Document text
nui 3-19.30
(Formerly FM 19-30)
N /
Physical Security
Headquarters, Department of the Army
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*FM 3-19.30 (FM 19-30)
Field Manual
No. 3-19.30 Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 8 January 2001
PHYSICAL SECURITY
Contents
Page
PREFACE Vi
Chapter 1 PHYSICAL-SECURITY CHALLENGES 1 -1
Overview 1-1
Automated Information Systems 1-1
OPSEC and the Threat 1-3
Chapter 2 THE SYSTEMS APPROACH 2-1
Protective Systems 2-1
Systems Deveiopment 2-2
The Integrated Protective System 2-5
Security Threats 2-6
Chapter 3 DESIGN APPROACH 3-1
Design Strategies 3-1
Protective Measures 3-1
Vehicie Bombs 3-2
Exterior Attack 3-10
Standoff Weapons 3-13
Baiiistics 3-16
Forced Entry 3-17
Covert Entry and Insider Compromise 3-19
Surveiiiance and Eavesdropping 3-20
Maii and Suppiy Bombs 3-22
Chemicai and Bioiogicai Contamination 3-24
Chapter 4 PROTECTIVE BARRIERS 4-1
Overview 4-1
Fencing 4-2
Utiiity Openings 4-5
Other Perimeter Barriers 4-5
Security Towers 4-5
Instaiiation Entrances 4-6
Warning Signs 4-8
Other Signs 4-8
Instaiiation Perimeter Roads and Ciear Zones 4-8
Arms-Faciiity Structurai Standards 4-9
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This publication supersedes FM 19-30, 1 March 1979.
FM 3-19.30
Page
Chapter 5 PHYSICAL-SECURITY LIGHTING 5-1
Overview 5-1
Commander’s Responsibility 5-1
Planning Considerations 5-2
Principles of Security Lighting 5-3
Types of Lighting 5-4
Wiring Systems 5-5
Maintenance 5-6
Chapter 6 ELECTRONIC SECURITY SYSTEMS 6-1
Overview 6-1
ESS Design Considerations 6-2
Interior ESS Considerations 6-7
Exterior ESS Considerations 6-8
ESS Alarm-Annunciation System 6-12
ESS Software 6-17
Interior Intrusion-Detection Sensors 6-18
Exterior Intrusion-Detection Sensors 6-29
Electronic Entry Control 6-39
Application Guidelines 6-42
Performance Criteria 6-43
Data Transmission 6-44
CCTV for Alarm Assessment and Surveillance 6-45
Chapter 7 ACCESS CONTROL 7-1
Designated Restricted Areas 7-1
Employee Screening 7-4
Identification System 7-4
Duress Code 7-10
Access-Control Rosters 7-10
Methods of Control 7-10
Security Controls of Packages, Personal Property, and Vehicles 7-1 1
Tactical-Environment Considerations 7-12
Chapter 8 LOCK AND KEY SYSTEMS 8-1
Installation and Maintenance 8-1
Types of Locking Devices 8-1
Chapter 9 SECURITY FORCES 9-1
Types of Security Forces 9-1
Authority and Jurisdiction 9-2
Personnel Selection 9-3
Security Clearance 9-3
Organization and Employment of Forces 9-4
Headquarters and Shelters 9-4
Execution of Security Activities 9-5
Training Requirements 9-6
Supervision 9-7
Uniforms 9-8
Vehicles 9-9
Firearms 9-9
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FM 3-19.30
Page
Communications 9-9
Misceiianeous Equipment 9-9
Miiitary Working Dogs 9-10
Summary 9-1 0
Chapter 10 IN-TRANSIT SECURITY 1 0-1
In-Port Cargo 10-1
Raii Cargo 10-4
Pipeiine Cargo 10-6
Convoy Movement 1 0-7
Chapter 1 1 INSPECTIONS AND SURVEYS 1 1 -1
Inspections 11-1
Surveys 1 1-2
Appendix A METRIC CONVERSION CHART A-1
Appendix B SAMPLE INSTALLATION CRIME-PREVENTION HANDBOOK B-1
Section I — Installation Crime-Prevention Programs B-1
Crime-Prevention Working Groups B-1
Crime-Prevention Officers B-2
Crime-Prevention Program Deveiopment B-2
Training B-5
Civiiian Crime-Prevention Organizations B-5
Section II — Criminal Analysis B-5
Sources of Information B-6
Individuai Criminai Anaiysis B-9
Criminai-Anaiysis Procedures B-1 5
Criminai-Anaiysis Summary B-1 7
Section III — Command and Law-Enforcement Countermeasures B-1 7
Crime Hot Lines B-1 7
Crime Prevention Through Environmentai Design B-1 8
Speciaiized Patroi Tactics and Surveiiiance B-25
Pubiicity Campaigns B-30
Residentiai-Security Surveys B-31
Juveniie Crime Prevention B-34
Fraud B-47
Internai Theft B-52
Piiferage B-53
Section IV — Army Property at the Local Level B-61
Motor Vehicies B-61
Consumer Outiets B-63
Arson B-66
Section V — Community Crime-Prevention Programs B-67
Neighborhood Watch Program B-67
Operation ID B-71
Neighborhood Waiks B-74
Vigiiantism B-75
Mobiie Patrois B-76
Project Lock B-76
Section VI — Evaluation B-79
Mi
FM 3-19.30
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Crime-Prevention Programs B-79
Crime Rates B-83
Measures of Effectiveness B-84
Internai Measures B-85
Appendix C INTELLIGENCE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, AND THREAT ANALYSIS C-1
Information Sources C-1
Responsibiiities of US Government Lead Agencies C-2
Information Requirements C-4
Threat Anaiysis and Assessment C-5
Determination of the Threat Levei C-6
Appendix D CRISIS-MANAGEMENT PLAN D-1
Appendix E OFFICE SECURITY MEASURES E-1
Physicai-Security Survey E-1
Security-Engineering Assessment E-1
Technicai Assessment of Responses E-2
Physicai-Security Enhancement Measures E-2
Appendix F PHYSICAL-SECURITY PLAN F-1
Annexes F-6
Tacticai-Environment Considerations F-7
Appendix G PERSONAL-PROTECTION MEASURES G-1
Personai Protection G-1
Working Environment G-2
Home Environment G-4
Appendix H BOMBS H-1
Generai H-1
Conceaiing Bombs H-1
Damage and Casuaity Mechanisms H-1
Teiephonic Threats H-3
Evacuation Driiis H-3
Searching for a Suspected lED H-6
Appendix I EXECUTIVE PROTECTION 1-1
Suppiementai Security Measures 1-1
Executive Protection Goais 1-1
Residentiai Security Measures 1-2
Transportation Measures 1-4
Individuai Protective Measures 1-7
Combating-Terrorism Training for Executives 1-10
Travei to Potentiai Physicai-Threat Risk Areas 1-10
Protective Security Detaiis 1-10
Executive-Protection System Integration 1-12
Appendix J RESOURCE MANAGEMENT J-1
Funding Programs J-1
IV
FM 3-19.30
Page
Projected Requirements J-1
Obligation Plan J-1
Types of Appropriations J-2
Appendix K VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT K-1
Assessment Considerations K-1
THREATCON Levels K-2
Assessing Vulnerability K-3
GLOSSARY Glossary-1
BIBLIOGRAPHY Bibliography-1
INDEX Index-1
V
Preface
This field manual (FM) sets forth guidance for all personnel responsible for physical security. It is
the basic reference for training security personnel. It is intended to be a "one-stop" physical-
security source for the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of the Army (DA), and
other proponents and agencies of physical security.
Prevention and protection are the two primary concerns of physical security. Both serve the
security interests of people, equipment, and property. These interests must be supported at all
staff and command levels; and this support must be unified in joint, multinational, and
i nteragency operations.
Support to joint, multinational, and interagency operations relies on the fact that the Army will
not conduct operations alone. Additionally, force-projection operations conducted by the military
will involve the integration of war-fighting capabilities with stability and support operations.
This manual's primary focus is the articulation of a balanced understanding of physical security
for joint, multinational, and interagency operations throughout the environments of peacetime,
conflict, and war (whether in the continental United States [CONUS] or outside the continental
United States [OCONUS]).
Physical security must integrate the various capabilities of joint, multinational, and interagency
operations in pursuit of a seamless connection between the strategic, operational, and tactical
levels of war. Physical security must also address an expanded rangeof threats that embraces not
only traditional threat components of war, but also nontraditional threats generated by
guerrillas, terrorists, criminals, and natural or man-made disasters. In addition, physical
security must address the concept of H omeland Defense due to the aforementioned threats.
Homeland Defense is the military's role in the United States (US) government's principal task of
protecting its territory and citizens. This is accomplished by joint, interagency, and
multijurisdictional organizations. Homeland Defense includes—
• Supporting domestic authorities for crisis and consequence management with regard
to weapons of mass destruction (WM D).
• Protecting national-security assets (such as installations) and deploying forces and
ensuring the availability, integrity, and adequacy of other critical assets.
• Deterring and defending against strategic attacks while maintaining freedom of
action through antiterrorism and force-protection operations.
With this in mind, it is essential to address the five pillars of force protection— combating
terrorism, physical security, personal security, law enforcement, and operations security
(OPSEC). Physical security is a central component of force protection and provides an integrated
venue to express support for operations. Physical security is a primary- leader task and an
inherent part of all operations to protect soldiers, family members, civilians, and resources. This
function directly supports the Army's universal task list.
While the effects of these changes (when viewed individually) appear revolutionary, the basic
activities remain relatively unchanged, though executed under different conditions and
standards. Another component that remains unchanged is our reliance upon quality soldiers and
leaders well versed in physical-security fundamentals. Leaders will be challenged to ensure that
they are functionally proficient; possess an understanding of physical-security operations; are
VI
FM 3-19.30
educated in joint, multinational, and interagency operations; and have the ability to perform
physical -security functions in support of full -dimension operations.
Appendix A contains an English-to-metric measurement conversion chart. Appendix B is a
sample installation crime-prevention handbook. This handbook is designed to assist commanders
in developing crime-prevention programs for their installation and units.
The proponent of this publication is HQ TRADOC. Send comments and recommendations on DA
Form 2028 directly to Commandant, US Army Military Police School (USAM PS), ATTN : ATSJ -
MP-TD, Directorate of Training, 401 Engineer Loop, Suite 2060, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri
65473-8926.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively
to men.
Chapter 1
Physical-Security Challenges
Physical security is defined as that part of security concerned with
physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent
unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents;
and to safeguard against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. As such,
all military operations face new and complex physical -security challenges
across the full spectrum of operations. Challenges relative to physical
security include the control of populations, information dominance,
multinational and interagency connectivity, antiterrorism, and the use of
physical -security assets as a versatile force multiplier.
OVERVIEW
1-1. Reductions in manpower and funding are critical challenges to physical
security. Manpower for supporting physical-security activities is reduced
through deployments and cutbacks. The rapid evolution of physical-security-
equipment technology also lends to physical-security challenges, which are
exponentially multiplied by the introduction of the information age.
1-2. Physical-security challenges must be understood, and measures must be
taken to minimize them to enhance force protection. Leaders must create
order when coming upon a situation; and when they depart, some semblance
of that order must remain. They must be aware of the human-dimension
factors and ensure that their soldiers do not become complacent. It was
human error rather than modern technology that took lives in the bombings of
the African embassy. Warning was given, but not heeded. Complacency
became a physical -security challenge.
AUTOMATED INFORMATION SYSTEMS
1-3. Success on past battlefields has resulted not so much from technological
advances, but from innovative ways of considering and combining available
and new technologies as they apply to war fighti ng. Some of these technologies
dealt with disseminating and processing information. For example, the
telegraph, the telephone, the radio, and now the computer have redefined the
fire-support paradigm.
1-4. As the armed forces move into the technological age, a greater need for
physical -security measures is required. The risks associated with automated
information systems (AISs) are widespread because computers are used for
everything. Army Regulation (AR) 380-19 outlines the requirements that
commanders and managers need for processing unclassified and classified
information and for securing media, software, hardware, and different
systems.
Physical-Security Challenges 1-1
FM 3-19.30
1-5. The threat to AISs and information systems security (ISS) involves
deliberate, overt, and covert acts. This includes the physical threat to tangible
property, such as the theft or destruction of computer hardware. Also included
is the threat of electronic, electromagnetic-pulse, radio-frequency (RF), or
computer-based attacks on the information or communications components
that control or make up critical Army command and control (C^)
infrastructures. In most cases, the threat's target is the information itself
rather than the system that transmits it. The threat comes from a range of
sources, including the foil owing:
• Unauthorized users (such as hackers) are the main source of today's
attacks, primarily against computer-based systems. The threat they
posetoAIS networks and mainframe computers is growing.
• Insiders are those individuals with legitimate access to an AIS. They
pose the most difficult threat to defend against. Whether recruited or
self- motivated, the AIS insider has access to systems normally
protected by I SS against an attack.
• Terrorists once had to operate in the immediate vicinity of a target to
gain access to or collect intelligence on that target. The proximity to
the target risked exposure and detection. Today, a terrorist can
accomplish most target selection, intelligence collection, and
preoperational planning by gaining access through a computer
network. He can increase his probability of success by using computer
systems to reduce his "time on target." Terrorist access to an Al S also
increases the threat of critical-data destruction or manipulation.
Although his presence would be virtual, the potential for damage to
Army systems could be equal to or greater than that achieved by
physical intrusion, especially when used as a force multiplier in
conjunction with a traditional terrorist attack. Therefore, while
traditional preventive measures are still needed to protect unwanted
access to information, the information age has added additional
concerns for the commander and new opportunities for those with
hostile intent.
• Non-state- and state-sponsored groups provide additional challenges.
In many cases, it is difficult to confirm state sponsorship of threat
activity against an AIS, no matter how apparent the affiliation might
seem. Activists of all persuasions are increasingly taking advantage of
information-age technology. Neither AISs nor ISS are immune from an
adversary's interest in exploiting US military information systems or
disrupting communication infrastructures. The availability of low-cost
technology and the proliferation of an AIS increase the risk to the
Army by potential adversaries.
• Foreign-intelligence services (FIS), both civil and military, are
continually active and are another source of contention concerning
information systems. In peacetime, they are increasingly targeted
against US commercial and scientific interests, rather than military
information. With little effort, this peacetime intrusiveness could
easily be refocused on Al Ss and I SS using a wide range of information
operations tactics.
1-2 Physical-Security Challenges
FM 3-19.30
• Political and religious groups are other potential adversaries to AISs
and ISS. The world's political climate is diverse and complicated. It
embraces traditional mainstream political values, as well as radical
religious fundamentalism and political extremism. When political or
religious viewpoints also incorporate anti-US sentiment, US
information infrastructures (including Al Ss) are increasingly at risk of
penetration or exploitation by these potential adversaries.
1-6. When considering an AIS, physical security is more than just
safeguarding the equipment. It includes the foil owing elements:
• Software is marked for each system and secured when not in use.
• I nitial logon is password-protected (at a minimum).
• Passwords are a minimum of eight characters, using a mixture of
letters and numerals.
• Access to an AIS is allowed only to authorized and cleared personnel
(per AR 380-19).
1-7. Classified material is entered and transmitted only on approved devices
with the following considerations:
• Approved classified devices are operated in a secured environment.
• Classified devices are secured in appropriate containers when not in
use.
• Securetelephoneunit-lll (STU-II I ) keys aresecured in an appropriate
safe when not in use (as outlined in AR 380-19).
1-8. Additional information regarding AISs can be found in ARs 380-5 and
380-19. Required training of personnel working with an AIS is located in AR
380-19.
OPSEC AND THE THREAT
1-9. OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and subsequently
analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other
activities. The threat is identified usi ng the factors of mission, enemy, terrain,
troops, time available, and civilian considerations (METT-TC). The threat
defines the physical -security challenges. Implementing physical-security
measures supports OPSEC. Providing soundproof rooms for conducting
briefings is a simple but invaluable measure.
1-10. Another issue to consider when evaluating physical-security challenges
is what actions to take in case of political implications interfering with
physical -security measures. In the devastating event at Khobar Towers, a
warning was given but not everyone received it. It took too long to evacuate
the building after the warning was issued because a cohesive plan was not in
place.
1-11. Commanders can minimize the challenges to physical security through
proactive measures. They should periodically change the physical -security
posture of thei r area of responsi bi I ity to throw off perpetrators.
Physical-Security Challenges 1-3
Chapter 2
The Systems Approach
Commanders must ensure that appropriate physical -security measures are
taken to minimize the loss of personnel, supplies, equipment, and material
through both human and natural threats. Commanders commonly exercise
those protective responsibilities through the provost marshal (PM) and/or
physical-security officer and the force-protection officer. The force-protection
officer must coordinate with several different agencies to complete his
mission. For example, the Army's I ntelligence and Counterintelligence
Program (see Appendix C) provides information that will be used to
complete the unit's crisis-management plan (see Appendix D).
PROTECTIVE SYSTEMS
2-1. The approach to developing protective measures for assets should be
based on a systematic process resulting in an integrated protective system.
The protective system focuses on protecting specific assets against well-
defined threats to acceptable levels of protection. The system is organized in-
depth and contains mutually supporting elements coordinated to prevent gaps
or overlaps in responsibilities and performance.
2-2. Effective protective systems integrate the following mutually supporting
elements:
• Physical protective measures, including barriers, lighting, and
electronic security systems (ESSs).
• Procedural security measures, including procedures in place before an
incident and those employed in response to an incident. (These include
procedures employed by asset owners and those applied by and
governing the actions of guards.)
• Terrorism counteraction measures that protect assets against terrorist
attacks.
2-3. The following determinations are made when considering system-
development procedures:
• The resources available.
• The assets to be protected.
• The threat to those assets.
• The risk levels applicable to those assets.
• The applicable regulatory requirements for protecting the assets.
• The applicable level of protection for those assets against the threat.
• Additional vulnerabilities to the assets (based on the threat).
The Systems Approach 2-1
FM 3-19.30
SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT
2-4. AR 190-51, DA Pamphlet (Pam) 190-51, and Technical Manual (TM)
5-853-1 are useful tcx)ls for developing protective systems using the systems
approach. The key to applying these tools successfully is to use a team
approach. A team may include physical-security intelligence, and operations
personnel; the installation engineers; and the user of the assets. It may also
include representatives from the multinational, host-nation (HN), and local
police as well as the regional security office from the embassy.
ASSETS
2-5. Protective systems should always be developed for specific assets. The
goal of security is to protect facilities and buildings and the assets contained
inside. The risk-analysis procedure in DA Pam 190-51 is used to identify
assets. This procedure is applied to all mission-essential or vulnerable areas
(MEVAs) according to AR 190-13. It represents the majority of assets with
which DOD is commonly concerned. These assets include—
• Aircraft and components at aviation facilities.
• Vehicle and carriage-mounted or -towed weapons systems and
components at motor pools.
• Petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL).
• Controlled medical substances and other medically sensitive items.
• Communication and electronics equipment; test, measurement, and
diagnostic equipment (TMDE); night-vision devices (NVDs); and other
high-value precision equipment and tool kits.
• Organizational clothing and individual equipment stored at central-
issue facilities.
• Subsistence items at commissaries, commissary warehouses, and
troop-issue facilities.
• Repair parts at installation-level supply activities and direct-support
(DS) units with authorized stockage lists.
• Facilities-engineering supplies and construction materials.
• Audiovisual equipment, training devices, and subcaliber devices.
• M iscellaneous pilferable assets (not included above) and money.
• Mission-critical or high-risk personnel.
• General military and civilian populations.
• I ndustrial and utility equipment.
• Controlled cryptographic items.
• Sensitive information (included in TM 5-853-1, but not included in DA
Pam 190-51).
• Arms, ammunition, and explosives (AA&E).
• I nstallation banks and finance offices.
RISK LEVELS
2-6. DA Pam 190-51 provides a procedure for determining risk levels—
assessing the value of the assets to their users and the likelihood of
2-2 The Systems Approach
FM 3-19.30
compromise. These factors are assessed by answering a series of questions
leading to value and likelihood ratings.
2-7. Asset value is determined by considering the following three elements:
• The criticality of the asset for its user and the Army as a whole.
• How easily the asset can be replaced.
• Some measure of the asset's relative value.
2-8. The relative value differs for each asset. For some assets, the relative
value is measured in terms of monetary cost.
2-9. The likelihood of the threat is assessed for each applicable aggressor
category by considering the asset's value to the aggressor, the history of or
potential for aggressors attempting to compromise the asset, and the
vulnerability of the asset based on existing or planned protective measures.
REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
2-10. The risk level is the basis for determining the required protective
measures for assets covered in AR 190-51. For each asset type, there may be
physical protective measures, procedural security measures, and terrorism
counteraction measures. These measures are specified by risk level. The
measures identified in AR 190-51 are the minimum regulatory measures that
must be applied for the identified threat level. The minimum regulatory
measures for AA&E are based on the risk category established in AR 190-11.
ANTITERRORISM/FORCE-PROTECTION CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS
2-11. In accordance with DOD Instruction 2000.16, the commanders in chief
(Cl NCs) have developed standards for new construction and existing facilities
to counter terrorism threat capabilities within the area of responsibility.
These construction standards have specific requirements for such measures as
standoff distance, perimeter barriers, building construction, and parking. The
DOD construction standard provides for minimum standards that must be
incorporated into all inhabited DOD structures regardless of the identified
threat. These standards provide a degree of protection that will not preclude
the direct effects of blast but will minimize collateral damage for buildings
and people and will limit the progressive collapse of structures. These
standards add relatively little cost, may facilitate future upgrades, and may
deter acts of aggression. (All services have adopted common criteria and
minimum standards to counter antiterrorismAorce-protection [AT/FP]
vulnerabilities and terrorism threats.) Protection to identified threat levels is
described in the following paragraphs. Physical-security personnel must be
familiar with theCI NC and DOD AT/FP construction standards because these
standards may affect elements of physical-security plans and how individual
facilities are secured.
THREAT IDENTIFICATION
2-12. The threat must be described in specific terms to help determine the
assets' vulnerabilities or to establish protective measures. This description
should include the tactics that aggressors will use to compromise the asset
(weapons, tools, and explosives are likely to be used in an attempt). For
The Systems Approach 2-3
FM 3-19.30
example, the threat might be described as a moving vehicle bomb consisting of
a 4,000-pound vehicle containing a 500-pound explosive. Another example
would be a forced-entry threat using specific hand, power, or thermal tools.
These types of threat descriptions (called the design-basis threat) can be used
to design detailed protective systems to mitigate the attacks. TM 5-853-1 and
DA Pam 190-51 contain procedures for establishing design-basis threat
descriptions in the format described above. These procedures can be used
together or separately. Threats listed in theTM will be summarized later in
this chapter. When using the TM as a lone source or in conjunction with DA
Pam 190-51, the following actions occur:
• When theTM process is used alone, the user goes through an identical
process to that in DA Pam 190-51 up to the point where the risk level
would be determi ned. In TM 5-853-1, the value and likelihood ratings
are used differently than in DA Pam 190-51. The likelihood rating is
used to determine the weapons, tools, and explosives that will be used
by a particular aggressor in carrying out a specific tactic. In this
procedure, higher likelihood ratings result in more severe mixes of
weapons, tools, and explosives. The assumption is that the more likely
the attack, the more resources the aggressor is likely to use in carrying
out the attack.
• When the procedure in TM 5-853-1 is used in conjunction with the
results of the DA Pam 190-51 risk analysis, the likelihood rating is
taken directly from the risk analysis and applied as described above.
LEVEL OF PROTECTION
2-13. The level of protection applies to the design of a protective system
against a specified threat (for example, a bomb, breaking and entering,
pilfering, and so forth). The level of protection is based on the asset's value
rating from either DA Pam 190-51 or TM 5-853-1. The level increases as the
asset's value rating increases. There are separate levels of protection for each
tactic. TM 5-853-1 provides detailed guidance on how to achieve the levels of
protection, and Chapter 3 of this manual provides a summary of the levels of
protection as they apply to various tactics.
VULNERABILITIES
2-14. Vulnerabilities are gaps in the assets' protection. They are identified by
considering the tactics associated with the threat and the levels of protection
that are associated with those tactics. Some vulnerabilities can be identified
by considering the general design strategies for each tactic described in TM
5-853-1 and as summarized in Chapter 3 of this manual. The general design
strategies identify the basic approach to protecting assets against specific
tactics. For example, the general design strategy for forced entry is to provide
a way to detect attempted intrusion and to provide barriers to delay the
aggressors until a response force arrives. Vulnerabilities may involve
inadequacies in intrusion-detection systems (IDSs) and barriers. Similarly,
the general design strategy for a moving vehicle bomb is to keep the vehicle as
far from the facility as possible and to harden the facility to resist the
explosive at that distance. Vulnerabilities may involve limited standoff
2-4 The Systems Approach
FM 3-19.30
distances, inadequate barriers, and building construction that cannot resist
explosive effects at the applicable standoff distance.
PROTECTIVE MEASURES
2-15. Where vulnerabilities have been identified, protective measures must
be identified to mitigate them. AR 190-13, AR 190-51, DA Pam 190-51, and
TM 5-853-1 are effective tools for developing protective measures. The key to
effective development of protective systems is a partnership between physical-
security personnel and the installation engineers. Appendix E of this manual
discusses information for office security, which should be listed in the
physical-security plan (see Appendix F). Appendix G discusses personal-
protection measures.
THE INTEGRATED PROTECTIVE SYSTEM
2-16. Protective systems integrate physical protective measures and security
procedures to protect assets against a design-basis threat. The characteristics
of integrated systems include deterrence, detection, defense, and defeat.
DETERRENCE
2-17. A potential aggressor who perceives a risk of being caught may be
deterred from attacking an asset. The effectiveness of deterrence varies with
the aggressor's sophistication, the asset's attractiveness, and the aggressor's
objective. Although deterrence is not considered a direct design objective, it
may be a result of the design.
DETECTION
2-18. A detection measure senses an act of aggression, assesses the validity of
the detection, and communicates the appropriate information to a response
force. A detection system must provide all three of these capabilities to be
effective.
2-19. Detection measures may detect an aggressor's movement via an I DS, or
they may detect weapons and tools via X-ray machines or metal and explosive
detectors. Detection measures may also include access-control elements that
assess the validity of identification (ID) credentials. These control elements
may provide a programmed response (admission or denial), or they may relay
information toa response force. Guards serve as detection elements, detecting
intrusions and controlling access.
2-20. Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) detection systems must be used
to measure and validate acts of aggression involving WMD. NBC detection
systems should also be used to communicate a warning.
DEFENSE
2-21. Defensive measures protect an asset from aggression by delaying or
preventing an aggressor's movement toward the asset or by shielding the
asset from weapons and explosives. Defensive measures—
The Systems Approach 2-5
FM 3-19.30
• Delay aggressors from gaining access by using tools in a forced entry.
These measures include barriers along with a response force.
• Prevent an aggressor's movement toward an asset. These measures
provide barriers to movement and obscure lines of sight (LOSs) to
assets.
• Protect the asset from the effects of tools, weapons, and explosives.
2-22. Defensive measures may be active or passive. Active defensive
measures are manually or automatically activated in response to acts of
aggression. Passive defensive measures do not depend on detection or a
response. They include such measures as blast-resistant building components
and fences. Guards may also be considered as a defensive measure.
DEFEAT
2-23. Most protective systems depend on response personnel to defeat an
aggressor. Although defeat is not a design objective, defensive and detection
systems must be designed to accommodate (or at least not interfere with)
response-force activities.
SECURITY THREATS
2-24. Security threats are acts or conditions that may result in the
compromise of sensitive information; loss of life; damage, loss, or destruction
of property; or disruption of mission. Physical-security personnel and design
teams must understand the threat to the assets they are to protect i n order to
develop effective security programs or design security systems. Historical
patterns and trends in aggressor activity indicate general categories of
aggressors and the common tactics they use against military assets. Aggressor
tactics and their associated tools, weapons, and explosives are the basis for the
threat to assets.
THREAT SOURCES
2-25. There are many potential sources of threat information. Threat
assessment is normally a military-intelligence (Ml) responsibility. Ml
personnel commonly focus on such security threats as terrorists and military
forces. Within the US and its territories, the Federal Bureau of I nvestigation
(FBI ) has primary responsibility for both foreign and domestic terrorists. The
FBI , the US Army Criminal I nvestigation Command (USACI DC [Cl D]), and
local law-enforcement agencies are good sources for physical-security
personnel to obtain criminal threat information. Coordinating with these
elements on a regular basis is essential to maintaining an effective security
program.
THREAT CATEGORIES
2-26. Security threats are classified as either human or natural. Human
threats are carried out by a wide range of aggressors who may have one or
more objectives toward assets such as equipment, personnel, and operations.
Aggressors can be categorized and their objectives can be generalized as
described below. (See DA Pam 190-51 and TM 5-853-1 for more information.)
2-6 The Systems Approach
FM 3-19.30
Aggressor Objectives
2-27. Four major objectives describe an aggressor's behavior. Any one of the
first three objectives can be used to realize the fourth. These objectives
include—
• I nflicting injury or death on people.
• Destroying or damaging facilities, property, equipment, or resources.
• Stealing equipment, materiel, or information.
• Creating adverse publicity.
Aggressor Categories
2-28. Aggressors are grouped into five broad categories— criminals, vandals
and activists, extremists, protest groups, and terrorists. Hostile acts
performed by these aggressors range from crimes (such as burglary) to low-
intensity conflict threats (such as unconventional warfare). Each of these
categories describes predictable aggressors who pose threats to military assets
and who share common objectives and tactics.
• Criminals can be characterized based on their degree of sophistication.
They are classified as unsophisticated criminals, sophisticated
criminals, and organized criminal groups. Their common objective is
the theft of assets; however, the assets they target, the quantities they
seek, their relative efficiency, and the sophistication of their actions
vary significantly. Vandals and activists may also be included under
this category.
• Vandals and activists are groups of protesters who are politically or
issue oriented. They act out of frustration, discontent, or anger against
the actions of other social or political groups. Their primary objectives
commonly include destruction and publicity. Their selection of targets
will vary based on the risk associated with attacking them. The degree
of damage they seek to cause will vary with their sophistication.
• Extremists are radical in their political beliefs and may take extreme,
violent actions to gain support for their beliefs or cause.
• Protesters are considered a threat only if they are violent. Lawful
protesters have to be considered, but significant protective measures
and procedures are not normally needed to control their actions. The
presence of extremists or vandals/activists at a peaceful protest
increases the chance of the protest becoming violent.
• Terrorists are ideologically, politically, or issue oriented. They
commonly work in small, well -organ! zed groups or cells. They are
sophisticated, are skilled with tools and weapons, and possess an
efficient planning capability. There are three types of terrorists—
CONUS, OCONUS, and paramilitary OCONUS.
■ CONUS terrorists are typically right- or left-wing extremists
operating in distinct areas of the US.
■ OCONUS terrorists generally are more organized than CONUS
terrorists. They usually include ethnically or religiously oriented
groups.
The Systems Approach 2-7
FM 3-19.30
■ Paramilitary OCONUS terrorist groups show some military
capability with a broad range of military and improvised weapons.
Attacks by OCONUS terrorists are typically more severe.
2-29. Natural threats are usually the consequence of natural phenomena.
They are not preventable by physical-security measures, but they are likely to
have significant effects on security systems and operations. They may require
an increase in protective measures either to address new situations or to
compensate for the loss of existing security measures. They may reduce the
effectiveness of existing security measures by such occurrences as collapsed
perimeter fences and barriers, inoperable protective lighting, damaged patrol
vehicles, and poor visibility. Natural threats and their effects relative to
security include the foil owing:
• Floods may result in property damage, destruction of perimeter fences,
and damage to I DSs. Heavy rains or snowfalls may have similar effects
even if they do not result in flooding.
• Storms, tornadoes, high winds, or rain may cause nuisance alarms to
activate and cause damage to I DSs. They may limit the visibility of
security personnel and may affect clos^-circuit television (CCTV)
systems. Winds may also disrupt power or communication lines and
cause safety hazards from flying debris.
• Earthquakes may cause nuisance alarms to activate or may disrupt
I DSs. They may also cause broken water or gas mains, fallen electrical
or communication lines, and weakened or collapsed buildings.
• Snow and ice can make travel on patrol roads difficult, may delay
responses to alarms, may impede the performance of I DSs, and may
freeze locks and alarm mechanisms. Heavy ice may also damage power
and communication lines.
• Fires may damage or destroy perimeter barriers and buildings,
possi bly leavi ng assets suscepti ble to damage or theft.
• Fog can reduce the visibility of security forces, thereby requiring
additional security personnel. It may also increase the response time to
alarms and reduce the effectiveness of security equipment such as
CCTV systems.
Aggressor Tactics
2-30. Aggressors have historically used a wide range of offensive strategies
reflecting their capabilities and objectives. These offensive strategies are
categorized into 15 tactics that are specific methods of achieving aggressor
goals (seeTM 5-853-1). Separating these tactics into categories allows facility
planners and physical-security personnel to define threats in standardized
terms usable as a basis for facility and security-system design. Common
aggressor tactics include—
• Moving vehicle bomb. An aggressor drives an explosive-laden car or
truck into a facility and detonates the explosives. His goal is to damage
or destroy the facility or to kill people. This is a suicide attack.
• Stationary vehicle bomb. An aggressor covertly parks an explosive-
laden car or truck near a facility. He then detonates the explosives
either by time delay or remote control. His goal in this tactic is the
2-8 The Systems Approach
FM 3-19.30
same as for the moving vehicle bomb with the additional goal of
destroying assets within the blast area. This is commonly not a suicide
attack. It is the most frequent application of vehicle bombings.
• Exterior attack. An aggressor attacks a facility's exterior or an
exposed asset at close range. He uses weapons such as rocks, clubs,
improvised incendiary or explosive devices, and hand grenades.
Weapons (such as small arms) are not included in this tactic, but are
considered in subsequent tactics. His goal is to damage the facility, to
injure or kill its occupants, or to damage or destroy assets.
• Standoff weapons. An aggressor fires military weapons or
improvised versions of military weapons at a facility from a significant
distance. These weapons include direct (such as antitank [AT]
weapons) and indirect LOS weapons (such as mortars). His goal is to
damage the facility, to injure or kill its occupants, or to damage or
destroy assets.
• Ballistics. The aggressor fires various small arms (such as pistols,
submachine guns, shotguns, and rifles) from a distance. His goal is to
injure or kill facility occupants or to damage or destroy assets.
• Forced entry. The aggressor forcibly enters a facility using forced-
entry tools (such as hand, power, and thermal tools) and explosives. He
uses the tools to create a man-passable opening or to operate a device
in the facility's walls, doors, roof, windows, or utility openings. He may
also use small arms to overpower guards. H is goal is to steal or destroy
assets, compromise information, injure or kill facility occupants, or
disrupt operations.
• Covert entry. The aggressor attempts to enter a faci I ity or a portion of
a facility by using false credentials or stealth. He may try to carry
weapons or explosives into the faci I ity. H is goals include those listed for
forced entry.
• Insider compromise. A person authorized access to a facility (an
insider) attempts to compromise assets by taking advantage of that
accessibility. The aggressor may also try to carry weapons or explosives
into the faci I ity in this tactic. H is goals are the same as those listed for
forced entry.
• Visual surveillance. The aggressor uses ocular and photographic
devices (such as binoculars and cameras with telephoto lenses) to
monitor facility or installation operations or to see assets. Hisgoal isto
compromise information. As a precursor, he uses this tactic to
determi ne i nformation about the asset of i nterest.
• Acoustic eavesdropping. The aggressor uses listening devices to
monitor voice communications or other audibly transmitted
information. Hisgoal is to compromise information.
• Electronic-emanations eavesdropping. The aggressor uses
electronic-emanation surveillance equipment from outside a facility or
its restricted area to monitor electronic emanations from computers,
communications, and related equipment. His goal is to compromise
information.
The Systems Approach 2-9
FM 3-19.30
• Mail-bomb delivery. The aggressor delivers bombs or incendiary
devices to the target in letters or packages. The bomb sizes involved are
relatively small. H is goal is to kill or injure people.
• Supplies-bomb delivery. The aggressor conceals bombs in various
containers and delivers them to supply- and material-handling points
such as loading docks. The bomb sizes in this tactic can be significantly
larger that thosein mail bombs. His goal is to damage the facility, kill
or injure its occupants, or damage or destroy assets. Appendix H
addresses the actions to take when a bomb is suspected.
• Airborne contamination. An aggressor contaminates a facility's air
supply by introducing chemical or biological agents into it. His goal is
to kill or injure people.
• V^feterborne contamination. An aggressor contaminates a facility's
water supply by introducing chemical, biological, or radiological agents
into it. These agents can be introduced into the system at any location
with varying effects, depending on the quantity of water and the
contaminant involved. His goal is to kill or injure people.
2-31. The aforementioned tactics are typical threats to fixed facilities for
which designers and physical -security personnel can provide protective
measures. However, some common terrorist acts are beyond the protection
that facility designers can provide. They cannot control kidnappings,
hijackings, and assassinations that take place away from facilities or during
travel between facilities. Protection against these threats is provided through
operational security and personal measures (see Appendices G and I), which
are covered in doctrine relative to those activities and are under the general
responsi bility of the Cl D.
TACTICAL ENVIRONMENT CONSIDERATIONS
2-32. When determining the assets and threats, the same considerations
should be given to the systems approach in the tactical environment as when
in the cantonment area. The same process of determining the assets, their risk
level, and any regulatory guidance apply. Identifying potential threats and the
level of protection required for the assets are necessary. Commanders and
leaders must also identify additional vulnerabilities and other required
protective measures. Commanders are not expected to have the same physical
protective measures due to the impact of resources, budget, location, and
situations.
2-33. Commanders must consider the various tactics used by aggressors and
use their soldiers' abilities to counteract these tactics. Considerations for
specific assets (such as military-working-dog [M WD] and explosive-ordnance-
disposal [EOD] teams and their abilities to detect and disassemble a bomb)
must be identified. Units must have the ability to improvise in a tactical
environment. Their training and resourcefulness will compensate for
shortcomings in the field.
2-34. The systems approach to security provides focus and integration of
resources. Protective systems are mutually supporting and systematically
developed to negate the threat. Commanders conduct an intelligence
preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and vulnerability assessments (VAs) to
determine risks. Security resources and measures are applied to mitigate
risks and to deter, detect, defend, and defeat the threat.
2-10 The Systems Approach
Chapter 3
Design Approach
Developing protective systems to protect assets depends on an effective
partnership between engineers and physical-security personnel. Physical-
security personnel need to understand the basic approaches the engineers
will take in laying out protective systems. Engineers must understand the
issues involved with ensuring that anything they lay out is compatible
with security operations and the operations of the asset users. The best
way to ensure a viable design is through teamwork. This chapter provides
a summary of the basic approaches to protecting assets against threats
(the design strategies). Understanding these strategies iscritical to being
an effective team member in developing protective systems.
DESIGN STRATEGIES
3-1. There are separate design strategies for protecting assets from each
tactic described in Chapter 2. There are two types of strategies associated
with each tactic— the general -design and specific-design strategies. The
general -design strategy is the general approach to protecting assets against
tactics. The specific-design strategy refines the general -design strategy to
focus the performance of the protective system on a particular level of
protection. (SeeTM 5-853-1 for more information.)
PROTECTIVE MEASURES
3-2. Protective measures are developed as a result of the general- and
specific-design strategies. These protective measures commonly take the form
of site-work, building, detection, and procedural elements.
• Site-work elements include the area surrounding a facility or an asset.
Technically, they are associated with everything beyond 5 feet from a
building. They can include perimeter barriers, landforms, and standoff
distances.
• Building elements are protective measures directly associated with
buildings. These elements include walls, doors, windows, and roofs.
• Detection elements detect such things as intruders, weapons, or
explosives. They include I DSs, CCTV systems used to assess intrusion
alarms, and weapon and explosive detectors. These elements can also
include the guards used to support this equipment or to perform
similar functions.
• Procedural elements are the protective measures required by
regulations, TMs, and standing operating procedures (SOPs). These
elements provide the foundation for developing the other three
elements.
Design Approach 3-1
FM 3-19.30
VEHICLE BOMBS
3-3. Vehicle-bomb tactics include both moving and stationary vehicle bombs.
I n the case of a moving vehicle bomb, the aggressor drives the vehicle into the
target. This is commonly known as a suicide attack. In a stationary vehicle
bomb, he parks the vehicle and detonates the bomb remotely or on a timed
delay.
GENERAL -DESIGN STRATEGY
3-4. Blast pressures near an exploding vehicle bomb are very high, but they
decrease rapidly with distance from the explosion. The design strategy for
these tactics is to maintain as much standoff distance as possible between the
vehicle bomb and the facility and then, if necessary, to harden the facility for
the resulting blast pressures. Barriers on the perimeter of the resulting
standoff zone maintain the required standoff distance. The difference between
moving and stationary vehicle-bomb tactics is that the aggressor using the
moving vehicle bomb will attempt to crash through the vehicle barriers; the
aggressor using the stationary vehicle bomb will not. Therefore, vehicle
barriers for the moving vehicle bomb must be capable of stopping a moving
vehicle at the perimeter of the standoff zone. For a stationary vehicle bomb,
vehicle barriers must mark the perimeter of the standoff zone, but they are
not required to stop the moving vehicle. They only need to make it obvious if
an aggressor attempts to breach the perimeter.
LEVELS OF PROTECTION
3-5. There are three levels of protection for vehicle bombs— low, medium, and
high. The primary differences between the levels are the degree of damage
allowed to the facility protecting the assets and the resulting degree of
damage or injury to the assets.
• Low. The facility or the protected space will sustain a high degree of
damage but will not collapse. It may not be economically repairable.
Although collapse is prevented, injuries may occur and assets may be
damaged.
• Medium. The facility or the protected space will sustain a significant
degree of damage, but the structure will be reusable. Occupants and
other assets may sustain minor injuries or damage.
• High. The facility or the protected space will sustain only superficial
damage. Occupants and other assets will also incur only superficial
injury or damage.
SITE -WORK ELEMENTS
3-6. The two primary types of site-work elements for vehicle bombs are the
standoff distance and vehicle barriers. The vehicle's speed must also be taken
into consideration.
Standoff Distance
3-7. The standoff distance is the maintained distance between where a vehicle
bomb is allowed and the target. The initial goal should be to make that distance
3-2 Design Approach
FM 3-19.30
as far from the target facility as practical. Figure 3-1 shows the distances
required to limit building damage to particular levels (including the levels of
protection described above) for a range of bomb weights. All bomb weights are
given in terms of equivalent pounds of trinitrotoluene (TNT), which is a
standard way of identifying all explosives regardless of their composition. The
example in Figure 3-1 is a building of conventional construction (common,
unhardened construction). Buildings built without any special construction at
these standoff distances will probably withstand the explosive effects.
Conventionally constructed buildings at standoff distances of less than those
shown in Figure 3-1 will not adequately withstand blast effects. (Refer toTM
5-853-1 for information on hardening buildings to resist a blast.) Do not allow
vehicles to park within the established standoff distances. Recognize that this
restriction can result in significant operational and land-use problems.
3-8. Exclusive Standoff Zone. When an exclusive standoff zone is
established, do not allow vehicles within the perimeter unless they have been
searched or cleared for access. The zone's perimeter is established at the
distance necessary to protect the facility against the highest threat explosive.
All vehicles should be parked outside the exclusive standoff zone; only
Design Approach 3-3
FM 3-19.30
maintenance, emergency, and delivery vehicles should be allowed within the
zone after being searched. Figure 3-2 shows an exclusive standoff zone.
3-9. Nonexclusive Standoff Zone. A nonexclusive standoff zone is
established in a location having a mixture of cars and trucks (with relatively
few trucks). A nonexclusive standoff zone takes advantage of aggressors being
able to conceal a smaller quantity of explosives in a car than they can in a
truck. Therefore, a nonexclusive standoff zone includes inner and outer
perimeters. The inner perimeter is set at a distance corresponding to the
weight of explosives that can be concealed in cars. The outer perimeter is set
at a distance associated with the weight that can be placed in trucks (refer to
TM 5-853-1). With these two perimeters, cars can enter the outer perimeter
without being searched but they cannot enter the inner perimeter. Trucks
cannot enter the outer perimeter, since it is established based on what they
can carry. Figure 3-3 shows a nonexclusive standoff zone. The nonexclusive
standoff zone provides the advantages of allowing better use of the parking
areas and limiting the number of vehicles that need to be searched at the
outer perimeter.
dg = exclusive standoff-zone distance
Figure 3-2. Exclusive Standoff Zone
3-4 Design Approach
FM 3-19.30
Figure 3-3. Nonexclusive Standoff Zone
Vehicle Barriers
3-10. Two types of vehicle barriers are used for vehicle bombs— perimeter and
active barriers. The type of barrier used for a moving vehicle bomb differs
from the barrier used for a stationary vehicle bomb. The barrier used for a
stationary vehicle bomb does not have to stop a vehicle's motion. The goal for
that barrier is to make anybody driving through the barrier noticeable. The
assumption is that the aggressor's goal in the stationary vehicle bomb is to
park the vehicle and sneak away without being noticed. Crashing through a
barrier would be noticeable. Barriers for the moving vehicle bomb need to stop
the vehicle's motion; they must be much more substantial.
3-11. Perimeter Barriers. Perimeter barriers are fixed barriers placed
around the entire perimeter of a standoff zone. Anything that presents a fixed
obstacle will work for the stationary vehicle bomb. Common applications
include chain-link fences, hedges made of low bushes, and high (over 8 inches)
curbs. Aggressors driving through such barriers are likely to be noticed.
Barriers capable of stopping moving vehicles include chain-link fences
reinforced with cable, reinforced concrete "Jersey barriers", pipe bollards,
planters, ditches, and berms. When barriers such as thej ersey barriers and
planters are used to stop moving vehicles, they must be anchored into the
ground to be effective. The cables in the reinforced fence also have to be
anchored into the ground or partially buried. Spaces between barriers should
Design Approach 3-5
FM 3-19.30
be no greater than 4 feet. Figure 3-4 shows common perimeter barriers for
stationary or moving vehicle bombs. Refer alsotoTM 5-853-1.
3-12. Active Barriers. Active barriers are placed at openings in perimeters
where vehicles need to enter or exit. These barriers must be able to be raised
and lowered or moved aside. For the stationary vehicle bomb, barriers can be
as simple as chain-link, pipe, or wooden gates that can be raised and lowered.
Aggressors crashing through any of these or similar obstructions will likely
draw attention. For the moving vehicle bomb, the barriers are heavy
structures and have many construction and operations considerations
Stationary vehicle-bomb barriers
n
■ High curb
fy.y'f.
Fence
TTTir
' '/'y'.y.
Moving vehicle-bomb barriers
Figure 3-4. Perimeter-Barrier Application
3-6 Design Approach
FM 3-19.30
asscxiated with them. These barriers may stop vehicles weighing up to 15,000
pounds and travelling 50 miles per hour. They commonly cost tens of
thousands of dollars (refer to TM 5-853-1). Some common active vehicle
barriers are shown in Figure 3-5. For temporary or deployed conditions, park a
vehicle across an opening and move it aside to grant access.
Speed Control
3-13. It is important to control the speed of a vehicle approaching a barrier
used for a moving vehicle bomb. The energy from a vehicle that a barrier must
stop increases as its speed increases. The energy also increases with more
weight, but the effect of speed is much greater. Therefore, decreasing the
vehicle's speed results in smaller and less costly barriers. The best way to
limit a vehicle's approach speed to perimeter barriers is to place or retain
obstacles in potential approach paths. The vehicles are forced to reduce speed
when going around these obstacles. The same principle applies for road
approaches. Placing obstacles in a serpentine pattern on the road forces a
vehicle to reduce its speed (see Figure 3-6, page 3-8). If the vehicle hits the
obstacles instead of going around them, they are still slowed down. Other
means to slow vehicles include forcing them to make sharp turns and
installing traffic circles.
Figure 3-5. Active Vehicie Barriers
Design Approach 3-7
FM 3-19.30
Figure 3-6. Serpentine Pattern
BUILDING ELEMENTS
3-14. Once the standoff distance is established and the site has been laid out,
the designers can select the building components necessary to protect the
assets against the threat explosives at the standoff distance. The building
components include the walls, roofs, doors, and windows. Detailed design
issues related to these building elements arecovered in TM 5-853-1.
V^^llsand Roofs
3-15. If the distances shown for the desired damage levels in Figure 3-1, page
3-3, cannot be enforced, the building's walls and roofs will need to be
strengthened. This can be achieved in new construction by using reinforced
masonry or reinforced concrete in the walls and reinforced concrete in the roof.
When the standoff distance is not available for existing construction, a more
detailed analysis may be required to determine what the explosion's impact
will be on the structure. When the construction is inadequate, more standoff
distance should be investigated or the engineers should apply specialized
techniques for retrofitting the construction to increase its strength.
Windows
3-16. Historically, glass fragments have caused about 85 percent of injuries
and deaths in bomb blasts. There are two basic approaches to mitigating the
effects of bomb blasts on glass— retrofitting the windows with film or curtains
and using blast-resistant glazing.
3-17. Retrofitting Windows One of the most common means of decreasing
the hazards from broken glass is to install fragment-retention film on the
glass. The film is a plastic (polyester) sheet that adheres to the window glass
with a special adhesive. The film does not strengthen the glass; but when the
glass breaks, it keeps the fragments from spreadi ng throughout the room. The
3-8 Design Approach
FM 3-19.30
glass fragments stick to the film, and the film either stays in the window
frame or falls into the room in one or more large, relatively nonhazardous
pieces instead of many small, lethal pieces. Another retrofit approach is to
install a blast curtain or a heavy drape behind the window. The curtain or
drape catches the glass fragments. The curtains are generally used with
fragment-retention film. Another retrofit technique is to use fragment-
retention film with a metal bar placed across the window. This "catcher bar"
catches the window. The designs for this and other types of retrofit devices are
complicated and require specialized engineering-analysis tools. The retrofit
techniques are generally thought of as providing a lower level of protection
than the glazing replacement techniques. For deployed locations, removing
the windows and covering them with plywood minimizes the danger.
3-18. Blast-Resistant Glazing. To achieve higher levels of protection, the
window glass must be replaced and the window frame should be reinforced.
Because of its expense, this procedure is generally limited to new construction
and major renovations. Special blast-resistant glazing and frames are
available that use either tempered glass or a plastic glazing (such as
polycarbonate). Another promising type of blast-resistant glazing is laminated
glass, in which several layers of common glass are adhered together with a
special interlayer. The resulting laminated construction is usually stronger
than common glass while retaining the same thickness. The interlayer acts
similarly to fragment-retention film. For deployed locations, a means of
minimizing the danger of windows is to remove them and replace them with
plywood.
Doors
3-19. Doors are another building component particularly vulnerable to an
explosive blast. Common metal and wood doors provide little resistance to a
blast. Thetwo ways to address the problem of doors is to install them in foyers
or to replace them. Glass doors or doors containing windows should be
avoided.
Foyers
3-20. Door hazards can be reduced by installing doors in foyers during
construction or by adding foyers to existing buildings. When a door is located
in a foyer and the outer door fails, the outer door flies into a wall instead of the
building's interior (see Figure 3-7, page 3-10). The inner door then has a
greater chance of remaining intact. This option generally provides a low level
of protection.
3-21. Another option is to replace the doors with specially constructed blast-
resistant doors and frames. These doors are commercially available and can
provide a high level of protection, but they are very expensive and heavy. The
doorframe must be made of the same type of material and provide the same
level of protection as the door.
DETECTION ELEMENTS
3-22. Detection elements for vehicle bombs are limited to the use of guards to
control access into standoff zones. The guards search vehicles seeking entry
Design Approach 3-9
FM 3-19.30
into the perimeter through an entry-control point. The recommended levels of
searches depend on the required level of protection (seeTM 5-853-1). Guards
can be stationed at entry-control points continuously, or they can be
summoned to an entry-control point when access is needed. The latter is
commonly the case for the inner perimeter of exclusive standoff zones where
only delivery and maintenance vehicles need access.
EXTERIOR ATTACK
3-23. An exterior attack is a physical attack using weapons such as rocks,
clubs, improvised incendiary devices (I IDs) such as Molotov cocktails,
explosives such as improvised explosive devices (lEDs), and hand grenades.
The explosives can be thrown at or placed near a facility's exterior. Examples
of I EDs for this tactic range from pipe bombs and hand grenades to briefcase-
sized explosives.
GENERAL -DESIGN STRATEGY
3-24. Because the exterior attack is directed at a facility's exterior surfaces,
the general-design strategy is to keep aggressors away from the facility (at a
standoff distance) and, if necessary, to harden the facility's exterior
components to resist the effects of weapons and explosives. A standoff distance
from the facility reduces the degree of hardening required to resist weapons
effects. When briefcase-sized bombs are a threat, an obstacle-free zone should
be established around the facility and the explosives placed within should be
detected and disarmed.
LEVELS OF PROTECTION
3-25. The levels of protection for exterior attacks are similar to those for
vehicle bombs. Levels of protection vary based on the level of building damage
and asset injury or damage allowed. However, due to the limited sizes of
explosives involved in this tactic, the damage to the building will be much
more localized and injuries or damage to assets will be confined to smaller
areas.
3-10 Design Approach
FM 3-19.30
SITE -WORK ELEMENTS
3-26. Site-work elements for exterior attacks are relatively limited because
the explosive weights are more limited. Large standoff distances are not a
consideration. The common approach to site-work elements is to lay out a
standoff zone of about 50 feet and to provide a fence or perimeter barrier
about 7 feet high. The purpose of the standoff is to make it harder for
aggressors to throw pipe bombs and hand grenades at targets inside the
perimeter. Trees can be left around the perimeter to make it harder for
aggressors to throw explosives over the fence. The remaining component of
site-work elements is a clear zone around the facility. A clear zone is applied
so that anything placed in that area can be detected visually. This limits the
aggressor's ability to place explosives near the target facility.
BUILDING ELEMENTS
3-27. Building elements for exterior attacks are similar to those for vehicle
bombs. For small lEDs and I IDs, the building-element requirements do not
increase the cost of the building significantly. For larger, briefcase-sized
bombs, the measures are more significant than for incendiary devices but less
than for vehicle bombs.
V^fellsand Roofs
3-28. Walls and roofs are not a problem with small explosives. Conventional
construction normally provides adequate protection. Walls with 6-inch
reinforced concrete or 8-inch, grout-filled, reinforced masonry will withstand
the effects of typical pipe bombs or hand grenades. The corresponding roof
construction is 6-inch reinforced concrete. I n the case of briefcase-sized bombs,
considerations similar to those discussed for vehicle bombs need to be
employed.
Windows
3-29. A significant goal when constructing windows is to make them difficult
to throw an explosive or incendiary device through, especially when
considering smaller explosives. This is accomplished by constructing smaller
windows or making narrow windows (see Figure 3-8, page 3-12). For existing
windows, parts of the windows can be covered to achieve a narrow effect.
These windows still may be susceptible to breakage due to explosive effects,
even from the smaller explosives. This problem is solved by installing 3/4-
inch-thick plastic (polycarbonate) glazing or by raising the windows over 6 feet
high to develop a small standoff distance (as shown in Figure 3-9, page 3-12).
A 3/4-inch glazing will also stop grenade fragments. Fragment-retention film,
a blast curtain, or a heavy drape as described in vehicle-bomb tactics are also
good applications for small bombs.
Conventionally Constructed Doors
3-30. Doors are not a significant problem with small bombs and incendiary
devices. Generally, metal doors are adequate for incendiary devices, and doors
placed in foyers (as shown in Figure 3-7) are adequate for pipe bombs and
hand grenades. A similar application for briefcase-sized bombs would provide
Design Approach 3-11
FM 3-19.30
level of protection, but blast-resistant glazing is required to achieve a higher
level of protection.
DETECTION ELEMENTS
3-32. Other than awareness of aggressor activity on or outside the site,
detection is only a specific design goal where briefcase-sized bombs are
anticipated. When that is the case, the clear zone around the building must be
visually monitored so that any objects placed in it are detected. At higher
levels of protection, visual surveillance is augmented by I DSs.
STANDOFF WEAPONS
3-33. The standoff-weapons tactic includes the use of AT weapons and
mortars. I n both of these tactics, the aggressor fires weapons at assets located
in the protected facility from a distance. An AT-weapon attack requires a clear
LOS to the target, while mortars can fire over obstacles and only need a clear
line of flight.
GENERAL -DESIGN STRATEGY
3-34. Standoff-weapons attacks cannot be detected reliably before they occur.
Protective design to resist these tactics relies on blocking LOSs to protected
areas of a facility or hardening the facility to resist the particular weapon's
effects. The approaches to protection against mortars and AT weapons differ
from each other and will be discussed separately. Detection measures are not
applicable for these tactics.
LEVELS OF PROTECTION
3-35. There are two levels of protection against both mortars and AT
weapons. For AT weapons, the low level of protection depends on detonating
the AT round before it hits the target facility. The high level of protection
avoids the risk associated with that and hardens the building to resist the
direct impact of the AT round.
3-36. For mortars, the low level of protection involves allowing some areas of
the facility to be sacrificed. Those spaces provide a buffer to the assets to be
protected. The assets within the sacrificial areas and the areas themselves
may be destroyed. At the high level of protection, the building's exterior fully
resists the mortar rounds and there are no sacrificial areas.
SITE -WORK ELEMENTS
3-37. The pri mary site-work element for standoff weapons is to obstruct LOSs
from vantage points outside of the site. With AT weapons, the aggressor
cannot hit what he cannot see. This is not true with mortars, but blocking
LOSs from mortar firing points helps to make targeting more difficult. The
LOSs are blocked by using trees, other buildings, vehicle parking areas, or
fences. Another site-work element, a predetonation screen, applies only to an
AT weapon. When using a predetonation screen, the AT round is detonated on
the screen and its effects are dissipated in the distance between the screen
and the target (see Figure 3-10, page 3-14). Any screen material (such as a
Design Approach 3-13
FM 3-19.30
Figure 3-10. Predetonation Screen
wooden fence) will detonate the round unless it has spaces in it. The screen
distances vary from less than 10 feet to almost 40 feet, depending on the
building construction (see TM 5-853-1). This measure only applies to the low
level of protection.
BUILDING ELEMENTS
3-38. Building elements for AT weapons and mortars involve the building's
layout. This includes the materials used in the construction.
Layout
3-39. A building's interior layout is only an issue for the low level of protection
against a mortar round. The layout issue involves designating sacrificial areas
in which unimportant assets are located. The assets to be protected are
located in a hardened interior layer. Figure 3-11 includes a plan view (from
above). The sacrificial area has to be both around and above the protected
area in case a mortar round comes from above. If such a layout is not feasible,
other options include going to a higher level of protection and either
hardening the entire building or building the facility underground (which are
both very expensive).
lA^ilsand Roofs
3-40. Walls and roofs must offer protection against both AT weapons and
mortar rounds. The design of walls that protect against AT weapons varies
with the level of protection. For the low level of protection where the round is
predetonated, the walls can be of conventional construction, varying with the
standoff distance from the predetonation screen to the wall. For higher levels
of protection, the walls must resist the full effect of the round, requiring the
walls to be 24-inch-thick reinforced concrete. Roofs are not an issue in
3-14 Design Approach
FM 3-19.30
Asset with 3 layers
Multiple assets with Multiple assets with
shared 2nd and 3rd layers shared 1st, 2nd, and 3rd
layers
Multiple assets with 3 Asset with shared
shared layers outer layer
Figure 3-11. Assets Protected by Hardened Interior Layer
protecting against AT weapons because it is difficult to get direct LOSs to
roofs. If such LOSs are possible, the roof should be designed I ike the walls.
3-41. To provide protection against mortar rounds, walls and roofs should be
designed to resist the explosive effects in the rounds at the standoff distance
that the sacrificial space provides. I n the case of sacrificial areas, the walls can
be of common construction. The interior protected-area walls are then
designed of rei nforced concrete or rei nforced masonry for the standoff distance
those sacrificial walls provide. When the walls must resist the full effect of the
rounds (as in the higher level of protection), they are likely to be very thick (up
Design Approach 3-15
FM 3-19.30
to 30 inches of reinforced concrete for some improvised mortars). Similar
considerations should be made for roofs. Roofs are designed to take the direct
effects of the round or to take the round at the standoff distance provided by
the sacrificial area.
Doors and Windows
3-42. It is impractical to provide doors and windows that are resistant to
mortar rounds and AT weapons. Windows should only be used in sacrificial
areas where there is a mortar threat. When there is an AT weapon threat,
windows can only be used where the round is predetonated. The windows
should be narrowed or raised to present a smaller target (see Figures 3-8 and
3-9, page 3-12). Doors should be placed in foyers (see Figure 3-7, page 3-10) for
protection against AT rounds and to achieve a low level of protection against
mortars. Blast-resistant doors are necessary to achieve a high level of
protection against mortar rounds.
BALLISTICS
3-43. I n a ballistics tactic, aggressors fire small arms at assets from vantage
points outside of the target facility's control. Ballistic attacks cannot be
detected reliably before they occur.
GENERAL -DESIGN STRATEGY
3-44. Protective measures to resist these tactics rely on blocking LOSs to
protected areas of a facility or by hardening the facility to resist the ballistic
effects. This strategy focuses on assets within buildings. Protecting people or
property in the open is difficult and can only be addressed through operational
measures. Detection measures are not applicable for this tactic.
LEVELS OF PROTECTION
3-45. There are only two levels of protection for this tactic. The low level of
protection depends on blocking LOSs to assets. This strategy assumes that the
aggressor cannot hit what he cannot see. The risk of an aggressor firing into a
building randomly and hitting something is what makes this the low level of
protection. The high level of protection involves hardening building
components to resist the ballistic effects. These strategies can bethought of as
either hardening or hiding.
SITE -WORK ELEMENTS
3-46. Site-work elements are of limited use for the ballistics tactic. When they
are appi ied, they are used to obstruct LOSs from vantage poi nts outside of the
site, which is consistent with the low level of protection. The LOSs can be
blocked using trees, other buildings, motor pools, or fences.
BUILDING ELEMENTS
3-47. Building elements are the principal means of protecting assets against a
ballistics attack. They can be applied to achieve either the low or high level of
protection.
3-16 Design Approach
FM 3-19.30
V^fellsand Roofs
3-48. Walls and rcx)fs are inherently opaque, so it is easy to achieve the low
level of protection (hiding) with them. Achieving the high level of protection
(hardening) for walls and roofs can be done within conventional construction
using reinforced concrete, concrete-masonry units (CMUs), or clay brick. The
material's required thickness is shown in Table 3-1. The thicknesses of CMUs
and clay brick are nominal, meaning they do not represent the actual
thickness of the material; they represent the thicknesses at which those
materials are commercially available. Steel plates (mild steel and armor steel)
and bullet-resistant fiberglass can be used to retrofit existing building
components that would not provide the needed bullet resistance.
Table 3-1. Required Thicknesses, in Inches
Ballistics Type
Reinforced
Concrete
Grouted
CMU*
Clay
Brick*
Steel Plate
Bullet-Resistant
Fiberglass
Mild
Armor
.38 special
2
4
4
1/4
3/16
5/16
9 mm
2 1/2
4
4
5/16
1/4
7/16
7.62 and 5.56 mm
4
6
6
9/16
7/16
1 1/8
7.62-mm AP
6 1/2
8
8
13/16
11/16
N/A
*Nominal thicknesses
Windows
3-49. Windows can include openings in walls and skylights, although
skylights are only an issue where there are LOSs to them. When skylights
require protection, treat them like windows. Achieving the low level of
protection (hiding) for windows requires making it difficult to see through
them, such as installing reflective film on the glass. An aggressor cannot see
through the windows during daylight while it is lighter outside than inside,
but he may see through them at night when the opposite might be true.
Drapes or blinds that can be closed at night address that vulnerability. To
achieve the high level of protection requires bullet-resistant window
assemblies. These are commercially available for a wide range of ballistics
types. They are purchased as manufactured-and-tested assemblies (including
glazing and frames, both of which are equally bullet-resistant). The glazing
materials and thicknesses and the framing details are proprietary to their
manufacturers. The manufacturers make them according to industry test
standards to ensure an effective product.
Doors
3-50. Doors without glass easily meet the requirements for the low level of
protection. Meeting the high level of protection requires the installation of
bullet- resistant door assemblies. Doors can be installed in foyers so that there
is no direct LOS into assets within the building (see Figure 3-7, page 3-10).
FORCED ENTRY
3-51. In the forced-entry tactic, an aggressor tries to forcibly gain access to
assets. He may use tools or explosives to breach building components or other
barriers.
Design Approach 3-17
FM 3-19.30
GENERAL -DESIGN STRATEGY
3-52. The genera I -design strategy for forced entry is to detect the aggressor
eariy in the forced-entry attempt and deiay him iong enough for a response
force to intercept him. The combination of detection and defensive measures
must provide sufficient time for a response force to intercept the aggressor
before he reaches the asset or before he escapes with it, depending on the
protective goais for the asset. The first goai wouid appiy where the asset is
likeiy to be destroyed or where access to it is not acceptabie. The second goai
wouid be appiied when the idea is to prevent it from being stoien.
LEVELS OF PROTECTION
3-53. Severai ieveis of protection appiy to forced entry. These ieveis vary in
terms of system design, deiay time, and response-force arrivai time.
SITE -WORK ELEMENTS
3-54. Site-work eiements do not normaiiy piay a major roie in protecting
against a forced entry. However, the site shouid be iaid out and maintained so
that an aggressor does not have a hiding piace nearby that wiii conceai his
attempts to break into the buiiding. Another site-work eiement is the
appiication of perimeter barriers, most common iy fences. Fences are effective
at dei ineating a boundary and at keeping honest peopie honest, but they are
i neffecti ve for prevent! ng a forced entry. The design strategy for forced entry is
based on delaying the aggressor, and any serious aggressor could climb a fence
in less than 4 seconds or can cut through a fence in less than 10 seconds.
Therefore, fences are not used as delay elements, but they are used to
establish boundaries and as platforms on which to hang sensors. The final
site-work consideration is securing utility-access ports such as manholes. If
there are utility tunnels through which aggressors can enter a building, those
accesses should be locked using padlocks or locking bolts.
BUILDING ELEMENTS
3-55. Building elements are the principal construction elements of a system
for protecting against a forced entry. The building elements are used to
provide delay. The process for designing to resist forced entry involves laying
out concentric "rings" of delay (called defensive layers). These defensive layers
can include the facility's exterior, interior rooms within that layer, and
containers within the interior rooms. The individual building components for
each of the layers (walls, doors, windows, floors, ceilings, and roofs) provide
thedelay time (see TM 5-853-1).
DETECTION ELEMENTS
3-56. For a protective system to be effective against a forced entry, the
aggressors must be detected at a point of adequate delay. Detection at that
point can be achieved by using an I DS. Once a sensor detects an aggressor, the
alarm annunciator communicates that event to security personnel, who then
dispatch a response force. The alarm can be assessed through a guard
response or via CCTV. Chapter 6 and TM 5-853-4 provide detailed discussion
of I DSs, CCTV systems, and other elements of ESSs.
3-18 Design Approach
FM 3-19.30
COVERT ENTRY AND INSIDER COMPROMISE
3-57. In the covert-entry tactic, an aggressor who is not authorized to be in
the facility attempts to enter using false credentials. In the insider-
compromise tactic, personnel with legitimate access to a facility try to
compromise an asset. The insider may or may not have legitimate access to
the asset itself. The purpose of the entry in either case can be to steal or
otherwise compromise the asset or to destroy it. In the latter case, the
aggressor may bri ng I E Ds or 1 1 Ds.
GENERAL -DESIGN STRATEGY
3-58. The general -design strategy for both the insider-compromise and covert-
entry tactics is to keep people from entering areas they are not authorized to
enter. For covert entry, aggressors are denied access to controlled areas. For
insider compromise, aggressors are denied access to assets within controlled
areas based on their need to have access to them. The general -design strategy
also includes detecting aggressors removing assets from protected areas and
detecting aggressors carrying tools, weapons, and explosives into protected
areas.
LEVELS OF PROTECTION
3-59. The levels of protection for these tactics address different issues,
depending on whether the aggressor's goal is to steal or otherwise compromise
an asset or to destroy it. When the goal is to steal or compromise an asset, the
levels of protection vary with the number and sophistication of the access
controls required to verify personnel access into a controlled area. When the
goal is to destroy the assets, the levels of protection vary with the amount of
damage the building (and the assets inside) are allowed to sustain and the
sophistication of detecting weapons or explosives at entry points.
BUILDING ELEMENTS
3-60. Building elements vary with an aggressor's goal. To protect against
theft or compromise of assets, building elements are used to establish and
maintain controlled areas into which only authorized personnel can enter. For
insider compromise, there may be an additional requirement that access be
further limited among personnel otherwise authorized access to the control led
area. That access is based on the need to have access to a specific asset. The
result is that the controlled area may be compartmentalized, and each
compartmentalized area may have separate access requirements. There are
no special construction requirements for these tactics if the goal is theft of
compromise. The only requirement is that the building elements of controlled
areas should provide enough resistance to require aggressors to force their
way through them to gai n entry and to provide evidence of the forced entry if
it is attempted. Forcing entry would be contrary to the aggressor's assumed
goal to be covert. In addition, a common design goal would be to limit the
number of entrances i nto control led areas because there wi 1 1 need to be access
control at each entry.
3-61. To protect against the destruction of assets, building elements are used
to shield assets from the effects of explosives goi ng off at access-control poi nts.
Design Approach 3-19
FM 3-19.30
The basic approach is to lay out areas at access points in which guards can
search for carried-in weapons, explosives, or incendiary devices. The
construction of that area is designed to limit damage to the rest of the building
if an explosive is detonated in that area. Those levels of damage are similar to
those discussed in relation to vehicle bombs. The walls and doors between the
access point and the protected area will be hardened, and the walls and doors
to the outside will be of lightweight construction so that they may fail and
vent the blast pressure away from the building. At the higher level of
protection, the access-control area is located in a separate facility and the
target building is hardened to resist an explosion in that separate facility.
DETECTION ELEMENTS
3-62. Detection elements for these tactics also vary based on the aggressor's
goal. For theft, the detection elements are mainly related to access control. For
destruction, the detection elements are used to detect weapons, explosives, or
incendiary devices.
3-63. The main detection elements for theft or compromise are access-control
devices. These can include procedural systems (such as guards checking I D),
mechanical systems (such as keyed or combination locks), or electronic entry-
control elements (such as electronic card readers, keypads, and biometric
devices). Chapter 6 provides detailed discussion of electronic devices. The
sophistication of these elements and the number used varies with the level of
protection. For example, achieving the higher levels of protection requires the
application of multiple forms of access-control elements such as a card reader
and an electronic keypad for electronic-entry control or a badge check and
badge exchange for a procedural system.
3-64. When destruction of the assets is the goal, detection is oriented toward
detecting weapons, explosives, or incendiary devices. At the lower levels of
protection, it is sufficient for guards to search for carried-in items. Achieving
higher levels of protection requires the application of such equipment as metal
detectors. X-ray machines, and explosive detectors.
SURVEILLANCE AND EAVESDROPPING
3-65. Surveillance and eavesdropping tactics include visual surveillance,
acoustic eavesdropping, and electronic-emanations eavesdropping. In these
tactics, aggressors remain outside of controlled areas and try to gather
information from within those areas. The tools used for these tactics include
ocular devices for the visual-surveillance tactic and listening devices and
electronic-emanations-eavesdropping equipment for the eavesdropping tactic.
GENERAL -DESIGN STRATEGY
3-66. The genera I -design strategy for these tactics is to deny aggressors
access to information assets. The kind of information (objects, operations, or
files; secure conversations; or electronically processed data) and how it can be
compromised differs for each tactic as do the specific protective strategies.
Therefore, each tactic is addressed separately.
3-20 Design Approach
FM 3-19.30
LEVELS OF PROTECTION
3-67. Each of these tactics has only one level of protection. Either one protects
or fails to protect against these tactics.
SITE -WORK ELEMENTS
3-68. Site-work elements play a minor role in protecting assets from all
surveillance or eavesdropping tactics. The main issue is to eliminate or control
vantage points from which aggressors can surveil or eavesdrop on assets or
operations. In addition, for the visual-surveillance tactic, a design goal can be
to block LOSS from vantage points. Items used to block LOSs include trees,
bushes, fences, and other buildings (see Figure 3-12).
BUILDING ELEMENTS
3-69. Building elements are the principal components of the protective
strategies for surveillance and eavesdropping tactics. For visual surveillance.
Design Approach 3-21
FM 3-19.30
the building elements must block LOSs from outside the building. Walls and
roofs perform this function effectively. Doors are only a problem when they
have windows in them or are made of transparent materials. When this isthe
case, they can be treated like windows or they can be placed in foyers so that
there are no direct LOSs through them. Windows can be treated with
reflective film and drapes or blinds as described in the ballistics tactics. When
there are LOSs through skylights, they should be treated like windows.
3-70. Building elements for acoustic eavesdropping relate to the construction
of areas (preferably separated from the building exterior) that minimize the
sound that can be transmitted through them. This requires specialized
construction that has a sound-transmission-coefficient (STC) rating. Walls,
floors, and ceilings can be constructed to achieve specific STC ratings using
conventional construction materials as described in TM 5-853-1. Doors and
windows that are STC rated are commonly manufactured and tested as
assemblies. This type of design and construction can be expensive.
3-71. Protection against electronic-emanations eavesdropping involves the
application of Terminal Electromagnetic-Pulse Emanation Standard
(TEMPEST) guidance, most of which is classified. The protection is based on a
TEMPEST assessment done for the Army by the US Army Intelligence and
Security Command (INSCOM) and on guidance in AR 380-19. The results of a
TEMPEST assessment will commonly lead to countermeasures from one or
more of the fol lowi ng categories:
• Follow information security policies and procedures recommended
during the assessments.
• Provide control led space both inside and outside the facility.
• Provide TEM PE ST-shielded equipment.
• Provide separation between electronic circuits that handle classified
information and those that do not. This is commonly called red/black
separation.
• Provide TEMPEST-shielded enclosures. This is specialized, metal-
shielded construction that is very expensive.
MAIL AND SUPPLY BOMBS
3-72. In mail- and supply-bomb tactics, aggressors place bombs in materials
delivered toa facility. Explosives used in supply bombs are significantly larger
(briefcase size) than those in mail bombs (pipe bombs or smaller). Mail bombs
are usually directed at individuals, while supply bombs may be used to target
larger numbers of people. These tactics assume that the facility containing the
asset has a mail-handling area or a supplies-handling and -receiving area.
These tactics do not apply if mail or supplies are handled and screened in a
different facility.
GENERAL -DESIGN STRATEGY
3-73. A bomb exploding within a building has more severe effects than the
same size bomb exploding outside of the facility because the blast pressures
cannot dissipate inside. Also, there is no standoff distance between the
explosive and the facility to mitigate blast effects. Thegeneral-design strategy
3-22 Design Approach
FM 3-19.30
for mail and supply bombs is to detect delivered bombs before they explode
and to harden the area where the explosion takes place. This minimizes the
damage to the remainder of the facility. Occupants and contents within the
mail room or supplies-handling area are likely to be killed or destroyed if an
undetected bomb explodes.
LEVELS OF PROTECTION
3-74. The levels of protection for mail and supply bombs are based on the
amount of damage allowed to the building and, therefore, the occupants of the
building. They also vary based on the sophistication of the detection measures
used.
BUILDING ELEMENTS
3-75. The purpose of building elements in relation to these bomb tactics is to
shield assets from the effects of explosives going off at supply areas, receiving
points, or mail rooms. The basic approach is to lay out either a mail room or a
supplies-receiving area in which people can search suspicious packages for
explosives or incendiary devices. Constructing this type of area will limit the
damage to the rest of the building if an explosive is detonated there. Those
levels of damage are similar to those discussed in relation to vehicle bombs.
Mail Rooms
3-76. Mail rooms should be located on the facility's exterior, away from any
critical assets. The walls and ceiling between the mail room and the
remainder of the building are hardened to keep the blast effects out of the
facility. The exterior walls and doors should be of lightweight construction so
that they may fail and vent the blast pressure away from the building. There
may be an explosives container in the mail room where suspicious packages
can be placed. I f the package explodes, the container will keep its effects from
causing damage or injury. The hardened construction will protect assets
outsideof the mail room if the explosion occurs outside of the container. Check
with EOD personnel to determine the local policy for using explosive
containers. At higher levels of protection, the mail room is constructed to
completely contain the effects of an explosion either through hardened
construction or by using a specialized construction called vented suppressive
shielding. Mail rooms should not have windows into protected areas. Doors
between the mail room and the rest of the building should be avoided, placed
in foyers, or replaced with blast-resistant doors, depending on the desired
level of protection.
Supplies-Handling Areas
3-77. Supplies-handling areas should also be on the building's exterior, away
from critical areas of the facility. Walls and doors between the handling area
and the protected area should be hardened, and the exterior walls and doors
should be of lightweight construction so that they may fail and vent the blast
pressure away from the building. There should be no windows between the
handling area and the protected area. At the higher level of protection, the
handling area is located in a separate facility and the target building is
hardened to resist an explosion in that separate facility.
Design Approach 3-23
FM 3-19.30
DETECTION ELEMENTS
3-78. Detection for these assets varies with the level of protection. At the
lower levels of protection, bombs are detected by inspection. As the level of
protection goes up, the sophistication of the detection increases. At the higher
levels of protection, equipment such as X-ray examining devices, metal
detectors, and explosives detectors can be used. Explosive-detection dogs are
an alternative to explosive detectors.
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION
3-79. When using chemical- and biological-contamination tactics, aggressors
introduce contaminants into the air or water supply to a facility or a group of
facilities. Both airborne and waterborne contaminants include chemical,
biological, and radiological agents. Aggressors may also forcibly enter a
facility to contaminate water or air using the forced-entry tactic.
GENERAL -DESIGN STRATEGY
3-80. Both chemical and biological agents are difficult to detect in water and
air supplies. Radiological agents are relatively easy to detect in water, but
they are not commonly included in water-quality examinations. It is unlikely
that all agents will be detected, so the general -design strategy for these tactics
is to filter out suspected airborne contaminants or to shut off suspected
waterborne contaminants. Also, because contaminants can easily be entered
into the environment from inside a facility, the strategy includes limiting
access to the facility (especially mechanical rooms, water intakes, and so
forth).
LEVELS OF PROTECTION
3-81. The levels of protection for each of these tactics differ only in the
frequency with which some protective measures are exercised. For the low
level of protection, they are exercised only in response to a known threat. I n
the high level of protection, they are exercised continuously.
SITE -WORK ELEMENTS
3-82. Site-work elements are only significant for waterborne contamination.
They include protecting water-treatment plants and water-storage structures.
This protection may include constructing perimeter barriers (such as chain-
link fences) and controlling access to the plant site. These measures are used
because most contaminants require quantities on the order of truckloads to
contaminate a water supply, so the focus of security is to keep such large
vehicles under control. The perimeter barriers do not need to stop the vehicles
because the assumption is that the aggressor wants to be covert. An overt act
would alert people to avoid the water supply.
BUILDING ELEMENTS
3-83. Building elements for both tactics include controlling access so that
aggressors cannot sneak in and plant devices in the building. Protection
against airborne contamination at a facility involves making elements of the
3-24 Design Approach
FM 3-19.30
air-handling system (including air intakes) inaccessible and laying out toxin-
free areas for people to be protected. A toxin-free area is an area in which the
internal air pressure is higher than the external air pressure. Therefore, if a
chemical, biological, or radiological device is set off outside, its contaminant
will not be able to penetrate the protected area. Achieving that "net positive
pressure" requires a significant air-handling system with air filters to filter
contaminants out of the air. It also requires an air-lock entrance into the area
so contaminants cannot enter through the door. At the low level of protection,
the filters and the air-handling system are only used in response to a credible
threat. At the high level of protection, that risk is not acceptable and the
filters are run continuously.
3-84. The building-element issues for waterborne contamination are limited
to providing protection against forced and covert entries into water-treatment
plants and water-storage areas. These methods have been previously
described. The only additional issue is the provision for alternative water
sources. If it is suspected or detected that the water is contaminated, a backup
water source should be in place (such as bottled water). For the high level of
protection, bottled water should always be used for drinking.
Design Approach 3-25
Chapter 4
Protective Barriers
Protective barriers are used to definethe physical limits of an installation,
activity, or area. Barriers restrict, channel, or impede access and are fully
integrated to form a continuous obstacle around the installation. They are
designed to deter the worst-case threat. The barriers should be focused on
providing assets with an acceptable level of protection against a threat.
OVERVIEW
4-1. Protective barriers form the perimeter of controlled, limited, and
exclusion areas. Utility areas (such as water sources, transformer banks,
commercial power and fuel connections, heating and power plants, or air-
conditioning units) may require these barriers for safety standards. Protective
barriers consist of two major categories— natural and structural.
• Natural protective barriers are mountains and deserts, cliffs and
ditches, water obstacles, or other terrain features that are difficult to
traverse.
• Structural protective barriers are man-made devices (such as fences,
walls, floors, roofs, grills, bars, roadblocks, signs, or other construction)
used to restrict, channel, or impede access.
4-2. Barriers offer important benefits to a physical -security posture. They
create a psychological deterrent for anyone thinking of unauthorized entry.
They may delay or even prevent passage through them. This is especially true
of barriers against forced entry and vehicles. Barriers have a direct impact on
the number of security posts needed and on the frequency of use for each post.
4-3. Barriers cannot be designed for all situations. Considerations for
protective structural barriers include the foil owing:
• Weighing the cost of completely enclosing large tracts of land with
significant structural barriers against the threat and the cost of
alternate security precautions (such as patrols, MWD teams, ground
sensors, electronic surveillance, and airborne sensors).
• Sizing a restricted area based on the degree of compartmentalization
required and the area's complexity. As a rule, size should be kept to a
minimum consistent with operational efficiency. A restricted area's size
may be driven by the likelihood of an aggressor's use of certain tactics.
For example, protecting assets from a vehicle bomb often calls for a
substantial explosives standoff distance. I n these cases, mitigating the
vehicle bomb would often be more important than minimizing the
restricted area to the extent necessary for operational efficiency.
Protective barriers should be established for—
■ Controlling vehicular and pedestrian traffic flow.
Protective Barriers 4-1
FM 3-19.30
■ Providing entry-control points where I D can be checked.
■ Defining a buffer zone for more highly classified areas.
■ Precluding visual compromise by unauthorized individuals.
■ Del ayi ng forced entry.
■ Protecting individual assets.
4-4. If a secured area requires a limited or exclusion area on a temporary or
infrequent basis, it may not be possible to use physical structural barriers. A
temporary limited or exclusion area may be established where the lack of
proper physical barriers is compensated for by additional security posts,
patrols, and other security measures during the period of restriction.
Temporary barriers (including temporary fences, coiled concertina wire, and
vehicles) may be used. Barriers are not the only restrictive element, and they
may not always be necessary. They may not be ideal when working with
limited or exclusion areas or when integrated with other controls.
4-5. Because barriers can be compromised through breaching (cutting a hole
through a fence) or by nature (berms eroded by the wind and rain), they
should be inspected and maintained at least weekly. Guard-force personnel
should look for deliberate breaches, holes in and under barriers, sand dunes
building up against barriers, and the proper functioning of locks.
FENCING
4-6. Three types of fencing are authorized for use in protecting restricted
areas— chain link, barbed wire, and barbed tape or concertina. The type used
for construction depends primarily on the threat and the degree of
permanence. It may also depend on the availability of materials and the time
available for construction. Fencing may be erected for other uses besides
i mpedi ng personnel access. 1 1 can i mpede observation, can serve as a means to
defeat standoff- weapon systems (such as rocket-propelled grenades [RPGs]),
and can serve as a barrier to hand-thrown weapons (such as grenades and
firebombs).
4-7. Generally, chain-link fencing will be used for protecting permanent
limited and exclusion areas. All three types of fencing may be used to augment
or increase the security of existing fences that protect restricted areas.
Examples would be to create an additional barrier line, to increase existing
fence height, or to provide other methods that effectively add to physical
security. It is important to recognize that fencing provides very little delay
when it comes to motivated aggressors, but it can act as a psychological
deterrent.
CHAIN LINK
4-8. Chain-link fence (including gates) must be constructed of 6-foot material,
excluding the top guard. Fence heights for conventional arms and ammunition
security must be 6 feet for standard chain-link, wire-mesh fencing. Chain-link
fences must be constructed with 9-gauge or heavier wire. They must be
galvanized with mesh openings not larger than 2 inches per side and have
twisted and barbed selvages at the top and the bottom. The wire must be taut
and securely fastened to rigid metal or reinforced-concrete posts set in
4-2 Protective Barriers
FM 3-19.30
concrete. It must reach within 2 inches of hard ground or pavement. On soft
ground, it must reach below the surface deep enough to compensate for
shifting soil or sand. Materials and construction must meet with the US Army
Corps of Engineers (USAGE) guide specifications shown in the USAGE
Standard (STD) 872-90 series. Weaknesses in the chain-link fence occur as a
result of weather (rusting) or failure to keep it fastened to the post that affects
the desired tightness. Damage to the fence and fence fabric may be the result
of allowing vegetation and trees to grow on or near the fence. The interaction
between the fence and the overgrowth often leads to fence damage and
reduces the integrity and continuity of the fence as a perimeter boundary and
barrier. The perimeter fence is the most obvious protective measure. A well-
maintained fence indicates that the asset owner is dedicated to physical
security.
BARBED WIRE
4-9. Standard barbed wire is twisted, double-strand, 13.5-gauge wire, with
four-point barbs spaced an equal distance apart. Barbed-wire fencing
(including gates) intended to prevent human trespassing should not be less
than 6 feet high and must be affixed firmly to posts not more than 6 feet apart.
The distance between strands should not exceed 6 inches, and at least one
wire should be interlaced vertically and midway between posts. The ends
must be staggered or fastened together, and the base wire must be picketed to
the ground.
BARBED TAPE OR CONCERTINA
4-10. A barbed-taped obstacle (BTO) is fabricated from 0.025-inch stainless
steel and is available in 24-, 30-, 40-, and 60-inch-diameter coils. The barbs
shall have a minimum length of 1.2 inches, and the barb cluster's width shall
be 1.21 inches. A BTO deploys tangle-free for fast installation. It may be
recovered and used again. Fifty feet (plus or minus 2 inches) can be covered by
101 coil loops. Handling barbed tape requires the use of heavy barbed-tape
gauntlets instead of standard barbed-wire gauntlets.
Barbed-Tape Concertina
4-11. Barbed-tape concertina (standard concertina barbed tape) is a
commercially manufactured wire coil of high-strength-steel barbed wire that is
clipped together at intervals to form a cylinder. When opened, it is 50 feet long
and 3 feet in diameter. When used as the perimeter barrier for a restricted area,
the concertina must be laid between poles with one roll on top of another or in a
pyramid arrangement (with a minimum of three rolls).
4-12. Reinforced barbed-tape concertina consists of a single strand of spring-
steel wire and a single strand of barbed tape. The sections between barbs of the
barbed tape are securely clinched around the wire. Each coil is about 37 1/2
inches in diameter and consists of 55 spiral turns connected by steel clips to
form a cylindrical diamond pattern when extended to a coil length of 50 feet.
One end turn is fitted with four bundling wires for securing the coil when closed
and each end turn is fitted with two steel carrying loops. The concertina extends
to 50 feet without permanent distortion. When released, it can be retracted into
a closed coil.
Protective Barriers 4-3
FM 3-19.30
4-13. When possible, a top guard should be constructed on all perimeter
fences and may be added on interior enclosures for additional protection. A top
guard is an overhang of barbed wire or tape along the top of a fence, facing
outward and upward at about a 45-degree angle. Placing barbed wire or tape
above it can further enhance the top guard. Top-guard supporting arms will be
permanently affixed to the top of fence posts to increase the overall height of
the fence by at least 1 foot. (Due to liability issues in some locations, the top
guards will not be allowed to face outward where the fence is adjacent to
public areas.) Three strands of barbed wire spaced 6 inches apart must be
installed on the supporting arms. The number of strands of wire or tape may
be increased when required. The top guard of fencing adjoining gates may
range from a vertical height of 18 inches to the normal 45-degree outward
protection but only for sufficient distance along the fence to open the gates
adequately. Bottom and top tension wires should be used in lieu of fence rails.
A concrete sill may be cast at the bottom of the fence to protect against soil
erosion. A bottom rail is used on high-security fences to prevent intruders
from lifting the fence.
Gates and E ntrances
4-14. The number of gates and perimeter entrances must be the minimum
required for safe and efficient operation of the facility. Active perimeter
entrances must be designed so that the guard force maintains full control.
Semiactive entrances, such as infrequently used vehicular gates, must be
locked on the inside when not in use. When closed, gates and entrances must
provide a barrier structurally comparable to their associated barriers. Care
must be afforded against the ability to crawl under gates. Top guards, which
may be vertical, are required for all gates.
Triple-Standard Concertina (TSC) Wire
4-15. This type of fence uses three rolls of stacked concertina. One roll will be
stacked on top of two rolls that run parallel to each other while resting on the
ground, forming a pyramid. In many situations, this fence has been used
effectively in place of a chain-link fence. (If perimeter fencing consists of TSC,
a top guard is not feasible.)
Tangle-Foot Wire
4-16. Barbed wire or tape may be used in appropriate situations to construct a
tangle-foot obstruction either outside a single perimeter fence or in the area
between double fences to provide an additional deterrent to intruders. The
wire or tape should be supported on short metal or wooden pickets spaced at
irregular intervals of 3 to 10 feet and at heights between 6 and 12 inches. The
wire or tape should be crisscrossed to provide a more effective obstacle. The
space and materials available govern the depth of the field.
AIRCRAFT CABLE
4-17. Although not used very often, aircraft cable can be used as a temporary
barrier. Refer to FM 5-34 for information required for determining the
barrier's strength. The barrier is created using wire rope. Clips are spaced six
times the diameter of the wire rope. Aircraft cable (deployed as described
4-4 Protective Barriers
FM 3-19.30
above or attached to a chain-link fence) can also be made to act as a barrier to
moving vehicles. To do so, the cable must be anchored into the ground at both
ends at about 200-foot intervals (seeTM 5-853-1).
UTILITY OPENINGS
4-18. Sewers, air and water intakes and exhausts, and other utility openings
of 10 inches or more in diameter that pass through perimeter barriers must
have security measures equivalent to that of the perimeter (seeTM 5-820-4).
Specific requirements of various openings are discussed below:
• Manhole covers 10 inches or more in diameter must be secured to
prevent unauthorized opening. They may be secured with locks and
hasps, by welding them shut, or by bolting them to their frame. Ensure
that hasps, locks, and bolts are made of materials that resist corrosion.
Keyed bolts (which make removal by unauthorized personnel more
difficult) are also available.
• Drainage ditches, culverts, vents, ducts, and other openings that pass
through a perimeter and that have a cross-sectional area greater than
96 square inches and whose smallest dimension is greater than 6
inches will be protected by securely fastened welded bar grilles (refer to
TM 5-853-3, Figure 8-1). As an alternative, drainage structures maybe
constructed of multiple pipes, with each pipe having a diameter of 10
inches or less. Multiple pipes of this diameter may also be placed and
secured in the inflow end of a drainage culvert to prevent intrusion into
the area. Ensure that any addition of grilles or pipes to culverts or
other drainage structures is coordinated with the engineers so that
they can compensate for the diminished flow capacity and additional
maintenance that will result from the installation.
OTHER PERIMETER BARRIERS
4-19. Buildings less than two stories high that form part of a perimeter must
have a top guard along the outside edge to deny access to the roof. When using
masonry walls as part of a perimeter barrier, they must be at least 7 feet high
and have a barbed-wire top guard. The top guard should be sloped outward at
a 45-degree angle and carry at least three strands of barbed wire. This will
increase the vertical height of the barrier by at least 1 foot.
4-20. Protect windows, active doors, and other designated openings by
securely fastening bars, grilles, or chain-link screens. Fasten window barriers
from the inside. If hinged, the hinges and locks must be on the inside. Building
elements that provide delay against forced entry have stringent requirements.
These elements should be designed according toTM 5-853-1.
SECURITY TOWERS
4-21. 1 1 is not acceptable to observe a peri meter from towers only. FI owever, al I
towers should be located to provide maximum observation and should be
constructed for protection from small -arms fire.
Protective Barriers 4-5
FM 3-19.30
4-22. Mobile towers are useful in some temporary situations such as a large,
open storage area where receiving and storing activities take place. All
facilities using towers must have a support force available for emergencies.
Tower personnel should be rotated at frequent intervals.
4-23. The height of a tower i ncreases the range of observation duri ng dayl ight
hours and at night with artificial illumination. However, during inclement
weather and during a blackout, towers lose this advantage and must be
supplemented by on-ground observation.
4-24. The following considerations should be made when planning for the use
of towers:
• Hardening the tower against small -arms effects by using sandbags,
salvaged armor, or commercially fabricated bullet-resistant
construction. This may require strengthening the tower supports,
which should be performed only under the supervision of an engineer.
The level of protection required must equate to the threat level
identified during the IPB or the military decision-making process
(MDMP). The best approach is to design for the worst identified threat
rather than to try and modify the tower at a later date on short notice.
• I nstal ling communications and alarm systems, both audible and visual
(primary and alternate).
• Using appropriate surveillance, target-acquisition, and night-
observation (STANO) equipment with the tower and perimeter
barriers being surveilled. Infrared (IR) items may be especially
valuable. Considerations for the selection and use of STANO
equipment must be made while evaluating the effects of perimeter
protective lighting.
• Providing security lighting for route protection to the tower. Security
lighting also allows for support of the guard force entering or exiting
the perimeter.
• Ensuring that the tower's height isdetermined according to the area of
observation.
• Ensuring that towers have overlapping, mutually supporting fields of
observation and fire.
• Providing towers with a backup fortified defensive fighting position, as
appropriate.
INSTALLATION ENTRANCES
4-25. The number of installation or activity gates and perimeter entrances in
active use should be limited to the minimum number required for safe and
efficient operations. When necessary, install vehicle barriers in front of vehicle
gates. Security lighting should be considered at entry points (see Chapter 5).
Refer toTM 5-853-1 for the application and selection of these barriers.
4-26. Plans to use guards for controlling entry to an installation or activity
must be predetermined based on the threat conditions (THREATCON). The
construction of the guard post must be included in the security plan.
4-6 Protective Barriers
FM 3-19.30
PERIMETER ENTRANCES
4-27. Active perimeter entrances should be designated so that security forces
maintain full control without an unnecessary delay in traffic. This is
accomplished by having sufficient entrances to accommodate the peak flow of
pedestrian and vehicular traffic and having adequate lighting for rapid and
efficient inspection. When gates are not operational during nonduty hours,
they should be securely locked, illuminated during hours of darkness, and
inspected periodically by a roving patrol. Additionally, warning signs should
be used to warn drivers when gates are closed. Doors and windows on
buildings that form a part of the perimeter should be locked, lighted, and
inspected.
ENTRY-CONTROL STATIONS
4-28. Entry-control stations should be provided at main perimeter entrances
where security personnel are present. Considerations for construction and use
should be based on the information outlined in USAGE STD 872-50-01.
4-29. Entry-control stations should be located as close as practical to the
perimeter entrance to permit personnel inside the station to maintain
constant surveillance over the entrance and its approaches. Additional
considerations at entry-control stations include—
• Establishing a holding area for unauthorized vehicles or those to be
inspected further. A turnaround area should be provided to keep from
impeding other traffic.
• Establishing control measures such as displaying a decal on the
window or having a specially marked vehicle.
4-30. Entry-control stations that are manned 24 hours each day should have
interior and exterior lighting, interior heating (where appropriate), and a
sufficient glassed area to afford adequate observation for personnel inside.
Where appropriate, entry-control stations should be designed for optimum
personnel ID and movement control. Each station should also include a
telephone, a radio, and badge racks (if required).
4-31. Signs should be erected to assist in controlling authorized entry, to deter
unauthorized entry, and to preclude accidental entry. Signs should be plainly
displayed and be legible from any approach to the perimeter from a
reasonable distance. The size and coloring of a sign, its letters, and the
interval of posting must be appropriate to each situation.
4-32. Entry-control stations should be hardened against attacks according to
the type of threat. The methods of hardening may include—
• Reinforced concrete or masonry.
• Steel plating.
• Bullet-resistant glass.
• Sandbags, two layers in depth.
• Commercially fabricated, bullet-resistant building components or
assemblies.
Protective Barriers 4-7
FM 3-19.30
VWVRNING SIGNS
4-33. A significant amount of warning signs should be erected to ensure that
possible intruders are aware of entry into restricted areas. Warning signs
augment control signs. They warn intruders that the area is restricted and
that trespassing may result in the use of deadly force.
4-34. Warning signs should be installed along the limited area's physical
barriers and at each entry point where they can be seen readily and
understood by anyone approaching the perimeter. In areas where English is
one of two or more languages commonly spoken, warning signs must contain
thelocal languagein addition toEnglish. The wording on the signs will denote
warning of a restricted area. The signs should be posted at intervals of no
more than 100 feet. They must not be mounted on fences equipped with
intrusion-detection equipment. Additionally, the warning signs prescribed in
AR 190-13 should be posted at all entrances to limited, controlled, and
exclusion areas. See Chapter 7 for more details.
OTHER SIGNS
4-35. Signs setting forth the conditions of entry to an installation or area
should be plainly posted at all principal entrances. The signs should be legible
under normal conditions at a distance not less than 50 feet from the point of
entry. Such signs should inform the entrant of the provisions (search of the
person, the vehicle, packages, and so forth) or prohibitions (such as against
cameras, matches, and lighters and entry for reasons other than official
business) that may be prescribed by the installation commander.
4-36. Signs or notices legibly setting forth the designation of restricted areas
and provisions of entry should be plainly posted at all entrances and at other
points along the perimeter line as necessary. The wording of these signs or
notices is prescribed in AR 190-13.
INSTALLATION PERIMETER ROADS AND CLEAR ZONES
4-37. When the perimeter barrier encloses a large area, an interior all-
weather perimeter road should be provided for security-patrol vehicles. Clear
zones should be maintained on both sides of the perimeter barrier to provide
an unobstructed view of the barrier and the ground adjacent to it. Roads
within the clear zone should be as close to the perimeter barrier as possible
without interfering with it. The roads should be constructed to allow effective
road barriers to deter motor movement of unauthorized personnel during
mobilization periods.
4-38. Clear zones should be kept clear of weeds, rubbish, or other material
capable of offering concealment or assistance to an intruder attempting to
breach the barrier. A clear zone of 20 feet or more should exist between the
perimeter barrier and exterior structures, parking areas, and natural or man-
made features. When possible, a clear zone of 50 feet or more should exist
between the perimeter barrier and structures within the protected area,
except when a building's wall constitutes part of the perimeter barrier.
Ammunition supply points (ASPs) will have clear zones 12 feet outside of the
ASP and 30 feet inside, and the vegetation will not exceed 8 inches (4 inches
4-8 Protective Barriers
FM 3-19.30
for high-threat and highly controlled areas). Refer to AR 190-11 and DOD
0-2000.12-H, Appendix EE, for further information.
4-39. When it is impossible to have adequate clear zones because of property
lines or natural or man-made features, it may be necessary to increase the
height of the perimeter barrier, increase security-patrol coverage, add more
security lighting, or install an intrusion-detection device along that portion of
the perimeter.
4-40. When considering the construction of a new site or perimeter, ensure
that the plans include a fence located well inside the property line, thus
permitting control of enough space outside the fence to maintain at least a
minimal clear zone. The following considerations apply:
• On a large installation (such as a proving ground), it is unreasonable to
construct an expensive perimeter fence and keep it under constant
observation. Such an installation is usually established in a sparsely
inhabited area. Its comparative isolation and the depth of the
installation give reasonable perimeter protection. Under these
circumstances, it is usually sufficient to post warning signs or notices,
reduce access roads to a minimum, and periodically patrol the area
between the outer perimeter and the conventionally protected vital
area of the installation.
• An alternative to erecting new or replacing old chain-link fence
involving an entire installation perimeter is to relocate or isolate the
sensitive area or item by—
■ Relocating the item within a safe perimeter.
■ Consolidating the item with other items.
■ Erecting a chain-link fence (regulations permitting) around
individual assets rather than the installation's perimeter.
ARMS-FACILITY STRUCTURAL STANDARDS
4-41. It is next to impossible to build a protective barrier that cannot be
penetrated by a human or heavy armor. Therefore, as opposed to protecting a
facility using only one barrier, enhance security by using a combination of
barriers to increase delay. Multiple barriers also cause aggressors to expend
more energy trying to breach all of the barriers. They also provide the
appearance of additional security and may further deter some aggressors.
4-42. The interest of security must be kept in mind when constructing walls,
ceilings, floors, and roofs. Facilities that house arms and ammunition are
constructed as security barriers in the interest of deterring and delaying
penetration. Construction guidelines for arms facilities are outlined in AR
190-11. AR 190-11 requires coordination with the engineer office, the safety
office, the provost marshal office (PMO), or the security-force office when
definitive drawings and specifications for new construction or upgrades or
modifications of AA&E storage structures are proposed. This coordinated
effort ensures that safety and physical -security requirements are met. AR
190-11 also addresses waivers and exceptions for AA&E storage structures, as
well as the requirements for a tactical (training or operational) or shipboard
environment. Waivers and exceptions are not discussed in this manual. The
Protective Barriers 4-9
FM 3-19.30
following guidelines are provided for securing AA&E in tactical and shipboard
environments:
• The criteria and standards for protecting AA&E will be developed by
the major Army command (MACOM) according to AR 190-11.
• The deploying commander will establish and enforce procedures for
securing deployed AA&E based on the assessment of the threat, the
objectives, the location, and the duration of the deployment.
• TheAAS(E in the tactical environment will be secured at all times.
• TheAAS(E will be under continuous positive control.
• Persons charged with the custody of AA&E will have the capability to
sound the alarm if a forceful theft is attempted.
• A response force will be available to protect the AA&E.
• A system of supervisory checks will be established to ensure that all
personnel comply with security measures. Supervisory checks of the
AAS(E holding area will be made to ensure that the AA&E being
guarded have not been tampered with.
• All officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), or civilian equivalents
will closely monitor the control of ammunition and explosives during
field training or range firing.
• Selection of personnel to perform guard duties at AA&E holding areas
will be closely monitored by commanders to ensure that only
responsible individuals are assigned duties.
4-10 Protective Barriers
Chapter 5
Physical-Security Lighting
Security lighting allows security personnel to maintain visual -assessment
capability during darkness. When security-lighting provisions are
impractical, additional security posts, patrols, MWD patrols, NVDs, or
other security means are necessary.
OVERVIEW
5-1. Security lighting should not be used as a psychological deterrent only. It
should also be used along perimeter fences when the situation dictates that
the fence be under continuous or periodic observation.
5-2. Lighting is relatively inexpensive to maintain and, when properly used,
may reduce the need for security forces. It may also enhance personal
protection for forces by reducing the advantages of concealment and surprise
for a determined intruder.
5-3. Security lighting is desirable for those sensitive areas or structures
within the perimeter that are under observation. Such areas or structures
include pier and dock areas, vital buildings, storage areas, motor pools, and
vulnerable control points in communication and power- and water-distribution
systems. In interior areas where night operations are conducted, adequate
lighting facilitates the detection of unauthorized persons approaching or
attempting malicious acts within the area. Security lighting has considerable
value as a deterrent to thieves and vandals and may make the job of the
saboteur more difficult. It is an essential element of an integrated physical-
security program.
5-4. A secure auxiliary power source and power-distribution system for the
facility should be installed to provide redundancy to critical security lighting
and other security equipment. During deployed operations, primary power
may not exist or may be subject to constraints or interruptions due to poor
infrastructure or hostile activity. Auxiliary power sources must be available
for critical electrical loads and must be secured against direct and indirect
fires as well as sabotage. If automatic-transfer switches are not installed,
security procedures must designate the responsibility for the manual start of
the source.
COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITY
5-5. Commanders determine perimeter lighting needs based on the threat,
site conditions along the perimeter, surveillance capabilities, and available
guard forces. Commanders ensure that security lighting is designed and used
to discourage unauthorized entry and to facilitate the detection of intruders
approachi ng or attempti ng to gai n entry i nto protected areas.
Physical-Security Lighting 5-1
FM 3-19.30
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
5-6. Security lighting usually requires less intensity than working lights,
except for ID and inspection at entry-control points. Each area of a facility
presents its own unique set of considerations based on physical layout,
terrain, atmospheric and climatic conditions, and security requirements.
Information is available from the manufacturers of lighting equipment and
from the installation's director of public works, who will assist in designing a
lighting system. This information includes—
• Descriptions, characteristics, and specifications of various lighting
fixtures, arc, and gaseous-discharge lamps.
• Lighting patterns of various fixtures.
• Typical layouts showing the most efficient height and spacing of
equipment.
• Minimum levels of illumination and lighting uniformity required for
various applications.
5-7. In planning a security-lighting system, the physical-security manager
considers the—
• Cost of replacing lamps and cleaning fixtures, as well as the cost of
providing the required equipment (such as ladders and mechanical
buckets) to perform this maintenance.
• Provision of manual-override capability during a blackout, including
photoelectric controls. These controls may be desirable in a peacetime
situation but undesirable when a blackout is a possibility.
• Effects of local weather conditions on lighting systems.
• Fluctuating or erratic voltages in the primary power source.
• Grounding requirements.
• Provisions for rapid lamp replacement.
• Use of lighting to support a CCTV system.
• Limited and exclusion areas. Specific lighting requirements are
referenced in AR 190-59 and TM 5-853-2. TM 5-853-4 provides
guidancefor facility applications that include CCTV cameras.
■ Lighting in these areas must be under the control of the guard force.
■ For critical areas (such as weapons storage areas), instantaneous
lighting with a backup source is required. Any period without
lighting in a critical area is unacceptable. Therefore, these areas
generally have a requirement for backup power (such as diesel-
engine generators, uninterrupted power supplies, and batteries) in
case of power loss.
■ Security-lighting systems are operated continuously during hours of
darkness.
■ Protective lights should be used so that the failure of one or more
lights will not affect the operation of the remaining lights.
• Lighting requirements for adjoining properties and activities.
• Restrike time (the time required before the light will function properly
after a brief power interruption).
5-2 Physical-Security Lighting
FM 3-19.30
• Color accuracy.
• Other facilities requiring lighting, such as parking areas.
PRINCIPLESOF SECURITY LIGHTING
5-8. Security lighting enables guard-force personnel to observe activities
around or inside an installation while minimizing their presence. An adequate
level of illumination for all approaches to an installation will not discourage
unauthorized entry; however, adequate lighting improves the ability of
security personnel to assess visually and intervene on attempts at
unauthorized entry. Lighting is used with other security measures (such as
fixed security posts or patrols, fences, and ESSs) and should never be used
alone. Other principles of security lighting include the foil owing:
• Optimum security lighting is achieved by adequate, even light on
bordering areas; glaring lights in the eyes of an intruder; and little
light on security-patrol routes. In addition to seeing long distances,
security forces must be able to see low contrasts (such as indistinct
outlines of silhouettes) and must be able to detect an intruder who may
be exposed to view for only a few seconds. H igher levels of illumination
i mprove these abi I ities.
• High brightness contrast between an intruder and the background
should be the first consideration when planning for security lighting.
With predominantly dark, dirty surfaces or camouflage-type painted
surfaces, more light is needed to produce the same brightness around
installations and buildings than when clean concrete, light brick, and
grass predominate. When the same amount of light falls on an object
and its background, the observer must depend on contrasts in the
amount of light reflected. His ability to distinguish poor contrasts is
significantly improved by increasing the illumination level.
• The observer primarily sees an outline or a silhouette when the
intruder is darker than his background. Using light finishes on the
lower parts of buildings and structures may expose an intruder who
depends on dark clothing and darkened face and hands. Stripes on
walls have also been used effectively, as they provide recognizable
breaks in outlines or silhouettes. Providing broad-lighted areas around
and within the installation against which intruders can be seen can
also create good observation conditions.
5-9. To be effective, two basic systems or a combi nation of both may be used to
provide practical and effective security lighting. The first method is to light
the boundaries and approaches; the second is to light the area and structures
within the property's general boundaries. Protective lighting should—
• Discourage or deter attempts at entry by intruders. Proper
illumination may lead a potential intruder to believe detection is
inevitable.
• Make detection likely if entry is attempted.
• Prevent glare that may temporarily blind the guards.
Physical-Security Lighting 5-3
FM 3-19.30
TYPES OF LIGHTING
5-10. The type of lighting system used depends on the installation's overall
security requirements. Four types of lighting units are used for security-
lighting systems— continuous, standby, movable (portable), and emergency.
5-11. Continuous lighting is the most common security-lighting system. It
consists of a series of fixed lights arranged to flood a given area continuously
during darkness with overlapping cones of light. Two primary methods of
using continuous lighting are glare projection and controlled lighting.
• The glare security-lighting method is used when the glare of lights
directed across the surrounding territory will not be annoying nor
interfere with adjacent operations. It is a strong deterrent to a
potential intruder because it makes it difficult to see inside of the area.
Guards are protected by being kept in comparative darkness and being
able to observe intruders at a considerable distance beyond the
perimeter.
• Controlled lighting is best when it limits the width of the lighted strip
outside the perimeter, such as along highways. In controlled lighting,
the width of the lighted strip is controlled and adjusted to fit the
particular need. This method of lighting may illuminate or silhouette
security personnel.
5-12. Standby lighting has a layout similar to continuous lighting. However,
the luminaries are not continuously lit but are either automatically or
manually turned on when suspicious activity is detected or suspected by the
security force or alarm systems.
5-13. Movable lighting consists of manually operated, movable searchlights
that may be lit during hours of darkness or only as needed. The system
normally is used to supplement continuous or standby lighting.
5-14. Emergency lighting is a system of lighting that may duplicate any or all
of the above systems. Its use is limited to times of power failure or other
emergencies that render the normal system inoperative. It depends on an
alternative power source such as installed or portable generators or batteries.
FENCED PERIMETERS
5-15. Fenced perimeters require the lighting specifications indicated in TM
5-853-2. Specific lighting requirements are based on whether the perimeter is
isolated, semi -isolated, or nonisolated.
• Isolated fenced perimeters are fence lines around areas where the
fence is 100 feet or more from buildings or operating areas. The
approach area is clear of obstruction for 100 or more feet outside of the
fence. Other personnel do not use the area. Use glare projection for
these perimeters and keep patrol routes unlit.
• Semi -isolated fenced perimeters are fence lines where approach areas
are clear of obstruction for 60 to 100 feet outside of the fence. The
general public or installation personnel seldom have reason to be in the
area. Use controlled lighting for these perimeters and keep patrol
routes in relative darkness.
5-4 Physical-Security Lighting
FM 3-19.30
• Nonisolated fenced perimeters are fence lines immediately adjacent to
operating areas. These areas may be within an installation or public
thoroughfares. Outsiders or installation personnel may move about
freely in this approach area. The width of the lighted strip depends on
the clear zones inside and outside the fence. Use control led lighting for
these perimeters. 1 1 may not be practical to keep the patrol area dark.
ENTRANCES
5-16. Entrances for pedestrians will have two or more lighting units providing
adequate illumination for recognition of persons and examination of
credentials. Vehicle entrances will have two lighting units located to facilitate
the complete inspection of passenger cars, trucks, and freight cars as well as
their contents and passengers. Semiactive and inactive entrances will have
the same degree of continuous lighting as the remainder of the perimeter, with
standby lighting to be used when the entrance becomes active. Gatehouses at
entrances should have a low level of interior illumination, enabling guards to
see approaching pedestrians and vehicles.
OTHER
5-17. Areas and structures within the installation's property line consist of
yards; storage spaces; large, open working areas; piers; docks; and other
sensitive areas and structures.
• Open yards (unoccupied land only) and outdoor storage spaces
(material storage areas, railroad sidings, motor pools, and parking
areas) should be illuminated. An open yard adjacent to a perimeter
(between guards and fences) will be illuminated according to the
perimeter's illumination requirements. Where lighting is necessary in
other open yards, illumination will not be less than 0.2 foot-candle at
any point.
• Lighting units are placed in outdoor storage spaces to provide an
adequate distribution of light in aisles, passageways, and recesses to
eliminate shadowed areas where unauthorized persons may hide.
• I Nominating both water approaches and the pier area safeguards piers
and docks located on an installation. Decks on open piers will be
illuminated to at least 1 foot -candle and the water approaches
(extending to a distance of 100 feet from the pier) to at least 0.5 foot-
candle. The area beneath the pier floor will be lit with small wattage
floodlights arranged on the piling. Movable lighting is recommended as
a part of the protective lighting system for piers and docks. The
lighting must not in any way violate marine rules and regulations (it
must not be glaring to pilots). Consult the US Coast Guard (USCG)for
approval of protective lighting adjacent to navigable waters.
WIRING SYSTEMS
5-18. The wiring circuit should be arranged so that failure of any one lamp
will not leave a large portion of the perimeter line or a major segment of a
critical or vulnerable position in darkness. Feeder lines will be placed
underground (or sufficiently inside the perimeter in the case of overhead
Physical-Security Lighting 5-5
FM 3-19.30
wiring) to minimize the possibility of sabotage or vandalism from outside the
perimeter. Another advantage to underground wiring is reduced effects from
adverse weather conditions.
MAINTENANCE
5-19. Periodic inspections will be made of all electrical circuits to replace or
repair worn parts, tighten connections, and check insulation. Keep fixtures
clean and properly aimed.
POWER SOURCES
5-20. Primary and alternate power sources must be identified. The following
is a partial list of considerations:
• The primary source is usually a local public utility.
• An alternate source (standby batteries or diesel -fuel -driven generators
may be used) is provided where required and should—
■ Start automatically upon failure of primary power.
■ Be adequate to power the entire lighting system.
■ Be equipped with adequate fuel storage and supply.
■ Be tested under load to ensure efficiency and effectiveness.
■ Be located within a controlled area for additional security.
CCTV-CAMERA LIGHTING REQUIREMENTS
5-21. TM 5-853-4 provides a detailed discussion of CCTV-camera lighting
requirements and guidelines for minimum lighting levels and lighting
uniformity. The following considerations apply when lighting systems are
intended to support CCTV assessment or surveillance:
• The camera's field of view.
• Lighting intensity levels.
• Maximum light-to-dark ratio.
• Scene reflectance.
• Daylight-to-darkness transitions.
• Camera mounting systems relative to lighting.
• The camera's spectral response.
• The cold-start time.
• The restrike time.
5-6 Physical-Security Lighting
Chapter 6
Electronic Security Systems
An overall site-security system is comprised of three major subelements—
detection, delay, and response. The detection subelement includes
intrusion detection, assessment, and entry control. An ESS is an
integrated system that encompasses interior and exterior sensors; CCTV
systems for assessing alarm conditions; electronic entry-control systems
(EECSs); data-transmission media (DTM); and alarm reporting systems
for monitoring, controlling, and displaying various alarm and system
information. Interior and exterior sensors and their associated
communication and display subsystems are collectively called IDSs.
OVERVIEW
6-1. Many Army and DOD regulations specify protective measures, policies,
and operations related to security. Although the regulations specify minimum
requirements, it is possible that more stringent requirements will be
necessary at specific sites. A designer will use a previously performed site
survey to determine which regulations apply and to determine whether
circumstances require more stringent measures. Refer to TM 5-853-4 for
additional detailed information.
6-2. AR 190-13 requires the use of a standardized ESS, if practical and
available. The receiving element must determine whether a standardized
system can meet the requirements and whether it is available. After
coordinating with the product manager for physical-security equipment to
verify that a standardized system is available, the associated MACOM can
issue approval to procure a commercial system in lieu of a standardized
system.
USE OF ESS
6-3. An ESS is used to provide early warning of an intruder. This system
consists of hardware and software elements operated by trained security
personnel.
6-4. A system is configured to provide one or more layers of detection around
an asset. Each layer is made up of a series of contiguous detection zones
designed to isolate the asset and to control the entry and exit of authorized
personnel and materials.
GENERAL ESS DESCRIPTION
6-5. An ESS consists of sensors interfaced with electronic entry-control
devices, CCTV, alarm reporting displays (both visual and audible), and
security lighting. The situation is assessed by sending guards to the alarm
Electronic Security Systems 6-1
FM 3-19.30
point or by using CCTV. Alarm reporting devices and video monitors are
located in the security center. The asset's importance will determine whether
multiple or redundant security centers are required and, ultimately, the
required sophistication of all elements in the ESS. Digital and analog data are
transmitted from local (field) interior and exterior locations to the security
center for processing. Reliability and accuracy are important functional
requirements of the data-transmission system.
ESS IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS
6-6. The ESS implementation process is shown in Figure 6-1. Implementing
an ESS is based on general requirements tailored to a site-specific mission
and physical profile. The process begins with a site survey that i ncl udes a top-
down view of basic needs and classic configurations that are tailored to such
site-specific characteristics as terrain, site geography, climatic conditions, the
type of asset, and priorities. This data is used to determine the hardware and
software requirements, taking into account the additional capacity that
should be factored into the design system for future expansion. Once the
requirements for an ESS have been identified, the user must determine
whether an existing standardized system is suitable for the application. (AR
190-13 outlines the process for gaining approval to use nonstandard
equipment.) The user must also secure funding for the equipment (refer to
Appendix J ). Depending on the current funding regulations, operation-and-
maintenance, procurement, or other funds may be required. For example,
operations and procurement. Army (OPA) funds may be required for IDS
devices; and operations and maintenance. Army (OM A) funds may be required
for installation items. A contract is normally awarded to procure and install
the equipment. The procurement or installation must be overseen. This may
be accomplished by reviewing submittals, inspecting the contractor's work, or
responding to the contractor's requests for information. Once the equipment is
installed, the acceptance-testing activities must be witnessed and verified.
Site conditions during acceptance testing affect the demonstrated detection
capability of an exterior IDS. As feasible, acceptance testing should be
designed to determine a sensor system's probability of detection (PD) under a
range of conditions. For some types of sensor systems, this may be as
straightforward as conducting both daytime and nighttime trials to
experience differences in temperature and solar heating. After the ESS has
been accepted, it must be operated and maintained throughout the remainder
of its life cycle. Planning for manpower to operate the system and forecasting
the funding and personnel to properly maintain the system is critical for
success.
ESS DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
6-7. A facility may require interior and exterior ESS elements, depending on
the level of protection required. The applicable regulations, threat, and design
criteria will define the ESS's general requirements. For an existing ESS,
hardware and software may need to be supplemented, upgraded, or
completely replaced. A site layout (in which all assets are identified and
located) is required. It is a useful design tool for such tasks as configuring the
DTM.
6-2 Electronic Security Systems
FM 3-19.30
Figure 6-1. Entry-Control System Configured With Distributed Control
6-8. The exterior and interior I DSs should be configured as layers of unbroken
rings concentrically surrounding the asset. These rings should correspond to
defensive layers that constitute the delay system. The first detection layer is
located at the outermost defensive layer necessary to provide the required
delay. Detection layers can be on a defensive layer, in the area between two
defensive layers, or on the asset itself, depending on the delay required. For
example, if a wall of an interior room provides sufficient delay for effective
response to aggression, detection layers could be between the facility exterior
and interior-room wall or on the interior-room wall. These would detect the
intruder before penetration of the interior wall is possible.
RESPONSE AND DELAY
6-9. When dealing with an ESS, the response time is defined as the time it
takes the security force to arrive at the scene after an initial alarm is received
at the security center. The total delay time is defined as the sum of all of the
barriers' delay times, the time required to cross the areas between barriers
after an intrusion alarm has been reported, and the time required to
accomplish the mission and leave the protected area.
6-10. An ESS's basic function is to notify security personnel that an intruder
is attempting to penetrate, or has penetrated, a protected area in sufficient
time to allow the response force to intercept and apprehend him. To
accomplish this, there must be sufficient physical delay between the point
Electronic Security Systems 6-3
FM 3-19.30
where the intruder is first detected and his objective. This provides delay time
equal to or greater than the response time (refer toTM 5-853-1).
6-11. When dealing with interior sensors, boundary sensors that detect
penetration (such as structural-vibration sensors or passive ultrasonic
sensors) provide the earliest warning of an attempted intrusion. This alarm is
usually generated before the barrier is penetrated. This gives the security
force advance notification of an attempted penetration, thus allowing the
barrier's delay time to be counted as part of the total delay time. Door-position
sensors and glass-breakage sensors do not generate an alarm until the barrier
has been breached; therefore, the delay time provided by the barrier cannot be
counted as part of the total delay time.
6-12. Volumetric motion sensors do not generate an alarm until the intruder
is already inside the area covered by the sensors. Therefore, if these sensors
are to be used to provide additional response time, additional barriers must be
placed between the volumetric motion sensors and the protected asset. Point
sensors, such as capacitance sensors and pressure mats, provide warning of
attempted penetration only if they detect the intruder before access is gained
to the protected area.
BASIC GUIDANCE
6-13. An I DS is deployed in and around barriers (as detailed in TM 5-853-1).
Voice communication links (radio, intercom, and telephone) with the response
force are located in the security center. Security personnel will man the center
and will alert and dispatch response forces in case of an alarm.
6-14. The barrier should always be deployed behind the IDS to ensure that
integrity is maintained against intruders. An intruder will then activate the
alarm sensor before penetrating or bypassing the barriers, thus providing
delay for alarm assessment and response. The delay time is the determining
factor in whether an assessment is conducted by dispatching a guard or by
observing the CCTV. Normally, an intruder can climb a fence before a guard
can be dispatched; therefore, a CCTV is usually required with an exterior I DS.
Barriers can be located ahead of an alarm sensor as a boundary demarcation
and can serve to keep people and animals from causing nuisance alarms by
inadvertently straying into a controlled area. These barriers provide no
additional response time because the barrier could be breached beforethe I DS
sensors could be activated.
6-15. Data for monitoring and controlling an ESS are gathered and processed
in the security center where the operator interacts with information from the
ESS components located at remote facilities. The ESS's alarm-annunciation
computer and its DTM line-termination equipment should be located in a
controlled area and provided with tamper protection. Supervisory personnel
should permit changes to software only, and these changes should be
documented. If redundant DTM links connect the central computer to the
local processor, diverse paths should be used to route these links.
6-16. The preferred medium for transmitting data in an ESS is a dedicated
fiber-optics system. It provides for communications not susceptible to voltage
transients, lightning, electromagnetic interference, and noise. Additionally,
6-4 Electronic Security Systems
FM 3-19.30
the fiber optics will provide a measure of communication-line security and
wide bandwidth for video signals and increased data-transmission rates.
ESS EFFECTIVENESS
6-17. An ESS has a degree-of-protection effectiveness that is based on its
probability of detecting intruders attempting to go over, under, around, or
through the physical-security system. The intruder may use forced-entry,
covert-entry or insider-compromise tactics. A well-designed system will
minimize the possibility of a successful penetration through covert entry or
insider compromise. Interior and exterior alarm sensors have a PD based on
the capability to detect an intruder passing through a sensing field. An
intruder disturbs the steady-state quiescent condition of a sensor for a finite
period. Sensors are designed to detect a person of minimum stature moving
within a specific range of speeds and distances from the sensor, and any target
outside of those parameters will probably not be detected. The PD for a
specific sensor is usually specified at 0.9 or greater, but the designer must be
aware that the PD is based on certain constraints and environmental
conditions.
6-18. Manufacturer specifications usually do not discuss environmental or
nuisance alarms that can be caused by climatic conditions (such as wind or
rain) or by the intrusion of animals (including birds). The alarm annunciation
is valid because the sensor's thresholds have been exceeded; however, the
alarm does not represent a valid penetration attempt. If the assessment
system is slow, the operator may not be able to determine the cause of the
alarm and must, therefore, treat an environmental or nuisance alarm as real.
6-19. Another type of false alarm is caused by electronic-circuit tolerances
being exceeded, resulting in the sensor's actuation. False alarms may also
result from improper installation of the sensor or from effects of other
equipment in the immediate area.
6-20. After an alarm is sensed and information is displayed in the security
center, the console operator must determine the cause of the alarm (intrusion,
nuisance, environmental, or false). Timely assessment is required when
determining its cause. For example, if an intruder scales a fence in 10 seconds
and runs 20 feet per second, the intruder will have overcome the barrier and
be 2,200 feet from the point of penetration in 2 minutes. To conduct an
accurate assessment of the alarm after 2 minutes, guards will have to search
an area of about 200 acres. A fixed-television camera properly located and
integrated with the alarm processor can assess the situation while the
intruder is still in the control led area.
6-21. For a CCTV camera to be effective, the area it views must be adequately
lighted. To correlate the alarms and cameras in a large system (more than 10
cameras) in a timely manner, a computer-based processing system must be
used to select and display alarms and camera scenes for the operator. A
complex ESS has the following basic components:
• I ntrusi on-detection sensors.
• Electronic entry-control devices.
• CCTV.
Electronic Security Systems 6-5
FM 3-19.30
• Alarm-annunciation system.
• DTM.
6-22. The intrusion-detection sensors are normally deployed in a series of
concentric layers. The overall PD improves with each added layer of sensors.
The layers (interior and exterior) should be functionally uniform; however,
their overall effectiveness and cost are different. The exterior zones
significantly differ from the interior zones due to the following considerations:
• The consistency of the PD.
• The PD.
• The cost per detection zone.
• The number of zones.
• The overall sensor coverage.
6-23. Exterior IDSs usually have PDs equal to those of interior IDSs.
However, exterior sensors are more likely to experience weather-related
situations that cause the system's PD to vary. Sensor phenomenology (passive
infrared [PIR], microwave radar, and so forth) determines which
environmental factors may alter the system's PD. The frequency of occurrence,
severity, and duration of a weather event jointly determine whether it
represents security vulnerability with the I DS in use. Typically, sophisticated
intruders will attempt their penetration and challenge an ESS under
conditions most favorable to themselves. Inclement weather (fog, snow, and
rain) affects the usefulness of CCTVs and security lighting such that the
capability for remote assessment of alarm events may be lost. Exterior I DSs
are not necessarily less likely to detect a penetration attempt during fog, rain
and snow; the effect of such site conditions on the IDS depends on sensor
phenomenology. For example, fence motion caused by rain impact may drive
the response of a fence-mounted sensor closer to satisfying the system's alarm
criteria, with the result that the margin of disturbance available to the
intruder is less. Also, certain buried sensors are more likely to detect an
intruder when the ground is wet because of rain or melting snow. Since
interior sensor systems are less influenced by environmental conditions, their
PD is typically more consistent than that of some types of exterior sensor
systems. Other considerations in comparing an interior and exterior ESS are
the cost, the number and size of detection zones required, and the detection
height.
• Because of environmental conditions, the exterior electronics must be
designed and packaged for extremes of temperature, moisture, and
wind. The result is that exterior electronic packages are more costly
than equivalent packages for interior applications.
• State-of-the-art exterior sensors do not detect penetration attempts
above the height of a fence (typically 8 feet). Fence-mounted sensors
are usually limited to this height because the fence fabric or poles are
used to support the sensor. For aboveground sensors in the controlled
area between the fences, the sensor's mounting brackets and posts
limit the detection height. In some applications of field sensors
(especially buried sensors), the detection height is no more than 3 feet.
For a facility, interior sensors can be deployed on walls, floors, or
ceilings, thus permitting complete protection of the asset.
6-6 Electronic Security Systems
FM 3-19.30
6-24. An interior ESS may be far less costly than that of a comparable
exterior ESS. This comparison indicates to the designer the value of selecting
and deploying a well-planned, well -designed, layered system. The basic rule in
overall design of an ESS is to design from the inside out; that is, layered from
the asset to the site boundary.
INTERIOR ESS CONSIDERATIONS
6-25. An interior ESS is typically deployed within a boundary in the
immediate vicinity of the asset being protected. If the interior ESS operates in
a controlled environment, its PD will be independent of any weather-induced
variation in exterior conditions. Also, the physical-security system's
effectiveness is enhanced by the interior barriers (walls, ceiling, and floor)
that inherently impose a longer delay than exterior barriers (fences and
gates).
6-26. Functionally, an interior asset should be viewed as being contained
within a cube with sensors protecting all six faces. Interior sensors can be
deployed at the cube's perimeter, in its interior space, or in the space
immediately outside of the cube.
6-27. If an increased level of protection is dictated by the threat, and if the
building is large enough, multiple layers of interior sensors may be deployed
for a given asset. A multilayered interior IDS will improve the overall PD.
Tamper protection and access-/secu re-mode capabilities must be considered
when planning and laying out interior sensors.
TAMPER PROTECTION
6-28. To minimize the possibility of someone tampering with circuitry and
associated wiring, all sensor-related enclosures must be equipped with tamper
switches. These switches must be positioned so that an alarm is generated
before the cover has been moved enough to permit access to the circuitry of
adjustment controls. I n addition, several types of sensors should be equipped
with tamper switches to protect against being repositioned or removed.
Security screens containing grid-wire sensors and vibration sensors that can
be easily removed from a wall are examples of sensors that require tamper
switches.
ACCESS/SECURE MODE
6-29. During regular working hours, many of the interior sensors must be
deactivated by placing the area in the access mode. For example, door-position
sensors and volumetric sensors in occupied areas must be deactivated to
prevent multiple nuisance alarms caused by the normal movement of people.
This can be done locally or remotely. With local control, a switch is used to
bypass or shunt alarm contacts when the sensor is placed in the access mode.
When done remotely, the security-center operator usually enters a command
that causes the processor software to ignore incoming alarms from those
sensors placed in the access mode. Flowever, when a sensor is placed in the
access mode, its tamper-protection circuitry must remain in the activated or
secure mode. During nonworking hours when the facility is unoccupied, all
sensors must be placed in the secure mode. Certain devices (such as duress-
Electronic Security Systems 6-7
FM 3-19.30
alarm switches, tamper switches, grid-wire sensors covering vent openings,
and glass-breakage sensors) should never be placed in the access mode. The
designer must ensure that selected sensors can be placed in an access mode (if
required) and that certain types of sensors (such as duress and tamper
switches) are configured so that they cannot be put in the access mode under
any condition.
EXTERIOR ESS CONSIDERATIONS
6-30. An exterior ESS is typically deployed at a site's boundary or some other
significant boundary such as the demarcation fence for a group of bunkers. An
exterior ESS has the advantage that it remains in the secure mode at all
times.
6-31. The ideal configuration for an exterior ESS is a rectangle or a polygon,
with all sides being straight. The ESS is located in and around barriers that
typically include a dual fence. The outside fence is used for demarcation, and
the interior fence is used to aid in detection and provide some delay. If dual
fences are not used, the sensors should be deployed on the fence or inside it.
DESIGN GUIDELINES
6-32. The general -design criteria of a perimeter IDS involves primarily the
selection and layout of exterior sensors that are compatible with the physical
and operational characteristics of a specific site. I mportant factors to consider
during the selection process include physical and environmental conditions at
the site, the sensor's performance, and the overall cost of the system. Refer to
TMs 5-853-1 and 5-853-2 for additional guidance on the requirements for and
placement of exterior sensor systems. Since exterior barriers provide very
little delay, exterior sensor systems generally do not provide a significant
increase in the available response time.
Physical and Environmental Considerations
6-33. Physical and environmental considerations are often the determining
factors for selecting exterior sensors. The site's characteristics can
significantly affect a sensor's operational performance, both in terms of PD
and the susceptibility to nuisance alarms. Exterior sensor systems should be
selected on the basis of the frequency and duration of weather-related periods
of poor detection capability. An exterior IDS may have an unacceptably low
PD during a particular weather event or site condition, yet otherwise be
superior to other IDSs in terms of good detection capability and a low
nuisance-alarm rate. It may be appropriate to select that IDS in spite of its
known vulnerability, precisely because the circumstances of its vulnerability
are known and precautionary measures can be taken at those times. The
overall performance of that IDS, together with its cost, may justify its
selection.
6-34. Weather and climatic conditions at a specific site can significantly
influence sensor selection. For example, I R detectors are not very effective in
heavy rain, fog, dust, or snow. Deep snow can affect detection patterns and
performance of both IR and microwave sensors. High winds can cause
numerous false alarms in fence-mounted sensors. Electrical storms can cause
alarms in many types of sensors and may also damage the equipment.
6-8 Electronic Security Systems
FM 3-19.30
6-35. Vegetation can be a significant cause of nuisance alarms. Tall grass or
weeds can disturb the energy pattern of microwave and both thermal I R and
near-IR beam-break sensors. Vegetation growing near electric-field sensors
and capacitance sensors can cause nuisance alarms. Large weeds or bushes
rubbing against a fence can produce nuisance alarms from fence-mounted
sensors. Large trees and bushes moving within the field of view of video
motion sensors can cause nuisance or environmental alarms. A clear area
must be established for exterior sensors. This area must be void of vegetation
or contain vegetation of carefully controlled growth.
6-36. Topographic features are extremely important. Ideally, perimeter
terrain should be flat, although gently sloping terrain is acceptable. Irregular
terrain with steep slopes may preclude the use of LOS sensors and make
CCTV assessment difficult. Gullies and ditches crossing the perimeter
represent a vulnerability to LOS sensors and may be a source of false alarms
(from flowing water) for buried line sensors. Large culverts can provide an
intruder with an entry or exit route across the perimeter without causing an
alarm. Likewise, overhead power and communication lines may permit an
intruder to bridge the perimeter without causing an alarm.
6-37. Large animals (such as cows, horses, and deer) can cause nuisance
alarms in both aboveground and buried sensors. Sensors sensitive enough to
detect a crawling or rolling intruder are susceptible to nuisance alarms from
small animals such as rabbits, squirrels, cats, and dogs. To minimize the
interference from animals, a dual chain-link-fence configuration may be
established around the site perimeter with the sensors installed between the
fences.
Sensor Performance
6-38. Exterior sensors must havea high PD for all types of intrusion and have
a low unwanted-alarm rate for all expected environmental and site conditions.
U nfortunately, no single exterior sensor that is presently available meets both
these criteria. All are limited in their detection capability, and all have high
susceptibility to nuisance and environmental conditions. Table 6-1, page 6-10,
provides estimates of PDs for various types of intrusions. Table 6-2, page 6-10,
lists the relative susceptibility of various types of sensors to nuisance and
environmental alarms.
Economic Considerations
6-39. Exterior sensor costs are usually given in cost per linear foot per
detection zone (typically 300 feet). These costs include both equipment and
installation. Fence-mounted sensors (such as strain-sensitive cable,
electromechanical, and mechanical) are generally less costly than stand-alone
and buried line sensors. Installation costs can vary significantly, depending on
the type of sensor. Table 6-3, page 6-11, provides a comparison of relative costs
for procuring and installing various types of exterior sensor systems. It should
be remembered that the sensor system's cost is only a portion of the total cost
for employing a perimeter IDS. Additional costs include fencing, site
preparation, CCTV assessment, and perimeter lighting.
Electronic Security Systems 6-9
FM 3-19.30
Table 6-1 . Estimate of PD by Exterior Sensors
Intruder Technique
Type of Sensor
Slow walk
Walking
Running
Crawling
Rolling
Jumping
Ui
c
o
c
c
Trenching
Bridging
Cutting
Climbing
Lifting
Fence mounted
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
VH
VL
L
VL
M/H
H
M/H
Taut wire
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
VH
VL
VL
VL
H
H
H
Electric field
VH
VH
VH
H
VH
VH
VL
L
L
N/A
N/A
N/A
Capacitance
VH
VH
VH
H
H
VH
VL
L
L
N/A
N/A
N/A
Ported cable
H
VH
VH
VH
VH
H
M
VH
L
N/A
N/A
N/A
Seismic
H
VH
H
M
M
M
L
M
L
N/A
N/A
N/A
Seismic/magnetic
H
VH
H
M
M
M
L
M
L
N/A
N/A
N/A
Microwave
H
VH
H
M/H
M/H
M/H
VL
L/M
L
N/A
N/A
N/A
IR
VH
VH
VH
M/H
M/H
H
VL
L
VL
N/A
N/A
N/A
Video motion
H
VH
VH
H
H
H
VL
L7M
M
N/A
N/A
N/A
VL = very low, L = low, M =
medium, H =
high, VH = very high, N/A =
: not applicable
Table 6-2. Relative Susceptibility of Exterior Sensors to False Alarms
Intruder Technique
Type of Sensor
Wind
Rain
Standing
water/runoff
Snow
Fog
Small animals
Large animals
Small birds
Large birds
Lightning
Overhead
power lines
Buried power
lines
Fence mounted
H
M
L
L
VL
L
M
L
L
L
VL
VL
Taut wire
VL
VL
VL
VL
VL
VL
L
VL
VL
VL
VL
VL
Electrio field
M
L7H
VL
M
VL
M
VH
L
M
M
L
VL
Capacitance
M
M
VL
M
VL
M
VH
L
M
M
L
VL
Ported cable
VL
M
H
L
VL
VL
M
VL
VL
M
VL
L
Seismic
M
L
L
L
VL
L
VH
VL
VL
L
L
M
Seismic/magnetic
M
L
L
L
VL
L
VH
VL
VL
H
M
H
Microwave
L
L
M/H
L/M
L
M/H
VH
VL
M
L/M
L
VL
IR
L
L
L
M
M
M
VH
L
M
L
VL
VL
Video motion
M
L
L
L
M/H
L
VH
VL
M
L
L
VL
VL = very low, L = low, M =
medium, H =
high, VH = very high
6-10 Electronic Security Systems
FM 3-19.30
Table 6-3. Exterior IDS Sensor Cost Comparison
Type of Sensor
Equipment
Installation
Maintenance
Fence mounted
L
L
L
Taut wire
H
H
M
Electric field
H
M
M
Capacitance
M
L
M
Ported cable
H
M
M
Seismic
M
M
L
Seismic/magnetic
H
M
L
Microwave
M
M
L
IR
M
L
M
Video motion
M
L
M
L = low, M = medium, H = high
PERIMETER LAYOUT AND ZONING
6-40. A protected area's perimeter is usually defined by an enclosing wall or
fence or a natural barrier such as water. For exterior sensors to be effective,
the perimeter around which they are to be deployed must be precisely defined.
In most applications, a dual chai n-l I nk-fence configuration will be established
around the perimeter. Typically, fences should be between 30 and 50 feet
apart; as the distance increases, it is harder for an intruder to bridge the
fences. If fence separation is less than 30 feet, some microwave and ported-
coax sensors cannot be used. The area between fences (called the controlled
area or isolation zone) may need to be cleared of vegetation and graded,
depending on the type of sensor used. Proper drainage is required to preclude
standing water and to prevent the formation of gullies caused by running
water after a heavy rain or melting snow. Cleared areas are required inside
and outside of the controlled area. These areas enhance routine observation,
as well as sensor-alarm assessment, and minimize the protective cover
availableto a would-be intruder.
6-41. After the perimeter has been defined, the next step is to divide it into
specific detection zones. The length of each detection zone is determined by
evaluating the contour, the existing terrain, and the operational activities
along the perimeter. Detection zones should be long and straight to minimize
the number of sensors or cameras necessary and to aid guard assessment if
cameras are not used. It may be more economical to straighten an existing
fence line than to create numerous detection zones in accommodating a
crooked fence line. If the perimeter is hilly and LOS sensors or CCTV
assessment are used, the length of individual detection zones will be
commensurate with sensor limitations. Entry points for personnel and
vehicles must be configured as independent zones. This enables deactivation
of the sensors in these zones; that is, placing them in the access mode during
customary working hours (assuming the entry points are manned) without
having to deactivate adjacent areas.
6-42. The specific length of individual zones can vary around the perimeter.
Although specific manufacturers may advertise maximum zone lengths
Electronic Security Systems 6-11
FM 3-19.30
exceeding 1,000 feet, it is not practical to exceed a zone length of 300 feet. If
the zone is longer, it will be difficult for an operator using CCTV assessment
or for the response force to identify the location of an intrusion or the cause of
a false alarm.
6-43. When establishing zones using multiple sensors, the designer should
establish coincident zones where the length and location of each individual
sensor will be identical for all sensors within a given zone. If an alarm occurs
in a specific zone, the operator can readily determine its approximate location
by referring to a map of the perimeter. This also minimizes the number of
CCTV cameras required for assessment and simplifies the interface between
the alarm-annunciation system and the CCTV switching system.
ESS ALARM-ANNUNCIATION SYSTEM
6-44. Status information from the various intrusion-detection sensors and
entry-control terminal devices must be collected from the field and
transmitted to the alarm-annunciation system in the security center, where it
is processed, annunciated, and acted on by security personnel. The alarm-
annunciation system may also interface with a CCTV system. There are
typically two types of alarm-annunciation configurations available. The
simplest configuration, which is suitable for small installations, is the point-
to-point configuration. With this configuration, a separate transmission line is
routed from the protected area to the security center (see Figure 6-2). The
J oint-Service I nterior I ntrusion-Detection System (J -SI I DS) is typical of this
type of configuration but will not be further discussed in this manual. The
second, and more popular type, is a digital multiplexed configuration that
allows multiple protected areas to communicate with the security center over
a common data line. A block diagram of a typical multiplexed alarm-
annunciation system is shown in Figure 6-3.
IDS alarm
IDS sensors annunciation
Figure 6-2. Typical Point-to-Point IDS
6-12 Electronic Security Systems
FM 3-19.30
ALARM-ANNUNCIATION CONFIGURATION
6-45. A blcxk diagram of a typical alarm-annunciation system is shown in
Figure 6-4, page 6-14. As shown in the figure, the central computer is the hub
of the information flow. The central computer receives and displays alarm and
device status information and sends operator-control commands to the ESS's
local processors. It also interfaces with the CCTV system. For larger facilities,
the management of the DTM communications tasks may be delegated to a
separate communication processor so that the central computer can turn its
full attention to interpreting the incoming information and updating the
control and display devices located at the security console (display, logging,
control, and storage devices).
6-46. The central computer may consist of one or more digital computers. The
real-time clock is usually integral to the central computer and provides a time
stamp for alarms and other events. It allows for time synchronization with the
CCTV and other systems, if included. The console operator must beabletoset
the clock, which should include a battery backup. All system events must be
properly time-correlated. For example, there will be an exact time correlation
for an ESS alarm event reported on the alarm printer and the corresponding
video scene recorded by the CCTV's video processor.
DATASTORAGE
6-47. Computer-based systems are required to store large amounts of
information such as system software, application programs, data structures,
and system events (alarm transactions and status changes). Therefore, a large
amount of nonvolatile memory is required. The semiconductor memory
provided with a central computer is designed for rapid storage and retrieval
Electronic Security Systems 6-13
FM 3-19.30
Figure 6-4. Typical IDS Alarm-Annunciation System
and possesses extremely fast access times. The most commonly used media for
archival storage are magnetic tape; compact-disk, read-only memory (CD-
ROM); and magnetic disk. These media are capable of economically storing
large amounts of data.
OPERATOR INTERFACE
6-48. The operator interacts with the alarm-annunciation system through
devices that can be seen, heard, or touched and manipulated. Visual displays
and printers can be used to inform the operator of an alarm or the equipment's
status. Audible devices are used to alert an operator to an alarm or the
equipment's failure. Devices such as push buttons and keyboards permit an
operator to acknowledge and reset alarms, as well as change operational
parameters.
6-14 Electronic Security Systems
FM 3-19.30
• Visual displays. The type of display used to inform the operator
visually of the ESS's status is determined primarily by the system's
complexity. Status information is usually displayed on monitors.
Alphanumeric displays and map displays are seldom used. Monitors
provide great flexibility in the type and format of alarm information
that may be displayed. Both text and graphic information can be
displayed in a variety of colors. Multiple alarms may also be displayed.
I f alarms are prioritized, higher-priority alarms may be highi ighted by
blinking, by using bold print or reverse video, or by changing colors. To
assist the operator in determining the correct response, alarm-specific
instructions may be displayed adjacent to the alarm information.
• Audible alarm devices. I n conjunction with the visual display of an
alarm, the alarm-annunciation system must also generate an audible
alarm. The audible alarm may be produced by the ringing of a bell or
by the generation of a steady or pulsating tone from an electronic
device. I n any case, the audible alarm serves to attract the operator's
attention to the visual-alarm display. A silence switch is usually
provided to allow the operator to silence the bell or tone before actually
resetting the alarm.
• Logging devices. All alarm-system activity (such as a change of
access/secure status, an alarm event, an entry-control transaction, or a
trouble event) should be logged and recorded. Logged information is
important not only for security personnel investigating an event, but
also for maintenance personnel checking equipment performance for
such causes as false and nuisance alarms. Most alarm-annunciation
systems are equipped with logging and alarm printers.
• Alarm printers. Alarm printers are typically of the high-speed,
continuous-feed variety. The printer provides a hard-copy record of all
alarm events and system activity, as well as limited backup in case the
visual display fails.
• Report printers. Most ESSs include a separate printer (report
printer) for generating reports using information stored by the central
computer. This printer will usually be typical of those found in modern
off i ce en vi ron ments.
• Operator control. A means is required to transmit information from
the operator to the system. The type of controls provided usually
depends on the type of display provided. The following are consistent
with the controls:
■ Keypads consist of a numeric display system that will generally be
provided with a 12-digit keypad and several function keys such as
access, secure, acknowledge, and reset. The keypad enables an
operator to key in numeric requests for the status of specific zones.
■ Monitor-based systems are usually provided with a typewriter-type
keyboard that enables an operator to enter more information using a
combination of alphanumeric characters and function keys.
■ An ESS may be equipped with enhancement hardware/devices to
help the operator enter information or execute commands quickly. A
mouse or a trackball are typical examples.
Electronic Security Systems 6-15
FM 3-19.30
FIELD-DATA COLLECTION
6-49. Sensor and terminal device data must be transmitted to the central
alarm monitor located in the security center using a selected DTM. The
following are DTM methods that may be used:
Local Processors
6-50. Multiplexing techniques can be used to minimize the number of data
links needed to communicate field-device status to the security center. This is
done through devices called local processors. The following is descriptive of a
local processor's capabilities:
• A local processor may have very few device inputs, or it may have many
(depending on the manufacturer). Rather than having a fixed number
of inputs, many local processors are expandable. For example, a basic
local processor may be provided with eight device inputs with
additional blocks of eight inputs available by using plug-in modules.
• The local processor must provide line supervision for all
communication links to sensors, terminal devices, and so forth.
Usually, direct-current (DC) line supervision is supplied as the
standard with more secure techniques available as options. The data
communication links between the local processor and the central alarm
monitor must also be supervised.
• Local processors can also provide output signals that can be used for
such functions as activating sensor remote test features, light control,
or portal control or activating a deterrent (such as a loud horn).
• The local processor contains a microprocessor, solid-state memory, and
appropriate software. It has the capability to perform a number of
functions locally (such as access-/secu re-mode selection, alarm reset,
card or keypad electronic-entry control, portal control, and device
testing). If the communication link to the security center istemporarily
lost, local processors can continue to operate in a stand-alone mode,
storing data for transmission after the link is restored.
• The number of local processors required for a specific site depends on
the number of protected areas and their proximity to each other and
the number of sensors within a protected area. For example, a small
building may require one local processor, whereas a large building may
require one or more for each floor. An exterior I DS perimeter with two
or three different sensors may requi re one local processor for every two
perimeter zones. All local processors may be linked to the central
computer using one common DTM link, or the DTM may consist of
several links. The designer should note that the temporary loss of a
DTM link would render all local processors on that link inactive for the
duration of the loss.
Central Computer and Local-Processor Data Exchange
6-51. When the ESS is powered up or reset at the security center, the central
computer will download all necessary operational information over the DTM
to all local processors. After the download is complete, the central computer
will automatically begin polling the local processors for ESS device status. In
6-16 Electronic Security Systems
FM 3-19.30
addition to alarm status, tamper indications, and local -processor status, the
DTM may be required to convey security-center console-operator commands to
field devices. Examples include security-area access-/secure-mode changes
and initiation of the intrusion-sensor self test.
CCTV Interface
6-52. If a CCTV assessment system is deployed with the ESS, an interface
between the two is required. This interface allows CCTV system alarms (such
as loss of video) to be displayed by the ESS's alarm-annunciation system. The
interface also provides I DS alarm signals totheCCTV's video switcher so that
the correct CCTV camera will be displayed on the CCTV monitors to allow
real-time alarm assessment and video recording as required.
ESS SOFTWARE
6-53. The software provided with computer-based ESS alarm-annunciation
systems consists of three types— a standard operating system (such as the
Microsoft ©-disk operating system [MS-DOS]); vendor-developed application
programs; and user-filled, site-specific data structures.
• System software. The designer will ensure that system software
provided by the vendor conforms to accepted industry standards so
that standard, follow-on maintenance and service contracts can be
negotiated to maintain the central computer system.
• Application software. The vendor-developed application programs
are typically proprietary and include ESS monitoring, display, and
entry-control capabilities.
• User-filled data structures. These data structures are used to
populate the site-specific database. Specific electronic address
information, personnel access schedules, and normal duty hours are
typically included in the site-specific database. The information may
include preferred route descriptions for the response force, the phone
number of the person responsible for the alarmed area, and any
hazardous material that may be located in the alarmed area.
6-54. ESS software functions typically include the foil owing:
• Alarm monitoring and logging. The software should provide for
monitoring all sensors, local processors, and data communication links
and notifying the operator of an alarm condition. All alarm messages
should be printed on the alarm printer, archived, and displayed at the
console. As a minimum, printed alarm data should include the date
and time (to the nearest second) of the alarm and the location and type
of alarm.
• Aiarm display. The software should be structured to permit several
alarms to be annunciated simultaneously. A buffer or alarm queue
should be available to store additional alarms until they are
annunciated and, subsequently, acted upon and reset by the console
operator.
• Alarm priority. A minimum of five alarm-priority levels should be
available. Higher-priority alarms should always be displayed before
Electronic Security Systems 6-17
FM 3-19.30
lower-priority alarms. This feature permits an operator to respond
quickly to the more important alarms before those of lesser importance.
For example, the priority of alarm devices may be as follows:
■ Duress.
■ I ntrusi on detection.
■ Electronic-entry control.
■ Tamper.
■ CCTV alarms and equipment-malfunction alarms.
• Reports. The application software should provide for generating,
displaying, printing, and storing reports.
PASSWORDS
6-55. Software security will be provided by limiting access to personnel with
authorized passwords assigned by a system manager. A minimum of three
password levels shall be provided. Additional security can be provided by
programmed restrictions that limit the keyboard actions of logged-in
passwords to the user ranks of system managers, supervisors, and console
operators, as appropriate.
OPERATOR INTERFACE
6-56. The software should enable an operator with the proper password to
enter commands and to obtain displays of system information. As a minimum,
an operator should be able to perform the following functions through the
keyboard or the keypad:
• Log on by password to activate the keyboard.
• Logoff to deactivate the keyboard.
• Request display of all keyboard commands that are authorized for the
logged-in password.
• Request display of detailed instructions for any authorized keyboard
command.
• Acknowledge and clear alarm messages.
• Display the current status of any device in the system.
• Command a status change for any controlled device in the system.
• Command a mode change for any access/secure device i n the system.
• Command printouts of alarm summaries, status summaries, or system
activity on a designated printer.
• Add or delete ESS devices or modify parameters associated with a
device.
INTERIOR INTRUSION-DETECTION SENSORS
6-57. Interior intrusion-detection sensors are devices used to detect
unauthorized entry into specific areas or volumetric spaces within a building.
These sensors are usually not designed to be weatherproof or rugged enough
to survive an outdoor environment. Therefore, this type of sensor should not
be used outdoors unless descri bed by the manufacturer as suitable for outdoor
use.
6-18 Electronic Security Systems
FM 3-19.30
6-58. Interior intrusion-detection sensors generally perform one of three
detection functions— detection of an intruder penetrating the boundary of a
protected area, detection of intruder motion within a protected area, and
detection of an intruder touching or lifting an asset within a protected area.
Therefore, interior sensors are commonly classified as boundary-penetration
sensors, volumetric motion sensors, and point sensors. Although duress
switches are not intrusion-detection sensors, they are included in this
discussion because they are usually wired to the same equipment that
monitors the interior intrusion-detection sensors.
BOUNDARY-PENETRATION SENSORS
6-59. Boundary-penetration sensors are designed to detect penetration or
attempted penetration through perimeter barriers. These barriers include
walls, ceilings, duct openings, doors, and windows.
Structural-Vibration Sensors
6-60. Structural-vibration sensors detect low-frequency energy generated in
an attempted penetration of a physical barrier (such as a wall or a ceiling) by
hammering, drilling, cutting, detonating explosives, or employing other
forcible methods of entry. A piezoelectric transducer senses mechanical energy
and converts it into electrical signals proportional in magnitude to the
vibrations. To reduce false alarms from single accidental impacts on the
barrier, most vibration sensors use a signal processor that has an adjustable
pulse-counting accumulator in conjunction with a manual sensitivity
adjustment. The count circuit can beset to count a specific number of pulses of
specific magnitude within a predefined time interval before an alarm is
generated. However, the circuitry is usually designed to respond immediately
to large pulses, such as those caused by an explosion. The sensitivity
adjustment is used to compensate for the type of barrier and the distance
between transducers. Typically, several transducers can be connected together
and monitored by one signal processor. Figure 6-5, page 6-20, shows an
example of wall-mounted, structural-vibration sensors.
Glass-Breakage Sensors
6-61. Glass-breakage sensors detect the breaking of glass. The noise from
breaking glass consists of frequencies in both the audible and ultrasonic
range. Glass-breakage sensors use microphone transducers to detect the glass
breakage. The sensors are designed to respond to specific frequencies only,
thus minimizing such false alarms as may be caused by banging on the glass.
Passive Ultrasonic Sensors
6-62. Passive ultrasonic sensors detect acoustical energy in the ultrasonic
frequency range, typically between 20 and 30 kilohertz (kHz). They are used
to detect an attempted penetration through rigid barriers (such as metal or
masonry walls, ceilings, and floors). They also detect penetration through
windows and vents covered by metal grilles, shutters, or bars if these openings
are properly sealed against outside sounds.
Electronic Security Systems 6-19
FM 3-19.30
Figure 6-5. Wall-Mounted, Structural-Vibration Sensors
6-63. Detection Transducer. The detection transducer is a piezoelectric
crystal that produces electrical signals proportional to the magnitude of the
vibrations. A single transducer provides coverage of an area about 15 by 20
feet in a room with an 8- to 12-foot ceiling. A typical detection pattern is
shown in Figure 6-6. Ten or more transducers can be connected to a signal
processor. As with vibration sensors, the signal processor for a passive
ultrasonic sensor has manual sensitivity adjustment and an adjustable pulse-
counting accumulator.
6-64. Sensors. Passive ultrasonic sensors detect ultrasonic energy that
results from the breaking of glass, the snipping of bolt cutters on metal
barriers, the hissing of an acetylene torch, and the shattering of brittle
materials (such as concrete or cinderblock). However, the sensors will not
reliably detect drilling through most material nor attacks against soft
material such as wallboard. Their effective detect! on range depends largely on
the barrier material, the method of attempted penetration, and the sensitivity
adjustment of the sensor. Examples of maximum detection distances for a
typical sensor for different types of attempted penetration are shown in Table
6-4.
6-20 Electronic Security Systems
Figure 6-6. Typical Passive-Ultrasonic-Sensor Detection Pattern
Table 6-4. Detection Range for Passive Ultrasonic Sensors
Penetration
Distance (in Feet)
Cut 1 /4-inch-thick expanded metal with belt cutters
55
Cut 5/8-Inch reinfercing bar with belt cutters
45
Use acetylene cutting torch
39
Cut wood with circular saw
30
Cut 5/8-Inch reinforcing bar with hacksaw
19
Drill through brick
15
Drill through 1 /8-inch steel plate
6
Cut 1 /8-Inch steel plate with hacksaw
4
Drill through cinderblock
3
6-65. Balanced Magnetic Switches. Balanced magnetic switches (BMSs)
are typically used to detect the opening of a door. These sensors can also be
used on windows, hatches, gates, or other structural devices that can be
opened to gain entry. When using a BMS, mount the switch mechanism on the
Electronic Security Systems 6-21
FM 3-19.30
door frame and the actuating magnet on the door. Typically, the BMS has a
three- posit I on reed switch and an additional magnet (called the bias magnet)
located adjacent to the switch. When the door is closed, the reed switch is held
in the balanced or center position by interacting magnetic fields. If the door is
opened or an external magnet is brought near the sensor in an attempt to
defeat it, the switch becomes unbalanced and generates an alarm. A BMS
must be mounted so that the magnet receives maximum movement when the
door or window is opened. Figure 6-7 shows several configurations for
mounting BMSs.
Grid-Wire Sensors
6-66. The grid-wire sensor consists of a continuous electrical wire arranged in
a grid pattern. The wire maintains an electrical current. An alarm is
generated when the wire is broken. The sensor detects forced entry through
walls, floors, ceilings, doors, windows, and other barriers. An enamel-coated
number 24 or 26 American wire gauge (AWG) solid-copper wire typically
forms t
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