCS’s per-
sonal recommendation to the Secretary of Defense
for his consideration in the DPG. The recommenda-
tions are the CJCS’s views of programs important to
creating or enhancing joint war-fighting capabilities.
(b) The CPR is delivered early in the
POM cycle. It provides input to programming and
budgeting and is provided as advice to the Secretary
of Defense for use in preparing the DPG. The CPR
delineates the issues the CJCS deems critical priori-
ties and performance goals for the Secretary to con-
sider. The Secretary considers the CJCS’s recom-
mendations, and then publishes the DPG.
(c) The CPR recommendations are not
restricted to the FYDP. Examining and recom-
mending program alternatives within joint war-
fighting capability areas requires careful scrutiny of
empirical data, appropriate application of analytical
processes, and sound military judgment. The CPR
focuses upon specific recommendations that will
enhance joint readiness, promote joint doctrine and
training, and satisfy joint war-fighting requirements.
(2) The Chairman ’s Program Assessment.
(a) This assessment contains the
CJCS’s alternative program recommendations and
budget proposals for consideration by the Secretary
of Defense in refining the defense program and
budget. These adjustments are intended to enhance
joint readiness, promote joint doctrine and training,
and to reflect strategic and CINC priorities. The
CJCS reviews the POMs of the Services and other
DOD agencies and the preliminary program deci-
sions.
(b) The CPA is delivered late in the
Program review cycle, and provides the CJCS as-
sessment of composite Services’ and DOD agencies’
POMs adequacy. The CPA evaluates the extent that
the POMs conform to strategic priorities and CINC
requirements. The CJCS comments on the risks as-
sociated with the planned allocation of DOD re-
sources. When applicable, the CJCS makes recom-
mendations to the Secretary of Defense on specific
alternative programs and budget proposals based
upon personal assessment of current and future joint
war-fighting capabilities.
i. Key JSPS related documents.
(1) Defense Planning Guidance. The DPG
furnishes programming and fiscal guidance to the
military departments for development of POMs. It
includes major planning issues and decisions, strat-
egy and policy, the Secretary of Defense’s program
planning objectives, the Defense Planning Estimate,
and the Illustrative Planning Scenarios. The DPG is
a major link between the JSPS and PPBS.
(2) Contingency Planning Guidance. The
CPG provides written policy guidance for contin-
gency planning. The CPG focuses the guidance pro-
vided in the NMS and DPG and directly impacts the
JSCP.
j. JSPS in summary. Overall, the JSPS is a
flexible and interactive system intended to provide
supporting military advice to the DOD PPBS. It also
provides strategic guidance for use in the JOPES.
Through the JSPS, the Joint Chiefs of Staff review
the national security environment and national secu-
rity objectives; evaluate the threat; assesses current
strategy and existing or proposed programs and
budgets; and propose military strategy, programs,
and forces necessary to achieve national security
objectives. It accomplishes this in a resource-limited
environment, consistent with policies and priorities
established by the President and the Secretary of
1-8
FM 100-11, Force Integration
Defense. The JSPS process permits the JCS and the
CEvfCs to participate in the development of every
JSPS document.
1-10. Joint Operation Planning and Execution
System
The JOPES is the command and control system re-
quired hy DOD regulation for all joint conventional
operational planning and execution. JOPES also in-
cludes theater-level nuclear and chemical plans and
addresses mohilization, deployment, employment,
and sustainment mission areas. It is the principal
system for translating and implementing policy deci-
sions of the NCA and the JSPS into plans and orders
for operations in support of national security policy.
It also provides joint operational requirements for
analysis in the PPBS for resource decisions that af-
fect the National Security Council System (NSCS)
and JSPS.
Section IV:
The Army Environment
1-11. Army leadership
The leadership of the Department of the Army (DA)
is responsible for the Army’s strategic planning and
for assisting in joint strategic planning. The senior
leadership nucleus includes the Secretary, the Chief
of Staff, the Undersecretary, and the Vice Chief of
Staff. The Army executes its statutory missions hy
raising, provisioning, sustaining, maintaining, and
training Army forces. These forces provide the
CINCs of the unified combatant commands with
military forces for operations.
1-12. The Army Planning System
The Army Planning System (APS) starts the Army’s
strategic planning process, building on the NMS. It
determines force requirements and objectives and
establishes guidance for the allocation of resources
for the execution of Army roles and missions in sup-
port of national security and policy objectives. Stra-
tegic planning provides direct support to the DOD
PPBS and JSPS and indirectly serves as a guide for
the later development of Army programs and budg-
ets.
1-13. The Army Planning, Progr amm in g , Budg-
eting, and Execution System
a. Army requirements descend not only from the
statutory functions, but also from strategic and op-
erational requirements derived from the planning
element of DOD’s PPBS. DOD planning translates
into the planning phase of the Army’s Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System
(PPBES).
b. The PPBES is the Army’s primary strategic
management system used to allocate and manage
resources. Its objectives are to —
(1) Eollow the NMS in sizing, structuring,
manning and training of Army forces.
(2) Obtain required forces, manpower, mate-
riel, and dollars.
(3) Allocate forces, manpower, materiel, and
dollars among competing demands according to
Army resource allocation policies and priorities.
(4) Evaluate execution of the program and
budget to achieve intended purposes and adjust re-
source requirements based on feedback.
c. The PPBES provides for a progression from
national security objectives, policies, and strategies
to the development of force structure and programs
within resource constraints and as the basis for the
six-year period of the EYDP. Einally, the PPBES
leads to preparation, execution, and review of the
budget. A detailed discussion of the PPBES is found
in Chapter 12.
1-14. The Army Mobilization and Operations
Planning and Execution System
The Army Mobilization and Operations Planning
and Execution System (AMOPES) provides the
structure and process for Army participation in
JOPES. It covers the full course of military action to
include mobilization, deployment, sustainment, force
expansion, redeployment, and demobilization. The
goal of AMOPES is to ensure that the Army can
support the combat operations of the combatant
commanders. AMOPES provides the linkage be-
tween war planning under JOPES and mobilization
planning as directed by DOD and the JCS. It pre-
scribes the Army crisis action system for managing
the execution of mobilization and operation plans.
1-15. The Army Mobilization Plan
a. The Army Mobilization Plan (AMP) is a col-
lection of mobilization plans of the major Army
commands (MACOM). The purpose of Army mobi-
lization planning is to provide the resources required
to support various operation plans (OPE AN). This
includes mobilizing units, manpower, and materiel
required for implementation of an OPLAN, as well
as the resources required to sustain the operation.
b. The United States Army Eorces Command
(EORSCOM) mobilization plan, with its associated
Mobilization Planning and Execution System
(MPES), details the time-phased flow of mobilizing
Reserve Component units from home station to their
mobilization stations.
c. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com-
mand (TRADOC) training base expansion plan
(TBEP) provides installations and training base
1-9
FM 100-11, Force Integration
augmentation units in the Army with guidance on
training base expansion activities.
1-16. The TRADOC requirements process
a. The TRADOC requirements process identi-
fies the capahilities required to attain the vision of
the future Army. It receives input from the war-
fighting CINCs’ Integrated Priority Lists (IPL) and
the Army component commanders. The TRADOC
Requirements Process considers the domains of
doctrine, training, leader development, organiza-
tions, and materiel (including science and technol-
ogy) which focus on soldiers (DTLOMS).
b. The objectives of TRADOC requirements
process are to —
(1) Develop the Army’s vision of future bat-
tlefields, functions, and tasks.
(2) Identify required capabilities to execute
the vision.
(3) Influence PPBES consistent with Army
priorities.
(4) Maintain research, development, and ac-
quisition (RDA) program stability.
c. After determining strategic, operational, and
tactical battlefield requirements, and requirements
derived from statutory missions, the Army must de-
vise and execute rational solutions. DOD and the
Army make these decisions and provide the re-
sources for their execution through the DOD PPBS
and Army PPBES.
Section V:
The Army Organizational Life Cycle
Model
1-17. Management of change
Change requires the Army to remain capable in an
environment of technological advancements, internal
management variances, and a world in turmoil. The
management of change is an evolving process that
must have focus and methodology to support the
Army’s vision, imperatives, core competencies, and
enduring values.
1-18. The Army organizational life cycle model
a. Each resource required by an organization is
somewhere within a life cycle model from its devel-
opment to its ultimate separation or expenditure. The
AOLCM is depicted in figure 1-6.
b. The norm of the AOLCM is constant change.
The need exists to resource and manage this change.
Any resource will always be in some functional
stage, with all of these functions occurring concur-
rently in a never-ending process.
c. The fundamental output of the AOLCM is
combat-ready units progressing through —
(1) Force development, force development is
the process of translating Army missions and func-
tions into materiel and organizational requirements,
time-phased programs, and structure within avail-
able resources. It is the initiating process of the
AOLCM.
(2) Acquisition. Acquisition is an initial pro-
curement activity that results in an asset being
brought under military control. This activity includes
research and development (R&D), test and evalua-
tion (T&E), and military construction (MILCON)
programs.
(3) Training. Training is the vehicle for or-
derly transition from a civilian to a military envi-
ronment. In the AOLCM, this training establishes
the entry-level skill baseline for all soldiers.
(4) Distribution. Distribution is the process
of assigning or transferring people or materiel from
the wholesale level to the user.
(5) Deployment. Deployment is the move-
ment of organizations, people, and things in accor-
dance with the worldwide commitments of the Army.
(6) Sustainment. Sustainment is the process
of using acquired resources to maintain and logisti-
cally support the Army.
(7) Development. Development is the process
of constantly improving soldier's skills and experi-
ence through progressive assignments, education,
and training. Units develop through collective train-
ing.
(8) Separation. Separation is the process of
removing personnel and materiel from active service.
People may separate from military service voluntar-
ily or involuntarily due to reduction in force actions,
mandatory retirement, or medical or disciplinary
reasons. Materiel is removed through the Defense
Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO) or
through foreign military sales (f MS).
d. Essential to the functioning of the AOLCM
model are the critical inputs of resources and leader-
ship. Resources, including time, money, people,
materiel, technology, and information are needed to
energize the system. Command, management, and
leadership provide necessary control and direction
through the Army’s operating processes for the de-
velopment and sustainment of combat-ready units.
1-10
FM 100-11, Force Integration
\ STRUCTURING\
/ EQUIPPING /
SUSTAINING
^DEPLOYING
STATIONING
/INFORMATION /
^TECHNOLOGY/
READINESS
Figure 1-6. Army Organizational Life Cycle Model
Section VI:
Operating Processes
1-19. Strategic and operational requirements
determination process
The strategy, fiscal guidance, and OPLANs and
contingency plans (CONPLANs) flow from DOD
into the Army resourcing process.
1-20. Research, development, and acquisition
process
The requirements for new materiel flow to the mate-
riel developer, who executes the Life Cycle System
Management Model (LCSMM), which provides
materiel systems.
1-21. Force development process
Requirements for new or changed organizations or
new or improved materiel systems initiate the force
development process.
1-22. Resource allocation and distribution process
The national strategy, fiscal guidance, and force
structure guidance establish the requirement to dis-
tribute resources, in priority, to achieve the highest
force readiness and to accept risk where rational.
1-11
FM 100-11, Force Integration
1-23. Battlefield requirements determination
process
The TRADOC Requirements Process identifies re-
quired capabilities and develops solutions in terms of
DTLOMS. The materiel developer and combat de-
veloper translate the requirements for materiel sys-
tems.
1-24. Manpower allocation and distribution proc-
ess
Based on priorities and valid authorizations, person-
nel are acquired, trained, and distributed to units.
1-25. Materiel allocation and distribution process
Based on priorities and valid authorizations, materiel
(acquired through the RDA process) is allocated and
distributed to units.
1-26. Battle laboratories (labs)
Battle Labs are a means to develop capabilities for a
force projection Army that is technologically supe-
rior. For a contingency oriented, power projection
Army it is imperative to maintain a technologically
superior force. Tied to our evolving battlefield dy-
namic concepts and war-fighting doctrine in FM
100-5, Battle Labs use the battlefield as a reference.
By encouraging experimentation via simulations or
prototypes. Battle Labs determine requirements in
the areas of DTLOMS (see Figure 1-7). They serve
as a practical mechanism for working with new
ideas and assessing new capabilities provided by
advanced technology. The eight Battle Labs and
their locations are-
a. Early Entry, Lethality, and Survivability; Eort
Monroe, Virginia.
b. Depth and Simultaneous Attack; Eort Sill,
Oklahoma.
c. Mounted Battlespace; Eort Knox, Kentucky.
d. Dismounted Battlespace; Eort Benning, Geor-
gia.
e. Battle Command; Eort Leavenworth, Kansas;
Eort Huachuca, Arizona; Eort Gordon, Georgia.
/. Combat Service Support; Eort Lee, Virginia.
g. Maneuver Support; Eort Leonard Wood,
Missouri.
h. Air Maneuver; Eort Rucker, Alabama.
Section VII:
Summary
The Army operates within the national security
structure as a strategic force. The nature of the
Army’s roles, functions, and missions implies that
change will occur constantly and that management
of change is vital to minimizing turbulence while
increasing force capability in a coordinated manner.
This management of change produces and maintains
combat ready units that are capable of conducting
prompt and sustained operations on land, against
any threat on any battlefield, and winning decisively.
PROCESS
- Conceptualize
- Analyze
- Simulate
- Experiment
- Evaluate
- Prioritize
SOLUTIONS
Expressed in terms of:
- Doctrine
- Training
- Leader Development
- Organizations
- Mattel
- Soldiers
BENEFITS
-Brin^ Together Users,
Science & Technology,
and Other Pliers
- Louisiana Maneuvers Interface
Figure 1-7. Battle Lab Approach
1-12
FM 100-11, Force Integration
Chapter 2
How the Army Intends to Fight
Section I:
Introduction
2-1. Doctrine
The Army fights according to doctrine derived from
a hierarchy of concepts. Doctrine is the Army’s col-
lective view of how it intends to fight; it provides a
basis for change. It gives the Army a common lan-
guage and purpose and serves to unite the actions of
many diverse elements into a team effort. Doctrine
also influences the development of organizations and
weapon systems hy establishing potential functions
and limits of employment.
2-2. Force projection
Power projection is central to U.S. national strategy.
The Army contributes to this strategy as part of a
joint force through force projection. Army compo-
nents of joint forces must have the capability to
alert, mobilize, deploy, and conduct operations rap-
idly anywhere in the world. Force projection applies
to the total Army within and outside CONUS. Army
organizations are designated forward presence, crisis
response, initial reinforcement, follow-on reinforce-
ment, and reconstitution forces.
Section II:
The Role and Development of Doctrine
2-3. The role of doctrine
a. Doctrinal Principles. Doctrine represents the
fundamental principles by which military forces
guide their actions in support of national objectives.
It is the statement of how the Army fights cam-
paigns, major operations, battles, and engagements;
influences events in operations other than war
(OOTW), and deters actions detrimental to national
interests. The intent is to ensure the availability of a
force capable of decisive victory anywhere in the
world.
b. Joint and combined operations. Army war-
fighting doctrine reflects the nature of modem war-
fare. Guided by strategic policy, it applies the prin-
ciples of war, the Army’s basic tenets, and combat
power dynamics to current and future battlefields. It
is inherently a joint doctrine that recognizes the
teamwork required of all the services and by allies. It
considers the extension of the battlefield in time,
space, and purpose through all available resources
and campaign design. In land warfare, ground force
units, in coordination with members of a joint and/or
combined team, are the decisive means to the strate-
gic ends.
c. The role of technology. Doctrine will develop
an understanding of the technological potential of the
age and its effects on methods of Army operations.
Doctrine seeks to be sufficiently broad and forward
looking to rapidly accommodate major technological
opportunities to give soldiers a battlefield advantage.
Resources and force dispositions — themselves re-
flective of strategy — also contribute to the develop-
ment of doctrine.
d. The role of the threat. Doctrine seeks to meet
the challenges of the uncertain threat facing the
Army by providing guidance to deal with a range of
threats. It reflects the strategic context in which
Army forces will operate and incorporates the wis-
dom of the Army’s collective leadership in estab-
lishing a guide to action in war and OOTW.
e. Doctrinal specificity. Doctrine provides a
framework to foster initiative and freedom of action,
creativity, and independent decisions. Doctrine and
supporting tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTP) should only limit the commander’s freedom of
action to the extent necessary to ensure the applica-
tion of doctrinal consistency, compliance, and sound
application of risk assessment and management
techniques.
/. Applicability. Doctrine is authoritative but re-
quires judgment in application. It is a statement of
principles on “how to think,” not “what to think.”
While sufficiently definitive to guide specific opera-
tions, it must remain adaptable to address diverse
and varied situations worldwide.
g. Scope. Capstone manuals and principal pro-
ponent manuals focus on doctrine. All other doc-
trinal literature emphasizes TTP.
(1) Tactics describe the application of doc-
trinal principles. Tactics portray how units operate
successfully. Techniques and procedures provide
methods to perform assigned missions and functions;
they ensure uniformity of action between organiza-
tions and relate to current organizations and equip-
ment.
(2) Additionally, organizations develop tacti-
cal standing operating procedures (TSOP) to stan-
dardize tasks and functions supporting tactical op-
erations for like units focused on organizations,
equipment, reports, support, and command and con-
trol. Standard procedures apply unless modified
based on the commander’s assessment of mission,
enemy, terrain, troops, and time available
(METT-T).
2-1
FM 100-11, Force Integration
2-4. Conceptual foundation of doctrine
Concepts provide the vision and required capabilities
for the evolution of the Army. They describe the ob-
jective force and provide a basis for the prioritiza-
tion of capabilities required. Concepts serve as the
basis for Battle Laboratory and branch proponent
analyses and focus the development of future doc-
trine and technical efforts. Various concepts build
required capabilities for deployment and employ-
ment of Army forces across the operational contin-
uum:
a. Umbrella concepts derive from DOD and
Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA)
planning documents, historical perspectives, lessons
learned, threat assessments, and technology fore-
casts. Umbrella concepts provide top-down concep-
tual guidance for all subordinate concepts.
b. Battle dynamic concepts describe required
capabilities within a battle dynamic. These concepts
flow from the umbrella concept and other extant
guidance. Battle dynamic concepts provide concep-
tual guidance to branch proponents. Battlefield dy-
namics are the interrelationships of time, space, and
forces. In aggregate, battle dynamics focus on five
sectors:
(1) Early entry, lethality, and survivability.
(2) Depth and simultaneous attack.
(3) Battle space (mounted/ dismounted).
(4) Battle command.
(5) Combat service support.
c. Operational concepts describe required com-
bat, combat support, and combat service support
capabilities. These concepts derive from battle dy-
namic concepts and from the umbrella concepts.
d. Organizational concepts describe how organi-
zations accomplish doctrinal tasks and missions.
e. Technology concepts leverage technology to
enhance future capabilities. These concepts describe
potential technological applications to solve a pro-
jected operational problem or to take advantage of
existing opportunities.
2-5. Sources of doctrinal change
a. Doctrine derives from a variety of sources
and is revised as these sources change. Doctrine is
evolutionary to ensure the force keeps pace with the
threat, national military strategy, technology, and
lessons of warfare. Causes for revisions include
combat lessons learned, ideas from the war-fighting
CINCs, and exercises.
b. Changes in doctrine affect how the Army
equips, organizes, and trains. New or changed doc-
trine cannot be isolated within a single type of or-
ganization. As changes occur, they affect organiza-
tions at different force levels: brigade or regiment.
division or corps. To be effective, doctrine must be
executable at operational and tactical levels
throughout the Army.
c. Any change in doctrine will require leaders
and soldiers at all levels to adopt new ways of
thinking. Change must start with the senior leader-
ship. Impending doctrinal changes must establish a
common understanding of changes. Discussions of
doctrine will surface issues that require resolution
and set the strategy for implementation.
d. The introduction of new doctrine and materiel
into organizations begins with doctrine and tactics
training (DTT) together with new equipment training
(NET) and new organization training (NOT). A
unit's combat readiness validates the incorporation
of the doctrinal change. Unit training accomplishes
the sustainment of change.
2-6. Validation of doctrine
Once doctrine has been developed, staffed, and ap-
proved, the implementation and evaluation phase
begins. The evaluation of doctrinal changes occurs
under operational conditions at the appropriate force
level. It occurs by conducting tests during focused
rotations at the combat training centers or during
Army, joint, or combined exercises.
Section III:
Fundamentals of Army Operations
2-7. The range of military operations
The United States Army exists to protect and defend
the Constitution of the United States. It does that by
deterring war, and, if deterrence fails, by providing
Army forces capable of achieving decisive victory as
part of a joint team on the battlefield — anywhere in
the world and under virtually any conditions. To
these ends, the Army relies on its Total Eorce —
Active Component, Reserve Components, and civil-
ians — acting in concert with the other services and
the military forces of our allies to conduct opera-
tions. The total force policy helps gain public sup-
port for operations requiring force projection de-
signed to achieve strategic aims in diverse environ-
ments. The Army classifies its activities as war and
OOTW.
a. War. In war, the Army, as part of a joint
team, applies decisive force to fight and win with
minimum casualties. War may be of a limited or
general nature. In war, the strategic goal is to con-
clude hostilities on terms favorable to the U.S. and
its allies and to return to peacetime as quickly as
possible.
b. OOTW. Army forces must prepare to conduct
activities during peacetime and conflict that may or
may not involve armed clashes between two organ-
ized forces. During peacetime, the U.S. attempts to
2-2
FM 100-11, Force Integration
influence world events through diplomatic actions
that routinely occur between nations. For the Army,
typical peacetime operations include counter dmg,
disaster relief, civil support, peace building and na-
tion assistance. Conflict is characterized by hostili-
ties to secure strategic objectives. During conflict,
the goal is to deter war and resolve hostilities on
terms favorable to the United States. Military op-
erations during conflict are combat or noncombat.
Strikes and raids, peace enforcement, support to in-
surgency, antiterrorism, peacekeeping, and noncom-
batant evacuation operations are examples.
2-8. The levels of war
Basic to the Army’s doctrine is an appreciation of
the levels of war— doctrinal perspectives that define
the wide range of operations and links tactical ac-
tions and strategic objectives. The levels of war are
defined more by the result of their outcome than they
are by the echelon of involvement — normally, the
higher the echelon the higher the level of war. There
are no limits or boundaries between the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels. These levels apply
not only to war, but also to OOTW:
a. The strategic level is both worldwide and re-
gionally oriented. Strategy concerns itself with na-
tional, alliance, or coalition objectives. The theater
commander has both a theater strategy and cam-
paign plan that achieve the strategic objective.
b. The operational level provides the vital link
between strategic aims and tactical employment of
forces. At the operational level, military forces attain
strategic aims through the design, organization, and
conduct of subordinate campaigns and major opera-
tions. Operational commanders set the terms of bat-
tle and exploit the results of battles and engage-
ments.
c. The tactical level of war concerns the execu-
tion of operations of immediate consequence to the
forces in contact. On the battlefield, the primary fo-
cus of the tactical commander is on winning battles
and engagements. Tactical level commanders depend
on their higher commanders to move them effectively
in and out of battles and engagements.
2-9. Principles of war and tenets of operations
An understanding of the Army’s doctrinal founda-
tions serves as the basis for operating successfully
across the full range of possible operations. These
are the principles of war and the tenets of Army op-
erations. The nine principles of war provide general
guidance for the conduct of war at the strategic, op-
erational, and tactical levels. They are the enduring
bedrock of Army doctrine. The nine principles of
war are: objective, offensive, mass, economy of
force, maneuver, unity of command, security, sur-
prise, and simplicity. The Army's success on and off
the battlefield depends on its ability to operate in
accordance with five basic tenets: initiative, agility,
depth, synchronization, and versatility.
2-10. The combined arms concept
The Army employs three general types of combat
forces: heavy, light, and Special Operations Forces
(SOF). Army forces fight as combined arms teams.
The combined arms team strives to conduct fully
integrated operations within available time, space,
and resources.
2-11. Rules of engagement
As a disciplined force subordinate to political
authority, the Army conducts warfare according to
established rules of engagement (ROE) and interna-
tional laws. The Army expects all of its units to fight
within constraints specified by higher authority.
Army forces apply the combat power necessary to
ensure victory, but are careful to limit unnecessary
death and destruction. Military necessity justifies
objectives attained through appropriate and disci-
plined use of force.
2-12. The dynamics and functions of combat
power
Four primary elements — maneuver, firepower, pro-
tection, and leadership — combine to create combat
power and the ability to fight. Winning in battle de-
pends on an understanding of the dynamics of com-
bat power and their proper integration and synchro-
nization to ensure defeat of the enemy. Individual
combat functions build and sustain combat power.
The combat functions consist of the following —
a. Intelligence. Gathering and analyzing infor-
mation on the environment of operations and the en-
emy.
b. Maneuver. Creating the conditions for tactical
and operational success through the direct or indirect
application of combat power.
c. Fire support. Synchronizing fire with maneu-
ver. It includes the coordinated employment of fires
of armed aircraft, land- and sea-based fire systems,
and electronic warfare systems against ground tar-
gets.
d. Air defense. Protecting the force from air at-
tack.
e. Mobility and survivability. Preserving and
protecting the force from weapon effects and natural
occurrences.
/. Logistics. Providing the physical means with
which the force operates.
g. Battle command. Visualizing friendly and en-
emy forces in time, space, and purpose and formu-
lating concepts of operation to accomplish specified
and implied missions.
2-3
FM 100-11, Force Integration
Section IV:
Force Projection Operations
2-13. Stages of force projection operations
Force projection operations follow a general se-
quence, although stages overlap in time and space.
For instance, mobilization and deployment are con-
tinuous and may occur simultaneously or sequen-
tially. Force projection operations include the fol-
lowing stages —
a. Mobilization stage. This is the augmentation
of Active Component capability in preparation for
war or national emergency. It includes activating all
or part of the Reserve Components as well as as-
sembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and
materiel. The mobilization system includes five lev-
els:
(1) Selective mobilization.
(2) Presidential selected reserve call-up.
(3) Partial mobilization.
(4) Full mobilization.
(5) Total mobilization.
b. Predeployment stage. Activities in this stage
ensure units prepare to execute operations based
upon their design capability.
c. Deployment stage. This stage requires forces
to use sttategic assets and host nation support, if
available, to move to the area of operations. Force
mix, combat capability, and sustainment are respon-
sive to effect changes during this operation.
d. Force Entry stage. Operations in this stage
may be in direct support of host nation or forward
presence forces. Conditions may require entry under
opposed or unopposed conditions.
e. Operations stage. This stage may include the
full range of combat as well as OOTW.
f. War Termination and Post-conflict Opera-
tions stage. This may include restoring order, rees-
tablishing the host nation’s infrastructure, and pre-
paring forces for redeployment.
g. Redeployment and Reconstitution stage. This
stage removes forces no longer required for post
conflict operations, rebuilds unit integrity, and ac-
counts for soldiers and equipment.
h. Demobilization stage. This is the process by
which units, individuals, and materiel transfer from
active to Reserve status.
Section V:
Summary
Concepts provide the underpinning for determining
battlefield requirements that result in new or
changed doctrine, training, leader development, or-
ganizations, materiel and focuses on soldier
(DTLOMS) needs. These changes address solutions
to battlefield needs that form the operational capa-
bility to enable the Army to accomplish its force
projection mission.
2-4
FM 100-11, Force Integration
Chapter 3
The Reserve Components
Section I:
Introduction
3-1. Two components
Chapter 1003, title 10, United States Code (10
use), identifies the Army National Guard of the
United States (ARNGUS) and United States Army
Reserve (USAR) as the Reserve Components (RC)
of the Army. The RC, Active Army and civilian
workforce comprise the Total Army.
3-2. The Army National Guard
The Army National Guard (ARNG) is the state mi-
litia, normally controlled hy governors of the states
and several territories. The ARNG is also a federal
Reserve and reports to the Department of the Army
when Federalized during national emergencies. It
supports both Federal and state governments and
deploys as a state or Federally activated force to
ensure domestic tranquility.
3-3. The U.S. Army Reserve
The USAR is a major element under the Department
of the Army. Public law limits the domestic role of
the USAR and Active Army.
Section II:
Reserve Component Structure
3-4. RC statutory foundation
a. Section 10102, 10 USC, identifies the RC
purpose to provide trained units and qualified per-
sons available for active duty in time of war, na-
tional emergency, or as national security requires.
Legal provisions specific to the ARNG are in title
32, United States Code (32 USC).
b. The RC role has expanded from wartime
augmentation to an integral part of the Total Army
force. Today’s Army requires the RC to meet any
major contingency.
3-5. RC composition
The RC includes the Ready Reserve, the Standby
Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. Figure 3-1 sum-
marizes the categories of the Army Reserve.
a. The Ready Reserve. The Ready Reserve con-
sists of military members of the National Guard and
the Army Reserve, organized in units, or as indi-
viduals, liable for recall to active duty to augment
the Active Army in time of war or national emer-
gency. The Ready Reserve is the Selected Reserve,
Individual Ready Reserve and the Inactive National
Guard.
CATEGORY
RESERVE OF
THE ARMY
STATUS
Ready Reserve
SELECTED RESERVE
Active
INDIVIDUAL READY
RESERVE
Active
INACTIVE ARMY
NATIONAL GUARD
Inactive
Standby Reserve
STANDBY RESERVE
(USAR only)
Active/
Inactive
Retired Reserve
RETIRED RESERVE
(USAR only)
Retired
Figure 3-1 . Categories of the Army Reserve
(1) The Selected Reserve. The Selected Re-
serve consists of Ready Reserve units and individu-
als designated by the Army and approved by the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, as so essential to
initial wartime missions that they have priority over
all other Reserves (10 USC 10143). All Selected
Reserves are in an active status.
(a) Selected Reserve units. Units
manned and equipped to serve and/or train either as
operational or augmentation units. Operational units
train and serve as units; augmentation units train
together but lose unit identity when mobilized. Se-
lected Reserve units include —
• Drilling unit Reservists. Unit members who
participate in unit training activities on a
part-time basis.
• Full-time Reserve unit support personnel.
National Guard and Army Reserve members
of the Selected Reserve ordered to active
duty (Active Guard Reserve (AGR)) for the
purpose of organizing, administering, re-
cruiting, instructing, or training Reserve
component units. AGR soldiers must be as-
signed against an authorized mobilization
position in the unit they support.
(b) Individual Mobilization Augmen-
tees. Trained USAR individuals preassigned to an
Active Army, Selective Service System or Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) billet that
requires fill on or shortly after mobilization. Individ-
ual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) participate in
training activities on a part-time basis (12 days an-
nually) with an Active Army unit in preparation for
mobilization recall.
3-1
FM 100-11, Force Integration
(c) Training pipeline (non-deployable).
Enlisted members who have not yet completed initial
active duty for training (lADT) and officers attend-
ing professional category or undergraduate flying
training.
(2) The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)
(USAR only). The IRR consists of Ready Reservists
not in the Selected Reserve.
(a) Annual training (AT) Control
Group. IRR soldiers with a training obligation. They
are not normally assigned to USAR units and take
part in AT when directed by the Army Reserve Per-
sonnel Center (ARPERCEN).
(b) Reinforcement Control Group. All
IRR soldiers not assigned to another control group.
Both obligated and non-obligated officers are eligi-
ble for assignment to a USAR unit or an IMA posi-
tion. Non-obligated officers who decline assignment
risk being removed from active status.
(c) Officer Active Duty Obligator Con-
trol Group. Active duty officers, appointed in the
USAR, who do not begin active duty at the time of
appointment.
(d) Dual Component Control Group.
Regular Army enlisted soldiers or warrant officers
who hold Army Reserve commissions.
(3) The InActive Army National Guard
(ING). ING personnel are in inactive status in the
Ready Reserve and attached to a specific National
Guard unit. ING members muster annually with
their assigned unit, but do not participate in training
activities. On mobilization, ING members mobilize
with their units.
b. The Standby Reserve.
(1) The Standby Reserve consists of person-
nel who maintain their military affiliation without
being in the Ready Reserve, are designated key ci-
vilian employees, or have a temporary hardship or
disability.
(2) The Standby Reserve is a pool of trained
individuals available to fill manpower needs in spe-
cific skills. These individuals are not assigned to
units and have no training requirement.
(3) The Standby Reserve are subject to in-
voluntarily mobilization for the duration plus six
months during war or national emergency declared
by Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law,
provided the Secretary of the Army, with the ap-
proval of the Secretary of Defense, determines there
are insufficient qualified, readily available Ready
Reservist or ING.
(4) Active Standby Reserve soldiers are eli-
gible for inactive duty training (IDT) without pay or
travel allowances. However, they are eligible for
retirement points, promotion credit, or both.
(5) Inactive Standby Reserve soldiers retain
their Reserve affiliation in a nonparticipating status
but are ineligible to train for points, pay or promo-
tion.
c. The Retired Reserve. The Retired Reserve
consists of soldiers retired based on active and/or
Reserve Eederal service or medically retired. Those
who complete 20 or more years active duty (Regular
or Reserve) are eligible for voluntary active duty
recall when required by the Secretary of the Army.
They are subject to involuntary active duty recall
when in the interest of national defense.
Section III:
Reserve Component Management
Structure
3-6. Congress and the Department of Defense
a. As with the Active Army, Congress, OSD,
and DA enact laws and policies that affect the
ARNG and USAR. The Senate Armed Services
Committee (SASC) and the House National Security
Committee (HNSC) prepare the Defense Authoriza-
tion Act that addresses strength authorizations and
other matters concerning the ARNG and USAR. The
Defense subcommittees of the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees prepare the appropria-
tions acts that authorize funding.
b. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of De-
fense (Reserve Affairs) (ASD(RA)) has overall re-
sponsibility for the RC at OSD level. The principal
policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense on RC
matters is the Reserve Eorces Policy Board (REPB)
which acts through the ASD(RA). The REPB in-
cludes a civilian chairman, an RC general officer as
board executive officer, the Assistant Secretaries
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs) of each Service,
Guard and Reserve general officers, and one active
duty general or flag officer from each military de-
partment. The REPB submits an Annual Report to
the President and Congress on the Status of the RC
as required by statute. That report normally reviews
the progress made by DOD and the Services in im-
proving the readiness of the RC. It also identifies
areas where the Board concludes further improve-
ments are necessary to make the Reserve Forces
more effective.
3-7. U.S. Army Reserve Component controls
a. Within the DA, the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Af-
fairs) (ASA(M&RA)) has overall responsibility for
RC matters.
b. The Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee
(ARFPC) reviews and comments to the Secretary of
the Army and Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) on major
policy matters directly affecting the RC and mobili-
zation preparedness of the Army. The Secretary of
3-2
FM 100-11, Force Integration
the Army appoints the committee members com-
prising five Active Army general officers from the
Army Staff, five ARNG general officers, and five
USAR general officers. The Secretary also appoints
five alternate members from the ARNG and USAR.
The committee selects a chairman to serve a
two-year term from among the RC members. The
Director of the Army Staff serves as adviser to the
committee.
c. The Reserve Component Coordination
Council (RCCC) reviews progress on RC readiness
improvements, ascertains issues and coordinates
tasking those issues to the Army Staff, and reviews
the progress of staff efforts. The Vice Chief of Staff,
Army (VCSA) chairs the RCCC and membership
includes the Deputy ASA(M&RA), Director of the
Army National Guard, FORSCOM Chief of Staff,
and selected general officers from the Army Staff,
Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Army
Reserve.
3-8. Army National Guard
a. State control. State governors command their
respective ARNG until federalized. Governors exer-
cise state command and control through The Adju-
tant General (TAG), whose authority as a state
official is recognized by federal law. TAGs manage
federal resources to build combat-ready units. Their
management staffs include both state and federal
employees. ARNG commanders lead their units in
training during peacetime. A State Area Command
(STARC) commands and controls ARNG units
during premobilization through arrival at the mobili-
zation station and performs movement control func-
tions for all armed services and components during
mobilization. STARCs provide family support func-
tions for mobilized Reserve soldiers.
b. Federal control. At the federal level, the Na-
tional Guard Bureau (NGB) is a joint bureau of the
Departments of the Army and Air Force. It provides
a peacetime channel of communications among the
Departments of the Army, Air Force, and National
Guard as established by 10 USC 3040. It is both a
staff and an operating agency.
(1) The staff function of the NGB is to for-
mulate and administer a program for the develop-
ment and maintenance of National Guard units in
accordance with Army and Air Force policies. As an
operating agency, the NGB deals directly with state
governors and TAGs. Figure 3-2 depicts the Na-
tional Guard management structure.
Figure 3-2. National Guard Management Structure
(2) The Chief, NGB (CNGB), is a lieutenant
general appointed for a four-year term by the Presi-
dent, with the advice and consent of the Senate, from
a list of National Guard officers recommended by
the state governors. He may succeed himself He
reports to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force
3-3
FM 100-11, Force Integration
through the respective Chiefs of Staff and is their
principal adviser on National Guard affairs. The
CNGB has no command authority; cooperation is
facilitated through control of funds, end strength,
equipment, and force structure programs, and hy
authority to develop and puhlish regulations per-
taining to the ARNG when not federally mohilized.
(3) The CNGB is also the appropriations di-
rector of six appropriations hy law: three ARNG
and three Air National Guard appropriations (pay
and allowance, operations and maintenance, and
construction). He exercises administrative control
through the Vice Chief, NGB (a major general of the
opposite service of the CNGB) to the Directors of
the ARNG and Air National Guard.
(4) The Director of the Army National Guard
(DARNG) administers allocated resources to sup-
port ARNG force structure, personnel, facilities,
training, and equipment, and to provide comhat-
ready units. In support of the Federal mission, the
DARNG also formulates the ARNG long-range
plan, program, and budget for submission to the
Army Staff. The DARNG organization is at Figure
3-3.
• Comptroller Directorate
• Installation, Logistics and Environmental
Resource Directorate
• Operations, Training, and Readiness Directorate
• Force Management Directorate
• Aviation and Safety Directorate
• Personnel Directorate
• Information Systems Directorate
Figure 3-3. Director of the Army National
Guard (DARNG) Organization
c. Federal funds and property supervision. The
United States Property and Fiscal Officer (USPFO)
is an Army or Air National Guard officer ordered to
active duty under 10 USC. The USPFO receives and
accounts for all Federal funds and property and pro-
vides financial and logistical resources for the
maintenance of Federal property provided to the
state. The USPFO furnishes advice and assistance to
units within the state to ensure that use of Federal
property is in accordance with applicable Depart-
ment of the Army directives as implemented by the
NGB. The USPFO manages the Federal logistics
support system for the states and, upon mobilization
of a supported unit, provides support necessary for
the transition to active duty status. The USPFO is a
federal contracting officer and responsible for fed-
eral procurement activities within the state. The
USPFO is also the transportation officer responsible
for mobilization planning and transportation of
ARNG personnel, technicians, supplies, and equip-
ment. Finally, the USPFO is a payroll certifying of-
ficer who certifies the accuracy of Federal payrolls.
3-9. U.S. Army Reserve
a. USAR management structure. The Army
management structure for the USAR is at Figure
3-4. The Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR)
provides direction for USAR planning to provide
trained units and individuals to support Army mobi-
lization plans. Figure 3-5 shows the organization of
the OCAR. The Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) is ap-
pointed by the President, with the advice and consent
of the Senate, and holds the rank of major general in
the Army Reserve. The CAR also functions as the
FORSCOM Deputy Commanding General for Re-
serve Affairs and commands the U.S. Army Reserve
Command (USARC).
b. The USAR command. USARC commands all
USAR troop program units (TPU) in CONUS and
Puerto Rico. The Commanding General,
FORSCOM, commands the USARC and is respon-
sible for organizing, equipping, stationing, training,
and maintaining combat readiness of assigned units.
An exception to this arrangement in CONUS is that
USAR SOF are commanded by the Commander,
USASOC. The Commanding General, U.S. Army
Pacific (USARPAC), commands all assigned USAR
TPUs and assists in training Hawaii and
Guam-based ARNG units. The Commander in
Chief, U.S. Army Europe, commands all assigned
USAR TPUs.
c. USAR organizational structure and missions.
(1) In CONUS, there are two continental
U.S. Armies (CONUSAs) that command Readiness
Groups and Senior Army Advisory Groups and co-
ordinate training, operations, mobilization, and de-
ployment (TOM-D) with Army Reserve Regional
Support Commands (RSC) within their geographical
regions. RSCs are geographically aligned with the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (EEMA)
regions to facilitate response to domestic emergen-
cies.
(2) USAR TPUs are assigned to RSCs (in
CONUS), United States Army Reserve Commands
(ARCOMs (OCONUS)), functional or “go to war”
commands, divisions (institutional training), or divi-
sions (exercise). Engineer commands, theater Army
area support commands, corps support commands,
and military police commands are examples of func-
tional commands.
3-4
FM 100-11, Force Integration
(3) USAR units consist of combat support
and combat service support units, institutional
training divisions, or exercise divisions. Divisions
(institutional training) have a mobilization mission to
conduct basic training (BT), advanced individual
training (AIT) and one station unit training (OSUT).
Divisions (exercise) write and conduct brigade,
group, battalion, and lower unit Army Training and
Evaluation Programs (ARTEP), command post ex-
ercises (CPX), and field training exercises (ETX).
(4) Also included in the USAR structure are
Army garrisons with a mobilization mission of
staffing a post and U.S. Army Reserve Eorce
(USARE) schools that conduct enlisted military oc-
cupational specialty (MOS) courses, special courses,
and U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
(USACGSC) courses for Active Army, National
Guard, and USAR soldiers. Upon mobilization, per-
sonnel from these units augment the TRADOC
school system. Army training centers, USAG, or
other activities.
(5) Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Op-
erations (PSYOPS) units perform their mission un-
der the direction of Special Operations Command
(SOCOM).
(6) In addition to major USAR organizations,
there are approximately 3,300 company or detach-
ment-sized units.
Figure 3-4. Management Structure for the USAR
3-5
FM 100-11, Force Integration
Figure 3-5. Organization of the Chief, Army Reserve
Section IV:
Reserve Component Training and
Equipment Program
3-10. Reserve Component training program
a. All enlisted personnel without prior service perform
an initial period of active duty for training (ADT) under
Active Army auspices. This includes BT/AIT or OSUT
and is a ininimum of 12 weeks. An alternative training
method is the “split-training” concept, whereby a RC
member may do BT (OSUT Phase I) during one year and
AIT (OSUT Phase II) the following year.
b. The Active Army prescribes the training pro-
grams of the ARNG and the USAR, both during
IDT (commonly referred to as Unit Training Assem-
blies (UTAs), multiple Unit Training Assemblies
(MUTAs), drills, or assembly periods), and during a
two week period generally known as annual training.
ARNG and USAR units train to the same standards
as the Active Army.
c. ARNG and USAR units, as elements of the
Selected Reserve, participate in a required minimum
of 48 drills (UTAs) and a two-week (14 to 15 days)
AT period during the training year. The general
trend is to consolidate these Unit Training Assem-
blies during the year to accomplish four UTAs dur-
ing a single weekend each month. This MUTA-4
configuration provides continuity for individual and
crew training, qualification and familiarization fir-
ing, field training, and refresher training.
d. AT consists of mission-essential training con-
ducted at the training site, and includes collective
and individual training.
e. The USARF school system conducts profes-
sional development and MOS training for officers
and enlisted personnel of the Active Army and RC.
Upon mobilization, USARF school personnel aug-
ment the TRADOC school system. Army training
centers (ATC), and other activities.
3-11. Reserve Component equipment program
a. The policy of “first to fight, first resourced”
is to ensure that units employed first are adequately
equipped. Under this policy, some RC units receive
substantial amounts of modem equipment. Army
procurement distributes new equipment and priority
3-6
FM 100-11, Force Integration
sequence determines the redistribution of excess
equipment. Later-deploying units, whether Active
Army or RC, are provided minimum essential
equipment for training.
b. The National Guard and Reserve Equipment
Appropriation is a special appropriation designated
for the acquisition of equipment by the RCs to im-
prove readiness. Also known as the Dedicated Pro-
curement Program (DPP), Congress may further
fence these funds for the purchase of specific items
of equipment. DPP funds compliment the Service
appropriations that primarily fund force moderniza-
tion, thereby improving training and readiness in the
RC.
Section V:
Reserve Component Assistance
3-12. Full time support personnel
Military and civilian positions for full-time support
(FTS) personnel provide assistance in organizing,
administering, recruiting and retaining, instructing,
and training RC organizations. They provide skills,
stability, continuity, and a full-time availability not
provided by part-time drilling Reservists. Full-time
personnel support the development and maintenance
of Selected Reserve units and individual readiness.
The four categories of FTS are —
a. Active Component. Soldiers assigned directly
to USAR units who serve exactly as if assigned to
Active Army units.
b. Military technicians. ARNG and USAR
technicians provide full-time assistance and support
and act as representatives for their commanders
during non-drill periods. Technicians ensure conti-
nuity in administration, supply, maintenance, and
training, and are critical to mobilization prepared-
ness. Both ARNG and USAR technicians are Fed-
eral Civil Service employees. The provisions of the
Civil Service System apply to Army Reserve techni-
cians (ART). The same provisions apply to ARNG
technicians except as modified by Public Law
90-486 (National Guard Technician Act of 1968);
32 use 709; and regulations prescribed by the
NGB.
c. Active Guard Reserve. AGR soldiers serve on
active duty in support of the RCs. Personnel gov-
erned by 10 use are available for worldwide as-
signment. Personnel governed by 32 USC remain
under control of the state.
d. Other Federal Civil Service personnel. Civil
service employees who are not classified as military
technicians.
Section VI:
Summary
Over half of the Army’s total deployable forces are
in the ARNG and Army Reserve. The management
of these forces is of paramount importance to the
total force. The structure for RC management in-
cludes the Congress, DOD, HQDA, states, MA-
COMs, and units. Two key managing agencies at
HQDA are the NGB and OCAR. At MACOM level,
states, FORSCOM, USARC, and CONUS armies
have a leading role in preparing RC forces for mobi-
lization and deployment.
3-7
FM 100-11, Force Integration
Chapter 4
The Force Integration Process
Section I:
Introduction
4-1. Change as a factor
Change is an inherent element of how the Army ac-
complishes its statutory functions to structure, man,
equip, train, sustain, deploy, station and fund or-
ganizations to produce a measurable output. In
comhat, that organizational output consists of op-
erational ohjectives achieved. In peacetime, the out-
put is the attainment of readiness ohjectives.
4-2. The force integration challenge
a. Force integration is the process that intro-
duces, incorporates, and sustains approved organ-
izational, doctrinal, and materiel change. It considers
the implications of change on organizations as they
progress to a higher level of capability.
b. The imperative for organizations to remain
viable in an environment of change is to understand
and manage change. This is the challenge of force
integration.
Section II:
Management of Change
4-3. Organizational change
a. Management of change is a fundamental ac-
tivity among people, organizations, or nations since
relationships do not remain constant over time. The
foundations of change that affect Army organiza-
tions can be external or internal to the force.
b. History shows that organizations must change
with their environment to function successfully and
support their continued existence. This evolution will
vary with the external pace and magnitude of
change, the functions affected, and the organizations
involved. Managing change effectively demands an
understanding of the environment, related processes,
and primary influences.
4-4. Goals
a. The Army manages and executes change
through force integration to assure —
(1) Enhanced effectiveness in war-fighting
capability.
(2) Balanced capabilities to maintain all core
competencies.
(3) Flexible processes to evolve the force in
any direction, consistent with guidance and available
resources.
b. These goals require that the management and
execution of change be structured from a total sys-
tem perspective. This perspective will —
(1) Incorporate consideration of all input
factors.
(2) Develop alternatives.
(3) Provide processes that support decision
making.
(4) Assure integration of all solution elements.
(5) Provide output for execution and feedback.
4-5. Force management processes
a. Force management is the capstone process
which encompasses all processes associated with the
progression from requirements determination
through execution of time-phased programs and
structures. It involves rank ordering of requirements
and the resources applied to these requirements. To
accomplish Army missions and functions within re-
source constraints, force management allocates re-
sources and assesses their utilization.
b. Force management includes several develop-
mental processes as shown in Figure 4- 1 .
(1) Combat development. This is the process
of determining requirements for doctrine, training (to
include leader development), organizations, and ma-
teriel. It also includes the processes by which or-
ganizational requirements are translated into organ-
izational models.
(2) Doctrine development. This process
translates requirements for doctrine into publications
that prescribe doctrine, tactics, techniques, and pro-
cedures.
(3) Training development. This process
translates requirements for training and leader de-
velopment into programs, methods, or devices.
(4) Materiel development. This process is the
conception, development, and execution of solutions
to materiel requirements identified and initiated
through the combat development process, translating
equipment requirements into executable programs
within acceptable performance, schedule, and cost
parameters.
(5) Organization development. This process
translates organization requirements into organiza-
tional models.
c. The force development process is an amalga-
mation of materiel and organizational developments;
it translates materiel and organizational requirements
into RDA programs and force structure.
d. Force management processes ensure the plan-
ning, development, integration, introduction, incor-
poration, and sustainment necessary to field the op-
timum force within imposed constraints.
4-1
FM 100-11, Force Integration
FORCE MANAGEMENT
DOCTRINE
DEVELOPMENT
COMBAT DEVELOPMENT
TRAINING
DEVELOPMENT
ORGANIZATION
DEVELOPMENT
■ DOCTRINE REQUIREMENTS
■ TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
■ LEADER DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS
■ ORGANIZATION REQUIREMENTS
■ MATERIEL REQUIREMENTS
MATERIEL
DEVELOPMENT
FORCE DEVELOPMENT
Figure 4-1. Force Management Development Process
4-6. Force management tasks
Fundamental force management tasks include —
a. Doctrine development. This task guides de-
velopment of operational concepts and doctrine
across the operational continuum. Activities associ-
ated with this task include —
(1) Developing and preparing concept state-
ments and doctrine in all hattlefield dynamics.
(2) Monitoring development of the research,
development, and acquisition plan (RDAP) and
POM to examine consistency among approved doc-
trine, organization designs, and system development
and acquisition.
(3) Aligning concept and doctrinal develop-
ments with assessments of emerging technological
capabilities.
b. Requirements determination. This task is
designed to balance missions, required capabilities,
threats, and identified vulnerabilities. Associated
activities include-
(1) Determining detailed force requirements
to achieve necessary operational capabilities. In-
cluded are requirements for structure, personnel,
materiel, facilities, and training.
(2) Reviewing force planning and program-
ming documents to ensure consistency of missions,
requirements, and system developments.
(3) Reviewing and validating organizational
and materiel requirements documentation.
c. Resource prioritization. These activities align
mission requirements with projected resource con-
straints by establishing priorities for —
(1) Activating, converting, and reorganizing
units.
(2) Allocation of personnel and equipment to
Army organizations and activities.
(3) Funding Army investment, operations,
and maintenance accounts.
d. Authorization allocation. These activities
distribute projected resources to meet requirements
in Army organizations and activities according to
established priorities by —
(1) Executing application of resources to
Total Army requirements.
4-2
FM 100-11, Force Integration
(2) Allocating personnel and equipment
authorizations based on established priorities.
(3) Allocating personnel and equipment re-
sources to units in integrated packages of defined
capability increments.
(4) Assessing the operational and organiza-
tional impact of resource options.
(5) Maintaining planned, programmed,
budgeted, current, and historical troop lists.
(6) Planning, programming, budgeting, di-
recting, monitoring, and evaluating organizational
capabilities.
(7) Preparing, justifying, maintaining, and
defending organization^ and materiel systems man-
agement decision packages (MDEP).
e. Functional management. Associated activi-
ties, such as the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Person-
nel and Logistics (DCSPER and DCSLOG), ensure
availability and timeliness of the appropriate mix of
resources (structure, personnel, equipment, funds
and facilities) by —
(1) Managing resources to ensure capabili-
ties, organization, personnel and equipment allow-
ances, and funds are sustained throughout the unit
life cycle.
(2) Managing actions which affect major
units to ensure internal consistency of organization
integration actions and providing linkage between
the resourcing and force programming systems.
(3) Managing materiel systems from devel-
opment through retirement from the force. Systems
integration is directed at ensuring materiel viability
and sustainability from the user’s perspective. This
task ranges from defining operational requirements
and operational test and evaluation (OT&E) to
equipment fielding and sustainment.
(4) Conducting affordability, executability,
and supportability assessments for structure, per-
sonnel, equipment, fiscal resources, facilities, train-
ing, sustainment, deployability and readiness.
(5) Developing total resource packages for
systems and organizations over time.
(6) Developing and executing functional poli-
cies and procedures in support of the force integra-
tion and force management processes.
(7) Monitoring all force integration activities
to identify functional management requirements.
/. Program analysis. These activities support
Army planning and programming by —
(1) Providing rationale, and justification.
(2) Analyzing RDA programs, initiatives,
and alternatives to assist in resource determinations.
(3) Conducting the necessary planning and
analyses to ensure RDA programs support moderni-
zation and readiness objectives within resource con-
straints.
(4) Developing and executing policies and
procedures for analytical support. This support in-
cludes materiel programs, force development analy-
ses, and related affordability, executability and sup-
portability assessments.
g. Operational testing and evaluations. These
activities ensure organizations and equipment meet
approved operational capabilities when fielded. This
is achieved through the management and conduct of
all testing and experimentation by —
(1) Developing and executing policies and
procedures for user testing and evaluation.
(2) Managing, scheduling, resourcing, coor-
dinating, and executing user testing and evaluation
programs.
Section III:
Force Integration
4-7. Scope
The scope of force integration includes the functions
of structuring, manning, equipping, training, sus-
taining, deploying, stationing, and funding the force
during the introduction and incorporation of ap-
proved change. It also includes the function of
measuring force readiness during the sustainment of
change. Eorce integration synchronizes these func-
tional activities to produce combat-ready organiza-
tions. Eorce integration is an enabling process of
force management.
4-8. Mission
a. The mission of force integration is to improve
war-fighting capabilities with minimum adverse ef-
fect on readiness during the period of transition.
Execution of the force integration mission in-
cludes —
(1) Placing new or changed doctrine, organi-
zations, and equipment into the Army.
(2) Developing strategies for coordinating
and integrating the functional and managerial sys-
tems that exist in the Army.
(3) Assessing the impact of decisions on or-
ganizations.
b. The force integration mission can also be seen
from a functional, temporal, and organizational per-
spective (see Eigure 4-2).
4-3
FM 100-11, Force Integration
Figure 4-2. Force Integration Environment
(1) Functional. Force integration, from a
functional perspective, incorporates each function
and describes processes for planning and execution
supportive of all the affected functions.
(2) Temporal. The force integration environ-
ment can also be considered from the perspective of
time. This views force integration in the context of
the PPBES with activities occurring in the near-term
(current year and budget years), the mid-term (the
program years), and the far-term (the extended plan-
ning period). Each of the functional inputs and
products has timelines that must be aligned to ensure
success.
(3) Organizational. Erom the organizational
perspective, synchronization of force integration
functions and processes is accomplished at all com-
mand and agency echelons. Planning and program-
ming of activities are designed to ensure that execu-
tion at the user organization can be accomplished in
minimum time with minimum readiness degradation
and will result in a maximum possible increase in
capability.
c. These three force integration perspectives
provide a holistic view of the environment. The ac-
tivities, processes, products, decision support
mechanisms, and databases associated with force
integration occur within this environment. The com-
plexity of functional execution and synchronization
is apparent. Integration and synchronization of these
functions requires —
(1) Mutually supportive planning and execu-
tion mechanisms.
(2) Centralized planning and decentralized
execution.
(3) Comprehensive and flexible decision sup-
port processes.
4-9. Force integration components
Force integration encompasses processes, decision
support mechanisms, and products to manage
change by —
a. Assessing requirements for changes in
capability.
b. Ensuring consideration of growth alternatives.
c. Developing suitable, feasible, and acceptable
concepts to execute programs.
d. Determining and recommending solutions.
e. Obtaining approval for solutions.
f. Preparing and executing detailed plans of
action.
g. Assuring feedback that validates or modifies
actions and execution, as necessary.
4-4
FM 100-11, Force Integration
4-10. The role of operational requirements in
force integration
Within the Army, operational requirements establish
the parameters for change management. They in-
clude the following —
a. Direction and guidance. NCA, JCS, and de-
partmental guidance provide the basis for developing
Army plans and conducting operations.
b. Missions. Missions are based principally on
laws, customs, and directions from higher authority.
The Army’s statutory, specified, and implied mis-
sions establish the framework within which the
Army manages change.
c. Doctrine. Army doctrine establishes the broad
principles for the conduct of military and other sup-
port operations. As missions, allies, history, and
technology evolve, the Army reexamines and revali-
dates or changes its war-fighting doctrine.
d. Organizations. The Army designs its force
structure to conduct combat operations in conso-
nance with approved doctrine. At any point in time,
current organizations in the force structure are the
baseline from which the Army’s evolution must oc-
cur.
e. Training. The force is structured, equipped,
and trained for a given set of missions. Training is a
key element in the incorporation and sustainment of
organizational change.
/. Current and programmed force programs.
Force stmcture changes approved in the defense
budget and POM establish the parameters for future
activities.
g. DOD, HQDA, and MACOM priorities. Pri-
orities established by these elements can limit the
flexibility available to the Army at large to manage
change within specific timelines.
h. Resources. A key determinant for managing
change is resource allocation, directly effecting
changes in program execution.
Section IV:
Foundations of Force Integration
4-11. The Army Organizational Life Cycle Model
a. Force integration is a multidisciplinary, cap-
stone process that examines, validates, modifies, and
monitors all aspects of change. It results from ac-
tivities within fimctions or functional groupings de-
signed to increase operational capability at the or-
ganization level. The AOLCM provides a construct
for explanation and examination of the overall proc-
ess. No function of the model can be viewed as a
discrete entity because no single function can be ac-
complished without reference to, or effect on other
functions. The AOLCM is depicted in Figure 4-3,
with the eight functions supported and influenced by
command, leadership and management, and re-
sources.
b. To articulate the nature of change and to as-
sess the executability and supportability of change,
all factors affecting organizations must be consid-
ered. The definitions of the nine force integration
functional areas (FIFA) provide the standard to be
achieved in transitioning organizations from one
level of capability to a higher level. They prescribe
the correctly structured, equipped, trained, manned,
sustained, deployed, stationed, and funded end state
to be achieved at the culmination of modernization
as well as the required readiness level.
(1) Structuring. An organization is properly
structured when the organization, its direct sup-
port/general support (DS/GS) structure, and the
support infra-structure have accurate requirements
documents, HQDA-approved authorization docu-
ments on hand, and registered unit identification
codes (UIC).
(2) Manning. An organization is properly
manned when the organization, its DS/GS structure,
and the support infra-structure have assigned, by
grade and skill, all authorized personnel.
(3) Equipping. An organization is properly
equipped when the organization and its DS/GS
structure have the most modem equipment author-
ized, to include major end items; associated support
items of equipment (ASIOE); test, measurement, and
diagnostic equipment (TMDE); special tools and test
equipment (STTE); maintenance floats; and all
authorized common table of allowances (CTA)
items.
(4) Training. An organization is properly
trained when the organization and its DS/GS stmc-
ture have completed all required Army moderniza-
tion training (AMT) to include NET, DTT and
NOT, and have been evaluated and meet ARTEP
standards. All authorized organizational training
support material and training devices must be in unit
hands and all institutional training courses and
training systems, training ammunition, and training
facilities must be available. All doctrinal publica-
tions must be on hand.
(5) Sustaining. An organization can be prop-
erly sustained when all authorized organization-level
combat support and combat service support person-
nel are assigned and all support equipment, facilities,
spares, and supplies are on hand. The DS/GS
structure and any support infrastructure must be
structured, equipped, trained, manned, sustained,
stationed, and funded to sustain the supported or-
ganization. All support publications must be on hand
and the organizations must have valid Department of
Defense activity address codes (DOD A AC).
4-5
FM 100-11, Force Integration
Figure 4-3. Army Organizational Life Cycle Model
(6) Funding. An organization is properly
funded when all costs associated with the organiza-
tion and its DS/GS structure have been identified,
programmed, and resourced. Funds must he avail-
able to support activation, reorganization, conver-
sion, stationing, property turn-in or transfer, trans-
portation, facility construction or renovation, and
operating tempo (OPTEMPO).
(7) Deploying. An organization is deployable
(and/or employable) when the organization, its
DS/GS structure, and associated round-up/round-out
units are structured, equipped, trained, manned,
sustained, stationed, and funded to operate as an
element of an Army component command. The or-
ganization must be compatible with associated re-
serve component and sister Service organizations.
(8) Stationing. An organization is prop-
erly stationed when the organization has an appro-
priate mission and its DS/GS structure have all re-
quired organizational facilities and support infra-
structure in place. No degradation of quality of life,
safety, or environmental standards can exist.
(9) Readiness. An organization is operation-
ally ready when the organization and its DS/GS
structure are at overall and commodity area category
levels consistent with the organization’s authorized
level of organization (ALO).
c. Horizontal synchronization of these vertical
functions is focused on user organizations to achieve
an enhanced operational capability after transition.
Section V:
Force Integration Pianning
4-12. Planning requirements
a. Requirements for force integration originate
with the NMS with further details found in the DPG.
Mid- and long-range planning is further refined by
the joint strategic and Army long-range planning
systems. Systemic relationships are depicted in Fig-
ure 4-4.
b. Planning to execute change involves the ef-
forts of force integrators at all force levels down to
the lowest manageable level: regiment, separate bri-
gade, or division. All actions and activities that can
be accomplished at these levels must be planned and
accomplished to reduce the complexity of executing
change for the ultimate executor: the organization
commander. Proponency for planning rests with the
staff force integrator, who must monitor execution to
ensure changes are introduced, incorporated, and
sustained.
4-6
FM 100-11, Force Integration
Figure 4-4. Defense Planning System Interrelationships
c. Planning and execution of force integration
actions will occur in all environments — ^in peace-
time, mobilization, wartime, and during demobiliza-
tion. Activations, conversions, and reorganizations
are programmed and documented to ensure that
long-range objectives are attained. This is significant
because unilateral decisions to activate, convert, or
reorganize units provisionally require diversion of
programmed resources and may only achieve
short-term success. The flexibility of a commander
to task organize forces does not give him the license
to effect unprogrammed and undocumented organ-
izational change.
4-13. Impact assessments
Assessments of force integration actions must quan-
tify their impact on organization and force readiness.
Changes that are documented in the authorization
database without adequate supporting resources
may, if implemented, result in a degradation of unit
status in terms of personnel, equipment on hand,
equipment serviceability, or training. If such action
could result in a lower unit status category rating,
any associated changes must be subjected to inten-
sive planning and management.
4-14. Planning factors
a. Full consideration of selected planning factors
is critical for accomplishing the force integration
mission successfully. Force integration planning
must —
(1) Identify the nature of change, when it will
occur, and what organizations it will affect.
(2) Ensure that documentation supports the
change.
(3) Develop suitable, feasible, and acceptable
concepts to execute the change.
(4) Assess the executability and supportabiity
of the change.
(5) Involve affected organizations in the
planning process.
(6) Identify facilities requirements.
(7) Establish command and staff responsi-
bilities and milestones.
(8) Control turbulence in organizations.
(9) Avoid “instant unreadiness.”
(10) Maintain a war-fighting focus.
b. Application of decision support methodolo-
gies in the planning process ensures that required
tasks are stmctured in the sequence in which they
are to be accomplished. A synchronized plan re-
quires that critical and concurrent activities be iden-
tified and correlated in time and by organization.
4-7
FM 100-11, Force Integration
Section VI:
International Considerations
4-15. National priorities
As U.S. interests evolve, their relative importance
for achieving National interests will vary. For exam-
ple, the relative importance of geography, trade,
natural resources, or National debt may change.
These elements may increase or decrease in signifi-
cance as their impact on National goals and ohjec-
tives changes. Such change may, in turn, have corre-
sponding influences on the Army.
4-16. History and world environment
A nation’s historical perceptions influence its rela-
tionships with the family of nations. A nation’s se-
lection of allies also evolves over time as national
interests change and significantly influence interna-
tional relations. Historical alliances have had signifi-
cant influence on the future goals of the nation and
its military and affect the planning and execution of
military operations.
4-17. Potential adversaries
Much like alliances, potential adversaries shift over
time as national interests evolve. This results in a
periodic reassessment of which nation constitutes a
significant threat to national and alliance interests.
4-18. Technology
The accelerated pace of technological develop-
ments is a significant element of change. This
revolutionary trend directly affects requirements
for the timely exploration of technological op-
portunities and the need to manage change within
the military.
4-19. Missions
The above factors directly impact on missions as-
signed to the military. Modifications in prospective
responsibilities, potential alliances, and threats have
a profound effect. Furthermore, the evolution of na-
tional interests and priorities significantly influence
the conduct of warfare and OOTW.
4-20. Direction and guidance
The sum total of internal and external elements pro-
vides the foundation for direction and guidance from
the NCA to the JCS and the military departments.
Section VII:
Summary
Management of change through the force integration
process is vital to the Army. Change is affected by
complex external and internal factors. The process
of introducing, incorporating, and sustaining change
is the force integration process. Functional process
synchronization integrates the activities associated
with force integration. This introduction to the com-
plexity of the force integration mission will be ex-
panded in the remainder of this manual.
4-8
FM 100-11, Force Integration
Chapter 5
Organization Management
Section I:
Introduction
5-1. Organizational integration
The Army manages organizations through organiza-
tional integration. Organizational integration focuses
on user organizations in the process of introducing,
incorporating, and sustaining new structure, equip-
ment, and doctrine into the Army. Organizational
integration manages the documentation, resourcing,
fielding and sustainment of assigned organizations
as integrated packages, assuring doctrinally aligned
capabilities within resource constraints. Organiza-
tion integration focuses on increasing force capabil-
ity while managing the organizational changes
through prioritization of resources, management of
information, synchronization of activities and as-
sessment of capabilities.
5-2. Management structure, objectives and execu-
tion
The management of functionally similar organiza-
tions and major units composed of functionally dis-
similar subordinate elements requires structure, ob-
jectives, and execution at HQDA, Army component
command, MACOM, corps, division, and installa-
tion levels. This chapter discusses functional respon-
sibilities at each of these levels. It also addresses
organizational structure, integration, and assess-
ments as management tools for cyclic reviews and
decision support for changes in Army organizational
structure, materiel, and doctrine.
Section II:
Organization Management Structure
5-3. Levels of control
a. The National level. The executive and legis-
lative branches of government, to include the DOD,
affect force management processes. These agencies
define and resource force structure and approve
materiel acquisition programs. Such involvement
frequently determines if individual Service planning
and programming can be executed or must be
changed. Therefore, the Army must plan and pro-
gram the force in detail and retain sufficient flexibil-
ity for modifications and adjustments.
b. Department of the Army level. HQDA is re-
sponsible for prioritizing assets, determining re-
quirements and establishing authorizations for peo-
ple and materiel. The Army Staff (ARSTAF) plans,
programs, and develops the force. It develops pro-
jections for required force capabilities to accomplish
Army missions and functions. The Vice Chief of
Staff is responsible for force management. The
DCSOPS, HQDA is responsible for Army-wide
execution of force management .
c. Army MACOMs and component commands.
Force management staffs of MACOMs and Army
component commands plan, program, and develop
their portion of the total force from the perspective
of their command’s specific operational require-
ments. They also develop the force structure options
, guidance, and information necessary to ensure ef-
fective execution of the force integration process
within subordinate organizations.
d. Below MACOM level. Force management
staffs at corps, division, and installation perform the
force integration mission at their level. Actual exe-
cution of organizational activations, conversions,
and reorganizations is accomplished by the parent
organization of affected units.
5-4. Implementation considerations
Implementation may occur as a result of planned,
programmed, and documented organizational change
or in support of unit deployments into combat or
OOTW. In either case, organizations activated, con-
verted, or reorganized must be structured, manned,
equipped, trained, sustained, deployed, stationed,
and funded to function as part of the Army compo-
nent of a joint task force or unified command. Re-
serve Component organizations that round-up,
round-out, or enhance Active Component forces
must also be capable of being sustained by the Ac-
tive Component’s parent organization.
Section III:
Organizational Integration
5-5. Objective and scope
Organizational integration is a tool of change man-
agement that focuses Army management actions on
organizations to ensure orderly introduction, incor-
poration, and sustainment of new structure, equip-
ment, and doctrine into the total Army.
a. The objective of organizational integration is
to manage the combined impact of Army functional
systems on organizations to ensure the right mix of
resources (structure, people, equipment, dollars, fa-
cilities) is available to support a planned activity for
an organization. Increasing capabilities within re-
source constraints.
b. Execution of organizational integration in the
near-, mid-, and far- terms involves —
(1) Recommending priorities. Organizations
must be considered in their totality when determining
priorities for managing change while accounting for
5-1
FM 100-11, Force Integration
total force war-fighting requirements during the
planning and execution phases.
(2) Managing information. Information that
is routinely conveyed vertically through functional or
branch “stovepipes” must he shared horizontally
across the force management spectrum. Force man-
agement staffs must ensure that echelon-specific
information is integrated and analyzed. All available
information must be focused on an organizational
perspective.
(3) Synchronizing activities. Sequencing
events in time is involved in virtually all force man-
agement activities. Change requires multifunctional
support from all organizational echelons down to the
specific, affected and supporting unit(s). Responsi-
bilities, milestones, and decision points must be es-
tablished to achieve operational requirements. The
definitive critical path of an action allows command-
ers to synchronize the total integration function.
(4) Monitoring execution. Routine functional
staff supervision of force management activities en-
ables adjustments and deconfliction of actions, and
provides necessary updates of schedules.
(5) Assessing capability. Affordability, sup-
portability, and executability must be assessed prior
to and incident to activations, conversions, reorgani-
zations, strength changes, or authorized level of or-
ganization (ALO) changes ensuring total organiza-
tional integration.
5-6. Organization integration team
a. Organizational integration (01) is the doctrine
of change management that focuses actions on or-
ganizations to ensure the orderly introduction, incor-
poration and sustainment of new stmcture and new
materiel systems to increase force capability. Force
management, planning, and execution may be ac-
complished by several management solutions.
b. The 01 team (Figure 5-1) is a task-organized
group of organization managers, functional area
proponents and special interest proponents responsi-
ble for management of organizational change that
provides the proper staff synergism for the manage-
ment of change.
c. Execution of the force management process
depends on the synchronized efforts of organiza-
tional and functional management and special inter-
ests. Special interests are represented by external
agencies whose activities affect or are affected by
the specific actions.
ORGANIZATION INTEGRATOR
FORCE INTEGRATOR •
COMMAND MANAGER •
ORGANIZATION
MANAGEMENT
REPRESENTATION
• SYSTEMS INTEGRATOR
• DOCUMENT INTEGRATOR
STRUCTURING •
• STATIONING
EQUIPPING •
FUNCTIONAL
• FUNDING
MANNING •
MANAGEMENT
• DEPLOYING
TRAINING •
SUSTAINING •
REPRESENTATION
• READINESS
TRADOC SYSTEM •
• RESERVE COMPONENTS
MANAGER
SPECIAL
INTEREST
REPRESENTATION
• DA SYSTEM COORDINATOR
PROGRAM/PROJECT/ •
PRODUCT MANAGERS
• INSTALLATIONS MANAGER
COMMAND
REPRESENTATIVE
Figure 5-1. Organization Integration Team
5-2
FM 100-11, Force Integration
d. Functional management is represented by
command or staff proponents of each force integra-
tion functional area. Functional area proponents
manage organizations and/or materiel systems based
on function or branch. The challenge is to incorpo-
rate organization or system changes, normally ac-
complished within the vacuum of a stovepipe struc-
ture and therefore divorced from the force manage-
ment staff, into the total force management effort.
Functional representatives include, but are not lim-
ited to, the following:
(1) Personnel Systems Staff Officer
(PERSSO) for the manning function.
(2) DA Logistics Systems Officer (DALSO)
for the equipping function.
(3) Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation
Management (ACSIM) representative for the sta-
tioning function.
e. Staff points of contact (POC) contribute
functional expertise to force management without
assuming staff proponency.
/. Coordination of force integration actions is
accomplished by the 01 team. The team’s structure
depends on the task and organization(s) affected, to
include representation from organizational and func-
tional management personnel. Special interests, to
include affected organizations, should be repre-
sented. The 01 team uses information available in
existing Army information systems to assess af-
fordability, supportability and executability of
planned and programmed activities. If problems ap-
pear in information systems or the validity of plans,
the 01 team identifies the issue and assesses the im-
pact by functional area. Action is taken to correct
the problems at the lowest manageable level. The
functions of each member of the 01 team are as fol-
lows:
(1) Force Integrator. The Force Integrator
(FI) represents organization interests of functionally
dissimilar organizations grouped into brigades,
regiments, divisions, and corps. The FI —
(a) Assesses the ability of functional
systems to provide personnel, equipment, facilities,
and fiscal resources for major units.
(b) Develops, maintains, and defends
organizational MDEPs for major organizations.
(c) Develops, assesses, and makes rec-
ommendations for alternative use of resources for
establishing and maintaining major organizations to
support a war-fighting CINC and other MACOMs.
(d) Acts as the link between resource
allocators and OIs.
(e) Evaluates and analyzes the total im-
pact of incorporating personnel, facilities, equip-
ment, doctrine, structure, and capability changes into
major organizations.
(f) Ensures validity of operating system
databases.
(g) Reviews requirements and authori-
zation documents.
(h) Assesses the impact of new doctrine,
structure, manning, equipment, and facilities on
major units. This includes strategic policy, training,
mobilization, deployment, sustainment, redeploy-
ment, demobilization, and resource strategies.
(2) Organization Integrator. The Organiza-
tion Integrator (01) represents organization interests
of functionally similar organizations and integrates
management of all aspects of structuring, equipping,
manning, training, sustaining, deploying, stationing,
and funding. The 01 represents all organizations in a
specific standard requirements code (SRC) or spe-
cific type organizations within a branch. The 01 also
organizes and synchronizes 01 team activities. The
01—
(a) Assesses the ability of the functional
systems to provide personnel, materiel, and facilities
for organizations.
(b) Recommends priorities for allocation
of personnel, materiel, and facilities to organizations
as integrated packages.
(c) Assesses the impact on readiness as
a result of personnel, training, equipment, facilities,
doctrine, or structure changes.
(d) Reviews distribution plans and de-
termines impacts on organizations. Assesses impact
of new capabilities on organization structure, doc-
trine, or resources.
(e) Reviews, coordinates ARSTAE re-
view, and recommends final ARSTAE position to
the Director, Eorce Programs, ODCSOPS, on all
organization requirements documents (tables of or-
ganization and equipment (TOE), basis-of-issue
plans (BOIP), and manpower requirements criteria
(MARC) studies).
(f) Coordinates authorization docu-
ments. Maintains the documentation audit trail on all
additions, deletions, and other changes to organiza-
tion authorization documents.
(g) Develops, maintains, and defends
organizational MDEPs for organizations.
(h) Ensures validity of operating system
databases, such as the Structure and Manpower Al-
location System (SAMAS).
(3) Command Manager (Force Structure).
The Command Manager (Eorce Structure) (CM
(ES)) represents the organizational interests of a
MACOM, manages its tables of distribution and
allowance (TDA), and serves as the modification
5-3
FM 100-11, Force Integration
TOE (MTOE) 01 and El for that MACOM. The
CM (ES)—
(a) Acts as POC for command plans
and concept plans.
{b) Maintains the documentation audit
trail on all additions, deletions, and other changes to
unit MTOEs and TDAs.
(c) Produces manpower resource guid-
ance for MACOM Program Budget Guidance
(PBG).
{d) Manages command force structure
allowances.
g. Eigure 5-2 illustrates the different responsi-
hilities of the 01, El, and CM (ES).
ORGANIZATION INTEGRATOR (01)
FORCE INTEGRATORS (FI)
COMMAND MANAGER (CM)
« BATTALION
XXX
COMPANY
XX
DIVISION
ACR
TDA
Figure 5-2. Force Integration Responsibilities
(4) Systems Integrator. The Systems Inte-
grator (SI) represents user interests in all materiel
system management aspects of force integration. The
SI is involved in all aspects of equipping, from the
front-end requirement determination process through
system fielding. The SI —
(a) Determines requirements for mate-
riel fielding and other user-oriented functions related
to materiel acquisition.
(b) Develops the command position on
materiel requirements documents.
(c) Assesses the affordability of the
materiel requirements.
(d) Develops materiel acquisition or
fielding alternatives.
(e) Recommends materiel acquisition
priorities for research, development, test, evaluation,
procurement, and materiel change programs.
(f) Recommends priorities for materiel
distribution.
(g) Participates in system design reviews.
(h) Ensures all aspects of rationaliza-
tion, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) are
considered.
(/) Reviews requirements and authori-
zation documents for materiel user implications.
(/) Recommends disposition of displaced
equipment.
(5) Document Integrator. Document Inte-
grators (DI) ensure that requirements and authoriza-
tion documents meet approved Army force pro-
grams. Documentation integration is a function of
the U.S. Army Eorce Management Support Agency
(USAFMSA), a DA DCSOPS field operating activ-
ity (EGA). DIs include requirements document de-
velopers and authorization document developers.
The DIs link requirements, planned or programmed
force stmcture actions, and the documentation proc-
esses. The DIs —
(a) Develop requirements documents
(TOE, BOIP, and MARC).
{b) Produce authorization documents
(MTOE) based on HQDA guidance, organization
requirements documents, command plans, and input
from the MACOMs.
(c) Review proposed authorization
documents to ensure compliance with manpower,
personnel, and equipment policies and directives.
(6) Command Manager (Program Budget
Guidance). The Command Manager (Program
Budget Guidance) (CM (PBG)) ensures that the
manpower allocation for each MACOM is accu-
rately reflected in the SAMAS system, in confor-
mance with Army leadership decisions, and within
5-4
FM 100-11, Force Integration
the manpower controls as specified by OSD. The
CM (PEG) represents the Army’s budget interests of
functionally dissimilar organizations grouped into
the various MACOMs. The CM (PEG) —
(a) Manages the manpower database of
record by MACOM, at UIC, MDEP, and Army
management structure code (AMSCO) level of de-
tail, by fiscal year, by category (military and civil-
ian) for each budget cycle.
{b) Maintains the Army’s only detailed
audit trail for manpower.
(c) Interfaces with all ARSTAF agen-
cies and MACOMs during each budget cycle.
{d) Produces the manpower addendum
to the PEG at the conclusion of each PPEES event.
(e) Manages and maintains the Army’s
controlled accounts.
(7) Army component commands and MA-
COMs. Force management staffs at these echelons
manage the planning and execution of the force inte-
gration mission through —
(a) Document integration, including
authorization document (MTOE) review, TDA de-
velopment, and database management.
(b) Systems integration, including, re-
quirements and authorization document review, the
materiel fielding plan (MFP) process, new equip-
ment training plan (NETP) review, and facilities
support annex review.
(c) Organization integration, including
the organizational assessment process, review of
requirements and authorization documents, and doc-
trine review.
(d) Force structure management, in-
cluding TDA document management, the Master
Force (MFORCE), and end strength management.
(e) Force planning, including the total
Army analysis (TAA) process, command plan
(CPFAN) process, force reduction planning and
monitoring, and concept plan (CONPFAN)
development.
(f) Readiness management, including
Status of Resource and Training System (SORTS)
input and the unit status reporting (USR) process.
(8) Corps, division, regiment, separate bri-
gade, and installation. Force management staffs at
these levels manage force integration through —
(a) Force structure management, in-
cluding authorization document (MTOE) and
MFORCE management, USR monitoring, and force
structure review and analysis.
{b) Systems integration, including action
plan development, distribution plan reviews, and
facilities review.
(c) Organization integration, including
organizational assessments, force structure review
and analysis, and authorization document review
process.
Section IV:
Assessments
5-7. Force Validation Committee
a. Organizational assessments are management
forums for identifying and resolving issues that in-
hibit execution of short-term organizational change
(activations, conversions, strength changes, AFO
changes, and reorganizations) occurring in the
budget year and the first year of the POM.
b. The Force Validation Committee (FVC) is a
HQDA fomm that meets on a schedule directed by
the DCSOPS to review force management actions.
The FVC reviews the upcoming 24 months, for all
components, for all SRCs and UICs undergoing or-
ganizational change. The FVC reviews all aspects of
manning, equipping, funding, training, and station-
ing to ensure that the organizations attain a readiness
category of level C-3 or better upon activation or
conversion. (See Chapter 13 for a discussion of
readiness categories.)
c. Organizational assessments support the force
management mission of increasing war-fighting ca-
pability by providing credible information in support
of decision making. This should occur with mini-
mum adverse effect on readiness as organizations
transition to new structure, materiel, and doctrine, or
a combination of any of these. The assessment proc-
ess uses the force integration functional areas to fo-
cus on total organizations; that is, the organization
undergoing change and all other DS, GS,
round-up/round-out, and sister service organizations
affected. The organizational assessment methodol-
ogy may be employed to support “call forward” de-
cisions or validation of programmed force structure
actions.
d. Comments from subordinate commands, as
well as studies and analyses (such as, system pro-
gram reviews) peculiar to a specific functional area,
may be used to develop issues to focus the assess-
ment process. Issues are identified, coordinated, and,
if possible, resolved throughout the assessment proc-
ess. Unresolved issues are briefed during the conduct
of formal assessment presentations.
5-8. Functional area assessments
a. Functional area assessments (FAA) are inten-
sive management forums that allow the Army lead-
ership to identify and resolve issues that prevent or
inhibit the execution of near- and mid-term plans and
programs. FAAs examine the impacts of moderniz-
ing the Army, by functional area.
5-5
FM 100-11, Force Integration
b. FAAs investigate the horizontal and vertical
exchange of information focusing on the Army’s
ability to maintain readiness, force capability and
force modernization in the POM years. The focus is
on the Army’s ability to execute its modernization
plans and fully support all aspects of programmed
unit transitions improving the war-fighting capabil-
ity of the total force with minimum adverse effect on
readiness.
c. FAAs assist the Army leadership in shaping
the most cost-effective force, while emphasizing
readiness, modernization and capability. The VCSA
may use the FAA process to consider special man-
agement areas, such as command and control or
force management.
d. The DCS OPS is the executive agent for the
FAA process. The proponent and coordinator of the
FAA process is the appropriate TRADOC service
school commandant, MACOM commander, or
ARSTAF proponent. FAA’s executability analyses
address the functional domains of doctrine, training,
leader development, organizations, materiel and sol-
diers (DTLOMS).
5-9. Affordability assessments
Affordability assessments review organizational
change through prioritization of resources, synchro-
nization of activities, and availability of personnel,
equipment, training resources, infrastructure, mobi-
lization, deployment and sustainment (PEG sup-
port). Affordability assessments identify and resolve
systemic discontinuities of PEG support prior to
impacting force readiness and force capability. They
are assessments of the ability of the Army to provide
PEG support to force structure actions.
5-10. Supportability assessments
Supportability assessments are UlC-specific as-
sessments conducted for change documented in the
current or budget year. Supportability assessments
determine the ability of the functional systems
(personnel, materiel and sustainment) to support
documented change by projecting the unit status
category on completion of the organization transition
period. Failure to meet the readiness objective (C-3)
may require action to modify the effective date (E-
date) of change or prioritization of personnel or
equipment. They are assessments of whether there
are sufficient personnel and equipment resources in
the Army to fill to C-3 or better at MOS, grade, and
equipment quantity (by line item number (LIN))
level of detail.
5-11. Executability assessments
Executability assessments are SRC-specific assess-
ments conducted to determine if there are sufficient
personnel and equipment resources available to fill
units to C3 or better at the unit location by the ef-
fective date (E-date).
Section V:
Summary
The organization management framework for the
force integration process focuses on organizations to
ensure that change affecting organization at all
Army levels is coordinated, synchronized, and con-
tinually assessed. This coordination, synchroniza-
tion, and assessment is conducted from HQDA
through Army component commands and MACOMs
to corps, division, and installation levels.
5-6
FM 100-11, Force Integration
Chapter 6
Structuring the Force
Section I:
Introduction
6-1. Basis for force requirements
Force development is initiated by determining battle-
field requirements. Minimum mission-essential war-
time requirements for the conduct and sustainment
of combat operations are the basis for Army organ-
izational designs and force structure requirements.
6-2. Resourcing requirements
The development of force structure to accomplish
Army missions and functions includes the active and
Reserve Components and aims at a balanced mix of
organizations. Authorizations for required personnel
and equipment are constrained by available re-
sources (manpower, equipment and dollars) provided
through the Army’s PPBES. Documentation of these
authorizations culminates the process of structuring
the force.
6-3. Balancing resources and requirements
Force managers who structure the force through the
POM consider the best application of resources to
achieve desired results. They allocate available re-
sources to the Active and Reserve Components, the
Federal Civil Service work force and consider force
stmcture offsets from sister services or other na-
tional assets.
Section II:
Source Documentation
6-4. Joint Strategic Planning System
The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) includes
an identification and evaluation of the threat. It pro-
vides the basis for formulating strategy and resource
needs for forces and materiel. Three outputs of JSPS
are the National Military Strategy (NMS), CPR and
the JSCP. The NMS announces the fiscally con-
strained force as determined by the JCS. The CPR
establishes the priority for joint war-fighting capa-
bility. Force sizing (Figure 6-1) translates the NMS
into the JSCP and optimizes the use of resources to
meet the war-fighting CINCs’ operational require-
ments.
6-5. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
The JSCP translates strategy into taskings and re-
quires that plans be completed to accomplish mis-
sions within available resources. The JSCP is the
JSPS document that starts the deliberate planning
process and is the only formal tie between JSPS and
the JOPES. As operational plans are developed, re-
source requirements are prioritized through alloca-
tion of resources in the PPBS.
6-6. DOD Planning, Progr a mmin g , and Budget-
ing System
a. The DOD PPBS begins with the NMS, which
starts the planning phase and serves as the basis for
the DPG. PPBS, the DOD resource allocation sys-
tem, focuses on the acquisition of resources neces-
sary to organize the forces required to execute the
strategy in the DPG.
b. The POM force is developed based on re-
sources projected to be available. Using the major
combat forces in the Army fiscally constrained
force, extensive analysis determines the comple-
mentary combat, combat support, and combat serv-
ice support force structure. In the force structuring
process, the major combat forces, referred to as
“above-the-line” forces (divisions, brigades, regi-
ments and groups), are directed by the DPG.
“Below-the-line” forces, which are echelon above
division/echelon above corps (EAD/EAC) combat,
combat support, and combat service support force
stmcture, are derived from TAA.
Force Sizing
cues FISCALLY 10 DIVS
CONSTRAINED FORCE
ARMY FISCALLY
CONSTRAINED FORCE
POM FORCE
BUDGET FORCE
CURRENT FORCE 10 DIVS
Figure 6-1. Force Sizing
c. The POM force is a balance between resource
availability reflected in the Army POM, the Army’s
major programming input into the PPBS. Risks as-
sociated with the POM force are addressed in the
CPA.
6-7. Joint Operations Planning and Execution
System
JOPES is the final element in the DOD management
system and focuses on operational planning. JOPES
is oriented on the most effective use of the nation’s
current military capability against the near-term
threat.
6-1
FM 100-11, Force Integration
Section III:
Organizational Design and
Requirements Documentation
6-8. Organizational design process
The building blocks of the force structure that sup-
port operations planning are units, which are
grouped into organizations; for example, companies
grouped into battalions. When a new or modified
Army organizational structure is required, new units
and organizations are designed.
a. Identification of organizational issues.
(1) The organizational design process is initi-
ated by the identification of issues that originate
from the combat development process, the CINCs,
the MACOM commanders, TRADOC school com-
mandants and center commanders, other Army
commanders, or the Department of the Army Staff
(2) Issues are concerned with enhancing unit
or force capabilities and result from changes to doc-
trine, new or revised operational (branch/ functional)
concepts, acquisition of new equipment , or signifi-
cant restructuring of a MOS.
(3) When it is determined that an organiza-
tional solution to an issue is appropriate, new or re-
vised operational concepts that address a unit’s mis-
sion, functions and required capabilities are devel-
oped to provide the basis for organizational design.
b. Unit reference sheets. An organizational so-
lution requires the development of a unit reference
sheet (URS). The URS is the first organizational
document that leads to the development of a table of
organization and equipment (TOE). It provides
much of the information that will subsequently be
refined and documented in the TOE.
(1) Combat developers of TRADOC, the
Army Medical Department Center and School, U.S.
Army Special Operations Command and the U.S.
Army Intelligence and Security Command are re-
sponsible for developing URS for their functional
areas. As a minimum, a URS contains the following:
(a) Personnel requirements by job title,
grade, and quantity.
(b) Major equipment requirements to in-
clude nomenclature and quantity.
(c) A breakout of organizational ele-
ments with related personnel and equipment re-
quirements.
(d) A summary that includes other rele-
vant information such as unit title, design descrip-
tion, mission, assignment, assumptions, limitations,
dependencies, mobility requirements, and concept of
operations.
(2) The combat developer coordinates the
URS to identify other doctrinal, organizational.
training, leader development or materiel impacts
such as requirements for increased maintenance,
supply, transportation, and medical force structure.
The design is then submitted to HQ TRADOC for
design approval and for introduction into the force
design update (EDU) process, if appropriate.
c. Force design update.
(1) The EDU is a semi-annual process used
to develop consensus within the Army on new or
changed organizational designs and to obtain CSA
implementation decisions for such designs when
they —
(a) Require a policy change.
(b) Affect the war-fighting capability of
a CINC.
(c) Require additional resources
(d) Implement a new concept.
(e) Have high visibility or sensitivity.
(2) The TRADOC Commander is the Army
approval authority for organizational requirements
and designs. The TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff
for Combat Developments (DCSCD), in coordina-
tion with the DA DCSOPS, determines which de-
signs meet the EDU criteria for obtaining a CSA
implementation decision. Designs that do not meet
the EDU criteria are not addressed further in the
process except, in selected cases, as informational
items.
(3) The Eorce Design Directorate (EDD),
DCSCD, TRADOC, manages the EDU process.
EDD is responsible for analyzing issues in the
TRADOC domains of doctrine, training, leader de-
velopment, organizations, materiel and soldiers
(DTLOMS) and assessing and detailing the resource
impacts (such as costs of personnel, materiel, facili-
ties) of adoption of the new or changed units or force
designs.
(4) EDD establishes a briefing schedule and
provides briefings on the results of the analyses to
the MACOM and Army component commanders
and to the CINCs for comment and to gain consen-
sus. Subsequent to TRADOC design approval, the
ARSTAE and the VCSA and CSA are briefed for
implementation decision.
(5) CSA implementation decisions are not
always approvals for immediate execution. Often
they are approvals for documentation as new or re-
vised TOEs and for subsequent competition for re-
sourcing through the TAA process. On the other
hand, issues and designs without resource require-
ments that are approved at any level are approvals
for TOE documentation and implementation at the
earliest possible date. They do not need to compete
in TAA.
(6) Approval of a URS and its associated
concepts and the HQDA implementation decision
6-2
FM 100-11, Force Integration
ends the organizational design process. The design is
then handed off from TRADOC to the Requirements
Documentation Directorate (RDD), USAFMSA, a
DA DCSOPS field operating agency, for documen-
tation as a new or revised TOE.
6-9. Documentation of requirements in TOE
a. Tables of organization and equipment.
(1) TOE are organizational models which
state the minimum mission essential wartime re-
quirements for personnel and equipment needed for
accomplishment of a unit’s doctrinal wartime mis-
sion. Approved TOE are used in force planning and
subsequently in the development of MTOE which
are authorization documents against which person-
nel and equipment resources are programmed for
allocation.
(2) The TOE is the end product of the com-
bat development process. It merges, into one docu-
ment, the results of the requirements determination
process. This includes —
(a) Operational (functional/branch)
concepts.
(b) Manpower Requirements Criteria
(MARC).
(c) Basis of issue plans.
(d) EDU decisions.
(e) Other related documents and re-
quirements systems.
b. Manpower Requirements. Manpower re-
quirements that are documented in TOE are based
on Department of the Army approved criteria.
(1) Variable (workload driven) criteria.
Manpower requirements for combat support (CS)
and combat service support (CSS) positions are
based primarily on workload data for a function.
(a) The number of mechanics required
to support the tanks in a tank battalion is computed
on the basis of the annual man-hours of workload
generated by scheduled and unscheduled mainte-
nance actions for the battalion’s tanks.
(b) The required number of personnel
specialists, finance specialists, or cooks is based on
the number of soldiers supported.
(2) Standard criteria. These criteria include
staff positions and senior enlisted supervisors such
as commanders, first sergeants, command sergeants
major and operations NCOs.
(3) Doctrinal criteria. Requirements for
combat positions, such as the number of soldiers in a
rifle squad, are based on doctrine. The number of
crewmen required for a tank, though doctrinal, is a
function of the tank’s crew positions. Some non-
combat positions, such as primary staff positions,
may also be prescribed by doctrine (in this case, EM
101-5).
(4) MARC studies. Variable and standard
MARC are established through the conduct of stud-
ies that provide a complete explanation of the func-
tion, s ki lls involved, and the methodology employed
to establish the proposed criteria. RDD of
USAEMSA conducts these MARC studies in coor-
dination with the MOS or functional proponents.
After they have been coordinated with the propo-
nents for all TOE that will be affected by the new or
changed MARC, the studies are reviewed by HQDA
staff agencies and approved or disapproved by the
DA DCSOPS. Approved MARC are then dissemi-
nated for use in documentation of TOE. MARC are
reviewed and/or revised at least every three years.
(5) Personnel requirements for new or im-
proved equipment. Determining personnel require-
ments for the operation and support of new or im-
proved equipment is a special case. Personnel re-
quirements for TOE are developed as qualitative and
quantitative personnel requirements information
(QQPRI) and documented along with equipment
requirements in the BOIP for the equipment.
c. Basis-of-issue plans.
(1) A BOIP for new or improved equipment
is an automated record that establishes the minimum
mission essential wartime requirements (MMEWR)
for the equipment and its associated support items of
equipment and personnel (ASIOEP) in specific
TOEs. It also identifies any equipment and personnel
requirements to be replaced, if appropriate. BOIPs
are developed on automated systems and are applied
to specific TOEs by automated means.
(2) Materiel developers use the BOIP as in-
put for concept studies, life-cycle cost estimates, and
trade-off analyses during the R&D process.
(3) Eorce managers use the BOIP to plan and
program the modernization of specific units through
the provisioning of the new or improved equipment
and its ASIOEP.
(4) MACOMs use the BOIP to plan and pro-
gram for equipment, facilities, initial provisioning,
and personnel required to support the new or im-
proved equipment.
(5) An integral part of the development proc-
ess for a BOIP is the development and refinement of
the QQPRI. The QQPRI provides the following:
(a) MOS for operators, crew size, and
special personnel tasks.
(b) MOS for maintainors for the princi-
pal item of equipment, its components with separate
line item numbers (LIN), and associated support
items of equipment (ASIOE). The QQPRI also pro-
vides an engineering estimate for the direct produc-
tive annual maintenance man-hours (DPAMMH)
required for their support. The initial estimates for
DPAMMH and their subsequent refinements are
used to update the Army’s maintenance MARC data
base.
6-3
FM 100-11, Force Integration
(c) The materiel developer coordinates
the QQPRI with comhat developers, personnel pro-
ponents, and other materiel developers throughout
the development process. The final QQPRI data be-
comes part of the approved BOIP.
(6) Other types of BOIP are used in the TOE
development process as the means for making
changes to TOE based on changes in doctrine, per-
sonnel (for example, restructuring of an enlisted ca-
reer management field), or equipment (for example,
changing quantities of rifles and bayonets in a TOE).
(7) The final BOIP is required 30 months be-
fore the first unit equipped date (EUED) to allow for
documentation of authorizations and development of
modernization and institutional training.
d. Requirements for command, control, com-
munications and computer (C4) equipment.
(1) Prior to documentation in BOIPs and
TOEs, C4 equipment requirements are approved
through the operational facilities (OPE AC) require-
ments mles process.
(2) This is a combat developments process
for identifying requirements and establishing rules to
govern the allocation of C4 equipment for specific
functions in specific types of units and at specific
battlefield locations (brigade, echelons above bri-
gade, division, echelons above divisions, echelons
above corps, and so on).
(3) OPE AC rules are developed by the TOE
proponents and validated by the OPEAC review
board at the U.S. Army Signal Center. After valida-
tion, the rules are sent to HQ TRADOC for
approval.
(4) The U.S. Army Signal Center maintains
an automated data base of approved OPEAC rules,
each of which is identified by a unique five position
alpha-numeric code. An approved OPEAC rule must
exist in order to justify including a C4 equipment
requirement in a BOIP or TOE.
e. Equipment readiness codes. All equipment in
a TOE is coded with an equipment readiness code
(ERC) to indicate the relative essentiality of the
equipment to the organization. ERCs are an asset
distribution tool that, when combined with the De-
partment of the Army Master Priority List
(DAMPL), allow DCSOPS to establish priorities for
allocation of equipment that is in short supply.
ERCs distinguish between primary mission and sup-
porting mission equipment within the same unit. The
codes are explained in Chapter 13.
f. Incremental TOE system. The incremental
TOE system consists of base TOE records, groupings
of related BOIP records, which are called incremental
change packages (ICPs), and an ICP header list which
is generated by the automated system.
(1) The base TOE (BTOE). The BTOE is the
least modernized version of the TOE. An example
would be a tank battalion TOE equipped with M60
tanks and VRC-12 series radios.
(2) Incremental change packages (ICP).
ICPs are doctrinally sound groupings of one or more
BOIPs consisting of personnel and equipment
changes that will be incrementally applied to a
BTOE to form a succession of intermediate TOEs
(ITOE) as a unit is modernized. Eigure 6-2 illus-
trates this concept. An example of an ICP would be
a grouping of the BOIPs for radios in the single-
channel ground and airborne radio system
(SINCGARS) along with the BOIPs for their re-
spective vehicle installation kits.
(3) ITOE. The ITOE reflects how an organi-
zation will look at a specific point in time based on
the aggregation of ICPs applied to that point.
(4) Objective TOE (OTOE). The OTOE
portrays a fully modernized unit upon application of
all applicable ICPs.
(5) ICP header list. The ICP header lists all
of the BOIPs (grouped by ICP) applicable to a spe-
cific TOE and sequenced in the order in which they
are intended to be applied to the TOE. The ICP
header list portrays the doctrinal modernization path
(MODPATH) of a unit over time from the least
modernized configuration to the most modernized.
The ICP header list identifies all ICPs that pertain to
a specific TOE and the sequence in which they are to
be applied as the unit is modernized.
g. TOE strength levels. TOEs are documented
with five strength levels. These levels provide force
managers with options in a constrained resource en-
vironment.
(1) Level 1 depicts the personnel and equip-
ment needed for the unit to effectively accomplish its
missions on a sustained basis.
(2) Levels 2 and 3 reduce the number of per-
sonnel to approximately 90 percent and 80 percent,
respectively, of level 1. These levels represent bal-
anced organizational structures with reduced capa-
bilities in terms of sustaining combat capability or
the ability to perform the TOE’s level 1 quantitative
workloads
(3) Level B provides a means for conserving
U.S. military manpower by allowing the substitution
of other categories of personnel (such as local na-
tionals and contractor personnel) in certain posi-
tions. Level B shows the minimum numbers of U.S.
Army personnel required for command, supervision,
technical, maintenance and other key functions.
Type B organizations are only used for selected
combat support and combat service support units.
(A level A column appears in TOEs but it is not cur-
rently used.)
6-4
FM 100-11, Force Integration
(4) Level C specifies staffing that provides
the cadre for activation of a unit to one of the other
levels.
(5) Equipment requirements remain at 100
percent at all levels except for individual equipment
such as protective masks, tool kits and individual
weapons.
Figure 6-2. Incremental Table of Organization and Equipment System
h. Consolidated TOE update. TOEs and BOIPs
are developed and maintained in an interactive, real-
time, automated system called the Requirements
Documentation System (RDS). The automated rec-
ords for DA approved TOEs and BOIPs are re-
corded (“frozen”) periodically in the automated sys-
tem in a process called the Consolidated TOE Up-
date (CTU). CTU records are then disseminated to
the Army Staff, MACOMs, Army component com-
manders and other DOD activities for use in devel-
oping authorization documents, command plans,
programs, budgets and many other purposes.
i. Use of TOEs in force planning. TOEs pre-
scribe a particular type unit organization, man-
power, and equipment and specify the unit doctrinal
capabilities and wartime missions. They are the ba-
sis for developing authorization documents and de-
termining future resource requirements. They are
used to record and project the force structure of the
Army through the POM years and extended planning
period. When used with the master force database,
they provide a force structure projection that reflects
force levels in the program. Requirements docu-
ments are also used to depict the future force re-
quirements in the Structure and Composition System
(SACS).
Section IV:
Force Structure Development
6-10. The influence of constraints
a. The mix of unit models that make up a bal-
anced and affordable force structure must support
joint and Army planning, programming, and budg-
eting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
Eorce development is based on an understanding of
the objectives to be achieved, the threat, and con-
straints (dollars, end strength, roles, and missions).
The primary differences among various force struc-
tures are the extent to which constraints are imposed
and the time over which force structure requirements
are forecast.
b. The determination of the size and content of
force structure is an iterative, risk/benefit trade-off
analysis process. The CJCS fiscally constrained
force is capable of achieving the national objectives
with some reasonable assurance of success. This
force supports the joint strategic planning conducted
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs of the
unified combatant commands.
6-5
FM 100-11, Force Integration
6-11. Supporting analysis
a. Analyses are eondueted to identify critieal
near-term foree structure deficiencies and readiness
capabilities, resources needed to meet current and
programmed requirements, and the distribution of
these resources when translated into specific action
programs.
b. The current force capability to mobilize, de-
ploy, and sustain forces in combat is assessed by
comparing its actual capabilities with its designed
capabilities.
6-12. Total Army analysis
a. The Army’s program force is developed dur-
ing the TAA process. TAA analytically and subjec-
tively generates the below-the-line tactical support
forces and the general purpose forces necessary to
support the above -the-line divisional and nondivi-
sional combat forces contained in the Army fiscally
constrained force (divisions, separate brigades, spe-
cial forces groups, and armored cavalry regiments).
The POM force is adjusted for affordability and ex-
ecutability to become the basis for POM develop-
ment. The initial POM force becomes the approved
POM force after determining which force structure
initiatives will be included in the POM.
b. The TAA is a multiphased force structuring
process consisting of qualitative and quantitative
analyses. It generates tactical support and general
purpose forces necessary to sustain the divisional
and nondivisional combat forces designated in the
Army fiscally constrained force. The DPG, The
Army Plan (TAP) and TAA form the basis for the
Army’s POM development and establishment of the
POM force.
c. The TAA consists of two phases, a require-
ments phase (force guidance and quantitative analy-
sis) followed by a resourcing phase (qualitative
analysis and leadership review). The sequence of the
TAA activities is depicted in Figure 6-3.
Total Army Analysis
6-13. TAA phases
a. Requirements phase.
(1) Force Guidance.
(a) Force guidance includes the DPG
and TAP, which provide the NMS, threat data, and
resource assumptions and priorities. DOD-directed
scenarios are specified in the illustrative planning
scenarios. The Army force planning data and as-
sumptions (AFPDA) document is a single-source
reference for theater-level studies and modeling that
contains information concerning logistics and per-
sonnel planning, consumption and workload factors,
host nation support offsets by theater, support to and
from other services, stockage levels, and other plan-
ning factors crucial to force structure development.
During the force guidance phase, allocation mles are
reviewed and updated for use by the Concepts
Analysis Agency (CAA) during the quantitative
analysis phase.
6-6
FM 100-11, Force Integration
{b) Allocation rules consist of —
• Existence rules that tie a requirement for
one unit to the existence of another unit.
• Workload rules that tie unit requirements to
a measure of workload.
• Manual entry (direct input) rules that are
theater-unique requirements not identified in
other allocation rules.
(c) The force guidance phase culminates
with a senior advisory group (SAG) to address unre-
solved issues.
(2) Quantitative Analysis.
(a) Quantitative analysis determines
tactical support requirements through a series of
simulations. The strategic deployment analysis pro-
vides the strategic mobility forces and air/sealift data
contained in the AFPDA. The output is port-to-port
arrival times of comhat and support units. This be-
comes input for the combat operations analysis, a
war-fighting simulation that produces combat inten-
sities and forward edge of battle area traces, casu-
alty and ammunition consumption rates, and loss
rates for major items of equipment. This informa-
tion, along with allocation rules and logistics data, is
used in the logistical operations analysis to generate
support force requirements and a time-phased force
deployment list.
(b) Using the forces generated by the lo-
gistical operations analysis, CAA produces a com-
parison report (MATCH) of newly determined doc-
trinal support requirements against current and pro-
grammed units.
(c) These simulations are completed for
each scenario and the product of the quantitative
analysis phase. The TAA decision force is sent to
the MACOMs for review and issue formulation in
preparation for the qualitative analysis phase.
b. Resourcing Phase.
(1) Qualitative Analysis.
(a) Qualitative analysis develops the
initial POM force, within end-strength guidance, for
use in the development of the POM. A series of
analyses, reviews, and conferences, to include a
council of colonels (COC) and a general officer
(GO) conference, validates the computer-generated
requirements. MACOM and HQDA inputs, pro-
posed changes, and force structure issues centering
on claimants versus billpayers are reviewed. The
review centers on the an^ysis of each discrete level
and type of TOE unit in the decision force and the
integration of TDA issues.
{b) A Force Feasibility Review (FFR)
precedes the final phase of TAA and examines the
proposed force structure’s capability to accomplish
assigned and/or programmed missions by determin-
ing the affordability, supportability, executability
and sustainability of the force by answering such
questions as —
• Can the force be equipped? Is equipment al-
ready in the budget? Are there programs to
support the equipment requirements for the
force by year?
• Can the force be manned? Is the predicated
mix of personnel, by component, grade and
skill, available in the force?
• Can the force be provided facilities? Do fa-
cilities in current and budget construction
programs meet the living, working and
training needs of the force? Are the required
facilities in the right locations?
• Can the force be trained? Do ammunition,
procurement spares and stock-funded repair
parts in the supply system support the de-
sired unit training level each year? Do
TRADOC and Reserve Component schools
have the capability to support individual
training requirements?
• Can the force be sustained? Are spare parts
and depot maintenance output available to
support the desired OPTEMPO?
(2) Leadership Review.
(a) Eeadership review begins after
qualitative analysis to resolve issues before briefing
the Army leadership in the fourth step in the process.
The VCSA chairs a force program review to review
and resolve any issues, which is then briefed to the
CSA for decision. The resulting TAA base force
represents the force structure for POM development
and includes all authorized structure for all compo-
nents through the POM years.
{b) The product of the TAA and POM
processes is the approved force structure for the
Total Army. It is divided into multiple components:
the Active Army (COMPO 1), the ARNG (COMPO
2), the USAR (COMPO 3), and required but unre-
sourced units (COMPO 4).
(c) Other components include —
• Army prepositioned (PREPO) sets of
equipment (COMPO 6).
• Direct host nation support (COMPO 7);
guaranteed by host nation support agree-
ments.
• Indirect host nation support (COMPO 8);
the CINC’s estimate of how much additional
indigenous labor would be available in war-
time
• Logistics civil augmentation (COMPO 9);
contracts for additional support and services
to be provided by domestic and foreign
firms.
6-7
FM 100-11, Force Integration
(d) Direct and indirect host nation sup-
port and the logistical civilian augmentation program
(LOGCAP) comprise offsets for requirements for
Army structure that are reasonably assured hy ne-
gotiated host nation support agreements, estimates,
or contracts.
Section V:
Authorization Documentation
6-14 Purpose
Unit authorization documentation can he viewed as
the integration of unit model design and force struc-
ture development. Authorization documents provide
each organization or activity with the stmcture, per-
sonnel, and equipment to accomplish its mission or
function. An authorization document constitutes
authority to requisition personnel and equipment and
is the basis for measuring unit status. The authori-
zation document system is used to manage all as-
pects of personnel and materiel procurement, force
planning, programming, budgeting, training, and
distribution.
6-15. The command planning process
a. Active Army.
(1) The command planning process begins
with the forces reflected in the master force
(MFORCE) (current and programmed).
(2) MACOM plans are developed based on
HQDA guidance and command initiatives. HQDA
guidance as to which units to document, what CTU
to use and PEG constraints includes the Army
structure message (ARSTRUC), which documents
TAA decisions, and management of change (MOC)
window guidance.
(3) These inputs are used by the MACOM to
develop subsequent guidance that directs subordinate
organizations to submit a plan recommending the
allocation of manpower by specific units. Command
plans are developed by integrating the plans submit-
ted by the subordinate organizations, considering
earlier MACOM POM submissions, and incorpo-
rating the results of MACOM analysis and deci-
sions. Command plans submitted to HQDA for re-
view and approval contain troop lists representing
the current and projected forces of the command,
results of executability assessments, and justification
for any deviation from HQDA guidance. Those
command plan initiatives that are approved are used
to update the master force and are the basis for the
authorization documentation process.
b. Reserve Components. The ARNG and USAR
prepare command plans and develop plans for force
structure actions. The Chief of Army Reserves pro-
vides the troop action guidance to FORSCOM.
FORSCOM (USARC), U.S. Army Furope
(USARFUR), and USARPAC, prepare a reserve
component program that contains all organizational
actions planned for the USAR in the program years.
The reserve component program is submitted to the
OCAR for review in coordination with HQDA. The
NGB, in coordination with the state adjutants gen-
eral, produces the ARNG troop structure program
(ARNG-TSP). The ARNG-TSP, which contains all
organizational actions for three years, is submitted
to HQDA for review after acceptance by the states.
6-16. Documentation process
The MTOF documentation process is illustrated in
Figure 6-4.
a. The MFORCE.
(1) The MFORCF contains the data neces-
sary for force structuring, force planning, and ac-
counting of all Army units. The MACOMs maintain
a copy of the MFORCF with internal automated
force structuring data capability. The MACOM da-
tabase interfaces with the HQDA MFORCF by
means of distributed Structure and Manpower Allo-
cation System (SAMAS). The MFORCF is recon-
ciled semi-annually at HQDA with the authorization
database by the Automatic Update Transaction
System (AUTS). AUTS is a comparison of SAMAS
force structure programming, PEG resources and
The Army Authorization Document System- Redes-
ign (TAADS-R) documentation. AUTS is the proc-
ess by which HQDA approves or disapproves
authorization documents.
(2) The MFORCF is designed to capture na-
tional policies, mandates, and directives from OSD
and Congress. This force structure and documenta-
tion guidance permits development of authorization
documents to account for personnel and materiel
allocation. This guidance is obtained when the
MFORCF (established by the DPG and TAA for
POM submission) and OSD/HQDA guidance (in the
form of defense management reviews, program
budget decisions, and Army management reviews)
directs specific force structure actions be carried out
within allocated resources over time. Troop lists for
current, budget, and program years are provided in
the master force database as the official force
structure record. It accounts, by UIC, for COMPOs
1, 2, 3, 4 and 6, over time, with supporting informa-
tion to include missions, organizational data, pro-
gram applications, and descriptions.
b. Command Plan Development.
(1) Distributed SAMAS is provided to the
MACOMs to initiate the development of command
plans. Development of command plans begins before
the receipt of input, using advance (draft) informa-
tion provided by HQDA.
6-8
FM 100-11, Force Integration
(2) Command plans are compared with the
master force structure files, PBG, and draft
TAADS-R documents to determine MACOM
agreement with HQDA guidance and direction. Pro-
cedures for reviewing the different plans are the
same, although the mechanisms used depend on the
format of the plan. The master force is updated
based on command plan review and approved force
structure changes. The process is completed when
changes from all plans are used to create a new
MFORCE. This new MFORCE reflects all force
structure actions taken to comply with the PBG and
other management decisions.
c. The Structure and Composition System.
(1) The Structure and Composition System
(SACS) (Eigure 6-5) is updated to reflect the latest
BOIP, TOE, SAMAS, and TAADS-R positions and
known resource constraints (positive and negative
“wedges” in the budget not yet reconciled at UIC
level of detail), to produce the logistics (LOGSACS)
and personnel (PERSACS) component databases.
These products are comprehensive, multiyear list-
ings of personnel or equipment authorizations and
requirements for the total force.
(2) PERSACS describes the required and
authorized manpower of the force; however, the of-
fice of the DCSPER (ODCSPER) and the U. S.
Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) use
the Personnel Management Authorization Document
(PMAD) in lieu of PERSACS due to their ability to
continually update PMAD. The PMAD data base is
also reconciled with the SAMAS and TAADS-R
data bases. PERSACS is also used for troop support
planning in the facilities process by the Army Sta-
tioning and Installation Plan (ASIP). ASIP also uses
structure and manpower allocation system civilian
manpower data as an input to its planning analysis.
(3) Guidance for documenting equipment
authorizations is provided by the TOE/SRC and its
modernization level (BOIPs and ICPs applied as the
result of approved systems distribution plans).
(4) LOGSACS describes the equipment of
the force and is the principal input to the Army
equipment distribution program (TAEDP). It pro-
duces an equipment distribution program for the cur-
rent, budget, and program years and supports Army
modernization by supplementing new and displaced
equipment planning information in the BOIP. It pro-
vides essential details such as quantities of equip-
ment and distribution dates by unit.
MTOE Documentation Process
MACOM
SACS
-
LOGSA
-
PERSCOM
Figure 6-4. Documentation Process
6-9
FM 100-11, Force Integration
Figure 6-5. Structure and Composition System
6-17. Authorization documentation
The authorization documentation schedule is shown
in Figure 6-6.
a. Uses of authorization documentation. Every
organization and activity must have an authorization
document to reflect an organizational structure that
is supportable hy the manning and equipping sys-
tems. Authorization documents state a unit’s ap-
proved structure and resources and serve as a basis
and authority for requisitioning. Changes to authori-
zation documents require synchronization to ensure
that direct and general support organizations (such
as supply, transportation, maintenance, fire support)
effect necessary change prior to the organization(s)
they support.
b. Automated documentation system. The de-
velopment of authorization documents is supported
by an automated system that contains all unit
authorization documents. It maintains quantitative
and qualitative personnel and equipment data for
individual units and the entire Army force structure.
It provides standardized authorization documents for
similar parent units and an interface with other
automated systems. The authorization document
data maintained in the database include
organizational structure and personnel and equip-
ment requirements and authorizations at the same
level of detail for both MTOE and TDA organiza-
tions.
c. Modification table of organization and
equipment. The MTOE prescribes the unit organi-
zation, personnel, and equipment authorized to ac-
complish its doctrinal wartime mission at a specific
point on its MODPATH. MTOEs are for war-
fighting units. They reflect allocation of manpower
and equipment resources in order to accomplish
those doctrinal wartime missions. When a unit is
organized at ALO 1, it will normally be authorized
100 percent of all equipment and personnel required
in accordance with their level of modernization.
When a unit is organized at ALO 2, they will nor-
mally be authorized 100 percent of the major equip-
ment items designated with equipment readiness
code (ERC) A (less individual items such as weap-
ons, bayonets, protective masks) and between 88 and
98 percent of their required personnel strength. Units
organized at ALO 3 (or less) may have authoriza-
tions for major items of equipment reduced; how-
ever, ERC A items should be considered for reten-
tion when possible. Units organized at ALO 3 will
be authorized between 78 and 88 percent of their
required personnel strength.
6-10
FM 100-11, Force Integration
DOCUMENTATION TIMELINE
Winter 96
Summer 96
Winter 97
One
MOC Window
MOC Window
MOC Window
MOC Window
Nov. 95 May 96 Nov 96 May 97 May 98
Focus:
• FY97
• Below the line
forces
• Above the line
forces by ex-
ception
•NET EDATE
961116
Focus:
• FY98
• Above and Be-
low the line
forces
•NET EDATE
971016
Focus:
• FY99
• Above and Below
the line forces
•NET EDATE
981016
Focus:
• FYOO
• Above and Be-
low the line
forces
•NET EDATE
991016
Figure 6-6. Authorization Documentation Schedule
d. Table of distribution and allowances.
(1) The TDA prescribes the organizational
structure for an organization or activity with a mis-
sion or function for which a TOE does not exist, and
may include civilian positions. TDAs are unique
authorization documents to attain the most efficient
use of personnel and the most effective operational
capability within the manpower spaces prescribed in
the command force structure to accomplish specific
missions and functions. Activities with similar mis-
sions may be similar in organization but have sub-
stantially different personnel and equipment authori-
zations due to differences in worldoad and the
demographics of the population they support. A
TDA is used for the same purposes as a MTOE ex-
cept for unit status reporting, which is not usually
required of TDA activities. Manpower determination
standards and standard installation organization
models establish personnel requirements and
authorizations. Equipment utilization data and BOIP
will be used to develop TDA materiel authorizations.
Types of TDA documents include —
• Mobilization TDA.
• Augmentation TDA.
• Eull-time support TDA.
• Joint table of allowance/joint table of
distribution.
(2) However, the basis for developing the two
documents differs. MTOEs are derived by applica-
tion of BOIPs/ICPs to Base TOEs to meet specific
operational, environmental, or modernization re-
quirements and are consistent with the mission and
the availability of manpower spaces as prescribed in
the approved command plan adjusted force struc-
ture.
e. Modification of authorization documenta-
tion.
(1) Concept plan requirements. Concept
plans are required from the MACOM to obtain
HQDA approval of unprogrammed requirements for
force structure, manpower, or materiel. The concept
plan will state the purpose, objectives, advantages,
and disadvantages of the proposed activation or re-
organization. Proposed authorization documents are
submitted concurrently with the plan to accelerate
the review process. Approved concept plans do not
serve as an authorization document but support the
creation of one.
(2) HQDA review. HQDA reviews all
authorization documents to ensure compliance with
standardization of mission, capabilities, organiza-
tion, ALO, and the allocation of resources. Organi-
zations will not substantially change authorization
documents more than once a year. Substantial
change is any personnel and/or equipment change
that creates a resource demand on the Army. De-
partment of the Army policy provides that one
authorization document (MTOE or TDA), one CTU,
and one edit (POSC-edit {personnel occupational
specialty code — edit file} for personnel and
LINEDIT (LIN edit} for equipment) per unit, per
year will be applied in order to reduce turbulence.
6-11
FM 100-11, Force Integration
(3) Demobilization requirements. The proc-
ess of activating new organizations and converting
and reorganizing existing organizations is evolution-
ary. It is based on capability increases in docttine,
force design, and acquisition of materiel. However,
the demobilization process requires that decreased
levels of capability be determined and force structure
be inactivated. The processes of increasing and de-
creasing force capability are identical in the incre-
mental approach to total organizations. Like mod-
ernization, force reduction considers impacts on di-
rect and general support organizations. Force capa-
bility is reduced by inactivations of organizations
followed by support structure and support infra-
structure.
Section VI:
Summary
Sttucturing the Army is accomplished by execution
of DPG and TAP directed “above-the-line” force
structure (divisions, brigades, regiments and groups)
and TAA derived EAD/EAC “below-the-line” com-
bat, combat support and combat service support
force structure documented in the total force. Plan-
ning, programming and documentation of docttinally
correct requirements and budget supported authori-
zations result in combat ready units.
6-12
FM 100-11, Force Integration
Chapter 7
Manning the Force
Section I:
Introduction
7-1. Manpower constraints
The Congress, Office of Management and Budget
(0MB), Office of Personnel Management (0PM),
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Of-
fice of the Secretary of the Army (OSA) establish
annual manpower end-strengths. They develop poli-
cies that may restrict the availability of military and
civilian manpower or limit the latitude available to
personnel managers. Policies may limit permanent
changes of station (PCS), set tour lengths, set officer
grade limitations, or place a ceiling on local national
hires.
7-2. Manpower management
Manpower management determines minimum essen-
tial requirements, alternative means of providing
resources, and the policies to be followed in utilizing
manpower. It involves the development and evalua-
tion of organizational stmcture and reviews the use
of active. National Guard, USAR, and civilian per-
sonnel. It also includes contractors when contractual
services are appropriate to satisfy manpower re-
quirements.
7-3. Role of manpower managers
Manpower managers deal with the efficient and eco-
nomic use of human resources within the organiza-
tional stmcture. They focus on requirements de-
manding specific grades and skills to perform spe-
cific tasks before determining which requirements to
support with authorizations (spaces). Personnel
managers implement authorizations through the ac-
quisition, training, and assignment of personnel
(faces) to authorized positions.
Section II:
Army Manpower
7-4. Manpower spectrum
a. Total military strength. The total military
strength of the Active Army is a dynamic measure of
personnel “faces” consisting of the operating
strength (personnel available for assignment to
authorized positi
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