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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
Marl
>78
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT.
Igtribution limited to
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15 Mar Tfr^^OtheLJtrtTies ts for this
document inmiiHf^referred to US
Army U**^foIlege 8tl»i^ic Studies
Ltute, Carlisle BarratHs^PA
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Distribution Unlimited.
Effective Date YA?7/7Jby0/&3d - P/9
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DISCLAIMER
The views of the author do not purport to reflect the position of the
Department of the Army or Department of Defense.
I;
PREFACE
|
This special report is intended to be a companion piece to the
US Army Field Manual on Operations (FM 100-'')) . The author reviews the
manual through the eyes of a Soviet officer and comments on some simi-
larities and differences between Soviet and US doctrine as outlined in
the manual. In addition, the author considers two instances where he
believes Soviet operations are inadequately portrayed in FM 100-5, and
develops cases supporting his contentions. Key Soviet open source
publications are used throughout to provide the reader a better grasp
of Soviet military perceptions.
This special report was prepared as a contribution to the field
of national security research and study. As such it does not reflect
the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the
Department of Defense.
'rw * 2KJ%L;
JOgEJH E. PIZ&I<29
onel. Infantry
Director
iii
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FOREWORD
This paper was prepared for presentation at the Tactics and
Military Posture Symposium which was held at the Combined Arms Center
at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas 30 March - 1 April 1978.
The paper is written with the idea of helping the reader to
better understand and become more familiar with the US Army Field
Manual on Operations (FM 100-5) as well as to learn about and increase
understanding of the Soviet Ground Forces and their operational
principles and tactics.
There are a large number of quotes from Soviet open source
publications--perhaps an excessive number. However, many readers
will not have read some of the key books and other publications
which help one to understand the essence of Soviet operations. This
paper provides the reader with a more extensive view of Soviet military
thought in the Soviets' own words.
In the two cases where 1 feel an incorrect or Incomplete picture
of Soviet operations is portrayed in FM 100-5 (one dealing with the
type of Soviet offensive action which NATO should expect and the other
with tactical nuclear warfare), I have developed in detail not only
what I feel should be written or included in FM 100-5, but also the
case supporting it.
I have tried to write a companion piece to FM 100-5, following it
and paralleling it chapter by chapter, subject by subject — in sequence —
and in some cases quoting FM 100-5 in order to make the comparison or
contrast more vivid.
FREDERICK C. TURNER
Colonel, Armor
US Army
SUMMARY
Ar
r
tl/
In this paper, the alithor, attem^iTng to look at FM 100-5 through the
eyes of a Soviet off icer,<*£omments'fon some similarities and differences be-
tween Soviet doctrine and the US doctrine as outlined in FM 100-5.1 This in-
cludes comments on doctrine ascribed to the Soviets in the manual.'1
*The
le author uses exclusively Soviet sources both written and oral, and
interpreted based on his extensive contact with Soviet Ground Forces per-
sonnel in the 1960s and 1970s to highlight some of the similarities and
differences in US and Soviet military thinking. Using FM 100-5 as a vehicle,
the writer of this paper proceeds chapter by chapter in sequence to empha-
size many of the salient points in the manual and simultaneously provide
the reader with considerable information regarding Soviet operations and
tactics as well as a myriad of other minor but interesting details, obser-
vations and comments about the Soviet military.
Since the mid sixties we have seen an impressive outpouring of Soviet
books/manuals which describe, develop and illustrate' tactics and operational
principles. The author uses extensive quotes from some of these recent
Soviet publications, cites conversations he has had with Soviet officers,
and gives his impressions and thoughts — often "thinking aloud" by means of
comments in parentheses.
The paper criticizes FM 100-5 explicitly on two counts and implicitly
on a third.
There is in FM 100-5, in the opinion of the author, excessive emphasis
on Soviet concentration of divisions echeloned in depth on a narrow front
for a breakthrough. While this is one of the basic tried and proven offen-
sive techniques, the meeting engagement (a movement to contact followed by
a hasty attack) is given at least as much emphasis in Soviet publications
where indications are numerous that in any Soviet offensive (and offensive
not defensive is the basis for Soviet military operations) the meeting
engagement is just as likely if not more likely than the deliberate break-
through attack. The trend, the author believes, is toward having less
second echelon forces below front level due to increased weapons capability
and staying power as well as the size of the combat zone, enemy disposition
and the type of warfare expected. The author suggests that in any subse-
quent changes to FM 100-5 "equal time" should be given to the likelihood of
the "meeting engagement" being the predominant type of Soviet operation,
and he points out why he current NATO situation makes that more likely
than the deliberate "breakthrough" attack.
Second, he highlights the Soviet emphasis on nuclear warfare although
with a possible initial conventional phase, while FM 100-5 (with the excep-
tion of one chapter) is devoted almost entirely to conventional war in Europe.
The author points out the Soviet declaratory doctrine that nuclear war can-
not be limited to a local or regional area once initiated and the advocation
of preemption by the Soviets in case they learn of a planned strike by US/
NATO forces. The Soviets expect and prepare for nuclear warfare which,
they feel, can and will probably escalate from a tactical nuclear to a
'
vii
A- ‘ ,
mCKDlNO PAG* BLaNC-NDT FILMED
—
strategic exchange, but they are prepared to go conventional for an indeter-
minate period of time. This the Soviets consider to their advantage in that
enemy nuclear weapons and delivery systems can be knocked out before the time
arrives for their use. Preemption is also advocated since if both sides
are going to use nuclear weapons, the first user has a big and perhaps deci-
sive advantage over the second user. The writer also feels insufficient
emphasis is given to US tactical nuclear warfare as a cornerstone of the
"flexible response."
While the US stresses leadership based on decentralization of respon-
sibility and authority to the commander on the ground and seeks a leader who
will act on his own, the Soviets depend on centralization, with decisionmaking
and initiative at higher levels. Flexibility in command, control and
communications at higher levels, the Soviets believe, permit this initiative
(regiment and above) to affect the actions at lower levels and to substitute
for lower level initiative. A dilemma posed for the Soviets is that the
meeting engagement, which the Soviets advocate as the most likely and effec-
tive type of offensive warfare, requires the greatest low level initiative
in order to be successful — and the Soviet system stifles low level initia-
tive.
INDEX
Page
INTRODUCTION I
Military Strategy 2
The Revolution In Military Affairs 1
Operations and Tactics 4
Military Doctrine 6
US ARMY OBJECTIVES (Chapter 1) 8
MODERN WEAPONS ON THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD (Chapter 2) 11
Lethality 11
Role of the Tank 12
Infantry 13
Field Artillery — Gun and Missile 14
Air Defense Artillery--Gun and Missile 15
Airpower 15
Night Combat 16
Mine Warfare 17
War in the Electromagnetic Spectrum 17
Tactical Nuclear Weapons 18
Mobility and Tempo 18
HOW TO FIGHT (Chapter 3) 20
Leadership 20
Terrain 21
Battlefield Dynamics 22
Generals, Colonels and Captains 22
Building Blocks 23
Command and Control and Communications (C^) 24
Night Operations 24
Operations Security (OPSEC) 25
OFFENSE, DEFENSE AND RETROGRADE (Chapters 4, 5, and 6) 26
Meeting Engagement ... 31
Quotes from Sidorenko's The Offensive 34
More on the Meeting Engagement (at Army, Division, and Regimental
Level) 43
Second Echelon and Reserve 48
"Deep Operations" 50
The Importance of World War II Combat to the Soviets 51
What it All Means 54
INTELLIGENCE (Chapter 7) 58
AIR- LAND BATTLE (Chapter 8) 59
ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONS (Chapter 9) 61
TACTICAL NUCLEAR OPERATIONS (Chapter 10) 62
CHEMICAL WARFARE AND NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL (NBC)
DEFENSE (Chapter 11) 73
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (Chapter 12) 74
OPERATIONS WITHIN NATO (Chapter 13) 77
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS (Chapter 14) 79
CONCLUSIONS 82
ix
EX
COMMENTS ON FM 100-5 — FROM A SOVIET POINT OF VIEW
'
«
(or The New Americanskiy Manual on Operational Art)
Introduction
In 1964 the Military Publishing House in Moscow translated and
published an edition of US Army Field Manual 100-5 (probably the
February 1962 edition).! It is thus likely that the Soviets will also
translate and publish the new bicentennial year edition of FM 100-5.
However, as of early 1978 (if one judges by the lack of references to
the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 in the Soviet open press) it would appear
that the Soviets have decided to treat it as a non-event. 2 One could
speculate that the absence of comment is due to their belief that the
new manual simply formalizes what has long since been in practice or
that they are still comparing it with the NATO Allied Tactical Publi-
cation (ATP) on Land Force Tactical Doctrine to determine our commit-
ment to coalition warfare and standardization of operational principles
and tactics.
Since the Soviets have chosen not to comment on our new manual
on operations, this author will take the liberty of speculating on
comments which a Soviet officer might make or the reactions or thoughts
which he might have upon picking up and perusing a translated copy of
the new FM 100-5. The author of this paper intends to quote liberally
from and interpret Soviet manuals /books ; to give the probable outlook
of the Soviet professional military, based on open source Soviet publica-
tions and the writer's own conversations with Soviet officers; and to
offer his comments and observations — often in the manner of "thinking
out loud" — with comments in parentheses.
1
The Soviet officer is the product of his own unique environment in a
Marxist-Leninist militarized society and the graduate of a three to five
5
year military commissioning school as a minimum (perhaps also of a ten-
month combined arms commander course, or possibly, instead, of a 3-5 year
command academy course at the Malinovski Tank Academy or the Frunze
Military Academy, and much less likely, of the two-year course for
selected colonels and one star generals at the Military Academy of the
General Staff). Thus, the American reader should understand that the
Soviet Russian reader may well have a different understanding of many
of the basic words which appear to translate so easily.
The Soviet officer in reading FM 100-5 will undoubtedly compare
it with what he has read in his Officer Library Series, other military
books, articles in military magazines such as The Military Herald
(Voyenni Vestnick) - the monthly publication of the Ground Forces, and
newspapers such as Red Star (Kraznaya Zvesda) - the daily publication
of the Ministry of Defense. Mich of what is found in FM 100-5 the
Soviet reader can subscribe to wholeheartedly. One of the techniques
employed by Soviet military authors is to state the western view on a
matter and teach by taking issue with it - or by implication accept it.
Military Strategy
The Soviets did their major soul searching regarding doctrine
and strategy in the late 1950's and early 1960's. This was the period
when Nikita Khrushchev tried to place major emphasis on his Strategic
Rocket Forces (SRF) , and Marshal Sokolovski was moved from his job as
Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces to a task as Chief
Editor of the book Military Strategy, editions of which appeared in
1962, 1963 and shortly after his death in 1968. Once the military
2
,yk
doctrine and military strategy had been agreed upon and the dialogues
in the military press were concluded, the Soviet military turned to
the development of operational principles and tactics. An impressive
number of books and articles on the implementing operational principles
and tactics have appeared since the mid sixties.
Military strategy has no*" changed essentially since 1968, as
outlined in the last edition .f the volume authored by a collective of
officers holding graduate degrees and representing military, party
and civilian institutions which form part of the so-called "strategy
establishment." These institutions include the Military Academy of
the General Staff, Frunze Military Academy, Malinovski Tank Academy,
Gargarin Air Academy, Lenin Military-Political Academy, the Military
History Institute of the Ministry of Defense, the Military History
Department of the General Staff, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism
(of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union),
the Academy of Sciences, the Institute of World Economy and International
Relations (IMEMO) and the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada
(IUSA) . This latest (1968) version of Military Strategy - now ten years
old - was edited by Marshal Sokolovski (as the two earlier editions had
been) and the chapters were written largely by the same authors who had
written the earlier two versions. This volume is considered by the Soviets
to be a major achievement of the late marshal and is read as a key work
and milestone by Soviet officers. 3
The Revolution in Military Affairs
In 1964 Marshal Sokolovski co-authored an article in Red Star
entitled "The Art of War at a New Stage - A Revolution in Military
Affairs, Its Meaning and Consequences . "^ This "revolution in military
affairs" was cited as the reason for the changes in doctrine and
strategy - which would shortly be followed by corresponding changes
in operational art and in tactics. It was brought about by the
(1) development of nuclear weapons, (2) development of intercontinental
missiles and other delivery means, and (3) the technical innovations in
command, control and communications.
Operations and Tactics
Once the key decisions had been made concerning military strategy
and doctrine, the Soviets turned to the development of compatible and
supporting operational art and tactics. Some of the key books published
since the first two editions of Sokolovski's Military Strategy in 1962
and 1963^ and his Red Star article in 1964 are the following: Major
General Reznichenko's Tactics in 1966,® Colonel Sidorenko's The Offensive
in 1970,^ Colonel Savkin's Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tac-
tics, 1972,® The Tank Battalion in Battle by Colonels Konoplya and Maikov
in 1972®3 as well as Colonel Garbuz' (and other members of the author
collective) The Motorized Rifle Battalion in Battle the same year,^
Colonel General Lomov's Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution
in Military Affairs in 1973,^ Army General Radziyevski's edited series
Regimental Tactics through Combat Examples — authored by a collective
including Major General Reznichenko and Colonel Garbuz in 1974, ^ and
12
Division Tactics through Combat Examples in 1976, as well as Radziyevski's
1977 volume on Tank Strike— the offensive operations of a tank array, based
13
on World War II operations. My cotments regarding possible Soviet reaction
to FM 100-5 will be based largely on these books and various talks I have
had with numerous Soviet officers during my years of contact with Soviet
Ground Forces personnel.
4
. C- ’
• 4 "
****&&&■
The Soviet publication closest by title to FM 100-5 is probably
Colonel Savkin's book on Operational Art and Tactics. 8 A Soviet officer
comparing the two would first contrast the multi-shade-green, cardboard
covered, 375 page, almost pocket-sized Soviet volume with the loose
leafed, green and black camouflage covered US volume which has about 200
pages, larger print, impressive graphics and is of large notebook size.
In contrast to the Soviet book which is listed inside the cover as
being printed for officers and generals of the Soviet Army (there being
also soldiers, sergeants and warrant officers in the Soviet Army), the
US manual is obviously designed for Army personnel down to squad level.
The manual on tactics by General Reznichenko, by comparison, is listed
as being provided for officers of the Soviet Army, students at military
institutions and officers in the reserve (but not for generals or war-
rant officers, sergeants and soldiers). 14 in the Soviet Army, instruc-
tion for soldiers and sergeants is normally conducted by use of training
boards — although personnel are literate and can certainly read the
material printed in books. However, Soviet books and articles do not
have the illustrations and tabular /outline, easy-to-read format which
serves to emphasize the main points and which characterize US military
publications. The Soviet military reader has to "dig" for his informa-
tion with many diamonds lying in an expansive rough.
The Soviet reader probably would turn to the last page of the book
looking for the table of contents, rather than to the front where one
finds it in the US field manuals and books. The absence of an author
will surprise him since his military books are written by military (and
usually graduate) specialists in the "military academies" (similar to
our war colleges and command and staff colleges). Often they are
5
' v *>i
authored by a group (or collective) of officers and sometimes are edited
by the Commandant of the "academy" having principal responsibility for
the subject covered.
Hilitary Doctrine
The title "operations," which translates in Russian to "operational
art" ia understandable to a Soviet reader since operational art is one
of the three components of military art, the other two being strategy
and tactics. Thus, a manual on operations, as the Soviet understands
it, deals with lower level strategy or higher level tactics, usually
found at front (army group) or army (army corps) level. The reference
to the manual setting forth the basic concepts of US Army doctrine,
however, would probably leave him confused. In the first place, he
probably will have read "army" as "ground forces" (which is correct)
rather than the Russian term "army” which is a generic term referring
to four of the five services (ground forces, air forces, strategic
rocket — or missile — forces, and the national air — or aerospace — defense
forces, but not naval forces). However, military doctrine, which
includes the methods and forms of conducting the war (and by Soviet
definition also the preparation of the country and its armed forces for
war) is "developed and defined by the political leadership of the state"
(i.e., the Communist Party). 15 According to the Soviets, military doc-
trine is based on politics, the social structure, the level of science
and technology, and the nature of the anticipated war. The Soviet
officer is taught that his military doctrine is "based on the peace
policy of the Soviet Union," has been developed on the basis of instruc-
tions from the central comnlttee of the party, and is based on military
.-I .®V>. ,
science (not military art) and the "political and economic might of the
USSR and the other countries of the socialist commonwealth. "16 This
military doctrine involves preparing the armed forces and the country
as a whole for a "struggle against an aggressor . "17 The Soviets
consider that military strategy is based on military doctrine (rather
than vice versa) . Current Soviet military doctrine was developed in the
late 1950s, based on guidance from the post-Stalin 20th Communist Party
Congress in 1956.
• **
US ARMY OBJECTIVES (Chapter 1)
The US Army objectives — to win the land battle, destroy enemy
military forces and secure or defend important geographic objectives —
are similar to those of his own ground forces ("routing of enemy tactical
groupings confronted and the capture of important areas of terrain") . 18
Notice that the defensive orientation is missing, since the Soviets
advocate that the best defense is a good offense and they will reply to
aggression only by a sweeping offense. The American emphasis on preparing
to win the first battle of the next war may seem strange to the Soviet
whose experience in WW II leads him to concentrate on winning the last
battle — hence the war. His professed desire is to avoid war and perhaps
from an ideological point of view to consider any future war as the
final war rather than the next war (since according to Marxist-Leninist
ideology any future war with the West will be a struggle to the death
between socialism and capitalism with socialism winning and ending wars
for all time — the single economic, political and social system of
socialism — later developing into communism, and having no internal con-
tradictions which will lead to war).
Not only is the US Army prepared to fight outnumbered and win, but
so is the Soviet Army. 19 The Soviet reader understands the theme that
soldiers need the best weapons that industry and technology can provide.
Recently his Defense Minister Marshal Ustinov, wrote that:
. . . those who even consider attaining military
supremacy over the Soviet Union with the help of
such weapons (new types of weapons of mass destruc-
tion) should remember that our country's economy.
8
science and technology are now at such a high
level that we are in a position to create any
type of weapon in the shortest time . . .20
There is certainly no disagreement on the importance of crew/team
proficiency or tactics which, under the direction of well-trained
leaders, can maximize weapons capabilities.
The Soviet reader will certainly concur with the idea expressed
that combat development is based on a search of combat experiences and
technology for ways to provide better weapons systems, organization,
tactics and techniques. His only concern might be the relative impor-
tance of experiments and tests in the process. To the Soviet the
tactics which have been tried and proven in combat cannot be easily
disproved by a series of experiments and tests, although they may
serve to reconfirm the validity of combat tested methods. This, of
course, makes the Soviet dependent on WW II experience, since there has
been no other Soviet combat experience since then. The Soviet officer
sometimes questions the value of US combat experience in Korea and
Vietnam since that was not in Europe and the terrain and operational
conditions in a non-European engagement are not generally applicable to
a European scenario. The Soviets thus update cautiously their WW II
combat experience on European soil against an advanced Western military
power and alliance.
Where the manual speaks of communicating an effective doctrine
throughout the forces, the Soviet with another understanding of doctrine
will be interested in communicating accepted principles of operational
art and tactics to those levels of the forces which require knowledge
(and this is often to a higher level than in the US forces since the
Soviets consider that each soldier, sergeant and warrant officer needs
to know only his part of the operation — a specialist versus generalist
view) .
The Soviet would certainly say an equivalent to "amen" to the
emphasis on unit training involving effective combined arms teamwork,
although the frame of reference is somewhat different.
The mention of readiness could come easily from a Soviet publica-
tion— the aim being to produce a unit ready to fight and win now. Combat
readiness is a frequently used term in Soviet publications, and with no
major recall problems (military personnel remaining in or close to bar-
racks even on a weekend) the units are able to clear barracks areas
in a short period of time.
Finally there is the subject of confidence with the Army being
convinced it will win and soldiers understanding what to do and why it
must be done. The Soviet is used to being bombarded with written and
oral testimonials to the "glorious" and "victorious" Soviet Army
(generally called the Red Army until WW II) . The what to do is
covered by the repetitious training of units, teams and crews. The
why it must be done is supported by the party political-moral education
which takes about 10 percent of the soldiers ' time and is reinforced by all
oral and written information media. As outlined in Chapter I, the
courage, skill of soldiers, quality of leaders, and excellence of tech-
nique and tactics all play an important part in the Soviet Army as does
resolve, although there is less emphasis on the need for leaders at all
levels to operate independently and follow mission-type orders.
10
’ • •
'U*
MM
* - • < -L *<' ,
MODERN WEAPONS ON THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD (Chapter 2)
The Soviet reader is very aware of his fielded capability in modem
weapons, although as he looks around at the various types of trucks in
a unit and reads letters from friends who serve in semi-ready (poluraz-
vyortavyie) , cadre (kadrirovanaya) or training (uchebnaya) divisions,
he is aware of the presence of large numbers of old tanks and artillery
pieces which have "trickled down" from the ready (razvyor tivyie) divi-
sions such as those in Groups of Forces and along the Sino-Soviet border.
Lethality
That war is lethal is no secret to the Soviet, who hears constantly
about the loss of 20 million Soviet citizens in the Great Patriotic War.
On the Eastern Front during the final years of WW II, the Soviets were
renowned for the prodigious amounts of ammunition fired and combat
equipment utilized. Thus, he certainly accepts the description of the
"new lethality" posited by FM 100-5. However, he reads and hears that
surprise and the effective use of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear
and chemical) can minimize this lethality against his own troops. This
. writer suggests that the Soviets have increased the numbers of tanks in
many units and areas by one-fourth to one-third as a partial counter to
this increased lethality caused largely by the increase in the number
and effect of antitank weapons. 21 The change from the three-tank to the
.
four-tank platoon in motorized rifle units increases the number of tanks
by one-third. The relatively new separate tank battalions in the divi-
sions add to this tank strength and permit greater losses to antitank
weapons while still maintaining an equal or greater tank strength.
11
Role of the Tank
If the US view is that,
. . . The tank is the primary offensive
weapon in mounted warfare . . . has the
firepower, protection and mobility to
carry the battle to the enemy and destroy
him . . . (and) . . . all other elements
in the combined arms team must be employed
to support and assist the forward movements
of tanks . . ,
the Soviets feel no less strongly. In the wbrds of the CINC of the
Soviet Ground Forces in 1975,
. . . Despite the improvement and growth
of the effectiveness of antitank weapons,
tanks remain the main strike force and
mobile force of the ground forces and a
powerful means of resolving important
tasks in modern warfare. Moreover, com-
pared with other types of combat equip-
ment, they (tanks) are the best suited
for decisive, maneuvering actions. 22
Thus, there is uniform agreement that the battlefield will be dominated
by tanks (although many of them will be lost to antitank weapons) , and
the Soviet military reader is used to hearing and reading that "the
tanks of the Soviet Army are the best in the world."23 General Lomov
continues: "They (Soviet tanks) have strong armor, powerful weapons,
a dependable motor, a great range and advanced driving and fire control
instruments . . . the tank could carry various weapons, use combustible
case ammunition as well as AT guided missiles (PTURS) to Include a
nuclear charge." He also suggests use of aluminum and plastics to
replace steel armor. Regarding the organizational trends for tanks,
Colonel Sidorenko in The Offensive writes,
12
Tanks are making important qualitative changes
during the postwar period. Their proportion as
part of the ground forces increased. Tanks are
now organized into strong tank soyedineniye and
chast (armies, divisions and regiments). Along
with this they are organically included as part
of the combined arms soyedineniye and chast
(i.e., tank divisions in combined arms army, a
tank regiment in the motor rifle division, and
a tank battalion in the MR regiment). 24
The number of old and new models of Soviet tanks suggests that the
Soviets have bet heavily on the tank for the foreseeable future, and
a battlefield replacement for the tank is not discussed.
Infantry
The Soviets agree with the requirements for infantry, weapons,
mobility, helicopters and airborne forces. On the lethal modern battle-
field where the antitank weapon is contesting the tank for mastery, the
Soviets are also increasing the numbers and models of ATGMs. General
Lomov's statement that "our PTURS (antitank guided missiles) are capable
of neutralizing any armored targets at a distance of two or more kilo-
meters" is typical of the claims made for Soviet antitank weapons. 25
The Soviets often use foreign writings to intimate agreement, if
unchallenged in the article. Thus, such phrases as "according to
foreign specialists" and "abroad they say/believe" are common introduc-
tions to requirements to "create new combat and transport vehicles with
high cross country capabilities, able to move off the roads, over swamps,
through deep snow, across land and water, and even fly at low altitude."
The Soviet infantry combat vehicle (BMP — bronovaya mashina pekhoti-
armored vehicle infantry) is said to have "demonstrated high qualities."
In the new Soviet Military Encyclopedia (the first four volumes of which
had been published at the time this article was written), references to
the BMP point out that it was designed for movement and conduct of
battle. It increases the mobility, firepower and protection of the
crew against nuclear explosions, conventional rounds, and chemical and
biological weapons. One of the 1976 volumes, under the authoritative
editorship of Marshal Grechko, the late Minister of Defense, and
including on the editorial board others such as Admiral Gorshkov, CINC
of the Soviet Navy, and General Altunin, Deputy Minister of Defense and
Civil Defense Chief, points out that the BMP permits combat under
favorable circumstances without having to dismount and facilitate
cooperation with tanks. These BMPs can also support the operations of
dismounted infantry with the fire of their own machine guns and cannons.
The modern BMP is listed by the Soviets as being a tracked vehicle (but
also produced in a less common wheel model) which is usually amphibious,
aerotransportable, and droppable by parachute. The crew of 2-3 is in
addition to the 8-9 motor rifle personnel who can either fire on the
move through embrasures in the sides or quickly leave the vehicle to
fight in a discounted formation. The BMP is armed with antitank guided
missiles/ATGMs (PTURS) and equipped with an air filtration system for
nuclear and chemical warfare and night vision equipment for night combat.
Based on the BMP, the Soviets are developing various combat vehicles
designed for antitank, staff, repair and maintenance, medical evacuation
and engineer purposes. 26
Field Artillery — Gun and Missile
According to the Soviets, "the role and proportional amount of
rocket artillery have Increased even more." Artillery, which is generally
14
considered together with rockets /missiles and is under the command of
the Chief of Rocket Troops and Artillery (CRTA), has long been known as
the "God of War" (Bog vaini). FM 100-5 points out that artillery was
the greatest casualty producer in WW II. The current Soviet emphasis
is on suppression by covering an area with a large amount of firepower,
rather than using artillery for pin point "neutralizing targets on the
battlefield" as in the "conventional field artillery of the capitalist
armies." The Soviets have long commented about "the continuous rise in
the proportional amount of self-propelled artillery" in the West and
they seem now to have joined the trend with their new 122mm and 152mn
self-propelled artillery pieces. The Soviets, however, feel that mis-
siles (rockets as they usually call them) are a Soviet development
(going back to the Katyushas in WW II--120n»n multiple rockets fired
from vehicles in salvos of 20-30) and they are particularly proud of
them. Soviet military personnel are constantly subjected to statements
similar to that of General Lomov who wrote that "Soviet tactical-operational
and tactical missiles . . . are the best in the world and surpass similar
missiles in the armies of the capitalist nations. "27
Air Defense Artlllery--Gun and Missile
The Soviet reader would agree wholeheartedly With the statement that
"air defense is Integral to the combined arms team" and he looks at his
motorized rifle (MR) regiment for an example of a fielded capability.
Alrpower
The Soviet reader, when encountering the term close air support,
probably does not have a clear picture. Except for support of river
crossings by high performance aircraft (where the area to be attacked is
well delineated), he is used to high performance aircraft being used as
15
an extension of artillery (i.e., what the artillery cannot reach,
frontal aviation can). The introduction of helicopters into frontal
aviation has provided an opportunity to provide close air support
across the FEBA without the aircraft having to leave Soviet airspace.
Regarding helicopters, the Soviets have paid close attention to US
development of the helicopter as a combat vehicle. They have long
scoffed at the capability of the helicopter to stand up on the modern
battlefield in a major conflict, but the alacrity with which they are
introducing the helicopters to the frontal air army belies their state-
ments. 28 it is common to see such statements as:
In the United States and certain other
imperialist nations, particular attention
has been paid to developing helicopters
and to raising their proportional amount
in army aviation. . . . They can be armed
with air-to-ground missiles, rapid firing
cannons, ATGMs (PTURS) , rotary ammunition,
machine guns, cluster bombs and so forth. 29
The Soviet reader must muse that "we seem to be joining the trend and
it is certainly logical considering that a Russian invented the autogiro/
helicopter."
Night Combat
If the Soviet reader thought back over the number of articles on
night tactics in his Military Herald (Voyenni Vestnick) carried in 1976
and 1977, he would probably conclude that night combat was not considered
nearly as important as other variations of combat. However, he would
remember his frequent night movements and mobility exercises and the
night vision equipment on his combat vehicles. Thus, he can certainly
agree that the aim is to have weapon sight effectiveness equal the weapon
range effectiveness. The IR, thermal sight and image intensifiers
may some day turn night into day for combat operations. However, until
that day there is still a need to increase visibility in the northern
European area where fog, haze, snow and smoke are frequent and winter
nights aren’t broken until about nine o'clock in the morning (by local,
not Moscow time) .
Mine Warfare
The Soviet reader will likewise realize that his Military Herald
reading over the past two years has been somewhat deficient in articles
on mine warfare, at one tine one of the Soviets' heralded strong points.
Of course, if as is written, "Soviet military strategy will have a
decisive, active and offensive character ,"30 he should not be surprised
to find less emphasis on a defensive weapon.
War in the Electromagnetic Spectrum
In the Radio Electronic Struggle (radio-elektronnaya borba) ,
generally translated as radio electronic combat (REC) , the Soviet is
extremely aware of the capability afforded by modern technology. He
subscribes completely to the ideas of FM 100-5 (that battles may be won
or lost by the fight in this medium, that EW is now a form of combat
power, that command, weapons and surveillance can be attacked and
defended "in the struggle" and that direction finding (DF) and jamming
can be very effective against an enemy unit). He would probably tie in
the use of rockets and artillery as the result of DFing to neutralize
enemy capabilities and could easily consider that the subject matter
had been written by a Soviet.
Tactical Nuclear Weapons
The Soviet reader knows that the US has long championed the cause
of tactical nuclear weapons and such weapons play an important role in the
"forward defense" and "flexible response." His leaders do not accept
the so-called "conventional-nuclear war," but he is expected to be able
to be victorious in a nuclear, conventional or "conventional-nuclear"
conflict. The reference to enhanced radiation weapons will probably
make him see red (not necessarily the Communist variety) . Articles in
his daily military newspaper, such as the one on February 10, 1978,
constantly condemn the projected new weapon and offer to reach an
agreement on the ban of production of neutron weapons. 31
Mobility and Tempo
The Soviet is used to emphasis on mobility and tempo of the offensive.
He can certainly appreciate the capabilities of an "aerial antitank
force," particularly in a fluid situation, and airmobility (air mobile
units) seems to be an idea whose time has arrived or is arriving — even
for the Soviet Ground Forces. Sea lift doesn't particularly ring a
bell for him, but strategic mobility as evidenced by the air lift with
his militarized civilian airline Aeroflot helping to bring his replacements
twice yearly to the Groups of Forces in Eastern Europe makes him appreciate
the problem confronting American planners who send replacements to Europe.
Tempo in the offensive is a constantly played Soviet theme. Articles
in 1977 issues of Military Herald with titles such as "A High Tempo of
Attack — The Indispensable Condition for Victory" and "Maneuver — The Key
to Victory" are typical of the plethora of writings which stress the
speed of movement. The first article, by MR Division Commander Colonel
- . ■•-■-c'.v, ■ *r ■>»•**
Lobachev, who commands the Taman Division near Moscow, points out that
A high tempo is not a goal in itself, but a
means of achieving victory in offensive combat.
The speed of movement of the attackers denies
the enemy the opportunity to freely maneuver
with his forces and equipment, to utilize the
reserve . . . and it neutralizes many of the
strengths of the enemy defense. . . . The
presence of the modem means of combat opens
today wide possibilities for an increase in
the tempo of the offensive. The struggle to
keep up the tempo of the advance is equalled
with maintaining the initiative. A high tempo
of attack is senseless without reliable sup-
pression of the firepower of the defender,
above all of his antitank fire and without
the ability of the combined arms commanders
to properly utilize the results of nuclear
strikes, the firepower of the attached and
supported units, especially the artillery and
air and also ATGM units (battalions, companies
and platoons) .... In directions (on axes)
where nuclear weapons are used, the tempo of
the advance can equal the cruising speed of
the tanks and BMPs. 32
The second article, by a Colonel Simchenkov, published two months later
refers to the earlier article and suggests that.
The tempo of the advance is directly dependent
on the capability of the battalions and com-
panies to operate under conditions of radio-
active contamination. ... A high tempo of
attack is, especially in the depths of the
defensive area, impossible without skillful
envelopments and seizure of strong points by
taking advantage of weakly defended road
junctions, unoccupied areas and uncovered
flanks. 33
Tempo is to the Soviet reader a familiar and key word.
19
HOW TO FIGHT (Chapter 3)
"The most demanding mission that could be assigned the US Army
remains battle in Central Europe against the forces of n* Warsaw Pact,,"
The Soviet reader is well aware that his forces must split their attention
between NATO in the West and China in the East. This chapter, which
concentrates on how to fight a conventional battle in Central Europe
against the Warsaw Pact Forces, espouses a combined arms team fighting
with maximum combat effectiveness. Most articles published in Soviet
publications involving tactics still concentrate on a nuclear battle-
field but caveat with expressions such as "if nuclear weapons are not used."
Leadership
The Soviets certainly agree on the need for competent leaders, brave
soldiers, good discipline, and feelings of duty, pride, trust and obliga-
tion. That the leader must act intelligently is an article of faith,
but the requirement for him to act "responsibly on his own" is going too
far. Although the strength of the US Army may lie in the "decentraliza-
tion of responsibility and authority to the commander on the ground,"
the Soviets tend toward centralization, and the regimental commander (by
American standards) often ends up running the battalions and companies.
There is little emphasis on flexible mission-type orders and the Soviet
tactical system is characterized by a lack of flexibility. Skill is
demanded and expected from leaders, but initiative and imagination are
not really encouraged at levels lower than regiment. The Soviet reader
is used to a demand for step-by-step fulfillment exactly according to
the plan.
20
' • t ' -
—
to **
However, initiative is considered of great importance by the
Soviets, They maintain that it is based on a thorough knowledge of
military art and of the enemy's views on conducting combat operations,
and an understanding of the senior commander's plans. It involves the
skillful utilization of existing conditions and a readiness to take
upon oneself the responsibility for making an independent decision.
The display of initiative is one of the most
important conditions for successful operations
, . . its importance in operations with the
development of equipment and capabilities for
armed combat is steadily growing . . . and it
is especially essential when the orders/missions
received no longer correspond to the situation
and there is not time or possibility to receive
new orders from the higher commander. . . . The
dynamic character of present day operations, the
frequent and radical changes in the situation,
(and) the increasing possibility for the break-
down in communications especially increases the
role of initiative by all comnanders and chiefs. 34
Terrain
US manuals emphasize movement on covered or concealed routes for
maximum protection. The Soviets try for surprise until the attack is
launched, but attempt to cover the ground distance in the shortest
possible time to overrun the enemy with superior forces and weapons.
The Soviet reader does not expect his tank platoon to utilize the
terrain for maximum protection; terrain is a tool used by higher level
commanders to successfully execute the attack. The emphasis is on
surprise and the time-distance race with superior numbers to overwhelm.
Time, formation and suppressive fires are more Important than individual
use of terrain and firing accuracy. In a defensive operation the
individual soldier is expected to use the terrain, and the Soviet
21
soldier in the Great Patriotic War achieved great acclaim for his ability
to camouflage, dig in, use the terrain, and operate in the dark. The
average Soviet soldier in the 1970s, however, no longer comes from the
rural village and does not have the innate ability of the rural soldier
to use the land and to become accustomed to the dark and the cold — as
did his father of World War II fame. The soldier, who is the product
of a cradle-to-grave togetherness, also has a tendency to bunch up and
stay close to his comrades. Soviet articles are constantly calling for
commanders to keep their personnel spread out to avoid bunching up. The
Soviet reader might well wonder if his army was the only one with that
problem.
Battlefield Dynamics
The rules that are outlined in the manual could be copied from
Soviet publications. Concentrate adequate forces and weapons (the
Soviet "norms"); control and direct the battle, use cover, concealment,
suppression and combined arms; and use maximum capabilities of weapons.
Only the emphasis on cover and concealment would be less for the Soviet —
and the school of the soldier provides instruction on proper use,
particularly in the defense.
Generals. Colonels and Captains
The Soviet reader will definitely have difficulty in understanding
the thrust of this oversimplification. Many Soviet division commanders
are colonels (for example, the colonel who was the author of the Military
Herald article cited earlier) and it is normal for a colonel to be selected
as a division commander and serve in that grade for six months or longer
while proving that he can handle the job. The Soviet pay and allowances
22
I
i
■
system is also based on position pay (example: division commander), which
can amount to more than half of the total pay and allowances, while the
rank pay (example: colonel) may be only about half the amount of the
position pay. Thus, the important criteria is position, not rank, and
it is not uncommon to find a senior lieutenant, captain, major or
lieutenant colonel as battalion commander. The Soviet reader would
understand it much better if he read that "division and army commanders
concentrate forces." The objective of never being outnumbered or out-
gunned more than 3:1 at the point and time of decision, and of attacking
with concentrations providing 6:1 superiority would sound logical to
the Soviet.
As for colonels controlling and directing the battle, once again
the important thing to the Soviet is the position rather than the rank.
In any case, it is the regimental commander (who may well be a lieutenant
colonel) who is going to do the directing and controlling — rather than
the brigade and battalion commanders as in the US Army.
The statement that an attacker should seek combat power ratios
(the Soviets call them "norms") of at least 6:1 at the point of decision
or (the Soviets might say "and") supplement by firepower, surprise,
deception or superior skill — is a Soviet maxim. The agreement is complete.
Building Blocks
Whereas the basic building block for the US Army, particularly in
defensive warfare, is the cross-reinforced tank/raech battalion task
force or tank/mech company team, the Soviets do not practice cross
reinforcement. The Soviet combined arms teamwork is based on the regi-
mental organization with, for example, companies of the MRR tank bat-
talion being attached to or placed in support of each of the MR battalions
23
♦ i , ,,
J* •“ • ^ ^ *•
•••>-: w. . • - ■'V’*
/•' —
1
I
I
w
l
and the platoons (4 tanks each) being sometimes further attached to or
placed in support of the rifle companies. (Note: With the four-tank
platoon it is possible for the platoon leader to remain with or near
the MR company commander and still have a single tank working with each
of the three rifle platoons.) The tanks of the regimental tank battalion
often remain on a single battalion net and control can be exercised by
MR officers sending requests for tank support up the MR regimental net
to the regimental CO, who then contacts his tank battalion commander, who
in turn issues instructions to tank company and perhaps platoon commanders
in support of MR units. Soviet combined arms operations are characterized
by the co-location of principal commanders and a limited task organization
which does not include cross attachment. The Soviet reader would find it
hard to understand the cross attachment/reinforcement system which we
feel provides us with great flexibility.
C3
The Soviet reader will certainly not take issue with the guidance
that the commander must be forward to see, feel and control the battle
and that his deputy/executive officer must be informed and ready to
take command. Only the terminology would be confusing to the Soviet
reader who would expect his Chief of Staff (at battalion, regiment,
division, army or front) to be the one to assume command (although his
first deputy commander at army or front might also assume command at a
later time) .
Night Operations
Passive viewers and sights will soon enable the US Army to fight
at night almost as in day. The Soviet reader would expect his Army to
be able to do the same.
24
~ 4*'
OPSEC
1
If US generals are expected to execute strategic deception and
large scale feints, the Soviet reader feels that anything they can do,
his generals can do better--particularly in the field of strategic and
tactical surprise. The Soviets write and speak often of the Manchurian
campaign at the end of the Great Patriotic War when they claim to have
f
achieved both strategic and tactical surprise against the Japanese. This
campaign, incidentally, is cited as a model for future operations.
If colonels and captains are supposed to be involved with communica-
tions security, the Soviet reader would agree with its importance. The
Soviets stress communications security and limit the personnel trans-
mitting by radio largely to officers. The large number of stations on a
net (for example, every tank in a battalion of some 30-40 tanks) makes
it essential that communications be closely controlled from the top down.
* . '
An advanced or flank guard with its special mission would, of course,
have a different SOP. In any case, operations security has a high
priority which the Soviet reader would readily recognize.
OFFENSE, DEFENSE AND RETROGRADE (Chapters 4, 5, and 6)
The Soviet reader might well look at the next three chapters as a
group (offense, defense, and retrograde operations). His text on Tactics
(1966) has chapters on the meeting engagement, the attack/offense, and
the defense (in that order). The 1972 text on the hbtorized Rifle
Battalion in Combat has only three chapters covering, in order, the
march and meeting engagement, the offensive (which also contains a
section on attack from march formations against a defending enemy) , and
the defense. The 1974 and 1976 texts on regimental and divisional tac-
tics through combat examples have chapters on the attack/offense, the
meeting engagement, and the defense (in that order). The 1977 text.
Tank Strike, by Army General Radzievski, which deals with tank army
operations, has chapters on preparation for offensive operations and
execution of offensive operations (but no chapter on defense) . Sections
of the chapter on the execution of offensive operations deal with the
meeting engagement, pursuit, river crossing, conduct of the defense in
the course of offensive operations, etc. Thus, the Soviet reader is
offense oriented and is primed for the meeting engagement.
He has been told repeatedly that Lenin recognized the attack to be
the basic and decisive form of armed conflict and pointed out that only
through resolute offensive actions is it possible to win victory and the
war. ^ Soviet military science considers "the offense as the basic form
of combat actions, since only by a decisive offense conducted at high
tempo and to a great depth is total defeat of the enemy achieved." 36
26
As he scans the purpose for the offense and the fundamentals of
offense in fM 100-5, he feels he could well be reading from a Soviet
text except that the method of expression is different in certain cases
and there is no ideological slant. Certainly the fundamentals listed
(concentrate overwhelming combat power; suppress enemy defensive fires;
shock, overwhelm and destroy enemy; attack deep into the enemy rear;
and provide continuous mobile support) can be found in Soviet texts.
Only the "see the battlefield" fundamental might cause momentary con-
fusion until he connected reconnaissance, intelligence (and perhaps
radio-electronic capabilities) with the figurative as well as literal
idea.
However, what he was probably expecting to find listed as "funda-
mentals" were the principles listed and expanded upon in his "operations
manual. "
Savkins’ Principles of Operational Art and Tactics devotes a large
part of its text to explaining what the Soviets consider to be the seven
(or eight) basic principles: mobility and high tempos of combat opera-
tions, concentration of efforts (and the necessary superiority in men
and weapons over the enemy at the decisive place and time) , surprise .
combat activeness (to seize the initiative through offensive action) ,
preservation of combat effectiveness of friendly troops (particularly
in a nuclear conflict) , conformity of the goal of the operation to the
conditions of the actual situation (a good estimate of the situation
regarding capabilities, appreciation of time-space factors and the
maintenance of a strong reserve) , and interworking or coordination
(combined arms units for combined arms operations). Savkin posited an
27
r
eighth principle which apparently has not yet been officially accepted:
the principle of simultaneous action upon the enemy to the entire depth
of his deployment and upon objectives of the deep rear. He bases this
principle on the "introduction of nuclear weapons and longer range means
of warfare."
As to the admonition that one attacks outnumbered only if the
eventual outcome promises higher enemy losses (than his own) or capture
of a crucial objective, one does not find such prescribed limitations
on offensive combat in Soviet publications.
Reading that in mounted offensive combat the basic element of the
combined arms is the battalion task force, he is once again on strange
ground. His basic element of combined arms is the regiment (with MR/
tanks, artillery (field and antiaircraft) and administrative, supply,
political and rear service functions) ; the task force idea (cross
attachment) is alien to him. He is in complete agreement with the
further statements about the tank being the primary offensive weapon —
a common meeting ground.
As he finds the offensive operations being broken down into some
five categories, the Soviet reader is probably beginning to recall how
the offensive is presented in Soviet publications. The movement to
contact and the hasty attack are combined and called the meeting engage-
ment. However, he would not agree that in the movement to contact one
should "move so as to meet the enemy with the least force possible, thus
avoiding excessive casualties in the first moments of battle." He would
also not understand the emphasis on having the task forces and teams
move from "one covered position to another," although he would be
28
reassured by reading that the attacker "moves aggressively toward the
enemy." The deliberate attack he would certain equate with his own
breakthrough operation, but he would not consider the exploitation as
warranting equal consideration with the deliberate attack (probably
since to him part of the successful deliberate attack is a form of
exploitation). He recognizes pursuit as requiring distinct and separate
tactics, parallel pursuit and frontal pursuit.
Reading the purposes of the defense, he agrees that they are
academically valid if you are forced into the defense. However, his
own military doctrine has stressed that it can be only a temporary
condition. He probably has to chuckle when he reads that the "defender
has every advantage except initiative," since one of his basic principles
of operational art teaches that the initiative is of overwhelming impor-
tance. He does agree, however, with the expressed thought that the
"attack is a vital part of all defensive operations."
As to organizing for the defense, the Soviet reader would understand
the covering force area which they used to call security lines (polosa
obespecheniya) ; the main battle area which they subdivided into forward
positions, 1st positions, 2nd positions, main line of defense, third
positions — and then further back a second line of defense; 3nd the rear
area. It is interesting that in Reznichenko' s Tactics (1966) they show
the US schematic defensive organization ("according to US Army views
1954-1964") on what appears to be a division level as the last in a
series of schematics portraying the development of defensive lines and
positions (most of which are Soviet) and by implication infer that the
US defense is the most advanced. They often point to the multiple lines
29
of defense which they established at Kursk to blunt the German attack
as an example of how to conduct an effective defense. They do not
consider their main battle area to be an "elastic" defense as is ours,
but it is based on a series of strong points.
On coming to the chapter on retrograde, the Soviet reader would
have to pause and think. There is generally a single Russian word
used for retrograde, withdrawal and retirement (otkhod) . Delay is not
considered as a separate form of action. Little emphasis is placed on
retrograde in the Soviet Army. The book Tactics has its shortest
chapter on the subject (5b pages). The Motorized Rifle Battalion in
Battle does not even discuss the subject; neither does Colonel Savkin's
book on operational art.
Thinking back to a chapter in The Offensive entitled "Defeat of a
Defending Enemy and Exploitation of Success" and another section in the
same book entitled "The Possible Character of Modern D**fdnse of the
Troops of the NATO Countries," he reads with great interest in FM 100-5
(chapter 4) the references to his own array and the expected form of
offensive operations. Thus, he learns that "the Soviet army attacks in
very narrow fronts in great depth with artillery massed at 70-100 tubes
per kilometer in the breakthrough sector." Also that there can be 600
tanks in the leading echelon and as many more behind. Already in Chapter
3 (3-6) and glancing ahead to Chapter 7 (7-13) he finds identical
references to Soviet doctrine describing concentration of forces up to
I six divisions echeloned in depth on a 10-12 kilometer front (breakthrough) .
An example given has three successive echelons of two divisions each and
some 20-25 battalions and 600 tanks in the first echelons. The US
”
division is expected to concentrate 6-8 battalions in a narrow sector
to block the advance and to accept risks on the flanks.
Now this is nothing new to the Soviet reader who is certainly
familiar with his own breakthrough operations. However, he has two
baskets in which to put his offensive eggs (the offensive operation
involving the breakthrough as developed to a high degree during the
Great Patriotic War) and the meeting engagement (which involves an
attack from the march and a hasty attack) . Judging by the coverage of
both offensive variants in magazines and books over the past decade, it
is obvious that considerable thought has been and is being given to
both. One could also make a case for the conclusion that the trend is
from the breakthrough to the meeting engagement — or that the meeting
engagement would be used or considered first if conditions gave any
reasonable chance for success. The Soviet leader on sitting back and
thinking for a moment might wonder if FM 100-5 didn't place too much
emphasis on defense against the breakthrough — to the exclusion of con-
sideration regarding what could well be a much more likely threat, the
meeting engagement. He also might wonder if there were not an overempha-
sis on the Soviet second echelon, since there may be only one echelon
at various levels and a smaller combined arms reserve may be more useful
in the 1970s, particularly if used in conjunction with the meeting
engagement.
Meeting Engagement
To refresh his memory on what the latest party and MOD line is
regarding variants of offensive warfare and combat formations, he picks
up the newly published Soviet Military Encyclopedia, edited by among
31
others. Marshal Ogarkov, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces; Admiral
Gorshkov, CINC of the Navy; Air Marshal Kutakhov, CINC of the Air
Forces; Army General Pavlovski, CINC of the Ground Forces; Army General
Yepishev, Chief of the Main Political Administration; Army General
Shavrov, Commandant of the Military Academy of the General Staff
(somewhat similar to our War College) who is responsible for agreed and
published strategy and operational art; and Professor Zemskov, a noted
strategist and writer. He then proceeds to look for meeting engagement
and combat formations, to see if there is any late guidance. 37 Alpha-
betically he first comes to meeting engagement (vstrechnoye srazheniye)
at operational level involving fronts and armies. The article fills
almost two complete pages and aside from reminding him that the first
meeting engagement was carried out successfully by the Russian General
Suvorov fighting against the Napoleonic forces in Italy in 1799 at the
battle of the Trebbia River, he learns that the meeting engagement (at
army or front level) can be used at the beginning of a war; is charac-
terized by fierce struggle to seize and hold the initiative; that the
battle is usually developed from march column; that it is developed by
forward elements who facilitate the entrance into combat of main force
elements under favorable circumstances; that an excellent example in the
Great Patriotic War was the meeting engagement at Prokhorovka on 12 July
1943 (during the Kursk Campaign when the 5th Guards Tank Army and the
5th Guards Army met elements of a German panzer army head on) ; that if
the meeting engagement is unsuccessful it is reconmended that a deliberate
attack be launched to destroy the enemy and start the pursuit; and that
the success of the meeting engagement is dependent on the initiative of
commanders at all levels, the persistence, and the decisiveness in
carrying out the decision. The article was written by one N. I.
Kratinsky .
‘
..... . .
The next article alphabetically is also on the meeting engagement
(vstrechniy boy) at tactical level. 38 This article is slightly shorter
(a little over one page) with a sketch showing an MR battalion rein-
forced by a tank company and supported by an artillery battery. It
covers some of the same historical information as found in the previous
article, but also comments on the post war mobility which makes the
meeting engagement increasingly feasible, the development of combat over
a wide front, a confused situation, sudden changes in the situation, and
the limited time to organize forces for the operation. It advocates
bringing heavy suppressive fire on the enemy, hitting him quickly with
major forces, and striking the enemy on the flank and in the rear with
the aim of defeating him in a short period of time. The most important
criteria to ensure success are continuous and deep reconnaissance, a
timely decision and a quick issuance of orders to the troops. The
decision is made based on the map and verified on the ground. It advo-
cates the quick exploitation of the results of nuclear weapons (if they
are used) and fire of conventional weapons with tanks and BMPs/BTRs
being used for the main attack. The article goes on to cover the
opportunities for aviation to strike the enemy columns moving forward
through road junctions, valleys, defiles and river crossings. The main
attack is strengthened by battalions and regiments from the second
echelon and the reserve. The article ends by pointing out that the
meeting engagement calls for the utmost in "moral and physical strength,
33
'V * -vir***
a* \ +
1
1
good training, bravery, initiative and decisiveness." The article is
written by A. A. Sidorenko, and the name does ring a bell.
Colonel A. A. Sidorenko, Doctor of Military Science, is a member
of the faculty at Frunze Military Academy, one of the institutions
responsible for the determination and elaboration of tactics based
on the new strategy and doctrine. Sidorenko's work as an official
spokesman for Soviet military thought has spanned more than a decade.
In 1966 he was a member of the author collective from Frunze Military
Academy which wrote and edited Tactics . one of the first and basic
books of the "Officers' Library" series; in 1967 he wrote an article
in Red Star on "Meeting Engagements"; in 1970 his definitive work on
The Offensive was published; in 1973 he wrote an article on ground
force armaments In the Military History Journal; and in a 1977 volume
of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia published by the Ministry of Defense
and the Institute of Military History, there was this article written
by the same A. A. Sidorenko. So let's look at what he writes about the
meeting engagement and also about the second echelon in his book, The
Offensive, which was published to "facilitate the broadening of the
officers' tactical horizon."
Quotes from Sidorenko's The Offensive (Nastupleniye)
As he turns the pages looking for references on meeting engagements,
these are some of the words which catch his eye: ^
In the chapter on "Combat Missions and Formations of Troops,"
Sidorenko counsels that,
The combat formation must ensure swift use of
results of nuclear strikes and destruction by
fire of the enemy so that he has no time to
34
%**.'♦-*
I
L
collect himself, execute a maneuver, close the
breaches, restore his system of fire and control,
and conduct other measures to eliminate the after-
effects of nuclear strikes and the effects of fire.
This requirement can be met by assigning tank
podrazdeleniya (i.e., tank battalions) to the
first echelon on the main axis, by operations of
motorized rifle podrazdeleniya (battalions and
companies) on armored combat vehicles on axes of
nuclear strikes, and by the wide employment of
airborne landings. . . . For fullest use of
results of nuclear strikes, the podrazdeleniya
(battalions) on each axis must be given a certain
degree of tactical independence so that they can
overcome the resistance of the surviving enemy,
areas of destruction, centers of fire and other
obstacles on the battlefield, and also cross
zones of radioactive contamination and eliminate
the aftereffects of enemy nuclear strikes with
a minimum radiation of personnel.
There is no doubt that the Soviets are looking very carefully at
NATO defensive capabilities and tactics. In fact, one of the major
subparagraphs in the chapter on "The Nature of the Offensive Under
Conditions Where Nuclear Weapons are Employed" in Sidorenko's The
Offensive is entitled "The Possible Character of Modern Defense of the
Troops of NATO Countries." This author suggests that the same relative
freedom of action, increased initiative at lower levels, and fast tempo
operation which is posited here is compatible with the meeting engage-
ments in Central Europe as the Soviets see them. They would be
advantageous both in a situation where the enemy was not yet present
in force in strongly organized defense positions oir where there was a
reasonable possibility of the conflict suddenly turning nuclear with
the penalty for concentration of forces which could be decimated by a
■ w-
. r
- \ <t
*# -L.
nuclear strike.
The combat formation is echeloned deeper on the
main axis and in places where strong enemy resis-
tance is expected. It is less deeply deployed on
secondary axes and in anticipation of weak enemy
resistance. With commitment of the second echelon
organization of coordination with attached and sup-
porting means of reinforcement, eased the rapid
commitment of podrazdeleniya (battalions) of second
and succeeding echelons of regiments and made con-
trol more stable. (And control is the name of the
game.)
He continues by pointing out that the division commander had no
means for exploiting success "... and as a result the attack took
place at a slow tempo." (Hopefully the new equipment and condition
of enemy defenses might change that.) He further lists some of the
advantages of a one-echelon deployment (albeit at battalion level) as
being maximum use in combat of the fire of small arms, increased force
of the initial blow, eased control, and a reduction in infantry losses
from enemy artillery, mortar and aircraft fire (wouldn't this also
36
I
apply to a possible nuclear situation where there is an advantage to
"hugging" the eneny?). He analyses contemporary conditions by advo-
cating varying combat formations depending on the combat mission,
availability of men and materiel, nature of the enemy defense, and
terrain conditions. He did state that the battalion level attack would
most likely be carried out in two echelons (when he wrote the book in
1970).
The first echelon is the most important element
(of the combat formation) ... it must be capa-
ble of delivering a powerful and deep initial
attack, exploit swiftly the results of nuclear
strikes, and complete the defeat of the first
echelon of the opposing enemy with a continuous
attack against the depth of his disposition, or
accomplish his defeat independently if nuclear
weapons are not employed.
(Notice the caveat on the use of nuclear weapons.)
Employment of nuclear weapons against an enemy
defense permits allocating not only motorized
rifle troops to the first echelon, as was
usually done previously, but tank troops as
well. Tank podrazdeleniya (battalions) possess
high maneuverability, great firepower and
attacking force, and lower vulnerability to
enemy nuclear attacks than other combat arms.
They are capable of quickly exploiting results
of friendly nuclear strikes, attacking at high
rates, and penetrating to a great depth while
operating a considerable distance from the
remaining forces. They are more adapted to
delivery of swift, bold and crushing attacks.
Presence of tanks in the first echelon permits
shifting combat operations to the depth in a
short time and, under favorable conditions,
achieving the ultimate goal of the attack
without commitment of the second echelon or
the reserve. Therefore the question of use
of tank units in the first echelon is resolved
each time depending on the degree the enemy
has been hurt by nuclear and conventional
weapons, the nature of the enemy's defense
(is he ready and in position?), the combat
37
i
*
composition of friendly forces, the assigned
mission (could we read the depth of the final
objective?), terrain conditions, and other
data on the situation.
The distinction of the second echelon from the
reserve was that it (second echelon) was created
ahead of time with a precisely defined mission--
to intensify the force of attack of troops of the
first echelon from a specific position and exploit
success in depth. The immobility of defensive
positions of the enemy permitted assigning a com-
bat mission ahead of time to troops not only of
the first echelon, but of the second echelon as
well, and not improvising it in the course of
combat operations as was the case in the presence
of a reserve. ... The combat mission was assigned
to troops of the second echelon at the same time as
assignment of missions to troops of the f
echelon . . . under contemporary conditions the
second "echelon has not lost its significance. It
is especially needed when podrazdeleniya (battailous;
conduct combat operations without the employment of.
nuclear weapons.
The reserve is usually created when deploying the
combat formation in one echelon. It is designed
primarily to accomplish missions which arise
unexpectedly.
Sidorenko speaks of "the necessity of intensifying troop efforts
by the maneuver of fresh forces or reserves, or by the maneuver, _of
battalion-size units from secondary axes to the main axes. (A flexi-
bility that transportation and conmunications denied the Soviets in
WW II.)
... a build-up of efforts of the first echelon
must be accomplished before the rates of its attack
drop, i.e., before its offensive capabilities are
exhausted. The commitment of fresh forces after
an advance of attacking podrazdeleniya (battalions)
has slowed down or completely halted what would
occur under unfavorable conditions. Such a situa-
tion will indicate loss of initiative and an un-
favorable ratio of forces in the given sector.
38
.
In contemporary warfare the battalion reserve
. . . may be committed according to different
variations. ... It is most advantageous to
commit the reserve into the intervals between
the first echelon units or from behind their
flanks ... it precludes mixing with the first
echelon and overcrowding a combat formation.
The commitment of fresh forces from the depth
by leapfrogging over the first echelon was
recognized to be extremely disadvantageous in
the past war. . . . The direction of commit-
ment of the reserve usually is chosen where
the attack is being developed most successfully
. and where the direction can lead to a decisive
turning point. . . . Coranitment of the reserve
must be supported by the massed fire of all
available means of destruction. . . . Enemy
resistance must be broken by fire. . . . Now,
however, the presence of combat vehicles with
high cross country ability permits broad execu-
tion of maneuver on the battlefield not only by
reserves and second echelon but also by first
echelon podrazdeleniya (battalions and companies).
For this reason it is necessary to employ more
boldly the maneuver and regrouping of the
podrazdeleniya of the first echelon and retarget
them opportunely onto those axes where greatest
success may be achieved. . . . Contemporary
reserves are highly mobile.
. . . the presence in . . . ground forces of
bourgeois armies of a large number of tanks,
APCs, other armored combat vehicles, self-pro-
pelled artillery, ATGM, and also high-capacity
engineer equipment permits creation of a firm,
. stable defense in the shortest possible time.
Therefore winning time has very great signifi-
cance for successfully overcoming such a defense.
At the present time the attacker possesses real
possibilities for reliably suppressing the enemy
to a great depth (with his air, missiles and
artillery) and for conducting the attack at high
rates, which permits taking intermediate defensive
positions primarily from the march. This method
to the fullest extent meets the character of a
contemporary attack. Its employment ensures
surprise in the attack, deprives the enemy of
the opportunity to improve his defense, and often
even to take up a defense, and permits the attacker
to avoid a dangerous accumulation of men and weapons
39
XT
in front of the defensive position, to take it
with least expenditure of efforts, and, most
important, to maintain a high tempo and con-
tinuity of the attack. , . . Attacking units
(battalions and companies) approach the defen-
sive position in a dispersed manner along a
broad front in march, approach march, and some-
times even combat formations, depending on the
degree of enemy resistance. In all cases it is
considered desirable . . . that tanks be at the
head of the unit columns.
(From chapter on "Defeat of a Defending Enemy and Exploitation
of Success.”)
. . . it is advisable to take the intermediate
defensive position across a wide front along
axes primarily passing through areas of nuclear
strikes, intervals and gaps in the enemy's deploy-
ment, and also areas weakly occupied by enemy
troops. The absence of a solid front and the
enemy's hasty shift to the defense create favor-
able conditions for a rapid breakthrough by attack-
ing troops along axes, the wide employment of deep
and close envelopment, and the rapid completion
of the defeat of the defending units and overcoming
of the defense at a high tempo. ... A brief pre-
paratory fire in the form of one or more concentra-
tions may be conducted on those axes where nuclear
weapons were not employed or where the enemy was
insufficiently neutralized as the units approach the
defensive position. . . . The reserve is usually
created when deploying the combat formation in one
echelon. It is designed primarily to accomplish
missions which arise unexpectedly in the course of
an attack such as repulse of counterattacks, combat
against enemy airborne landings, replacement of
weakened first echelon units, reinforcement of
attacking units, etc. But it can also be used to
perform missions assigned to second echelon, primarily
to Intensify efforts and exploit success. The combat
mission is assigned to the reserve as it is committed.
Before this it is only given an area of disposition,
direction of movement, and a time for general readiness
for action on specific threatened axes. As it is
committed, the reserve may be reinforced by artillery
and other means.
Tank and motorized rifle units (battalions) can
operate in the approach march formation not only
on axes of nuclear strikes, but also in all other
cases where enemy organized resistance is broken
and the need for a combat formation disappears.
40
I
In his chapter on "Defeat of a Defending Enemy and Exploitation
of Success," he writes that.
The line of deployment of the battalion into an
approach march formation usually is recommended
to be designated at such a distance from the
enemy so as to be outside the range of fire of
enemy ATGMs, guns, and tanks which are firing
by direct laying as well as outside the range
of mortars. . . . This can be on the average
within the limits of 3-4 kilometers from the
enemy forward edge of defense. . . . For tank
units the line of attack is chosen approximately
1-2 km from the forward edge of the enemy's
defense, and for MR units it is chosen based on
the selected method of attack. ... It is
advantageous to have tanks at the head of
columns so that MR units deploy under their
cover and so that a strong initial blow against
the enemy is ensured.
A halt of attacking troops even for a short time
involves the risk of being subjected to enemy
nuclear strikes. In addition, this would provide
the defender an opportunity to execute a maneuver
of reserves and set up a defense capable of halting
the attack or of considerably slowing its tempo.
... on approaching the defensive position . . .
it is well to move the artillery at the head of
the podrazdeleniya (tank and MR battalion) columns.
. . . The attack on the enemy is conducted from the
march right after nuclear and fire strikes. The
podrazdeleniya move into the attack independently
on each axis as they approach the enemy position.
With their move into the attack, the units destroy
the enemy defending on the forward edge, wedge
boldly between his strong points avid centers of
resistance, deliver strikes against his flank and
rear and, without delaying, develop the attack
forcefully into the depth. ... In order to
maintain a high tempo of attack, the podrazdeleniya
operating on axes where the enemy has been reliably
neutralized by nuclear weapons, and also everywhere
the situation permits, advance in approach march forma-
tions. They deploy into combat formations only with
organized resistance. As a rule, surviving centers
of enemy resistance are bypassed. It is not advis-
able to divert first echelon units for the destruc-
tion of these centers ... it is also possible to
moving up for counterattacks or to occupy a
new position.
. . . the presence of nuclear weapons In the
hands of withdrawing troops gives them an
opportunity to actively counter the pursuit.
Inflict heavy losses on the attacker, set up
zones of contamination and destruction, sharply
lower th§ rates of attack of the pursuing troops,
and even disrupt the pursuit. Under these con-
ditions success will be on the side of the one
who is able to employ nuclear weapons more skill-
fully and overcome the obstacles created by the
* enemy 9 ... As the experience of past wars
shows, the greatest results in the pursuit are
achieved when it is conducted by the main forces
along routes parallel to the enemy withdrawal
(parallel pursuit), in combination with pursuit
by a part of the forces from the front (frontal
pursuit) .... Under contemporary conditions
. . . for conduct of a parallel pursuit primarily
tank units are assigned since the combat capa-
bilities of the tanks permit them to advance
swiftly, execute a maneuver, and suppress or
bypass an enemy who is offering resistance in
the depth of his defense. . . . Units which have
lost contact with the enemy may become a profit-
able target for his nuclear strikes.
In his conclusion he cites the goal of the attack as being "total
defeat of the enemy in short periods of time and the seizure of impor-
tant areas." This is to be achieved.
... by the destruction of the main enemy
groupings and his means of mass destruction
(nuclear launchers and warheads) . . . the
swift attack of tank and motorized rifle troops
to a great depth in coordination with aviation
and airborne landings, and by their bold move-
ments to the flanks and rear of the enemy. . . .
The sharp increase in troop combat capabilities
has led to an increase in the depth of combat
missions and attack frontage of units. The
grouping of men and weapons in the attack has
changed substantially (perhaps lesser emphasis
on second echelon, using a smaller but more
capable and flexible reserve?). . . . Units
have received the opportunity to make wide use
not only of combat, but also approach march and
march formations in the course of an attack. . . .
Troops attacking In a different way will overcome
the enemy's defense, not by "gnawing through" on
narrow sectors and a solid front, as was the case
in past wars, but simultaneously across a broad
front, along axes, from the march, at high tempos,
right after nuclear strikes (can we substitute
surprise for nuclear strikes?), taking advantage
of breaches, intervals and gaps in the enemy's
combat deployment, and by wide employment of
maneuver .
Leaving the words of "The Meeting Engagement" and The Offensive
behind, the Soviet reader checks one additional source, the Great Soviet
Encyclopedia (Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia) . The listing informs
him that the meeting engagement.
... is characterized by changing and confused
situation, fluidity of combat action, lack of
time for organization, engagement from march
column, presence of exposed flanks, and freedom
to maneuver.
It can also involve,
. . . anticipatory fire strikes at the enemy, use
of advanced detachments and airborne troops, speedy
comnltment of the main forces to combat, and strikes
by the main force at the flanks and rear of the
principal enemy grouping in order to split it up
and rout it in a short time. ... A meeting engage-
ment (vstrechniy boy) may also grow into an encounter
battle (large scale) (vstrechnoye srazheniye).
More on the Meeting Engagement (at Army. Division. Regimental and Battalion Level)
Army
—
By the third and final period of the war offensive operations at
front (army group) level had the goal of
the destruction of 16-18 enemy divisions, the
development of an offensive extending to a depth
of 150-300 km in the enemy rear, and the seizure
of important regions, objectives and lines . . .
A3
I
the possibility was revealed under certain conditions
for the use of tank armies in the first echelon of
the front in an offensive operation ... in some
cases tank armies advanced in the front's first
echelon ... in those cases where tank armies were
in the first echelons of a front, they operated on
a frontage of 20 km . . . on breaking through the
exploitation was conducted on a frontage of 20-60 km
. . . meeting engagements involving tank armies in
wartime developed on the main axis at the start of
the operation, in the course of its development,
(and) in the final and concluding phase . . . even
if not used for breakthrough or against the initial
enemy defensive positions, the tank army was used to
smash strategic reserves. This was usually done by
a meeting engagement. After a breakthrough, to it
(the tank army) belonged the leading role in the
defeat of approaching enemy reserves and the repulsing
of their counterattacks — which most often were accom-
plished by means of meeting engagements . . . meeting
engagements involving tank armies in the course of
offensive operations developed on frontages of from
20 to 60 km and lasted 1-3 days and sometimes longer
. . . the success of tank army operations was greatly
enhanced by the achievement of a surprise tank strike.
This caught the enemy unaware, paralifeed his will,
sharply lowered his combat capability, disorganized
his control, and created favorable conditions for his
defeat. ... In seven meeting engagements involving
tank armies, the enemy was routed in two, he suffered
heavy losses and reverted to the defensive in three
others, and in two the Soviets had to go on the
defensive . . . the duration of these seven meeting
engagements ranged from 1-5 days . . . they developed
over a depth of 20-345 km. 40
The Soviets consider the Manchurian Campaign in 1945 to be a
prime example of what a tank army can do if it achieves strategic and
tactical surprise.
In the Manchurian campaign the 6th Guards Tank Army
advanced on a frontage of some 200 km with spearheads
on frontages of up to 100 km . . . the 6 GTA in Manchuria
was in the first echelon of the front . . . the tank army
was usually committed on the afternoon of the first day
or the morning of the second day (of the offensive) when
the leading units had driven a wedge 4-6 km in the enemy
defense . . . the 6 GTA in the Manchurian campaign achieved
the amazing rate of 180 km/day. 41
44
-Hr-*
>feeting engagements involving tank armies were characterized by:
dynamism, maneuver, the decisiveness of combat
operations, the presence of open flanks and con-
siderable intervals (between units) , and by fre-
quent wedges (into each other's positions) by
combat spearheads . . . one of the peculiarities
of meeting engagements involving tank armies was
that they were conducted regardless of the season
or time of year.
Examples of meeting engagements at night and in snowstorms were
given. In most of the meeting engagements the number of tanks and SPs
on both sides was in excess of 500 with up to 1500 supporting mortars
and artillery pieces. The deployment for combat was carried out in a
"limited period of 3-24 hours in a complex and tense situation."
The depth of operations involving tank armies grew steadily during
the war and this capability has been enhanced by increased capabilities
for extended mobility, maneuver and communications. In 1944 the six
Soviet tank armies "were operating over considerable distances before
having to stop for resupply and reorganization." These distances ranged
from 250-400 km in 1944; in 1945 the 1 GTA advanced 600 km, the 2 GTA
some 700, and the 6 GTA (in Manchuria) over 800 before making a major
halt. The pattern of the 1 GTA was given as 20 days of combat followed
, by 16 days of preparation for the ensuing 30 days of combat; this was
followed in turn by 19 days of preparation for the next combat phase.
The Soviets expect to do better now.
The experience in meeting engagements showed that the basic condi-
tions for successful defeat of the enemy were:
timely receipt of information on the enemy, speed in
making the decision and notifying the units, preventing
the enemy from executing air strikes, opening artillery
fire, planning and executing tank attacks on the flanks
and in the rear of the principal enemy units, and the
swiftness and decisiveness of unit action.
«
I ; '/• V
'a. ■*■ -»*' ' *
All this was tied to the development of "decisive superiority over
the enemy in forces and equipment on the axes of attack and above all on
the main axis." Tank units were generally reinforced by artillery (field
L
t
and antiaircraft), engineers, and aviation. .
Key decisions in conjunction with the meeting
engagement included determination of the area
of the probable meeting engagement, organization
and conduct of an active, deep and continuous
reconnaissance, the creation of the appropriate
forces and equipment, protection of one's forces
from enemy air strikes, and the implementation of
necessary measures for rear support (CSS) . 42
"A large role in the successful conduct of meeting engagements was
played by aviation. For support of the tank armies, significant forces
from the air army were concentrated." The average sorties per day in
support of three meeting engagements involving tank armies were 114,
692, and 850; total sorties for the entire meeting engagement varied
from 630 to 2280. "These sorties included attacks on the approaching
enemy reserves and protection of the front line and rear area troops
and supply units from enemy air attacks."
In addition to aviation, the success of meeting engagements "often
was dependent on the rapid and skillful maneuver of troops and equipment
from one axis to another.'
Division
Similar emphasis is placed on the meeting engagement at division
level. In one new book on division tactics, 34 of the 294 pages are
dedicated to the meeting engagement. The book outlines the principles
and characteristics, provides a number of combat examples to illustrate
them, and then reviews the teaching points and principles.
46
A
!
Some typical quotations include:
The more maneuver oriented and rapid the combat
operations became, the more often meeting engage-
ments occurred . . . thus, combat experience
demonstrated that success in executing a march
with the expectation of a meeting engagement
depends on how carefully it is organized. . . .
An analysis of meeting engagements shows that
success in many cases depended on the effective-
ness of the reconnaissance, the actions of the
security detachments and forward detachments
(advanced guard) .... As experience shows
the best results were obtained by the rapid
execution of attacks on the flank and in the
rear of the enemy. . . . Combat experience
teaches that successful conduct of a meeting
engagement is inconceivable without a well
organized command and control of units. As
in no other form of combat, there is a require-
ment in the meeting engagement for commanders
at all levels to display skill, initiative and
resourcefulness. 43
Regiment
The book on regimental tactics devoted an even greater proportion
to the meeting engagement — 51 of the 283 pages. The reader learns that
"an analysis of experience in meeting engagements showed that the combat
formation of the regiment depended on the combat mission of the regiment
and the concept of the commander for the meeting engagement."
It is also pointed out that the experience of the Great Patriotic
War was an important step in the "development of the methods of organi-
zation and conduct of the meeting engagement." This, according to the
Soviets, helps to determine the best way to resolve "the problems of
today's meeting engagement." Under current conditions the Soviets
expect the commander to have information on the strength and equipment
of the enemy long before the engagement takes place and thus be able to
make his decision based on a realistic appraisal based on accurate
47
calculations. The introduction of new technology is also considered, as
are tendencies toward increased speed, sharply changing situations, limited
time to organize for the engagement, increase in maneuver capabilities, etc.
"Under present day conditions" the regiment is encouraged to have its
battalions in a meeting engagement "attack or envelop one or both of the
enemy's flanks."^
At battalion level the emphasis on the meeting engagement continues:
"The meeting engagement, especially for tank subunits (battalions and
companies) is the most common form of combat action."^® and further "The
immediate task of the tank battalion in this case (a meeting engagement)
is usually to defeat the opposing enemy and seize the terrain facilitating
favorable conditions for subsequent actions. The chapter on the meeting
engagement also points out that emphasis is placed upon time (speed) as the
/« /» ^
most significant determining factor in the meeting engagement.
Thus, the meeting engagement involves units from battalion to army;
and the Soviets emphasize that present day conditions make this form of
combat even more likely and more decisive than it was in World War II.
Second Echelon and Reserve
According to the definitions of "second echelon" (as found in the
Dictionary of Basic Military Terms published in 1965 for the "Officers'
Terms published
a year later} the second echelon is composed of units of combat troops not
taking active part in combat operations at the given moment and designated
to increase the striking power of the offensive, add strength to the defense,
or to replace first echelon units which have suffered heavy losses. It
has the same mission as the first echelon and usually knows its mission
well in advance. The "reserve" on the other hand is a unit, now almost
48
■v 4*
always combined arms, which can be used to exploit success, destroy surviving
enemy formations, repel counterattacks, lead counterattacks against the
enemy, break through into the enemy rear, and replace units which have lost
their combat effectiveness. In general, the reserve is smaller than second
echelon forces, and is much more flexible and responsive in its employment.
The commander determines the composition and mission of the second
echelon. The mission is given during the preparatory phase of the
operations and at the same time as the mission for the first echelon;
it can be modified as the second echelon prepares to enter combat. In
WW II Soviet second echelon forces were generally a battalion of each
regiment, a regiment of each division, a division or two of each army,
45
and an army of each front.
Soviet battle formations and use of echelons change according to
the conditions expected or met. For example, "in 1942, when the enemy
(Germans) had not yet taken up a deeply echeloned defense, an order was
given (Order No. 306) for a single echelon formation at all levels—
from motorized rifle platoon to motorized rifle division. Thus, in
1942 the battle formations of the company, battalion, regiment and
divisions were usually first echelon formations. In 1943 they changed
to two echelons as a reaction to the deep trench defense by the German
Army. This increased the depth of the battle formation of the larger
units. ^
This idea would appear to be reinforced by an entry in the new
Soviet Military Encyclopedia under the heading of "combat formation"
which reads in part as follows;
After the 2nd Uorld War the introduction into the
forces of new means of warfare — nuclear weapons,
missiles, BMPs, ATGMs, military helicopters, a
significant increase in the number of tanks, (and)
an Improvement in the capability of conventional
materiel-- led to the further development of combat
formations. In them there appeared some new elements
and several older elements underwent a qualitative
change. The combat formation began to include first
echelon, second echelon or a combined arms reserve,
missile rocket units, artillery, air defense units,
specialized reserves (antitank, engineer, etc) . . .^8
At a lower level, in the Motorized Rifle Battalion in Battle one reads:
A strong initial blow is, as we know, one of the
important requisites for achieving success once a
meeting engagement has begun. This can be achieved
if the battalion combat formation is grouped in one
echelon . . . but the battalion will not always be
able to organize its combat formation in this manner.
When waiting for the approach and deployment of a
third company can lead to the loss of Initiative,
two companies of the MR battalion join battle immedi-
ately, while the third comprises the reserve .^9
Likewise, regarding the tank battalion, one can read: "The combat
formation of the tank battalion in the meeting engagement is usually in
one echelon with a designated reserve (one or two tank platoons) ."49a
and
The battalion reserve moves forward, as the experience
of the past war shows, at an Interval of 1.5-2 kilometers
(behind the leading companies). It follows in column on the
most vulnerable flank of the battalion, and enters combat
depending on the situation. Thus, in the course of a
meeting engagement, the reserve is used to repulse sudden
enemy attacks, especially those on the flank and in the
rear, to exploit the success of the battalion when the
other companies are conmitted, and also to seize and
destroy the enemy's nuclear weapons and delivery systems. "4 9b
"Deep Operations"
Like the meeting engagement, the theory and practice of "deep
operations" (glubokaya operatsla) is said to have been of Soviet/Russian
origin. According to the Soviets it was a form of military operations
50
A
<
conducted at army or front level (or sometimes divisional or regimental)
which was "worked out by Soviet military science in the 1930s," and based
on theories of Marshal Tukhachevsky . "Deep Operations" involve long range
artillery, tanks, combat vehicles, aviation, and airborne units. The
Soviets credit much of their success in World War II to "deep operations."
It certainly helped them to "think big." Thus, army level offensive operations
extended to 100-180 km in depth and the operations of a front (like GSFG?)
reached for some 400-600 km. By these criteria (400-600 km)^ a front on the
West German border could be expected to conduct "deep operations," at least
as far as the French border (less than 600 km away). If you get there
"the fusstest with the mostest," a Soviet might think maybe your adversary
won't get there at all, maybe he'll decide not to fight, and if he does
decide to fight you have an advantage which you may be able to maintain
by bringing up additional forces.
In the postwar period the Increase in mobility, firepower, and shock
action has made it possible to break through the enemy defense at an increased
tempo. According to the new Soviet Military Encyclopedia the term "deep
operation" has not been used in official documents since the 1960s, but "the
general principles of this theory have not lost their meaning/value even
at this time." The article was written by one N. V. Ogarkov.^
The Importance of World War II Combat to the Soviets
In the 1970s the Soviets still write at great length and in great
detail regarding the lessons learned in the Great Patriotic War, to
Include the Manchurian Campaign at the end of the war. They consider
51
for the last war rather than the next one; and the Soviets attempt to
caveat the WW II experience In light of the changes In weapons, tech-
nology, and mobility since the 1940s. However, the tactics and principles
outlined In the three new mantia Is /books and underscored In the new Soviet
Military Encyclopedia are those which the Soviets feel have stood the test
„ , 51
of time.
As Army General Radzlyevskl wrote In his 1977 book on tank army
offensive operations,
. . . the wide use of tank armies . . . significantly
changed the character of offensive operations. . . .
They Increased the decisive character. Increased the
depth and rate of advance (of operations), shortened
the duration (of operations), and combat operations
greatly Increased In maneuverability and dynamics. . . .
Present day offensive operations will also be charac-
terized by decisiveness of objectives, broad scope,
maneuver, and the dynamic character. ... It Is for
this reason that the study of the experience of the
combat operations of the tank armies during the years
of the Great Patriotic War have so much importance
today. . . . The combat experience ... In many
respects has not lost Its significance even under
present day conditions. . . . Their study, creative
mastery and use - is one of the Important tasks of
Soviet military science.
The reader is also cautioned.
Although since the end of the Great Patriotic War over
thirty years have passed. Its thorough study can pro-
vide much that is useful for the broadening of the
operational-tactical horizons of our comnanders . One
should, however, examine the experience through the
prism of new conditions, new equipment, new forms and
methods of combat action and thus enrich his military
outlook. 53
The former defense minister. Marshal Grechko, was no less certain
of the value of World War II experience, writing that The Great Patriotic
War subjected Soviet military theory and practice to a merciless test
snd convincingly proved that "Soviet science and art as military science
52
and military art of the Socialist social system have indisputable
advantages over the military theory and military art of the obsolescent
capitalist world."^
The 1976 book on Tactics Through Combat Examples --Division under-
scores the great value of the Soviet combat operations "for the training
and education of our forces and for the further development of tactics. . . .
The process of perfection of tactics will develop further with due regard
for the experience of the past war." However, it duly warns the reader
that he "should not draw direct parallels between the examples of combat
actions involving tank and mechanized corps during the Great Patriotic
War and the tactical operations of present day combined arms divisions ."55
The first, apparently, in the new series of green and vftiite tactics
manuals/books appeared in 1974. One of the members of the author col-
lective which wrote the book was V. G. Reznichenko, who as a Major
General in 1966 served as chief editor of the original work on tactics;
another was G. E. Garbuz, one of the authors of the 1972 work on tactics
for the motorized rifle battalion (as was also D. F. Loza). The fore-
ward to this volume points out that "the generals and officers forming
the author collective for the work were active participants in the
Great Patriotic War and also mentions the fact that "the greater part
of the officer corps of our army . . . does not have combat experience."
The book on regimental tactics "is Intended for a large number of
readers— the commanders and political workers of the various arms and
services, students at military educational institutions, officers in the
reserve. . .
1
53
The reader learns that.
The past war was a most important stage in the
development of Soviet military art in general,
and tactics for combined arms operations in
particular. . . . More than a quarter of a
century has passed since the Great Patriotic
War ended. Much has changed during this period
in military affairs. . . . There have been
great changes in the form and methods of mili-
tary operatinns. However, the experience of
the war has not lost its meaning, even under
present day conditions. The fact is not only
that familiarity with the combat experience
of the past war is interesting from a cogni-
tive point of view, but that it will awaken
creative thoughts in officers, thus facilitating
the successful resolution of present day tasks.
. . . The serious study of this experience . . .
also provides rich material for practical
conclusions . 57
The conclusion to the book continues in the same vein:
The Great Patriotic War made an enormous contribution
to the development of the theory of combined arms com-
bat; it enriched the tactics of motorized rifle and
tank units with invaluable experience in preparing and
executing decisive offensive operations, the creation
of an unsurmountable and active defense, diversified
maneuver, and flexibility in troop control. . . .
Under contemporary conditions (and) under the influence
of scientific-technical progress, the theoretical state
of tactics has changed considerably. However, the
experience of the past does not mean to put it into
practice blindly. ... In this work we have examined
a relatively small number of examples from the experi-
ences of the Great Patriotic War in many types of com-
bat and in a variety of tactical situations, but that
is enough to show how varied and rich is the tactical
mastery of Soviet commanders. An analysis of this
experience will help officers to more thoroughly
learn the essence of modern warfare.
What it All Means
I suggest there is a direct connection between the meeting engage-
ment and what I consider is less emphasis on and a lesser number of
second echelon units. This permits maximum forces forward where in a
fast moving situation they can bring maximum pressure on the enemy.
54
\
and the multiple regimental and battalion formations seeking meeting
engagements (followed by hasty attacks) would be backed by a smaller
number of combined arms reserves. New combat vehicle mobility comple-
mented by an increased communications capability makes possible lateral
movement of the first echelon units (the same as FM 100-5 advocates
for the defense) to exploit breaches in the forward defense or to
increase strength and pressure along the main axis or threaten the
flanks (and rear) of defensive strong points.
The meeting engagement meets the criteria for a Soviet attack. As
outlined in the Soviet Ground Force Regulation, such an attack involves:
... a combination of fire and swift movements of
units (regiments) and subunits (battalions) in order
to strike and rout the enemy. An attack is carried
out by tank and motorized rifle troops with the sup-
porting artillery fire and air strikes; the attack is
supported by engineer, chemical, and other special
' troops. An attack is carried out at the start of an
offensive from march column or from an occupied posi-
tion in direct contact with the enemy. The artillery
and aviation carry out preparation fire and provide
fire support during the attack. Motorized rifle troops
attack most frequently behind tanks, moving either on
foot or in APCs.59
The meeting engagement is certainly an alternative to the break-
through and massive second echelon support. It would take advantage of
any lack of NATO readiness, NATO deployment or redeployment difficulties,
and the possibility that the conflict might turn nuclear at any time
and presence close to the defender would offer some protection against
heavy casualties from nuclear weapons. It would maximize the chance
to break through a thin line of defense and head for the Rhine River
and points west, and the presence of advancing second echelon fronts
to the rear, with their increasing capability for rapid movement, would
55
ensure that any NATO counterattack would not threaten the integrity of
the Warsaw Pact nations and the LOC.
.
L.
What appears possible is an offensive where in each army (corps)
all the divisions are in first echelon except one which is in reserve.
The other divisions in first echelon have all their regiments and bat-
talions in what is effectively a line of columns, each advancing in
march column seeking a meeting engagement. The division in reserve will
be used to exploit whichever axis appears to facilitate a "deep operation"
as the result of a successful meeting engagement. Perhaps one army would
be kept in second echelon or reserve for the front and there would be one
second echelon or reserve front for each first echelon first. Thus,
the emphasis would be on maximum combat power forward along the broad
front of each front (army). The reserve division would take advantage of
its mobility and the success of one or more forward battalions or regiments
in order to initiative the "deep operation." The second echelon army could
be used for a preplanned (truly second echelon) Insertion along a main
axis, a preplanned substitution for one of the first echelon armies, or
a blocking force in case of unexpected enemy counterattack or success.
The second echelon front would follow in the wake of the first echelon
fronts and be used in any second phase of the operation.
The Soviets feel they have the fielded mobility and communications.
They certainly have the doctrine. The questions seem to be whether they
have the initiative and leadership to carry it out, whether they practice
it sufficiently to ensure a reasonable chance of success, and finally
whether they feel that the conditions leading to any WP-NATO conflict
would favor surprise and the meeting engagement over the lengthy buildup
to a superior and overwhelming breakthrough operation with large second echelon
forces at every level from battalion to front. A dilemma posed for the
Soviets is that the meeting engagement, which the Soviets advocate as the
most likely, effective, and decisive type of offensive warfare, requires
the greatest low level initiative in order to be successful — and the Soviet
system stifles low level initiative. I suggest that judging by what the
Soviet military leader is reading in his publications, it is obvious that
the Soviets are hedging their bets and are prepared to go in two radically
different directions.
I also suggest, incidentally, that the same mobility and communications
will permit us to effectively defend against the breakthrough or the meeting
engagement — provided it is a defense in depth. For political reasons it
may be an anathema to advocate trading space for time, but we cannot afford
to place everything on the line (literally or figuratively) and slug it
out in a "winner take all" battle which could decimate the FEBA or make it
difficult for the forces engaged to be effective in lateral movement or
defense in successive positions.
The Soviets suggest that the first echelon variant would be advantageous
in situations where (1) the enemy is not in position or is unable to defend
across a broad front and in depth, (2) nuclear weapons might be used and
it is advantageous to "hug" the enemy to avoid being hit by his weapons,
(3) the depth of the combat zone is so limited that frontal operations can
probably reach the final objective without having to stop for refitting or
substitution by a following second echelon front, and (4) time is of the essence
The situation in Central Europe would seem to meet most if not all of
the criteria, and it would thus appear ideal for the Soviets to try their
meeting engagement. The Soviet reader must certainly wonder why FM 100-5
does not make its reader aware of the importance the Soviets place on the
meeting engagement and the lessened emphasis on the second echelon.
I
1
57
INTELLIGENCE (Chapter 7)
-
1
As the Soviet translates or reads the translation of Intelligence,
he Is in a quandry since the Russian word is identical for intelligence
and reconnaissance (razvedka) . This is similar to the Russian "mir"
which means both peace and the world (as well as a village community) ;
so it is difficult to tell if the Soviet Russian is prepared to fight
for "peace" or for "the world" in his commonly used expression.
When found in most Soviet open press publications the word
(razvedka) refers to reconnaissance (such as a February 1977 article
in the Military Herald entitled "Reconnaissance in the Mountains.")
It is a little bit as if intelligence were a dirty word, or is it that
intelligence is. reconnaissance and reconnaissance is^ intelligence?
In any case the downplaying of Intelligence is perhaps manifested
uniquely by looking at an English translation of the Great Soviet
Encyclopedia where razvedka is listed under both reconnaissance and
Intelligence. The entries under intelligence are (1) counterintelligence
(2) state security and (3) intelligence service (British). Tactical
and strategic intelligence do not exist --if one judges the book by its
cover.
In any case the Soviet reader would probably not disagree with
the statement that the Soviet's primary means of collecting tactical
Intelligence is through the electromagnetic spectrum — although he doesn't
read very much about that in his open publications . However, the pro-
fusion of radio -electronic equipment and the presence of radar and
radio intercept battalions makes him aware of the effort and capability,
even if it isn't overly publicized.
58
I
AIR-LAND BATTLE (Chapter 8)
The difference in philosophy and organization regarding the air-
land battle is absolute. The Soviet reader would probably not agree
that the Army cannot win the land battle without the Air Force. The
Sovidt Ground Forces expect the air defense units (missile and cannon)
to protect them against enemy air. All Soviet frontal aviation will be
under the command of the front commander, a ground forces officer,
although Long Range Aviation, under Soviet Air Force command can be
used to strike targets in the enemy rear — or to supplement Frontal
Aviation. The air army commander works for the frontal commander as
do all the other tank, shock, and combined army commanders. Since
ground air defense units (many of them mobile) are to protect the
Soviet ground forces against enemy air, Frontal Aviation can then be
used to influence action in the enemy rear by striking air fields,
nuclear delivery units and nuclear storage areas, depots, command and
control targets and reserves. The Soviet does not seem to place as
much importance on the aerial battles which we expect to determine air
superiority (perhaps because efficient use of surprise strikes by
missiles — or aircraft — could result in NATO aircraft being destroyed
on the ground) .
The technique of Close Air Support is also different. The Soviet
Forward Air Controller (or "pointer") directs the aircraft in the right
direction (usually over the FEBA^to an area to the rear of the first
echelon enemy positions which the Soviets feel they can better neutralize
by artillery fire) . The Soviets also express confidence that they can
59
jam our close air support aircraft by being closer to the aircraft
with a greater source of power than our FAC — and besides, once an
enemy aircraft comes over Soviet positions, it is subject to missile
and cannon fire from the air defense units traveling with and supporting
each regiment (the Soviets also advocate having all troops mass fire
on the aircraft — to include even the main armament of tanks) .
Thus, the Soviet cannot but disagree with or have difficulty in
understanding our view of the air-land battle.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONS (Chapter 9)
The Soviet reader on turning to this chapter feels he has almost
a proprietary interest, as if he had written it himself. His organiza-
tion is different, he emphasizes destruction as well as listening and
jamming, and his fielded capability is all around him. He is used to
seeing jammers in his front areas; however, on thinkir.g;he might con-
sider that they lack protection and need better mobility. In any case,
the Soviet reading this chapter should have no difficulty in understanding
the subject and agreeing to the importance and capabilities of radio-
electronic warfare.
TACTICAL NUCLEAR OPERATIONS (Chapter 10)
In reading the statement, "In any battle we must have the capability
to use nuclear weapons effectively, along with our conventional weapons, in
support of the land battle," the Soviet reader is in accord. He probably,
however, would have written the statement, "... have the option to use
exclusively conventional weapons as well as nuclear weapons (supported by
conventional weapons) in support of the land battle." In fact, the Soviets
have always hedged a little on the option to use conventional, although
the name of the game is and has been nuclear.
As for envisioning the nuclear battle, he certainly will not disagree
that "the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons will significantly
influence every phase of the battle"— as stated in the manual. He remembers
how Marshal Sokolovski, in a two part article written with Major General
Cherednichenko and entitled "The Art of War at a New Stage," described
the expected nuclear battle. The article appeared some fourteen years ago.
However, most of the views are still considered valid today, although the
exact relationship and sequence between strategic and tactical nuclear
warfare has become clouded. Specifically, they read in part as follows:
Under contemporary conditions . . . the outcome of
war will be determined by the nuclear strikes by
strategic means. The results of attack by strategic
means or, in other words, strategic success, determine
the success of battles and campaigns. The combat,
battle, or campaign in the normal sense loses the
significance as a single means for destroying an
enemy and for achieving victory. The combat, battle
or campaign in an active ground or naval theater
will be conducted on the basis of exploiting the
results of nuclear attacks by strategic forces
with the intent of completing the defeat of the
enemy. . . . Then the basic missions of combat and
battle, as well as campaigns will be settled by
nuclear attacks with tactical weapons.
»
62
Certainly there may be rare occasions in the course
of war when combat missions may be performed by con-
ventional weapons without using nuclear weapons.
Troops, therefore, must be able to wage even such a
(conventional) war. . . . Nuclear attacks against
the enemy are the quickest and most successful course
toward victory in modern war.
Military ideologies of imperialism steadfastly profess
that a nuclear war in principle will not be distinguish-
able from other past wars except for somewhat greater
losses. There is a great deal of talk going on about
"limited" nuclear war and of employing nuclear weapons
only against military targets, against armed forces.
The concept of regulating nuclear war is demagogy, a
hypocrisy by the military groups of imperialism.
Nuclear missile weapons and other new means of warfare
sharply increase the possibility of surprise attack. . . .
The possibilities for timely discovery of the launching
of an attack are growing. Owing to the far-sighted
policies of the Communist Party and Soviet Government,
the Soviet Union has at its disposal all necessities
for disrupting the aggressive plans of imperialists
for the initial phase of a war. Modern means for
discovery and prevention insure the timely launching
of a crushing retaliatory nuclear attack, the success-
ful repulse of a surprise attack and the frustration
of criminal intentions.
A distinguishing feature of this phase (the initial
phase of a world war) will be the conduct of vigorous,
decisive military activities from the very beginning
of a war with a commitment of the greatest possible
quantity of ready forces and means along with the use
of nuclear weapons accumulated during peacetime. The
initial phase of a world war will be the time in which
it is possible to predetermine the development and
outcome of the entire war. Armed conflict in this
phase will be especially vicious and destructive. In
connection with this, special significance is now
assigned to maintaining a high state of combat readi-
ness by the armed forces. . . .
In a new world war, if it is launched by the imperial-
ists, time will be of decisive significance for victory.
Those tasks which formerly were settled in months and
years, will be determined in a nuclear missile war
in the course of minutes, hours, a few days. . . .
In our opinion, an indisputable conclusion: a thermo-
nuclear war cannot be of long duration. It is neces-
sary, therefore, in our view, to be prepared in top
63
priority for a short war . . . one should not
exclude the possibility of the outbreak of a rela-
tively protracted war. This may be related to a
war in which nuclear weapons will not be used (for
example, a local war capable of expanding to a
global conflict) . One should not, therefore,
neglect the preparation for a relatively drawn
out war.
In the event war in unleashed by imperialist aggres-
sors, nuclear attacks will be carried out against
these concentrations (NATO ground troops and tactical
aviation). Following this, decisive offensives by
ground troops and frontal aviation will be launched
to complete the defeat of enemy troops in the theater,
to seize enemy territory and to deny a penetration by
aggressor forces onto the territory of the socialist
countries . Offensive operations on a strategic scale
(strategic offensives with participation by various
ground armies and divisions, armies of other services
of the armed forces) will be deployed in the ground
theaters.
Nuclear weapons delivered by intermediate range mis-
siles and long range aviation together with tactical
rockets and tactical aviation are the primary means
of armed combat in ground theaters. Tank and motor-
ized rifle armies and divisions, as well as air-land
divisions, will exploit the results of nuclear attacks
to complete the annihilation of enemy troop concentra-
tions and to penetrate into the depths of his terri-
tory. The objectives of armed combat in a theater
will be, to an equal extent, the enemy's nuclear means,
his tank, airborne, motorized rifle or rifle divisions
and the subordinate units.
The absence of continuous fronts will be typical.
Military activities will be carried on simultaneously
over a great area both in frontage and in depth; they
will be distinguished by a high tempo and maneuverability
of troops, by great violence.
Tactical aviation will play an Important role in the
theater. It is capable of destroying enemy aviation,
missiles, artillery, antitank weapons and troops by
using nuclear weapons and conventional means, per-
forming air defense missions, reconnaissance and troop
transport. The tactics of aviation is basically altered
by the equipping of tactical aviation with supersonic
Jet aircraft and air-to-ground and air-to-air missiles.
The flight of large numbers and the long, overhead combat
r
patrols have passed into history. In their place
has appeared maneuver by small groups, two or even
single aircraft operating at low level and relying
on complex methods to deliver attacks— over the
cockpit (LABS), etc.
Airborne landings, carried by helicopter to the
enemy rear areas, will be widely employed. Motor-
ized rifle regiments and battalions may be used for
such landings.
The tactics of tanks and motorized infantry are being
changed . The offense will be carried out primarily
by tanks, armored carriers, and even by helicopter
along the principle approaches. The dismounted attack
will be a rare phenomenon. Since the threat of enemy
nuclear attack will always hang over the attacking
troops, they must be dispersed, maneuverable, always
on the move while being constantly prepared with
defensive measures against flash blindness or radia-
tion and to use their vehicles or terrain irregularities
for protection from shock waves. In the course of combat
these troops complete the defeat of enemy concentrations
destroyed by nuclear strikes. Meanwhile they must be
ready to annihilate separate enemy groupings with conven-
tional weapons.
Four years la^er (1968) in the third edition of Military Strategy,
the Soviets were still tilting nuclear, but not ruling out the conven-
tional as these two paragraphs indicate:
... armed conflict in theaters of military opera-
tions will be characterized by great violence, the
mass destruction of troops, colossal destruction,
and the formation of broad zones with a high level
of radioactive contamination.^
The basic means for armed combat in land theaters
in a future world war will be the nuclear weapon
used primarily with operational-tactical missiles,
and also frontal aviation. In addition, the Strategic
Rocket Troops and long-range aviation will deliver
nuclear strikes against important objectives in the
zone of the offensive fronts. Airborne landings
will be widely used. As before, tank units and for-
mations will be used in mass concentration on the
battlefield. The motorized infantry will be just
as Important, although it will not be the "queen of
battle" as in past wars. On the battlefield the
65
!
I
decisive role will be played by fire or nuclear
weapons; the other means of armed combat will
utilize the results of nuclear attacks for the
final defeat of the enemy . . . personnel of
the army and navy learn to wage combat operations
both in conditions of the use and without the use
of the nuclear weapon. It is important to decide
all study tasks so that the soldier will be always
ready to successfully operate on the battlefield in
circumstances that take shape in different ways.bJ
In Sidorenko's and Lomov's books in the early 1970s, the emphasis
was still on the nuclear as shown here.
It is held that the side which uses nuclear weapons
first and suddenly, can resolve the issue of the
battle in its favor. 64
The employment of nuclear weapons permits inflicting
heavy losses on the enemy's personnel and equipment
almost instantly, annihilating entire units . . .
destroying installations and other targets, annihi-
lating the enemy's centers of resistance. 5
As a rule, the upper hand has always remained with
offensive weapons and this has been particularly
apparent with nuclear missile weapons . . . for
achieving operational level goals (army or front
objectives) it is now important to defeat not only
the land and aviation enemy groupings in the theater,
but above all its nuclear grouping, since without
their decisive destruction one can hardly count on
the successful carrying out of the missions in the
operation . . . decisive victory in an offensive is
achieved by using the results of nuclear strikes,
by having the commanders at all levels make daring
decisions. . . . The possibility of rapidly shifting
efforts in depth and from one axis to another . . .
and the conduct of surprise attacks from different
directions require new methods of conducting opera-
tions in a nuclear war. 66
An offensive under modem conditions will be carried
out, as a rule, in a deployed battle formation . . .
on those axes where decisive destruction with nuclear
-v ■—
A- •>»**?“* r «♦*
I
weapons will be made against the enemy and he will
be incapable of organized resistance, the motorized
rifle and tank battalions will be able to advance in
depth in approach march formation and route columns,
organizing reconnaissance ahead.
Combat, under the conditions of prepared enemy defenses
with the impossibility of skirting them or capturing
them on the move, will begin with a breakthrough which
consists in breaking the defenses by nuclear weapons
and air strikes, by artillery and tank fire, and an
offensive by battalions with the subsequent development
of actions in depth.
However, Soviet publications often hedge on the use of nuclear
or conventional warfare with phrases such as "both with and without the
use of nuclear weapons," "in case nuclear weapons are not employed,"
and "if a nuclear attack is not delivered." This makes it clear that
the Soviets are keeping their options open. Even Sidorenko hedges on
the use of nuclear weapons by statements such as this one:
In spite of the fact that nuclear weapons will
become the chief means of defeating the enemy,
their role and capabilities cannot be made abso-
lute, especially in the attainment of goals of
combat by battalions and regiments. In a number
of cases battalions and regiments will have to
perform various combat actions, including the
attack, without use of nuclear weapons, using
only conventional, organic means of armanent —
artillery, tanks, small arms, etc. Therefore,
along with the development of the nuclear mis-
sile might of the Soviet Armed Forces, our
party and government have attached and continue
to attach great Importance to the development
and sophistication of these means of warfare,
which have not lost their importance in an
way whatsoever. 0/
And the Great Soviet Encyclopedia keeps the conventional option
alive in its statement that.
The appearance in the 1950s of totally new means of
war, nuclear weapons and missile-created new condi-
tions in which combat could be waged with or without
the use of nuclear weapons.
67
If nuclear weapons and other fire means are
employed, combat will be characterized by even
greater maneuverability, dynamism, rapid and
extreme changes In the situation, unevenness
of development along the front and In depth,
great extensiveness and high rates of advance.
The basic principles of modern combat include
coordination of regimental and battalion size
units of the various conbat arms and various
branches of the armed forces, the element of
surprise In conbat operations, aggressiveness
and persistence In the a chlevement of a given
objective. . . .
The subject of nuclear weapons Is a common theme even at battalion
level. In the book on the motorized rifle battalion It Is mentioned fifteen
times In the single chapter on the meeting engagement; the chapter on the
meeting engagement In the book on the tank battalion only mentions the
subject four times. The subject Is often caveated, as these two examples
show: "If nuclear weapons are used, the battalion commander coordinates
the movement and deployment of the main body with the time of the nuclear
attack, and also with the time of the air strike and fire by attached
artillery."
The tank battalion in the first echelon moves at top speed, using
cover and concealment, and by the shortest route, "utilizing the results
of the nuclear strike (If It was delivered), air strikes and artillery fire."
Recent authoritative statements Include this one by the late
Marshal Grechko, which hedges on the use of nuclear weapons:
Depending on their scale, modern wars may be
local, limited to the participation of two or
several countries, or worldwide between two
opposing systems. . . . Due to a qualitative
Improvement In conventional means of destruction
and the increase of these weapons in units and
formations, there has been a great Improvement
In the fire, shock action, and maneuver capa-
bilities of troops, which permits assigning
68
A
them very decisive missions on the battlefield
which they are capable of accomplishing without
resorting to nuclear weapons. 69
and this statement by Marshal Kulikov which makes it clear that
nuclear weapons are still considered the principal means of combat:
Military strategy has determined the most expedient
ways of repulsing aggression and inflicting a crushing
retaliatory strike and methods of nuclear and conventional
weapons in the course of a strategic offensive by major
groupings . . . (with operational art formulating) the
use of nuclear weapons in operations and combat actions
by formations of the different services of the Armed
Forces --principles concerning in particular, the
organization and delivery of massed nuclear strikes.
Profound changes occurred in the tactics of ail service
branches with the introduction of nuclear weapons . ^0
The Soviet reader is naturally interested in the controls on nuclear
release. He does not expect to be so restrained (the preplanned packages,
specified time frame, and specified geographical area) when and if
nuclear launch is ordered. He is somewhat amused by the statement "Where
the use of nuclear weapons by the other side is a possibility ..."
since he wonders how it can be otherwise when the Warsaw Pact organic
divisional weapons can fire them.
He is impressed by the determination implied in the statement that
defensive capability must not be allowed to deteriorate to the point
where available forces cannot conduct post strike operations (before
requesting nuclear weapons), but when he turns the page and looks at
the request sequence he is surprised to see an example in which it
requires some 24 hours between the Corps request and receipt of
authorization by the delivery system to fire.
This should be more than et.ough time for him to preempt, as suggested
by Lomov --"One of the decisive conditions for success in an operation is
69
the anticipation of the enemy in maki
articularl
against the enemy's nuclear missile weapons"71 and Savkin— "The importance
of the principle of surprise Increases as the means of warfare develop.
79
Surprise permits anticipating the enemy in delivering strikes. . .
Reading about employment, he notes that the first use of US tactical
nuclear weapons would probably be in a defensive mode} he is not sure how
he would know this if he were the adversary or what difference it would make.
He further reads that to convey to the enemy that we are using nuclear
weapons in a limited manner, all weapons in a package should be fired in
the shortest time. Both Sokolovksi and another author have indicated Soviet
refusal to distinguish between limited and general use of tactical nuclear
weapons .
In advocating the theory of limited war. American
strategists strive to secure the safety of the USA
from retaliatory nuclear strikes. . . "
... By its character, a limited war contains two
problems: on the one hand such a war must be conducted
decisively ... to achieve the set political and
military goals; on the other hand, in a limited war,
the armed forces must be used in such a way as to reduce
(to a minimum) the risk of a limited conflict escalating
into general war. The contradiction of this situation
is clearly seen, if only because the need for success
in a limited war is incompatible with the requirement
for limiting the scale of combat operations, as regards
territory, forces and means, the number of participants
in the armed conflict, etc. . . . The most candid statement
of opinion by the military-political leadership of the USA
on this question was the statement of the former Deputy
Secretary of Defense of the United States, Gllpatric,
who in one of his press conferences in June 1961
announced: '. . .As for me, I never believed in a
so-called limited nuclear war. I simply do not see
how one can establish such limitations, once any sort
of nuclear weapon is launched . '
In allowing for the possibility of unleashing war against
the Warsaw Pact countries with conventional weapons, the
NATO command envisages in its plans the maximum lowering
of the 'nuclear threshold. ' That is , the changeover to
;
military conflict, even at the start of it, the Soviet
Armed Forces cannot fail to take this into account. 74
In keeping the option open to operate at least initially in a con-
ventional environment, the Soviets feel that NATO use will be delayed until
they have an opportunity to knock out at least some of the delivery means.
This has been suggested:
By Sokolovski in his book on strategy:
Without the destruction or neutralization of the enemy's
nuclear means, it is impossible to count on the successful
conduct of any combat actions in the theater, whether they
be offensive or defense. 75
By Savkin in his book on operations:
... in delivering strikes (not necessarily nuclear)
on the nuclear attack means of the enemy, one can knock
the 'sword' out of his hands . . . (and) deprive him of
the possibility of employing nuclear weapons, or in any
case substantially reduce that possibility . 7b
The maintenance of continuous contact with the enemy,
the deep penetration into his zone of deployment
increase the relative safety ... of the troops of
the first echelon . . . rapid penetration into the
deep rear of the enemy brings the forces into the zone
where the long range means of nuclear assault are based,
which forces the enemy under the threat of seizure to
change his position and (which) does not allow him to
inflict response mass nuclear attacks.
By all means are to be destroyed or captured not only
the delivery vehicles of nuclear weapons themselves,
but also the forces and means supporting them — stocks
of nuclear weapons, command posts and intelligence
organs . . . troops fulfilling support functions.
And by Reznichenko in his book on tactics:
. . . advancing within the enemy positions, the
attacking troops seize or destroy his nuclear attack
means, his stores of nuclear ammunition . . . advance
detachments . . . may be given such . . . tasks as _
the combat against the enemy's nuclear attack means.
I
■ ' * ? — n
1
the greater the speed of the attack, the smaller
the possibility for the defense to deliver a
response strike on the offense.
We have indicated that we are going to use tactical nuclear weapons,
and the Soviets believe us. They appear confident that they can find out
when we intend to use them and successfully preempt. Thus, the Soviets
are keeping their options open— arguing against a "limited war," for
preemption, but also reserving the right to fight conventionally while
attempting to destroy the NfcTO tactical nuclear capability. While there
has been no formal decoupling of the theater level and intercontinental
level nuclear conflict in the Soviet open press, the fact that a strong
coupling is no longer stressed may indicate a change. In any case the
Soviets do not subscribe to the conventional-nuclear theory, insisting
that a theater war is either nuclear or conventional— but may be conventional
first.
CHEMICAL WARFARE AND NUCLEAR , BIOLOGICAL. AND CHEMICAL (NBC) DEFENSE
(Chapter 11)
I
k
After reading US policy and the threat, the Soviet reader cannot
help but remember that most of the articles he reads in his military
publications are oriented on the defensive use of equipment. He realizes
he does have a lot of equipment and is particularly confident of the
ability to use it. The constant training of radiation detection and
chemical survey teams, the presence of chemical defense units, the
frequent publication of articles (for example, an article entitled
"Radiation Detection and Chemical Survey at Night" by Major General
Moiseyev in the January 1976 issue of Military Herald), and the frequent
exercise of protective masks and clothing and decontamination of per-
sonnel and equipment serve to make the Soviet officer aware of the
emphasis on chemical and nuclear defense.
Of course, if you can operate against enemy chemical or nuclear
attack (with the chemical or nuclear contamination) , you can certainly
operate more effectively to exploit your own use of nuclear or chemical
weapons. The few Soviet officers who can read East European publica-
tions find them often more hawkish on the use of chemicals than are the
Soviets — at Jeast in the open press.
73
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (Chapter 12)
The "arm, fuel, fix and man" requirement is familiar to the Soviet
reader — although not in those exact words. The Rear Services is his
organization for CSS, and "the role of the rear services has grown
immeasurably."2® The Rear Services is now headed by a four star general
and Deputy Defense Minister who earlier served as CINC of the Group of
Soviet Forces in Germany. 79 He agrees that arm and fuel come first in
priority and believes the "the mass, character, and diversity of
materiel demands a large expenditure of ammo and fuel."®® Reading
about the generals authorizing basic loads, he equates that with his
boyevoy komplekt, translated as unit of fire, which is defined as "the
quantity of ammunition prescribed for one piece of armament or for a
combat vehicle as determined by combat experience, transportation to
move it, and vehicular storage space and carrying capacity. "81
As for "fixing it," he understands the "organization for technical
support" as being based on "quickly repairing combat equipment in its
areas of greatest accumulation" with mobile repair bases being set up
"to repair first those vehicles which can be returned to duty soonest."®2
Maintenance in the battalions and companies is performed by driver
mechanics and vehicle crews. The battalion has a deputy battalion
commander for maintenance who rides a recovery vehicle and directs
the battalion effort from there. 83
His system for "manning Lt" and priorities appears to differ from
what he reads in FM 100-5. Replacements in combat are generally on the
unit rather than individual replacement basis, food service supply
74
includes "mobile bakeries, flour mills, refrigeration units and trucks,
mobile slaughterhouses, etc,"®^ and his medical service is oriented on
"high mobility and moving rapidly toward the areas of destruction. "85
Although his diet is considerably different, the reader still
expects cooked rations, since "it is very important to feed small units
a hot meal before a battle." If this is impossible "permission is
granted to use part of the dry rations" and for liquid refreshments
"thermos bottles will be filled with tea."®*’
Troop health is also considered of great importance. From first
aid (which is "often administered by the servicemen themselves" using
individual first aid kits and the medical chests carried by tanks and
combat vehicles) to the battalion medical point (at which the wounded
are assembled for evacuation by higher echelon medical transport vehicles
to the regimental or higher level medical point where doctors are avail-
able) to the various "medical battalions, hospitals, hospital bases,
ambulance units, sanitation-epidemiological laboratories" — the emphasis
is on quick evacuation by higher level units and combatting the "effects
of the enemy's use of weapons of mass destruction." Antidotes, data
on the radiation and chemical situation, and designation of contaminated
areas and water sources are all considered important. "The vehicles
of 3mall units (platoons, companies, battalions) that have been victims
of enemy weapons of mass destruction can be used for the rapid evacua-
tion of casualties.
Heading about logistic command and control, the Soviet reader would
m *• • h»- conclusion that the principles are the same even if the
#■ . . «re different. He is also used to increased dependence
75
on computer based systems, and conservation and austerity are nothing
new for him. The use of civilian transportation for military transport
he has developed to a high degree with his "avtokolonas" (vehicle
columns) which mobilize the trucks of state enterprises along with
the drivers who are usually members of the reserve.
76
OPERATIONS WITHIN NATO (Chapter 13)
The Soviet reader hears constantly about NATO — the reason for his
being in the Group of Forces. He reads with interest about the variations
in tactics, organization, training, logistics, food and customs. He
wonders about the difference in equipment and notes that the factors
listed as affecting NATO operations also affect the Warsaw Pact. He
knows his Soviet books in Russian on tactics are translated into Polish,
Czech, German and other languages and assumes these must be the equiva-
lent of the Allied Tactical Publications.
He is used to seeing his weapons in the hands of the "fraternal
countries," although he does occasionally see some weapons and equipment
that are unique to a particular country. Sometimes he questions (to
himself) whether his country should provide the latest weapons, sophisti-
cated electronics and missile launchers to the Germans (East), for whom
he has the greatest personal dislike — although there is an official
policy of friendship.
As far as logistics responsibility remaining with the national
headquarters, he thinks that is the policy of the Warsaw Pact and sees
each country he passes through supporting its own forces. Host nation
support is also understandable, his troops dig potatoes in German fields
(if in GSPG) . However, local nationals do not work in his garrisons or
major training areas.
He knows of the US control of warheads , just as he knows of US and
NATO strategy. He remembers having read a recent article concerning US
nuclear warheads in Europe and changing US/NATO strategy and reaches for
77
I
1
'
I
his magazine to check it out. The January 1978 issue of the Military
History Journal recommends to the Soviet military reader a book by the
title of NATO — Strategy and Forces. The book, written by a collective
of East German and Polish authors, traces NATO strategy from 1949 to
1975. The Soviet reader learns of "document 'MC14/3' from 16 January
1968," and of the "principal elements of the strategy of 'flexible
response,' especially the principles of 'forward defense' which deter-
mined the development of the armed forces of the bloc." He also learns
that "In the US depots in the 1960s there were concentrated 7200 nuclear
warheads. Including 5500 on the territory of the FRG , " and that "The
USA in January 1971 adopted the strategy of 'realistic deterrence' while
NATO continued to operate under the strategy of 'flexible response, '"®®
He is surprised to read in FM 100-5 the extensive orientation on
European weather and terrain. He is still on his continent, and the
weather and terrain in Eastern Europe is not too different from that in
the Soviet Union. In his normal five years (officer) of service in
Eastern Europe he will get to know it well.
He cannot help thinking about the emphasis on NATO Europe in this
American manual. He knows his Ground Forces do not have the luxury of
being able to concentrate completely on one global area — Europe. About
a quarter of his Ground Force units are on the Chinese border, thousands
of miles away. This is something he never forgets.
On the other hand, he is not too Impressed with his allies, the non-
Soviet Warsaw P?ct Forces; he feels that they are there to protect the
northern and southern flanks of the Soviet Forces, but that any principal
"task" would be carried out by Soviet Forces. He wonders what the situation
is within NATO where he hears mostly about American and German forces.
78
4
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS (Chapter 14)
Reading the first sentence, "Although the primary mission of the
US Army is to prepare for the defense of NATO," the Soviet reader cannot
help but recall that his primary mission is said to be defense of the
homeland (the Soviet Union) — looking west toward NATO and east toward
China — with a secondary and complementary mission being defense of the
"fraternal socialist countries." There is seldom any discussion of
being committed to battle elsewhere;®^ although he feels strongly that
the next war should be fought on non-Soviet territory. It is hard for
him to understand why America is so committed to Western Europe, unless
as he has heard for years it is for the purpose of using Europe to attack
the Soviet Union and its allies.
As for mil'tary operations in mountains there is an occasional
article in the Military Herald such as "Reconnaissance in the Mountains,"
by Sr. Lt. Sitnikov in the February 1977 issue;90 however, there is
normally little discussion of or training in mountain warfare, although
part of the 7000 km border with China (including Mongolia) is mountainous —
and there are mountains throughout northern, southern, and much of
central Europe. The lack of emphasis could well be because the Soviets
expect any war to be a quick one with a massive offensive, and they
would attempt to go over or around for a decisive encounter.
The Soviet reader encounters almost nothing in his publications
regarding jungle fighting. While there have been Soviet advisors in
jungle areas (assisting in "wars of national liberation"), the Soviet
troops are not .rained for Jungle warfare. This is probably because it
79
is not decisive, because it is decentralized, because it has a slow
tempo of operations, and because there are no jungles in the Soviet
Union.
j
1
Deserts there are, and semi-desert areas along the borders with
China, Turkey and Iran. Soviets write about and train for desert war-
fare which permits fluid warfare, wide envelopments, and the use of
mobile forces (normal Soviet offensive operations). The Soviet officer
may well have trained for desert operations and probably has read arti-
cles such as "A Meeting Engagement in the Desert," by Major General
Grubi in the September 1976 issue of Military Herald. 91
The fourth of the special environments covered deals with northern
regions. This, of course, is the area about which the average Soviet
military reader is most familiar — not from reading articles such as
"In Winter Conditions," by Captain Lubicher in the January 1976 Military
Herald92 — but from being there. The long daylight hours in the summer,
the long winter nights, the freeze, the thaw, the problems of equipment
maintenance — all are familiar to the Soviet. He is acclimated to
northern regions, and it is hard for him to realize that most Americans
are not. In any case he does not expect any large scale engagements of
ground forces in the northern regions.
The final subject, built-up areas, is one which the Soviets
do not neglect in open literature. (An occasional article such as "The
Peculiarities of Combat in Cities," by Colonel Yefimov in the April 1977
Military Herald. )93 However, Soviet tactics and operations involve
bypassing cities wherever possible. Once I was told that the reason
for this was to avoid destruction of "class brothers," the working class.
80
I
most of whom live in cities. Like mountains, the Soviets would prefer
to go over or around, rather than through. FM 100-5 makes it clear
that US/NATO forces expect considerable combat in built-up areas; this
the Soviet reader does not relish or expect.
Incidentally, the 1974 and 1976 books on regimental and divisional
* tactics do have sections under the offensive on attacks in cities, moun-
tains and northern regions as well as the forcing of water barriers,
and a section on the regiment only concerning attack at night. Both
cover defense in cities, in northern regions and of river lines, while
only the regimental book has a section on defense at night. The monthly
magazines, however, and in particular the Military Herald, bring this
Soviet reader numerous articles on military operations in special
environments.
CONCLUSIONS
i
As the Soviet officer reader closes the manual, he cannot help but
have been impressed by its appearance, organization, format, new tactical
approach to the defensive operation, and the indicated "gung ho" spirit
of the US Army, his so-called "class enemies." If the services other
than the "American ground forces" have the same attitude, backed by the
chemical, electronic warfare, and other capabilities as outlined in
FM 100-5, it is not surprising that the USSR has had some difficulty in
catching up with and overtaking America (dognatz i peregnatz Amerlky) .
As Marshal Kulikov wrote in Komnunist in 1976, there is a need to
further develop the tactics of modern combined arms operations in order
to more fully utilize the capabilities of modern weapons and equipment,
increase maneuverability and surprise, and Improve electronic warfare
and reconnaissance (or is it Intelligence?) . The current Warsaw Pact
commander in his relatively new post has the opportunity to train to
reduce the gap between theory and practice and to integrate the new and
improved combined arm6 tactics which he was seeking as Chief of the
General Staff. The US Army has the same opportunity.
If communications and mobility permit US (NATO) to concentrate
forces, if Soviet suppressive fire does not prevent US(NATO) forces from
moving laterally to execute an effective defense, and if sufficient US
(NATO) reserves in a defense in depth can stop any Soviet (Warsaw Pact)
"deep operation" (glubokaya operatsla) either from a second echelon
supported breakthrough or a broad front, largely first echelon meeting
engagement scenario, the defensive operation advocated in FM 100-5
should work.
82
1
The USSR and USA both profess to have no aggressive intentions, to
be concerned with a threat presented by the other party (or alliance) ,
and to be prepared to defend their vital interests by resort to arms,
including nuclear weapons if necessary. The vital interests America
considers worth defending obviously include Western Europe, and the
emphasis in the manual is on defense (but not the Soviet view of the
best defense being a good offense) . This author believes that the
average Soviet reader hopes that the future does not hold a test shoot-
out of Soviet and US operational art in Western Europe involving NATO
and Warsaw Pact forces. The concern, however, arises when one ponders
what action the Soviet Union might take if it felt things were not going
its way in support of "historical determinism." (The "correlation of
forces" supposedly shifting in favor of the Soviet Union.) A visiting
Soviet professor stated that such a situation would be considered
"unnatural," "counterrevolutionary" and "against the laws of history" —
and the Soviets "would act accordingly."^ The world well remembers what
occurred in the case of "counterrevolutionary" activity in Czechoslovakia
during the "Prague Spring" and earlier in Hungary. The Soviets regard
gains by communism as being irreversible. This is exactly the sort of
ideological mind set misunderstanding which could bring about a test
of the operational principles of FM 100-5.
The Soviet reader cannot help but be struck by three major differ-
ences in approach found in FM 100-5. First, he would consider it strange
that there is so much emphasis on the defense, as he is taught that the
offense is everything. This is perhaps summed up best by an entry in
the Great Soviet Encyclopedia:
83
Defensive
(1) Defensive tactics in war (obsolete)95
(2) In Polish ....
Note: underlining is the author's
Second, he is unable to understand why the new US manual on opera-
tions, published in the 1970s, is based largely on non-nuclear operations;
since practically all of his books and manuals (but not all of his arti-
cles) are predicated on the use of nuclear weapons sooner or later. They
infer that with slight variations nuclear tactics will work even if the
weapons are not used — although the rate of advance will be slower. Whether
the Soviets are prepared to play the game (conventional-nuclear warfare)
by US/NATO rules is subject to conjecture. Their declaratory doctrine
is certainly at odds with US policy on limited tactical nuclear warfare.
There are, however, certain indications that the Soviets are initially
prepared and willing to play by "conventional" rules as long as every-
thing is going in their favor and while they attempt to destroy or
weaken the Western capability to resort to tactical nuclear warfare.
The third thing which would have stood out in FM 100-5 as being
different from all Soviet military literature is the absence of reference
to ideology (Marxism-Leninism), of stress on moral-political training,
and of comment on the role of the Conmunist Party in the training and
combat effectiveness of the Soviet soldier. The Soviets maintain that
"military training and political education is one process. "96 The
importance of this party-political work is emphasized in The Offensive
as follows ;9 7
On the degree to which soldiers master sophisti-
cated equipment, on their ideological stability and
conviction of the correctness of the cause which they
are defending, and on how much they surpass the enemy
in moral-political and psychological attitude depends
to a deciding degree the course and outcome of combat
operations.
84
Looking at the probable Soviet offense against a NATO defense, what
this author suggests the Soviet reader would see is a close connection
and logical relationship between the meeting engagement, a change in the
organization and strength of the second echelon and combined arms reserve,
and the "deep operation" (for want of a better and more current name).
The indications of change are all there; the Soviets write and talk about
them. They educate their officers regarding them. What a waste of time,
space and effort if they do not intend to concentrate on the meeting
engagement/first echelon-combined arms reserve/"deep operation" offense.
This does not mean that the traditional breakthrough with a deliberate
attack is passe. I submit that the breakthrough and the meeting engage-
ment are two separate and distinct forms of offensive combat for different
siutations. However, I also suggest that when one looks at Central
Europe where the Soviets may perceive an unprepared, unreinforced and
unwarned NATO defense that is vulnerable to a Soviet military move in
the face of a perceived future "provocation" or "counterrevolutionary"
trend (and to that we can perhaps add a little of the highly touted
Soviet surprise), the handwriting is on the wall and FM 100-5 should so
reflect this to its readers.
The reader is reminded that this article reflects the possible thoughts
and reactions of a Soviet officer reading a Russian language translation
of FM 100-5 based on his background, education and mindset. Thus, a
statement or observation should not necessarily be accepted as fact merely
because a Soviet may think or say it is so.
The above mentioned Soviet professor also gave some good food for
thought when he said, "The Soviets do not think in the way the West does.
85
— ^
The West deludes Itself by trying to attribute Western thought processes
to the Soviets." Even though I have spent over five years in close and
continuous contact with Soviet Ground Forces personnel as an officer
accredited to the Group of Soviet Forces In Germany, it may well be
that this author is wrong on many of the thoughts, reactions and comments
attributed or ascribed to the "typical" Soviet officer perusing FM 100-5
(and the "typical" Soviet officer is certainly much more typical than
the "typical" American officer). It could even happen that by the time
you read this, the real Soviet Russian will have stood up and Soviet
open press comment on FM 100-5 will be available. If so, and to the
extent such open press comment may reflect the Soviet reader's true
reaction (and it certainly will reflect official reaction), this writer
will be happy to stand corrected regarding 'The New Amerikanskiy Manual
on Operational Art.'
ENDNOTES
1
1. N. A. Lomov, Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution
in Military Affairs. Nauchno-teknicheskiy progress i revolutsia v
voyennom dele, Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1973. (USAF transla-
tion). See footnote p. 145.
2. The only reference the author has seen in Soviet open press
publications since FM 100-5 was published in 1976 is a quote in the
10 February 1978 Red Star/KZ (Krasnaya Zvezda) on page 3, an article on
the enhanced radiation weapon or "neutron bomb." The quote, when
translated from Russian back into English, went as follows:
"In the US Army Field Manual FM 100-5 it says directly:
'Critical serious conflicts in Germany without a doubt will
involve repeated, almost unbroken battles for large cities,
small cities and towns /villages .
The FM 100-5 passage from which this was apparently taken (13-16) reads
as follows: "Combat in Germany will automatically involve repeated,
almost continuous battle for cities, towns, villages, and adjacent built
up areas."
The article rails against the neutron bomb (actually an artillery shell).
Perhaps its principal thrust is that the US talks about the weapon being
used against tanks and by inference cutting down on collateral damage
and injury to civilians, although the new FM infers that much of the
combat will be in built up areas where civilians will be automatically
affected.
3. See Harriet Fast Scott's translation (with commentary and
analysis) of the third edition of (1968) Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy's
Military Strategy (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, for the
Stanford Research Institute, 1975).
4. V. D. Sokolovskiy and M. Cherednichanko, "The Art of War at a
New Stage - A Revolution in Military Affairs, Its Meaning and Conse-
quences," Krasnaya Zvezda/KZ, 25 and 28 August 1964.
5. See footnote 3 for translation which incorporates all three
editions and highlights additions, deletions, and changes.
6. V. G. Reznichenko, Taktika (Tactics). Military Publishing House,
Moscow, 1966. I know of no translation.
7. A. A. Sidorenko, Nastupleniye (the offensive), Military Publish-
ing House, Moscow, 1970. (USAF translation).
87
8. V. Y. Savkin, Osnovniye printsipi operationovo iskusstva i
taktikl, the Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics, Military
Publishing House, Moscow, 1972. (There is a USAF translation.)
8a. P. I. Konoplya and N. A. Maikov, Tankovy batalyon v boyu (The
Tank Battalion in Battle), Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1972.
(I know of no translation.)
This book was published first in 1966. The 1972 edition added a
chapter on "Movement of the Tank Battalion by Rail," a section on move-
ment using wheeled tank transporters, and other entries on "breaking
contact and withdrawal of the tank battalion (essential for lateral
movement and commitment on another axis)," and "occupation of an area
and its security." The chapter on the meeting engagement (Chapter 4)
was written by Colonel Maikov.
9. G. I. Garbuz, D. F. Loza, I. F. Sazonov, Motostrelkovy batalyon
v boyu (The Motorized Rifle Battalion in Battle) , Military Publishing
House, Moscow, 1972. (There is an Army translation.)
10. Lomov, op. clt.
11. A. I. Radziyevskiy, Taktika v bovevykh primerakh-polk (Tactics
through Combat Examples-Regiment) , Military Publishing House, Moscow,
1974.
12. A. I. Radziyevskiy, Taktika v boyevykh primerakh-diviziya (Tactics
through Combat Examples-Division) , Military Publishing House, Mosow, 1976.
13. A. I. Radziyevskiy, Tankovy udar (Tank Strike), Military Publish-
ing House, Moscow, 1977.
14. Reznichenko, op. cit.
15. Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopedia (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia),
Encyclopedia Publishing House, Moscow, 1970, English translation, Vol. V,
p. 258.
16. Op. cit. , p. 259.
17. Ibid.
18. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Vol. Ill, p. 653.
19. Savkin' s Operational Art and Tactics, pp. 133, 134.
20. Kommunist , No. 3, 1977, p. 18.
21. Soviet officers with whom I have spoken have pointed out that
the change from the 3-tank to the 4-tank platoon in MR units was in
progress in the early 1970s on the Sino-Soviet border. However, this
r—
AO-AObO 295 ARMY WAR COLL STRATEGIC STUDIES INST CARLISLE BARRACKS PA F/G 15/7
COMMENTS ON FM 100-5 FROM A SOVIET POINT OF VIEW.(U)
MAR 78 F C TURNER
UNCLASSIFIED NL
instant organizational increase of one-third in MR platoons together with
the relatively new divisional independent tank battalions has at least
in East Germany since the 1973 war (in the Middle East) provided the
Soviets with a considerably larger number of tanks. Thus, any increased
attrition on a European battlefield due to AT weapons would be offset by
the increased number of tanks.
22. Pravda, 15 Sep 75. (Army General Pavlovski)
23. Lomov, op. cit ■ , p. 82.
24. Sidorenko's The Offensive, p. 45.
25. Lomov's op. cit. , p. 80.
26. Sovetskava vovennavs entsiklopedla (Soviet Military Encyclopedia),
Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1977, Vol. 2, p. 513.
27. Lomov, op. cit., p. 81.
28. During the 1960s and the 1970s numerous Soviet officers have
indicated to me that they considered the helicopter too vulnerable for
high intensity combat. "We know what our antiaircraft guns and missiles
can do to your helicopters and we assume you could do the same to ours.
The helicopter just can't fly over modern armed troop units. They will
be shot down" - one typical statement.
29. Lomov, op. cit., p. 85.
30. Lomov, op. cit., p. 135.
31. KZ, 10 February 1978, p. 3.
32. Voyennl vestnick (Military Herald) (W) , No. 2 (Feb), 1977, p. 44.
33. VV, No. 4 (Apr) 1977, p. 68.
34. Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Vol. 4, p. 547. Marshal Grechko,
Minister of Defense, was the Chief Editor of the first two volumes which
were published in 1976. Marshal Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff, is
listed as Chief Editor of Volumes 3 and 4 which were published in 1977.
35. V. I. Lenin, Poln. aobr. each. (Complete Collected Works),
Vol. 39, p. 245.
36. Savkin's Operational Art and Tactics, p. 248.
37. Soviet Military Encyclopedia. Vol. 2, p. 405 and Vol. 1, p. 530.
38. Soviet Military Encyclopedia. Vol. 2, p. 407.
89
- -A .*V I >».-
39. Sidorenko' 8 The Offensive. The quotes in the following section
are from chapters 2, 3, 5 and 6.
40. Radziyevskiy's Tank Strike, pp. 4, 140, 254.
41. Radziyevskiy's Tank Strike, pp. 43, 47, 48.
42. Radziyevskiy's Tank Strike. The pages which the author con-
sidered most important regarding the meeting engagement and from which
all of the quotes are taken are pages 4, 5, 38-41, 43, 44, 47-49, 139,
140, 144, 254, 265.
43. Radziyevskiy's Tactics Through Combat Examples - Division. See
pages 152, 154, 155, 158, 165, 168, 180.
44. Radziyevskiy's Tactics Through Combat Examples - Regiment. See
pages 142, 148, 151, 154, 161, 162, 165, 173, 177, 189, 190.
44a. Konoplya, op. cit., p. 124.
44b. Op. cit., p. 126.
44c. Op. cit., p. 132.
45. Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, p. 421.
46. Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, p. 577.
47. Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Vol. Ill, P. 72.
48. Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Vol. 1, p. 530.
49. Garbuz, op. cit., p. 61.
49a. Konoplya, op. cit., p. 126.
49b. Konoplya, op. cit., p. 141.
50. Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Vol. 3, p. 578. Nikolai
Va8lllevlch Ogarkov is the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed
Forces and a Marshal of the Soviet Union.
51. The three books are the regimental and divisional series on
Tactics Through Combat Examples written by an author collective under
the general editorship of Army General Radziyevskiy and the volume
Tank Strike which was written by Radziyevskiy himself .
52. Radziyevskiy's Tank Strike, p. 5.
53. Radziyevskiy, op. cit., p. 256.
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I
54. A. A. Grechko, Vooruzhenniye sill sovetskovo gosudarstva (Armed
Armed Forces of the Soviet State), Military Publishing House, Moscow,
1975, p. 93.
55. Radziyevskiy ' s Tactics Through Combat Examples - Division, p. 5.
56. Radziyevskiy 's Tactics Through Combat Examples - Regiment, p. 6.
57. Radziyevskiy' s Tactics Through Combat Examples - Regiment, p. 5.
58. Radziyevskiy1 s Tactics Through Combat Examples - Regiment, p. 283.
59. Boyevoy ustav sukhoputnylth voiak (Combat Regulations of the
Ground Forces), Moscow, 1964.
60. I have had Soviet combat arms officers (combined arms/motorized
rifle, tank, and artillery) tell me that the suppressive fire directed
at both high performance aircraft and helicopters attacking troops,
particularly along the FEBA, includes that of the tank's main armament.
61. Sokolovski and Cherednichenko, op. cit.
62. V. D. Sokolovskiy, Military Strategy (Harriet Fast Scott trans-
lation), p. 291.
63. Sokolovskiy, op. cit. , p. 291.
64. Sidorenko's The Offensive, see chapter 4 on "The Employment of
Nuclear Weapons and the Destruction of the Enemy by Fire." The Soviet
author in this chapter frequently presents Western views — and by
implication agrees with them.
65. Ibid. The Soviets declaratory doctrine rejects the theory of
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Since the mid-60s there have been
almost no military voices that have spoken out against the use of nuclear
weapons — and few party or government spokesmen. Prior to that time
there were a number. Thus, it is interesting in 1977 to read in the con-
clusion to Tank Strike the statement by Army General Radziyevskiy that
"The means for the mass destruction of people has reached such a level
that a new war, if the imperialists unleash it, will create an enormous
danger for mankind." This is certainly a recent exception to the rule
that military men do not discuss the danger of nuclear weapons which
could lead to a defeatist attitude. Of course, the recent discussions
of the neutron bomb may have changed that.
66. Lomov, op. cit., pp. 132, 133, 144.
67. Sidorenko, op. cit.
68. Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Vol. Ill, p. 654.
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68a. Konoplya, op. cit., p. 137.
68b. Konoplya, op. clt., p. 140.
69. A. A. Grechko, Vooruzhennlve silt sovetskovo gosudarstva (Armed
Forces of the Soviet State), Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1975.
70. V. G. Kulikov, Kommunist (Communist), "The Soviet Armed Forces
and Military Science," February 1973.
71. Lomov, op. clt., p. 147.
72. Savkin, op. cit., p. 282.
73. Sokolovskiy, op. cit., (Harriet Fast Scott translation),
pp. 43, 68.
74. I. Zavyalov, KZ, "New Weapons and the Art of War," 30 Oct 1970.
75. Savkin, op. cit. That the Soviets do not expect the use of
nuclear weapons by NATO once a breakthrough occurs and there are rapidly
maneuvering units/targets in the rear is suggested by a LTC Molozov in
an October 1975 article in VV (The Military Herald) entitled "The Utility
of the BMP in Combat."
76. Sokolovskiy, op. cit.
77. Reznichenko, op. cit.
78. Lomov, op. cit. , p. 118.
79. Army General Semyon Konstantinovich Kurkotkin, present Chief
of the Rear Services, served as CINC, Group of Si viet Forces in Germany,
while I was accredited to HQ, GSFG.
80. Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Vol. VII, P. 654.
81. Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Vol. Ill, p. 775.
82. Lomov, op. cit., p. 119.
83. Garbuz, op. cit., p. 41.
84. Lomov, op. cit.. p. 121.
85. Lomov, op. cit., p. 119.
86. Garbuz, op. cit., p. 40. Also see Reznichenko. op. clt. . p. 158.
87. Garbuz, op. cit.. p. 42.
92
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88. Voyenno istoricheski zhurnal (Military History Journal), No. 1,
(Jan) 1978, p. 107.
89. One notable but not widely publicized exception to this is found
in an article entitled "The Leading Role of the CPSU in Building the Army
of a Developed Socialist Society" in Questions of History of the CPSU,
No. 5, 1974. The article was written by the former defense minister, the
late Marshal Grechko, and reads in part as follows:
"At the present stage the historic purpose of the Soviet
Armed Forces is not limited merely to their function in defend-
ing our Motherland (rodina) and other socialist countries. In
its foreign policy activity the Soviet state actively and pur-
posely opposes the export of counterrevolution and the policy
of oppression, supports the national liberation struggle, and
resolutely resists imperialist aggression in whatever distant
region of our planet it may appear. The Party and the Soviet
government rely on the country's economic and defense might
in fulfilling these tasks. . . The development of the external
functions of the Socialist armies is a natural process. It will
continue further."
90. Voyennl vestnick (The Military Herald) (W) , No. 2, 1977, p. 53.
91. VV, No. 9, 1977, p. 39.
92. VV, No. 1, 1976, p. 43.
93. VV, No. 3, 1977.
94. Soviet Professor M. Voslensky at the 1975 Convention of the
American Associaiton for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS)
was a member of a panel on "Detente and the Correlation of Forces."
He made several comments in response to questions.
95. Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Vol. VIII, p. 88.
96. Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, p. 515.
97. Sidorenko's The Offensive, p. 222.
• • v’
4./>
READ INSTRUCTIONS
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
before completing form
1. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
ACN 78043
*. TYPE or REPORT * PERIOD COVERED
Special Report
« PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
Comments on FM 100-5 — From a Soviet Point
of View
t. CONTRACT OR GRANT HUMBERT*;
Colonel Frederick C. Turner
Strategic Studies Institute
US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013
II. REPORT OATE
15 March 1978
II. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS
MONITORINO AGENCY NAME A ADORESSfl I dfffaiant free. Controlling Olllco)
IS. SECURITY CLASS, (ol Oil m import)
UNCLASSIFIED
19. KCY WORDS (Continue on revet am a I do II neceeeery end Identify by block number)
FM 100-5, meeting engagement, tactical nuclear operations, Soviet
offensive operations, the role of World War II experience in Soviet
military thinking, second echelon and reserves
20. A OS TRACT (Continue an rover— eldO II —emery end Idea
In this paper, the author, at temping to look at FM 100-5 through the eyes
of a Soviet officer, comments on some similarities and differences between Soviet
doctrine and the US doctrine as outlined in FM 100-5. This includes comments on
doctrine ascribed to the Soviets in the manual.
The author uses exclusively Soviet sources both written and oral, and inter-
preted based on his extensive contact with Soviet Gr
…[truncated]